# Appendix — Hodgson v. Minnesota > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1061%3A03 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 497 U.S. 417 ## Text IN THE JAN 4 1589 Supreme Court of the Unite —~_. JR. OCTOBER TERM, 1988 > JANE HODGSON, M.D.; ARTHUR HOROWITZ, M.D.; NADINE T., JANET T., ELLEN Z., HEATHER P., MARY J., SHARON L., KATHY M., and JUDY M., individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated; DIANE P., SARAH L., and JACKIE H.; MEADOWBROOK WOMEN’S CLINIC, P.A.,. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MINNESOTA, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; MIDWEST HEALTH CENTER FOR WOMEN, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; WOMEN’S HEALTH CENTER OF DULUTH, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, Petitioners, — THE STATE OF MINNESOTA; RUDY PERPICH, as Governor of the State of Minnesota; HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III, as Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, Respondents. APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT WILLIAM Z. PENTELOVITCH, ESQ. JANET BENSHOOF BECKY PALMER, Esq. (Counsel of Record) CHARLES HOFFMAN, Esq. RACHAEL PINE Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand LYNN PALTROW 1800 Midwest Plaza American Civil Liberties Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 Union Foundation (612) 339-8015 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 (212) 944-9800 LINDA OJALA, ESQ. KURZMAN, GRANT & OJALA 2445 Park Avenue South Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404 (612) 871-9004 Attorneys for Petitioners Other Than Planned Parenthood of Minnesota Attorneys for Petitioner Planned Parenthood of Minnesota A sip ”* TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Minn. Stat. Amn. § 144.343(1)-(7).......ccccccccsvces la ey is MS OE ic cic ciddscdcccccseresese Sa Order Substituting Caption (April 3, 1986)............ 6a Notice of Appeal (Nov. 18, 1986).................4.. 8a Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. Gh Se ee cee ee ee eee eee eke ie ese tes 10a Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987).. 53a Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en ER EE ee O ee er er are Pree TORS 74a Stay of Mandate (October 7, 1988) (stay pending the fil- ing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and, if petition is granted, pend- ing the decision of the United States Supreme Court) 110a EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF TESTIMONY I, SE, SE oc wc cnecsesesccesoenes 112a ” IN is coc cs eisckssivnrccsosss 112a Gunderson, Dr. Paul Duane................. 114a Se, SU IEE Be ccc dccecctcceccevescess ll4a PT, cron banseusedseddevinecevesveces 115a ii PAGE Henshaw, Dr. Stanley ....ssidseeuneeee 1l6a Himes, Jackie .. ...0+s0cesesees anne 1l6a Hodgson, De. Jame... .scccnseeeaseee 118a Kathy M. .....0ccecsceseue eee l2la Miaty J... ccccvccscesescesneu sun 12la Martin, Judge Gesald C. ..sccscecceeesee l2la Oleisky, Judge Alem ...0:0sseseseeeneeee 123a Petereen, Judge George ....0csoccceseueeunen 123a Riley, Judge Nell... ..cscccecsctssunene 124a Shasom L. ....c0cceseseeeee seen eee 124a Smuith, Susaame .....0000c8ee00eu ene 125a Sweeny, Judge Wiliam R. ..:sssetaebeee 12Sa Webber, Thomas P. ...0.0080s0000uueeee 126a Weish, Kathrine Reiche .....00scssesseuuee 128a Wendt, POwin. ...ccscccsessceuseue nan 129a Excerpts from Cynthia J. Deposition......... 132a Excerpts from Bonnie L. Deposition.......... 133a PLAINTIFFS EXHIBITS: Table: Percent Abortions in Second Trimester— Minnesota Resi@amts. ..occcccasséeseenne 135a Table: ‘‘Live Births and Induced Abortions to Women Age 15-19’’ in Minneapolis, 1980-1984 136a ill PAGE EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF TESTIMONY es occ ccccccesececcccess 138a EEE TT ET 140a EOE TTT TT ETTLITTE l4la Hodgson v. Minnesota, Nos. 3-81 CIV. 538 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 1985) (summary judgment order) .......... 146a Hodgson v. Minnesota, Nos. 86-5423, 86-5431 (8th Cir. November 13, 1987) (order granting petition for rehearing by the panel, vacating and withdrawing prior panel opinion, holding case in abeyance pending the decision in Hartigan v. Zbaraz, U.S. (1987), and denying petition for rehearing en banc).. 158a Hodgson v. Minnesota, Nos. 86-5423, 86-5431 (8th Cir. December 31, 1987) (order granting petition for hear- ing en banc and vacating opinion and judgment of the EES SEES ELSES POT ETTTTT TET ETT 160a la ABORTIONS—NOTICE TO PARENTS CHAPTER 228 H.F. No. 284 An Act relating to health; prescribing procedures for notifica- tion of parents, guardians, and conservators prior to per- forming abortions on certain persons; providing a penalty; amending Minnesota Statutes 1980, Section 144.343. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota: Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1980, Section 144.343, is amended to read: 144.343. Pregnancy, venereal disease, and alcohol or drug abuse, Subdivision 1. Minor’s consent valid. Any minor may give effective consemt or medical, mental and other health services to determine the presence of or to treat pregnancy and condi- tions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcoho! and other drug abuse, and the consent of no other person is required. Subd. 2. Notification concerning abortion. Notwithstand- ing the provisions of Minnesota Statutes, Section 15.162, Sub- divisiosn 4, section 13.02, subdivision 8, no abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed pursuant to sections 525.54 to 525.551 because of a finding of incompetency, until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the man- ner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4. (a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at his usual place of abode and delivered personally to the parent by the physician or his agent. (b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at this usual palce of abode with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee which means postal 2a employee can only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee. Time of delivery shall be deemed to occur at 12 o'clock noon on the next day on which regular mail deliv- ery takes place, subsequent to mailing. Subd. 3. Parent, abortion; definitions. For purposes of this section, “‘parent’’ means both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one. For purposes of this section, ‘‘abortion’’ means the use of any means to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with knowledge that the termination with those means will, with reasonable likelihood, cause the death of the fetus and “*fetus’’ means any individual human organism from fertil- ization until birth. Subd. 4. Limitations. No notice shall be required under this section if: (a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical record that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death and there is insufficient time to provide the required notice; or (b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person Or persons who are entitled to notice; or ©) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of that declaration shal] be made to the proper authorities as provided in section 626.556, subdivision 3. Subd. 5. Penalty. Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shal] be a misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied notification. A per- son shall not he held liable under this section if the person establishes by written evidence that the person relied upon evi- dence sufficient to convitice a careful and prudent person that 3a the representations of the pregnant woman regarding informa- tion necessary to comply with this section are bona fide and true, or if the person has attempted with reasonable diligence to deliver notice, but has been unable to do so. Subd. 6. Substitute notification provisions. If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or enjoined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced as though the following paragraph were incorporated as para- graph (c) of that subdivision; provided, however, that if such temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivi- sion 2 shall have full force and effect, without being modified by the addition to the following substitute paragraph which shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction or restraining order is again in effect. (c) (i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdic- tion shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appro- priate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that the preg- nant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an abortion upon her without notifica- tion of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests and shal] authorize a physician to per- form the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman’s best interests would be served thereby. (ii) Such a pregnant woman may participate in pro- ceedings in the court on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The court shall, how- ever. advise her that she has a right to court appointed counsel, and shall, upon her request, provide her with such counsel. 4a (iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shal! be confidential and shall be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a deci- sion promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman. A judge of the court who conducts proceedings under this section shall make in writ- ing specific factual findings and legal conclusions support- ing his decision and shall order a record of the evidence to be maintained including his own findings and conclusions. (iv) An expedited confidential appeal shali be avail- able to any such pregnant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abortion without notifica- tion. An order authorizing an abortion without notifica- tion shall not be subject to appeal. No filing fees shall be required of any such pregnant woman at either the trial or the appellate level. Access to the trial court for the pur- poses of such a petition or motion, and access to the appel- late courts for purposes of making an appeal from denial of the same, shall be afforded such a pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Subd. 7 Severability. If any provision, word, phrase or clause of Laws 1981, Chapter 228 or the application thereof to any person or circumnstance shall be held invalid, such invalid- ity shall not affect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses or application of Laws 1981, Chapter 228 which can be given effect without the invalid provision, word, phrase, clause or application, and to this end the provisions, words, phrases, and clauses of Laws 1981, Chapter 228 are declared to be severable. Approved May 19, 1981 Sa 144.346 Information to parents The professional may inform the parent or legal guardian of the minor patient of any treatment given or needed where, in the judgment of the professional, failure to inform the parent or guardian would seriously jeopardize the health of the minor patient. Laws 1971, c. 544, § 6, eff. May 27, 1971. 6a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA THIRD DIVISION Civil No. 3-81-538 Filed April 3, 1986 —<>— JANE HODGSON, M.D.; ARTHUR HOROWITZ, M.D.; NADINE T., JANET T., ELLEN Z., HEATHER P., MARY J., SHARON L., KATHY M., and Jupy M., individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated; DIANE P., SARAH L. and JACKIE H.; MEADOWBROOK WOMEN’S CLINIC, P.A.., PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MINNESOTA, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; MIDWEST HEALTH CENTER FOR WOMEN, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; Wom. EN’S HEALTH CENTER OF DULUTH, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, a Plaintiffs, —_V— THE STATE OF MINNESOTA; RUDY PERPICH, as Governor of the State of Minnesota; HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III, as Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, Defendants. > Jane Hodgson, M.D., et al, Plaintiffs, en The State of Minnesota, et al, Defendants. 7a ORDER The matter having come before this Court on the trial of the above captioned case and the Court having made certain rulings on the record pursuant to the agreement of counsel, it is on this 3rd day of April, 1986. ORDERED that the attached caption be substituted in all future filings with the Court. /s/ DONALD J. ALSOP Honorable Donald J. Alsop, U.S.D.J. 8a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA THIRD DIVISION 3-81 CIV 538 oo Jane Hodgson, M.D.; Arthur Horowitz, M.D.; Michelle Roe, Alice Roe, Diane Roe, Nadine T., Janet T., and Ellen Z.: individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly sit- uated; Lauren Z.; Meadowbrook Women’s Clinic, P.A., Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, Midwest Health Center for Women, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; Women’s Health Center of Duluth, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, Plaintiffs, —_—V.— The State of Minnesota; Rudy Perpich, as Governor of the Stte of Minnesota; Hubert H. Humphrey, III, as Attorney Gen- eral of the State of Minnesota, Defendants. —~<+>__ NOTICE OF APPEAL NOTICE Is HEREBY GIVEN that The State of Minnesota, Rudy Perpich and Hubert H. Humphrey, III, defendants above named, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the final judgment entered against defendants in this action on the 6th day of November, 1986. Dated: November 18, 1986. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III Attorney General State of Minnesota By: JOHN B. GALUS Special Assistant Attorney General 515 Transportation Building St. Paul, Minnesota 55155 Telephone: (612) 296-2654 Attorneys for Defendants 10a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA THIRD DIVISION 3-81 CIV 538 > JANE HODGSON, M.D.; ARTHUR HOROWITZ, M.D.;: MICHELLE ROE, ALICE ROE, DIANE ROE, NADINE T.. JANET T., and ELLEN Z., individually and on behalf of ali other persons similarly situated; LAUREN Z; MEADOW. BROOK WOMEN’S CLINIC, P.A., PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MINNESOTA, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, MID- WEST HEALTH CENTER FoR WOMEN, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; WOMEN’S HEALTH CENTER OF DULUTH, P.A., a nonprofit Minnesota corporation, Plaintiffs, —_—V.— THE STATE OF MINNESOTA; RUDY PERPICH, as Governor of the State of Minnesota; HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III, as Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, Defendants. oe FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION by JANET BENSHOOF, Esq., RACHAEL PINE, Esq. and SUZANNE LYNN, Esq. of New York, New York, appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. MASLON, EDELMAN, BORMAN & BRAND by WILLIAM PENTE- LOVITCH, Esq. of Minneapolis, Minnesota, appeared on behalf of plaintiff Planned Parenthood of Minnesota. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, III, Attorney General of the State of Minnesota by JOHN GALUS, special Assistant Attorney Genera] n . ee lla and PETER M. ACKERBERT, Special Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, St. Paul, Minnesota, appeared on behalf of defendants. ~~ The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial from February 10, 1986, until March 13, 1986, and for argu- ment on June 11, 1986. Having considered the evidence and being fully advised in the premises, the court makes the follow- ing: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs Jane Hodgson, M.D., and Arthur Horowitz, M.D., are licensed physicians engaged in the practice of obstet- rics and gynecology, including the performing of abortions, in Minnesota. 2. Plaintiff Meadowbrook Women’s Clinic, P.A., provides birth control, abortions and related medical services to its patients, including unemancipated minor women under the age of 18 at a medical facility located in St. Louis Park, Minnesota. 3. Plaintiff Planned Parenthood of Minnesota provides birth control, abortions and related medical services to its patients, including unemancipated minor women under the age of 18, at a clinic located in St. Paul, Minnesota. 4. Plaintiff Midwest Health Center for Women provides birth control services, abortions, and related medical services to its patients, including unemancipated minor women under the age of 18, at a clinic located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 5. Plaintiff Women’s Health Center of Duluth, P.A., pro- vides birth control services, abortions, and related medical ser- vices to it: patients, including unemancipated minor women under the age of 18, at a clinic located in Duluth, Minnesota. 6. Plaintiff Alice Roe was a 16-year old unemancipated minor and seven weeks pregnant at the commencement of this 12a action. Alice Roe asserts that she was at that time mature and that notification of her parents of her desire to have an abortion would not have been in her best interests. 7. Plaintiff Michelle Roe was a 15-year-old unemancipated minor who was pregnant at the commencement of this action. Michelle Roe asserts that she was at that time mature and that notification of her parents of her desire to have an abortion would not have been in her best interests. 8. Diane Roe was a 16-year-old unemancipated minor and eight weeks pregnant at the commencement of this action. Diane Roe asserts that she was at that time mature and that notification of her parents of her desire to have an abortion would not have been in her best interests. 9. Plaintiff Nadine T. was a 16-year-old unemancipated minor and pregnant as of the time of the filing of the amended complaint in this action. Nadine T. asserts that she was at that time mature and that notification of her parents of her desire to have an abortion would have not been in her best interests. 10. Plaintiff Janet T. was a 16-year-old unemancipated minor and pregnant as of the time of the filing of the amended complaint in this action. Janet T. asserts that she was at that time mature and that notification of her father of her desire to have an abortion would have not been in her best interests. 11. Ellen Z. was a 17-year-old unemancipated minor and pregnant as of the time of the filing of the amended complaint in this action. Ellen Z. asserts that she was then mature and that notification of her father of her desire to have an abortion would not have been in her best interests. 12. Plaintiffs Alice Roe, Michelle Roe, Diane Roe, Nadine T., Janet T., and Ellen Z. represent a class composed of preg- nant minors who assert that they are mature and that notifica- tion of one or both of their parents would not be in their best interests. 13. Lauren Z. is the mother of plaintiff Ellen Z. Lauren Z. asserts that notification of Ellen Z.’s father of Ellen Z.’s desire l3a to have an abortion would not have been in Ellen Z.’s best interests. 14. Defendants are the State of Minnesota, its Governor and its Attorney General. 15. In 1981, the Legislature of the State of Minnesota enacted Minn. Laws 1981, ch. 228, codified as Minn. Stat. § 144.343 (2)-(7). The statute was to become effective August 1, 1981. 16. Subdivision 2 of the statute generally requires physicians or their agents to attempt with reasonable diligence to notify the parents of an unemancipated minor under the age of 18 at least 48 hours before performing an abortion. Subdivision 3 defines ‘“*parent’’ as both parents if both are living, one parent if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through rea- sonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one. Subdivision 4 of the statute provides that the statutory notice requirement does not apply when the parents have consented to the abortion, when prompt action is needed to preserve the life of the minor, or when the minor reports that she is a victim of sexual or physical abuse or neglect as defined in Minn. Stat. § 626.556. Subdivision 5 subjects anyone performing an abortion in violation of Minn. Stat. § 144.343 (2)-(7) to criminal penalties and civil liability. 17. Subdivision 6 of the statute provides, in the alternative, that if subdivision 2 is ever enjoined by judicial order, then the same notice requirement shall be effective together with an optional procedure whereby an unemancipated minor may obtain a court order permitting an abortion without notice to her parents upon showing that she is mature and capable of giv- ing informed consent to an abortion or, if she is not mature, that an abortion without notice to her parents nevertheless would be in her best interests. - ir amended complaints, plaintiffs seek a declara- wll Pos tone that Minn. Stat. § 144.343 (2)-(7) violates the constitutions of the United States and the State of Minnesota and seek a permanent injunction against its enforcement. More particularly, plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their due = I l4a process rights, both on its face and as applied; that the statute violates the equal protection clause; and that the statute violates the due process, privacy and equal protection provisions of Article 1 of the Minnesota Constitution and also constitutes the delegation of administrative power to Minnesota state courts in violation of article 3 of the Minnesota Constitution. 19. Before the statute took effect on August 1, 1981, plain- tiffs sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the statute. 20. On July 31, 1981, the court temporarily restrained enforcement of subdivision 2 of the Statute, but denied plain- tiffs’ motion for an order temporarily restraining enforcement of subdivision 6. On March 22, 1982, the court preliminarily enjoined subdivision 2 but denied a preliminary injunction of subdivision 6. By virtue of these two rulings, the parental notifi- cation requirement and the judicial bypass option of subdivi- sion 6 went into effect on August 1, 1981, and have remained in effect since that date. 21. By memorandum order of January 23, 1985, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for par- tial summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs’ claims concerning the judicial bypass procedure of subdivision 6. Specifically, the court granted partial summary judgment for defendants by dis- missing all of plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims on jurisdic- tional grounds and by ruling that, on its face, the judicial bypass procedure in subdivision 6 does not violate the constitu- tional equal protection and due process rights of pregnant minors. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs should have the opportunity of a trial to prove their allegations that subdivision 6 is being applied unconstitutionally. Il. AVAILABILITY OF ABORTION SERVICES IN THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 22. Abortion services are less accessible in Minnesota than in the country as a whole. In Minnesota, 94% of the counties, or 82 out of 87 counties, have no readily available abortion pro- vider. In 1982, 44% of women in Mimnesota ages 15-44 lived in 1Sa a county with an abortion provider as compared to 72% of the same group in the country as a whole. 23. Access to information about abortion services in out- state Minnesota is comparatively limited. Many second trimes- ter patients come from counties with no abortion providers and thus with no media advertising or listing in telephone books for abortion services. . ions are performed in only four public and nine chan in naiie. and then only if a staff doctor requests it. There are only two hospitals where a patient can walk in and obtain an abortion: Hennepin County Medical Center and St. Paul-Ramsey. Virtually all of Minnesota s abor- tion providers are located in the two major metropolitan areas of the state: Duluth and Minneapolis-St. Paul. Many women have to travel long distances to obtain abortion services. . transportation problems facing women seeking Prey in Minnesota are illustrated by the experiences of those attending the Women’s Health Center Clinic in Duluth. The Health Center serves women from 24 counties in Minne- sota, 14 counties in Wisconsin, 4 counties in Michigan and the Canadian Province of Ontario. Some of the women served by the Health Center drive six to seven hours to get to the clinic. Airline flights are not available from some areas. Bus service from some areas is infrequent, requiring some women to spend ight in Duluth. _ yy ts travel long distances creates barriers to obtaining services. These barriers include increased cost, particularly if lodging is required; delayed pregnancy diagnosis and delayed treatment of post-abortion complications; jeopardized privacy of women away from home; and more hazardous travel during pense 30% of all abortions performed in Minnesota in 1982 were obtained by women who lived outside the Twin Cities met- ropolitan area, an increase of 20% since 1976. The near women [sic] has to travel to obtain a abortion, the less likely she is to obtain one. ee l6a 26. Women of all ages in Min . nesota have abortions later j me pregnancies than in the United States as a whole. In 1981, nn ; ~ oe et abortions in the United States had sec- er abortion, while 13.5% of all women obtaini . . *. . . tainin a ae in Minnesota did so in their second trimester. in na tit Pp Outside the metropolitan area who ns so during the second tri with only 10% of metro area women. iit 27. The cost of an abortion increases with gestational a — As — becomes more difficult and cantiie mea An t part of the doctor. The Meadowbrook Clinic 12-14 weeks, $275; 14-16 weeks, $596; 26 ne Sesion, $225; weeks, $550; 19-21 weeks, $650. After 21 cain tee - refers patients to St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital where a later bo. tion (22 weeks) costs $1600-1800; or to Wichita Kansas - - a late abortion (up to 24 weeks) costs $2000 cash. None of thece fees includes the cost of transportation or lodging ree ara will fund abortions for indigent women only if the peegnen is the result of rape or incest, or if continuing the pre nd would endanger the life of the woman. er 28. Unfavorable publicity surroundi i dures and delivery of services has rnonery aa. from performing abortions. For example, the Women’s Health Center in Duluth has been unable to contract local physicians to perform abortions. The Center has had to import physicians from small communities some distance from Duluth. Physi- clans are also concerned about the bombings of clinics and doc- tors’ offices. Consequent] ici : . y, some physicians ref abortion patients elsewhere. —— 17a Ill. APPLICATION OF MINN. STAT. § 144.343 IN MIN- NESOTA, AUGUST 1, 1981, TO MARCH 13, 1986. A. Compliance with Bellotti v. Baird, 432 U.S. 622 (1979) 1. Legal Standard 29. Minnesota Statutes § 144.343 (6) provides: (c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdic- tion shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appro- priate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that the preg- nant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an abortion upon her without notifica- tion of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to per- form the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman’s best interests would be served thereby. 30. With the exception of a hearing occurring shortly after the enactment of § 144.343, judges in Minnesota have faithfully applied the standards set forth in subdivision 6. Those judges who consider themselves unable to faithfully apply this stan- dard have consistently refused to hear bypass petitions. 31. Courts hearing bypass petitions regularly appoint guard- ians ad litem and provide appointed counsel to assist minors participating in bypass proceedings. . 32. Judges, public defenders, and guardians ad litem do not adhere to a single interpretation of either the “‘maturity’’ or ‘‘best interests’ standard. However, the variation in interpreta- tion of these standards does not exceed that typical of verbally expressed legal standards. Moreover, these differences of inter- 18a pretation do not produce diff, ceedings. erent results in actual bypass pro- 2. Expedition by pressing need these courts wi ' will hear a number of titions greater than that normally scheduled for a single rag These — also have in place procedures for hearing bypass peti- 10ns Outside of normal business hours on an emergency basis 34. Two or three days common! . y elapse between a minor’ first contact with the court and the hearing on her petition A delay of this duration creates an increased medical risk to an abortion patient, albeit small in magnitude, and may increase metropolitan counties is burdensome to minor petitioners However, this delay and its resultant burden are unavoidable and do not reflect a systemic failure to Provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious practicable manner. “ ; 35. Although the court systems of the non-metropolitan reas have had less frequent occasion to apply the judicial] bypass procedures than Hennepin, Ramsey, and St. Louis County courts, these court systems are acquainted with the stat- ute and h ied j “wee se nd have applied it conscientiously when called upon to do 36. Courts of non-metropoli j rt politan counties called upon to hear ms ‘Petitions generally have complied with their Statutory obligation to advise petitioners of their right to appointed coun- sel and to provide such counsel upon request. These courts also generally have appointed guardians ad ]j S i ers. litem to assist petition- 37. Despite conscientious efforts to provide an expeditious court bypass option in non-metropolitan areas, a number of 19a counties are not served by a judge who is willing to hear bypass petitions. A minor in one of these counties must travel to another county, most commonly a metropolitan county, to obtain an expeditious hearing of her petition. Although burden- some, this necessity also does not reflect a systematic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious practi- cable manner. 38. On August 13, 1981, the Supreme Court of Minnesota issued an order directing that all petitions under subdivision 6 should initially be filed in and considered by the county courts throughout the state or, in the cases of Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, in the juvenile division of the district court of those two counties. In the same order, the Minnesota Supreme Couirt directed that all appeals should be on the record to a judge of the district court, including the district courts of Hennepin and Ramsey counties. 39. In an amended and supplemental order effective July 1, 1984, the Supreme Court of Minnesota provided that in a uni- fied judicial district, an order denying a petition pursuant to the judicial bypass procedure shall be appealable on the record to two district court judges and if there be a division between those judges, the order denying the petition should stand. 40. No minor has been unable to obtain an expeditious appeal of an order denying her bypass petition. 3. Anonymity 41. Judges, public defenders, guardians ad litem, and court personnel involved in bypass proceedings are aware that Minn. Stat. § 144.343 (6) requires that bypass proceedings be kept strictly-confidential. Those involved in the proceedings take steps to insure confidentiality, including destroying interview notes, holding hearings in judges’ chambers rather than in open court, and referring to petitioners by first name only. In addi- tion, public defenders and courts have departed from normal] routines when adhering to the routine would have threatened confidentiality. 20a 42. The record discloses that the confidentiality of minors electing the judicial bypass option has been breached only in a small number of isolated cases. B. Burdens Imposed by Minn. Stat § 144.343 (2)-(7) 1. Judicial Bypass Procedure 43. As discussed above, scheduling practices in Minnesota courts typically require minors to wait two or three days between their first contact with the court and the hearing on their petitions. This delay may combine with other factors to result in a delay of a week or more. A delay of this magnitude increases the medical risk associated with the abortion proce- dures toa Statistically significant degree. Even a shorter delay may push the minor into the second trimester, when the abor- tion procedure entails Significantly greater costs, incon- vienence, and medical risk. 44. The experience of going to court for a judicial authoriza- tion produces fear and tension in many minors. Minors are apprehensive about the prospect of facing an authority figure who holds in his hands the power to veto their decision to pro- ceed without notifying one or both parents. Many minors are angry and resentful at being required to justify their decision before complete Strangers. Despite the confidentiality of the proceeding, many minors resent having to reveal intimate details of their personal and family lives to these strangers. Finally, minors are left feeling guilty and ashamed about their lifestyle and their decision to terminate their pregnancy. Some mature minors and some minors in whose best interests it is to proceed without notifying their parents are so daunted by the judicial proceeding that they forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or Carry to term. Some minors are so upset by the bypass proceeding that they consider it more difficult than the medical procedure itself. Indeed, the anxiety resulting from the bypass proceeding may linger until the time of the medical procedure and thus render the latter more difficult than necessary. 2la 2. Two Parent Notice Requirement 45. A minor who chooses not to go to court to avoid notify- ing her parents must notify both parents, if they are living, unless the second one cannot be located through reasonably dil- igent effort. The statute makes no exception fora non-custodial parent who is divorced or separated from the custodial parent, or for a parent who never married the custodial parent. No exception is made in the case of a parent, custodial or not, whom the minor considers likely to react abusively to notifica- tion, unless the minor is willing to declare that she is a victim of sexual or physical abuse. 46. If a minor declares that she is the victim of sexual or physical abuse, Minn. Stat. § 144.343(4)(c) obligates the recipi- ent of this information to report it to the local welfare agency, police department, or the country sheriff pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 626.556(3). This obligation binds counselors and physi- cians at abortion clinics. The welfare agency yaust report the information to the law enforcement agency, and vice versa. Minn. Stat. § 626.556(3). 47. Minors who are victims of sexual or physical abuse often are reluctant to reveal the existence of the abuse to those outside the home. More importantly, notification to government authorities creates a substantial risk that the confidentiality of the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy will be lost. Thus, few minors choose to declare they are victims of sexual or physical abuse despite the prevalence of such abuse in Minne- sota, as elsewhere. 48. In practice, the requirement that the minor notify both parents, if living, affects many minors in single parent homes who have voluntarily notified the custodial parent. No excep- tion is made, for example, in the case of a non-custodial — who for years has exhibited no interest in the minor’s tp op- ment. No exception is made for parents likely to react wit psy- chological, sexual or physical violence toward either the — or the custodial parent. Minors in such circumstances ass notify the non-custodial parent, or else go to court pe = zation to proceed without notifying the non-custodial parent. 22a Notification of an abusive or even a disinterested absent parent may reintroduce that parent’s disruptive or unhelpful participa- tion into the family at a time of acute stress. Alternatively, going to court to seek authorization introduces a traumatic dis- traction into the family relationship at a stressful juncture. The emotional trauma attending either option tends to interfere with and burden the parent-child communication the minor vol- untarily initiated with the custodial parent. 49. The two parent notification requirement also affects minors in two parent homes who voluntarily have consulted with one parent but not with the other out of fear of psycholog- ical, sexual, or physical abuse toward either the minor or the notified parent. Here, too, the minor must choose either to notify the second parent or to endure the court bypass proce- dure. Once again, the emotional trauma attending either option tends to interfere with and burden the parent-child communica- tion the minor voluntarily initiated with the custodial parent. 50. Instances, such as those described above, in which the requirement that the minor notify both parents of her decision interferes with and burdens parent-child ommunication volun- tarily initiated by the minor are not uncommon. Approximately 20-25% of minors who go to court for authorization are accom- panied by one parent or indicate that they have already con- sulted with one parent. 3. Forty-Eight Hour Waiting Period 51. Minors who elect to notify one or both parents by written notice, including those whose parents refuse to sign acknow!l- edgement forms despite having been told of their daughters’ decision, must wait until 48 hours after actual or constructive delivery of written notice. Constructive delivery of mailed notice occurs at noon on the regular mail delivery day following mailing. Thus, Minn. Stat. § 144.343 delays effectuation of a minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy by at least 48 hours and more commonly by 72 hours. $2. This statutorily imposed delay frequently is compounded by scheduling factors such as clinic hours, transportation 23a requirements, weather, a minor’s school and work commit- ments, and sometimes a single parent’s family and work com- mitments. In many cases, the effective length of the delay may reach a week or more. 53. Delay of any length in performing an abortion increases the statistical risk of mortality and morbidity. The increase in risk becomes statistically significant when the length of delay reaches one week. Moreover, even delays of less than one week may push a woman into the second trimester. Second trimester er entail significantly greater costs, inconvenience, and risk. | C. Results of Bypass Proceedings, August 1, 1981, to March 1, 1986 ; 54. The parties agreed to submit statistics reflecting disposi- tion of bypass petitions filed in Minnesota from August 1, 1981, to March 1, 1986, in the form of tables compiling infor- mation obtained by affidavit from court officials in each Min- nesota county. The table summarizing these statistics by judicial] district is appended hereto. 5S. During the period for which statistics have been com- piled, 3,573 bypass petitions were filed in Minnesota courts. Six petitions were withdrawn before decision. Nine petitions were denied and 3,558 were granted. 56. Anomalous circumstances surrounded several of the petitions which were denied. Three denials occurred in Henne- pin County. The Honorable Allen Oleisky, Judge of the Henne- pin County District Court, Juvenile Division, recalls denying two of the more than one thousand petitions he has heard. One of these petitions was brought by a minor who did not actually wish to have an abortion, but rather to marry her boyfriend. Judge Oleisky denied the petition in order to assist the minor in effectuating this desire by shifting responsibility for preventing the abortion from the minor to the court. The second denial involved a minor whom the judge determined was being coerced into having an abortion by her parents. After determining the 24a minor did not actually wish to have an abortion, Judge Oleisky denied the petition. The Honorable Gerald G. Martin, County Court Judge for the St. Louis County Family and Juvenile Court, granted all but one of the 225 or 226 petitions he heard during the period for which statistics were compiled. The petition Judge Martin denied was submitted by a rather immature 14 year old who was accompanied to court by her mother. The minor’s father had been out of contact with the minor and her mother for more than seven years. Rather than proceed to the best interests inquiry, Judge Martin denied the petition because he was cer- tain a notice mailed to the father’s last known address would not reach him. 57. The single denials occurring in Anoka, Mower, and Lyon Counties each occurred in the first petition brought in those respective counties. The Nobles County Court denied one of the two petitions brought there to date. A comparison to the experi- ence in the metropolitan counties, where the courts have heard large numbers of petitions and granted nearly all, suggests that some or all of the denials occurring in non-metropolitan coun- ties are due more to the courts’ unfamiliarity with the judicial bypass statute than to the petitioners’ immaturity or best inter- ests. For example, the Anoka County Court denied the first petition brought before it and then granted each of the 19 peti- tions heard during the remainder of the period for which statis- tics were compiled. D. Effectuation of State Interests 1. Asserted State Interests 58. The Minnesota legislature had several purposes in mind when it amended Minn. Stat. § 144.343 in 1981. The primary purpose was to protect the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss with their parents the decision whether to ter- minate their pregnancies. Encouraging such discussion was intended to achieve several salutory results. Parents can provide emotional support and guidance and thus forestall irrational and emotional decision-making. Parents can also provide infor- 25a mation concerning the minor’s medical history of which the minor may not be aware. Parents can also supervise post- abortion care. In addition, parents can support the minor’s psy- chological sequelae that may attend the abortion procedure. 59. The court finds that a desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies also motivated the legislature. Testimony before a legislative committee consider- ing the proposed notification requirement indicated that influ- ential supporters of the measure hoped it ‘‘would save lives’’ by influencing minors to carry their pregnancies to term rather than aborting. 2. Testimony as to Beneficial Effect of Minn. Stat. § 144.343 a. Judicial Bypass/Notice Requirement 60. The court heard testimony of judges who collectively have adjudicated over 90 percent of the parental notification petitions filed since August 1, 1981. None of these judges, on direct or cross examination, identified a positive effect of the law. Honorable Allen Oleisky has heard over 1,000 parental noti- fication petitions. He characterizes his function as ‘‘a routine clerical function on my part, just like putting my seal and stamp on it.’’ Moreover, he believes that the statute dissuades some minors from having abortions because of the fear of going to court in a distant city. Honorable Gerald Martin stated that he doesn’t ‘‘perceive any useful public purpose to what [he is] doing in these cases;’’ moreover, he finds the court experience difficult for minors. ‘‘] think they find it a very nervewracking experience,’’ he testi- fied. Honorable Neil Riley testified that he saw iio beneficial effects of the statute and further that he sympathized with ‘‘the predicament’”’ the minors were in. Honorable William Sweeney testified, ‘‘] know as a judge you would like to think your decisions are important, that you are providing some—you are doing some legitimate purpose. 26a What I have come to believe . . . [is] that really the judicial] function is merely a rubber stamp. The decision has already been made before they have gotten to my chambers. The young women I have seen have been very mature and capable of giving the required consent.”’ He further testified that ‘‘the level of apprehension that | have seen contrasted with even the orders for protection, which is a very intense situation, very volatile, and the custody ques- tions, is that the level of apprehension is twice what I normally see incourt. . . . You see all the typical things that you would see with somebody under incredible amounts of stress, answer- ing monosyllabically, tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of hands, you know, one young lady had her—her hands were turning blue and it was warm in my office. . . .”’ Mr. Paul Garrity, who adjudicated the same bypass petitions while a judge in Massachusetts, believed that the Massachusetts law accomplished nothing. ‘‘It just gives these kids a rough time. I can’t think it accomplishes a darn thing. I think it basi- cally erects another barrier to abortion.’ Further, he felt going to court was ‘‘absolutely’’ traumatic for minors. ‘‘You know, it was just—it was just another thing at a very, very difficult time in their lives,’’ he said. 61. Clinic counselors, who participate on a daily basis in the law’s implementation, are of a similar mind. Paula Wendt has counseled or supervised the counseling of more than 3,000 minors since the law went into effect. She concludes from her conversations with both parents and minors that the law has not promoted family integrity or communication. The law has, more than anything, disrupted and harmed families. On the basis of her experience, Tina Welsh concludes that the law has not benefitted intra-family communication. A minor’s unplanned pregnancy is a crisis which is not conducive to an attempt to build good family communications. Ms. Welsh does not believe that the law helps teenagers make a better decision about whether to [sic] have an abortion or continue the preg- nancy. Requiring a minor to tell either her parents or a judge about her pregnancy and the reasons she wants an abortion makes no beneficial contribution to the minor’s decision. 27a 62. The public defenders who participate in bypass proceed- ings believe that the law serves no beneficial] purpose. Its sole function, in their view, is to create a hurdle and impose addi- tional stress upon the young women. Similarly, the guardians ad litem do not perceive a beneficial purpose to their participa- tion in the process. 63. In most cases, minors seeking judicial authorization to terminate their pregnancies without informing their parents have already made up their minds before coming to court. Thus, judges, public defenders, and guardians ad litem find they impart no information and provide no counseling in the course of the bypass proceeding. Neither does the court system refer minors to their parents for guidance and support, as is demonstrated by the overwhelming rate of approval. At most, the bypass proceeding furthers the state’s interest in providing . Minors with guidance and emotional support only insofar as the abortion clinics have expanded their counseling of minors at the insistence of judges who hear the petitions. Counselors and administrators from the major Minnesota clinics testified, how- ever, that counseling of minors going to court and that of minors who do not differs merely in that the former are coun- seled about the court process and the latter are not. 64. Minors who seek authorization in Minnesota courts for confidential abortions tend to be above average in intelligence, education, and personal motivation. They also tend to be ambi- tious and concerned about the effect their decision will have on their futures. 65. Minnesota courts have denied only an infinitesimal pro- portion of the petitions brought since 1981. This fact indicates that in Minnesota immature, non-best interest minors rarely seek judicial authorization to terminate their pregnancies with- out parental involvement. Such minors either inform their par- ents, obtain an abortion outside Minnesota, or carry the pregnancy to term. Dr. Gary B. Melton suggested two partial explanations for this phenomenon. First, comparisons of personality function- ing between adolescents who abort and those who carry to term 28a generally show more adaptive, healthier functioning in the former group. Adaptation, in turn, marks a level of psychologi- cal and emotional development colloquially referred to as **maturity.”” Second, minor’s desire to maintain a measure of privacy of information about her personal matters is an impor- tant indication of individuation, a principal development task of adolescence. Indeed, defendants’ witness Dr. Vincent Rue testified that teenagers in the early stage of adolescence are much more likely to discuss a pregnancy than are teenagers in the mid-phase of adolescence who typically would desire more privacy, and teenagers in the latter stages of adolescence who would be the most private, and insist upon confidentiality. Adult women, in Dr. Rue’s view, would be most insistent upon maintaining the confidentiality of their decision. Therefore, while there may be ‘‘no logical relationship between the capac- ity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion,’’ H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408 (1981), some relationship does exist between the decision to abort in privacy and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of this decision. Conse- quently, a regulation that affects only minors who have elected to terminate their pregnancies and to do so in privacy tends inevitably to reach only mature minors and immature minors driven to this choice by their own best interests. Such a regula- tion will fail to further the State’s interest in protecting imma- ture, non-best interest minors. 66. Dr. Jane Hodgson, a leading practitioner in the field of obstetrics and gynecology, has given Minnesota’s parental noti- fication law considerable thought. She concludes, ‘‘I honestly think there is no benefit whatsoever.’ The law has created ‘nothing but problems’’ for her teenage patients. Testimony by plaintiffs’ other expert witnesses, each of unquestionably high standing in his or her respective field, corroborates this opin- ion. For example, Dr. Stephen Butzer testified, on the basis of his clinical experience, that when knowledge of an adolescent’s pregnancy or abortion is inadvertently communicated to one or both parents, the effect of the communication on the family or 29a relationship between adolescent and parents is ‘‘almost univer- sally negative.’’ 67. Defendants offered the court no persuasive testimony upon which to base a finding that Minnesota’s parental notifi- cation law enhances parent-child communications, or improves family relations generally. Dr. Vincent Rue possesses neither the academic qualifications nor the professional experience of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. More importantly, his testimony lacked the analytical force of contrary testimony offered by plaintiffs’ witnesses. Dr. Richard T. F. Schmidt does not prac- tice medicine in Minnesota, has never performed an abortion, and does not regularly counsel minors who wish to obtain abor- tions. Therefore, his testimony is less persuasive than the con- trary testimony of witnesses closer in each of these respects to the issue before the court. The court did not expect defendants to establish that in every case Minnesota’s parental notification law protects pregnant minors, promotes parent-child communication, and improves family relations generally. Defendants did establish that notifi- cation can serve these interests in individual cases. Defendants failed, however, to establish that the law promotes these values more than it undermines them. Five weeks of trial have pro- duced no factual basis upon which the court can find that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) on the whole furthers in any mean- ingful way the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity. b. Two Parent Requirement 68. National statistics reveal that approximately one out of every two marriages ends in divorce. There is no testimony in the trial of this case indicating that the divorce rate in Minne- sota differs from the national average. To the contrary, clinic experience indicates that only 50% of minors in the state of Minnesota reside with both biological parents. This figure is corroborated by one study indicating that 9% of minors in Min- nesota live with neither parent, 33% live with only one parent and thus 42% do not live with both biological parents. 30a 69. Studies indicating that family violence occurs in two mil- lion families in the United States substantially underestimate the actual number of such families. In Minnesota alone, reports indicate that there are an average of 31,200 incidents of assault on women by their partners each year. Based on these statistics, state officials suggest that the ‘‘battering’’ of women by their partners ‘‘has come to be recognized as perhaps the most fre- quently committed violent crime in the stace’’ of Minnesota. These numbers do not include incidents of psychological or sex- ual abuse, low-level physical abuse, abuse of any sort of the child of a batterer, or those incidents which are not reported. Many minors in Minnesota live in fear of violence by family members; many of them are, in fact, victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence. It is impossible to accurately assess the magnitude of the problem of family violence in Minnesota because members of dysfunctional families are characteristi- cally secretive about such matters and minors are particularly reluctant to reveal violence or abuse in their families. Thus the incidence of such family violence is dramatically under- reported. 70. Divorce or separation usually impairs family communi- cation severely. The non-custodial parent often has very little communication with the child. In addition, communication between divorced or separated spouses frequently is marked with the kind of hostility and angry vindictiveness that charac- terized the divorce or separation. The effect of compelling an adolescent to share information about her pregnancy and abortion decision with both parents in a divorced or separated situation can be harmful. The non- custodial parent often will reintegrate with the family in a dis- ruptive manner. The adolescent may be perplexed as to why the non-custodial parent should become an important factor in her life at this point, especially when the parent previously has paid her oittle [sic] attention and offered little support. Moreover, the testimony revealed no instances in which beneficial relations between a minor and an absent parent were reestablished fol- lowing required notification. Therefore, the minor may suffer disappointment when an anticipated reestablishment of her 3la relationship with the absent parent does not occur, as is most likely given the trying circumstances under which communica- tion is renewed. Involuntary involvement of the second biological parent is especially detrimental when the minor comes from an abusive, dysfunctional family. Notification of the minor’s pregnancy and abortion decision can provoke violence, even where the parents are divorced or separated. Studies have shown that vio- lence and harrassment may continue well beyond the divorce, especially when children are involved. The reaction of the custodial parent to the requirement of forced notification is often one of anger, resentment and frus- tration at the intrusion of the absent parent. Frequently, the custodial] parent fears that the absent parent will use the notifi- cation to threaten the custody rights of the custodial parent. Furthermore, a mother’s perception in a dysfunctional family that there will be violence if the father learns of the daughter’s pregnancy is likely to be an accurate perception. 71. Twenty to twenty-five percent of the minors who go to court either are accompanied by one parent who knows and consents to the abortion or have already told one parent of their intent to terminate their pregnancy. The vast majority of these voluntarily informed parents are women who are divorced or separated from spouses whom they have not seen in years. Going to court to avoid notifying the other parent burdens the privacy of both the minor and the accompanying parent. The custodial parents are angry that their consent is not sufficient and fear tht notification will bring the absent parent back into the family in an intrusive and abusive way. 72. Minors who ordinarily would notify one parent may be dissuaded from doing so by the two-parent requirement. A minor who must go to court for authorization in any event may elect not to tell either parent. In these instances, the require- ment that minors notify both biological parents actually reduces parent-child communication. 32a c. 48 Hour Waiting Period 73. Some period of mandatory delay between the time of actual or constructive notification of the minor’s parent and the abortion itself would reasonably effectuate the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors. A waiting period may allow par- ents to aid, counsel, advise, and assist minors in determining whether to undergo an abortion or to provide the physician with information which may be relevant to the medical judg- ments involved. 74. The interest effectuated by the State’s 48 hour waiting period could be effectuated as completely by a shorter waiting period. Therefore, to the extent the waiting period exceeds that necessary to allow parents to consult with minors contemplat- ing abortion, it fails to further the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 144.343 on several fronts. First, plaintiffs contend that § 144.343, subd. 2 is facially unconstitutional because it fails to afford minors the opportunity to obtain a judicial or adminis- trative waiver of the statute’s notification requirement. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (Ashcroft); Bellotti v. Baird, 432 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti I). Second, plaintiffs contend that even with the judicial bypass procedure of subd. 6 incorporated as subd. 2(c) by virtue of this court’s temporary restraining order of July 31, 1981, § 144.343(2)-(7), as applied in Minnesota, unduly bur- dens the fourteenth amnedment due process rights of pregnant minors. Even if § 144.343(2)-(7) is not unconstitutional in its entirety, plaintiffs contend that the statute’s requirement that minors notify both parents except when one parent is dead or the minor is unable to locate a parent with reasonable diligence, § 144.343(2), (3), is unconstitutional. Finally, plaintiffs con- tend the 48-72 hour waiting period imposed upon minors who choose to notify one or both of their parents in writing, see 33a Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(4), is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens a minor’s right to choose abertion. Noting ‘‘a requirement unduly burdensome in operation will be struck down even if not clearly invalid on its face,’’ see Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1011 (Ist Cir. 1981), this court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ as applied due process challenge to § 144.343(2)-(7). Hodgson v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 3-81 538 slip op. at 11 (Jan. 23, 1985). The court found that dispute existed with respect to material issues of fact including the confidentiality of the judicial bypass pro- cedure, delays and inconvenience, and lack of access to the courts in rural counties. This list of material facts was not all inclusive. Hodgson, slip op. at 10. Therefore, the action pro- ceeded to trial upon these issues and others. 1. STANDARD OF REVIEW Every woman has the fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy free from unwarranted government intrusion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Thornburgh v. American Col- lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, US. , 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2178 (1986) (specifically reaffirming Roe v. Wade); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983) (Akron) (similar). The right to choose abortion rather than childbirth is ‘‘not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.’’ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977). A state regulation that burdens an individual's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy by substantially limiting her access to the means of effectuating that decision is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977). Such a burden is imposed by a regula- tion that places an obstacle, absolute or otherwise, in the path of one seeking to exercise the protected right. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 (1977). 34a The term ‘‘undue burden’’ does not accurately describe the magnitude of interference necessary to trigger heightened judi- cial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected this analysis as ‘‘wholly incompatible with the existence of the fun- damental right recognized in Roe v. Wade.’’ Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-21 n. 1. Indeed, the Court’s traditional three tiered con- stitutional analysis exists to provide the courts a value-neutral framework by which to test the constitutionality of legislative enactments. Determining whether a burden is ‘“‘undue’’ as a threshold inquiry would leave availabie to judges no standard for making this determination but their individual assessment of a statute’s worth. Cf. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 713, 724 n. 9 (1982) (‘‘[W]hen a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of the classifi- cation do not vary simply because the objective appears accept- able to individual Members of the Court. While the validity and importance of the objective may effect the outcome of the anal- ysis, the analysis itself does not change.’’). Thus the term ‘undue burden’’ as used, for example, in Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74, refers to the ultimate constitutional issue under height- ened judicial scrutiny, rather than the threshold requirement for triggering such scrutiny. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1980); Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 630 n. 2 (D.R.1. 1984). Regulations imposing a constitutionally significant vurden on the free exercise of a protected right, including the right to choose to terminate one’s pregnancy, must be supported by a compelling state interest. Akron, 462 U.S. at 427; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. Such a regulation must also be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 686, 688 (1977). Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (Danforth). See Bellotti Il, 35a 433 U.S. at 633; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 693. Similarly, the burdens imposed by state regula- tion of abortion are no different for minors than for adults. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1985); see Bellotti I], 443 U.S. at 642 (‘‘[T]he potentially severe detriment facing a preg- nant woman is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, consider- ing her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional] maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor.’’). Therefore, the degree of burden that triggers heightened judicial scrutiny depends in no way upon whether the regulation applies to minor or adult women. The Supreme Court, however, long has recognized that a State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. This broader authority derives from the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing. Thus the difference between abortion stat- utes which regulate adults and those which regulate only minors is that the latter may be justified by a significant state interest that is not present in the case of an adult. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d at 1536. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 427 n. 10; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 693 n. 15; Dan- forth, 428 U.S. at 75. In addition, the State is not constitution- ally bound to employ the least burdensome method of effectuating its interests. Indiana Planned Parenthood Affili- ates Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pearson). Compare Pearson with Carey v. Population Ser- vices, 431 U.S. at 688 (state regulation burdening the right of adult women to terminate their pregnancies must ‘‘be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.’’). Instead, the state regulation must be rationally calculated to serve the state’s significant interests. Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 640 (D.R.I. 1984). As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and 36a long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interests of the minor. Bellotti IJ, 443 U.S. at 640. Therefore, a State’s interest in protecting immature minors will sustain the requirement of consent, either parental or judicial. Akron, 462 U.S. at 439. But even the State’s interest in encouraging paren- tal involvement in their minor children’s decision to have an abortion must give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or an immature minor whose best inerests are contrary to parental involvement. Jd. at 427 n. 10; Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. at 640. See Bellotti IT, 443 U.S. 649. Even under the less rigorous standard applicable to regula- tions burdening the rights of minor women to obtain an abor- tion, the burden of demonstrating a connection between the regulation and the asserted state policy falls on the state. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 696, 696 n. 22; Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1133. Neither a bare assertion that the burden is connected to a significant state policy, Carey, 431 U.S. at 696, nor sentiment or folklore, Jn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967), will satisfy this burden. Minnesota Statute § 144.343(2)-(7) requires minors either to notify their parents of their desire to obtain an abortion, or to obtain the judicial waiver of this requirement. The statute does not require parental consent or a waiver of parental consent. The parties agreed in response to a question from the court that the constitutional analysis applicable to notice requirements does not differ from that applicable to consent requirements. Moreover, despite the contrary suggestions of individual Mem- bers of the Supreme Court, see Akron, 462 U.S. at 469 (O’Con- nor, J., dissenting); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 338, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring), the court concludes that it is ‘‘paren- tal involvement”’ that an emancipated or mature minor must have an opportunity to avoid, without regard to whether that ‘tinvolvement”’ takes the form of notification or consent. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 427 n. 10; Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1132. See also Bellotti IJ, 443 U.S. at 647 (statute unconstitutional! because, inter alia, it failed to provide every minor an opportu- 37a nity to ‘‘go directly to a court without first consulting or notify- ing her parents’’). li. Minn, Stat. § 144.343(2) Subdivision 2 of § 144.343 prohibits performing an abortion upon an unemancipated minor, or upon a woman for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed because of a find- ing of incompetency, until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered to the minor’s par- ents or guardian or conservator. By its order of July 31, 1981, this court temporarily restrained defendants from enforcing the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2) because the court found it probable that plaintiffs would be successful in their challenge to subdivision 2. As a result of this restraining order, subdivi- sion 6 of § 144.343 took effect. This subdivision provides that subdivision 2 shall be enforced as though the judicial bypass provisions of subdivision 6 were incorporated as paragraph c of subdivision 2. Subdivision 6 further provides that if the court’s temporary injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have full force and effect, without being modified by the addition of the substitute paragraph, and the substitute paragraph shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction or restraining order is again in effect. A State choosing to encourage parental involvement in their minor child’s decision to have an abortion must provide an alternative procedure through which a minor may demonstrate that she is mature enough to make her own decision or that the abortion is in her best interests. Akron, 462 U.S. at 430 n. 10; see Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at-643-44. The unique nature and conse- quences of the abortion decision make it inappropriate ‘‘to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of a physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the con- sent.’’ Bellotti IT, 443 U.S. at 643; Planned Parenthood of Cen- tral Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). The Bellotti IJ court set forth the following requirements: 38a A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision inde- pendently, the desired abortion would be in her best inter- ests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed witfanonymity and suffi- cient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. 443 U.S. at 643-44. A statute that fails to previde such an alter- native to a consent or notification requirement imposes an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion. Jd., at 647. Without the judicial bypass option of subdivision 6, Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2) would unduly burden the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion. There are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether prevent, the minor’s efforts to exercise the right. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647. Young, pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulner- able to their parent’s efforts to obstruct an abortion. Jd.; Indi- ana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). The interests of the State and of these parents, must give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or of an immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement. See, e.g., Akron, 428 n. 10. Therefore, the court concludes that it must permanently enjoin defendants from enforcing Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2) as unmodi- fied by subdivision 6. i Ill. Constitutionality of Minnesota’s Parental Notification Law Plaintiffs contend that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) is uncon- stitutional as applied because it interferes with and burdens minors in the exercise of their constitutional rights and defen- dants have failed to demonstrate that the statute is necessary, narrowly drawn, and that it is accomplishing significant state interests. Defendants respond that plaintiffs’ position improp- 39a erly asks this court to disregard controlling Supreme Court precedent. In view of the fact that the relevant legal standards governing the constitutionality of parental notification require- ments are not in dispute, see Akron, 462 U.AS. at 439, defen- dants contend that the scope of this court’s inquiry properly is restricted to determining whether the statute complies with the guidelines set forth by the Bellotti I] plurality and subsequently approved by majority of the the Supreme Court in Planned — Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 ). Plainly, it is within neither the power nor the desire of this court to overrule Supreme Court precedent. E.g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983); Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1983). Nevertheless, the court is mindful that: Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may prop- erly be made the subject of judicial inquiry . . . and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (Citations omitted); see New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1260 (3d Cir. 1986). Compare Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1985) (ordinance limiting hours of solicitation held invalid) with City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986) (conducting de novo analysis of validity of similar ordinance). If the court properly may inquire into whether a change has occurred in the factual basis upon which the constitutionality of a statute depends, then surely an inquiry into the existence of a particular state of facts assumed but never demonstrated is at least equally proper. To this court’s knowledge, it is the first ever to examine a parental noti- fication or consent substitute statute in actual operation. See, e.g., Akron 462 U.S. 425 (enforcement of ordinance enjoined 40a before its effective date); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 683, (W.D.Mo. 1980) (stat- ute at issue in Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, enjoined on day after becoming effective); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 645 n. 25 (because appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting statute into effect, there existed an ‘‘absence of any evidence as to the operation of judi- cial proceedings under § 12s.’’). Initiation of the factual inquiry mandated by the Carolene Products court lies squarely within the province of a federal district court. Therefore, this court heard testimony and has made findings of fact with respect to plaintiffs’ allegation that Minn. Stat. § 144.343 (2)-(7) is not rationally related to the State’s asserted interests. Plaintiffs’ as applied challenge to the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) proceeded at trial on two levels. Plaintiffs’ more limited challenge attached the sufficiency of Minnesota’s compliance with the Bellotti IJ guidelines for establishing an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained. See Bellotti IJ, 443 U.S. at 643- 44. Plaintiffs’ broader challenge attacked the assumption, implicit in the Bellotti I] and Ashcroft decisions, that a notifica- tion or consent requirement imposed in conjunction with an appropriate alternative bypass procedure would serve the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors without unduly burdening the right of mature or best interests minors to obtain an abortion. The bulk of the testimony at trial related to whether requiring pregnant minors either to notify their parents of their desire to terminate their pregnancies or to go to court to obtain a waiver of the notification requirement actually furthers the State’s interest in proiecting pregnant minors. The court heard testi- mony of at least 37 witnesses who spoke to this issue. Only two of these witnesses related facts and expressed opinions from which a court could draw a reasonable inference that the statute does young women more good than harm. Neither of these wit- nesses, Dr. Vincent Rue or Dr. Richard T.F. Schmidt, has any direct contact with minors affected by Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)- (7). Neither witness counsels minors on a regular basis concern- ing the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy, neither 4la witness performs abortions, and neither witness sees minors who have had abortions on a regular basis. Of the remaining witnesses who spoke to the issue whether Minn. Stat. § 144.343 effectuates the State’s interest in protect- ing pregnant minors, all but four of these are personally involved in the statute’s implementation in Minnesota. They are judges, public defenders, guardians ad litem, and clinic coun- selors. None of these witnesses testified that the statute has a beneficial effect upon the minors whom it affects. Some testi- fied the law has a negligible effect upon intra-family communi- cation and upon the minors’ decision-making process. Others testified the statute has a deleterious effect on the well-being of the minors to whom it applies because it increases the stress attendant to the abortion decision without creating any corre- sponding benefit. Thus five weeks of trial have produced no factual basis upon which this court can find that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) on the whole furthers in any meaningful way the state’s interest in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity. The court has considered the possibility that the statute’s existence encourages immature, non-best interest minors to tell their parents, and that this intangible effect is not amenable to proof at trial. The court does not believe this to be the case. First, several witnesses who testified at trial were involved in providing abortions to minors both before and after the enact- ment of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). These witnesses could have testified as to a change in the level of parental participa- tion occurring at about the time of the statute’s effective date. Although these and other witnesses testified that a sizable pro- portion of minors seeking an abortion in Minnesota voluntarily notify at least one parent of their intention, none testified that this proportion changed at or around the effective date of the Minnesota parental notification law. Furthermore, the testimony indicates that the sort of inde- pendent self-assessment by the minor of her own maturity sug- gested by this scenario actually does not occur as a result of the statute. Although the major abortion providers in Minnesota inquire into a minor’s maturity in the course of the informed consent process, abortion providers to not decline to assist 42a minors because of their immaturity with any frequency. To the contrary, the testimony revealed the major providers tend to resolve any doubts as to a minor’s maturity by referring her to the judicial bypass system. These minors are almost universally successful in obtaining judicial waivers. Thus there appears to be little self-selection among those minors who come to the clin- ics initially without both parents. Instead, any self-selection as to maturity occurring among pregnant minors appears to be a result of the natural maturation process, rather than an effect of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). As descTibed in finding of fact number 65, the desire on the part of minors to retain their pri- vacy with respect to the abortion decision is, at least in part, a result of the maturation process. Therefore, it does not appear Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) has any greater beneficial effect upon immature minors than it does upon mature minors and minors whose best interests are not served by notification. In view of the foregoing, the court finds as a matter of fact that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) fails to serve the State’s asserted interest in fostering intra-family communication and protecting pregnant minors. This is not a case in which the State merely has failed to demonstrate that the challenged statute employs the alternative means of effectuating its interest that is least burdensome upon the rights of the affected individuals. See Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n, Inc. v. Pear- son, 716 F.2d 1127, 1134 (7th Cir. 1983) (state is not constitu- tionally required to provide the least burdensome alternative to notification.). Similarly, this is not a case in which the legisla- ture has utilized a yardstick that is imprecise or even unjust in particular cases. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S 398, 425 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (over-inclusiveness of parental-notice requirement does not undercut its validity). Instead, Minn. Stat. § 144.1343(2)-(7) imposes the substantial burden of obtaining a judicial waiver of the parental notification require- ment upon a group of minors composed a.most entirely of either mature minors or minors whose best interests are not served by notification. This substantial burden is not justified by the state’s interests in encouraging intra-family communica- tion and protecting immature minors because Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) fails to further either of those interests in any 43a meaningful way. When, as here, the state’s asserted interest fails to justify the burden imposed upon pregnant minors by an abortion regulation, the Supreme Court has invalidated such regulations as unduly burdensome upon the rights of pregnant minors. Bellotti II 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979); Planned Parent- hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). This court does not, however, write on a clean slate in deter- mining the constitutionality of Minnesota’s parental notifica- tion statute. The Supreme Court carefully delineated the elements of the alternative procedure states must employ if they wish to require parental consent or notification prior to abor- tion. Bellotti IT, 443 U.S. at 643-44. Although the Court’s dis- cussion of the necessary alternative procedure appears in a plurality opinion and at least arguably was unnecessary to the decision in the Bellotti I] case, the Supreme Court left no doubt as to its commitment to the Bellotti I] procedure in Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). Noting its Statement in Akron that the relevant legal standards with respect to parental-consent requirements are not in dispute, 462 U.S. at 439, the Court treated a challenge to the constitutional- ity of Missouri’s consent/bypass statute as an issue purely of statutory construction. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491. Because the Missouri statute at issue could fairly be construed to comply with the Bellotti I] requirements, it avoided any constitutional infirmities. Jd. at 493. Because no court has had occasion to consider the actual effect of a consent/bypass or notification/bypass statute in operation, plaintiffs contend the issue now before this court is far more complex than the statutory interpretation issue addressed by the Ashcroft court. Indeed, it appears to this court that the prophecy with which Mr. Justice Stevens closed his concurrence in Bellotti I] is fulfilled.’ Nevertheless, this court is 1 In arguing that the Bellotti 1] case presented the Supreme Court no occasion to render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the alter- native procedure recommended in Justice Powell's plurality opinion, Justice Stevens predicted ‘‘a real statute—rather than a mere outline of a possible statute—and a real case or controversy may well present questions thai appear quite different from the hypothetical questions Justice Powell has elected to address.’’ 433 U.S. at 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). 44a bound by applicable Supreme Court precedent. E.g. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 534 (1983); Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1983). This court has made factual findings as to the effect of Minnesota’s parental notification law as it affected the minors to whom it applied between its effective date in 1981 and trial in 1986. Were this court writing on a clean slate, it could not uphold the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) under the intermediate scrutiny appropriate in challenges to regulations that burden the funda- mental rights of minors. But it is not this court’s place to deter- mine the assumptions upon which the Supreme Court based its holdings in Bellotti I] and Ashcroft. Nor is it this court’s place to determine whether the facts actually demonstrated at trial comport or conflict with any assumptions the Supreme Court may have made. The Supreme Court directs that this court’s inquiry be limited instead to an issue purely of statutory con- struction: whether Minnesota provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with established legal standards. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491-92. Minnesota Statute § 144.343(2)-(7) satisfies these legal stan- dards. The court has found twat Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) cor- rectly directs courts hearing bypass petitions to conduct the inquiry required by the Be//otti I] court. Although the language of the Minnesota statute with respect to maturity varies slightly from that of the Bellotti I] decision, the requirement that the woman be ‘‘mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion’’ is the functional and legal equivalent of the Supreme Court’s requirement that the minor be ‘‘mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion deci- sion, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes.’’ See Bellotti I], 443 U.S. at 643. Arguably, however, the statute’s requirement that the court inquire in the case of an immature minor ‘‘whether the per- formance of an abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best inter- ests’’ differs from the Court’s inquiry whether ‘“‘the desired abortion would be in her best interests.’’ See id. at 644. Indeed, testimony indicates that some Minnesota courts consider 45a whether the abortion itself is in the minor’s best interests, while others examine whether avoiding parental involvement in the minor’s decision, whatever it may be, is in the minor’s best interests. This court, however, perceives that the former inquiry imposes the greater burden upon the minor in terms of what she must demonstrate before proceeding without involving her par- ents. Because the Supreme Court’s language approves the imposition of this more restrictive standard, this court con- cludes that the practice of some Minnesota courts of interpret- ing Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) to require a less intrusive and less burdensome inquiry does not violate the legal standards set forth in Bellotti I] and approved in Ashcroft. The court further finds that judges who hear the bypass peti- tions in Minnesota faithfully apply the standards set forth in Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6), and those judges who consider them- selves unable to faithfully apply the standard have consistently refused to hear bypass petitions. Furthermore, the court finds that Minnesota courts have established procedures to assure the minors’ anonymity, and to expedite both the initial hearing and any subsequent appeal. Finally, the court finds that the delays which do attend the bypass proceedings in practice, although burdensome to minor petitioners, do not reflect a systematic failure to provide a judicial bypass procedure created by Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6), as presently executed by Minnesota courts and the other offices that participate in the bypass proceedings, coplies with the procedural requirements set forth in Bellotti J] and approved in Ashcroft. Therefore, the court must reject plaintiffs’ challenge to Miuinnesota’s notification/bypass requirement as a whole. IV. Two Parent Notification Requirement Subdivision 3 of Minnesota Statute § 144.343 identifies the individuals entitled to notification as ‘‘both parents of the preg- nant woman if they are both living, one parent of the woman if only one is living or if the second cannot be located through rea- sonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one.”’ Plaintiffs contend the statute’s two parent notice requirement unduly burdens the exercise by 46a minors of the right to seek an abortion. The court finds that this requirement places a significant burden upon pregnant minors who do not live with both parents. Particularly in these cases, notification of an abusive, or even a disinterested, absent par- ent has the effect of reintroducing that parent’s disruptive or unhelpful participation into the family at a time of acute stress. Similarly, the two parent notification requirement places a sig- nificant obstacle in the path of minors in two parent homes who voluntarily have consulted with one parent but not with the other out of fear of psychological, sexual, or physical abuse toward either the minor or the notified parent. In either case, the alternative of going to court to seek authorization to pro- ceed without notifying the second parent introduces a traumatic distraction into her relationship with the parent whom the minor has notified. The anxiety attending either option tends to interfere with and burden the parent-child communication the minor voluntarily initiated with the custodial parent. The State has the burden of demonstrating that its interest in encouraging parental consultation justifies the burden imposed upon pregnant minors by the statute’s two parent notification requirement. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Interna- tional, 431 U.S. 678, 696 n. 22 (1977); Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1133. The Supreme Court has concluded that the requirement of obtaining both parent’s consent does not unconstitutionally burden a minor’s right to seek an abortion ‘‘[a]t least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home.”’ Bellotti IJ, 443 U.S. at 649. When all three live together, both the father and mother have an interest—one normally supportive—in helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of the daughter. Jd. This court concludes, how- ever, that a regulation requiring notification of both parents even when the nuclear family unit either has broken apart or never formed is not reasonably designed to further the State's interest in protecting pregnant minors. To the contrary, the court finds that the regulation adversely affects communication voluntarily initiated with one parent in a large number of cases. Indeed, 20 to 25% of minors seeking judicial authorization to proceed with an abortion without parental notification are accompanied to court by one parent, 47a or at least have obtained the approval of one parent. In these cases the necessity either to notify the second parent despite the agreement of both the minor and the notified parent that such notification is undesirable, or to obtain a judicial waiver of the notification requirement, distracts the minor and her parent and disrupts their communication. Thus the need to notify the second parent or to make a burdensome court appearance actively interferes with the parent-child communication volun- tarily initiated by the child, communication assertedly at the heart of the State’s purpose in requiring notification of both parents. In these cases, requiring notification of both parents affirmatively discourages parent-child communication. Thus the court concludes that this requirement fails to further the State’s interest. Because ‘‘state restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve any significant state interest,’’ Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. at 693; Dan- forth, 428 U.S. at 75, the court must enjoin defendants from enforcing the two parent notification requirement of Minn. Stat.§ 144.343. - V. Waiting Period Minnesota Statute § 144.343(2) prohibits performing an abortion upon an unemancipated minor until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered to the minor’s parenis. The notice may be delivered personally to the parent by the physician or his agent, or notice may be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at his usual place of abode, with constructive delivery occurring at 12:00 noon on the next day upon which regular mail delivery takes place, sub- sequent to mailing. Thus minors in Minnesota who choose to notify their parents in writing of their determination to obtain an abortion must wait at least 48 hours, and more commonly approximately 72 hours, between initiating the notification pro- cess and the abortion itself. Lower courts have split on the issue of the constitutionality of mandatory waiting periods imposed upon minor women seeking abortion. Some courts, including this one, have found that a reasonable period of notice is permissible to allow par- 48a ents to aid, counsel, advise, and assist their minor daughter in connection with the determination to undergo abortion or to provide the physician with information which may be relevant to the medical judgments involved. Akron Center for Repro- ductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1138-39 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Hodgson v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 3-81-538, slip op. at 5 (D. Minn. March 22, 1982). The Rosen court concluded that the notification requirement which the Supreme Court explicitly upheld for immature minors in Matheson would be an empty formalism with no practical effect if the abortion could proceed before parental consultation could take place. 633 F. Supp. at 1139. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has invalidated an Illi- nois statute requiring pregnant minors to wait 24 hours between notifying their parents and obtaining an abortion. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1985). The Zbaraz court based its decision upon its conclusion that the mandatory waiting period placed a direct and substantial burden on women who seek to obtain an abortion, and that the waiting requirement did not significantly further the State’s interest in promoting consultation when combined with the notification requirement because the notifi- cation requirement itself adequately promotes the State’s inter- est. 763 F.2d at 1537-38. The court further concluded that the statutory alternatives to the mandatory waiting period, such as having both parents accompany the minor to the place the abor- tion will be performed or having both parents submit signed, notarized statements indicating they have been notified, do not redeem the statute. Jd. at 1538. The Seventh Circuit based its decision in large part upon its prior decision in Jndiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n, Inc. v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983). There the court upheld a mandatory waiting period to the extent it delayed the abortion for the purpose of effective constructive notice. Jd. at 1142-43. Requiring delay after notification has been effected, however, is impermissible. Id.; see Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1538. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals three times has affirmed district court decisions that a mandatory 48 hour waiting period, applicable to adult and minor women alike, is unconsti- 49a tutional. See Women’s Services, P.C. v. Thone. 69 568-69 (8th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded for ur sideration sub nom. Kerrey v. Women’s Services ! ‘ U.S. 1126 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kanse Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 866 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'¢ 462 (1983); Women’s Services, P.C. v. Thone, 636 F 2c 2 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated for further consideration su: Thone v. Women’s Services, P.C., 452 U.S. 911 (1981) state of Missouri did not appeal the Eighth Circuit's decision u Ashcroft invalidating the statute’s 48 hour waiting period This court agrees with the district court for the Northern Dis- trict of Ohio that a notification requirement would be an empty formalism without practical effect if the abortion could proceed before the parental consultation could take place. See Rosen, 633 F. Supp. at 1139. However, the waiting period must effec- tuate actual consultation without unduly burdening the oppor- tunity of pregnant minors to obtain an abortion. In view of the logistical obstacles facing Minnesota women who live in coun- ties without a regular provider of abortion services, the court believes a 48 hour waiting period is excessively long. Travel to an abortion provider, particularly in winter from a rural area in Minnesota, can be a very burdensome undertaking. A require- ment that a minor either bear this burden twice or spend up to three additional days in a city distant from her home cannot be justified by the State’s interests in encouraging parental consul- tation, because a shorter waiting period would effectuate that interest as completely. Therefore, the court concludes that if a minor chooses to notify her parent by certified mail as provided in Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)(b), the State properly may deem delivery to occur at 12:00 noon on the next day on which regu- lar mail delivery takes place, subsequent to mailing. The State further may impose some reasonable waiting period subsequent to delivery of notification during which consultation may occur. Under conditions presently existing in Minnesota, how- ever, 48 hours is an unreasonable waiting period. Therefore, the court will enjoin defendants from enforcing the 48 hour waiting period imposed by Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2). 50a V1. Severability Defendants contend that the two parent notification require- ment and the 48 hour waiting period, which the court today holds unconstitutional, should be severed from the remainder of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). Subdivision 7 of Minnesota’s parental notification statute provides: If any provision, word, phrase or clause of this action or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provi- sions, words, phrases, clauses or application of this section which can be given effect without the invalid provision, word, phrase, clause or application, and to this end the provisions, words, phrases, and clauses of this section are declared to be severable. This language clearly evinces the legislature’s intent that any unconstitutional portions of Minnesota’s parental notification statute amenable to severance should be severed. Subdivision 7 creates a ‘‘presumption of divisibility’’ and places ‘‘the burden . . . on the litigant who would escape its operation.”’ Carter v. Carter Co., 298 U.S. 238, 335 (1936) (Cardozo, J.). See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 643 (1984); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983). Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law. See Regan 468 U.S. at 653; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932. Severance is improp , however, if the offending language is ‘‘inseparably intertwined’’ within a subsection of the law. Women’s Services, P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated for further consideration on other grounds sub nom. Thone v. Women’s Services P.C., 452 U.S. 911 (1982). The 48 hour waiting period in Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) is severable from the remainder of the statute. Excising the words ‘at Jeast 48 hours after’? from subdivision 2 does not disable the statute from reasonably effectuating the legislature’s intent. Sla Accordingly, the court holds that this language is severable from the remainder of Minn. Stat. § 144.343. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 463 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-673 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1985). The language of subdivision 3 defining ‘‘parent’’ as ‘‘both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one par- ent of the pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one’”’ is inseparably intertwined within Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). The Minnesota legislature would not have enacted a statute requiring notification of a minor’s parents prior to the abortion without identifying the individuals entitled to such notice. More importantly, the remainder of the statute cannot be given effect without the offending language. See Minn. Stat. § 144.343(7). In addition, this court is ill-situated to determine what alter- native definition the legislature would employ to remedy the constitutional infirmity identified in this decision. For example, the legislature may determine that requiring notice only to one parent is the functional equivalent of requiring notice to both in families enjoying healthy communication, while requiring notice only to one parent permits the notified parent in an intact but dysfunctional family to exercise his or her judgment con- cerning the wisdom of notifying the other parent. Alternatively, the legislature may determine that notification of both parents is appropriate when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home. See Bellotti IJ, 443 U.S. at 649. Other options also may suggest themselves to the legislature. Any of these choices, however, would leave Minn. Stat. 144.343 (2)-(7) with little resemblance to the program actually intended by the Minnesota legislature. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, U.S. : , 106 Sup. Ct. 2169, 2181 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 472 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Therefore, the definition of parent contained in Minn. Stat. § 144.343(3) is not severable from the remainder of the statute. The court must enjoin defendants from enforcing Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) in its entirety. 52a ORDER Upon the foregoing, the evidence presented at trial, the sub- missions and arguments of the parties, and the record as pres- ently constituted, IT Is ORDERED That Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) be and the same hereby is declared unconstitutional. IT Is FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk enter judgment as follows: IT Is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED That Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7) is unconstitutional. IT Is FURTHER ORDERED That defendants be and the same hereby are permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). It Is FINALLY ORDERED That the following injunction shall issue without security: IT Is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED That defen- dants are permanently enjoined from enforcing the provi- sions of Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7). DATED: November 6, 1986. Donald D. Alsop //s// DONALD D. ALSOP Chief U.S. District Judge 53a UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Nos. 86-5423-MN and 86-5431-MN —— Jane Hodgson, M.D.; Arthur Horowitz, M.D.; Nadine T., Janet T., Ellen Z., Heather P., Mary J., Sharon L., Kathy M., and Judy M., individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated; Diane P., Sarah L. and Jackie H.; Meadowbrook Women’s Clinic, P.A., Planned Parent- hood of Minnesota, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation; Midwest Health Center for Women, P.A., a nonprofit Min- nesota corporation; Women’s Health Center of Duluth, a nonprofit Minnesota corporation. P a seeemaeneee Appellees, Vv. The State of Minnesota; Rudy Perpich as Governor of the State of Minnesota; Hubert H. Humphrey, III, as Attorney Gen- eral of the State of Minnesota, Appellants. +> Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of P.A., Minnesota Argued: June 9, 1987 Filed: August 27, 1987 > Before LAY, Chief Judge, Heaney, Circuit Judge, and ROSENN,* Senior Circuit Judge. > * Max Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. S4a ROSENN, Circuit Judge. This appeal raises the constitutionality of a Minnesota stat- ute, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 144.343(2)-(7) (1987), which requires those providing abortions for minors’ to give notice of the pending abortion, when possible,” to both of the minor’s par- ents at least forty-eight hours before the abortion is to occur. The statute further provides that if the notification requirement is ever restrained or enjoined, as it has been since 1981, then the minor shall have the choice of either notifying both parents forty-eight hours before the abortion or demonstrating to the court in an expedited confidential proceeding either that she is ‘‘mature and capable of giving informed consent’’ or that the performance of an abortion without notification of her parents would be in her best interests. We conclude that a state may not constitutionally require a minor to notify her parents of her intent to have an abortion without providing the option of an appropriate alternative court procedure by which the minor may demonstrate either her maturity or that the performance of an abortion without notifi- cation to her parents would be in her best interests. We further conclude that even where there is the option of such an alterna- tive court procedure, a state may not constitutionally require the minor to always notify both of her parents whenever possi- ble, and that this requirement in the present statute is not sever- able from the remainder of the statute. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s judgment permanently enjoining the State of Minnesota from enforcing the provisions of Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 144.343(2)-(7). l Specifically, the statute covers unemancipated minors and women for whom a conservator has been appointed pursuant to state law because of a finding of incompetency. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343(2) (1987) (subd. 2). The statute also contains a number of exceptions, termed ‘‘limitations,’’ which we shall discuss further infra. For our purposes here, however, we will refer generically to those whom the statute covers as ‘‘minors.”’ 2 Again, the specific statutory requisites will be discussed further, infra. 5Sa l. In general, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343 provides guidelines for the treatment of pregnancy, venereal disease, alcohol and drug abuse, and abortions for minors. For example, § 144.343(1) (subdivision 1), which is not at issue, provides that a “‘minor may give effective consent for medical, mental and other health services to determine the presence of or to treat pregnancy and conditions asscciated therewith, venereal dis- ease, alcohol and other drug abuse, and the consent of no other person is required.’’ The constitutionality of the remainder of the statute, which deals with abortion treatment for minors, is at issue. Subdivision 2 (Subd. 2) is a notification provision, and has been under temporary restraint (and later preliminary injunc- tion) since July 31, 1981, the day before it was to go into effect. The measure states that no abortion may be performed ‘‘upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a guard- ian or conservator has been appointed . . . until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered . . .’’ to her ‘“‘parent.’’ It also provides for the mechanics of effecting notice. Subd. 2(a) provides for persona! notice by the physician or his agent. In the alternative, subd. 2(b) provides that notice may also be effected ‘‘by certified mail addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of the parent with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee . . . .”’ If notice is mailed, ‘‘[t)ime of delivery [is] deemed to occur at 12 o’clock noon on the next day on which regular mail takes place, subsequent to mailing.’’ Thus, when notice is ma led, as a practical matter the waiting period may become 72 hours. Further, the district court found that in many cases ‘‘scheduling factors’’ may cause the effective length of the delay to reach ‘‘a week or more.’’ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986). Parent is defined in subd. 3 as ‘‘both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one.’’ Subd. 4 provides S6a that no notice is required if: (a) the attending physician certifies that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death and there is insufficient time to provide the required notice; or (b) the abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are entitled to notice; or (c) the pregnant minor declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse as defined in the statute. In the latter case, notice of abuse is to be made to the proper authorities. Although not required, it appears that most or all ‘‘abortion providers’’ require a prior report of abuse before dispensing with notice under subd. 4(c). Subd. 5 is a penalty provision and subjects anyone perform- ing an abortion in violation of the statute to criminal penalties, and civil liability to any person wrongfully denied notification. Subd. 6 provides that if the notification provision of subd. 2 is ever enjoined by judicial order, as it has been since before its effective date, then during those periods of restraint a pregnant minor has the choice of either providing notice as set forth in subd. 2, or submitting to a ‘‘court bypass’’ procedure. Under the court bypass, a judge after an expedited confidential hear- ing, may authorize an abortion without parental notice after determining ‘‘that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion,’’ or that the performance of an abortion without notification would be in her best interests. The district court made a variety of factual findings with respect to the operation over the past five years of the court bypass procedure contained in subdivision 6. According to the court, confidentiality has generally been maintained. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763. Further, proceedings have gen- erally been expedited, so that minors have only had to wait two or three days between their first contact with the court and the hearing on their petitions. Jd. at 762-763. Thus, as with the notification delay, total delay (including scheduling problems) has been ‘‘a week or more.”’ Jd. at 763. This can increase both the cost and risk of an abortion. Further, the system frequently requires the pregnant minor to make two or three trips of often great distances, see id. at 761, which may in part be because by the time the court proceeding is over, it is too late in the day to still have the abortion. Judges have almost never denied a S7a minor a requested abortion; there were only nine instances, sev- eral of which were apparently justified (e.g., minor didn’t really want an abortion/changed her mind), and one of which was reversed on appeal. See id. at 765. The district court also found that the whole process produced a great deal of stress, and con- cluded that were the court writing on a clean slate it would have found the burdens greater than the benefits, of which the court found none. See id. at 775-76. The asserted benefit or purpose of the statute, as in part expressed at oral argument before this court, is to foster intra-family communication and to protect pregnant minors, by promoting parental involvement in the minor daughter’s abortion decision. The final provision in the statute, subd. 7, is a severability provision. It provides that if any part of the statute is held invalid, such invalidity should not affect any portion of the statute which can be given effect without the invalid portion. The statute was to become effective on August 1, 1981. On July 30, 1981, however, the plaintiffs, class action minors, a parent, four clinics, and two physicians, brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the statute violated due process on its face and as applied; (2) that the statute violated equal protection; (3) that as applied to estranged families the statute violated the due pro- cess and first amendment rights of custodial parents; and (4) that the statute violated various provisions of the Minnesota constitution. On July 31, 1981, the district court temporarily restrained enforcement of subd. 2 of the statute (the pure notice provi- sion), but not subd. 6. On March 2, 1982, the court issued a pre- liminary injunction against enforcement of subd. 2. On January 23, 1985, the district court granted partial sum- mary judgment in the defendant's favor on the plaintiffs’ state constitutional, equal protection, and facial due process claims against continued enforcement of the ‘‘notice/bypass’’ proce- dure, and accordingly dismissed those claims. Then, on Novem- ber 6, 1986, after a lengthy trial, the court held, inter alia, that: (1) the notification requirement, standing alone, was facially invalid; (2) the notice/bypass requirement was facially invalid to the extent it required a 48 hour waiting period instead of 58a some shorter period, and notification of both parents; (3) the 48 hour waiting period requirement was severable; (4) the two- parent notification requirement was not severable; (5) an ‘‘as applied’’ analysis of the notice/bypass procedure was barred by Supreme Court precedent; and (5) if an ‘‘as applied’’ analysis had not been barred, the district court would have found the statute unconstitutional as applied because it failed to serve the state’s asserted interests. Both sides appeal. Il. Plaintiffs first seek to keep permanent the current injunciton against the enforcement of subd. 2. They argue that subd. 2 is unconstitutional on its face, becuase it fails to afford mature minors and minors whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement, with an opportunity to obtain a judicial or admin- istrative waiver of the notification requirement. We agree. It is by now well established that, in general, any regulation restrictive of a woman’s right to choose an abortion must be justified by a ‘‘compelling’’ state interest; See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 54 U.S.L.W. 4618, 4621 (U.S. June 11, 1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1982); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972). Where minors are involved, however, the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate, and thus need only demonstrate a ‘“‘significant’’ state interest. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 427-28 n.10; Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 & n.15 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1975). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states may, in cer- tain circumstances, permissibly encourage parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion. See Planned Parent- hood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1982) (plurality portion of cpinion); Akron, 462 U.S. at 427-28 n.10, 439; H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640, 648 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti 11); Dan- forth, 428 U.S. at 75. 59a Nevertheless, the State’s right to regulate the activities of minors is not absolute. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1386 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642 (The potentially severe detriment facing a preg- nant woman is not mitigated by her minority. ‘‘Indeed, consid- ering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor.’’). For example, the Supreme Court has squarely held that ‘‘the State may not impose a blanket provision. . . requiring the consent of a par- ent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.’’ Dan- forth, 428 U.S. at 74. Rather, at least in consent cases, ‘‘[iJt is clear. . . that ‘the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is suffi- ciently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best inter- ests.’ ’’ Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40). See Bellotti Il, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48. The ration- ale for requiring this alternative procedure is clear: the State’s “‘significant’’ interest in encouraging parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision ‘‘must give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or of an immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement.’’ Akron, 462 U.S. at 428 n.10. In Bellotti II, supra, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion specifically reached the question of notice (as opposed to con- sent) in the context of a statute which required that an unmar- ried minor’s parents be notified whenever the minor child, as an alternative to obtaining her parents’ consent, sought court per- mission to have an abortion. The Supreme Court struck down the notice requirement, stating that such a requirement ‘‘would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion.’’ Jd. at 647. According to the Court, there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether prevent, the minor’s right to go to court. There is no reason to believe that this would be so in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But many 60a parents hold strong view® on the subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court. it would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most. We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity—if she so desires—to go directly to a court witho [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1061%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.