# Amicus Curiae Brief — Kungys v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 485 U.S. 759

## Text

“
_ ‘ .
efit X v.

(3) OCT 8 138
No. 86-228 lg

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

JUOZAS KUNGYS

Petitioner,
vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

BRIEF AND APPENDIX AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NESTOR L. OLESNYCKY
.955 Springfield Ave.
Maplewood, N.J. 07040
(201) 761-6480

Attorney for Amici Curiae
Ukrainian American Bar
Association, et, als.

THOR G. RAKOWSKY
Of Counsel

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR
HARD COPY AT THE TIME OF FILMING.
IF AND WHEN A BETTER COPY CAN BE
OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE WILL BE
ISSUED.

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. DID THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS MAKE IMPROPER DE NOVO FINDINGS
OF FACT AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH FIND-
INGS, CREATE A DILUTED “PROBABILITY”
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR “MATERIALITY”
UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT V
UNITED STATES. 364 US. 350 (1960)”

Il. ARE MISREPRESENTATIONS OF DATES
AND PLACES OF BIRTH ON PETITIONS FOR
VISAS AND FOR NATURALIZATION “MATERIAL”
UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT?

Appendix D — Displaced Persons in the United

“**
a

PAGE

Appendix E — DEP’T STATE BULL.., Vol. XV.
No. 386, Nov. 24, 1946, pp. 934-
ah 6 awe eu eee cs tsa

Appendix F — The Future of Displaced Persons
in Europe, Statement of Lt. Coll.
Jerry M. Sage. DEP’T STATE
BULL., Vol. XVII, No. 419,

July 13, 1947, pp. 86-88 ....... Sla
Appendix G — 22 C.F.R. 61.313. (i)(c)
CS 58a

Appendix H — DEPT STATE BULL. Vol. XVI,
No. 401, March 9, 1947, pp. 423-
DT ao 6 we eee cs cc ec 60a

Appendix | — UNRAA Order No. 52, Eligibility
For UN Assistance. June 24, 1946.

U.N.P.A.G.-4/4.2-82......... 75a
Appendix J — Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization......... 83a

iv

TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) .

Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490

Pr. ree ay hae Ue

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, et al.

SP es Ce CU a wobec ee bake 08

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118

CUED Bh ee pe oecaebeentasesecoeces

United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254

(N.D. Ill. 1984) aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.
SP ae er Ty Oe eee

United States v. Kowalchuk, 744 F.2d. 301
(3d.Cir. 1984, publication withdrawn) 773
F.2d 488 (3d.Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106

DESPUES & occ ce ewdseadce ces.

United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d. 516

eee eee eee ee

STATUTES:

@ Gees GD ED g wc cccccebeccecs

Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App.
(1952 G6.) 608.3951 G2 OBR. 2. cece cc cces

De DOs Sb ccecn ce eneeenes

OTHER:
Constitution of the International Refugee

Se dss PWh ab We a bodkesee ces <

Federal Register, December 24, 1946:

22 C.F.R. Sec.61.313.(a)(3) (Supp.1946).....
22 C.F.R. Sec.61.329 (Supp.1946) .........

PAGE

ll

10

PAGE
DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol. XVI. No.401,
se dk eh ee abd a oe Oe x
DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol. XVII. No.419,
nh 206 62 tee h dee to ¢ 606 « 7

Immigration and Naturalization Service
Monthly Review, Vol. III, No. 7 (January
hh oe b @ eae 666 & O64 OO bet ee ee 5

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, (November,

IE ee tee 5.6
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Monthly Review, Vol. V, No. 7 (January,
it. aGeud thee cee Oh eeapeess 6,7

Report of the Repatriation Poll of Displaced

Persons in UNRAA Assembly Centers in

Germany for the period 1-14 May, 1946:

Analysis of Negative votes, Attachment 8.
U.N.P.A.G.-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2 606 4
UNRAA Order No. 52, Eligibility for UN

Assistance, June 24, 1946. U.N.PAG-4/4.2-82. 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1986

JUOZAS KUNGYS,
y. Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

=

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
THE PETITION OF JUOZAS KUNGYS
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AMICI

The UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE, ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUN-
CIL, LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL,
AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION IN U.S.A.,
INC., AMERICANS FOR DUE PROCESS, BALTIC
AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, BYELORUSSIAN
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, UKRAINIAN AMERI-
CAN JUSTICE COMMITTEE, and THE COALITION
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY
are Organizations who represent or whose members include
naturalized United States citizens of Ukrainian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Estonian and Byelorussian descent. Many of
these persons are former refugees or displaced persons who
fled from their homelands before the advancing Soviet
armies towards the end of World War II, subsequently refus-
ing to return to their homelands after the War for fear of

———————

2

political persecution by the Soviets, and eventually
obtaining immigration visas from United States Consulates
in Germany and Austria for entry into this country.

Amici Curiae have obtained the written consents of
counsel for petitioner and for respondent and pray that a
writ of certiorari be granted to review the judgmeni of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kungys.
793 F.2d. $16(3d Cir. 1986).

This amicus brief contains a fuller argument on the
absence of any legal requirement that a refugee also had to
be a victim of Nazi persecution to be eligible for a non-
preference quota immigration visa, and on the incorrectness
of the Third Circuit's conclusion that misrepresentations as
to date and place of birth are now “material.” These issues
are critical to countless naturalized citizens who fled from
Soviet-occupied lands. The Third Circuit's conversion of
heretofore immaterial! misrepresentations of date and place
of birth on immigration papers under the first prong of
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350( 1960), into “mate-
rial” misrepresentations under the second prong of Chaunt
has resulted in a revision of history based on hypothesized
facts and jeopardizes the citizenship of those who cannot
establish that they were victims of Nazi persecution.

STATUTE

The federal statute involved in Section 340(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, (8
U.S.C” 1451(a)), which provides in pertinent part for revo-
cation of naturalized citizenship “procured by concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case
made de novo findings of fact that the holding of a German

——————

3

residency permit “without specia! restrictions” by a Lithua-
nian refugee who had fled from the advancing Soviet front
and who had obtained such permit from the German civil
authorities in the Third Reich shortly before the end of the
war, “tended” to show that he was not a victim of Nazi
persecution. Applying a “probability” test to the second
prong of Chaunt, the Third Circuit concluded he was thus
ineligible to receive a non-preference. quota immigration
visa, which the Court further found could have been issued
only to victims of Nazi persecution.

The Third Circuit ignored the finding of the District
Court which rejected as “in error” the testimony of Sey-
mour Maxwell Finger, a former career Foreign Service
Officer who had testifica that at the time petitioner applied
for his visa, only victims of Nazi persecution were issued
non-preference, quota immigration visas. Mr. Finger con-
tended that the Nazi persecutee requirement was contempo-
rary immigration policy embodied in a regulation or
regulations, but no such regulation was produced or proffer-
red by the government at trial. Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit, ignoring the holding of this Court just two months
earlier in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, et al, 106 S.
Ct. 1527(1986), that appellate courts are not to make de
novo findings of fact in cases tried without a jury in the
District Court, made its own finding of fact that such a
requirement did in fact exist.

Based upon that hypothesized disqualifying fact, the
Third Circuit concluded that misrepresentations or conceal-
ments by the defendant about his date and place of birth
became material under the second prong of Chaunt. The
significance to the Amici Curiae of the Third Circuit's fact
finding and holding lies in the creation of a novel judicial
test for proving “materiality”, whereby the mere status of

ee

4

not having been a victim of Nazi persecution can be con-
strued to mean that such refugee or displaced person ille-
gally procured his or her visa. and misrepresentations as to
date and place of birth are now deemed “material” pursuant
to a diluted probability standard of proof under the second
prong of Chaunt.

It is a historical fact that thousands of Eastern Europe-
ans. who cannot prove that they were victims of Nazi perse-
cution. fled the advancing Soviet armies before the end of
the Second World War. or refused to go back to their coun-
tries of birth or origin afterwards for fear of persecution by
the Soviets. (See Appendix A: Report of the Repatriatior
Poll of Displaced persons in UNRRA Assembly centers in
Germany for the period 1-14 May, 1946: Analysis of Nega-
tive votes. Attachment 8. U.N. PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2). It
stands to reason that left unchallenged, the Third Circuit's
decision will affect countless former refugees and displaced
persons who are now subject to denaturalization proceed-

ee
not also victims of Nazi persecution.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI:

A. NATURALIZED CITIZENSHIP WILL BE
UNDULY JEOPARDIZED BY A DILUTED
“PROBABILITY” STANDARD OF PROOF
FOR “MATERIALITY” UNDER THE
SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT, AS
DEMONSTRATED BY THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S REVISION OF HISTORY BASED
ON HYPOTHESIZED FACT FINDING.

The District Court had before it in evidence (Peti-

tioner’s App. E, 140a-141a Exh D-34) the actual non-pref-
erence quota immigration visa regulations in effect

5

immediately after World War II. as published in the Federal
Register on December 22, 1946. which provided in priority
category 3(i)(c) for the issuance of non-preference visas to
“Displaced persons covered by the President's Directive of
December 22. 1945.” 22 C.F.R. 61.313(a)(3). Those visa
regulations which, were the governing law, remained in
effect until the passage on June 25, 1948 of the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948. 50 U.S.C. App. (1952 ed.) Sec.1951 et
seq. There is nothing in the regulations or in the Directive of
President Truman included therein which interprets “dis-
placed persons” to be coterminous with “victims of Nazi
persecution.” (See Petitioner's Appendix F, Page 143a).
Further evidence contrary to the findings of the Third
Circuit is contained in articles published contemporane-
ously by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in its
“Month, Review™ by then INS Commissioner Ugo Carusi.
Commissioner Carusi was designated by President Truman
as Chairman of an interdepartmental committee to super-
vise the execution of the President's Directive of December
22, 1945 so that visas would be distributed fairly among
persons of all faiths, creeds and nationalities. He reported
that “the major group affected by President Truman's
Directive of December 22, 1945 are displaced persons and
refugees who are natives of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Balkans.” (See Appendix B: President Truman's Plan
for Refugees, Monthly Review, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (January
1946). pp. 254-255).

In March of 1946, Commissioner Carusi went to Ger-
many with the head of the Visa Division of the State Depart-
ment and other members of the interdepartmenta!
committee and concluded that it was immediately necessary
to establish categories to describe those persons who could
properly be classified as displaced persons. He then
described five categories of displaced persons which

i.

6

included “ .. . persons who feared to return to their
homes because of possible religious or political persecu-
tion.” (See Appendix C: Displaced Persons, Monthly
Review, Vol. IV, No. 5 (November 1946), p. 54.) Commis-
sioner Carusi further confirmed that “(t]he President had
requested that care be exercised to assure that no one group
would be favored over another nor discriminated against.”
Ibid. To have granted son-preference immigration visas
only w victims of Nazi persecution would actually have
been a violation of the law since the regulation was intended
to cover ali displaced persons. (See Petitioner's Appendix E
at p. 140a).

The actual number of “displaced persons” who were
admitted into the United States with quota visas under the
regulation contained in 22 C.F.R. 61.313 by November 30,
1947 was 26.801 from over 40 countries. (Appendix D:
Displaced persons in the United States, Table No. |,
Monthly Review, Vol. V, No. 7, (Jan. 1948) p.10*).

A Special Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs reported
that there were three principal groups of “ displaced per-
sons”:

“(1) the liberated forced-labe oe» » who were
brought into Germany from Pol», Yugoslavia
and the Ukraine; (2) the Baltic group, those who
fled from the Baltic States ahead of the armies in
1944 (the Balts include Latvians, Lithuanians,
and Estonians); and (3) the Jewish displaced per-
sons, most of whom come from the Eastern Euro-
pean countries.” /d at p. 103 and Displaced
Persons and the Internationa! Refugee Organiza-
tion: Report of a Special Subcommiittee on For-
eign Affairs, 80th Congress, First Session, p.2.
Washington 1947. (Appendix D, f.n.2, p. 103)

7

Despite this plethora of accessible historical! facts.
showing the wide scope of eligibility of displaced persons for
tions and the Truman Directive included therein, the Third
_ Circuit ignored the regulations and casually devoted a mere
footnote to its misreading of the President's Directive of
December 22, 1945 as speaking “only in general terms con-
cerning the need to resettle displaced persons and particu-
larly orphaned children.” (F.N.10, Petitioner's App. A.
33a). In fact the median age of the 28.789 displaced persons
admitted under the regulations was 31.9 years, with only
6.961 immigrants being under 2! years old. ‘Displaced Per-
sons in the United States, id. at p. 104).

Instead, the Third Circuit relied on the blatantly erro-
neous and totally unsubstantiated testimony of Seymour
Finger and came up with a revision of history. (See Appen-
dix E: Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XV; No. 386, Nov. 24,
1946 at pg. 935; see also Appendix F: Dept. of State Bulle-
tin Vol. XVII, No. 419, July 13, 1947 at pp. 86-88).

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals cites 22 C.F.R.
sec. 61.329 (supp. 1946), yet fails to cite 22 C.F.R.

sec. 61.313 (supp. 1946), (Appendix G), which is found in
the very same volume as 22 C.F.R. 61.329, and which places
in the first priority nonpreference class of quota immigrants
the following: “Displaced Persons covered by the President's
directive of Dec. 22, 1945 and his directive of Oct. 31,
1946." ibid. Such selective citation is not only legally unac-
ceptable, But also has resulted in a judicial ruling that
threatens the naturalized citizenship of thousands. An over-
view of President Truman's position as to displaced persons
can be found in Appendix H: Dep't State Bull. Vol. XVI No.
401, March 9, 1947, pp. 423-429.

A brief review of documentation relating to two United
Nations agencies created to dea! with refugee problems for

citizenship, or previous residence” during the time period
Sept. |, 1939 until the cessation of hostilities.

On July |, 1947, the Internationa! Refugee Organiza-
tion (IRO) rules and regulations superceded and replaced
the prior UNRRA rules. UNRRA and IRO were the two
United Nations-formed agencies dealing with refugees and
persons displaced by the Second World War. Under either
the UNRRA or IRO standards petit*oner was prima facie
eligible for assistance, as were thousands of Eastern Europe-
ans fleeing from and refusing to return to the Soviet-occu-
pied territories. It is critical to note that neither the
UNRRA nor IRO standards (nor, for that matter, the Dis-
placed Persons Act, supra, which relied upon the IRO Con-
stitution for its eligibility criteria) made Nazi persecution
the sole determinant of eligibility. As an example of those
stated to be prima facie eligible were residents of the Baltic
countries (other than German Balts) as well as residents of
Poland, the USSR. the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs.

Appendix J, the IRO Constitution, lists two eligible
classes of persons, refugees and displaced persons. Among
the classes of refugees, persecutees were only two of six
eligible categories, even under the most liberal reading of
the list. (Annex |, Part 1, Section A, 1-4.) Eligible refugees
were also defined in Section A, para. 2 as those who, other
than displaced persons, were outside their country and who,

os a a lm

as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the War
were unable or unwilling to return to their country. Nothing
is mentioned about persecution as a criterion of eligibility.

The conditions of IRO Eligibility are found in Sec-
tion C, and give a choice of repatriation or of going clse-
where if the refugee or displaced person had “valid
objections” to repatriation. These conditions clearly applied
to persons other than the victims of Nazi persecution.

Thus, there was no historical or regulatory basis for
Mr. Finger to have testified at trial that only Nazi per-

Sainy of cheusunte of Remora Gorepuans who exthfied the

is concurring
£40 US. 400 (1801) and bape for 0 chasthans
second prong of Chaunr.

:
2
4

10

B. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT
MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO DATES

AND PLACES OF BIRTH IN VISA AND

NATURALIZATION PETITIONS ARE
“MATERIAL” UNDER THE SECOND
PRONG OF CHAUNT IS INCONSISTENT
WITH PRIOR HOLDINGS, EVEN WITHIN
THE THIRD CIRCUIT, AND WITH PRIOR
ENFORCEMENT POLICY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

On the few occasions that courts have addressed even
peripherally the question of the materiality of incorrect
dates and places of birth in ummigration papers. the courts
have determined such misstatements to be immaterial.

In United States vs. Kowalchukh, 744 F.2d 30!
(3d Cur 1984) (pubhcanion withdrawn), even the dissenting
judge on the Third Circuit panel which had initially ruled in
favor of the defendant acknowledged that:

ws” musrepresentations having no bearing on
the sssues involved such as place of birth or per-
sona! data statements often made under duress to
avord repatriation, should not serve as a basis for
that Congress and the courts have chosen to
absolve”

Judge Rosenn’s dissent went on to cite this Court's
oprmon in Fedorenko vs United States. supra. and the legis-
latrwe history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 212(a PO), § USC 1182(a 19) (1982) as authority
for the ummatenality of incorrect dates and places of birth
on immigration papers.

a.

In United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp, 1254 (N.D.
Ill. 1984), aff'd 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986), the Govern-
ment sought to revoke the defendant's citizenship partly on
the grounds that he had provided a false birthdate and false
place of birth in his visa and naturalization papers. The trial
judge concluded that he“ . . . is persuaded that the false
information was wilfully represented by defendant. It is,
however, not material as that term has come to be defined.”
(600 F. Supp. at p. 1267). While the court went on to
acknowledge that the meaning of the Chaunt standards
remains unclear, and that the circuits are divided on this
issue, and further that the Seventh Circuit had yet to rule on
the issue, it left no doubt that, at least as far as the trial
court was concerned, false information as to date of birth
and place of birth is not material.

In a revealing footnote, the court wondered how denat-
uralization based upon the possibility that the disclosure of
non-disqualifying facts years earlier could conceivably have
led to the discovery of disqualifying facts squares with the
Supreme Court’s express recognition in Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) that denaturalization,
in which the government “seeks to turn the clock back” is
significantly different from the original naturalization.
(600 F. Supp. at p. 1265). As the Court in Schneiderman
concluded, citizenship once granted is a right which should
not be taken away without the clearest of justification and
proof. The trial court in Kairys recognized that a higher
burden of proof is required when the priceless status of
citizenship is being revoked and was properly concerned
that retroactive reliance upon previously non-material facts
in denaturalization proceedings so as to now make such
facts material might be contrary to the Schneiderman
requirement of a higher standard of proof.

12

Not only the courts, but also the Justice Department
has recognized that misstatements as to date and place of
birth are immaterial and should not be the basis for denatu-
ralization proceedings. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., (a former Direc-
tor of the Office of Special Investigations of the United
States Justice Department, a former attorney with the
Office of Solicitor General, and a former law clerk to a
Justice of the Supreme Court) recognized the reality that
numerous refugees from the Soviet front lacked authentic
proof of birth. or had misrepresented their dates and/or
places of birth. and publicly assured such persons that their
citizenship was not in jeopardy. In his speech to the Ukrain-
ian American Bar Association on October 30, 1982, in East
Hanover, N.J., Director Ryan promised:

“Many immigrants, otherwise innocent of wrong-
doing, gave false dates of birth or false places of
birth when they applied for a visa. Are they sub-
ject to prosecution? The answer is No.” (Address
of Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Director, Office of Special
Investigations, to Ukrainian American Bar Asso-
ciation, East Hanover, N.J., (October 30, 1982)).

Unfortunately, the Third Circuit has now provided an
unsound basis for denaturalizing citizens by retroactively
converting immaterial misrepresentations as to dates and
places of birth into “material” misrepresentations for those
who do not have the status of or cannot prove that they were
victims of Nazi persecution.

13
CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, it is imperative that
the Supreme Court reverse the Third Circuits’s holding
which implies that inability to establish that one was a
victim of Nazi persecution means that an individual had
illegally procured his citizenship, and clarify that misrepre-
sentations as to date and place of birth in immigration
papers are not “material” within the meaning and intent of
Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1451 (a).

Respectfully submitted,

NESTOR L. OLESNYCKY
Attorney for Amici Curiae
Ukrainian American Bar
Association, et als.

Date: October 7, 1986

APPENDIX A

REPORT OF THE REPATRIATION POLL
OF DISPLACED PERSONS
IN UNRRA ASSEMBLY CENTERS IN GERMANY
FOR THE PERIOD 1-14 MAY, 1946:
ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE VOTES,

ATTACHMENT 8 P.A.G. — 4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2
Why the Displaced Persons Refuse To Go Home

GERMANY
MAY 1946

ATTACHMENT 8

The following analysis of reasons why approximately
82% of the displaced persons voted not to return home is
based solely on their own statements and on summary anal-
yses prepared by the town directors. who, through daily
contact with the DPs are best fitted to analyse their present
position with regard to repatriation.' Observations con-
tained herein should in no way be construed as representing
the views of the UNRRA staff in Germany. They are the
views of the private individuals in the centers, and are

' After following a policy of encouraging outright repatriation of “for-
mer Soviet nationals” and others whose homelands came under Soviet
control after 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration (UNRAA) found that about one million displaced persons (DPs)
under its care refused to be repatriated. Approximately fifty-two nationali-
ues were among these DPs, and they were dispersed among 920 camps in
Germany, Austria, and Italy. Not fully understanding their reluctance,
UNRRA officials in the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany decided to con-
duct a secret poll among the DPs, during 1-14 May 1946. Each DP was
handed a sheet and asked to answer the following questions: (|) what
nationality do you claim”; (2) do you wish to be repatriated now”? (yes/no);
(3) if your answer to 2 is “no,” explain your reasons in the space below.

tetera erential

2a

included for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive pic-
ture of the group motives, personal motives and repatriation
desires of the displaced persons. _

Due to the tremendous number of ballots received and
the variety of replies in a multitude of languages, it has been
impossible to make an accurate numerical calculation of the
different reasons. The percentages quoted in this report are
therefore based on the most reliable estimates available.

It is interesting to note that nationals of so-called West-
ern countries give both personal and economic reasons for
not going home now, while the Eastern Europeans generally
fall back on political factors as their primary explanation.
The Eastern Europeans seem to show a real fear in their
replies, the fear increasing the further east the home of the
voter. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that, among
many of these people, the political explanation serves merely
as a convenient justification and cover for underlying
motives which are essentially personal and economic. Camp
directors throughout Germany point to a genera! impression
of demoralization and inertia among the Poles particularly,
a reluctance to leave a comparatively secure and comforta-
ble existence for a life of toil and hardship in their war-torn
country.

Annex “A” contains some typical replies from the prin-
cipal nationalities.

No exact figures on the total number of respondents were given by
UNRRA, but the poll gave U NRRA and the US. military authorities their
first comprehensive understanding of the difficulties involved in repatria-
tion. Although some facts and analyses in the report are inaccurate and
muisieading. the document does shed light on why DPs did not want to return
home after the war. (Ed)

3a

Estonians, Latvians. and Lithuanians

The displaced persons from the Baltic countries of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania submitted an almost unani-
mous vote against repatriation. They can be considered as a
single group, since their backgrounds are similar and all of
their replies express the same unwavering determination not
to return to their homelands as long as they are occupied by
the Russians.

2.

The principal groups among the Balts come from the
so-called “middie” and “upper-middie™ classes. Many are
well educated and enjoyed the prosperous, independent life

: of the average intellectual. professional or businessman
before the war. Others were independent farmers. small
artisans or craftsmen. They started coming into Germany in
large numbers in 1941-42, when the Germans first occupied
the Baltic lands. It is difficult to determine how many of
them came voluntarily, seeking better jobs. and how many

? Granted sovereignty in 1919, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia. and
Lithuania were included in a plan secretly arranged by Nazi Germany and
the USSR for dividing these states into spheres of inflvence. In the secret
protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939, Finland, Estonia. and
Latvia were ceded to the Soviets. By the Nazi-Soviet frendship treaty.
28 September | 939, Lithuania was similarily brought under Sovnet domina-
uuon. Profiting from the German advance of May-June !|940 on the Western
border strip reserved for Germany by the friendship treaty. On |S June
1940 Soviet forces entered Lithuania, and two days later they were in Latvia
and Estoma In August |940 the USSR officially incorporated these states
unto the USSR as the fourteenth, fifteenth. and sixteenth Sovnet republics.

After the German invasion of the USSR. the three countries, together
with part of Belorussia, constituted the Reichskommissariat Ostiand. under
the direction of Geuleiter Heinnch Lohse, and were deprived of their auton-
omy With the end of the war, attempts to reconstitute independent govern-
ments failed and the Red Army restored the politica! situation of 1940 By
1946 there were an estimated 190,400 Balts under UNRRA care. (Ed)

»———————

da

were actually deported to Germany. It is significant. how-
ever. that very few of this group were persecuted by the
Nazis. and that practically none of them have returned
home. The bulk of the “displaced” Balts, however. appear
definitely to have entered Germany in late 1944, fleeing, not
from the enemy. but from the Russians.

Their primary objection to repatriation is based on
political reasons. Approximately 90-95% of them express an
Outspoken antagonism toward “Communism as a was of
life” and especially toward “the Russian occupation of their
countries.” (It is interesting to note that some of the answers
were anti-communistic as opposed to anti-Russian. but the
majority made no distinction between the two.) Most of
their reasons are not a mere parrot-like repetition of politi-
cal propaganda which characterizes the Polish vote. but
arguments apparently based on personal experience during
the Russian occupation of 1940/1 when relatives and
friends were “transported to Siberia in sealed cars without
food or water, never to be heard of again.” They express the
fear that the same may happen to them if they return. Some
refer to the time the Communist party was voted into power
in a “free election,” held after all the parties but one were
dissolved, in which everyone was forced to vote.

Th actual replies on the ballots vary from a guarded
“our cowntry is occupied” to ferocious denunciations of
“Russian dictatorship.” Such words as “sadism,” “reign of
terror,” “bestial,” “murderous” etc. appear frequently in
the descriptions of Communism. A few quoted Molotov's
Statement made in | 940 to the effect that the Baltic nations
must be destroyed. About 30-40% of the Baltic DPs state
that they have lost relatives or friends, either killed or
deported by the Russians. There is no way of telling whether
or not this figure is accurate, but their reasons for not desir-
ing repatriation seem to be motivated by a real fear of

Sa

personal persecution. deportation or even death at the hands
of the Russian secret police.

Closely linked with the political reasons for not desiring
repatriation are the economic ones. These were mentioned

by approximately 60% of the Balts, usually as a secondary
_— in connection with the communistic regime. Only
about 10% based their primary reason for not returning on
economic factors. A large number of these DPs were accus-
tomed to a fairly high standard of living before the war.
“The confiscation of all private property” has reduced many
formerly well-to-do Balts to a position where they could not
hope to return to their previous way of life. A number of the
Baltic farmers. particularly Lithuanians, claim to have had
their land taken away from thern during the Russian occu-
pation and were forced to join “Kolchozes™ !kolkhozy) or
farming communities. They now refuse to return. The
uncertainty of being able to buy food at normal prices. the
shortage of houses, the prospect of unemployment and the
unfavorable currency exchange. all vital problems to the
Poles, seem to be relatively insignificant factors contributing
to the anti-repatriation desires of the Balts, who for the most
——_.°-TSE
think about these problems.

peclinnstetidieerteriememneten Gites
of religious persecution is also mentioned as a secondary
reason for not wanting to go home. Some mention the days
in 1940/1 when they “weren't allowed to go to church”;
some fear reprisals for their former membership in religious
organizations, while others merely state that “in my country
today religion is suppressed and the institution of marriage
does not exist.”

The majority of the Balts sincerely want to return,
provided they can return to a “free, democratic country.”
Some of them are optimistic enough to state that they

6a

“expect” to go home as soon as a democratic government is
established. A group of Latvians and Lithuanians in one
camp have reluctantly accepted the present situation in
their former countries as final and are hoping to immigrate
to either the U.S., Canada or Africa. However, the majority
of Balts seem to be waiting in Germany for the “occupa-
tion” of their countries to end, for there is very little mention
of resettlement as a solution to the Baltic “hard-core” prob-
lem. ’

Poles’

With very few exceptions, the Poles in the U.S. and
British Zones gave political reasons for their negative votes
in the repatriation poll. The three basic complaints,
repeated again and again. were the “presence of Russians in
Poland,” “the Communistic Warsaw government,” and “the
lack of personal freedom in Poland.” Although mst of the
Poles claimed the same reasons for not wanting to go home,
it is Clear from the comments on their ballots that they did

' These were persons considered to be non-repatriable. either because
they were unacceptable to their country of origin or were unwilling to be
repatriated. (Ed)

* On | September | 939 Poland was invaded by Germany and on |? Sep-
tember by the Soviet Lmon Polish army units were soon forced to surrender
to the Germans or the Red Army According to the 28 September | 939
agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov Poland was divided along the

rivers, that 6, approximately along the Curzon Line (see
note 7) In the German sphere. some territories were incorporated directly
into the Reich. and the centra! part of the country was organized under the
Genera) Government of Occupied Poland
On 7 May 1945, the day the Germans capitulated, Poland was split
between a Polish government recognized by the Western Allies and a Polish
Commuttee of Nationa! Liberation recognized by the USSR A solution of
sorts was worked out with the creation of the Provisional Government of
Nationa! Unity in Moscow in June 1945 On 5 July 1945 the major Western
SS ee eae
exile. (Bd)

7a

not all have the same motivation for their answers. In gen-
eral, the Poles who quoted politica! reasons can be broken
down into three groups.

The first and smallest of these groups is made up of
those so-called leaders and intellectuals who have an ideo-
logical conception of Poland as a “free democracy” and
refuse to return under present conditions. They claim to
abhor the thought of “Communism” in Poland, the “Rus-
sian-dominated Warsaw government,” the “occupation by
Russian troops,” the alleged repression of democratic free-
dom, and feel that they can do more for their fatherland by
not returning now. A few described the conditions under
which they would return: “When the Atlantic Charter is
applied; “When the Russians leave;” “When General
Anders returns,"* “When Democracy has been established

* The Atiantic Charter was a statemeni of fundamenta! principles for the
postwar world order, issued jointly by Roosevelt and Churchill after meet.
ings during 912 August 194) in Argenta Bay, Newfoundland The main

July 1941 He then formed an army of 75,000 citizens of Poland (inchuding
non-Poles) who fought on the British side in the Near East and participated
in the capture of Monte Cassino in May 1944 and of Bologna in April | 945

important role in the Polish answers as it does in those of the
Baits, the Russians and the Polish-Ukrainians.

The second group consists of people who have private
political reasons for fearing repatriation. The largest

back to Poland they would probably be sent to the newly
annexed western provinces which are now being settled by
the Poles.* This cannot properly be called repatriation, bu:

’ The Curzon Line refers to & proposal to settle the disputed frontier
between Poland and Russia, put to the Poles by Lioyd George, the British
Prome Minister, on 10 July 1920, and then dealt with by Lord George N
Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary. The line or demarcation stretched
from Grodno, through Brest-Litovsk and Praemyil, to the Carpathians. it
would have excluded from Poland the lands inhabited predominantly by
sad echenqueny smears rote oe ne Oo pp
and secured twee as a
Gewge Arte Nast Pare Ih Coe te
variations) Became the boundary between the German and Soviet spheres of
occupation. In 1945 i was accepted by the Polish Government as the
frontier wth the USSR. (Ba)

* At the Potsdam conference of I' July-2 August 1945, the Allies agreed
that Poland would occupy the German areas east of « line following the
Oder and Neinse rivers, from the Baltic Sea to the Ceschoslowsh frontier

sastern territories of interwar Poland were taken by the USSR. and
about |.4 million Poles left this territory in 1946-7 to settle in regions taken
from the Reich (Ba)

9a

rather “pioneering” in an unfamiliar land. far from frends
and relatives. Most of the DPs now being maintained in
camps in Germany seem to lack a pioneering spirit to set
forth and build a new home and a new life in an area where
conditions are reported to be difficult

The third and by far the largest group of the so-called
political refugees (estimated roughly at about 60% of the

camps, and are centered around the camp leaders. who were
elected by a free vote, the members of the Polish guard units

10a

and the Catholic clergy * These political and clerical leaders
have been successful in persuading a large number of Poles
that it ts agaist their mmterests to return home until their
country is “freed from the Russians.” The Polish-Ukraini-
ans who are unanimously opposed to repatriation have also
had an effect on the other Poles. as well as the demoralized
group who have lost all ambition and are content to stay in
the camps. leading a comparatively comfortable life, until
forced to make a decision. Three other factors which have
recent, had an unfavorable effect on the Poles’ desire to be
repatriated are Hoover's speech describing starvation in
Poland. Churchill's “iron curtain™ speech and the dissension
at the foreign ministers’ conference at Paris."

Over half of the Poles quoted economic factors as a
secondary reason for not wanting to go home. These factors
are probably more basic than the political ones in determin-
ing repatriation desires of the Polish DPs. The Poles in
Germany are not entrely cut off from their homeland. They

* The term Potsh guard emts refers to duptaced persoms recremed to
guard Amercan supp) depots and other instailanens (Ed)

On © Fedruary 1946 Stale gave a speech @ eheck be argued that,
despete (be end of Dostiltees there eas to be comtumeed wugilance; there was
to be no peace at home or abroad Churchell deliwered the Western reply at
Femon Musoer on § March | 46 He argued for chose co-operation among
ibe wortd » Engiad-epeaking peopies. because “from Stettin in the Baltic to
Troeste the Adretc. an wor curtan has descended across the continent,”
allowmg “police gorerements” wo rele Eastern Europe. The month of
Marcd | 846 @ seen by many hestorans as the beginning of the Cold War.

A’ the Pare conference of Albed foreign ministers in May 1946, the
USSR ecowsed tbe L meeed Kongo of imperialism for its suppression of the
(oreek redelbor and crmenzed the Netherlands for its repressive actions in
ledomesa The Bros foregn minister, Ernest Bevin, responded by accus-

ong the Sewer Lesoe of emperialism. These disputes prevented any agree-
ment from beemg reached at the conference. (Ed.)

maintain contact through newspapers, letters, radio broad-
casts and friends who have returned to Germany after hav-
ing been repatriated. From these sources they receive a
description of destruction in the towns and cities, shortages
of food, clothes and housing, unemployment and the genera!
economic insecurity of life in present-day Poland.

These Poles who believe they have lost al! of their
former possessions naturally hesitate to return to their war-
torn country where they fear they cannot earn a living.
Their feeling of economic insecurity is expressed in the fol-
lowing typical comment by a Polish farmer: “At my house
now, no horse, no cow, no pig — only a picture of Stalin on
the wall.” The desire to remain in their present condition of
comparative security is quite natural on the part of these
people, who were suddenly taken from a state of slavery and
placed into an artificial society where they are cared for
without having to work. Many of them who could not main-
tain the same standards of living at home will continue to
live in the assembly centers as long as they exist.

Many of the Poles have not been content to live idly,
however, but have found some measure of real economic
security in the form of employment. This is particularly true
in the French Zone where a large number of DPs live and
work in the German communities. The fact that a large
percentage of Polish DPs are employed in the local economy
in the French Zone is reflected in the ballot, for only 64%
gave political reasons, the rest economic or persona! reasons
for wanting to stay in Germany.

Very few of the Poles gave only personal! reasons tor »ot
wanting to go home. Among those who did are the peupic
who have lost their homes, their families and their friends as
a result of the war and have nothing to which to return. They
don’t appear to have the courage to face the future alone in a
destroyed country, and many of them want to start life anew

l2a

in a western land, preferably the U.S. or Canada. They are
waiting hopefully for a declaration of emigration opportuni-
ties by the governments of these countries. Another group of
DPs have family ties which are holding them here. They are
engaged or married to Germans, to DPs of another national-
ity or to members of the Polish Guard Units stationed in
Germany and are unwilling to break up their families to
return home. Others can’t be repatriated now for health
reasons. Either they are old or sick or are staying with sick
relatives, until they can be moved. Some mothers don’t want
to expose their infants and small children to the uncertain
conditions in Poland, but prefer to remain in Germany until
after the harvest. Others will return when their personal
affairs are settled. Included in this group are those awaiting
news from home or abroad before they set out to join rela-
tives, and some who are still trying to locate lost members of
their families who were deported to Germany during the
war.

A very small number of Poles, chiefly the elderly people
from the eastern provinces, gave fear of religious persecu-
tion as their main reason for not going home. This factor
was mentioned, however, on a number of ballots in connec-
tion with political reasons.

Polish-Ukrainians

Despite repeated instructions from UNRRA directors,
this group insists on describing itself as “Polish-Ukrainian”™
or “Ukrainian Stateless”.'' The constant dissemination of

'' At the end of the war, approximately 2.5-3 million Ukrainians were in
the Third Reich. Some were prisoners of war who had served in the Polish or
Red Army; most had been forced labourers in Germany. A smaller number
were politica! refugees and concentration camp survivors. An estimated two
million Ukrainians found themse!ves in the occupied zones under Supreme
Headquarters, Allied European Forces (SHAEF) in Austria. Germany, and

Ce

l3a

nationalistic propaganda has compleiely alienated them
from the idea of adherence to either Poland or Russia, and
thereby has eliminated all chance for a voluntary repatria-
tion of Ukrainian peoples. Like the Poles, they give mainly
political reasons for not wanting to return home but they are
generally more violent in their attacks on Russia, and
express fear of forced labor conditions, even “deportation to
Siberia,” should they dare to return. Some give supposed
first hand accounts of previous persecution, such as “I don’t
wish to be repatriated to the Ukraine because my father was
killed by the communists for his political and reiigious ideas
and I was sent to Siberia, and had to stay for five years in a
concentration camp.” About 10% of the Ukrainians

Italy. After voluntary and forcible repatriation about 250,000 remained and
they refused to be repatriated. About one-third were former citizens of the
Soviet Union before 1939; the remaining two-thirds were from other coun-
tries, primarily from Poland.

Official UNRRA and other statistical information on the exact
number of Ukrainians is, however, not entirely reliable for several! reasons.
The Allies used citizenship rather than ethnic origin to classify DPs, but
because Ukrainian DPs came from the prewar territories of Poland, Czech-
osiovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union their citizenship varied accord-
ingly. Also, the fear of repatriation was so great that many, especially those
from Soviet Ukraine, did not reveal their true nationality. In time, a change
in designation by officials was precipitated by the Polish government
because it insisted that Ukrainians from Poland be separated from “true”
Poles, arguing that Poland did not want Ukrainians back since their former
lands had been ceded to the USSR. Furthermore, they were to be repatri-
ated to the USSR. On 6 July 1946 Poland and the USSR concluded an
agreement to exchange Ukrainians in Poland for Poles in the USSR. More-
over, UNRRA and other authorities were not consistent in their use of the
term “Ukrainian.” Officially, Ukrainians were not designated by UNRRA
as @ separate nationality until the summer of 1947; however, even before
then, local UNRRA officials sometimes did allow refugees to designate
themselves as Ukrainians. For these reasons, official UNRRA statistics
underestimate the number of Ukrainians (100,000) and Soviet citizens
(10,000) while overestimating the number of Poles (275,000). (Ed.)

l4a

included in their reasons descriptions of the absence of polit-
ical, cultural, religious and persona! freedom at home, while
others compared “Bolshevik totalitarianism” with Nazism.

They claim that their country is occupied and since
they do not wish to become citizens of the USSR, they have
in effect no fatherland to which to return. Some stated that
they want a free, autonomous Ukrainian state, even within
the boundaries of the new Poland. An important factor in
this separatist movement has been the activity of the Greek-
Orthodox clergy, who constantly use their strong influence
against repatriation. As a logical consequence of this cleri-
cal influence, and the fact that Ukrainians are predomi-
nantly orthodox [sic], they seem to be much more concerned
over the lack of religious freedom than do the Poles.

A few of the Ukrainian DPs lost large land holdings in
the collectivization of estates by the Soviet government, so
that they have a bitter personal enmity toward the new
economic system. Others merely stated their dislike for a
system where there is no private property.

Russians [Soviet Citizens]

The few Russians who are still left in Germany belong
in three distinct categories, two of them comprising political!
refugees who refuse to return to Soviet Russia. The first
group represents those Russians and Russian Ukrainians
who came to Germany during the war as volunteers, desert-
ers, forced laborers or POWs. They express a hatred for
Communism and the “dictatorship” in Russia and would
rather stay in Germany for the time being. Eventually they
hope to emigrate to one of the western countries, when
opportunities are available.

The second group is composed of White Russians and
other Russian emigrants from 1919-20, displaced persons

|Sa

left over from the last war, who never adopted a new citizen-
ship. A few of them hold Nansen passports, while others
claim that theirs were lost or taken away by the German
authorities.'? Their return to Russian is out of the question,
as the majority of the older men were active counter-revolu-
tionists, and fear reprisal by the Communists, and the
younger ones, thé Children who were born abroad, have
never lived in Russia and have no desire to go to the country
from which their parents are exiles.

The third group all gave personal reasons for not going
home, such as illness or marriage to Germans, Poles or other
DPs.

Yugoslavs
The Yugoslavs in UNRRA camps are mostly Royalists
and therefore opposed to repatriation for political reasons. '’

'2 In 1921 Pridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), Norwegian explorer and later
politician, became the first head of the League of Nation's High Commis-
sion in Connection with the Problem of Russian Refugees in Europe. After
World War |, an estimated 800,000 refugees from tsarist Russia were scat-
tered throughout Europe; most refused to return to Bolshevik-controlled
Russia. Mandated to dea! with this major problem, Nansen called a confer-
ence in Geneva at which sixteen nations were represented. An agreement
was reached to issue for Russian refugees a specia! travel document, to be
known as the “Nansen certificate” or “Nansen passport.” By 1928 fifty-one
governments had agreed to issue and recognize this passport for refugees
from Russia and elsewhere. The passport gave the holder League of Nations
Protection and guarantees that they would not be arbitrarily treated or
forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union. (Ed.)

') The Royalists were supporters of King Peter Il, who ascended the
Yugoslav throne in 1934. On 27 March 194! he assumed full royal powers
when a coup d'état in Belgrade overthrew the regency, but he had to flee on
6 April when the Germans attacked Yugoslavia. He established a govern-
ment-in-exile in London that supported the Serbian officer, Dragoljub
(Draza) Mihailovié and his Chetniks. King Peter made an accommodation
with the Communist partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito) in August 1944 but
was deposed in November 1945

16a

Like the Balts and Poles, they claim a passionate love for
democracy (which they interpret to be a restoration of the
monarchy). On the other hand they represent a different
problem from the Poles and Balts who are afraid to go
home, since the Yugoslavs are for the most part ex-POWs
who still consider themselves as part of King Peter's army.
They do not accept their present status as a lasting one but
are hoping for the chance to go home and fight Tito. In one
center in the U.S. Zone, for instance, the Yugoslav leader
began the poll with a spirited declaration that he and his
men were soldiers, wished to be soldiers and had no pian to
go anywhere, or do anything else. He then suggested that
UNRRA send them all home to fight the Tito government.

The following explanation from one of the ballots is
typical of the general feeling of the Yugoslav DPs. “We were
determined to fight against Hitler's Germany for high prin-
ciples of democracy and freedom. Now the war is over;
instead of democracy and freedom we have a dictatorship in
Yugoslavia. We expect nobody's charity or any reward.
What we expect and claim is the most elementary right to
choose our own form of government. This was proclaimed in
Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter.”

In 1946 there were about | $0,000 Yugoslav refugees, most of wh. m
were dispersed in UNRRA and military camps throughout Italy Among
them were monarchists, Sertian Chetniks, Croatian nationalists (Ustash:).
and former partisans united in their opposition to Tito's regime The Yugo
slav government was particularly adamant in demanding their forcible repa-
triation. (Ed.)

17a

Jews'*

The Jews in UNRRA centers in Germany expressed a
unanimous desire to immigrate, the majority of them either
to Palestine or to the U.S. By far the largest number of
Polish and Ukrainian Jews express a desire to go to Pales-
tine. This desire can easily be understood in the light of
strong nationalistic feelings among the eastern Jewry
persecution at the hands of the Nazis. not to mention some
of their own countrymen during the war. Tragic personal
histories on the ballots present vividly the reasons for not
returning. It is now impossible for the Jews from Eastern
Europe to return to their large Jewish communities for so
many of them have been wiped out, and tales of continued
anti-semitism drift in daily with new refugees coming out of
Poland, seeking refuge in UNRRA centers in Germany.
Aithough many would perhaps prefer to go to some western
country, the emigration quotas to these lands will be sa low
as to allow only a trickle of immigrants to enter. Palestine
appears to be the only solution to their problem. Hundreds
of ballots showed just one word as an explanation for not
returning home: “Palestine.”

The German Jews are also anxious to emigrate, most of
them to Palestine but a large number have relatives abroad
whom they wish to join in such countries as the U.S., Can-
ada, Great Britain, France, Sweden or South America. Like
the Polish and other Eastern European Jews these people
feel that they can't settle down again in the country which is
a constant reminder of their personal tragedies. Some even

In December 1945 UNRRA listed only 18.361 Jews as receiving
assistance in various zones in Germany. By June 1946 the number had
reached 97,333, and in June 1946, 167.531. The combined total of Jews
under UNRRA care in Italy, Germany, and Austria was close to 250,000 in
June 1947. (Bd)

18a

stated that they feared history would repeat itself in Europe
and that they or their children might have to go through the
same sort of persecution should they remain in Germany
now.

Czechs

Although there are only about 2,000 Czechs still in
Germany, a large percentage of them are staying for the -
same political reasons as the Poles, namely fear of Commu-
nism and the repression of personal freedom. Some fear a
war in the near future and state that Czechoslovakia is too
close to Russia for any measure of comfort, should a war
break out.

In some cases their homes were in that part of Slovakia
annexed to Russia, and they are afraid or unwilling to
become Soviet citizens.'*

On the whole the Czechs are not as violent as the Poles
in their criticism of their home government, or in their
refusal to return home. It is interesting to note that about
25% of them are holding up their decision pending the out-
come of the Czech national vote, whereas a much smaller
percentage are looking forward to emigration.

The reasons why the remaining Czechs don’t want to
return are personal. Some are sick, or are staying with sick
relatives, some are married to Polish DPs while others are
still searching for lost relatives in Germany. In addition,
there is a small number who are employed by UNRRA, or

'S Some of these Czechoslovak citizens were no doubt Ukrainians
(Lemkos) from the eastern provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia),
ceded to the USSR after the war. It was an area of about 8,800 square
kilometers with a population of approximately 850,000. Not wishing to take
part in the “voluntary” transfer to the USSR, these Ukrainians fled primar-
ily to the U.S. Zone. (Ed.)

as i ee ee ee ee

ae i ei a

19a

the Military and have the permission of their national liai-
son officers to remain temporarily in the DP centers.

Western Europeans, British, U.S..,
and Smaller Groups

The small number of these nationals are staying in
Germany solely for personal or economic reasons. Either
they are married to Germans or other DPs whom they are
not yet allowed to take home with them, or else they wish to
settle in Germany where they have economic interests. The
last reason is particularly true in the French Zone where
many of the DPs are living privately and can carry on a
fairly normal! life in the German community. A few individ-
uals are probably collaborators who are trying to hide in
Germany, while others have lived in Germany for some time
before the war, and do not wish to move. ‘As in the case of
the Czechs, many of the Western Europeans are working for
UNRRA or the military authorities with the permission of
their national liaison officers. These jobs offer more security
than they could find at home. Several Frenchmen, Italians
and Dutchmen say that they fear to return to the present
unstable economic conditions in their countries. They know
of the shortages of food, clothing and employment possibili-
ties and prefer to stay in Germany under comparatively
favorable conditions until the situation in their homelands
improves. In the British Zone there are small numbers of
Dutch bargees [bargemen] who will return as soon as the
canals and waterways are opened.

Some so-called Armenians (including “Turks” and
“Iranians”) fear religious persecution in their homelands.

20a

ANNEX A

TYPICAL NEGATIVE REPLIES ON THE BALLOTS
OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONALITY GROUPS

I. Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians

1. “Under the present circumstances I do not want to
return, for | know well enough who is ruling behind the ‘iron
curtain and what kind of life the people lead in this ‘most
liberal country’.”

2. “lam not a Communist.”

3. “I have already been a political deportee to Siberia
for four years.”

4. “I am a mother and | want to raise my child
myself.”

5. “My country has ceased to exist.”

6. “In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania there is no dem-
ocratic government.”

7. “I cannot return. My brother, sister, father and
mother were deported to Siberia because they did not go to
the poll to vote for the Communists.”

8: “Russia.”

9. “I have never been a Russian citizen and I am not
interested to serve in the Russian army. Further I don’t
recognize the one-party system.”

10. “Stalin.”

11. “In all countries occupied by the USSR people are
physically and morally suppressed.”

12. “My country is occupied by the Bolsheviks.”

met te

statin teat akan ta a

2la

13. “In 1940 my father was arrested and killed
because he was a Russian officer under the Czars. My
mother was sent to Russia, then | escaped.”

Il. Poles
1. “Poland is not free.”

2. “The Russians are dominating the Polish Govern-
ment.”

3. “Quoting Mr. Churchill's speech; an ‘iron curtain’
is hanging from Stettin to Trieste. Behind it an ignorant
slave state is hidden from the eyes of us all, etc.” — “I ama
Democrat, not a Communist.”

4. “Communist dictatorship. No freedom of personal
opinion. Russians annihilate everything that is not Russian
and communistic.”

5. “Stalin annihilates people as well as Hitler.”

6. “I don’t trust Stalin and his government in
Poland.”

7. “Uncertain situation in Poland. The presence of
the Soviet Army is dangerous to the freedom of my coun-
try.”

8. “I don’t agree with the policy of the Government
and the persecution of the church and the lack of private
property and freedom.”

9. “I am afraid of Stalin, | am afraid of Siberia.
Pciand is not free.”

10. “After the election of a democratic government, I
shall return home.”

11. “The Russians occupy that part of Poland where |
lived. My home and family are gone.”

22a .

12. “I can’t find my family.”

13. “I am ill and tired after the hard work in Ger-
many.”

14. “If 1 go back I am sure they will kill me or send me
to Siberia.”

15. “They sent part of my family to Siberia and confis-
cated our farm.”

16. “I have been persecuted by the Communists and
condemned for exile to Siberia. I don’t want to try to live
under the Communists again.”

17. “My husband is not going back home and so |
don’t want to go.”

18. “When I get a letter from my family saying that
they are alive, then I| shall return home.”

19. “Because there is starvation in my country.”

20. “My family is in America. | shall wait until I can
also go there.”

Ill. Polish-Ukrainians
1. “I don’t want to live under dictatorship and ter-

”

ror.

2. “I am against violations and terror in the USSR. |
am against men who persecute religion, who turn peasants
into slaves. | am against the one-party system.”

3. “Two of my brothers were killed. My parents died
in jail after being there a long time. My brother was sen-
tenced to forced labor.”

4. “My homeland is at present occupied by Soviet
Russia, which follows the policy of general terror against
those who are. opposed to the communistic system. They

23a

persecute religion (Greek-Orthodox): bishops and priests
are sent to Siberia. Catholic churches are closed. Because of
these reasons | will not return.”

5. “I don't agree with the totalitarian system in the
USSR. Galicia belongs now to the USSR. I never was,
neither am, nor wish to be a citizen of the USSR. Persecu-
tion of the Greek-Orthodox Church.”

IV. Russians [Soviet Citizens]

1. “I don’t agree with Stalin-terror and oppression of
people. The system has nothing to do with democracy.”

2. “Ihave been persecuted by the NKVD since 1929
Most of the time I have been obliged to live under a false
name.”

3. “Democracy in the Soviet Union exists oniy on
paper. There is only freedom to vote for the candidates of
the Communistic Party and for its resolutions.”

4. “The Soviet regime is not a Russian government.
The main idea of the Soviet government is a world revolu-
tion.”

5. “Communism is even worse than Nazism.”

6. “In the Soviet Union there is no free work nor any
private property. There is only forced, slave-like labor in the
kolchoz[sic] (Government farms) and in the factories or
businesses, all run by the Government.”

Vv. Jews

1. “Palestine is my Fatherland.”

2. “Poland is covered with Jewish blood; even now
the Poles are persecuting Jews. We can visit the cemeteries,
but we cannot live there. Therefore | want to immigrate to

-

24a
the L.S. to join my relatives in the best democracy in the
world.”
3. “I have nobody left at home.”
4. “My husband was murdered by the Germans. I

spent three years in the KZ (concentration camp). My rela-

tives are in foreign countries. They will take care of me.”

5. “All my relatives were killed in Auschwitz. I can’t
live among the murderers of my parents.”

6. “Because of anti-Semitism in Poland, and | have
no family left there.”

7. “Because the Poles and Ukrainians are killing
Jews.”

8. “I am the only survivor of a family of eight. I have
no relatives in Europe. | am miserable and want to join
relatives in America. I have an affidavit.”

VL. Western Europeans and
Smaller Groups
1. “At present there is no job, life is too expensive in
France and as I am alone, I have nothing to look forward to
at home.”

2. “I will not be sent back because I have no job and
no home.” (Dutch)

2. “I don’t want to go back to Greece, because I have
no job and there is a food shortage.”

4. “I am married to a Pole, but the Dutch Govern-
ment won't allow her to come home with me. I shall wait in
Germany.”

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York.
PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, “Council Resolution 92 etc.”

‘ial

ee eee

ots ite Lede ee

At hited wk

APPENDIX B

PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S PLAN FOR REFUGEES,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE MONTHLY
REVIEW (HEREINAFTER INS MONTHLY
REVIEW), VOL. III, NO. 7
(JAN. 1946. pp. 254-255)

On December 22, 1945 President Truman announced a
far-reaching program to facilitate the admission into the
United States, within the framework of existing immigra-
tion laws and regulations, of displaced persons and refugees
from Europe. The President’s plan encompasses two princi-
pal groups. The first of these is the group of refugees now in
the relocation camp at Oswego, N. Y. Almost 1,000 persons
were originally housed in this camp, after having been
brought to the United States on an emergency basis by order
of President Roosevelt. Some 900 refuges still at Oswego
may now become permanent residents of the United States
“through appropriate statutory and administrative
processes.” Officers of the Department of State and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service are presently
processing the cases of those of the internees who desire to
become permanent residents of the United States, and if
found eligible, they will be granted preexamination or other
appropriate relief to enable them to establish legal resi-
dence.

The major group affected by President Truman’s direc-
tive of December 22, 1945 are displaced persons and refu-
gees who are natives of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Balkans. The annual immigration quotas for these countries
total approximately 39,000. Statutory restrictions preclude
the allocation of more than 10 percent of the annual quota in
any single month. Consequently, no more than 3,900 visas

26a

may be issued in any one month to natives of the affected
countries. .

The President declared that “common decency and the
fundamental comradeship of all human beings require us to
do what lies within our power to see that our established
immigration quotas are used in order to reduce human suf-
fering.” Therefore he directed that the following procedure
be followed “to facilitate full immigration to the United
States under existing quota laws”:

“The Secretary of State is directed to establish
with the utmost dispatch consular facilities at or
near displaced person and refugee assembly center
areas in the American zones of occupation. It shall
be the responsibility of these consulars officers, in
conjunction with the immigrant inspectors, to
determine as quickly as possible the eligibility of
the applicants for visas and admission to the
United States.

For this purpose the Secretary will, if necessary,
divert the personnel and funds of his department
from other functions in order to insure the most
expeditious handling of this operation. In coopera-
tion with the Attorney General he shall appoint as
temporary vice counsuls, authorized to isst 2 visas,
such officers of the Immigration ard Naturaliza-
tion Service as can be made available for this pro-
gram.

Within the limits of administrative discretion,
the officers of the Department of Stote assigned to
this program shall make every effort to simplify
and to hasten the process of issuing visas. If neces-
sary, blocs of visa numbers may be assigned to
each of the emergency consular establishments.

a

oe =

2/a

Each such bloc may be used to meet the applica.
tions filed at the consular establishment to which
the bloc is assigned. It is not intended, however.
entirely to exclude the issuance of visas in other
parts of the world.

Visas should be distributed fairly among per-
sons of all faiths, creeds and nationalities. I desire
that special attention be devoted to orphaned chil-
dren to whom it is hoped the majority of visas will
be issued.

With respect to the requirement of law that
visas may not be issued to applicants likely to
become public charges after admission to the
United States, the Secretary of State shall cooper-
ate with the immigration and naturalization ser-
vice in perfecting appropriate arrangements with
welfare organizations in the United States which
may be prepared to guarantee financial support to
successful applicants. This may be accomplished
by corporate affidavit or by any means deemed
appropriate and practicable.

The Secretary of War, subject to limitation
imposed by the Congress on War Department
appropriations, will give such help as is practicable
in:

(A) Furnishing information to
appropriate consular officers and. immi-
grant inspectors to facilitate in the selec-
tion of applicants for visas; and

28a

(B) Assisting until other facilities
suffice in:

(1) Transporting immi-
grants to a European port;

(2) Feeding, housing and
providing medical care to such
immigrants until embarked;
and :

(C) Making available office facili-
ties, billets, messes and transportation
for Department of State, Department of
Justice and United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration personnel
connected with this work, where practi-
cable and requiring no out-of-pocket
expenditure by the War Department and
when other suitable facilities are not
available.

The Attorney General, through the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, will assign per-
sonnel on duty in the American zones of operation
to make the immigration inspections, to assist con-
sular officers of the Department of State in con-
neetion with the issuance of visas and to take the
necessary steps to settle the cases of those Allies
presently interned at Oswego through appropriate
Statutory and administrative processes.

The administration of the War Shipping
Administration will make the necessary arrange-
ments for water transportation from the port of
embarkation in Europe to the United States, sub-
ject to the provision that the movement of immi-
grants will in no way interfere with the scheduled

ee —

29a

return of service personnel and their spouses and
children from the European Theater.

The Surgeon Genera! of the Public Health Ser-
vice will assign to duty in the American zones of
occupation the necessary personnel to conduct the
mental and physical examinations of prospective
immigrants prescribed in the immigration laws.”

Ugo Carusi, Commissioner of Immigration and Natu-
ralization, was designated by the President to serve as
Chairman of an interdepartmental committee, which
includes representatives of the Department of State, War,
and Justice, the War Shipping Administration, and the Pub-
lic Health Service, to supervise the execution of President
Truman’s directive. Commissioner Carusi, accompanied by
Howard K. Travers, Chief of the Visa Division of the State
Department, and Dr. Ralph C. Williams, Assistant Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service, has left for Europe to
make arrangements for the speedy inauguration of the Pres-
ident’s program.

It is anticipated that officers of the State Departrnent,
the Public Health Service and the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service will be stationed in the American zone of
occupation in Germany, to which immigration activities
under the President’s directive will be confined for the time
being, in order to pass on the qualifications of prospective
immigrants before they embark for the United States.

30a
APPENDIX C

DISPLACED PERSONS, BY INS COMMISIONER
UGO CARUSI, INS
MONTHLY REVIEW, VOL. IV, NO. 5,
(NOV. 1946 @ PP. 54-56)

By Commissioner Carusi

The Monthly Review! has previously reported the plans
which were made by the President to give some measure of
relief to the displaced people in Europe. In March of this
year I went abroad with Mr. Travers? of the Visa Division of
the State Department, Dr. Dunnahoo of the United States
Public Health Service and Lieutenant Colonel Buster of the
War Department to implement those plans.

We established our headquarters in Frankfort, Ger-
many, which was also the headquarters for the European
Theater Operations. Our job was to discover who the dis-
placed persons were, how many of them there were, what
countries they represented, what quotas were available for
those nationalities or countries, what transportation facili-
ties there were and what consular offices would have to be
established in order to process the displaced persons with the
greatest possible speed and the least amount of confusion.

After we had consulted with UNRRA, the Army and
the interested voluntary relief agencies, consulates were
established by the State Department in Berlin, Hamburg,
Stuttgart, Frankfort, and Munich and the task of processing
cases among the displaced persons who wished to come to
America was begun.

' See “President Truman's Plan for Refugees”, Monthly Review, Vol III,
No. 7 (January 1946) pp. 254-255.

2 Presently American Consul-General in Vancouver, British Columbia.

3la

It was immediately necessary to establish categories to
describe those persons who could properly be classified as
displaced persons. It was impossible to define displaced per-
sons because of the danger of including known pro-Nazis
who were dispiaced but obviously not contemplated by the
President’s Directive. Roughly stated, we did include per-
sons who were brought into Germany against their will for
forced labor, those who were forced to evacuate their homes
for military reasons other than for service in the army,
persons who feared to return to their homes because of
possible religious or political persecution, those who had fied
from their homes because they feared concentration and
relatives of such persons whose exclusion might break up
family groups. December 22 was chosen as the dav prior to
which the determination of a displaced person's status was
to be made, this date being selected in order to avoid an
influx of people into the American Occupation Zone other
than those coming to join families already there.

A large percentage of displaced persons were not in
camps. Many lived in communities with the help and guid-
ance of UNRRA. The displaced persons’ camps are mainly
former military barracks or concentration camps and the
present occupants were there as inmates when they were
concentration camps.

The President had requested that care be exercised to
assure that no one group would be favored over another nor
discriminated against. The available quotas are roughly
39,000 per year, of which about 25,000 are German. In the
entire Zone there were roughly 500,000 displaced persons,
about 200,000 of whom were Poles. There were also large
numbers from the Baltic States.

The procedure established for processing those people .
interested in coming to this country is, in general, as follows.
Questionnaires are sent to the areas within the American

32a

Occupation Zone asking for the information necessary to
the issuance of a visa and, in addition, questions as to reli-
gion and the location of relatives. Medical examinations are
conducted in the camps. The questionnaires are screened by
the Army for security reasons and by American Consuls
against their records. Those who pass muster are brought to
an assembly center near a Consulate from where they can
visit the Consul for the purpose of making the regular appli-
cations for visas. The normal procedures then prevaii. Upon
issuance of visas to sufficiently large groups, the Army
arranges transportation to the port of embarkation which is
in Bremen and the steamship tickets are provided either by
the individuals themselves or by some persons or organiza-
tions acting in their behalf. Immigration inspections are
conducted in this country but the thorough screening in
Europe makes the possibility of rejection on this side very
remote. They are treated as displaced persons in the matter
of food and handling until they board ship after which they
become regular passenger immigrants.

UNRRA and the voluntary relief agencies assist in the
distribution and execution of questionnaires so that the
Consular Offices are able to handle the cases with the great-
est possible speed. For obvious reasons, many people are
without birth or baptismal certificates and the Consuls are
empowered to make allowances and use discretion in the
matter of accepting unsupported statements. Many of these
people have become suspicious of authority and have trained
themselves over a period of years to lie in self-preservation.
This suspicion is breaking down, as we have been able to
inspire confidence and demonstrate that we are a different
sort of keeper. This is a difficult and complex problem
because we want to be sure that those who come can readily
adjust themselves to our mode of living, be self-sustaining
and make contributions to our society and economy.

33a

Seven social welfare agencies have furnished the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service with corporate affida-
vits? as a guarantee that the displaced persons whom they
sponsor will not become public charges upon their arrival in
the United States. These organizations are the American
Christian Committee for Refugees, Inc., the Catholic Com-
mittee for Refugees, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant
Aid Society, the International Rescue and Relief Commit-
tee, Inc., the United Service for New Americans, the Vaad
Hatzala Emergency Committee and the United States
Committee for the Care of European Children, Inc. The
American Christian Committee for Refugees has signed a
corporate affidavit for 500 people and indicated that it will
increase that number as needed. Two hundred and sixty-
eight displaced persons have arrived under their sponsor-
ship. The Catholic Committee for Refugees has provided a
corporate affidavit for 200 Roman Catholic persons of
which 163 have been used. The Hebrew Sheltering and
Immigrant Aid Society has signed a corporate affidavit for
4,500 Jewish persons of whom 627 have arrived. The Vaad
Hatzala which is particularly interested in Orthodox
Rabbis, scholars and their children, has provided a corpo-
rate affidavit for 3,500 persons, will increase this number
whenever it becomes necessary and has sponsored the arri-
val of 2,228 individuals. The /nternational Rescue and
Relief Committee has provided a corporate affidavit for 500
people of which 119 have arrived. The United States Com-
mittee for the Care of European Children has signed a
corporate affidavit for 2,000 children, this being the only
organization authorized to sponsor unaccompanied children
of whom 296 have arrived under its sponsorship. In addition,
963 displaced persons have come to the United States under

3 See “Guarantees of Support of Refugee Children and Displaced Per-
sons”, Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 4 (October 1946) pp. 46-49.

34a

individual sponsorship. This brings the total to date to
4.664.

The first displaced persons arrived in the United States
aboard the SS Marine Flasher on May 20, 1946 and there
have been seven subsequent arrivals, all of which have been
at the port of New York. All of the ships are met by a
representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice and by representatives of the interested welfare agen-
cies, the latter for the purpose of directing the persons whom
they sponsor to their destinations.

Considering the limited personnel with which we have
to work, the restricted transportation facilities, the necessity
tor adhering to the quota immigration law and the fact that
the American Occupation Zone contains a relatively small
percentage of the displaced persons in Europe, I believe that
an excellent job is being done. However, it should be
remembered that the entire problem of displaced persons in
Europe amounts to some 2,000,000 individuals. Most of
them are former slave laborers, others are political or racial
refugees and all of them fear unsettled economic conditions
Or persecution in their homelands. They are spread over all
of the countries of central Europe and in addition,
uncounted thousands are to be found in Russia, Palestine
a i the Far East. Nearly a million displaced persons in
Germany, Austria and Italy are being fed by UNRRA or
the Allied armies. The most optimistic estimates indicate
that, at best, between 500,000 and 600,000 of these people
are likely to remain as a long-term problem for the United
Nations’ new International Refugee Organization.

Certain conclusions can be drawn from our experience
thus far in the program which we have operating. The
39,000 quota numbers available on an annual basis to our
present program can never be filled because of the large
number, 25,000, which must be charged to the German

35a

quota and the comparatively small number of Germans,
including the few surviving German Jews, who wish and can
qualify to come to the United States. Transportation facili-
ties will have to improve tremendously before any apprecia-
ble increase in immigration to the United States can be
expected and this statement applies particularly to those
individuals who might wish to come from Europe. And a
change in the present quota laws will have to be made before
they benefit any large number of displaced persons because
the largest groups of displaced persons have the smallest
quotas available to them. The extent to which the United
States may further obligate itself in the matter of displaced
persons is a question which will face the next Congress. We
are now demonstrating what can be done pursuant to
existing legislation. The extent to which the country will
take on further obligations by accepting and caring for
larger numbers of displaced persons depends entirely on
whether legislation to that effect will be forthcoming.

36a
APPENDIX D

DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
INS MONTHLY REVIEW, VOL. V. NO. 7,
(JAN. 1948 @ PP. 103-105)

It has been a little over two years since the President of
the United States on December 22, 1945, set forth a policy
regarding the admission of displaced persons. The directive'
of that date outlined a plan for admitting displaced persons
within the framework of the immigration laws. The tables
presented in this report bring to November 30, 1947, availa-
ble statistics concerning displaced persons admitted to the
United States by the officers of the Immigration and Natu-

ralization | Sgrvice.

In a recently published report of a Special Subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, it was stated that
“displaced persons constitute the remainder of the forced
laborers and concentration-camp victims of the Nazis, and
are those who fled before the occupation armies of a dicta-
torship to which they were violently opposed or who fled in
legitimate fear of political or religious persecution from
their homelands.”

The statistics appearing in this article were furnished by the Office of the
Assistant Commissioner for Research and Education, Immigration and
Naturalization Service.

' See “President Truman's Plan for Refugees,” Monthly Review, Vol. II!
No. 7 (January 1946), pp. 254-255. See also, “Displaced Persons” by Ugo
Carusi, Montly Reveiw, Vol. V1, No. 5 (November 1946), pp.54-56; “Dis-
placed Persons—Location and Activity in the United States” by Hugh
Carter, Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 11 (May 1947), pp. 138-144.

2? Displaced Persons and the International Refugee Organization.
Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
80th Congress, First Session, p. 2, Washington, 1947.

37a

The members of this Committee found in their visits to
approximately 150 displaced persons camps in the United
States, British, and French occupied zones of Germany.
Austria, and Italy, that there were three principal groups of
displaced persons: (1) the liberated forced-labor group who
were brought into Germany from Poland, Yugoslavia, and
the Ukraine: (2) the Baltic group, those who fled from the
Baltic States ahead of the armies in 1944 (the Balts include
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians); and (3) the Jewish
displaced persons, most of whom have come from the East-
ern European countries. There is an additional group of
displaced persons, the Volksdeutche. This group consists of
members of German-speaking minorities who had settled in
Southern and Eastern Europe. During the war and after.
these minorities moved or were expelled from their homes.
The bulk of the displaced persons in camps therefore was
born in Southeastern Europe.

Of the 28,789 displaced persons admitted to the United
States under the President's directive through Novem-
ber 30, 1947, 56 percent were born in Southern and Eastern
Europe, 43 percent in Northern and Western Europe, princi-
pally Germany, and one percent from all other countries.
(See Table 1.)

Ninety-three percent of those admitted came as quota
immigrants, and five percent as non-quota, chiefly wives of
citizens, while two percent were nonimmigrants who were
resident aliens returning to this country or students.

38a
TABLE NO. 1

Displaced Persons Admitted to the United States Under

The President's Directive of December 22, 1945,

By Class of Admission and Country of Birth:

December 22, 1945 to November 30, 1947*

|

Country or regioe of birth

—_ — — am on a-
SZirt i iBr rir ~~ 1s (iim Sirs pyyeeens

oo - - ~ <—
BH em a FB EMO Sh | HAr ane 88 am wows

‘
1.18)
107

16
11.509
=

gervs's ae" Saas a % sgsen omrse

cP
ga°ae Sgacver sagen" Rsageo "A RA RAZENeRm“oRTE

£8” '43* Rs ever agers gsage*g” ET a" ER LEASART"TRES
| ae.

Hs
ga”
i vadltanal 4 bullae ‘it i

*The firs: vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20. | 946

39a

The single country with the largest number of admis-
sions is Germany. When it is recalled that the annual quota
for Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans is approxi-
mately 39,000, of which almost 26,000 is for Germany and
13,000 for the remaining countries, it is easy to understand
that there are quota numbers available for persons born in
Germany, whereas other countries having proportionately
greater numbers of displaced persons have fewer quota
numbers available and therefore can have proportionately
fewer admissions to the United States.

The median age of displaced persons rose from 28.7
years in the six months July 1-December 31, 1946, to 33.9 in
the comparable period, July 1-November 30, 1947. The
increase in preference quota of parents being brought to the
United States by citizens is one reason for the increasing
average age. In contrast, during the fiscal year 1947 the
median age of all immigrants was 27.4. The low median age
for all immigrants is accounted for in large part by the
young war brides coming to the United States. For the
cumulative total of displaced persons, the median age is
31.9, as may be observed in Table 2.

The sex distribution for all immigrants in 1947 and for
all displaced persons admitted is shown below:

Displaced
Year ended December 22, 1945-
June 30, 1947 November 30, 1947*
Ce 2 ei ole. 6 ge 6 6 « 147,292 28,789
DPE EE CL Gl lis 5 6 6 6 6 « 53,769 14,359
ee es 6 kw 93,523 14,430
Males per 1.000 females .... 57.5 99.5

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946.

40a

TABLE NO. 2

Displaced Persons Admitted to the United States Under
The President’s Directive of December 22, 1945,
By Sex, Age, and Marital Status:
December 22, 1945 to November 30, 1947*

Age Group Total Male Female
Tota! ato Ve bs ek eS OP eee 28.789 14.359 14,430
a eee a es 2.521 1,244 1,297
13 to 20 vears . 4.440 2.396 2.044
21 to 30 years 6,967 3,390 3,557
TS. ls ns. 6 he wy ae Weim tere ae 5,390 3,050 2,340
ED ar bis 6 6 o ee & 00 ew 3,883 1,926 1,957
ff eae ee a6 a oon ee 2.552 1.214 1,338
i) ) ae vane ea 1.980 758 1.222
71 to 80 years ene Pe re eye th oe 969 369 600
&. years and over un ie Gil eee are ie hee eal 87 32 $5
ee eee ow ioe teens 31.9 31.6 32.3
Marital Status

RE I PE ee ee ae 28,789

a) Sd ot wn cdS6 oe SS eee 12,324

Dt » 6s 6.66046 deen keene 12,676

Dis ¢ «\¢ 6 66.564 ue 6) e464 ee 3,377

De.) 6 i 6 6 Sa be 64 8S eo 412

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946

The report of the Special Subcommittee has a table
showing the skills of displaced persons in camps in the
United States Zone of Germany in May 1947. The table
indicates that as many as a seventh of the persons were
professional and semi-professional workers, and more than
a fifth were craftsmen and skilled workers.

While not strictly comparable since the period is not
the same, the occupation distribution for all immigrants
admitted in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1947, and for the
displaced persons admitted between July 1 and Novem-
ber 30, 1947, is shown in Table 3.

4la

TABLE NO. 3

Major Occupation of Immigrants Admitted to the
United States, Year ended June 30, 1947,
And of Displaced Persons Admitted,

July 1-November 30, 1947

Displaced
Immigrants persons

admitted year admitted,
ended July 1, 1947 to
June 30, 1947 Nov. 30, 1947
Occupation No. Percent No. Percent
I tate a md de alah eee 6 4 147,292 100.0 8.3824 100.0

Professional and semi-professiona!

ii SS aie wiles 6:4 9-4 10,891 74 916 10.4
Farmers and farm managers... ... . 3,462 2.4 196 2.2
Proprietors, managers, officials, except

Dts ce ton Mas Ww. 88 « < a 5,886 4.0 587 6.7
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers .. . 13,961 9.5 719 8.1
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers 8,726 59 817 9.3
Operatives and kindred workers .... . 10,580 7.2 1,002 114
Domestic service workers ........ 4,922 3.3 87 1.0
Protective service workers ........ 292 2 22 2
Service workers, except domestic and

DT Eat eh 66 e-0 cee ces 3,590 2.4 212 2.4
Farm laborers and foremen ....... 442 3 30 3
Laborers, except farm .......... 2,831 1.9 62 7
SE 6 '@ WS ye 0 0-0 e686 81,709 $5.5 4,174 47.3

The Immigration and Naturalization Service cooper-
ates with a number of private agencies to facilitate the entry
into the United States of displaced persons. Toward that
end, the Service accepts applications from social agencies
that desire to execute affidavits guaranteeing that a specified
number of persons whom they wish to sponsor will not
become public charges. These affidavits are called corporate
affidavits. An agency desiring to participate in the program
is requested to furnish information concerning the financial
Status of the organization, the purpose for which it was
incorporated, and other material to show that the organiza-
tioni is able and willing to assume responsibility for the
number of persons specified. If the agency is approved, it

42a

may thereafter submit corporate affidavits to United States
consuls in connection with applications for immigration
visas by displaced persons.

Of the 28,789 displaced persons admitted to the United
States through November 30, 1947, 36 percent were spon-
sored by agencies, while 64 percent were sponsored by indi-
viduals, usually relatives or close friends of the immigrants.
(See Table 4.)

TABLE NO. 4

Agency Participation With Respect to Displaced
Persons Admitted to the United States Under
The President’s Directive of December 22, 1945:
December 22, 1945, to November 30, 1947*

Persons sponsored

Agency Number Percent
Sh aa tetas ha othe Sd i tie 6 “ere & oes 02% > + 3-04! ee 100
Church World Service. Inc. ........... | 97) 3
Catholic Committee for Refugees ........... 1,096 4
Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society... . . 1,823 6
International Rescue and Relief Committee .... . . 301 1
United States Service for New Americans ... . ... . $5,039 18
— U.S. Committee for Care of European Children... . 1,150 4
Vaad Hatzala Rehabilitation Committee... . .. . , 26
Individually sponsored ............... . 18,383 64

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946.

From time to time as the need arises, supplemental
affidavits to cover additional groups are received and consid-
ered for approval. When affidavits are approved, the Visa
Division of the Department of State is advised and that
division cables the information to the appropriate consuls of
this country, since the question of who are displaced persons
within the meaning of the President’s directive and who of
those are entitled to immigration visas for permanent resi-
dence in the United States are matters determined by the
Department of State through its consuls abroad.

43a

The first corporate affidavits were approved for dis-
placed persons located in the United States, British, and
French zones of Austria and Germany. In April 1947, cor-
porate affidavits were approved for displaced persons
located in Shanghai.

Persons sponsored by agencies are generally of the
same religious faiths as the social agencies sponsoring them.
That is, the Church World Service sponsors the Protestant
group: the Catholic Committee, the Catholic group: and
HIAS, USNA, and Vaad Hatala Emergency Committee,
the Jewish group. The International Rescue and Relief
Committee, the United States Committee for Care of Euro-
pean Children, and the American Federation of Interna-
tional Institutes are non-partisan organizations.

Pursuant to the requirements of the corporation affida-
vit, the agency submits a detailed report for each person
under its sponsorship within the time limit prescribed by the
corporate affidavit, giving the place of residence of the indi-
vidual, how he is being maintained, if employed, the weekly
wage earned, and whether the person has become a public
charge since entering into the United States. If the report
shows that the person is steadily employed, is self-support-
ing, has had no serious illness, and has not become a public
charge, no action is taken on the report and under the terms
of the corporate affidavit the agency is automatically
released from further responsibility sixty days from receipt
of the report by the Service.

44a

APPENDIX E

DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol XV. No. 386,
Nov. 24, 1946, pp. 934-938
U.S. POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US.
DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS!

To begin with. Mr. Chairman, I| should like to state
very briefly the position of the United States on this Interna-
tional Refugee Organization, which will care for and help to
rehabilitate nearly a million people from Europe and the
Far East. As long as they are refugees and displaced persons
they constitute a threat to peace and good relations among
governments.

The maintenance in camps of these persons leads to
deterioration among them as human beings and is an eco-
nomic waste for all the nations of the world. We, in the
United States, feel this most keenly, since from practically
all the countries where they come from we have received
citizens who have built up our nation. Therefore, the United
States supports the principles of the General Assembly reso-
lution of February 12, 1946 namely:

' (a) The problem is international in character.
(b) There shall be no compulsory repatriation.

(c) Action taken by IRO must not interfere with
existing international arrangements for apprehension
of war criminals, Quislings, and traitors. This is being

' Made by the US. representative, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, before Com-
mittee 3 of the General Assembly at Lake Success on Nov. 8 and released to
the press by the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations on the same date.

45a

done by military occupation forces and is not the
responsibility of this new organization.

As a consequence we support the draft constitution of
the IRO which reflects the foregoing principles.

The United States has supported the principles advo-
cated by my colleague from the U.S.S.R. which is proved by
the numbers of people that have been repatriated from the
United States zone. However, it would be foreign to our
conception of democracy to force repatriation on any human
being. Three and one-half million persons have been repatri-
ated from the United States zone, but our people will alwa~:
believe in the right of asylum and complete freedom of
choice.

The Pilgrims, the Huguenots, and the Germans of 1848
came to us in search of political and religious freedom and a
wider economic opportunity. They built the United States.

These people now in displaced-persons camps are kin to
those early settlers of ours, and many of them might have
relatives in the United States.

My Government urges the participation in the IRO as
members by all peace-loving nations. There is no question
but that this participation will entail financial sacrifices by
all participating governments. For a time it will be a heavy
burden, but in the long run it will be an economy and well
worth the cost.

The finances of our organization will be considered in
committee 5, where the financial burden will be allotted to
the participating governments, so that the cost will be equi-
tably shared by all, and each government will pay according
to the standards laid down by committee 5.

In the interest of brevity I shall comment at this time
only on some of the essential points in Mr. Vyshinsky’s

46a

speech of Wednesday, leaving other points for comment
when we discuss the draft constitution article by article.

First of all | should like to say that Mr. Vyshinsky’s
view that no assistance should be given to those who for
valid reasons decide not to return to their countries of origin
is inconsistent with the unanimous decision of the General
Assembly in the resolution on displaced persons of Febru-
ary 12, 1946. That clearly provides that these persons shall
become the concern of the International Refugee Organiza-
tion.

Mr. Vyshinsky says that this problem is very simple. It
can be solved by repatriating all the displaced persons. In
fact, those who do not wish to be repatriated must fall into
this category. I think this point of view fails to take into
consideration the facts of political change in countries of
origin which have created fears in the minds of the million
persons, who remain, of such a nature that they choose
miserable life in camps in preference to the risks of repatria-
tion.

Our colleague from Poland mentioned that since
arrangements had been made to give people food allowances
after their return home the numbers going home had
increased. I think he is quite right that the fear of an eco-
nomic situation has deterred a number of people from tak-
ing the risk of repatriation, but not all of them are actuated
by consideration of the economic situation in their country
of origin.

Seven million people have already been repatriated;
repatriation is still proceeding. One thousand Poles are leav-
ing the U.S. zones of Germany and Austria daily. The mili-
tary administration which accomplished this result can
hardly be held solely responsible for the failure of the last
million to return.

47a

It was a new point, I think, which Mr. Vyshinsky raised
when he presented his position that those who do not choose
to return to their countries of origin shall not be resettled,
shall receive no aid towards settling somewhere else. This
leaves them with the prospect of spending the rest of their
lives in assembly centers as long as the IRO supports them
or else of facing starvation. They obviously cannot be left in
assembly centers to their own devices. They would continue
as an irritant in good relations between friendly govern-
ments and contribute to delay in the restoration of peace and
order which is the concern of all governments. There is no
reason why they should become wanderers if instead they
can be given an opportunity for resettlement in some coun-
try which has a future to offer them.

By another provision of the General Assembly resolu-
tion of February 1946, which, I think, Mr. Vyshinsky must
have forgotten, no action taken shall be of such a character
as to interfere in any way with the surrender and punish-
ment of war criminals, Quislings, and traitors in conformity
with international arrangements or agreements. These
arrangements, however, are the responsibility of other gov-
ernment bodies, including the military authorities.

I can tell you very briefly how arrangements for the
apprehension of Quislings works out under the US. occupa-
tional authorities. U.S. officials are continuously engaged in
screening the refugee personnel to locate Quislings or those
who for other reasons are not entitled to be given asylum.
When special complaints are received from other govern-
ments they are made by the governments’ liaison officers
with the United States Forces, European Theater. USFET
thereupon makes an investigation through Army channels.
If the investigation appears to substantiate the complaint,
the case goes before a board of officers, which makes the

48a

final determination. This method of procedure has in gen-
eral been satisfactory; but it must be emphasized that this
committee here is not, and should not. be the forum for
debate as to its effectiveness. It is not our function here to
discuss the adequacy of these arrangements or the perform-
ance under them. We are concerned with final decisions on
the draft of the constitution of IRO. This draft clearly
excludes from the benefits of the organization war
criminals, Quislings, and traitors. We can hope that such
persons will be entirely eliminated by the time the IRO
begins to function.

Mr. Vyshinsky spoke of members of various military
groups. The military character of different groups and their
members, we think, has been greatly exaggerated. They are
the concern of the military authorities, however, and will be
handled by them. Those who fought with the Germans and
collaborated with them are clearly excluded from assistance
from the IRO in the constitution before us. I have asked that
the U.S. military authorities supply me with a report on
each of the incidents complained of by Mr. Vyshinsky where
the U.S. is concerned, and | shall report these findings in
writing to the committee. if it so desires, as soon as they are
available.

Now we come to the point which Mr. Vyshinsky made
that all propaganda should be suppressed in the camps. He
challenges us on the point that under the guise of freedom of
expression propaganda hostile to the countries of origin is
tolerated. On this point | am afraid we hold very different
ideas. But this does not preclude cooperation between us.
We, in the United States, tolerate opposition provided it
does not extend to the point of advocacy of the overthrow of
government by force. Unless the right of opposition is con-
ceded, it seems to me that there is very little possibility that
countries with differing conceptions of democracy can live

49a

together without friction in the same world. Much progress
has been made to date in dealing with this problem of propa-
ganda within the framework of these divergent views. With
patience and understanding we can achieve still further
progress in this direction.

Mr. Vyshinsky objects to the inclusion of certain cate-
gories of refugees and displaced persons.

One group consists of those who, as a result of events
subsequent to the outbreak of the second World War. are
unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of
the government of their countries of nationality or of former
nationality.

This paragraph covers those who for political reasons,
territorial changes, or changes of sovereignty are unable to
return to their country. That paragraph is in annex |, part |,
section A, paragraph 2. I regret that Mr. Vyshinsky cannot
confirm the agreement reached at the last sensation of the
Economic and Social Council on this point. We consider it
essential that the paragraph be retained. But since he asked
who these people are, I should like out of my own experience
to mention a few. I visited two camps near Frankfurt, where
the majority of people had come from Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. I have received innumerable petitions. My mail
today carried three from people in different countries, who,
because changes had come in the types of government in
their countries, felt that they did not wish to return. That
does not mean that they do not love their country; it simply
means that they prefer the country as it was before they left
it. That country they feel no longer belongs to them. I gather
that Mr. Vyshinsky felt that anyone who did not wish to
return under the present form of government must of neces-
sity be Fascist. I talked to a great many of these people who
do not strike me as Fascist, and the assumption that people
do not wish to return to the country of their origin because
those countries are now under what is called a democratic

50a

form of government does not seem to allow for certain dif-
ferences in the understanding of the word democracy. As
Mr. Vyshinsky uses it, it would seem that democracy is
synonymous with Soviet, or at least a fairly similar concep-
tion of political and economic questions. Under that formula
I am very sure that he would accept some of the other
nations in the world who consider themselves democracies
and who are as willing to die for their beliefs as are the
people of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Vyshinsky also objected to certain exceptions to
the general rule that those who had voluntarily assisted the
enemy are excluded from the concern of the IRO. The intent
of the exemptions is to cover those who were forced to
perform slave labor or who may have rendered humanitar-
ian assistance, such as assistance to wounded civilians. Mr.
Vyshinsky proposes to exclude all those who assisted in any
manner. Under such language those merely present in any
occupied area forced by necessity of survival to perform any
form of work or service within the German economy would
be considered to have assisted the enemy and would thus be
excluded. This would result in cruel hardship on many. We
can, however, discuss the point at greater length later.

I sincerely regret having to speak in opposition to some
of Mr. Vyshinsky’s views. But he will recall that in London
there were some things which because of the fundamental
beliefs I hold, I had to stand on. I felt strongly about them
then and I still do. This does not mean that Mr. Vyshinsky

- cannot hold to his basic beliefs as well and still achieve with

us a solution. This solution can be reached if we are both
willing in these fields to try for a spirit of cooperation and a
realistic approach to our problems. It is essential to the
peace of the world that we wipe out some of our resentments
as well as our fears. I hope that as time goes on our two great
nations may grow to understand each other and to accept
our different viewpoints on certain questions.

APPENDIX F

THE FUTURE OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN
EUROPE
DEP’T STATE BULL. VOL. XVIII, NO. 419,
JULY 13, 1947, PP. 86-88

STATEMENT BY LT. COL. JERRY M. SAGE’

On my return to Europe in 1946, I learned that of the
about 8,000,000 displaced persons that the German armies
had forced into Germany from other countries of Europe
which they had occupied, approximately 7,000,000 had
returned, with the aid of the Western Allied Armies, to the
areas in which they formerly lived. In the zones of the
Western Allies in Germany, Austria, and Italy, there were
at the first of this year slightly over a million displaced
persons in the hands of the Western Allied Armies. Between
80 and 90 percent of these had been forced into German
territory by the Nazi armies before the end of hostilities.
The balance were persecutees, for the most part the Jewish
people who fled into our zones in Austria and Germany,
almost entirely from Poland, in 1946. This movement was
Spey coomerates Uy Gis cameer of 40 Sous ot Kielce on
July 4, 1946.

At this point I should like to clarify a misapprehension
which has arisen in previous discussions of this bill. It has
been erroneously stated that 80 percent of the DP’s entered
the occupied zones after the end of hostilities. As I have
indicated above, the true situation is exactly the reverse. I do
not know how this misapprehension came about. It may

' Excerpts from statement made on July 2, 1947, before the House
Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, and released to the
press on the same date. Lieutenant Colonel Sage of the United States Army

is attached to Headquarters of European Command, Frankfurt, Germany.

S2a

possibly stem from the fact that millions of Germans and
persons of German ethnic origin (“Volksdeutsch™) have fled
or been transferred into the western zones of Germany from
eastern Germany or from eastern European countries where
they formerly resided. It is not with these people that we are
concerned as they are Germans and have become a part of
the German economy.

Of the million displaced persons remaining, Lithuani-
ans, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Jews, Yugoslavs, Ukraini-
ans, and stateless persons, of whom we are talking here now,
the United States has control of about 600,000 in Germany,
Austria, and Italy. Of this number I have been vitally con-
cerned with those residing in the U.S. zone of Germany, a
total of over 500,000. When I left Germany a month ago,
there were 354,000 of these displaced persons in assembly
centers in our zone and about | 50,000 living outside centers,
either in labor units working for the U.S. cedars
in the German economy.

The United States Army has been charged with the
responsibility for this group of half a million people. We
have endeavored, with the assistance of UNRRA workers,
to feed, clothe, and rehabilitate these people to the best of
our ability and resources.

But we are continually asked one question and it is one
we continually ask ourselves: “What is to become of these

people—the ones our Army took under its control and still
has under its control?”

The four alternative solutions presented by General
Hilldring are not new. They have been discusse?, consid-
ered, and elaborated on around our conference tables in
Germany for many months. But the United States Army in
Germany, although charged with the responsibility for dis-

53a

decision as to what we are to do with these people in the
future. That decision, we are fully aware, must be made by
the United States Government—by the Congress—the ulti-
mate governmental authority over them.

There are four possible alternatives:
1. Forcible repatriation.

2. Closing the camps and telling the displaced per-
sons to become Germans and fend for themselves as best
they can in Germany.

3. Continuing to maintain them separate from the
political and economic organization in Europe, indefinitely,
in the little communities which they form in the assembly
centers.

4. Endeavoring to secure their resettlement in coun-
tries where they can rebuild their lives and strike new roots.

All I am here for is to give you briefly such of my
observations of these people as you might feel to be useful to
you in reaching your decision as to which of these alterna-
tive courses is to be pursued.

I shall endeavor to answer any questions which occur to
you and to deve'»p more fully any aspect that you may
desire.

Repatriation

The alternative of repatriation must, at this point, be
definitely termed “forcible repatriation”. As has just been
pointed out, a tremendous job has been done in returning
7,000,000 persons to their homelands. Over the past two
years every opportunity has been afforded to those now
remaining in our zones to return. From my observation,

those whom we still have on our hands are essentially a hard
core of nonrepatriables who will not return to their place of

S4a

origin because the map of the area where they formerly lived
has been redrawn and a government alien to them is in
power. They fear a lack of political freedom and have a real
dread of persecution. I can certainly testify as to the pres-
ence of those fears. It is not unusual in the United States
zone of Germany, when a movement of displaced persons is
contemplated from one installation to another for better
accommodations or to meet a military exigency, that rumors
immediately begin to circulate about the camp, and the fear
is developed that transportation is coming to repatriate the
displaced persons against their will. On several occasions it
has been part of my job to visit such installations to quiet the
panic among the people by giving them the true facts about
the movement and reiterating that it has not been and is not
the policy of the United States Government to force dis-
placed persons to return to the area from which they came.
There are still a few people who are accepting our continu-
ing offer to aid those who are willing to go. They receive,
when they reach their destination, a two months’ ration to
insure their subsistence until they get their feet on the
ground and become reestablished. Those who have gone
during the last year and those who may still be willing to go
are mainly Poles who came from that part of Poland which
is still Poland. But the vast majority of displaced persons
now in our hands have convinced me that they will not go
back. I cannot number the occasions on which I have asked
every variety of DP, “Why don’t you go home—to the piece
of ground you know, the members of your family and old
friends, to the place where you can use your native tongue?”

These are the answers I receive, and I receive them
every day from people of nearly every walk of life. The
Baltic peoples—the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estoni-
ans—have said to me, “I would rather die than return to my
home—it is no longer mine. It is in the hands of the same
people who took away every right I had in 1940 and 1941

55a

and who took away friends and relatives of mine whom I
never saw again.”

Many of the Poles and Ukrainians who formerly lived
in Poland east of the Curzon Line, now Poland no longer,
say, “I will not return to land now held by the U.S. S. R.”

The Jews in our camps tell me: “The Nazi teachings
were far reaching. I am still attacked in eastern Europe, as
well as in Germany. Let me go to Palestine.”

I recall a remark by a Yugoslav DP who was in the
same prison camp with me in 1943. “Should I go home to a
political regime I hate and fear—to be tried by Tito, who
accuses me of being a collaborator during the time I was
spending two years and 50 pounds of flesh in German prison
camps? The only one with whom I could have collaborated
was God!”

Such observations, multiplied hundreds of times, are
heard not only by me, but by every person who works with
displaced persons in our zone. It does not do any good to say
to these people that “7,000,000 displaced persons have gone
back to where they came from: why don’t you?” The answer
is too simple and too clear. Naturally, the millions of French
and other western Europeans went back home. Naturally,
the millions of Russians who believed in the Russian eco-
nomic and governmental system went back. Naturally, also,
anyone who believed in or was indifferent about the new
systems of government in other eastern areas went back.
The ones who have gone were the ones who were willing to
go. Their experience is no guide for those who are now
unwilling to go. Is it reasonable to expect the DP Balts, for
example, who are bitterly hostile to the political and eco-
nomic system which they experienced in 1940 and 1941 and
which now rigidly controls their countries, to feel that it is
safe for them to go back, carrying their hostility with them,

S6a

to work against Communism? The very fact that they go
back unwillingly is enough to endanger them. Or are we to
expect and demand of them that, because their native coun-
tries have changed hands, they must therefore change their
beliefs and accept Communism as their way of life? We
believe that these persons unwilling to go back would have to
be rounded up by the U.S. constabulary or German police
and forced into repatriation trains with gun and bayonet.

Shall We Close the Camps?

The second alternative is to close the camps and tell the
displaced persons that they should become Germans and get
such work or relief as the Germans might provide. From my
contacts with these people I have observed several aspects of
this alternative which you gentlemen may wish to consider
in determining what course to choose. The first is that the
great body of these people would regard it as a return to
imprisonment to be turned back to the Germans whose
armies brought them into Germany for forced labor or into
prisoner-of-war or concentration camps. It has been equally
apparent from my contacts that the Germans do not want
the displaced persons in their midst. The Germans have not
forgotten the Nazi indoctrination which looked on the non-
German as an inferior person to be exploited by the “master
race”. This feeling appears as one of our difficulties in find-
ing employment for displaced persons. Too often the Ger-
man administrator of a labor office discriminates against the
displaced-person applicant, at least by passive if not active
means. These ingrained antagonisms would be a perpetual
source of conflict. They would prolong and make more bur-
densome our task in the occupation of Germany.

In addition to these deep-rooted antagonisms, there are
factors in the economy of the western zone of Germany, as
we over there observe it, which also have a definite bearing
on the practicability of this second alternative. There are

57a

slightly over 500,000 displaced persons in the U.S. zone of
Germany alone. Can we expect the economy of the zone to
absorb this half-million? Before the war, this area contained
about 14 million people. In addition to that population we
have had to accept 1% million expellees (ethnic Germans)
from eastern countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland. Another million people have been added to the
German economy in our zone under the classification of
German refugees—Germans displaced from their homes in
either the Russian zone or in the area presently under Polish
administration. Thus, excluding the displaced persons, the
total population of our zone has now been brought to about
16% million. When one considers that at least 30 percent of
the housing in the U.S. zone has been destroyed and its
industries for the most part destroyed or collapsed; that even
before the war, under the extreme food-production efforts of
the Nazis, this area had to import 20 percent of its food
requirements for a normal population of 14 million; that 2’
million Germans have been added to the area; and that it is
also supposed to feed a million persons in the U.S. sector of
Berlin, the reason why American taxpayers have the alter-
native of contributing heavily to the support of this surplus
German population or letting it starve is apparent. Merely
to close the camps and add these half-million non-Germans
to the already surplus Germans in our area would give us
only an apparent but no real relief from the situation we
created when we conquered Germany and took these victims
of Germany into our hands.

58a
APPENDIX G

22 C.F.R. 61.3134ikc) SUPP. 1946

(j) First-priority nonpreference class. The first-prior-
ity nonpreference category of quota immigrants shall con-
sist of the following:

(a) Aliens who have served honorably in the
armed forces of the United States, and the alien wid-
Ows, parents, unmarried minor children, and unmar-
ried minor stepchildren of citizens of the United States
(including deceased citizens) who have so served, and
aliens who have served honorably as seamen for at least
one year on vessels of countries of the United Nations
engaged in sailing from ports in the United States, the
service in either case having occurred during the period
of the war that began on September 1, 1939, such
persons not having voluntarily abandoned such service
or occupation so long as they were not physically inca-
pacitated for such service.

(b) Aliens who have been recommended by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as persons whose admission is
highly desirable in the national interest, provided that
such cases have been approved by all appropriate gov-
ernmental agencies.

(c) Displaced persons covered by the President's
directive of December 22, 1945 and his directive of
October 31, 1946.

Aliens in the first-priority nonpreference class shall
have their applications for nonpreference-quota immigra-
tion visas considered only after consideration shall have
been given to the applications of all first-preference and
second-preference immigrants awaiting visas. Aliens in the
first-priority nonpreference-quota category shall have their

_—_

59a

applications for visas considered in the order in which their
registration forms were properly filled out and received at
the consular office. but consideration need not be given to
the visa application of any alien in this category unless a
quota number is likely to be available for use in issuing a
visa to him. [Subdivision (i) amended by Dept. Reg. 108.34,
Dec. 14, 1946, effective Dec. 24, 1946, 11 F.R. 14611]

APPENDIX H

DEPT STATE BULL. VOL. XVL. NO. 401,
MARCH 9, 1947, PP. 423-429

U.S. Participation in International Refugee Organization

THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION
TO THE CONGRESS'

To the Congress of the United States of America:

| recommend that the Congress authorize the United
States to participate as a member of the International Refu-
gee Organization.

As an aftermath of the war, there are more than one
million displaced persons remaining in Germany, Austria,
and Italy. Almost two thirds of these are under United
States care and control. The Allied military victory over the

Axis Powers brought with it a practical and moral responsi-
bility with reference to these vict

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1203%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
