# Amicus Curiae Brief — United States v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (Nos. 86-625, 86-495, 86-624)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986

## Text

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oe ; oS
Nos. 86-495, 86-624; and 86-625 f"""giecout us.
FILED
In THE
° ?
Supreme Court of the United $tate? * **
Ocroper TERM, 1986 Wee Pe E SPANIOL, IR
K Mart CorPorArtION, a
Petitioner,
Wa
CaRrTIER, INC., et al.
477TH Street Puoro, INc.,
Petitioner,

Ve

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY
OF AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY
OF AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
THE MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.

WILLIAM H. CRABTREE

(Counsel of Record)

Vice President and General]
Counsel

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED
States, Inc.

300 New Center Building

Detroit, Michigan 48202

(313) 872-4311

Attorney for Amicus MVMA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

nn eee eanstvcens ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................. 2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

Ne ne deb ee ences 3

FR ER a 4

I. THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REGULATION
CONFLICTS WITH PUBLIC POLICIES
AFFECTING MOTOR VEHICLE
DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES ... 4
A. The Customs Regulation Operates At Cross
Purposes To The Many Federal And State
Regulations Which Presuppose Manufacturer
Control Of Motor Vehicle Distribution ......
1. Motor Vehicle Safety Regulation........
2. Mobile Source Pollution Control ........
3. Motor Vehicle Fuel Efficiency ..........
~4. Warranty and Consumer Information ...
B. The Customs Regulation Adversely Affects
U.S. Manufacturers’ Control Of Distribution
Ee 12
Il. THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REGULATION
CONFLICTS WITH U.S. TRADEMARK LAW .. 13
A. Trademarks Provide I'he Cornerstone To The
Effective Distribution Of Domestic Motor
SS re ee 14
1. MVMA Member Companies’ Trademarks
Serve A Quality Or Guarantee Function. . 15
2. Customers Of U.S. Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Have An Interest In
Trademarks That Must Be Protected .... 16
B. The Customs Service Regulation Impairs U.S.
IID ob onic n Cbws sees ces ccesse 17
C. MVMA Member Companies Have An
Exclusive Right To The Use Of Their .
Trademarks In The United States........... 19
D. The Statutory Preference To U.S. Parties
Under § 526 Serves A Legitimate Purpose ... 20
me ER SE ee 21

cw ons >

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921),

7 © Bie G7, re rr te 14
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36

(erred ere were rye er 5, 12
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Lid.,

es fF |: ft S . eevee oe 16, 17
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878) .............4.. 14,19
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. SS. Kresge Co.,

Pe BS fs) ee yr ee 16
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-vistillers Corp.,

y Ris @ fi ee re 14
Park’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189

(ROR... bic ceccn ve teusonsueen eee 15, 16, 19

Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931) 14, 15
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90

(RBBB) . 0. ccc ccnwcevdcnecae ous sense 19
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, hae, 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.

|_|) rr 18

Statutes:

15 U.S.C. §§ 753-55; 757-60h; 792; 796; 2001-12, Energy

Policy and Conservation Act ...............0000e8.
15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seg., Lanham Act ................ passim
his (8) Pee 19
1S UBC. 6 TER... oo odcnccceuscens ctu sh eee 16
BS UBC. § TERA). «0.0 6 ccccccicvnteosndseun cee 19
15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), Lanham Act § 44(b) .............. 20
6 UBC. 6 IGF... us on cckeennne eee eee 16, 18
15 U.S.C. § 1231, et seg., Automobile Information

Disclosure Bat... .nccccvctacnshecheeee eee 5, 10
15 U.S.C. § 1381, et seg., National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act of 1065 2... 2. 00.sceenbunaueneee 5,7
15 U.S.C. § 1901, et seg., Motor Vehicle Information and

Cast Sawing Ast . ...6.cccccnscnssnccesusenneee 5
17 U.S.C. § 601, et seg., Copyright Act ................ 21

19 U.S.C. § 1337, Tariff Act of 1930 § 337 ............. 21

ii

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COALITION 10 Pim e THe Tir maniny
ce Amenican THAvHM Ani Of al

On Write af Certiorari to the Unived Braves Court of
for the Prints t of Coluenble Cireui

;
INTRREOT OF AMICUS CUMIAK

The Motor Veliiele Manufacturers Aesooiation of the United
Matos, lw (MY MA) le a voluntary, favors poreotle wanna tin pres
foro af a) ehgaged in the Wanutaeture and oale of
Hilo vehieles in the United Mates! MYMA's leven momnbwrs
assemble more Than ONL of the ears, (raeke and hises produved
ii the United Mates, perale more than 0 manutaviuring
favilities and franchiow over GUM potmil dealers of thet
vehivles in thie country MY MA euhinite thie beled in eupport
of (he Mespondente® position Purewant to Mupreme Court Mule
1, (he WriHien Consent of the parties aeoompanion (hie helet

MMA members’ failing \rademarke, eve we MOE, (ON
BAL, MOMMA, CH UY ALM and AHMN, originated in the
VK and are among the most readily recognised marke
worldwide Ae Wademark awners, MYMA members have a
Hiveet and VAT Intereet in (he resolution of (he principal imeue
before thie Court the validity of the UA Custome Merview reuw
lation permiling the importation of wertmin wooalled “grey
market gone’

Motor vebiclon are among the mont eomplen, eustly, essential
Hirable consumer goods and represent the second largest pur
chawe of mont consumers. 1 ie well recognined that the mower

vehicle industry is highly regulated. Federal and simte govern:

mente fihace exteneive reaponsibiity for the safely and quality
of vehieles sold in the United Mates upon mot vehiele
manufacturers

4

The Court's decision in (hie eae will ultimately define (he
degree of wontrol that a dementio vehiele manutaciurer may
oy enert aver ihe disteihiation of ite trademarhed prod

wither Heapondenta, whome poeition MYMA capporte,
py ’ peslenane, are likely to prewent io the Court the effeoie of
ite dewiaion on the enforoement and implementation uf the gow
erniment polieiee embodied in (he pervanive vehiole eafety, cme
sions, Fuel eoonnmy and consumer proteution regulations

INTRODUCTION AND GUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

sion ‘the ny toeeh por boa VM minor vhiele industey, | ite
dietvibution practions and the quality of ite products, and ite
conmumers Te will eee that the U8 Customs Merviee
regulation, 10 C.F (IMEI, by faetitating Imports inte the
United Minton of automobiles ‘ahh do nat comply with UF
quirements, adversely affects legitimate distribution practives
q UA vehicle manufacturers Custome regulation ale
nuibilie intereat hy failing to demure that vehicles

wld in tne United Mates comply with federal and wate

arey market Td

resumed w be the same as vehiclon wuld in the
vd Uva " ioabv og Nphedone ¢ with
standards applivable tv the United Water Hy f viet 1 the Cie

' ‘ ee Cisatd dete © lasek

Ne AF ringeMent upon (he legitimate inter:
omnentle vehiele induetry in proba n Metvihution

of ie motor vehieloe,

Thin briel exam
Aut, 10 0, § 1088,

aper content of § MM of the Tarif
vnelrate that there iene polley uF

‘

legal juetifieation for the Oustome ‘the th under modern
ivademarh law. The invalidity of the Custome regulation
hewmen apparent when ite Meet on the eulmtantive rights and
reaponeitilition of 1M trademark regietrante ie considered The
moter vehiele industry ie characieriond by an exteneive con
cviner manufacturer relationehip heginning before the purehace
of a vehiole and lwnting for years thereation The interent in
meeting coneumer needs le reinforoed hy the expanding range
of wtatatory chligations io consumers Tn thie content, the arong
reliance placed on the trademark applied to a vehicle and the
good will eatabiiohed in the United Mates hy MYMA member
companion ie underout hy the Customs regulation contrary t
ihe Tarif and Trademark Acts

Mection hh 2 ihe torit Aet, on te face, granite proteetion to
UM 1 AT fistered cfygg stad without ienivation "nore

dons in thie (netanee” ‘tiiet ‘an weep nth “ “4 We
Hw examine in some detail (hue “expectations for the demew
He motor veiele industry.

Cpernion At Crom
das : fy have

Us moter vebiese manweriarers 670 wifes 0 myriad of
late and federal laws and regulations enacted to proteet pulde

P

health, eatery and conwumer welfare, Thewe laws and regula
inne afoot veniole eatery, arnienione, fuel eonimny, note levels,
iabellinng and warrantion’ This phenomenon wae recognined hy
die Gower in Continental 1, Ine « OTR Mylanta tne, AO 8
Mm, fh, note a (1977), where it ated that Ap a rowutt of
ity and commonlaw developmente, aeclety ineremelnaly
mande that manufacturers aenume Mireot roagrneibility for
(he safety and quality of (hein producte ”

in anmering thene sation affecting the automobile induetry,
Congress wate legislatures ippened that UM motor
veniele manufacturers content (he Aiwtritnation of vebielon aed
in the nied Mates ander their trademaricn The Cuetonme Mery
nH undercute (hie aawumnption hy facilitating (he
importation of grey market bwand name vehicles thar 18
miter veniele manufacturers Ma net intend to be eld 18 he
lined Mates

6

Despite the fact that many vehicles intended for sale outside
the United States may look like a U.S. vehicle, there may be
many significant differences) CHRYSLER, FORD or
CHEVROLET branded vehicles intended for sale outside the
U.S. are equipped to meet local market conditions. As such,
they may possess different suspensions, chassis, engines and
standard and optional equipment.

Perhaps the most glaring regulatory areas in which the Cus-
toms Service regulation is at odds with other federal and state
regulatory efforts involve safety and emissions. Regulations
require that Customs identify vehicles which lack a certificate
attesting conformance to U.S. safety and emissions standards
and require posting a bond to ensure that such vehicles will be
modified to meet those standards.’ The effectiveness of these
regulations hinges on identification by Customs of grey market
vehicles. If, because of the familiar trademark, a vehicle is not
recognized or policed as grey market, these Customs Service
controls cannot work. Yet, if the Customs Service regulation at
issue followed the plain meaning of § 526, then grey market
vehicles that do not comply with applicable vehicle standards
could be effectively excluded from the United States. These con-
flicting policy concerns with grey market European automobiles
are discussed in a recent report of the United States General
Accounting Office.‘ Similar compliance issues and policy con-
flicts exist with regard to the grey market importation from
Canada and elsewhere of vehicles bearing the trademarks of
U.S. motor vehicle manufacturers.

*19 C.F.R. § 12.73, et seg. (1984).

‘Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives entitled, “Auto Safety and Emissions — No
Assurance that Imported Grey Market Vehicles Meet Federal
Standards”, December 1986. Copies of this report are being lodged
with the Court for its convenience.

7

1. Motor Vehicle Safety Regulation

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
15 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., as amended, requires that new vehicles
sold or imported into the United States comply with federal
motor vehicle safety standards. Pursuant to that Act, the Secre-
tary of Transportation has issued 49 safety standards to pro-
mote automotive safety and to reduce traffic accidents, includ-
ing deaths and injuries. Federai Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571, et seg. (1986).

In the case of the unbridled importation from Canada or
Mexico of grey market vehicles bearing the trademarks of U.S.
motor vehicle manufacturers because of current Customs
enforcement policies, consumers have no guarantee that such
vehicles meet all U.S. safety standards. It is believed that most
consumers do not even know they are buying a grey market
vehicle because they rely on the U.S. trademark in their pur-
chasing decision.

In the event of a safety recall, whether mandatory or volun-
tary, owners of grey market vehicles bearing the trademarks of
U.S. motor vehicle manufacturers may not be notified. The U.S.
manufacturer has no record of those vehicles being in the
United States. This inability to locate and notify owners of
recalled vehicles may prevent MVMA member companies from
remedying the conditions which required recall.°

The consequences of a failure to locate and recall a grey mar-
ket vehicle could present a safety risk to consumers. The lower
prices claimed by the proponents of grey market goods do not
compensate consumers for such risks.°

*This assumes, which may not be the case, that the grey market
vehicle has sufficient basic equipment that can be upgraded to cor-
rect the faulted conditions.

* National economic conditions, including foreign price controls or
extremely high sales taxes, often have the effect of “lowering” the
manufacturer’s price in some overseas markets, but there is no

8

2. Mobile Source Pollution Control

The Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq.,
requires that all new gasoline and diesel fueled vehicles be cer-
tified to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), by the
vehicle manufacturer as meeting emission standards for hydro-
carbon, carbon monoxide, oxide of nitrogen, evaporative, and,
where applicable, diesel particulates. These vehicle emissions
may affect air quality and pose public health risks.

Vehicles manufaciured for sale outside the United States are
subject to different emission control regulations. For example,
CHEVROLET and PLYMOUTH branded vehicles sold in Mex-
ico lack catalytic converters necessary to meet U.S. emission
standards. Moreover, even if some CHEVROLET, PLY-
MOUTH and FORD branded vehicles sold outside the United
States are capable of meeting U.S. emissions performance stand-
ards, those vehicles do not comply fully with all other U.S.
regulatory requirements, including vertification.’ Despite
MVMA member company efforts, the Customs Service rou-
tinely passes uncertified grey market vehicles into the United
States without verifying that these vehicles conform to all
applicable U.S. statutes and regulations. In essence, the Cus-
toms Service allows these vehicles into the United States

basis in law or equity for exporting foreign government economic
distortion to the U.S., where different U.S. governmental policies
have resulted in different costs and different prices.

"EPA regulations allow certain heavy-duty trucks equipped with
gasoline engines to be sold in the United States although they may
exceed U.S. emissions standards. 40 C.F.R. § 86.1101-87 (1985).
Under the law, those vehicles manufactured for use in the United
States require payment of a non-conformance penalty (NCP), and
must display labels indicating payment of an NCP and the non-
conforming pollutant compliance level and a certificate of compli-
ance with EPA regulations. Grey market trucks intended for sale
in Canada do not have an NCP iabel, nor is any NCP payment
made to EPA.

an

9

merely because they bear the familiar trademark of a US.
motor vehicle manufacturer.

Just as in the case of safety recalls, MVMA member compa-
nies are unable to recall grey market vehicles for possible emis-
sions equipment modifications. Grey market vehicles are simply
“invisible” for recall purposes; they are a phantom fleet.

3. Motor Vehicle Fuel Efficiency

The Customs Service regulation undercuts the corporate aver-
age fuel economy (CAFE) standards established by Congress
and the Department of Transportation.

In 1975, Congress enacted the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 753-55; 757-60h; 792; 796; 1901; 2001-12;
42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422, in response to the 1973 Mideast oil crisis
and for the purpose of reducing consumption of petroleum prod-
ucts. Title III of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2001, et seg., requires U.S.
motor vehicle manufacturers to meet increasingly stringent
fue] economy goals for their vehicles sold in the United States.
The Act sets a fuel efficiency standard measured by miles per
gallon and averaged over the entire fleet of cars produced each
year for sale in the United States. Under the Act, automobile
manufacturers not meeting the CAFE standards are subject to
fines.

The large scale importation into the United States of grey
market vehicles intended for sale in foreign countries falls out-
side of any CAFE calculation. By not blocking the importation
of grey market motor vehicles, the Customs Service regulation
is thwarting the intent of Congress with regard to U.S. con-
sumption of petroleum products.

4. Warranty And Consumer Information

Vehicles intended for sale outside the United States are
likely to be equipped differently and perform differently than
their U.S. counterparts. They are likely to contain metric

10

on

instrument gauges, have owner’s manuals in a foreign lan-
guage, lack labels or other consumer notices required by US.
law, and have different warranties, even though the motor vehi-
cle may bear a famous trademark of a MVMA member com-
pany and model designation identical to that used in the United
States.

All vehicles intended for sale in the United States must
exhibit price labels or “window stickers” as required by the
Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1231, et seq.
Among other things, this label informs consumers of all
optional and standard equipment contained on the vehicle
including the manufacturer’s suggested retail price for each
item. The label of vehicles intended for sale outside the United
States may not display all of the information that is required
by U.S. law. Although the Act provides that an importer also
must affix this label, there is no assurance for example, that a
broker importing 200 new CADILLAC branded vehicles from
Canada to the United States will be able to list accurately the
equipment they contain, provide the correct manufacturer’s
suggested retail prices in U.S. dollars or fuel consumption infor-
mation in miles per gallon.

Motor vehicles intended for sale outside the United States
may differ with respect to the manufacturers’_warranties. The
scope of U.S. and foreign warranties may vary as to the equip-
ment covered and the term of the protection, and the grey mar-
ket importer is unlikely to make-up any warranty deficiency.”

*Components such as tires may have separate warranties from
those extended by the vehicle manufacturer. The warranties may
have no value outside the country where the vehicle was sold ini-
tially. Emissions performance warranties by the U.S. vehicle man-
ufacturer required by federal and California law may not be appli-
cable to grey market vehicles. See, eg., Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521; 40 C.F.R. § 85.2107 (1986); Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 43204 (West Supp. 1986); Cal. Admin. Code
tit. 13, § 2035.

1]

The Customs Service regulation permitting the importation
of these vehicles into the United States facilitates customer
deception and a loss of good will on the part of vehicle manufac-
turers and their dealefS because consumers end up getting
vehicles different from those they reasonably expected to
receive. As a result, owners of the vehicles may unexpectedly
face fines or repair costs before the vehicles can be registered.’

Further, whatever warranty might be provided by the manvu-
facturer may have already expired by the time a problem is
noted. For example, the time clock on warranties starts with the
first sale of the vehicle by a dealer. By the time the vehicle has
passed from a foreign dealer through the grey market channel,
several months of warranty may have elapsed, yet the US.
consumer is unaware of this since he views the vehicle as new.

A consumer who unknowingly buys a new grey market vehi-
cle, intended for sale in the United Kingdom, Mexico, Canada
or elsewhere, expects the vehicle to meet all U.S. legal require-
ments and believes that his warranty and servicing will be the
same as for authorized vehicles sold in the U.S. In most cases,
consumers believe that they are purchasing U.S. authorized
vehicles because the grey market vehicle bears a famous trade-
mark identical to those used in U.S. production. Consumers fre-
quently become confused and dismayed as to why there is no
warranty or why the warranty is different from those of other
domestic vehicles. MVMA member companies suffer a loss of
good will because the consumer blames the U.S. trademark
owner and not the grey market importer.

* See, e.g., Arizona Annual Emission Inspection of Motor Vehicles,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1771, et seg. (Supp. 1986); Md. Transpor-
tation Code Ann. § 23-201, ef seg. (1984); and Michigan Vehicle
Emissions Inspection and Maintenance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 257.1051, et seg. (West Supp. 1986).

12

B. The Customs Regulation Adversely Affects U.S.
Manufacturers’ Control Of Distribution Of Their
Vehicles

U.S. manufacturers distribute trademarked motor vehicles
through over 20,000 independent franchised dealers whose rela-
tionships with the U.S. motor vehicle manufacturers are con-
trolled by comprehensive sales and service agreements. A dealer
makes a significant capital investment in order to be authorized
to sell at retail and to provide services for new vehicles. In most
cases, a dealer’s investment includes real estate, sales and serv-
ice facilities, a trained staff of certified technicians, mechanics
and an inventory of new vehicles and parts. A typical dealer’s
agreement contains not only vertical restrictions intended to
promote marketing efficiency, but also requirements regard-
ing pre- and post- sale information, equipment and training and
replacement parts inventories.

This Court has recognized that “(Sjervice and repair are vital
for many products, such as automobiles and major household
appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect
a manufacturer’s good will and the competitiveness of his prod-
uct.” Continental v. GTE, 433 U.S. at 55.

Consumer dissatisfaction with grey market vehicles harms_
the good will of MVMA member companies and their dealers
and the image and reputation of their products and trademarks.
Brokers of grey market vehicles have no incentive to protect the
good will of MVMA member companies’ trademarks. The

© “Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing
the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution
of his products. ... Established manufacturers can use them to
induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide
service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of
their products. ... Because of market imperfections such as the so-
called ‘free rider’ effect, these services might not be provided by
retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that
each retailer’s benefit would be greater if all provided the service
than if none did.” Continental v. GTE, 433-US. at 54-55.

13

marketing scheme of grey market brokers is to sell famous
brand name products solely on the basis of price. This goal is
achieved by the unauthorized use of famous trademarks of
MVMA member companies which, because of the commercial
magnetism of the marks, allows the grey market broker to sell
grey market goods with little or no investment. In this manner,
the grey market broker free rides on the advertising, servicing
and good will associated with the trademark and disrupts the
legitimate distribution of goods and services under U'S. regis-
tered trademarks.

II. THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REGULATION
CONFLICTS WITH U.S. TRADEMARK LAW

Petitioners’ treatment of trademark rights has a distinct
“now you see it, now you don’t” quality. Petitioners invoke
principles of trademark law to point to the “sharp departure”
supposedly represented by § 526 of the Tariff Act as reason for
this Court to ignore the plain language of the statute and,
instead, delve into the ambiguous legislative history and con-
flicting case law surrounding the statute. Thereafter, they con-
sider § 526 and the Customs regulation in a vacuum as far as
the substantive rights of U.S. trademark owners are concerned.

It is clear that the Customs regulation is enabled by both the
1930 Tariff Act and the Lanham Act. While § 526 is commonly
referred to as a Customs or trade statute, it is also clear that
application and understanding of this statute cannot be
undertaken without reference to trademark law. Yet, trademark
owners’ rights, which are at the heart of § 526, are totally
ignored.

The banner trademarks of the MVMA member companies,
such as CHEVROLET, FORD, CHRYSLER and JEEP, are
the linchpins that make the franchised vehicle dealer system
function. The good will associated with these and similar marks
is the magnet that draws retail customers to the dealership.

14

Grey market distribution of motor vehicles puts this valued
good will in the hands of others and beyond the legitimate
control of MVMA member companies. That is quite simply not
fair or in the public interest. Affirmance of the Court of Appeals
decision would assure that domestic vehicle manufacturers can
enjoy in full the benefits of the good will they have worked to
establish in their famous marks and to assure that the policy
interests behind the vehicle safety, emissions and fuel economy
laws are satisfied.

A. Trademarks Provide The Cornerstone To The
Effective Distribution Of Domestic Motor Vehicles

The foundation of American trademark law rests upon the
bedrock proposition that a trademark symbolizes the good will
of the product, service or business in connection with which the
mark is employed. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878).
Adjunct to this proposition is that a trademark, as a symbol of
good will, constitutes legally protectable property. Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194
(1936).

A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), estab-
lished the principle of “territoriality” of trademarks and barred
the importation of goods produced abroad and bearing a “genu-
ine” trademark. In Bourjois, the Court held that the mark in
question was the trademark of the plaintiff in the United
States; that mark “indicates in law” and by public under-
standing that the goods came from the plaintiff, although not
made by it. 260 U.S. at 692.

It is generally acknowledged that § 526 of the Tariff Act was
enacted in response to the decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539
(2d Cir. 1921), rev'd 260 U.S. 689 (1923). The same Circuit Court
subsequently considered the scope of § 526 in Sturges v. Clark D.
Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931). It held that a second-

15 :

hand “Hispano-Suiza” auto shipped from Europe should be
excluded because the U.S. owner of the “H-S” trademark regis-
tration had filed it with Customs authorities. The Second Cir-
cuit recognized that, under § 526, the U.S. trademark owner and
U.S. distributor for “Hispano-Suiza” cars had the right to have
Customs exclude even one single automobile. This decision
broadly interpreting § 526 was by the very court that earlier
had decided that the goods in Katzel should not be excluded.
Judge Augustus Hand stated:

“A mark betokening the origin of a car is an important
element in its value, and the American owner of the mark
is entitled to have the benefit of such sales as are affected
by it.” 48 F.2d at 1037.

The case for the MVMA member companies’ trademarks
such as CHRYSLER, FORD and CHEVROLET is more com-
pelling than Sturges. These famous marks originated in the U.S.
and are owned by long established U.S. companies.

1. MYVMA Member Companies’ Trademarks Serve A
Quality Or Guarantee Function

Supporters of the Customs Service regulation misconceive the
nature and scope of the function of trademarks; they would
“allow consumers to be deceived and misled. Trademarks have,
among other things, a “quality” or “guarantee” function.
1 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3:4 (2nd
ed. 1984). Under the quality function of trademarks, a mark not
only indicates a source, but also serves as a badge of quality to
indicate a level of consistent quality of goods or services. Park’N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985)
(“trademarks desirably promote competition and the mainte-
nance of product quality...’’). In fact, some of the very
trademarks of MVMA member companies, such as CADIL-
LAC, LINCOLN, and NEW YORKER, in the minds of Ameri-
can consumers, set the standards for quality.

16

Passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 and subsequent amend-
ments codified the quality function of trademarks. 15 U.S.C.
§ § 1114 and 1127 (expanded test of confusion of any kind and
definition of “related company”). It is the trademark functions
of indication of quality and of source which provide the very
basis for modern business franchising so vital to U.S. motor
vehicle manufacturers. The Customs Service regulation at issue
here aids and abets the unauthorized use of the marks, to the
total detriment of the franchise system.

Trademarks also serve the manufacturer, merchant or seller
as an important advertising element in promoting their goods
and services. The advertising function of trademarks creates
the consumer demand for the goods and services on which the
mark appears. MVMA member companies have committed
significant funds to promote products bearing their registered
trademarks with the expectation of sales and resultant eco-
nomic gain. Not only are their trademarks symbols of good will,
indications of source and badges of quality, but a highly effi-
cient means for creating consumer demand and acceptance for
the goods and services. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v.
SS. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“protection of
trademarks is the law’s recognition of the psychological value
of symbols” in the purchasing decision).

2. Customers Of U.S. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Have An Interest In Trademarks That Must Be
Protected

Trademarks protect the interests of trademark owners, their
franchisees and consumers. The multiple interest in trademark
protection (i.e., the interest of the consumer as well as the trade-
mark owner), have been recognized by the courts and Congress.
Park’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. (The Lanham Act protects a trade-
mark owner’s good will and consumer’s ability to distinguish
competing products.) See also, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.

17

v. Pussycat Cinema Lid., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979). Protec-
tion of U.S. trademarks, therefore, must be viewed from both
the trademark owners’ and the consumers’ interests. By deny-
ing § 526 protection to certain U.S. manufacturers and domestic
registrants and thereby permitting widespread grey marketing,
the Customs Service regulation fails to protect the interests of
consumers as well as U.S. manufacturers and trademark own-
ers. Specifically with respect to the U.S. motor vehicle indus-
try, it flies in the face of the public policy embedded in the
federal and state vehicle safety, emissions and fuel economy
laws.

B. The Customs Service Regulation Impairs U.S.
Trademark Rights

There can be no doubt that the Customs Service regulation
fails to protect a substantial number of domestic registrants of
U.S. trademarks and thus impairs their substantive rights. One
Petitioner argues that the Customs Service regulation comports
with U.S. trademark law, but the contrary is true.

The Customs Service regulation denies MVMA member com- —
panies owning US. registered trademarks the procedural pro-
tection that the plain meaning of § 526 provides. Protection is
denied simply on the grounds of an arbitrarily defined degree of
ownership or relationship between the domestic trademark reg-
istrant and a foreign entity or because the goods are made over-
seas where the mark is applied to the goods with permission of
the U.S. trademark owner.

Petitioners attempt to justify the Customs Service regulation
on the ground that, as to this class of U.S. trademark regis-
trants, the procedural protections of § 526 should be denied as
there can be “no confusion of source” as to grey market goods.
Brief for Petitioner K Mart at 38. Petitioners attempt to
explain that in these instances (and paradoxically not in
others), consumers know the goods are of foreign manufacture

18

or are distributed by a U.S. company having some relationship
with the foreign trademark owner and manufacturer. This
argument narrowly focuses on archaic functions of trademarks
and completely ignores the obvious fact that a domestic trade-
mark registrant is entitled to protection from confusion of any
kind including confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship and
approval. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79
(2d Cir. 1981). If, as Petitioners urge, the Customs Service regu-
lation denies § 526 protection to certain U.S. registrants because
of the alleged absence of source confusion, then the regulation
directly conflicts with U.S. trademark law by failing to consider
other forms of confusion, such as confusion concerning the qual-
ity and advertising functions of trademarks. These functions
and services are being performed by U.S. motor vehicle manu-
facturers and their authorized franchisees who distribute, serv-
ice and promote the sale of vehicles which meet federal and
state laws and bear their famous U.S. trademarks.

Moreover, Petitioner’s argument supporting the Customs
Service regulation under the source theory of trademarks con-
siders only alleged absence of confusion as to the identity of the
manufacturing source without considering the identity of the
US. distributional source of the goods or services. The “dis-
tributional source” function of trademarks is found in the very
definitions of the terms “trademark” and “service mark” in the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

No Petitioner has explained, or can explain, the paradox
which exists under the Customs Service regulation where con-
fusion of source is assumed to exist for U.S. trademark regis-
trants qualifying for § 526 protection, while for other U\S.
trademark owners who are denied § 526 protection, confusion of
source is assumed not to exist. This anomaly serves to illustrate
that there is no legal or policy justification for the Customs
Service regulation under modern trademark law.

ne

19

C. MVMA Member Companies Have An Exclusive
Right To The Use Of Their Trademarks In The
United States

Registration of a mark on the Principal Register is prima
facie evidence of a registrant’s ownership, the validity of the
registration and of the exclusive right of the registrant to use
the mark in commerce in connection with the goods specified in
the Certificate of Registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1057. The importance
of the “exclusive right of use” was emphasized by this Court’s
pronouncement that unless an incontestable registration could
be asserted to enjoin infringement by others, the “exlcusive
right” recognized by the Lanham Act would be rendered mean-
ingless. Park’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196. This same “exclusive right”
is in fact stripped away by the Customs Service regulation since
it allows others to use the famous marks of MVMA member
companies without their consent.

Petitioners attempt to justify the invasion of a US. trade-
mark registrant’s exclusive right of use by asserting that the
registrant does not qualify for § 526 protection when its mark
does not possess good will in the United States apart, from any
good will which the mark enjoys elsewhere in the world. This
justification is contrary to the statutorily conferred prima facie
and conclusive presumptions of validity and ownership which
are accorded all U.S. trademark registrations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057,
1115(b). These statutory presumptions of ownership and valid-
ity carry with them the added presumption that good will
exists and is appurtenant to the mark because, by definition, a
trademark is a symbol of good will and can have no existence
apart from the good will which it represents. McLean v. Fleming,
96 U.S. at 252; United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 US.
90, 97 (1918); 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). In Park’N Fly, this Court
stated that “|T|he Lanham Act provides national protection of
trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the good

20

will of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers”. 469 U.S. at 198.

The denial of § 526 protection to a substantial class of US.
trademark registrants such as MVMA member companies on
the ground that such registrants have not established good will
in the United States is directly contrary to the statutory pre-
sumption that the registered mark is valid and owned by the
registrant of record and, therefore, symbolizes good will. It is
pure folly to suggest that MVMA member companies such as
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler do not have established
good will in the United States. Yet, the Customs regulation
denies this fact.

The question before this Court cannot be decided by Petition-
ers’ contorted reading of the statute and resort to inapplicable
principles of statutory construction. A plain reading of § 526
with a fundamental knowledge and appreciation of modern
trademark law manifests the intention of this section to include
all U.S. registrants who are citizens of and domiciliaries in the
United States regardless of what relationship they have with
their authorized users of identical foreign marks.

D. The Statutory Preference To U.S. Parties
Under § 526 Serves A Legitimate Purpose

Section 526 enhances the substantive rights granted to US.
trademark owners under the Lanham Act by creating a proce-
dure for recording trademark registrations with the Customs
Service and receiving a comprehensive exclusion order. Unlike
the provisions of the Lanham Act, § 526 does not extend its
procedural advantages to foreign entities. However, since § 526
does not impart any additional substantive trademark rights on
its beneficiaries, it is not inconsistent with § 44(b) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), or relevant international trea-
ties which require reciprocity of rights.

Moreover, as a Customs and trade statute, §526 was
naturally designed and intended to protect United States trade

|

21

and domestic businesses such as MVMA member companies.
This is a lawful and legitimate purpose which has also been the
basis for similar procedural benefits accorded to U.S. owners of
other intellectual property rights. For example, under § 601, et
seq. of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 601, et. seg, only a US.
national or domiciliary can exclude the importation of certain
copyrighted works. Likewise, under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, merchandise may be excluded by the
International Trade Commission if it finds the existence of
unfair practices or unfair methods of competition against a
domestic industry.

Petitioners and this Amicus agree that § 526 was enacted to
protect domestic businesses such as the MVMA member compa-
nies here. Yet, the Customs regulation prevents MVMA mem-
ber companies from availing themselves of the benefit of the
Tariff Act simply because products bearing these trademarks
are sold abroad with their consent.

III. CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectively submitted,

WILuiAM H. CRABTREE*

Vice President and General
Counsel

Motor VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED
Srates, Ic.

300 New Center Building

Detroit, Michigan 48202

(313) 872-4311

Attorney for Amicus MVMA
*Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1101%3A21. Public record. Not legal advice.
