# Reply Brief — K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. (No. 86-495)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988

## Text

eeproeme Uoulrl, U.s,
riLcen
Nos. 86-495, 86-624 and 86-625 sa o2, ne?
IN THE JOSEPH F. SPeNIDY

Supreme Court of the United Stetes——

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

K MART CORPORATION,

‘ Petitioner,

CARTIER, INC., ef ai.

47TH STREET PHOTO, INC..
Petitioner,
We
COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF
AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ef a/..
Pe titione rs,
Vv.
COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF
AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, ef al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR
PETITIONER K MART CORPORATION

ROBERT W. STEELE

ROBERT E. HEBDA

Steele & Fornaciari

Suite 850
2020 kK Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1857

202) 887-1779
JAMES C. TUTTLE

Assistant General Counsel
Antitrust and International
K mart Corporation
International Headquarters
3100 West Big Beaver Road
Troy, Michigan 48084

(313) 643-1688
Attorneys for Petitione

K mart Cor poration

September 22, 1987 Counsel of Record

_ ene

a
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

JR.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES _____.________________ ii

pie A el 2
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME FAVORS

PARALLEL IMPORTS ............._._____ 4

A. Protection Of Trademarks._______________ 4

B. Protection Of American Interests ________ : 7

C. Regulatory Authority ..._.__._.__._._.._._____ 9
Il. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC HAVE
LONG RELIED ON THE CUSTOMS SERV-

— fF ee eee 9

ET airtcuberteteniaansshcnhdetaitnesiiermnein aightimeclnianmaies 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES ; Page
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir.
1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) _......----- 5,7
Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp.
Bes CREAR. ES. BRED .cucaddéececuneeusaaen 7
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
oe? BO) re ee a ee 8
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
at @ § | eee eee 2

El] Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,
806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’g 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), petition for cert. fled,

No. 86-1735 (Apr. 27, 1987) ..........-_-_--- 6
Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 652 F. Supp.
Ge GAS BUD asassdicieeneeeee 3

National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
ee Se Se 9
_ NEC Electronics, Ine. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc.,
810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert.
filed, No. 87-125 (July 20, 1987) _____________ 6
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada
Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987),
aff’g 640 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), petition

for cert. filed, No. 87-38 (July 3, 1987) ._______ 6
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) __ 2
STATUTES

Clean Air Act

48 U.S.C. § 7401 o€ eee. ...................- 4
Fair Packaging and Labelling Act

is ae en I in st 4
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act

ey es Oe in ie ce ee 4
Lanham Act

SP Ge BOE vedudecsadumee sdhasiocantel pa 3

Fy EE cnindisncetldctciaaeindeaiioes passim

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Page
ay eee een Ge Oem, ...................- 4
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
EL Ee * 4
Tariff Act of 1930
Ce 9
EE passim
TT TT ceuwecen 9
Trademark Act of 1905
EE 5
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1) (B) ------.-----.-_- 6
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
62 Cong. Rec. S 11,605 (Aug. 19,1922) _.._ x
133 Cong. Rec. H 7,303-7,304 (daily ed. Aug. 7,
LEI EAS TEE A 9
133 Cong. Rec. S 11,893-11,894 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
Nee ewe 10

S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

ee 6, 10
REGULATORY MATERIALS
Art. 517, Customs Regulations of 1981 ________._ 5
1 Fed. Reg. 1,725 (1936) (T.D. 48,537) _____- 5,8
a ee cee 10
19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1946) ____- ee 5
19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1969) a 2 i 5
MISCELLANEOUS
COPIAT, The Economic Impact of Diversion, sub-
mitted to the Customs Service Sept. 20, 1984__ 3

Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 1987, at2 __._.___- ~

ee mg

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

_ Nos. 86-495, 86-624 and 86-625

K MART CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
v.

CARTIER, INC., et al.

47TH STREET PHOTO, INC.,
+ . Petitioner,
COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF
AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

. Petitioners,

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF
AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR
PETITIONER K MART CORPORATION

K mart submits the following brief in reply to the
May 7, 1987 briefs for Respondents and amici, and as
a supplement to its February 21, 1987 brief.

2

ARGUMENT

Respondents argue for a supposedly literal construc-
tion of Section 526 which would ¢o something done by
no other trademark law (or copyright or patent law)
before or since: entitle an enterprise to impose restric-
tions upon the resale of its goods. Section 526 was in-
tended to protect United States trademark owners
against the importation of infringing goods made by
others, not to enable foreign manufacturers to control
the flow of their own goods after sale.’

Even the Respondents tacitly concede that the drafters
of Section 526 never envisioned such a drastic result as
flowing from their legislative efforts. But based on a
twisted interpretation of a rather clear cut legislative
intent to prevent trademark infringement by independent
foreign companies, Respondents ask the Customs Service
to enforce territorial restrictions and price discrimina-
tions which are illegal both in the United States? and
abroad*. There is especially no justification for this
when Respondents are themselves responsible for the ex-
istence of parallel imports:

1 As Justice Holmes said in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S.
359, 368 (1924), “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit
the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the
sale of another’s product as his.” Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911), holding that
once a product has been sold, the public is entitled to the advantage
of competition in the subsequent traffic.

* The antitrust laws prohibit the price-fixing and other restric-
tions on domestic distribution which Respondents seek to impose
at the point of importation.

* Respondents admit that “efforts to stop diversion short of this
country’s borders are often ineffectual because of the practical or
A legal difficulty or impossibility of preventing sales in foreign coun-
tries to third-party diverters.” Respondents’ May 7, 1987 Brief at

3. This is because other countries have rejected as illegally anti-
competitive Respondents’ efforts to restrict parallel imports. See
foreign cases cited in K mart’s February 21, 1987 Brief at 43-44.

3

COPIAT members manufacture abroad, rather than
in the United States, because it is more profitable;

COPIAT members promote the same trademarks
and use the same packaging worldwide because it
is more profitable; *

COPIAT members charge the American consumer
higher prices because it is more profitable; and

COPIAT members are owned and/or controlled by
foreign companies because it is more profitable.

Respondents have proffered conflicting economic reasons
for parallel imports.’ On the one hand, Respondents
claim that expensive warranties and service in the
United States account for the cost differences which
result in parallel imports. However, COPIAT has sub-
mitted statistics to the Treasury Department in connec-
tion with the ongoing rulemaking proceeding which show
instead that these costs come nowhere near the price
difference between “authorized” and parallel imports.”

* Respondents claim that import restrictions are necessary be-
cause they market inferior products abroad with trademarks, pack-
aging and labelling identical to those on the products they market
in the United States. See Lever Brothers Co. v. United States,
652 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987). The Lanham Act, however, ex-
pressly provides that a trademark is forfeited if a related company
uses it on an inferior product, thereby deceiving the public. 15
U.S.C. § 1055.

° If the result in this case were to depend on such evidence, the
case must be remanded for discovery. Cross motions for summary
judgment were filed, but no discovery was conducted on the con-
tested issues of material fact (J.A. 2 No. 28). See Statement of
Robert W. Steele (J.A. 2 No. 28 Att. 8).

* See Statements of Robert H. Miller © 13, Aaron Altman ° 9,
Jack M. Abrams "€ 12-18 (J.A. 2, No. 8).

‘For example, the warranty costs for three camera manufac-
turers averaged less than 2.7% of the retail price; three f ragrance
and cosmetic manufacturers had no warranty or service costs what-
soever. COPIAT, The Economic Impact of Diversion, submitted to
the Customs Service Sept. 20, 1984 at Table 4.

4
The latter is the more sensible conclusion: Respondents
must promote, market, service, and guarantee their prod-
ucts regardless of the country in which they sell them; on
the other hand, United States retailers must promote,

market, service and guarantee parallel imports at their
own expense.*

I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME FAVORS PARALLEL
IMPORTS

Respondents and their amici would have the Court be-
lieve that Section 526 (and Section 42 of the Lanham
Act) were actually meant to deal with imagined evils
ranging from unsafe automobiles to adulterated liquor.
As legislative history and court decisions confirm, these
are not the controlling statutes on such matters. Stat-
utes such as the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 301 et seqg., the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seqg., and the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seg., govern the contents
and labelling of cosmetics and the safety and emissions
of cars—whether imported or domestic and whether sold
by an “authorized” or an “independent” distributor.
Likewise, federal and state warranty, labelling and con-
sumer protection statutes, such as the Fair Packaging
and Labelling Act, 15 U.S.C. $1451 et seg., and the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et sezq.,
govern the responsibility of retailers, distributors and
manufacturers (whether foreign or domestic) for con-
sumer goods.

A. Protection Of Trademarks

Respondents apparently no longer contend that the
Customs Service regulations are inconsistent with Sec-
tion 42 of the Lanham Act. It is certainly difficult to
argue that parallel imports violate Section 42, since no

—__ _*See statements of William Propst §11, John M. Bauersfeld -_

* 5, Ely Steinfeld £13 (J.A. 2 No. 28 Atts. 1, 4, 6). For example,
K mart spent over $495 million on product promotion in 1986.

<4
wv

“copying or simulating” is involved. Respondents’ con-
cession is significant because courts, Congress and the
Customs Service have traditionally considered the Lan-
ham Act together with Section 526 when deciding the ex-
tent to which the importation of genuine trademarked
goods can be prevented. This was the genesis of Section
526, when the Second Circuit held in Katzel*® that the
Trademark Act of 1905 did not protect the bona fide
purchase of trademark rights by an independent Ameri-
can firm. Since 1922, virtually every congressional
and judicial" discussion of parallel imports has relied
on both Section 526 and Section 42 of the Lanham Act,
and the Customs Service has consistently relied on both
as the authority for its regulations."* For example, the
1936 regulations, which permitted the importation of
trademarked goods manufactured abroad where the for-
eign and domestic trademarks were “owned by the same
person, partnership, association or corporation”, relied
upon both Section 526 and the Trademark Act.”

When these two statutes are considered together and
construed consistently, the only possible conclusion is
that Congress intended trademarked goods to be freely
imported except in the very specific Katzel situation—
to prevent fraud on the independent American purchaser
of the domestic rights to a foreign trademark.

The Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the proper
application of the Lanham Act to parallel imports.'* In

®A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd,
260 U.S. 689 (1923).

* 1 See K mart’s February 21, 1987 brief at 24-31.
11 See K mart’s February 21, 1987 brief at 1 n.1.

'2 See Art. 517, Customs Regulations of 1931 (J.A. 21-22); 19
C.F.R. § 11.14 (1946) (J.A. 45-46); 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1969) (J.A.
67).

1 Fed. Reg. 1,725 (1936) (T.D. 48,537) (J.A. 27-28).

1*In two cases, the Second Circuit has seriously confused the
law of parallel imports by failing to consider the 1984 Lanham Act

6

NEC Electronics, Inc. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Ine., 810
F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), the court held that the
Katzel decision “presuppose[s] the American [trade-
mark] owner’s real independence from the foreign manu-
facturer, and courts interpreting Katzel have repeatedly
emphasized this factor.” 810 F.2d at 1510. The court
of appeals also acknowledged that the Customs Service
“has for decades made an exception to section 526 in
cases where the American trademark owner and the
foreign producer are under common control.” 810 F.2d
at 1510 n.4 (emphasis added).

The court further recognized that NEC and its affili-
ates were themselves responsible for the parallel imports:

If NEC-Japan chooses to sell abroad at lower
prices than those it could obtain for the identical
product here, that is its business. In doing so, how-
ever, it cannot look to United States trademark law
to insulate the American market or to vitiate the
effects of international trade. This country’s trade-
mark law does not offer NEC-Japan a vehicle for
establishing a worldwide discriminatory pricing
scheme simply through the expedient of setting up
an American subsidiary with nominal title to its
mark.

810 F.2d at 1511.

Respondents would have this Court endorse such a
scheme. .

amendments which defined the indicia of a genuine trademark.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). Moreover, the court ignored the
legislative history which confirmed the legality of parallel imports.
S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3627, 3629. Petitions for
certiorari are pending in both El Greco Leather Products Co. v.
Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), and Original Ap-
palachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1987).

7

B. Protection Of American Interests

Respondents characterize Petitioners’ interpretation of
Section 526 as xenophobic. But Section 526 by its terms
protects only “a citizen of” or “a corporation or asso-
ciation created or organized within” the United States
which is also “domiciled in the United States,” and the
legislative history confirms this bias against foreign
companies.'®

Although Respondents have now proffered a plethora
of complex corporate structures to test the limits of the
Customs Service regulations, the court below recognized
the predominant distribution system at issue:

This situation typically arises when a foreign pro-
ducer creates an American subsidiary that then
registers the American trademark.

790 F.2d at 904."

To escape antitrust liability for their price-fixing and
distributional restraints, COPIAT and its amici argue
vigorously that the foreign producer and its American
subsidiary are a single entity which cannot conspire with
itse]f."* If each of these parent-subsidiary combinations

‘8 The Katzel decision itself was xenophobic, since the plaintiff
was perceived to have been cheated by the French company from
which it purchased trademark rights.

16 While Congress in 1922 did not envision the complex structure
of the modern multinational corporation, there is no reason to
assume that it would have favored such an entity over American
consumers.

17 Chief Judge Weinstein described the corporate structure of a
COPIAT member as follows:
Hattori and its American subsidiaries do maintain some inde-
pendence—about as much as the egg and vegetables in a west-
ern omelette.
Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1341
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).

18 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
771 (1984). Respondents alternatively argue that at most they
engage in vertical price-fixing, which should no longer be regarded

8

is a single entity, with a foreign company exercising
control, that entit~has no right—under the literal words
of Section 526—to exclude goods that it has soid abroad.
On the other hand, if the domestic subsidiary is considered
the agent of ‘ts foreign parent, Congress in 1922 stated
that parallel imports could not be excluded:

The mere fact of a foreigner having a trade-
mark and registering that trade-mark in the United
States through an ageney,-of course, would not be
affected by this provision [i.e., Section 526].

62 Cong. Rec. S 11,605 (Aug. 19, 1922) (statement of
Sen. McCumber).

Congress recently confirmed that it considers a foreign
manufacturer and its American subsidiary a single
entity by refusing to recognize the supposed independence
of Toshiba America, Inc., the wholly-owned Toshiba sub-
sidiary which markets consumer electronics in the United
States. Congress voted to ban the importation and sale
of Toshiba products because one of Toshiba’s Japanese
subsidiaries, at most a “half-sister” of Toshiba America,

as per se illegal under the antitrust laws. Respondents’ May 7,
1987 Brief at 39. This position is questionable both as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact.

Recent events confirm that the Customs Service regulations pro-
tect American consumers from horizontal price-fixing conspiracies.
For example, the Electronics Industries Association of Korea,
whose members distribute through wholly-owned American sub-
sidiaries, recently announced that it was “voluntarily placing re-
straints—in the form of price floors—on exports [of consumer
electronics products] to the U.S.” and would consider imposing
export restrictions to keep retail prices high. Wail Street Journal,
Aug. 29, 1987, at 2. Where an entire industry adopts such a posi-
tion, parallel imports are the only source of interbrand or intra-
brand price competition.

19 Likewise the Customs Service regulations have, since at least
1936, expressly recognized that Section 526 does not apply where
the foreign and domestic trademarks “are owned by the same per-
son, partnership, association, or corporation.” 1 Fed. Reg. 1,725
(1936) (T.D. 48,537) (J.A. 27-28).

9

Inc., had sold secret submarine technology to the Soviet
Union.”°

C. Regulatory Authority

Respondents argue that Congress, in granting general
rulemaking authority,’ did not intend the Customs Serv-
ice to interpret or construe Section 526, because Section
526 itself contains no delegation of rulemaking authority;
on the other hand, where Congress intended the Customs
Service to have such authority in particular areas, it
made specific, limited delegations of such authority.

This argument has been rejected, perhaps most dra-
matically in connection with the delegation of rulemaking
authority to the Federal Trade Commission. The District
of Columbia Circuit held that although Congress had
specifically given the FTC rulemaking authority in cer-
tain particular areas, this did not preclude the agency
from relying on a general delegation of authority to issue
broad, substantive rules with the full force and effect of
law.”*

The Customs Service regulations on parallel imports
are entitled to similar treatment.

Il. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC HAVE LONG
RELIED ON THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REGULA-
TIONS

Respondents argue vigorously that the Customs Serv-

ice regulations are neither long-standing nor consistent.
However, at the end, Respondents are forced to admit
that a multinational enterprise with both American and
foreign arms has not been allowed to preclude importa-

20 The Senate voted 95-2 to ban the importation of Toshiba prod-
ucts. House conferees on the Trade Bill were directed to accept
such prohibitions to protect national defense. See 133 Cong. Rec.
H 7,303-7,304 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).

2119 U.S.C. § 66; 19 U.S.C. § 1624.

22 National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 695-
697 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).

10

tion of goods bearing a United States trademark since
at least 1936.°* Nor can Respondents point to a single
instance when the Customs Service has issued a regula-
tion or public decision supporting their reading of Sec-
tion 526.

The attacks which Respondents have launched against
the various Customs Service regulations in effect since
1936 are largely linguistic. For example, Respondents
argue that the Customs Service was somehow inconsist-
ent in 1953 when it amended the regulation expressly to
allow admission of trademarked goods~ manufactured
abroad by “related companies’.** Respondents ignore,
however, that the related company language, if it
changed the Customs Service regulation at all, broadened
the class of trademarked goods which could be imported
freely into the United States. At no time since 1936 has
Customs ever indicated that Section 526 could be the
basis for precluding all imports of trademarked goods
manufactured abroad by a multinational enterprise.

It is clear that Congress has had this understanding of
Customs Service regulations for some time.** Indeed,
even those legislators who oppose parallel imports are
constrained to admit that the Customs Service pation
presently allows such imports.*°

23 While we recognize that Section 526 was directed toward goods
manufactured abroad by a foreign company, it should not be con-
strued to permit a United States company to preclude the im-
portation of trademarked goods which its own subsidiary has
manufactured abroad. Indeed, such a construction would apparently
~ be contrary to the Lanham Act, which only prohibits the sale of
copies, simulations or counterfeits.

*4T.D. 53,399 (1953) (J.A. 55, 56). See Respondents’ May 7,
1987 Brief at 44.

25 See S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3627, 3629.

26 See 133 Cong. Rec. S 11,893-11,894 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1987).

11

Under the circumstances, American companies which
have been dealing in parallel imports have had every
right to rely upon the Customs Service regulations.
These companies have brought price competition to the
market which would not exist if it were not for their
reliance and their efforts.

CONCLUSION

Respondents have not advanced any credible reason
now to overturn the Customs Service regulations of
which Congress has been apprised and on which a sub-
stantial domestic industry has relied for over five
decades. The rules of statutory construction and con-

siderations of public policy mandate that the regulations
be upheld.

For these reasons and those set forth in K mart’s
February 21, 1987 Brief, the judgment of the court of
appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT W. STEELE *

ROBERT E. HEBDA

Steele & Fornaciari

Suite 850

2020 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1857
(202) 887-1779

JAMES C. TUTTLE
Assistant General Counsel
Antitrust and International
K mart Corporation
International Headquarters
3100 West Big Reaver Road
Troy, Michigan 48084
(313) 643-1688
Attorneys for Petitioner

K mart Corporation

September 22, 1987 * Counsel of Record

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1086%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
