# Record and brief — Turnock v. Ragsdale

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1042%3A0

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 492 U.S. 916

## Text

DOCKET

‘*arta» ial interest in the patier..’

ane of risks

205. ). a pe information may be provided
post-operatively, shall be ided if desired by the
patient. Jd. Counseling must place in a room separate
pan in rcenige Suse, ant © cosas’ of they coumatiing
given is to be included in the patient's clinical record. /d.

App. 8

The subpart contains its own reporting requirement which

requires monthly reporting of each “on forms

provided by [the + yy A y, the regula-

tions prohibit an A em partareming Ghevkens o8 pe

+ =_ a gestational age exceeding twelve weeks.
.740.

B. Enforcement Policies

Net all of the provisions of challenged statutes and reg
ulations are being enforced. Since 1981, the Act and regu-

—— of procedures
(including abortions). ee ree
in to Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.

2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which refused to enforce,
in a criminal proceeding, that of a local ordinance

. ‘ fi j *
outside an A is similarly not being enforced, but the
evidence on this point is equivocal.

The defendants also contend that the on per
formance of second trimester abortions in ASTCs is not
enforced because it was considered the

for
S. 416, 103 8S. Ct. 2481 (1 Planned Parenthood As-
sociation, Inc..v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 8. Ct. 2517
(1983); and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 5.

C

App. 9
Ct 2582 (1963). An internal memorandum of the Depart
ment of Pubts Heath Steutg te See

uirement, was enjoined by Judge Kocoras in v.
arey, 579 F. . 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on Charles v. Daley, 749 F 2d

area of northwestern Illinois because his landlord
to renew his lease. The facility which he
was not in full compliance with the ASTCA

tive landlord his lease commitment. In addition,
officials © with enforcing the regulations told him
that they require “consiuerably more substantial

te)
rr

Rie! walt 5
itetest iste ine a | zl,

tei itl ik fie a :
a in bik
‘j i LF RH iy! i

Bea ao Har

z
:
>

aS
z
:

EES
:
i
fH

cE
=
H |
i:
4
F

trimester
dismissed. ore we vacate the portion of the
unction that pertains to it.

a]

However, we do not believe that the challenge to the
ing requirement of the ASTCA and regulations is
! defendants testified that this requirement
is no longer being enforced in light of Charles v. Carey,
579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), we have reviewed that
decision and cannot find anything in it which remotely
supports the conclusion that the requirement under chal-
a a. ony seperting uirement

by that decision was section 11(d) of Illinois
Abortion Act, which required the reporting to the Depart-

i

ment of the name of any diagnosed as having com-
ications from abortion. more general requirements
are quite different. Unlike its tations of non

district court’s concern that the State’s position on this
provision is asserted only in this litigation.

C

: The challenge to the application of the ASTCA and reg-
‘ulations to first trimester abortions is similarly not moot.

App. 14

While the requirement is apparently no longer applied to
the “occasional” abortion provider, the State continues to
maintain that it is free to apply the ASTCA to abortion
providers whose practice is “primarily devoted to’”’ per-
forming surgery, even if that “surgery” consists exclusive-
ly of first trimester abortions. This is in fact the situation
facing at least one of the named plaintiffs, Dr. Ragsdale.

Additionally, the evidence regarding the suspension/ rev-
ocation sanction in the MPA was, as we have noted, am-
2 A representative of the Department merely tes-
tified that any complaint ing this provision would
be “examined by the General Counsel’s for a deter-
mination of whether there would be any enforcement ac-
tion taken pursuant to that section.” He additionally tes-
tified that “to the best of [his] knowledge” the Depart-
ment would not enforce the section. While we admit that
it would be anomalous for the Department to take the

sition that “occasional” abortion providers need not be
icensed but that performance of such abortions could sub-
ject the physicians to revocation of their licenses to prac-
tice icine, the Department's ition is sufficiently
murky and the sanctions sufficiently 1 severe, that we be-
lieve a live controvery exists sane this requirement.
Doctors should not have to risk loss of their professional
licenses to explore the contours of the asserted non-
enforcement position. :

Ill

On the merits,* we must consider whether the require-
ments of the statutory and regulatory scheme violate the

* On appeal, various of the defendants and amici contend that
the district court did not properly weigh various of the factors
which are normally considered in issuing a preliminary injunction.
We note that the presentation of the case below focused almost
exclusively on the constitutionality vel non of the statutory scheme
or its component parts. None of the parties argued the traditional
factors governing the granting of preliminary relief to the district
(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 15

right to privacy (and to abortion) as established in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 710 (1973), and its prog-
eny. In Roe, the Court first set out the now familiar “tri-
mester” approach:

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end
of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting
its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother. .

410 U.S. at 164-65, 93 S. Ct. at 732.

In elaborating on this approach, the Court noted that
the State’s interest in the health of the mother becomes

compelling:

6 continied

court. Although no doubt its task was made more difficult by the
lack of assistance from the ies, the district court undertook

a thorough examination of t traditional factors, i.e., the lack
of an adequate remedy at law, irreparable harm, balance of harms,
likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. We
confine our discussion to the likelihood of success on the inerits,
that is, the governing lega! standards and their relationship to the
facts found below for two related reasons. First, the balancing of
the other factors is typically reviewed on an “abuse of discretion
standard” and we see no » Rng and second, we find insufficient
merit to any of the defendants’ or the amicus’ belated assertions
that this or that factor was given insufficient weight to add to
this already lengthy opinion. -

App. 16

in the light of present medical knowledge, . . . at ap-
roximately the end of the first trimester. This is so
use of the now-established medical fact, . . . that
until the end of the first trimester mortality in abor-
tion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.
It follows that, from and after this point, a State may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health. Examples of per-
missible state regulation in this area are requirements
as to the qualifications of the person who is to per-
aS | ee oe rson;
as tot ility in whi procedure is to be per-
formed, that is, whether it eS ee oe
be a clinic or some other place of less-than- ital
status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.

This means, on the other hand, that, for the period
of pregnancy prior to this “ ing” point, the at-
tending physician, in consultation with his patient, is
free to determine, without ‘or by the State,
that, in his medical a, patient’s pregnancy:
should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.

Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.

Since Roe, the Court, along with the lower federal
courts, has on numerous occasions clarified the constitu-
tional standards which apply to regulations aimed at both
first and second trimester abortions. Few restrictions on
first trimester abortions have been upheld. For example,
the Court upheld a requirement that all abortions be per-
formed by a licensed sician. Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9, 96 S. Ct. 170 (1975) (per curiam). This require-
ment, from being endorsed in dictum in Roe, was
upheld “the State retains an interest in ensur-
ing the validity of Roe’s factual assumption that ‘the first
trimester abortion [is] as safe for a woman as normal
childbirth at term,’ an assumption that ‘holds true only

App. 17

if the abortion is performed by medically competent per-
sonnel under tions insuring the maximum safety of
the woman.’” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 n.12, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2492
n.12 (quoting Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11, 96 S. Ct. at 171).

Likewise, the Court upheld a state-required pathology
examination which ired tissues removed by abortion,
like all other removed tissues, to be examined by a pa-
thologist. Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Ash-
croft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). This was be-
cause such an examination was considered “absolutely

” from a medical standpoint and “ ‘abnormalities
in the tissue warn of serious, fatal disor-
ders.’ ”’ Jd. at 487-89, 103 S. Ct. at 24. eye bey
the Court, certain regulations of even first trimester
tions that “ ‘have no significant oe the woman’s
exercise of her right [to have an ion] be per-
missible where justified by i t state objec-
tives.’ "’ Jd. at 489-90, 103 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Akron,
462 U.S. at 430, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (alterations by the
Court)).

The quoted language clearly indicates that, where first
trimester abortions are inv “tony Bey must the im-
of the challenged regulation in terms
do comnts uate al tar Gain also that the
ion must be “justified by important state health
objectives.”” This is consistent with our own case law to

* Appellants make much of

proper standard. See F.2d at

at THE nal th
> 5
i ie i ae
ts tle ial
rd eld a ik
all pyle
eget! PHT hel: ti
AA eT TE
Wiad tiie
entienienal |
ale : a guESt: Hele
2 Te FI pafied Epiees 4
ll; I Hibatie iT
syinstges Heat sues
ese eal lah
Te a eD id ieee /
HEH Mia ie

ih

i

(Footnote continued on following page)

aie Ha

aH

uel
‘lit i

;

— only that interest.
such laws always inv

toe

App. 20

distinguish between the two. Indeed, as written, due

the (now unenforced) second trimester hospitalization hn
quirement, they originally applied only to first trimester
abortions. Accordingly, as we have in other cases, we ap-
ply the legal standards applicable to restrictions on first
trimester abortions. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 782:

Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of

Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1149 (7th Cir. 1974), cert

420 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 1438 (1975). We - inal os
at liberty to insert the words “except with regard to first
trimester abortions” into either the statute or the regula-
tions. To do so would result in a scheme with little re-
semblance to that enacted by the Illinois legislature or
the Department of Public Health. See Thornburgh v.

8 continued

Much of the testimony below was to the effect j require
ments of the regulations bore little sitasip te a ae
of mg fag trimester abortions as well as first trimester abor-
— should come as little surprise, since the medical pro-
: ures utilized are quite similar if not identical. We remind the

tate of the Supreme Court’s admonition in Akron that:

(I}f it appears that during a substantial porti

trimester the State's regulation Teas ban comet
medical practice, supra, at 2493, the regulation may not be
upheld simply because it may be reasonable for the remain-
ing portion of the trimester. Rather, the State is obligated to
make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations

* Ad yo tok trimester during which its health interest

462 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.

Thus, while the trimester approach remains the li
trin cab]

men for weighing the competing interests iaiabeed A -
abortion decision, it does not necessarily follow that all state
regulations of abortion which are keyed to it are reasonable. In-
stead, the state should endeavor to ew its regulations designed
7 further maternal health in medically relevant terms (for exam-
p - certain of the requirements of the statute involved here may
- make sense for late second trimester abortions which are per-
ormed under a general anesthetic, but not for simple “dilation

and evaculation” ;
nde abortions performed early in the second tri-

App. 21

American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2181
(1986).

Defendants suggest that, because the regulations apply
to all facilities primarily devoted to surgery, we must
review them under a different standard than if they had
singled out abortions. We disagree. Defendants have cited
us to no cases, and we have found none, which would jus-
tify such a distinction. In fact, Friendship suggests, albeit
in dictum, exactly the opposite. 505 F.2d at 1153-54; see
also Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352,
361-62 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying strict scrutiny notwith-
standing general applicability of regulations).

We adhere to the statement in Friendship for several
reasons. First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA
was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and
only applied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an
effort to save the statute from unconstitutionality. See Pf.
Ex. 22-24 (minutes of ASTC Licensing Board meetings).
Secondly, the State cannot, merely by applying the ex-
pedient and conclusory label “‘surgery’’ to a medical pro-
cedure, apply requirements which would be necessary to
major surgical procedures in the abortion context where
they would be wholly inappropriate. It is as much a vice
to treat abortion similarly to dissimilar procedures as it
is to treat it differently from analogous procedures. In
either case, imposition of burdensome requirements which
are completely unnecessary to the performance of safe
abortions is attempted. A prime example of this problem
is the fact that many of the physical plant requirements
of the regulations are designed with procedures to be per-
formed under general anesthesia in mind, although the
testimony in this case clearly established that first and
early second trimester abortions of the type at issue here
are not usually performed using such anesthesia and that,
in fact, the use of a general anesthetic increases the risk
of death and major complications from such procedures.

With the standards enunciated above in mind, we now
turn to evaluation of the constitutionality of the challenged
statutes and regulations.

App. 22

IV
A.

The State initially contends that the plaintiffs have not

met their threshold burden of showing an im

abortion decision. We must reject this conietion The
district court found that the regulations at issue do sub-
stantially burden the effectuation of the decision to have
an abortion. Specifically, the lower court found that the
regulations raised the cost of abortions, by $25-$40 for
abortions performed at Dr. Ragsdale’s clinic, and, more
importantly, that they would limit the availability of abor-
tions in that, unless the regulations were enjoined, the
clinie would close for lack of a suitable location that could

* The Americans United for Life Legal Def
curiae, contends that, because individual laintift De ‘Ragsdale
regardless of the regulations

the relocation of an existi
ment of a new one. As cual. abortion practice or the commence-

to warrant the grant of injunctive relief.

"© Defendants place considerable em i
ant phasis on the alleged] -
— admission of Dr. Ragsdale’s handwritten cost estimates We
a not decide whether these constituted inadmissible hearsa
eae, because Dr. Ragsdale testified at le h, and without
objection, to the substance of the estimates. Therefore, the ad-

mission of the wri : ‘ ;
harmless. written estimates themselves, if error, was surely

App. 23

that this is not a great deal more than the cost of the
pathology examination upheld in Ashcroft, they seem to
have missed the import of that case. The Court did not
hold that the impact was so small that the state was not
required to justify it at all. It merely held that, during
even the first trimester, requirements having an insignifi-
cant impact on the abortion decision were constitutional
“where justified by important State health objectives.”
Thus, the regulations at issue here, which have a greater
financial impact than that in Ashcroft, must be justified
by at least similar state interests.

Additionally, although the financial per-patient cost of
compliance might not seem overwhelming, it is not the
only burden which must be considered. The lack of avail-
ability of abortions caused by the up-front cost and dif-
ficulty of obtaining a complying facility is at least as real
and possibly more burdensome to women seeking abor-
tions. Furthermore, there was testimony of the psycho-
logical burdens which would result from having to undergo
an abortion in a hospital-like facility when the more psy-
chologically comforting setting of a doctor’s office would
serve just as well from a medical standpoint. We cannot
say that these burdens are “de minimus.” Cf. Charles
I, 627 F.2d at 777 (“direct interference” is shown where
impact is not de minimus or where regulation imposes
restrictions “that did not already exist’’). Therefore, they
must be justified by important state health objectives.

B.

The first facet of the scheme we consider is the require-
ment that facilities performing first trimester abortions
be licensed at all. ile this may not seem a particularly
onerous requirement, we note Supreme Court precedent
suggests only that a licensing requirement may be per-
missible in the second trimester. The Court stated in Roe
that the state’s interest in maternal health during the sec-
ond trimester extends to “the facility in which the pro-
cedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be

App. 24

a hospital or may be a clinic of some other place of less-
than-hospital Status; as to the licensing of the facility; and
the like.’’ 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 732. By contrast,
the Court stated that during the first trimester “the at.
tending physician, in consultation with his tient, is free
to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may
be effectutated by an abortion free from interference by
the State.” Id. (emphasis added).

While we realize that the last quoted statement has
been qualified by the Court in subsequent decisions (that
is, where the “interference” does not have a significant
impact and furthers important state health concerns), we
nonetheless believe it retains force here. Thus, we are
persuaded in this case that the State may not require
separate licensure of facilities primarily devoted to per-
forming abortions.

A primary factor which persuades us is that the State
has in no way shown that performance of first trimester
abortions in physicians’ offices rather than heavily regu-
lated ASTCs in any way undermines the safety of the
operation. We further note that Akron itself seems to re-
ject such an argument. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11. The State
in fact basically concedes that it cannot prevent doctors
from performing at least some abortions in their offices.

To the extent that there is any basis for distinguishing
between a doctor who occasionally performs an abortion
in his office and one whose practice is primarily devoted
to such rocedures, the ions appear to run contrary
to sound health policy. of the expert testimony in the

App. 25

We realize that the Sixth Circuit upheld a similar gen-
eral licensing requirement in Reizen. However, in doing
so, the court did not address a challenge based on the
constitutional right to abortion, but rather an Equal Pro-
tection challenge based upon the physician’s right to prac-
tice. Accordingly, the court applied a highly deferential
“rational basis” standard of review. 743 F.2d at 358-59.
As we have already held, such a standard of review is
not appropriate in this case. Additionally, none of the
evidence of the t mentioned above was apparently
present in Reizen. There, the district court found that a
private physician was more likely to have direct control
over staff and procedures, but that the absence of this
control might characterize a “clinic.” Such findings are
absent in this case.

Purely as a matter of the plain language of the statutory
and regulatory scheme, once the licensing requirement
falls, the remainder of the requirements fal] with it (or,
more properly, are inapplicable). The specific substantive
requirements are not (leaving aside the unenforced re-
quirement that all abortions must be performed in an
ASTC) applicable to abortions, per se, but rather to
ASTCs. In the alternative, however, we analyze those spe-
cific substantive aspects of the regulations focused on at
trial which render the scheme unconstitutional as a whole."

't We do not decide whether particular provisions of the regula-
tions not specifically mentioned in the text would, standing lone,
pass constitutional muster. In particular, the pathology examina-
tion required by the general regulations seems nearly identical to
that upheld in Ashcroft. Also the reporting requirement does not

pear particularly onerous, nor does it ar calculated to raise
the fear of harassment by physicians rhe atients by raising the
spectre of public disclosure. Section 205.60 of the regulations
merely requires a rt of each procedure performed in an ASTC
within ten days, and that such reports be made in such a manner
and at such time so as not to avoid accurate reporting of com-
plications. If complications become known to the ASTC, it is re-
quired to submit a supplemental report. Section 205.620, a non-
abortion-specific reporting requirement, merely requires reporting

(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 26

C.
_The abortion-specific subpart of the regulations is of par-
ticular concern. Many of the requirements set forth in that
subpart seem clearly contrary to either prior Supreme

'! continued

of the number and type of procedures performed, the number and
type of complications reported, the number of patients uirin
transfer to hospitals, the number of patients returning for iow.
up, and the number of deaths. These requirements appear to be
consistent with Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. y Danforth
428 U.S. 52, 79-81, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2846-47 (1976). The requirements
mee og = less — than those previously enjoined. In
articular, the name o is i j i
disclosed to the State. Eee

Additionally, a number of the other general r ul

as though they would wy no real canton at all = te dae
might. Requirements which may fall in this category might include
the general provisions relating to personnel and administrative pro-
cedures governing ASTCs, such as those calling for a written pol-
icles and procedures manual, consulting committee, organization
plan, personnel policies, and maintenance of a sanitary facilit
Similarly, the operative care and post-operative care i “
-— ~ in accord with accepted medical practice. Dr

objected to many of these requirements as “stati ious.”
However, so far as we 0 onan there is => cokened the

to “stating the obvious” even where abortion procedu
.-= res are con-

Fewer of the abortion- 1 i i
discussion in the text, Se ae yy o
testimony below that the counselor qualification requirements of
section 205.730(bX2) were consistent with accepted medical .
tice. Additionally, subsection (1) of the same regulation madly oo
quires, in general terms, that some counseling be given prior to
the performance of an abortion (and that it occur in a room .
rate from the procedure room). As noted in the text infra po
aspects of the counseling requirements suffer from constitutional
defects. Also, section 205.710 merely provides that “Abortions shall
be provided to the _— with the same standards of safety effec.
tiveness, and regard for patients rights as any other health saveien i
Of course, we need not and do j imate it
tionality of any of the sequivamente aonumcand aan Riise

App. 27

Court precedent or our own cases. In particular, we note
that section 205.730(aX2) apparently requires the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion to also perform a
pregnancy test on the patient regardless of whether such
testing had previously been done by another physician.
We previously invalidated a similar “same doctor’ require-
ment in an Illinois statute. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 784,
786. The requirement in the instant regulation is, if any-
thing, more burdensome and less justified than the one
we invalidated there, which required only that the per-
forming physician provide the patient with “a true copy’
of her pregnancy test, rather than to possibly conduct a
second test. For the same reasons as in Charles I, the
provision in this case is invalid.

The counseling requirements too suffer from constitu-
tional defects. Section 205.730(bX3) attempts to prescribe
the precise content of such counseling in mandatory terms
applicable to all cases. The regulation states that counsel-
ing “shall include a discussion of alternatives, description
of the procedure to be performed, explanation of the risks
and possible complications.’’ We believe that this provi-
sion, particularly the requirement of a “discussion of alter-
natives” is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). The requirement
“that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes
upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician
and thereby imposes the ‘undesired and uncomfortable
straitjacket’”’ which the Court has rejected. Jd. at 2179
(quoting Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 n.8). The
informational requirements of the regulation are certain-
ly not as intrusive or as specific as those previously
stricken by the Court, but they are just as inflexible. Dr.
Ragsdale testified below that some of the information, par-
ticularly the “discussion of alternatives” might not be ap-
propriate for some patients. We agree that “for a patient
with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its

App. 28

very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the
physician-patient relationship.” Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at
2180. We bear in mind that, during the second trimester
at least, “the validity of an informed consent requirement
... rests on the State’s interest in protecting the health
of the pregnant woman.” Jd. at 2179 (quoting Akron, 462
U.S. at 443, 103 S. Ct. at 2499). Viewed in this light, the
provision at issue here may, like that in Thornburgh, “‘re-
quire{ ] the dissemination of information that is not rele-
vant to such consent, and thus, it advances no legitimate
state interest.” Jd. at 2180.

Another aspect of the counseling requirements is trou-
bling. Section 205.730(bX2XD) requires that “counselors
shail have no financial interest in the patient’s decision.”
We find it impossible to read this provision in such a way
that it does not, at least in some cases, preclude the per-
forming physician from providing the counseling. This, we
believe, is fundamentally at odds with the emphasis placed
on the patient-physician relationship by Roe anu its prog-
eny. The woman desiring an abortion, according to those
cases, is to reach that decision in consultation with “her
responsible physician.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S. Ct.
at 727; cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 449, 103 S. Ct. at 2502
(striking down a requirement that the attending physician,
rather than other professionals, must provide the requisite
counseling). The state cannot preclude that dialogue, or
demand that others be a party to it merely because the
physician has a “financial interest” in the woman’s deci-
sion. In all other areas of medicine, the state relies on
the physician’s professional and ethical obligations to pre-
vent his “financial interest” from clouding his perspec-
tive to the detriment of his patient. It may not do other-
wise merely because an abortion decisivn is involved. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-200, 93 S. Ct. 739, 750-51
(1973). In Doe, the Court struck down requirements that
an abortion be approved by a hospital abortion committee
and by two other physicians independent of the woman’s
own consulting physician because, inter alia, the state re-
quired such additional approval for “no other voluntary

App. 29

medical or surgical procedure. . . .”’ According to the
Court:

If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recog-
nized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable
clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional cen-
sure and deprivation of his license are available rem-
edies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has
no rational connection with a patient’s needs and un-
duly infringes on the physician’s right to practice.

Id. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 751.

We believe those principles are equally applicable here.
Accordingly, we hold that the requirement that counsel-
ing be conducted by one who has no “financial interest
in the patient’s decision is unconstitutional.

D.

Of the requirements applicable to ASTCs generally, the
physical plant equipment and staffing requirements, in
particular, seem totally unjustified from a medical stand-
point. The testimony regarding many of the physical plant
requirements makes clear that they have “‘no medical jus-
tification whatsoever” when applied to first and early sec-
ond trimester abortions of the type involved in this case.

According to the testimony, the minimum size require-
ments for examination rooms, procedure rooms, recovery
rooms, and corridors and doors not only are not “medical-
ly necessary,” but do not enhance the safety of the abor-
tion procedure “in any way” and do not have “any medi-
cal justification.” R. Vol. I at 263-72 (testimony of Dr.
Hern); see also R. Vol. I. at = —— mf 2
Ragsdale) (large procedure room “not only medically un-
asuaaae we gh eter poor’). We agree that the re-
quirements that ASTCs performing first and early second
trimester abortion(s) be “the functional equivalent of small
hospitals” are not sufficiently justified by “important state
health objectives’’ to be sustained.

App. 30

Additionally, the ventilation requirements of the regula-
tions, which require specific air pressure relationships be-
tween rooms and specific air change ratios are unrelated
to the safety of first and early second trimester abortions.
The purpose of such requirements is to prevent infection
from airborne bacteria. All of the medical experts, includ-
ing defendants’, testified that airborne bacteria simply is
not relevant to the procedures involved in this case, be-
cause the procedures do not involve an incision. The sole
testimony to the effect that such requirements might be
advisable came from the State’s architectural expert, who
apparently believed that an incision was required. It can
scarcely be doubted that such a witness lacks any exper-
tise to enable him to form an opinion regarding the medi-
cal justification for a particular requirement.!? '

More importantly, perhaps, the defendants failed to ad-
duce any evidence at all of a medical justification for the
physical plant requirements. Although the defendants pro-
test on appeal that plaintiffs’ experts who testified as to
the lack of medical justification were not building and con-
struction experts, the relevant test is whether the stan-
dards are “justified by important state health objectives.”
It seems clear to us that medical experts can offer tes-
timony relevant to that standard, and it is questionable
whether those without a health care background can. As
we have noted above, only defendants’ architectural ex-
pert testified as to the need for the ventilation re-
quirements. This witness similarly testified regarding
room sizes, although he stated that the requirements were
drafted with procedures imvolving general anesthesia in
mind. At one point, he testified that he relies on the

12 Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Barton, lacked significant ex-
perience performing first trimester abortions. Those which he did
perform were generally performed under a general anesthetic in
a hospital setting. Due to his lack of experience relevant to the
procedures at issue in this case, the district court properly ac-
corded his testimony little weight. Defendants similarly do not rely
on it heavily in this court.

App. 31

physician operating a facility to determine what is medical-
ly required. Linder Dept. at 42.

The structural, equipment, and staffing requirements of
the regulations are quite similar to those invalidated in
Reizen. See 743 F.2d at 364-65. They also bear a remark-
able resemblance to the abortion-specific scheme we inval- _
idated in Friendship. While the evidence in Reizen indi-
cated a per-patient cost increase considerably greater than
that in this case (Friendship did not consider particular-
ized cost estimates), the regulations there, as here, would
have required considerable up-front expenditures. Also,
as we have noted above, per-patierit financial cost is not
the only relevant burden. We have little trouble conclud-
ing that these requirements, which impose a substantial
burden and are not justified by health objectives, are
unconstitutional.

E

We also believe that the “certificate of need” proceeding
requirement of the Health Facilities Planning Act is un-
constitutional. The only interest which the State has ar-
ticulated is the desire to keep costs down under the “cost-
plus” disbursement method which was at one time used
by the State in making certain health care payments for
its residents. Apart from the fact that this interest no
longer exists because the State has discontinued use of
this method, the State has never made such payments for
abortions. Furthermore, the interest cannot be said to be
compelling in any event. While a state may have some
interest in preventing wasteful duplication of resources,
the interest must give way where the exercise of consti-
tutional rights is concerned. Certainly it would be uncon-
stitutional for a state to require that anyone desiring to
publish a newspaper demonstrate “‘need”’ for the publica-
tion, though it can scarcely be gainsaid that at least some
few involve wasteful duplication. Where the exercise of
constitutional rights is concerned, the government may
play no role in determining whether outlets for their ex-
ercise are “needed.”

App. 32

The unconstitutionality of the “certificate of need” pro-
ceedings as applied to ASTCs that wish to perform abor-
tions is exacerbated by the failure of the State to prevent
the process from becoming essentially a public veto of the
ASTCs’ existence. As we noted above, the proceedings
attended by the individual plaintiff physician was allowed
to degenerate into a shouting match between abortion foes
and advocates of free choice. The State’s unwillingness
or inability to confine the proceedings to its even arguably
legitimate goals bolsters our conclusion that this require-
ment cannot stand because it is not justified by any legit-
imate State interest.

V

While, as we have noted above, there may well be
facets of the statute and regulations which would indi-
vidually pass constitutional muster, supra nn. 8 & 11, we
are constrained to affirm the district court’s injunction of
the scheme as a whole. Defendants, citing Zbaraz v. Har-
itgan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal pending,
No. 85-673 and Charles I, 627 F.2d at 779, urge that we
specifically analyze each provision and sever those portions
which are unconstitutional. However, in neither Zbaraz
nor Charles I were we confronted with a comprehensive
scheme which either applied or not depending on whether
a licensing requirement could stand. In Zbaraz, we noted
that severability applies only to “any provisions which can
be given effect without the invalid provisions,” and that
“severance is improper if the unconstitutional provision
is ‘an integral part of the statutory enactment viewed in
its entirety.’ 763 F.2d at 1545 (quoting Scheinberg v.
Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). Here, where
we are dealing with a licensing scheme and the provision
for separate licensure is itself invalid, not only can none
of the other provisions “be given effect without the in-
valid provisions,” but the licensing provision is certainly
“an integral part” of the scheme as a whole. Additional-
ly, in neither Zbaraz nor Charles I was the scheme

App. 33

already so riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial
decisions and non-enforcement policies as to be unintelligi-
ble. In such circumstances, we simply “cannot untangle
the constitutional from the unconstitutional provisions.
...”’ Mahoning Women’s Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456,
460 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S.
918, 100 S. Ct. 3006 (1980).

As originally written, the statute and regulations rep-
resented at least a coherent, if unconstitutional, whole
which regulated all aspects of abortion practice in Illinois.
However, as a result of various judicial decisions, and the
defendants’ change of enforcement policies in response to
them, the scheme has long since lost that coherence. The
statute and regulations as written bear very little resem-
blance to the way they are currently enforced. As is clear
from portions of our opinion, we have at times encoun-
tered considerable difficulty discerning just what the law
in Illinois is. Yet, the State expects physicians, on pain
of professional censure (possibly including loss of their
licenses) and a $10,000 a day fine, to divine the contours
of the rules under which they must operate.

Under these circumstances, we fully agree with the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mahoning Women’s Center.
There, in invalidating, in its entirety, a local ordinance
that required “the functional equivalent of a hospital” for
first trimester abortions, the court held “ijn this situa-
tion, we do not believe a useful purpose would be served
by attempting to rewrite the minor provisions of the or-
dinance in order to make them constitutional.” 610 F.2d
at 461. We could not agree more.

Accordingly with the exception of the portion of the in-
junction regarding the second trimester hospitalivation re-
quirement, which is VACATED As Moot, the preliminary
injunction is

AFFIRMED.

App. 34

Correy, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A decade and one-
half ago the Supreme Court announced “that the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that
this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.” Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727 (1973). Today, under the
guise of protecting the woman’s constitutional privacy rights,
the majority holds that the State of Illinois’ health ser-
vices statutory scheme, enacted in an attempt to regulate
the ever-escalating costs of medical care without sacrific-
ing its citizens’ health and safety,'is unconstitutional. Spe-
cifically, now some 14 years after its enactment, the ma-
jority declares the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center
Act, 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1 et seq. (the “ASTCA” or
the “ASTC Act”) and the regulations promulgated there-
under unconstitutional. holding that the State may noi re-
quire licensure of facilities devoted primarily to performing
semi-complicated (minor) surgery, including first-trimester
abortions. As an alternative approach, the majority chooses
and carves out a select few ASTC regulations among var-
ious others, discusses their validity, and then proceeds to
invalidate those regulatory sections of the ASTC Act that
apply to first-trimester abortion facilities in Illinois, stating
that it was unable to sever those provisions of the Act
it deemed unconstitutional from those that were cunstitu-
tional. Thus, the majority strikes down the ASTCA and
baldly asserts that “the [statutory] scheme has long since
lost . . . coherence.”’ Unfortunately, it is the majority’s
decision, rather than the Illinois legislative scheme, that
lacks coherence.' I am convinced that under Roe and its

! The majority’s precise holding is confusing. On the one hand,
the majority affirms the district court’s preliminary injunction
which only enjo‘ned Illinois from regulating ASTCs to the extent
those facilities were performing abortions. On the other hand, the
majority apparently strikes down not only § 16(1) of the MPA,
but the ASTCA and the IHFPA as well, stating it could not “‘un-
tangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional,” and further
asserts that specific substantive aspects of the statutes and regula-
tions are unconstitutional and “render the scheme unconstitutional
as a whole.”

App. 35

progeny that the individual states have the authority to en-
sure that all surgical procedures, including first-trimester
abortions, are performed “under conditions insuring max-
imum safety for the woman.” Connecticut v. Menillo, 423
U.S. 9, 11, 96 S.Ct. 170, 171 (1975) (per curiam). Certainly
states have the power and authority, if not the duty, to
apply the same licensing standards to abortion facilities
as those applied to facilities performing similar surgical
procedures.? I know of no law to the contrary.

Moreover, the majority decision ignores the legislative
intent and the historical context of the enactment of the
challenged provisions: section 16(1) of the Medical Prac-
tice Act (the ““MPA”’), 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4433(1); the Am-
bulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, 111% II. Rev. Stat.
€¢ 157-8.1, et seg., and the regulations promulgated
thereunder; and the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act,
111% Il. Rev. Stat. 44 1151, et seq., particularly {4 1155-1160.
Research reveals that the Illinois legislature enacted § 16(1)
of the MPA® intending to limit the performance of abor-
tions only to licensed ambulatory surgical treatment
centers, hospitals, or similar facilities and expressed such
intention by requiring licensure of “‘any facility in which
a medical or surgical procedure is utilized to terminate
a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the facility is de-
voted primarily to this purpose,” (definitions section—

2 As demonstrated, infra, the most significant undisputed fact in
the record is that an abortion, regardless of the trimester in which
it is performed, is considered a surgical ae albeit a minor
— procedure, accompanied al] too frequently by concomitant
medical, physical, and psychological complications.

3 As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA “allows for revo-
cation or suspension of the license of any physician who performs
an ‘elective abortion’ in any place pe A than a licensed Am-
bulatory Surgical Treatment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facili-
ty run by the state or federal governments.” (Emphasis added.)

App. 36

ASTCA, 4 157-8.3(A)).4 However, the legislature’s primary
purpose for enacting the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment
Center Act was to regulate and prescribe safeguards for
the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective ambulatory
surgical medical services. The majority unfortunately dis-
regards tnis primary purpose which provided the impetus
for the enactment of the ASTCA and through mere specu-
lation holds that the ASTCA is solely an abortion stat-
ute. Further, in its determination to do away with the
duly enacted legislation, the majority completely disre-
gards the statute’s severability clauses as if they didn’t
exist, stating it could not “untangle the constitutional from
the unconstitutional’ and thus refuses to give effect to
the chalienged acts. Rather than recognize and effectu-
ate the true intent and legitimate purpose of the acts and
enjoin only those provisions which might impinge on a
woman's limited right to terminate her pregnancy (§ 16(1)
of the MPA, its companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) and
§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations), the majori-
ty, in over-expansive language, declares, “ ‘(W]e do not
believe a useful purpose would be served by attempting
to rewrite minor provisions of the ordinance [in this case

4 € 157-8.3 provides:

‘(A) ‘Ambulatory surgical treatment center’ means any in-
stitution, place or ere devoted primarily to the mainte-
nance and operation of facilities for the performance of surgical
procedures or any facility in which a medical or surgical pro-

cedure is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of
rily to this

whether the facility is devoted prima rpose. Such
facility shall not provide beds or other accommodations for the
overnight stay of patients. Individual patients shall be dis-
charged in an ambulatory condition without danger to the con-
tinued well being of the patients or shall be transferred to
a hospital.”

(Emphasis added to highlight the clause included in the ASTCA

restricting the availability of an abortion.)

5 The severability clauses of the MPA, ASTCA, and the IHFPA
are found respectively at 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4458, 111% II. Rev.
Stat. ¢ 157-8.15, and 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 1166.

App. 37

the statutes and regulations] in order to make them con-
stitutional.’””’ In so holding, the majority improperly sub-
stitutes its judgment for that of the legislature which
enacted the statute because of its concern for the safety
of its citizens. In the end, the majority decision severely
limits (or casts aside) the state’s ability to implement cost-
effective schemes and regulate rapidly developing and
modern methods of providing medical services simply
because abortion (surgical) procedures may be involved.
The majority’s misdirected holding ultimately protects
only the financial interests of abortion providers, like Dr.
Ragsdale, rather thar following the Supreme Court’s lim-
ited mandate in Roe aimed at protecting the patient’s
privacy rights. If we allow the majority’s “reasoning’’ to
stand, surgeons, as well as other ASTC operators whose
facilities are devoted primarily to the performance of abor-
tions, will be allowed to operate without regulation while
those ASTCs primarily performing other types of minor
surgical procedures will remain regulated (assuming the
majority's decision mer y affirms the district court’s
preliminary injunction). Thus having treated facilities
devoted primarily to abortions differently from those fa-
cilities primarily devoted to other surgical procedures, the
majority carves out an “abortionist exception” to the gen-
eral rule that states can reasonably regulate how medical
services are provided to its citizens. Ultimately, the ma-
jority in effect creates a legal vehicle for the non-abor-
tionists primarily performing other surgical procedures to
challenge the ASTCA on equal protection grounds; for
what rational basis exists for regulating ambulatory surgi-
cal centers differently than those facilities, like Ragsdale’s
abortion enterprise, devoted primarily to the termination
of pregnancies?

The task of a reviewing court, contrary to the majori-
ty’s reasoning, is, “of course, . . . to resolve the issue
by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and pre-
dilection.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116, 93 S.Ct. at 709.
Consistent with this Supreme Court directive, our deci-
sion must neither reflect pro choice nor anti-abortion sen-

App. 38

timent. The Illinois legislation at issue, specifically the
ASTCA, is fundamentally different from other TIilinois
abortion-related legislation and merits thorough, reflective,
and separate consideration. I would enjoin § 16(1) of the
MPA and sever and further enjoin its companion clause
in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA requiring licensure of “any
facility in which a medical or surgical procedure is utilized
to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the fa-
cility is devcted primarily to this p se” because these
provisions prevent a physician from performing a first-
trimester abortion in his or her office. Under Roe and
its progeny this prohibition may very well be considered
unconstitutional. I am convinced that the states, including
Illinois, are free to regulate ambulatory surgical treatment
centers, including those performing abortions, as long as
abortions are not singled out from other, similar surgical
procedures, subject only to the well-known rational basis
test governing social and economic legislation. Under the
rational basis test the ASTCA and IHFPA are constitu-
tional. Consistent with this analysis, I further evaluate
the remaining abortion-specific statute sections and regu-
lations* promulgated thereunder under the strict scrutiny
test articulated in Roe and its progeny? and would hold
all but one of these constitutional because these statutory
sections and regulations neither burden the abortion deci-

* For example, q 157-8.6-1 of the ASTCA requires that any cor-
poration operating an ASTC “devoted primarily to providing facil-
ities for abortion” must have a licensed physician who is “actively
engaged in the practice of medicine at the Center, on the board
of directors as a condition of licensure.” Additionally, subpart G
of Title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code contains abortion-
specific regulations. The validity of all but one of these provisions
is demonstrated, infra.

* I concur with the majority that the challenge to the second-
trimester hospitalizati ~ Rs pny rman is moot. It appears that the
majority effortlessly utilized and applied the severability clause of
the Act to the second-trimester hospital requirement, but lost this
analytical ability with respect to the other challenged provisions.

App. 39

sion nor its effectuation, and are justified with important
health objectives in mind.

When the alleged “tripartite” legislative scheme is thus
analyzed, neither a woman’s right to terminate her preg-
nancy, nor the state’s right to rationally regulate modern
medical services for the protection of its citizens is ad-
versely affected. Thus, I would reverse the district court’s
order enjoining Illinois’ health services laws, except to the
extent it enjoined § 16(1) of the Medical Practice Act, its
companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA, and
§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations.

I

The majority decision properly notes that the ‘‘statutory
and regulatory scheme is somewhat complex,” but then
proceeds to further confuse the challenged acts and their
interrelationships, completely disregarding the legislature's
intent regarding the various acts. The record of the legis-
lative history reveals that § 16(1) of the MPA, 111 Ill. Rev.
Stat. § 4433(1), and the Ambulato “y - Treatment
Center Act (ASTCA), 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1, et seq.,
were initially companion bills to the initial comprehensive
Illinois Abortion Act (IAA), 38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 81-11, et seg.*
The IAA, § 16(1) of the MPA, and the ASTCA, were
Senate bills (S.B.) 1049, 1050, and 1051, respectively. The
legislative history further reveals that S.B. 1049 and S.B.

* The initial Illinois Abortion Law, 44 81-11, et seg., became ef.
fective July 19, 1973, but was subsequently repealed by the Abor-
tion Law of 1975, effective October 30, 1979. The Abortion Law
of 1975 has been challenged on more than one occasion. See, ¢.9.,
Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452
(7th Cir. 1984), a 1 dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles,
106 S.Ct. 1697 (1986). The initial IAA had a com letely different

than the ASTCA and IHFPA. However, t — y con-
uses the purposes of the IAA from that of the A and
IHFPA, and in doing so clouds its ability to analyze the challenged
statutes and regulations.

App. 40

1050 were integrally related; their purpose was to regulate
abortions in Illinois in light of, and in an attempt to com-
ply with, the Supreme Court’s then-recent Roe and Doe
decisions. As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA
provided for the “revocation or suspension of the license
of any physician who performs ‘elective abortions’ in any
place other than a licensed Ambulatory Surgical Treat-
ment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facility run by the
state or federal governments.” Apparently, members of
the Illinois legislature were concerned that the State
would eventually be responsible for the cost of abortions
performed on indigents in hospitals, so to reduce the
State’s anticipated abortion costs, less-expensive ASTC
facilities were included in the list of approved locations
for the performance of pregnancy termination procedures.
At the same time the legislature was debating the regula-
tion of abortions, ASTCs were just coming into existence
and thus not regulated. Thus, S.B. 1051, an i nt
health regulatory bill creating and regulating S, Was
made a companion bill to the abortion bills.

Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the ASTCA, un-
like the IAA and § 16(1) of the MPA, was not primarily
enacted for the purpose of regulating abortions. The rec-
ord and legislative history reveal that the ASTC Act
became law in Illinois in 1973 with the express policy of
— maximum safety in all medical procedures, pro-
viding:

“for the better protection of the public health

the development, establishment, and enforcement of
standards (1) for the care of individuals in am
surgical treatment centers, and (2) for the construc-
tion, maintenance and operation of ambulatory surgi-
cal treatment centers, which, in light of advancing
knowledge, will promote safe and adequate treatment
of such individuals in ambulatory surgical treatment
centers.”

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, ¢ 157-8.2. Further, the ASTCA
was intended to regulate the cost-effective and rapidly
developing ambulatory outpatient surgical medical ser-

App. 41

vices. The minutes of the March 7, 1974, Ambulatory Sur-
gical Treatment Center Licensing Board meeting provide
relevant historical facts relating to the enactment of the
ASTCA:9

“In July 1971 . . . a member of the hospital licens-
ing board, was appointed chairman of a committee
appointed to formulate regulations for those facilities
that were presently unlicensable. Consideration was
given to a large number of classifications and actually
there were 32 types of health facilities listed... .
On July 12, 1972, the final draft (after four drafts)
of proposed standards were submitted to the Hospital
Licensing Board. . . . [OJn August 16 [a member of
the Board] sent these proposed regulations forward
[to the legislation liaison]. . . . About August 1972
[the Board] began to get involved more with the

% The majority improperly relies on the (STC Licensing Board
minutes for the legislative intent of the act. The March 7, 1974,
minutes conclude that “the legislation was written specifically for
regulation of the performance of abortions.’’ On this basis, the ma-
jority states, ‘First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA
was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and only ap-
plied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save
the statute from unconstitutionality.” Initially 7 point out that the
district court specifically and properly rejected the plaintiff's re-
quest to admit the minutes of the licensing board meeting as proof
of the oe intent. Tr. at 616. The district court’s eviden-
tiary ruling was proper because “a court should adhere to the
enacting legislature’s purposes,” Posner, The Federal Courts, p.
279 (1985), rather than post-enactment statements regarding legis-
lative intent, particularly when those statements are not even
made by the legislators involved. The district court received the
licensing board minutes only for the limited purpose of establishing
the Board’s state of mind regarding its decent procedures.
However, the historical facts regarding the development of the
ASTC legislation and regulations are reliable, material, and rele-
vant to understanding the historical context in which the ASTCA
was enacted. Thus, I make limited reference to the minutes of
the Board meeting only to draw attention to the historical facts
contained therein.

App. 42

question of abortions which became the primary tar-
get for discussion.”’ :

The significance of these Board minutes lies in the fact
that as early as 1971 a state agency began preparing the
proposed regulations in response to the changing needs
and practices of medical services. Cost-effective “{f}ree-
standing ambulatory surgical centers (FASCs) are indepen-
dent entities which first opened in 1970. . . . [T]hese
facilities were conceived to fill a gap between the doc-
tor’s office and the hospital for minor surgical procedures
not requiring overnight hospitalization.” Note, Freestand-
ing Emergency Centers: Regulation and Reimbursement,
11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).!° “The first success-
ful freestanding ambulatory surgery center (FASC), [well
known as Surgicenter], was opened in February 1970 in
Phoenix, Arizona.”” D. Ermann and J. Gabel, The Chang-
ing Face of American Health Care, Multi-Hospital
System, Emergency Centers, and Surgery Centers, 23
Medical Care 401, 406 (May 1985). As early as 1976 one
commentator observed:

“From a societal point of view, perhaps the greatest
impetus behind the ambulatory lemmas nan is its
potential for reducing the cost of services. This poten-
tial applies to both freestanding and hospital-based
facilities, the two major prototypes for ambulatory
surgery. By eliminating overnight hospital stays, ex-
penditures for hospital services for inpatient health
care, which now account for about 40 percent of our

"© Much has been written regarding trends in ambulatory medical
services, including ambulatory surgical treatment centers. See gen-
erally T. O'Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development
and Management (1976); L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Develop-
ing and Managing Successful Programs (1984); M. Roemer, Am-
bulatory Health Services in America (1981); D. Ermann and J.
Gabel, The Changing Face of American Health Care, 23 Medical
a rear ore a Setting Up and Operating Am-

are Centers in a Competiti is
ep pe petitive Environment, 29 St. Louis

App. 43

total national health expenditure, may be reduced
directly and dramatically, at least on a short-term
basis. By focusing on reducing inpatient surgery (ac-
counting for 60 percent of all hospital expenditures
and about 25 percent of total health care expendi-
tures), ambulatory surgery may further reduce costs.”

T. O’Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development
and Management, p. 143 (1976). Further, by 1984 the
ASTC trend was well established:

“The success of the Phoenix center precipitated rapid
growth of a new type of facility for the delivery of
ambulatory surgery, the freestanding, independent,
ambulatory surgery center. Since that time, the Sur-
gicenter has become a model for an increasing num-
ber of both independent and hospital-sponsored free-

standing ambulatory surgery programs.

According to the Freestanding Ambulatory Surgical
Association (FASA), there are approximately 125 in-
dependent freestanding ambulatory surgery centers,
86 of which are members of FASA. According to
FASA, which has been keeping statistics on its mem-
bers since 1974, the membership performed 94,499
ambulatory surgery procedures in 1981, an increase
of 6 percent over the number performed in 1980. This
figure can be compared to 3.2 million ambulatory
surgical procedures performed by hospitals offering
ambulatory surgery in 1980.”

L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Developing and Manag-
ing Successful Programs, pp. 11-12 (1984). Lastly, I ob-
serve that freestanding ambulatory surgical centers are
properly subject to licensure and regulation (as are the
vast majority of medical facilities performing surgeries)
throughout the country, and not only in Illinois. One
writer pointed out that:

“a FASC must obtain a state CON [Certificate of
Need] in order to build the facility. In some states
FASCs must also seek accreditation. In Illinois,
FASCs are licensed and regulated by the State De-

App. 44

partment of Public Health. In Minnesota, surgical
centers are covered by licensing rules. They must be

staffed and equipped to handle surgical procedures,
anesthesia, and post-surgical care.”

Note, Freestanding Emergency Centers, Regulation and,

Reimbursement, 11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).

Obviously the Illinois Legislature was not privy to all
this information regarding ambulatory surgical treatment
centers in 1973, at the time it enacted the ASTCA. How.-
ever, as I stated, the record and legislative history reveal
that the legislature was well aware of the new and fast
developing medical trend in outpatient ambulatory care
and specifically sought to regulate it. During the Senate

debates, state Senator Wooten summarized S.B. 1051 as
follows:

“This is another one of those bills that cuts across
lines in all kinds of ways. The Illinois State Medical
Society asked that it be presented in a series with
the two previous bills [S.B. 1049 and S.B. 1050], one
changing the law relating to abortion, the other chang-
ing the Medical Practices Act. While this has a rela-
tionship to abortion, it actually goes much beyond
that. It [S.B. 1051] provides for the establishment and
licensing of facilities which can perform minor sur-
gery. This would be things like tonsilectomy, hernias,
abortions would be included, facial surgery, plastic
surgery and so on. In other words procedures which
would not require an overnight stay. And indeed
these ambulatory surgical treatment centers are for-
bidden to keep patients overnight. However, those
of you who have kept close to medical practices know
that untoward things can occur at any time, and so
provision is made in here that doctors who function
in such a center must also be licensed to practice
in a hospital nearby so that if any complications oc-
cur they can quickly move the patient to that place.
Now, I handed out an outline to explain to you how
these things would work, definitions, they must get

App. 45

a license, some of these things are left open as to
See The Department would like to “4 a
hand in that. This is something doctors en? een
urging us to do for a couple of years now, a1 a
bulatory surgical treatment centers are... im —
out west. The idea is that they can be a grea ar
ing to a patient. One of the big costs in =
if you remember it’s kind of like a hotel which | om
special services and if you don’t need that overnig it
stay, you can save a great deal of money. So goss
a great savings possible for the patient who needs
this kind of one-day surgical treatment. It does in-
clude abortion, and everything would be rather close-
ly regulated and inspected.

(Emphasis added). Another state senator further pointed

out that: ee ss
“This bill is a good bill. It’s not related In any wa)
Ms pot ti It's sponsored by the Medical ——
tion. There’s nothing wrong with ambulatory medica
services.”

hus, contrary to the majority’s mere speculative anon.
se the legislative history clearly and eae ~~
ports the proposition that the ASTCA was . ena =
primarily to regulate abortions, but rather for the regu
tion of all semi-complicated (minor) surgical proce _
performed in the Se ey | — o

centers. Finally, | observe

the ASTCA’s enactment, Senator Wooten —
stated: “The main thrust of [S.B. 1051] is to ae ged
some money by getting minor surgical co oppo sso "
the hospital where it is hideously expensive and m
clinic.” (Emphasis added).

cord and the legislative history further reveal
aa -_ Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act Pca a
was enacted one year after the enactment of 8 “ .
the MPA and the ASTCA and was clearly not P —
a “tripartite” legislative scheme to limit the availa i “ y
of abortions. The legislative history of the IHF PA reveals

App. 46

that it neither mentions abortions, nor referred to them,
nor was it enacted for purposes of regulating abortions.
The IHFPA was intended to address the problem of ex-
pensive, overexpanded and underpopulated medical facil-
_ ities and underutilized medical equipment in the State of
Illinois. In the words of a legislator, the IHFPA was to

“provide a means for proper planning with local in-

put and decision making to cut down on empty hos-

pital facilities, nursing home facilities, sheltered care

. . . facilities and . . . ambulatory surgical facilities.”
(Emphasis added).

Thus, the legislative history of the acts supports the
valid premise that the legislature intended to regulate
abortions when it enacted the Illinois Abortion Act. It
also appears that section 16(1) of the MPA and its com-
panion clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTC were probably
enacted to prevent abortions from being performed in a
physician’s office. On the contrary, there is no proof in
this record that either the ASTCA or the IHFPA were
enacted primarily to regulate abortions; rather, these laws
were adopted to regulate the delivery of medical services
to its citizens and to attempt to prevent and control the
further unnecessary overexpansion of Illinois’ medical fa-
cilities. That the ASTCA was initially a companion bill
to the abortion bills is more of a historical coincidence
relished by political opportunists who, in this case, ap-
parently fully utilized it to their advantage. As the min-
utes of the licensing board reflect, for whatever their
worth: “Without the public interest in abortions, we would
not have any of the present legislation.” That is to Say
that the state legislators and other interested parties who
were primarily interested in regulating ambulatory medi-
cal services would not have been able to enact the legisla-
tion without the statewide and even nationwide interest
in the abortion question at the time.

The majority, acting and reasoning as if living in a social
and economie vacuum (overlooking the developing nation-
wide trend of ASTCs), ignores the dual purpose of the

App. 47 _

islative scheme presently at issue, selectively carving
a poopie non ‘aie of the ASTCA to support its
abortion theory of enactment. Thus, the majority —F
“As originally written, the statute {I assume the A
and regulations represented at least a coherent, if uncon-
stitutional, whole which regulated all aspects of —-
practice in Illinois.” Having ignored or at least overloo +
the State’s legitimate intent to regulate the new ae rapi :
ly developing trend of ambulatory surgical m = :
vices, the majority treats the ASTCA and the regulations
promulgated thereunder as “mincr _abortion provisions.
Further, the majority rejects the basic principle of a
bility when interpreting the construction of a duly —
legislative enactment which yh yng a ae

, iti ses; an

ae lena penlers the different acts and regulations
and affirms the preliminary injunction. Thus, the majority
limits and fails to effectuate the legitimate legislative =
poses behind the ASTCA. As a noted commentator as
observed, limiting the scope of a legislature s intent =
stitutes undesirable judicial activism as much as a =
sion construing a statute beyond its intended scope. oe
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, in the Classroom =
in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 822 (1983). The
majority’s failure to give full effect to the real and -
mate legislative intent to regulate ASTCs is the basis o
my dissent.

Recently, this court observed:

“I: igration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha ha 42 US. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
(1983), the Supreme Court stated that unconstitution-
al provisions in a statute shail be severed if it ap-
pears that the legislature would have enacted age
tutional provisions of the statute npenaty ; ®)
those provisions. 103 S.Ct. at 2774 (citing Buc “y
vy. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S.Ct. 612, 677,

L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)).”

App. 48

Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985

aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 479 (1987). The Illinois laws in eames
all have their own severability provisions; ths it is clear
that the Illinois legislature intended that the constitutional
provisions °f the acts should be given effect even if other
provisions were held unconstitutional. Accordingly, I ana-
lyze the challenged Statutes and regulations recognizing
that | severance is improper [only] if the unconstitutional
atte 4 peed noes a of the statutory enactment
in its entirety.’” Jd. (quoting Schein v. Smith,
659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). On the het hand, the
challenged provisious which burden a woman’s right to
privacy may be severed as long as the severed provisions
do not affect “the cssential purposes of the act.” Jd.

II

The abortionist, Dr. Richard M. Ragsdale, plaintiff- l-
lee, testified at the preliminary injunction Seater that the
alleged “{flirst and major burden (affecting a woman’s right
to terminate her pregnancy] is simply the requirement for
an independent licensure as an abortion provider.” This
licensing requirement, applicable to any physician who
wishes to perform an abortion outside of a hospital, an
ASTC, or other regulated facility, regardless of the gesta-
tional period of the embryo or fetus, was created when
the legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its com-
panion clause in the ASTC definitions section. As previ-
ously noted by the majority, “{sJection 16(1) of the Medical
Practice Act . . . allows for revocation or suspension of
the license of any physician who performs an ‘elective
abortion’ in any place other than a licensed Ambulatory
Surgical Treatment Center . . -, @ hospital, or a facility
run by the state or federal governments.” The following
clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA is the companion
clause to § 16(1) of the MPA, and brought all surgeons
who wished to perform abortions under the ASTCA li-
censing and regulatory scheme:

App. 49

““*Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center’ means...
any facility in which a medical or surgical procedure
is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of
whether the facility is devoted primarily to this pur-
Es
Significantly, the defendant-appellant, the State of Illinois,
asserts that it no longer enforces § 16(1) of the MPA. Ad-
ditionally, the majority observes that Illinois alleges that
the clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) above is no longer being en-
forced, noting that:

“Since 1981, the [ASTC] act and regulations have
been applied only to facilities which are primarily
devoted to the performance of surgical procedures
(including abortions). This enforcement policy was
adopted in response to Village of Oak Lawn v. Mar-
cowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which
refused to enforce, in a criminal proceeding, that por-
tion of the local ordinance which incorporated the
ASTCA definition of an ASTC which covered ‘any
facility where a mecical or surgical procedure is per-
formed for the termination of pregnancy, regardless
of whether the facility is primarily devoted to that

, 99

purpose.

The majority holds, and I agree, that Illinois’ alleged non-
enforcement policy does not render the issues moot.

Although several justices have persuasively argued that
Roe v. Wade and its progeny articulate an “unworkable
scheme for constitutionalizing the regulation of abortion,”
Thornburgh v. American Co of Obstetricians, 476 U.S.
747, 814, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2207 (1986) (Justice O’Connor, dis-
senting), or represent a “venture . . . fundamentally mis-
guided since its inception,” Jd. at 786, 106 S.Ct. at 2192
(Justice White, dissenting), this court should be bound by
Roe and its progeny. The Supreme Court’s recent Thorn-
burgh decision “‘reaffirm[ed] the principles laid down in Roe
and Akron.” Id. at 759, 106 S.Ct. at 2178. Thus, we
analyze the abortion licensing requirement created when
the lilinois legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its
companion provision contained in the ASTC definition of

App. 50

ambulatory surgical treatment center, 4 157-8.3(A), under
the standards articulated in Roe and its progeny.

“In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the ‘right of
privacy, . . . founded in the the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, .. . is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.’ .. .

* * * *

The Court also has recognized, because abortion is
a medical procedure, that the full vindication of the
woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that
her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make
his best medical judgment.’.. .

At the same time, the Court in Roe acknowledged
that the woman’s fundamental right ‘is not unquali-
fied and must be considered against important state
interests in abortion.’ . . . But restrictive state reg-
ulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial ex-
amination, must be supported by a compelling state
interest. . . . [The Supreme Court] recognized two
such interests that may justify state regulation of
abortions.

First, a state has an ‘important and legitimate in-
terest in protecting the potentiality of human life.’
. . . Although this interest exists ‘throughout the
course of the woman’s pregnancy,’ . . . it becomes
compelling only at viability, the point at which the
fetus ‘has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother’s womb.’ .. .

Second, because a State has a legitimate concern
with the health of women who undergo abortions, ‘a
State may y assert important interests in safe-
guarding health [and] in maintaining medical stan-
dards.’ . . . [The Court further] held in Roe, however,
that this health interest does not become compelling
until ‘approximately the end of the first trimester’

App. 51

of pregnancy. .. . Until that time, a pregnant woman
must be permitted, in consultation with her physi-
cian, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate
that decision ‘free of interference by the State.’

This does not mean that a State never may enact
a regulation touching on the woman’s abortion right
during the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain regula-
tions that have no significant impact on the woman’s
exercise of her right may be permissible where jus-
tified by important state health objectives. .

From approximately the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy, the State ‘may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reason-
ably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health.’ . . . The State’s discretion to reg-
ulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted
—_ practice. [The Court has] rejected a State’s
attempt to ban a particular second trimester abor-
tion procedure, where the ban would have increased
the cost and limited the availability of abortions
without promoting important health benefits. .. . Jf
a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate
the performance of abortions during this period, the
health standards adopted must be ‘legitimately re-
lated to the objective the state seeks to accomplish.’ ”

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 426-431, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2490-93 (1983) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).

Initially one observes that the abortion licensing a
ment as it exists pursuant to § 16(1) of the MPA and the
ASTCA definition, fails to distinguish between first and
second trimester abortions; thus, it prohibits the perfor-
mance of first-trimester abortions in physicians’ offices.
The record reveals that a woman’s qualified right under
Roe to terminate her pregnancy is very probably imper-
missibly burdened because surgeons who would otherwise
perform first-trimester abortions out of their offices are

App. 52

precluded from doing so. Dr. Ragsdale, an abortionist and
a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, testified
that outpatient abortions, whether performed in a physi-
cian’s office or a clinic, were as safe as an abortion per-
formed in a hospital setting.

Plaintiffs additionally called another alleged abortion ex-
pert, Dr. Warren Martin Hern, a doctor and general prac-
titioner without board certification in the specialty of ob-
stetrics and gynecol ~~ Hern testified that first-trimester
abortions, performed six to eight weeks from the last
menstrual period are “probably the safest surgical pro-
cedure being performed in the United States in this cate-
gory of p ures.”"''! Dr. Hern further testified that the
safest surgical method of first-trimester abortion was the

“vacuum aspiration” method. This procedure is basically

“a suction removal of the uterine contents.’’!?

The State of Illinois’ expert, Dr. John J. Barton, a board-
certified specialist in the fields of obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy, also testified that first-trimester abortions performed
in outpatient facilities (such as physicians’ offices or or ASTCs)
present no greater risk than the risks and complication

'! Dr. Hern defined “in this category of procedures” as “‘pro-
cedures that involve invasion of a body cavity or a major organ
of some kind.”

12 Dr. Hern noted that the fatality rate for abortion was about
five per one million, whereas, the case fatality rate for term de-
livery was about 11 per 100,000 live births, which meant that the
risk of term birth is roximately 25 times greater in terms of

risk of death than abortion. Dr. Hern the abortion sur-
gery risk factors to the risk factors of r types of outpatient
surgery. He testified that “some estimates . . . indicate tonsillec-
tomies are at least twice as dangerous as abortions.” Similarly,

Hern stated — 4 that he Bb. pay a colleague who informed him

that laparoscop resulted in a oon rate of two per

100,000. 0. Hern t testi tested Laparoscopic surgery involves the intro-

duction of a laparoscope into the cavity. pS ©
that permits

a tube, a metal tube, that is hollow and is cometh
the physician to look through it into the cavity is introduced
through the umbilicus, with or without operating instruments.”

App. 53

rates of abortions performed in hospitals. Based on the
medical experts’ testimony, it probable that first-
trimester abortions could be safely performed in the sur-
geon’s office. Thus, it appears that § 16(1) and its com-
panion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA would limit
the availability of abortions by precluding the performance
of abortions in a physician/surgeon’s office.

In Akron the Supreme Court noted that where the
abortion law “increased the cost and limited the availabil-
ity of abortions,” such a law would probably interfere with
the woman’s decision to have an abortion as well as its ef.-
fectuation. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2492-93. Further, although
dictum, the Supreme Court noted “that the medical evi-
dence suggests that until approximately the end of the
first trimester, the state’s interest in maternal health would
not be served by regulations that restrict the manner in
which abortions are performed by a licensed ——..
Id. at 2492 n.11. The Court further observed that “un-
complicated abortions generally may be performed in a
physician’s office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 weeks
from the first day of the last menstrual period.” /d.
(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-G ic Services 54
(5th ed. 1982)). In light of the Supreme ’s caveat
in Akron noting the probability that physicians can per-
form first-trimester abortions in their offices; given the
defendant’s policy of nonenforcement regarding § 16(1)
of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTC,
{ 157-8.3(A), requiring the licensure of any facility per-
forming even one abortion; and after evaluating the evi-
dence ted during the preliminary injunction hearing
which established that first-trimester abortions performed
in a controlled outpatient setting, including a physician's
office, probably were as safe as abortions performed in
hospitals, I would selectively enjoin the enforcement of
§ 16(1) of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTCA
definition without destroying the entire act because it is
more likely than not that the plaintiffs would prevail on
the merits in light of present Supreme Court precedent.

App. 54

In so holding, I agree with the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill. 2d
406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which also held that the ASTCA
definition was constitutionally invalid as incorporated in
a local ordinance which “closely resemble{d] the state
(ASTC] act and implementing regulations adopted by the
Department of Health.” Jd. at 38. The local ASTC ordi-
nance also required an “initial license fee of $5,000, plus
annual renewal fees of $2,000." Id. at 39. In Marcowitz
the Illinois court, foreshadowing the caveat in Akron,
stated:

“Given the substantial licensing fee required and the
detailed regulation involved, it seems inevitable that
medical practitioners who might otherwise perform
abortions for their regular patients, but whose facil-
ities were not primarily devoted to surgery, would
choose not to qualify under the ordinance. The right
of a woman considering a first-trimester abortion to
seek the advice and services of her obstetrician, gyne-
cologist, or other physician in whom she has trust
and confidence may not be so drastically curbed.

Id. at 42.

Further, both § 16(1) of the MPA and the pea
definition clause in the ASTCA," can easily severed
from their respective acts without affecting the legisla-
ture’s “essential purposes” for the acts’ enactments. See
Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at Ub4S. The MPA io stanly ene
and eapthl of teing eles Se § 16(1) and
as such will continue to be used inter alia to revoke or
suspend a malfeasant physician’s license. Similarly, the
A A becomes “abortion neutral” once the invalid
clause is removed from the definition of an ASTC. See,

3 The unconstitutional clause of 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA to
be severed reads as follows:

“or any facility in which a medical or surgical

procedure is
utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the
facility is devoted primarily to this purpose.

App. 55

e.g., Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 427 N.E.2d at
.14 So construed, the ASTCA fully effectuates the legis-
lature’s primary purpose for its enactment, i.e., to reg-
ulate the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective am-
bulatory surgical medical units. Thus, the State of Illinois
remains free to license any facility pursuant to the “abor-
tion neutral’ ASTCA “devoted primarily to the mainte-
nance and operation of facilities for performance of sur-
gical procedures,” including an abortion facility, like Dr.
Ragsdale’s, devoted primarily to the performance of abor-
tions.'5 As with other social and economic legislation, the
test traditionally applied is whether or not the law has
a “rational relation” to a valid state objective. See Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483, 491, 75
S.Ct. 461, 466 (1955). Thus, I would apply the ‘rational
relation” test to the now “abortion neutral’? ASTCA.

The majority, however, disagrees and would apply the
strict scrutiny test relying on mere dictum in Friendship
Medical Center Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d
1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
There the court observed:

“Furthermore, any proposed regulation, even if ap-
plied universally to ali similar medical procedures,

14 As I discuss, infra, the abortion-specific { 157-8.6-1, as well
as the abortion-specific regulations, are also severable; however,

all but one of these provisions survive the strict standard articu-
lated in Roe.

‘8 The majority baldly asserts that Dr. Ragsdale’s practice con-
sists exclusively of first-trimester abortions even though the record
reveals that e performed some 40,000 abortions between
1973 and 1985. Up until the Illinois court’s 1982 decision in Poe
v. Illinois rtment of Public Health, No. 78-C-4126 (N.D. Il.
1982), which found the second-trimester hospital requirement un-
constitutional, Ragsdale limited his practice to the performance of
first-trimester abortions. However, Ragsdale testified that subse-
= to Poe, he began performing second-trimester abortions. This

viously makes economic sense since the physician had the avail-
able licensed ASTC and would only lose income by refusing to
perform second-trimester abortions.

App. 56

because of the fundamental right of a woman to pro-
cure an abortion during the first trimester, would
have to meet a compelling governmental interest re-
quirement. Thus, any general health regulations
which would apply to first-trimester abortions would
have to be limited so as to give effect to the fun-
damental rights as established by Roe and Doe; that
is, not be burdensome on a woman’s right to decide
to abort a pregnancy. By this we mean that in all
probability nothing broader than general requirements
as to the maintaining of sanitary facilities and general
requirements as to meeting minimal building code
standards would be permissible.”

Id. at 1153-54.

Initially, I point out that Judge Fairchild, concurring,
rejected the Friendship majority’s dictum, stating:

‘Nevertheless, regulation of the safety of all these
procedures, incidentally including first-trimester abor-
tions, through imposition of generally applicable reg-
ulations, would seem to be a valid exercise of the
state’s interest in protecting health and need only
satisfy the traditional [rational basis] test of judicial
scrutiny imposed in this area.”

Id. at 1155 (Fairchild, J., concurring). Because Friend-
ship’s dictum to the contrary “was not refined by the fires
of adversary presentation,” it ‘“‘was not a fully measured
judicial pronouncement,” and thus “not authoritative.”’
United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, ___ (7th Cir.
1988). This caveat is particularly applicable here where
we are construing a legislative act regulating a broad field
of medical services, including minor surgical procedures.

The majority gives two reasons, unsupported by this
record, for relying on the Friendship dictum: “First, we
cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA was enacted pri-
marily with abortion clinics in mind and only applied to
outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save
the statute from unconstitutionality.” However, as I dem-

App. 57

onstrated in part I, the legislative history establishes the
contrary; the primary purpose of the ASTCA was to reg-
ulate the new cost-effective ASTCs in which semi-compli-
cated (minor) surgery was performed. In effect the ma-
jority puts the cart before the horse because it rests its
analysis of the ASTCA on the quagmire of legal dictum
set forth in Friendship which ultimately clouds and con-
fuses its analysis of the ASTCA.

The majority further states:

“Secondly, the state cannot, merely by applying the
expedient and conclusory label ‘onmney? gn Pe
procedure, apply requirements which would be neces-
sary to major surgical procedures in the abortion con-
text where they would be wholly inappropriate. It
is as much a vice to treat abortion similarly to dis-
similar procedures as it is to treat it differently from
analogous procedures.”’

The majority’s conclusory statement is incredible in light
of the record. First of all, the plaintiff's own medical ex-
perts testified that an abortion was a surgical procedure
(regardless of the type of abortion method used). On direct
examination Ragsdale stated that an abortion “is a minor
surgical procedure.” Tr. at 420. Dr. Hern also testified
that an early abortion—one performed six to eight weeks
from the last menstrual period—“‘is the safest surgical
procedure being performed.” Tr. at 241 and 260. Likewise,
it was Dr. Barton’s — opinion that an abortion con-
stituted an operation, Tr. at 452, and abortions “are clas-
sified as minor surgical procedures.” Tr. at 467. Dr. Hern
further stated that an abortion is a surgical procedure
categorized as a procedure “that involve[s] invasion of a
body cavity or a major organ of some kind.” Tr. at 241.
In reaching its conclusion that the state applied the “ex-
pedient and conclusory label ‘surgery’” to an abortion,
the majority once again disregards the record and strays
far afield from its area of legal competence and makes
medical judgments and pronouncements that are more
properly reserved to those expertly trained in the medical

App. 58

scientific fields such as physicians, surgeons, nurses,
medical technicians, etc.

Further, I observe that the courts have consistently
alluded to abortions as a surgical procedure. In Roe, for
example, Justice Stewart noted that the “protection of
the health and safety of a woman” was a legitimate ob-
jective, amply sufficient “to permit a state to regulate
abortions as it does other surgical procedures.” Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 170, 93 S.Ct. at 735 (Justice Stewart, con-
curring). Still more recently, in Akron the Supreme Court
observed that the district court had found that “an abor-
tion generally is considered a ‘minor surgical procedure.’ ”’
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444, 103 S.Ct. at 2500 n.35. Thus, the
evidence establishes that an abortion is a surgical procedure,
albeit a semi-complicated (minor) surgical procedure. Sig-
nificantly, the ASTCA was intended to regulate all minor
surgical edures, including all types of abortive proced-
ures performed in an ASTC; this the majority fails to recog-
nize. There is no reason to apply strict scrutiny in this
situation. There is no language in the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions upholding the majority’s speculative and implicit
theory that the Court intended to strike down social and
economic legislation such as the ASTCA in the name of Roe
or a woman’s limited right to terminate her pregnancy.

Further, in Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam), the court addressed the issue of
whether a state could subject the abortion decision, even
during the first trimester, to regulations promulgated by
the state board of health, including licensing requirements.
The Eighth Circuit concluded:

“A state can impose the same regulations on a clinic,
specifically built to perform abortions during the first
trimester, that are imposed on other clinics that per-
form surgical procedures requiring approximately the
same degree of skill and care as the performance of
first-trimester abortions. As long as the regulations
applying to abortion clinics are the same as those ap-
plied to other clinics performing similar surgical pro-

App. 53

cedures, it would not be impermissible to make them
specifically applicable to abortion clinics.”

Id. at 1358.

Moreover, in Baird v. Department of Public Health, 599
F.2d 1098 (1st Cir. 1979), the court Y held a state licen-
sure statute applicable to any clinic providing medical,
surgical, dental, restorative, or mental hygiene services
including facilities offering only first-trimester abortion
services. The First Circuit held: “There is room under
Roe for states to apply the same licensing standards to
abortion facilities as they apply to like facilities perform-
ing medically analogous procedures.” Id. at 1102 (empha-
sis added). See also Westchester Women’s Health Organi-
zation v. Whelan, 475 F.Supp. 734, 739-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Abortion Coalition v. Michigan Department of Public
Health, 426 F.Supp. 471, 477 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hallmark
Clinic v. North Carolina Department of Human Re-
sources, 380 F.Supp. 1153, 1157 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd on
other pone, 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975). Thus, Illinois’
laws licensing and regulating ASTCs are proper.

The law is very clear that a state has right to enact
legislation for the protection of its citizens. See Quilici
v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 274 (7th Cir.
1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983). The Supreme Court specifically stated:

“It is elemental that a state has broad power to es-
tablish and enforce standards of aden within its
borders relative to the health of everyone there. It
is a vital part of a state’s police power. The state’s
discretion in that field extends naturally to the reg-
ulation of all professions concerned with health.” _

Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449, 74 S.Ct
650, 654 (1954). Thus, I am persuaded by the logic of
Judge Fairchild’s concurrence in Friendship, rather than
by the unsupported and speculative conclusions of the ma-

jority, as well as the reasoning of the First and Eighth

Circuits, that under Roe and its progeny a state has not
only the power and authority, but also the duty, to reg-

App. 60

ulate all medical facilities, particularly any facility where
any surgical procedures are performed (including first-
trimester abortions) as a valid exercise of its interest in
protecting the health and welfare of its citizens while en-
suring that the facilities will provide “conditions insur-
ing maximum safety for the woman” who has decided to
terminate her pregnancy. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S.
at 11, 96 S.Ct. at 171.

The ASTCA and the regulations promulgated there-
under were intended to do just that, to protect the safe-
ty of its citizens, and is reason sufficient enough to sus-
tain the validity of the statute. As in many other surgical
procedures, there are a variety of similar medical and
physical risks involved in having an abortion. Depending
upon a particular woman’s characteristics and develop-
ment, medical and psychological problems may very well
arise during the abortion procedure that only an experi-
enced, well-trained, board-certified obstetrician and gyne-
cologist is capable of recognizing and effectively treating
in a properly designed, constructed, equipped, maintained,

and medically approved facility. Depending upon
the gestational duration of the embryo or fetus, such com-
plications include, but are not limited to, trauma, perma-
nent damage to vital organs, dysfunction of the cardiovas-
cular or respiratory system requiring cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation, internal bleeding or hemorrhaging of the
uterine wall, cervical lacerations, uterine perforation, em-
bolism of the blood vessels, allergic reaction to medica-
tion or anesthesia, if administered, and even the perma-
nent impairment of reproductive organs. Other medical
factors that must be considered in making an informed
abortion decision include the type of abortion to be per-
formed (dilation and curettage, dilation and vacuum as-
piration, dilation and evacuation, hysterotomy, or hyster-
ectomy), the woman’s medical history, her reaction to
previous surgical procedures, her tolerance to certain
medications, the chance that she is an RH-negative fe-
male, the likelihood of contracting a uterine infection, the
chance that the placenta and fetus will not be completely

App. 61

removed, the potential for future difficulties in bearing
children, and also the possibility of sexual sterility. It
defies reason te allow the state to license an ASTC per-
forming hernia surgery, cataract removals, and repairs of
a torn or detached retina, but not permit the state to
license ASTCs primarily performing abortions when there
are many similar risks involved in the myriad types of
abortive procedures.

Lastly, the majority asserts that it is irrational for the
state to regulate the full-time provider of abortions (those
primarily performing abortions) more heavily than the oc-
casional provider. While it may be true that the full-time
abortionist may consider himself or herself “more skilled”
and so theoretically need less regulation, the majority
overlooks that a state with limited resources may rational-
ly choose to direct its energies to improving the lot of
the greatest number. For example, if the state, after the
proper enactment of legislation, chooses to regulate ASTCs
and reduce the risk of minor surgery (as well as its cost)
for 100,000 of its citizens, and more instrusive regulation
of occasional providers would help only 2,000, the state
may very properly deal with the 100,000 first. Further,
the cost of regulation per patient will be lower if the state
concentrates its attention on high-volume businesses; sure-
ly this constitutes a rational relation to a permissible end.

The majority’s treatment of the ASTCA and the IHFPA
under the strict scrutiny test is just another way the ma-
jority circumvents and fails to effectuate the purpose of
the ASTCA, i.e., to regulate changes in the provision of
medical services. Essentially, the majority substitutes its
judgment for that of the legislature; this is truly unfor-
tunate in this case since courts should defer above all to
a legislature’s judgments on social and economic matters.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153
(1970). Lawyers who are now judges are neither trained
nor experienced in the medical disciplines possibly related
to abortion procedures, e.g., obstetrics, gynecology, psy-
chiatry, pathology, general surgery, or emergency medi-
cine. Nor are judges versed in the nuances of the prac-

App. 62

tices and techniques of the medical profession and thus
are ill-equipped to substitute their views regarding what
is medically adequate, proper, or antiseptic. “As recent-
ly stated by the Supreme Court, ‘there certainly is no
reason to think judges are better qualified than ropri-
ate professionals in making such decisions.’ St. Mary of
Nazareth v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 698 F.2d
1337. 1346 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2462 (1982)). However,
this majority decision is replete with such medical asser-
tions. For example, the majority states, “The testimony
regarding many of the physical plant requirements make
clear that they have ‘no medical justification whatsoever’
when applied to first and early second trimester abortions
of the type involved in this case.” However, the ASTCA
was intended to regulate all minor surgical procedures,
and the legislature is free to enact reasonable legislation.
Under these circumstances, and in light of the real risks
that accompany minor surgical procedures, including abor-
tions, it is dangerous for the majority to substitute its
judgment as to what constitutes necessary and/or appro-
priate ASTC regulations. Although in Dandridge the Su-
preme Court was concerned with welfare assistance pro-
grams, the following admonition is as applicable today as
it was then:
“We do not decide today that the [Illinois] regula-
tion is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social
and economic objectives that [Illinois] might ideally
espouse, or that a more [reasonable] system could not
be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intel-
ligence are raised by opponents and proponents of
almost every measure, certainly including the one
before us. But the intractable economic, social and
even philosophical problems presented by [regulating
medical services] are not the business of this [cjourt.
The Constitution may impose certain procedural safe-
guards upon [the regulatory] system . .. . But the
Constitution does not empower this [cjourt to second-
guess state officials charged with the difficult respon-

App. 63

sibility of [guaranteeing its citizens adequate, cost-
effective but safe, medical services.]”

Id. at 487, 90 S.Ct. at 1162-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). See also In re U.S. ex rel. Missouri State High
School, etc., 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Once a rational
relationship exists, and it exists here, judicial scrutiny
must cease. Whether the rule is wise or creates undue
individual hardship are policy decisions better left to legis-
lative and administrative bodies’’).

Lastly, because the courts “have returned to the orig-
inal constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the j t of legis-
lative bodies,” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 S. 276, 730,
83 S.Ct. 1028, 1031 (1963), the “abortion neutral” ASTCA
is entitled to presumptive validity. It is a well-recognized
principle that

“The question, whether a law be void for its repug-
nancy to the constitution, is, at all times, a question
of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be
decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case. The
court, when impelled by duty to render such a judg-
ment, would be unworthy of its station, could it be
unmindful of the solemn obligations which that sta-
tion imposes. But it is not on slight implication and
vague conjecture, that the legislature is to be pro-
nounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts
to be considered as void. ——— between the
constitution and the law be such that the
judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their in-
compatibility with each other.”

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 85, 128 (1810) (em-
phasis added). “ ‘Every possible presumption . . . is in
favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until
the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.’ ” Powell
v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1887) ( uoting Jn re
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1 )). See also
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1445-
46 (1976) (Justice Rehnquist, now Chief Justice, stated that

App. 64

state decisions regarding social legislation are ‘entitled
to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as
are state choices designed to promote other aims within
the cognizance of the State’s police power.”). As the Su-
preme Court recently observed in Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729, 104
S.Ct. 2709, 2717 (1984):

“ “It is by now well established that legislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life
come to the Court with a presumption of constitu-
tionality, and that the burden is on one complaining
of a due process violation to establish that the leg-
-islature has acted in an arbit and irrational way.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct.
1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Op-
tical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464,
99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).’”

(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892 (1976)). See also Rhinebarger
v. Orr, No. 87-1738, slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. February 4,
1988) (Chief Judge Bauer observed: “It is well established
that congressional a ‘adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life’ are presumed constitutional and
that ‘the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an
arbitrary and irrational way.’”). Here, the plaintiffs-appel-
lees have not demonstrated that the Illinois legislature
acted in an arbitrary or irrational way when enacting the
ASTCA and the IHFPA. Thus, within the parameters of
Roe, I am convinced that the state is free to regulate
abortions to the same extent it regulates similar surgical
procedures. I fail to understand how the majority holds
otherwise since the Supreme Court has never held that
Roe holds to the contrary. Thus, I would reverse the
district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the ASTCA
and the IHFPA.

App. 65

Ill
However, even if Roe and its progeny were to apply

~ to the ASTCA and IHFPA as asserted by the majority,

the Act would still be constitutionally valid. The holding
of Roe and its progeny

“does not mean that a state never may enact a reg-
ulation touching on the woman’s abortion right during
the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain regulations that
have no significant impact on the woman’s exercise
of her right may be permissible where justified by
important state objectives.”

Akron, 462 U.S. at 430, 103 S.Ct. at 2492. The plaintiffs
asserted that the ASTCA and IHFPA substantially bur-
dened the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in
three ways: (1) by limiting the availability of abortions;
(2) by increasing the cost of an abortion; and (3) by re-
quiring the provider to fulfill the certificate of need re-
quirements subjecting the abortionist to a “public veto
of his [abortion] services.” As I previously noted, § 16(1)
of the MPA and its companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of
the ASTCA could very well be considered unconstitutional
and therefore should be enjoined. Thus, the licensure of
facilities allegedly devoted primarily to the performance
of abortions does not limit the availability of abortions
since many other surgeons, if they so choose, could per-
form first-trimester abortions in their offices.’* Thus, the
ASTCA cannot be said to limit the availability of abor-
tions. Further, the possibility that Ragsdale’s clinic might
possibly close does not significantly, if at all, affect the
availability of abortions. plaintiffs stated that “there
are approximately 65,860 abortions performed in Illinois
annually.”” Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 F.Supp. 1212, 1219

'6 In Akron the Supreme Court reaffirmed its trimester approach.
Thus, I am convinced that the state could constitutionally require
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in an AS Ben
the plaintiffs’ experts testified that the risks of an abortion rise
substantially in the second trimester.

App. 66

(N.D. Ill. 1985). Of these, Ragsdale performs some 3,400
to 3,500 annually, or some 5 percent. Additionally, there
are some 42 to 44 ASTCs in Illinois and “approximately
half of these provide abortions services.” Jd. However,
the district court found that Ragsdale was the only avail-
able abortionist in his area. The record reveals that Rags-
dale initially testified that he was the “only provider” of
abortions in his area. Subsequently, he quali his testi-
mony, stating he was “primarily, and, in many ways, the
only abortion provider” in the area. However, Ragsdale
concluded, stating: “To the best of my knowledge, no one
else intends” to perform abortions in the area. These
statements, contrary to the district court’s finding that

was the “only” abortion provider, do not estab-
lish that abortions would be unavailable in the area if
Ragsdale had to close his facility (because he failed to
lease or purchase a new facility). Inferring from the high
volume of abortions perfo at Ragsdale’s clinic, it is
1 that the i of the clinic had reached that
of an “economy of scale,’’ making it uneconomical for
other physicians to enter the abortion market in the area.
However, assuming arguendo, that abortionists receive
anywhere from $250 to $400 per abortion,'’ it is unlikely
that another oe (like Ragsdale) would not perform
abortions in the area in the event Ragsdale’s business
closed. The physician-surgeon entrepreneur could not ig-
nore Ragsdale’s apparent potential annual gross income
from abortions alone, approximately $875,0~ ($250 per
abortion x 3500 abortions per year). The district court’s
finding that the closing of Ragsdale’s clinic would make
abortions unavailable is mere speculation and clearly erro-
neous.

'7 Plaintiff's counsel stated during closing argument before the
district court that the fee in a ital for an abortion
was $1,000 and that the hospital fee was 2.5 to 4 times greater
than the cost of an abortion —— in an outpatient facility
(including a physician's office). . ing to plaintiff's counsel,
an outpatient abortion costs $250 to $400.

App. 67

_The district court found the second burden on a woman's
nent to terminate her prqmeney wasted by the ASTCA
ice requirement was that icensing requirement
sated the east of on chevtion “th $25 to $40 for abor-

tions performed at Ragsdale’s clinic.” The defendants
argue that the district court erroneously relied on hear-
say for the basis of its factual findings ing the in-

creased cost. I couldn’t agree more since the defendants

cost sheets consisted of 8 ings after allegedly
discussing tentative plans to move his ility with con-
tractors and other vendors. , @ physician and sur
geon, is no more an expert in cost accounting, contracting,

areas are knowledgeable about the problems and practice

of and/or medicine. Thus, just as the majority re-

the defendant’s architectural expert’s testimony

the medical “need for the ventilation require-

ments,” so too should the majority, on proper balance,
reject Ragsdale’s compliance cost estimates.

Se a Se eee Slee ine Cepiiive
of a oe ive, medical service by re-
quiring engineering and construction standards

400-01). This added cost of $25.21 certainly cannot be con-
sidered as significantly more than the $19.40 (less than
a $5 difference) increase per abortion for tissue examina-

App. 68

upheld by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft because
in light of the substantial benefits that a ,
examination can have, this small cost is j
462 U.S. at 490, 103 S.Ct. at 2524. Moreover,
be pointed out that the increased cost testified
unlike the one in Ashcroft, would at best only
rary and not one that would remain ad i L
dale admitted that “‘much of the debt would be
two to five years.” Thus, after two years the
would be reduced to $10.90 per patient, and after

iit

:

|
Eiy
i

of patients, and the miniscule financial impact referred to
is clearly de minimis and justified.

One last observation ing the cost of an abortion.
, I found no evidence establish-
ing the cost of an abortion performed in a doctor's of:

plaintiff
ment before the district court stated that the costs of an

abortion performed in a ($1,000) was 2.5 to 4
times as costly as that of one in a surgeon's
office or in an outpatient clinic. figures reflect that

operating compliance
in fact represent the low end of the abortion market price.
This ition supports my earlier observation that
Ragedale's clinic, because of its efficiency, dominated the
local market. Further, assuming that Ragsdale’s increased

in the range of 6 to 10 t, certainly de minimis. It
is not as ff the price of an chertion went Gums G00 Os
$500, a significant burden.

App. 69

This brings us to the third burden allegedly impinging
upon a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnan-
cy, i.e., Certificate of Need (CON) for Ragsdale’s ASTC
and the related public hearing required pursuant to the
IHFPA.'® The majority unbelievably holds the certificate
of need requirement unconstitutional for the reason, inter
alia, that the public hearing accompanying a certificate
of need auned a public veto of a woman’s qualified right
to an abortion. The record establishes unequivocally that
Ragsdale’s landlord, a hospital, wished to terminate its
lease with Ragsdale because Ragsdale failed to refer pa-
tients to the hospital. e applied to the State of
Illinois, pursuant to the A and IHFPA, for a license

‘8 Pursuant to 44 1155-1160 of the IHFPA, and as noted by the
majority, “anyone ——s to open an ASTC [must] obtain a cer-
tificate of need for the facility from the Department of Public
Health after a public hearing and a 120-day review period.” A
CON is granted if the State Board finds

“(1) that the licant is fit, willing, and able to provide a
proper unde of health care service for the community with
i regard to the qualification, background and character

of the applicant, (2) that economic feasibility is demonstrated
in terms of effect on the existing and projected operating
ee ee eee care facility; in terms
0 ———— s ability to establish and operate such facility
in with licensure regulations promulgated under
pertinent state laws; and in terms of the projected impact on
the total health care expenditures in the facility and communi-
ty, (3) that safeguards are provided which assure that the
establishment, construction or modification of the health care
facility is consistent with the public interest, and (4) that the
establishment, construction or modification is con-

sistent with the orderly and economic development of such
facilities and is in accord with standards, criteria, or plans
7) rn a Pneeee & She provisions of
ion 12 of this Act for such facilities for comprehensive
— care in the community, area, or State served by such

111% Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 1156 (emphasis added). In this manner the
state has attempted to reduce skyrocketing health care costs by
limiting the expansion of unnecessary medical facilities.

App. 70

for his new facility. After a full investigation and subsequent
to holding public hearings, the state agency found that there
was in fact a need for Ragsdale’s medical services. At
the public hearing a number of citizens protested against
abortions stating their pro-life positions. It stretches the
imagination that one would write that the exercise of
one’s First Amendment rights to object to an issue be
treated somehow as creating a burden on a woman’s right
to an abortion. The majority, however, asserts that “‘the
state’s unwillingness or inability to confine the proceedings
[the public hearings on Ragsdale’s CON for his ASTC]
to its even arguably legitimate goals bolster our conclusion
{that the-CON] requirement cannot stand.” This statement
flies in the face of the fact that the state after due and
considerate deliberations absent emotion or hysteria ob-
jectively analyzed and in fact found that need existed for
Ragsdale’s medical services. Although I have previously
expressed that an individual, including an abortionist,
should be free from picketing in front of his private home,
see Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1355 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Coffey, J., dissenting), reh’g granted and decision vacated,
818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd by equally divided vote
619 F. Supp. 792, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 1988 U.S. L.W. 2211 (January 11, 1988), public
hearings are a different matter. Public hearings are an
open forum where all citizens should have the right to
be heard in an organized manner in our democratic form
of government. That some open forums or demonstrations
sometimes “degenerate into a shouting match” is nothing
new to our right of free speech, much less to our national
system of justice and ordered liberty. I fail to comprehend
the majority’s contrary view.

Further, the record in this case establishes that the
ASTCA regulations in question place no burden whatso-
ever on a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy
in the first trimester because they reflect nothing but the
common, accepted, and approved standards of medical
practice and procedure as testified to by the medical ex-
perts. For example, § 205.240 of the ASTC regulations

App. 71

requires the management or owner of an ASTC to formu-
late written policies and a procedures manual. Dr. Rags-
dale described this requirement as standard medical and
administrative practice. Other administrative and organiza-
tional regulations, such as those eo written safety
plans (§ 205.510), appointment of a qualified consulting
committee and medical director (§ 205.230), and written
personnel policies (§ 205.310), as well as those requiring

sanitary conditions (§ 205.420) and proper dis of all
materials from the abortion procedure and maintenance
of the equipment in good working order (§ 205.410) are
merely enunciations of universally recognized standard
practice for performing surgical procedures in an outpa-
tient facility. As Dr. Ragsdale conceded on direct examina-
tion, most of the regulations of this type simply “stated
the obvious” and in no way impinged upon a woman’s
decision, much less her right, to an abortion. Moreover,
the yy pee and construction requirements contained

in the ASTC regulations reflect proper engineering design
and practice from a medical service point of view and ac-

cepted minimum standards for medical facilities. Examples
include requirements for testing and balancing heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning systems to ensure that
they are in proper working condition (§ 205.1510), insula-
tion in appropriate locations (§ 205.1520), and a minimum
ceiling height of eight feet with appropriate exceptions
for certain rooms, such as storage rooms (§ 205.1400). I
believe that the state has more than just a compelling
interest, and in fact has an overriding interest, in ensur-
ing that any and all ASTCs performing any surgical pro-
cedures, including first-trimester abortions, are designed
and constructed to meet basic engineering standards for
medical facilities in order that all fairly sophisticated
medical procedures are conducted “under conditions en-
suring the maximum safety” of the patient. Connecticut
v. Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11, 96 S.Ct. at 171.

Dr. Hern, the plaintiff's alleged expert witness at trial,
testified that “90 to 95 percent . . . of all first-trimester
procedures in this country . . . are performed by vacuum

App. 72

aspiration technique of some kind,” and are “the safest
surgical procedure[s] now performed.” The record also
established that other abortion procedures, such as the
saline, urea, and installation techniques (involving insert-
ing a needle into the amniotic cavity, withdrawing fluid,
and installing a saline solution within the amniotic cavity)
were also being performed in ASTCs. These abortion pro-
cedures have a higher complication and fatality rate than
other abortion procedures, such as the vacuum aspiration
and dilation and evacuation methods. Since more compli-
cated and involved abortion ——— which require
close supervision, control and regulation are also per-
formed in ASTCs, I am persuaded that the state can,
should, and must regulate its ASTCs in order that it
might protect its citizens from possible serious medical
problems which could very easily arise. The State of Illi-
nois, through its legislators, has the authority, if it so
determines, to require a higher standard for the opera-
tion of these clinics, including attending and supervising
personnel, building specifications and design, as well as
maintenance, in order that it might protect its citizens,
just as the State of Wisconsin has the authority to re-

uire higher standards for its prisons and the State of

eorgia to protect its inmates if it so wishes. Cf. Wis.
Administrative Code §§ HHS 302, et seq. with rgia
Code Annotated § 42-5-50, et seq. Similarly, the State of
Illinois can pass legislation mandating more all-inclusive
immunization requirements for school-age children than
those required by the State of Missouri. Cf. Illinois Re-
vised Statute Chapter 111.5, 4 22.11 and Illinois Adminis-
trative Code Tit. 77, § 696.10 with Missouri Revised Stat-
ute § 167.181.

The Illinois legislature has determined that the ASTCA
and the IHFPA, by their very enactment, are very im-
portant social and economic laws for the betterment and
protection of its citizens. Neither the ASTCA nor the
IHFPA burden a woman’s qualified right to terminate a
pregnancy, and both Acts further serve the state’s im-
portant interest in the health and welfare of its citizens;

App. 73

thus, even under Roe and its progeny the ASTCA ;
IHFPA must be held constitutional. ines wie

Finally, turning to those abortion-specific ASTCA
lations; I would hold that all but oa these + aio
specific regulations survive Roe’s scrutiny. Initially, I
would hold that 4 157-8.6-1!° properly requires a physi-
cian actively engaged in practice at an ASTC be on the
board of directors of any ASTC “devoted primarily to pro-
viding facilities for abortions” as a condition of licensure.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut v.
Menillo, it has been clear that states can require that only
physicians perform abortions. Illinois’ additional

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1042%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
