# Record and brief — Flight Attendants v. Zipes

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 491 U.S. 754

## Text

No. 88-608-CFX Title: Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,
Status: GRANTED Petitioner

Vv.

Anne B. Zipes, et al.

Docketed:
October 11, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

See also:
88-664 Counsel for petitioner: Fehr,Steven A.
Counsel for respondent: Hartunian,Aram A.
Entry Date Note - Proceedings and Orders

1 Oct 11 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

2 Nov 8 1988 Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. in opposition
filed.

3 Nov 16 1988 DISTRIBUTED. December 2, 1988

4 Nov 16 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants filed.

5 Dec 21 1988 REDISTRIBUTED. January 13, 1989
6 Jan 17 1989 Petition GRANTED.
KREIS
7 Feb 16 1989 Record filed.
* Certified copy of C. A. proceedings received.
8 Mar 3 1989 Joint appendix filed.
9 Mar 3 1989 Brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.
10 Mar 3 1989 Brief amici curiae of United States and EEOC filed.
11 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Fire
Fighters, AFL-CIO filed.
12 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of Americans United For Life Legal
Defens Fund filed.
13 Mar 8 1989 SET FOR ARGUMENT, APRIL 25, 1989. (2nd CASE)
16 Apr 3 1989 X Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. filed.
17 Apr 3 1989 X Brief amici curiae of ACLU, et al. filed.
14 Apr 5 1989 CIRCULATED.
18 Apr 18 1989 X Reply brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.
19 Apr 24 1989 Letter from Counsel for petitioner received and
distributed.
20 Apr 24 1989 Record filed.
* Certified copy of original record received.
21 Apr 25 1989 ARGUED.

a

PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

88 -6 08 ) Supreme Court, U.S.

' FILED

No. OCT il 1988
ee

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
Vv.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN A. FEHR
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755
Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
of Flight Attendants

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i
QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented is fairly stated by Amicus United
States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“amicus E.E.0.C.” herein).

u
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....----.:0000cceeeeeeeeseesseees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........0-:::2e000eeesrseees 3

I. THE CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE OF ENCOURAG-
ING PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS WOULD BE FRUS-
TRATED IF ATTORNEYS’ FEES WERE NOT
FORTHCOMING AT THE VITAL STAGE OF

FASHIONING RELIEF ......-----sssescerrrsretst 5
U. LIABILITY FOR FEES IS NOT RESTRICTED TO
DEFENDANT-WRONGDOERS ......-----+sss0r00 6
ItwedectleR ......ccsccsccccescccccsossonsesscesesssss 6
A. The Statute Makes No Connection Between
Wrongdoing And Liability For Fees ......--++-+++- 6
B. There Is No Basis For Exempting Inter-
venors From § 706(k) ....-.-sseseererrrrsesrtn 10
II THE UNION WAS NOTA FUNCTIONAL
PLAINTIFF .......ccccecccccccccccccccccsscssseees ~
IV. INACONTEST BETWEEN TWO GENUINE PLAIN-
TIFFS, THE LOSING PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY
THE ATTORNEYS’ FEES OF THE WINNING
PLAINTIFF .......ccccccccccccccesteccccsscoseseees® 16
A. InContests Between Plaintiffs, The Defensive
Protection Of Christiansburg Should Be
Bliminated .........cccccsccccccccccsesesesesess 16
B. Attorneys’ Fees For The Work Made Neces-
sary By A Plaintiff-Intervenor Should Not
Be Imposed On The Original Defendant ......---- 17
19

CONCLUGBON .......cccccccccccccccemesessonssososeses:

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Air Line Stewards and Stewardesse
$ s Ass’n, Local 550
v. Trans Worid Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983) ..... l

Air Line Stewards And Stewardesses
8 2 Ass’n, Local 550
vu. American Airlines And Trans World Airlines, 490 F.2d

636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) ......... 2
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) ..... 5
Akron Center for Reproductive Ilealth a

v. Cit

604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ...... iid — 10
= v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016

(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) ....... 10
ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Ci bl

A, Cir. 1980), aff'd,
sub nom. Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 385 (1982) .......... 2, 3,17
Alyeska Pipeline Service C. } rm
421 US. 240 (1975) ....... coma — 6,7, 8,11
Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1984)..... 10
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
(5th Cir. 1986)...... — Saedendeeann
SLE L LE ee 18

ae m4 City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
a : sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 )
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) .......... 16

Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 i

| | 846 F. (7th Cir. 1988), petitio

cert. filed 57 U.S.L.W. 3314 (Oct. ) 19
—— oo ane _

(1978)

Pes ae ESE LEE EE A passim
te pag eae Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline
- ‘ F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), rev’d, sub nom
ipes uv. TWA, 455 U.S. 385 (1982) ............. | 2

iv
Page
Decker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 564 F. Supp. 1273

(E.D. Wis. 1983) ......... ccc ee eee c eee ee en eceeeeenres wee
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,

386 U.S. 714 (1967) ..... cc cece ccc eeceecceenceeneeeccneess 8
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747

CTD oc cccccccncccccsicecscssesccecsvesensoceevcesene 5,9
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .....-.-.-.++- 12
Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979) ........ 10
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)... -- +--+ - eee e eee eee 8
Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services,

524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ......---- eee eee eee eres 12
May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308 (D.N.J. aececKs 10
Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, 543 F.2d 224

(D.C. Cir. 1976) ...... 0 cece cece eee e cence ee eereeeecnceees 10
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas,

801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ....... 2. eee e eee cece eee eens 10
Newman uv. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400

(1QGB) oc cccccccccccccccccccscssccsscvscecccesscscccess 5
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478

U.S. 546 (1986) 2... ccc cece cece reece eee eeeeneeeeeeneceess 11
Planned Parenthood v. Citizens For Community Action,

558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977) ......--- cece e cece eee eee eeees 7
Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Commonwealth of Pa.,

508 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Pa. 1980) .......--- sence cere ees 10
Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1978) ......----++++> 16
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

479 U.S. 10383 (1987)... 2. cee cece cece e ener e eee eeeeeee 12
Rich v. United States, 417 U.S. 116 (1974) ......-.--- esses 14

Page
Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763
I i el el 10
Robideau v. O’Brien, 525 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ..... 10
S&R Wrecker Service, Inc. v. Mecklenbur,
, ANC. V. 2 County, 652
F. Supp. 527 (W.D.N.C. 1987) ............... : ror eee eee 10
Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. ted én see vs 10
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.). aff’d mem
409 U.S. 942 (1972)................... +7 a ny
Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp. 635 (D.D.C. Tr ss ocebas 10
Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d
q .2d 63
SE iieiundedccvecss co. ae, ie 10
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ................ 6

Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire
Department of the City of White Plains, 533 F. Supp.
ote 10

Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
rev d on other grounds, sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) ...... 7

Wis. Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann
460 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Wis. 1978) .

Gd ne ene 10
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385

ESRC rete nt 2, 3, 9, 13, 15
Statutes and rules:

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.

RARER it es ee ai a 10
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg............. 4
Civil Rights Act of 1964:

§ 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).. 2... oe eee eee ee. 11,13

§ 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ...............--.. passim

Page
Clean Water Act, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) ............... 10
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ............... 10

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ..... 10
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (4) (A)..... 14

Fk FRET Pr errr TT TTT TTT ier rT passim

A SITY 5 cc ccaccovecedeccecesesnetdsevedsess 3

Miscellaneous:

H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ............. 11

S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ............. 11,12

Note, Attorney’s Fees: Where Shall The Ultimate Burden Lie?,
SD Vee, Fe Be, TPG eves cccescesssnesssesccscess 8

No. 88-608

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
@ctober Term, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,

Vv.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Before 1970, Trans World Airlines fired stewardesses who
became pregnant or adopted children, but not male employees
who became parents. On August 8, 1970, the union! filed the
complaint, alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII. Air
Line Stewards And Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1983).

The union members were incumbent stewardesses as to
whom only prospective relief was warranted. In the lawsuit, the
union also purported to represent the previous, illegally fired,
stewardesses who were no longer union members. In July 1971,
the union entered into a settlement agreement with TWA that
obtained the prospective relief desired by the incumbents but
provided the former stewardesses with no back pay, retroactive

‘The union was then the predecessor to Petitioner IFFA. These
successive representatives of incumbent stewardesses are referred to
herein as “the union”.

2

seniority (either company seniority or competitive seniority), or
even the right to return to work except as openings might occur.
Air Line Stewards And Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v.
American Airlines And Trans World Airlines, 490 F.2d 636, 638
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). Because of the
union’s conflict of interest and its refusal to give opt-out notices
to the former stewardesses, the Seventh Circuit vacated the
District Court’s approval of the settlement, ejected the union as
the class representative, and remanded for resolution of the
merits. Id. at 640, 643.

After remand, plaintiffs obtained summary judgment. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the merits but reversed
as to those class members who did not file timely EEOC charges.
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582
F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), rev’d, sub nom. Zipes v. TWA, 455
U.S. 385 (1982). The mandate was stayed and both sides filed
petitions for certiorari. This Court granted a motion to defer
consideration of the certiorari petitions, pending effectuation of
a settlement which was then being negotiated.

A settlement was approved by the District Court which
provided for $3,000,000 in back pay, reinstatement, retroactive
company seniority and (as amended, J.A. 27)? such retroactive
competitive seniority as the District Court might order after a
hearing in which the union participated. ALSSA v. TWA, 630
F.2d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir. 1980). The class was divided into Sub-
Class A (those who had filed timely charges) and Sub-Class B
(those who did not). Jd. at 1166.

At the suggestion of plaintiffs, the union was invited to take
part in a hearing on the question of competitive seniority. Instead,
the union filed a full-blown petition to intervene, claiming that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of Sub-Class B, that
the settlement could not be approved without the union’s consent,
and that any grant of retroactive seniority would impermissibly
infringe upon the contract rights of the incumbents. (J.A. 23 4
11, 16, 18) If the union had its way, the settlement would have

2 Citations to the Joint Appendix are “(J.A. )”, and to the Appendix
to Petitioner’s Certiorari Petition as “(P.A. gf

3

been held for naught, and the plaintiffs and TWA would have
been forced vo continue litigating the claims on the merits (and
the question of jurisdiction) to the bitter end, in a winner-take-
all contest. (J.A. 32)

The District Court rejected the union’s jurisdiction objection
(J.A. 30) and, after three days of evidentiary hearings (P.A. 4a),
entered two orders. In one, the settlement was approved under
Rule 23(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. (J.A. 35-36) In the other order, the District
Court concluded that granting retroactive competitive seniority
would not have an unusual adverse impact on the incumbents
in an untypical way, and accordingly ordered that all re-employed
class members be credited with full competitive seniority
retroactive to the dates when they would have returned to work
(upon completion of pregnancy leaves) in the absence of TWA’s
no-mothers policy. (J.A. 37-38)

The union appealed not only from the seniority order, but
also from the orders which approved the settlement and rejected
the union’s jurisdictional challenge. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed, ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980), and
the union obtained certiorari. This Court affirmed those orders,
and reversed the earlier Seventh Circuit holding regarding subject
matter jurisdiction. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385
(1982).

Because of the union’s intervention and appeals, the plaintiff
class’ ultimate enjoyment of the settlement’s benefits was delayed
and came at a greatly increased cost. (P.A. 35a) On July 16,
1986, the District Court’s amended order required the union to
pay a total of $180,915.84 for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and $5,978
for expenses. (P.A. 37a, 40a)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Congressional purpose underlying § 706(k), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k), is to enable Title VII victims to obtain lawyers,

3 $57,258 thereof is for the work of counsel for Sub-Class A, who have
already been paid from the $3,000,000 settlement fund for their work
in fighting with the union. If plaintiffs prevail here, this amount will
be refunded to the members of Sub-Class A. (P.A. 37a)

4

thereby facilitating private enforcement of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. Since rightful place seniority
is a vital part of the relief available under Title VII, Congress’
intention to ensure the payment of a plaintiffs legal fees must
be applied to the relief stage as well as to the liability phase
of the case.

2. The fee-shifting provision is neither punitive nor limited
to wrongdoing defendants. It is to encourage plaintiffs to
vindicate a national policy of the highest priority. While
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E_E.O.C., 434 US. 412 (1978),
observed that fee awards are ordinarily imposed on violators
of the law, this Court did not hold that wrongdoing is a
precondition for fee awards to plaintiffs.

3. Congress intended that plaintiffs pay defendants’ attor-
neys’ fees only in groundless suits, in order not to discourage
potential plaintiffs. That being the underlying purpose of a
plaint immunity for a defendant’s fees, it is applicable
only when he is genuinely a plaintiff — that is, when he seeks
redress for a violation of either Title VII or some other federal
statute which carries a similar fee-shifting provision. The union
was not a “functional plaintiff’ because it neither asserted a
violation of, nor a right to relief under, Title VII or any other
fee-shifting statute. Moreover, the history of this case, including
the union’s litigation posture at the relief stage, demonstrates
that the union was a functional defendant. The union’s interests
were diametrically opposed to the plaintiffs; the union presented
the only opposition to plaintiffs’ obtaining complete relief: and
the union's efforts were aimed at destroying plaintiffs’ entire case.

4. The rare case in which the opposing parties are both
seeking redress from each other for violations of Title VII (or
some other statute with a fee-shifting provision) would not be
resolvable by the scriptures of Christiansburg. In such a case,
the policy considerations underlying § 706(k) require that
attorneys’ fees for work made necessary by an intervenor should
be borne by the intervenor rather than the winning plaintiff.
Reasons of policy also militate against imposing plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees on the defendant for work made necessary by
an intervenor.

5
I

THE CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE OF
ENCOURAGING PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
WOULD BE FRUSTRATED IF ATTOR-
NEYS’ FEES WERE NOT FORTHCOMING
AT THE VITAL STAGE OF FASHIONING
RELIEF

The two central goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were
to eradicate discriminatory practices and make persons whole
for injuries suffered by reason of unlawful employment practices.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Rec-
ognizing that enforcement of the Act would be largely dependent
upon private plaintiffs, who typically lack the means to attract
competent lawyers, Congress intended § 706(k)‘ to encourage the
bringing of private actions in order to facilitate enforcement of
Title VII. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0.C., 434 U.S.
412, 420 (1978) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey)); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 401-402 (1968).

The legal services performed at the relief stage comprise an
important aspect of Title VII enforcement. In particular, seniority
is a vital part of the make-whole remedy of Title VII. Franks
v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 US. 747, 774 (1976). Lawyers
will not be attracted as easily if they cannot expect payment
for the work at the relief stage. Thus, ensuring the payment of
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for the work involved in a seniority
dispute is critical. Since the fee-shifting scheme was designed
to encourage a plaintiffs obtaining benefits to the public,
requiring victorious plaintiffs to bear the costs of that significant
a part of the proceeding could not be squared with Congress’
purpose.

Every Title VII plaintiff (and his lawyer) should anticipate
the performance of substantial legal services even after the
defendant’s violation is proved. At the stage when relief must
be fashioned, the plaintiff will frequently encounter opposition

* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).

6

from non-defendant parties. This case serves as an instructive
example. After the settlement with TWA in 1979, four years
elapsed before the plaintiffs enjoyed the first benefit of that
settlement.5 And from that time until the plaintiffs’ lawyers
obtained a fee award against the union in 1986 for those 4 years
of work, another 2 years elapsed.

To the extent this case is any guide, if attorneys’ fees were
not recoverable for post-settlement work, it would serve as a
serious disincentive, which cannot be reconciled with either the
language or purpose of § 706(k).

II

LIABILITY FOR FEES IS NOT RE-
STRICTED TO DEFENDANT-WRONG-
DOERS

Introduction

Someone will inevitably bear the costs of necessary legal
services. Inasmuch as the performance of legal representation
in itself incurs a cost, the question is not whether that cost must
be borne, but upon whom the burden should fall.

A. The Statute Makes No Connection
Between Wrongdoing And Liability For
Fees

As this Court held in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, “the circumstances under which attorneys’
fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts
in making those awards are matters for Congress to determine.”
421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975). The interpretation of the statute begins,
as it must, with the language of the statute. United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). Section 706(k) provides that
“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party...
a reasonable attorney’s fee.” In the absence of wording to the
contrary, the natural and logical meaning of those words is that

° As shown post (at 13-14), it was not merely a matter of waiting those
4 a. Plaintiffs were required to fend off the union in order to succeed
at all.

7

the party who must pay a winning plaintiffs attorneys’ fees
is the party against whom the plaintiff prevailed.‘ Plaintiffs here
are indisputably the “prevailing party”.

The argument of the union and amicus E.E.O.C. that
“innocent” intervenors are not liable for attorneys’ fees is
premised on the notion that Congress designed § 706(k) to punish
violators of Title VII. That reading of § 706(k) is not warranted
because this section was intended to facilitate private enforce-
ment, not to punish violators.’ To interpret it as the union and
amicus E.E.0.C. want would require reading § 706(k) as though
it states “the court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable
attorney's fee against the party found guilty of violating the
statute”, words which are conspicuously absent.

Fee shifting ordinarily is intended to ensure that those who
act in the public interest will not be forced to shoulder the cost
of litigation, rather than to punish law violators. Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Nothing in § 706(k) or
its legislative history indicates that Congress thought otherwise.
On the contrary, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Congress was
fully aware of the opinion in Wilderness Society which preceded
this Court’s decision in Alyeska.

In deciding that a winning defendant should not ordinarily
get its fees paid by the plaintiff, this Court mentioned two
considerations, both of which support fee awards to winning
plaintiffs in the usual case: (1) a Title VII plaintiff is the chosen
instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority and (2) when a plaintiff is
awarded attorneys’ fees, they are awarded against a violator

® As stated in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1988),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3314 (Oct. 20, 1988) (No. 88-664), the
only question is: “Did the plaintiffs in fact prevail against the
intervenors?”

’ As explained in Planned Parenthood v. Citizens For Community
Action, 558 F.2d 861, 871 (8th Cir. 1977), “an award of attorneys’ fees
is compensatory, not punitive.”

8

of federal law. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S.
412, 418 (1978). However, this Court did not hold that both
considerations are required, only that both considerations are
ordinarily present and that both of those considerations militate
in the same direction. In Christiansburg, the fact that both
considerations were absent fortified the decision not to require
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s fees. But nothing in Christians-
burg indicates that one of them is not enough. And while both
of those considerations are ordinarily present, the private
plaintiffs incentive to enforce an important national policy is
clearly the more important.

As this Court observed, the two purposes that emerge from
the legislative history are:
First, Congress desired to “make it easier for a plaintiff
of limited means to bring a meritorious suit” [and]
second, .. . Congress intended to “deter the bringing
of lawsuits without foundation.”

Id. at 420. Those are, indeed, the only two purposes of § 706(k)
— not to punish law violators.®

Absent fee-shifting, a winning plaintiffs recovery is dim-
inished by the expense he incurs in order to obtain the relief
sought. This is the major criticism of the American Rule.? But
the American Rule may be changed by statute or contract.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
717 (1967). Once the American Rule is reversed, as it has been
under Title VII (at least for plaintiffs), a losing party can no
longer enjoy its protection. The losing side perforce becomes
obligated to repay the winning plaintiffs attorneys’ fees, simply
because the loser’s opposition is what caused those attorneys’
fees to become necessary.

8 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), is inapposite because the
plaintiff there did not prevail against the defendant against whom fees
were sought.

9 See authorities listed generally in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270 n.45 (1975); Note, Attorney’s
Fees: Where Shall The Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1216
(1967).

9

The union’s argument that it is not liable under § 706(k)
because it was innocent of the underlying violation is flawed
in the same respect as was its defense in Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982). In Zipes, the union resisted the
relinquishment of a small portion of each of the incumbent’s
seniority on the ground that the union itself had not been found
guilty of discrimination, a contention which this court found
“meritless”. Id. at 399. Six years earlier, Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), held that seniority relief
cannot be denied to Title VII victims on the ground that it
diminishes the expectations of innocent incumbents, because that
would frustrate the make whole objective of Title VII. Jd. at 774.

This situation is analogous to recovery from an “innocent”
bona fide purchaser of an article that was stolen from the plaintiff.
It is the plaintiffs superior right to the thing in the hands of
the innocent converter that controls; the absence of fault on the
part of the converter is irrelevant. Just as the plaintiffs had a
superior right to the seniority held by the union members,
Congress has determined that the plaintiffs’ right to get their
fees paid is paramount. By not mentioning any countervailing
equities, Congress must be taken to mean that the plaintiffs
right to attorneys’ fees is superior to the rights of any adversary
over whom the plaintiff prevails.

10

B. There Is No Basis For Exempting Inter-
venors From § 706(k)!°

Nothing in the language of § 706(k) limits the species of
litigant against whom an award may be made and nothing in
it exempts any species of losing parties from the burden of paying
the attorneys’ fees of the successful plaintiff. The absence of
language in either § 706(k) or § 1988 restricting the parties against
whom fees may be awarded stands in contrast to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (incor-
porating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)), where
liability for the winner’s attorneys’ fees can be imposed only
on the “defendant”. Congress clearly knows how to limit fees
liability when it wishes to do so. See also, Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

‘0 The courts unanimously hold that fee awards are available against
voluntary intervenors opposing relief to plainti

function as plaintiffs asserting rights apa A ly ere
See Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Ageny EJ

con ie Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. — 455 U.S. 989

. Sawyer
(D.D.C. 1984); May v. Couparnon, SIBF Beep. 100805 (D.NwJ. 984): Decker
vu. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 564 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Vulcan Society
of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of the City of White
Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Robideau v. O’Brien, 525 F.
Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Common-
wealth of Pa., 508 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Wis. Socialist Workers
1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 460 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Wis. 1978).

were denied because the language of the Clean Water Act, § 505(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), (“where appropriate”) was different than the § 1988
standard of “prevailing parties”, the same basis for the decision in Sierra
Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Richardson v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984), fees were denied because
under the ADEA they are available only against an offending employer.

11

Carving out an exception for intervenors cannot be justified
on the theory that Congress did not have intervenors in mind.
Section 1988 uses the same wording as § 706(k) and both statutes
should be interpreted in a similar manner. Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559-560 (1986)!
Section 1988 was enacted to correct the “gap” pointed out in
Alyeska.'2 Congress was surely aware of the fact that in Alyeska
the party against whom fees were sought and denied was an
intervenor. Also, the legislative history cited with approval! Sims
vu. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942
(1972), where fees were assessed against intervening legislators.
S. Rep. No. 1011 at 3 n.3.13

Congress recognized that civil rights plaintiffs are less likely
to recover damages, rather than non-monetary relief, and
therefore less likely to attract lawyers who might otherwise be
willing to look to contingent fees. In Title VII cases, money
damages are not available, only backpay under § 706(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g), when the court in its discretion deems it proper.
Moreover, because of the greater likelihood of non-monetary relief,
any Title VII plaintiff can expect to encounter intervenors more
frequently than in other cases. Granting exemption from § 706(k)
to intervenors would thus undercut the availability of lawyers
for plaintiffs in precisely the kinds of cases in which they have
the most difficulty attracting lawyers.

Imposing the winning plaintiffs attorneys’ fees upon an
intervenor whose opposition was unsuccessful is not inequitable.
Awarding compensation to a winning plaintiff accomplishes the
purpose of the fee-shifting statute, and has the salutary effect
of making an intervenor think twice before entering the fray.

‘| The legislative:history of § 1988 shows the same purpose as § 706(k)
~ to encourage private citizens to initiate court action to correct violations
of the Nation’s civil rights statutes. See H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1976).

12 See H.R. Rep. No. 1558 at 2. See also S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5908.

‘3 Congress also explicitly contemplated “defendant-intervenors”, albeit
as potential enforcers of Title VII. Jd. at 4 n.4.

12

I

THE UNION WAS NOT A FUNCTIONAL
PLAINTIFF

Section 706(k) arms a plaintiff with a sword and a shield,
both of which stem from the underlying Congressional purpose
of obtaining private enforcement. When a plaintiff wins, he gets
his attorneys’ fees reimbursed as a matter of course, absent special
circumstances. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E_E.O.C., 434 U.S.
412, 416 (1978); S. Rep. No. 1011 at 4. When a plaintiff loses,
he must pay the winning defendant’s fees only when the case
is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. Christiansburg, 434 U.S.
at 424; S. Rep. No. 1011 at 5. The plaintiffs shield serves the
purpose of assuaging concern about the cost of losing, thereby
furthering the Congressional purpose of encouraging private
enforcement. For that reason, a plaintiff is entitled to the shield
only when he brings into court an alleged violator of Title VI
and seeks redress for that violation. Only then can he be regarded
as a “plaintiff’ within the meaning of § 706(k) and Christians-
burg.

The formal labels “plaintiff’, “defendant” and “intervenor”
are not helpful in assessing responsibility for the fees of the
winning party. For example, if an employer brought an action
seeking a declaratory judgment over the legality of a new
promotion policy, he would be regarded as a “plaintiff’ under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but he would not be entitled
to the benefits of § 706(k). The real question is whether the losing
party acted like a plaintiff or a defendant.

Only when an intervenor presents a claim of a violation of
Title VI and seeks redress for it can he be characterized as
a party taking part in the eradication of discrimination. Only
then does an intervenor have Congress’ encouragement to act
as a “private attorney general”; only then can an intervenor
be regarded as a “functional plaintiff’; and only then does he
earn the shield of Christiansburg.’ If the rights asserted by an

14 See Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctiov.al Services, 524 F. Supp.
1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

13

intervenor fall short of those that Congress deemed worthy of
encouraging via fee-shifting, the intervenor has no claim to the
mantle of a “functional plaintiff’ or the protection of Christians-
burg.

The union did not qualify for protection under Christiansburg
as a “plaintiff’ because the union asserted neither a Title VI
claim nor any other claim covered by a fee-shifting statute.
Moreover, the nature and extent of the union’s opposition to the
plaintiffs’ quest for relief places it even farther away from its
desired status as a “functional plaintiff’. The union challenged
not only the restoration of the plaintiffs’ competitive seniority,
but the entire settlement agreement, arguing that the Court lacked
jurisdiction. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 391
(1982). If the union had its way, the Sub-Class B plaintiffs would
have taken nothing by their suit, just as surely as if TWA had
prevailed on the merits.'5

In fact, the procedural history of this case demonstrates that
from the beginning the union was a wolf in sheep’s clothing.
When it filed the complaint, the union purported to be the class
representative of the former stewardesses. At that time, the union
wanted an end to TWA’s no-mothers policy for the benefit of
the incumbents (union members). Section 706(g) made it clear
to the union that reemployment and retroactive seniority were
available to the former stewardesses, both of which were
antagonistic to the union’s members. In the s*ttlement agreement
negotiated with TWA, the union gave up any meaningful right
to reemployment (at least to the extent that it would have any
adverse affect on the incumbents’ ), and gave up all rights to
retroactive seniority. In order to get what the union wanted, it
also gave up all of the plaintiffs’ claims for backpay and company
seniority. That was of value to TWA and cost the union nothing.
The use of that bargaining chip to benefit the incumbents
Uluminated the union’s conflict of interest.

15 Even as to the SubClass A plaintiffs, the union argued that the
District Court could not award retroactive seniority in derogation of
the employment agreement between TWA and the incumbent employees.

16 The settlement provided for re-employment only when openings
occurred.

14

After the union was ejected as the plaintiffs’ class repre
sentative, the union was not heard from again until the plaintiffs
achieved their hard won settlement. At that point, the union
asserted the very argument which TWA had given up in the
1979 settlement — the jurisdictional challenge to plaintiffs’ entire
case. If the union had its way, the plaintiffs would have walked
away with nothing, as surely as if TWA had won the case. The
union could not have chosen grounds for combat more typical
of a defendant.'’

Essentially conceding that the union did not assert the kinds
of rights which elevate it to a private attorney general, amicus
E.E.0.C. suggests that an intervenor shouid be immune from
§ 706(k) fee awards whenever the views it presents at the relief
stage are merely important or socially desirable. However, had
Congress desired to immunize intervenors who present argu-
ments that are “important” (either to the intervenor or society,
generally), it could easily have done so.'* There is simply nothing
in the language of § 706(k), § 1988, or their respective legislative
histories that supports this attempt to carve out an exception
to the “prevailing party” standard.

Amicus E.E.O.C. and the union similarly argue that the
imposition of fee awards would have a “chilling effect” upon
intervenors who desire to contest the claims of Title VII plaintiffs
for relief. Concern about “chilling” is precisely one of the two
principal underpinnings of the American Rule. Cf. Rich v. United
States, 417 U.S. 116, 130 (1974). But the American Rule was
reversed in 706(k) as to those who choose to oppose plaintiffs
in Title VII cases. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 415-416.'9

1? That the umion was not “required” to intervene on account of its
duty of fair representation is explained at length in the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion below. (P.A. 14a-16a)

18 For example, in the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605
(c) (4) (A), Congress provided for fee awards to persons who represent
“an interest which would substantially contribute to a fair determina®ion
of the issues to be resolved in the proceeding.”

18 In the context of § 706(k), the “chilling effect” argument is atavistic.
Under the English Rule, where the loser pays as a matter of course,
no one would give a second thought to imposing upon an intervenor
the attorneys’ fees of the party who prevailed against him.

15

In any event, the argument that the expressions of the union’s
points in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982), were
important and socially useful is belied by the contrary assess-
ments of both this Court and amicus E.E.O.C. in Zipes. The union
argued there that the plaintiffs’ settlement could not be approved
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that, in any event,
because the case was settled without an adjudicated finding that
TWA had violated Title VII, the predicate for relief was missing.
This Court found both arguments to be “withoxt merit”.”

In its brief in Zipes (Nos. 78-1545 and 80-951), amicus E.E.0.C.
observed: “there is no merit to either of [the union’s] contentions”
(at 9); “there is no merit to IFFA’s contention that seniority may
never be restored in a settlement without the consent of a non-
party union representing incumbent employees” (id. at 9-10);
“IFFA’s contention that a settlement may not provide for the
restoration of seniority without the approval of a union that is
not a defendant, and thus has no potential liability . . . is both
extravagant and flatly inconsistent with Congress’ intent” (id.
at 26-27).

20 After disposing of the jurisdiction argument, this Court concluded
that the second contention “is also without merit”, 455 U.S. at 398,
and stated: “Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive
seniority contrary to the collective-bargaining agreement should not be
awarded over the objection of a union that has not itself been found
guilty of discrimination”, id. at 399.

16
IV

IN A CONTEST BETWEEN TWO
GENUINE PLAINTIFFS, THE LOSING
PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY THE ATTOR-
NEYS’ FEES OF THE WINNING
PLAINTIFF

A. In Contests Between Plaintiffs, The
Defensive Protection Of Christiansburg
Should Be Eliminated

Once the labels are cast aside and meaningful analysis has
determined whether the contending parties are functional
plaintiffs or defendants, it is apparent that only rarely will
plaintiffs oppose each other in Title VII or civil rights cases.
The likelihood of two parties opposing one another, each of whom
either asserts a violation against the other or seeks redress from
the other for a violation, is slim. It would seem that it can occur
only when a Title VII or civil rights lawsuit results in an order
which is then challenged as being a violation (of Title VII, etc.)."

In that sort of deadlock, it is literally impossible for both
plaintiffs to enjoy both the shield and sword of Christiansburg.
Several reasons favor elimination of the defensive shield, and
that the winning plaintiff should receive compensation for his
attorneys’ fees from the losing plaintiff.

Since the goal established by Congress is to encourage private
enforcement, the solution should adopt whatever is most likely
to enhance private enforcement. However intimidating it might
be to a plaintiff to contemplate paying the attorneys’ fees of
the “plaintiff’ he is about to sue, it would seem that it will be
outweighed by the prospect of receiving Ais attorneys’ fees if
he wins, providing he has a greater than 50% confidence of

21 Two such cases are Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42 (2d. Cir. 1978)
and Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980) aff'd,
sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). In those cases, the “second plain accused
the original plaintiff not of a violation in the usual sense but, rather,
of inetasens igating or supporting a violation by obtaining an order that
viola tle VIL.

17

winning. For the same reason, would-be plaintiffs who have less
than 50% confidence will be less likely than otherwise to file
suits in cases that pit plaintiffs against one another. The result
of the foregoing suggestion is likely to be that more cases will
be filed in which plaintiffs are relatively confident, and fewer
cases in which plaintiffs are less than sanguine.

Here, even if it had been the case that the union was truly
a “functional plaintiff’, the choice would be between: (a) an
innocent victim of a Title VII violation who, having demonstrated
a right to relief, was put to added litigation expense in order
to obtain redress; and (b) an intervenor who, while innocent of
the underlying violation, was the party who imposed those
additional costs upon the plaintiff. In making the choice, it would
have to be kept in mind that the union’s opposition was not
“rightful”. After all, the reason why the union lost was that its
position was without merit. .

B. Attorneys’ Fees For The Work Made
Necessary By A Plaintiff-Intervenor
Should Not Be Imposed On The Original
Defendant

In a contest between a plaintiff and an intervenor-plaintiff,
one possible solution too obvious to ignore would impose the
winner's attorneys’ fees on the original wrongdoer-defendant.
That is not a good solution.

In the case of a settled lawsuit, that would be contrary to
the policy of encouraging settlements. A wrongdoer defendant
who settles typically and understandably has the motive and
expectation of quantifying his total cost and terminating his

_ involvement in the proceedings. Subjecting a settling wrongdoer

defendant to open-ended liability for attorneys’ fees made

necessary thereafter by a party not under his control would serve
as a disincentive to settle.22

22 Of course, settlements are encouraged. ALSSA v. Trans World
Airlines, 630 F.2d 1164, 1166-7 (7th Cir. 1980).

18

That rule would also be unworkable in fully litigated cases,
inasmuch as the tenacity and vigor of an intervenor’s later
litigation posture, and hence the amount of attorneys’ fees that
will later flow therefrom, are unpredictable.“ In this case in
particular, TWA could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
that the union would assert lack of jurisdiction — the very
argument that TWA gave up by settling.

In any event, inasmuch as the union does not come close
to being a “functional plaintiff’, these questions ought not be
addressed in this case.

2 In Avoyelles Sportsmer.’s League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631 (Sth Cir.
1986), plaintiff prevailed against the government, but the government
was held to be not liable for fees in the later phase of the litigation
in which plaintiff was opposed by other parties. Id. at 632, 637.

19
CONCLUSION

The issue on which the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
disagree is not appropriate for decision in this case because the
union was not a functional plaintiff. Consequently, the writ of
certiorari should be dismissed. In any event, the judgment of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

AraM A. HarTUNIAN*
Rosert M. WeEIssBourD
Puyuus L. CROCKER
HARTUNIAN, FUTTERMAN &
Howarp, CHT».

Suite 1850

122 South Michigan Avenue

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 427-3600

Kevin M. Forpe
KATRINA VEERHUSEN
Kevin M. Forpe, Lrp.
Suite 1100
111 West Washington Street
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 641-1441

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

BRIEF

Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
APR 16. 3989
No. 88-608 JOSEPH F. SPANTOTSR
ee 2.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
= ‘ Petitioner,
ANNE B. ZIPES, et a/.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Se ———

STEVEN A. FEHR *
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JANAE L. SCHAEFFER
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER

& GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755

Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
* Counsel of Record of Flight Attendants

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

® Gea 60

c 8
\ 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. IFFA DID NOT ACT LIKE A DEFENDANT,
DID NOT VIOLATE THE LAW LIKE A
DEFENDANT, IS NOT A FUNCTIONAL
DEFENDANT, AND SHOULD NOT BE
TREATED AS A WRONGDOER DEFEND-
ANT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURPOSES.. 1

Il. IF ALLOWED TO STAND, THE RESULT BE-
LOW WOULD HAVE A SEVERE CHILLING
EFFECT UPON THE ADVERSARY JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS TO WHICH CONGRESS EN-
TRUSTED THE ULTIMATE EFFECTUA-

TION OF THE GOALS OF TITLE VII ............... 7
Ill. NOTHING IN THE LANGUAGE OF § 706(k)
REQUIRES THE RESULT BELOW... .....0000... 9

RRS SVREEERS OR secs a Ee 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness

Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) ............00..22.000.00..... 9
Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd

8 | NU ETS ee a 6, 7

Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988),
certiorari pending sub nom. Diamond v. Charles

CI, SINE .ccncncnncsisinsnsteicstetinientiammeamann nan 10
Christiansburg Garment v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

CRIED | sacccnsseepssnsssensenanvisnensdnnaeisananiasslaianananinanananaan passim
Freedman v. ALSSA, 730 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984)... 8
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...... 7

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390

is Se 5) eee eS 9,10
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987) 20.0.0. 2,7

Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d

anamn. GD Ua. GE GHD xnnsniccctioninieniee 3
Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977) 2.000000... 2
Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631

+ + 3; SRE ee 6,7
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

| _- e TT 6

Statutes
Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976,

42 U.S.C. § 1968 ............. santnintnininsstbiashiabaganae - §8
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

[| F Yee passim

Ee ee 4

. SS emsinenesneiiamma 4

ee Ba passim
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151,

OE I. sncensesicciccenninsntiviitistitipastamimaeteamieed he 4
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ............ 4

Constitution of the United States
II ccstcscstcncsanenss siipsessnnidaiasiakeemdemenanal 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-608

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
7 Petitioner,
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

I. IFFA DID NOT ACT LIKE A DEFENDANT, DID
NOT VIOLATE THE LAW LIKE A DEFENDANT,
IS NOT A FUNCTIONAL DEFENDANT, AND
SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS A WRONGDOER
DEFENDANT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURPOSES

Plaintiffs’ Brief ' is more notable for what it does not
dispute or discuss than for what it does.* The core of

1 References to Plaintiffs’ Brief will be denoted as “Pl. Br. ——.”

2 For example, Plaintiffs do not dispute (because they cannot)
that (1) the settlement effectively cost 159 Flight Attendants their
jobs; (2) Plaintiffs’ counsel was paid more than $1,250,000 from
the settlement fund which included the use of a “multiplier” of two
(and effectively paid counsel hourly wages as high as $300 per
hour); and (3) the typical class member received approximately
$2,000 in backpay as compensation for being deprived of her job for
15 years. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Subclass B members (who

9
ne

Plaintiffs’ position, however, seems to be that IFFA
should be characterized as a “functional defendant” and
not as a “functional plaintiff.” For numerous reasons,
this argument cannot stand.

Although it seems elementary, the proper starting point
for this analysis is the basic meaning of the terms
“plaintiff” and “defendant.” Like a plaintiff, IFFA came
into court complaining that what TWA and the Plaintiffs
had agreed to ask the court to order would injure IFFA
and its members. Unlike a defendant, IFFA was never
accused of committing a legal wrong. If one term or the
other must be chosen, clearly IFFA’s behavior was more
akin to that of a plaintiff than that of a defendant.

The centerpiece of Plaintiffs’ theory is that IFFA must
be a functional defendant because it was opposed by
Plaintiffs. But that contention makes no sense, for IFFA
was opposed by both Plaintiffs and adjudicated wrongdoer
defendant TWA. The emphasis should not be on who
opposes the innocent third-party, but instead on why that
innocent third party is present in the litigation. Thus,
the intervenors in Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987), were not
contending that the defendants had violated their rights
ab initio, but only that what plaintiffs and defendants
had agreed to do and what the court had ordered pur-
suant to the settlement of the plaintiffs’ claims violated
their rights, and therefore those intervenors were con-
sidered “functional plaintiffs.” IFFA found itself in pre-
cisely the same position.

constitute 92% of the class) were not the subject of timely charges
filed with the EEOC. (Pl. Br. 2). Moreover, Plaintiffs do not bother
to discuss the union’s duty of fair representation (except to state
that they agree with the Seventh Circuit Panel majority); or the
procedures which this Court has indicated must be followed in Title
VII remedial preceedings and the role the union (which is not an
adjudicated wrongdoer defendant) must play in those proceedings
as articulated in Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977); or even
the very “special circumstances” of this case.

a
vu

Indeed, Plaintiffs admit that the formal litigation
labels the parties bear are “not helpful in assessing”
liability for fees. (Pl. Br. 12). We agree that “The
real question is whether the losing party acted like a
plaintiff or a defendant.” (J/d.). It is worth noting, how-
ever, that in adopting this position Plaintiffs are seri-
ously undercutting and exposing the frailty of the ration-
ale of the Panel majority below. If the courts are indeed
to look beyond the litigation labels and analyze who the
parties truly are, then there is no real danger that wrong-
doer defendants will be able to successfully “cloak them-
selves” with phony claims in order to avoid liability for
fees.

There is no doubt that the courts not only should, but
can make these determinations. Plaintiffs persuasively
make this point themselves by noting that the legislative
history of 42 U.S.C. $1988 cites Sims v. Amos, 340
F.Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem. 409 U.S. 942
(1972). While it is true that the legislators who inter-
vened in Sims were assessed fees, it is clear from the ©
opinion that those legislators are the parties who actually
deprived plaintiffs of their rights. Thus, when the inter-
venors are true defendants who actually violated the law,
it is appropriate to treat those intervenors like defendants
for attorney’s fees purposes. But when the intervenors
are parties who did not deprive the plaintiffs of their
rights, and who are suffering a deprivation of their own
rights although they did no wrong, it is appropriate to
treat those intervenors like plaintiffs for attorney’s fees

purposes.

Given Plaintiffs’ admission that the Court must look
beyond the litigation labels, Plaintiffs’ other arguments
that IFFA should be characterized as a ‘functional de-
fendant” are quite illogical. We will discuss each in turn.

First, Plaintiffs contend that IFFA must be a “func-
tional defendant” because IF FA was not asserting Title
VII rights. Thus, if Plaintiffs are to be believed, a party

~ §

who contends that a settlement abridges her rights un-
der Title VII must be characterized as a “functional
plaintiff”, whereas a party who claims that her rights
are being abridged under a collective bargaining agree-
ment safeguarded by the Railway Labor Act or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act must be characterized as a
“functional defendant.” We find such reasoning to be
strained at best, and as pointed out by the United States
as amicus curiae (hereinafter “the Government’), such
a distinction would also be impractical and unworkable.
Both third parties are essentially contending that they
have been deprived of legitimate rights even though they
have not committed a legal wrong; and neither third
party had a claim initially, for the claim only arises as
a result of what the defendant may agree to do in order
to resolve the litigation and/or what the court may order
in that regard. Thus, as to both third parties, it is the
illegal act of a defendant in violation of the civil rights
law that directly caused their loss and their claims. In
any event, such a distinction, even if valid, could have
no possible relevance here, since an integral part of
IFFA’s arguments was that the deprivation of its con-
tractual rights at a time when Plaintiffs had not proven
that they were subjected to a legal wrong was a taking
in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee to Due
Process of law. (See pp. 24-27 and 35-37 of IFFA’s lead
Brief and pp. 1-6 of IFFA’s Reply Brief in No. 80-951).
In addition, throughout the litigation over the settlement
IFFA argued that the relief Plaintiffs were seeking was
inconsistent with §§ 703(h) and 706(g) of Title VII.
(See pp. 27-28 and 31-32 of our lead Brief in No. 80-
951). Given these Constitutional and Title VII argu-
ments, which, it must be remembered, were part of a
question presented which was worthy of a grant of cer-
tiorari, there is no basis for treating IFFA differently
from other “functional plaintiffs’ who may raise such
claims.

-
0

Second, Plaintiffs contend that IFFA must be con-
strued as a “functional defendant” because, according to
Plaintiffs, IFFA attempted to foree TWA and Plaintiffs
“!TJo continue litigating the claims on the merits (and
the question of jurisdiction) to the bitter end, in a winner-
take-all contest.” (Pl. Br. 3, see also Pl. Br. 13, 14). To
the contrary, in the very first paragraph of the Summary
of Argument in its lead Brief filed with this Court in
No. 80-951, IFFA stated:

TWA remains free to settle the case by offering the
Plaintiffs $3 million or any larger amount which
TWA owns; but it cannot diminish its own potential
monetary liability by granting to Plaintiffs competi-
tive status seniority inconsistent with the TWA-IFFA

contract. 7

As Plaintiffs know well, IFFA made statements to this
effect numerous times throughout the litigation over the
settlement. IFFA did not care whether there was a set-
tlement, but cared only about the harm a certain type of
settlement would cause to its members. Time and time
again IFFA suggested that the proper course was for
TWA to pay Plaintiffs more money, and to leave the
incumbent employees alone. The case, including the juris-
dictional issue, could have been settled at any time, with
or without the aid of the court. The presence of the Dis-
trict Court was necessary only to ensure that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the rights of the incum-
bent employees could be overridden. In addition, Plain-
tiffs’ “winner-take-all” scenario is belied by the facts. The
jurisdictional issue was litigated and Plaintiffs won, but
Plaintiffs hardly took “all.” Indeed, as to backpay,
Plaintiffs took very little.

A third argument made by Plaintiffs is that IFFA
must be treated as a “functional defendant” because it
attempted to frustrate the efforts of Plaintiffs to obtain a
“make-whole remedy.” (Pl. Br. 4, 5, 9). Plaintiffs seem
to forget that they settled quite cheaply. Indeed, Plain-

6

tiffs were not made anything close to whole. The fact
that Plaintiffs were not made whole was not caused by
IFFA but rather brought about by a serious weakness in
Plaintiffs’ case which forced them to settle with TWA for
something akin to two cents on the dollar. Under these
circumstances, there is no basis for assessing fees against
IFEA in the name of making Plaintiffs whole. Any
thought of a “make-whole”’ remedy was abandoned by
Plaintiffs at the moment they settled.

Fourth, there is also no basis for attempting to draw
a distinction between arguments raised by third parties
which contest some aspect of the relief plaintiffs seek and
arguments which could theoretically deprive plaintiffs of
all relief. Such a rule would lead to the quite illogical
result of innocent third parties being penalized if they
raised their strongest arguments but not penalized for
raising their weaker ones. Such a rule would also severely
inhibit incumbent employees from presenting the equities
of their position vis-a-vis the settling plaintiffs to the
district court, as Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in
Zipes I indicates that they should. It would also, as
Justice Powell warned, encourage employers to attempt
to “[S]ettle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away
the rights of current employees.” Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 401, n. 1 (1982) (Powell,
J., concurring). Here, IFFA made it plain that its sole
concern was the effect which a grant of seniority to plain-
tiffs would have upon the incumbents. Having so qualified
its interest, it hardly seems just to penalize IF FA because
it dared to point out to the District Court that its Court
of Appeals had held that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to which the court
was about to order that grant of seniority.

Fifth, Plaintiffs turn their own argument on its head
when they claim that Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Sup-
port, 820 F.2d 631 (3rd Cir. 1987), and Annunziato v.
The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1984) are inap-

7

posite because the “functional plaintiffs” there who were
not assessed fees were defendants and not intervenors.
Are Plaintiffs saying that defendants deserve more pro-
tection under § 706(k) than intervenors? We think not.
What Tunstall and Annunziato do demonstrate is that
even defendants can be “functional plaintiffs.” What
links the defendants in Tunstall and Annunziato with the
intervenors in Reeves, Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104
(D.C. Cir. 1986), and IFFA here, is not their litigation
labels but the fact that each of those parties was de-
prived of property and/or rights even though it had not
violated the law. The reasons for denying fees in each
instance has nothing to do with those labels or even the
precise nature of the deprivation suffered by these third
parties, but rather the fact that none of these third par-
ties had violated the law, and that their loss had been
brought about by the acts of the principal defendant
which did violate the civil rights laws. As the Govern-
ment aptly points out, this Court has stated that § 706
(k) must be construed pursuant to traditional considera-
tions of equity. Christiansburg Garment v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978). The purpose of a fee-shifting
statute, obviously, is to shift the cost of the litigation
from the wronged party to the party who committed the
wrong. But where innocent third parties are inevitably
harmed by the collateral consequences of civil rights liti-
gation, there simply is no equity in routinely assessing
fees against them.

Il. IF ALLOWED TO STAND, THE RESULT BELOW
WOULD HAVE A SEVERE CHILLING EFFECT
UPON THE ADVERSARY JUDICIAL PROCESS TO
WHICH CONGRESS ENTRUSTED THE ULTIMATE
EFFECTUATION OF THE GOALS OF TITLE VII

Plaintiffs clearly are not very concerned with the chill-
ing effect which the result below undoubtedly will have
upon the rights of innocent third parties harmed by the
settlement of Title VII cases. By way of reply to the

8

few, scattered points in Plaintiffs’ Brief which address
this subject, we make three points.

First, Plaintiffs contend that requiring the original
wrongdoer defendant to remain responsible for fees gen-
erated by innocent third parties would be “unworkable.”
(Pl. Br. 18). However, the only reason given in support
of this theory is that defendants want to know precisely
what their costs are as of the time of settlement and
that a contrary rule would therefore allegedly serve as a
“disincentive to settle.” (Pl. Br. 17). But as we noted
in our lead Brief, (1) the situation is quite different
when plaintiffs and defendant know that the settlement
will generate claims by the innocent third parties *;
(2) if their case is strong enough, plaintiffs can struc-
ture a settlement which will allow them to recover such
fees from the wrongdoer defendant, and if their case is
not strong enough, plaintiffs should not recover from
innocent employees what they could not recover from the
discriminating employer; and (3) here, a powerful argu-
ment can be made that TWA has already paid the Plain-
tiffs for the litigation cver the settlement through the
seven-figure fees which Plaintiffs’ counsel received from
the settlement fund. Plaintiffs fail to discuss any of
these points. Moreover, the notion that “TWA could not
reasonably be expected to anticipate” (Pl. Br. 18) that
in attempting to preserve its members’ job security IFFA
would bring to the attention of the District Court the
fact that its Court of Appeals had found a lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, is—in a word—absurd.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the “chilling effect” argu-
ment is “atavistic’ because under the “English Rule” the
“loser pays as a matter of course. . .”. (Pl. Br. 14,

3 Both the District Court and Seventh Circuit specifically noted
that the parties to the settlement surely knew that IFFA and the
incumbent employees would object to certain provisions in the
Settlement Agreement. Pet. App. 3la; Freedman v. ALSSA, 730
F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984).

9

n.19). But Plaintiffs fail to mention that under the
English Rule innocent third parties would be entitled to
recover attorney's fees if they prevailed. Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
247, n.18 (1975). This does nothing to diminish the
severe chilling effect which innocent third parties will
suffer if they are placed in a situation where they must
pay attorney’s fees if they lose but cannot recover at-
torney’s fees if they prevail.

Third, Congress entrusted the ultimate effectuation of
Title VII to the adversary judicial process. Christians-
burg, 434 U.S. at 419. This “[P]resupposes both a
vigorous prosecution and vigorous defense.” Jd. Surely
it also presupposes that innocent third parties harmed by
the settlement of a Title VII case will also have an op-
portunity to vigorously present their claims. As the Gov-
ernment stresses, the result below, if allowed to stand,
would cause significant harm to that adversary judicial
process. Many innocent employees would be deterred
from presenting their claims and would necessarily de-
cide that they could not afford to voice their rights.
Plaintiffs, we note once again, simply fail to respond on
this critical point.

Ill. NOTHING IN THE LANGUAGE OF §706(k) RE-
QUIRES THE RESULT BELOW

Plaintiffs emphasize that the language of § 706(k)
does not say that innocent third parties should be treated
as plaintiffs for attorney’s fees purposes. Therefore,
Plaintiffs argue, since Plaintiffs prevailed against IFFA
on the seniority issue, IFFA “must pay” Plaintiffs’ at-
torney’s fees under the plain meaning of the statute.

Whatever surface appeal this argument has is exploded
by a simple reading of Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) and Christiansburg.
Section 706(k) also does not say that prevailing plain-
tiffs should ordinarily recover attorney’s fees against ad-

10

judicated wrongdoer defendants unless special circum-
stances exist. Nor does the statute say that prevailing
defendants should not ordinarily recover attorney’s fees
from unsuccessful plaintiffs unless the plaintiffs’ claim
was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. For
whatever reason, Congress chose to leave the language of
the fee-shifting provision somewhat vague, entrusting the
courts to interpret the statute in a fashion consistent
with the purposes of Title VII and, as noted in Chris-
tiansburg, traditional considerations of equity. Chris-
tiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420. Accordingly, the Court must
decide this case, as it has Christiansburg, Piggie Park,
and numerous others, based upon those purposes and
those equitable considerations. The inconclusive language
of § 706(k) simply does not address the question pre-
sented.

Nor can the result below be upheld by pointing to the
discretion which § 706(k) vests in the district court, as
suggested by amicus curiae American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU). We do not contend that a district court
would never have discretion to award fees against an
intervening third party. But the fact here is that the
District Court was exercising no such discretion. Instead,
it believed (incorrectly) that an award of fees in favor
of Plaintiffs was “almost automatic” pursuant to the
fashion in which this Court had interpreted § 706(k) in
Piggie Park and Christiansburg.*

4 The ACLU, curiously, takes what clearly is an anti-free speech
position and sides with Plaintiffs. But much of the ACLU brief
reads as if it is arguing another case, and we suspect that it is,
and that that case is Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988),
petition for certiorari pending sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, No.
88-664, a case in which the ACLU represents the respondents.
Obviously, a decision on Charles will have to wait for another day.
Suffice it to say that the main thrust of the ACLU—i.e., opposition
to a “per se” prohibition barring a district court, in the reasoned
exercise of its discretion, from awarding fees against innocent third
parties—is irrelevant to this case. (ACLU Br. p. 3). We do not

11

Plaintiffs’ other arguments suffer from the same flaws.
In arguing that just one of the two factors listed in
Christiansburg is sufficient to justify an award of fees
here, Plaintiffs simply ignore the obvious point that the
strongest possible equitable reason for awarding fees-
against a defendant is that that defendant has violated
the law. Plaintiffs also make no effort to explain why
the need to encourage private attorneys general has any
applicability to the facts of this case.’ Moreover, Plain-
tiffs fail to mention that the equitable considerations
listed in Christiansburg as reasons for not routinely
awarding fees against plaintiffs read as if the Court was
discussing the events which befell this Petitioner in this
ease. (See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422, and our lead
Brief at pp. 24-25).

This latter point also dismantles the argument that in
a contest between two plaintiffs, the losing plaintiff
should pay the attorney’s fees of the winning plaintiff.
(Pl. Br. 16-17). Again, Plaintiffs fail to discuss the
reasons given in Christiansburg for not assessing fees
against plaintiffs, absent a showing that those plaintiffs
had brought frivolous claims. We can think of no reason
why those standards would not apply here, and certainly
Plaintiffs have offered none. Accordingly, this argument
must be rejected as well.

argue for such a per se prohibition, and as noted above the District
Court here did not feel free to make such a reasoned exercise of its
discretion.

5 Indeed, all of Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the need to encour-
age individuals to act as Title VII private attorneys general are
generic, and do not deal with the extraordinary circumstances of
this case. Regardless of how the issue may arise in other cases,
this case obviously must be decided on the facts of this case.

12

CONCLUSION

The judgment below should be reversed and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the claim for attorney’s fees
against IFFA.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN A. FEHR *
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JANAE L. SCHAEFFER
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER
& GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755
Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
* Counsel of Record of Flight Attendants

April 18, 1989

AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF

the soupreme Court ofthe Bite states

OCTOBER A teeune 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ‘

+ { ;

dulies '

AY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND e
* THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

a AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
; :

; WILLIAM C. BRYSON
‘ Acting Solicitor General ‘
; JAMB6 P. TURNER 3
t Acting Assistant Attorney General ;
THOMAS W. MERRILL

Deputy Solicitor General
ROGER CLEGG

Deputy Assistant Attorney General
CHRISTINE DESAN HUSSON

Assistant to the Solicitor General

DENNIS J. DIMSEY
Altorney

“ae? oC we oe

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

CHARLES A. SHANOR
General Counsel
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Washington, D.C. 20507

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a union that intervened unsuccessfully in an
employment discrimination action to challenge relief that
it alleged would impermissibly interfere with its collective
bargaining agreement should be assessed attorneys’ fees
pursuant to Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), under the same standard applied to
a losing defendant, even though the union has not been
found or alleged to have engaged in unlawful dis-
crimination.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Interest of the United States and the Equal Employment
Ne cc vce ccccesvevcoccesseces l
Ne coco e we rvececsccecess 2
eee ceceeeeecesees 5
Argument:
Intervenors should be treated like plaintiffs rather than
defendants for purposes of determining attorneys’ fee
EE 8
Conclusion ...... IE 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Inc. v. American

Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973) ............... 2
Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., No. 70 C 2071 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,

No ccc cccececcccncess 23
Air Lines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass’n v. Trans World

Airways, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980) .......... 3
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron,

604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ................ 19
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) .... 9, 10
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.

ESSE LS ICSI IE 13, 26
Annunziato v. The Gan, 744 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1984) ..... 14, 18
Baker vy. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich.

1980), aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704

F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040

ee ee cc cao cceeeeerscccceces 15, 17
Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) ......... 18
Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th

Nk owe ve ceccsaccccees 14
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

Tce ceca cee eecuscces 6, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22

City of Richmond vy. J.A. Croson Co., No. 87-998 (Jan.
Ne, ces eescesccces

25

IV
Cases — Continued: Page
Commissioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435

CE, Ge, BHD cn ccccccdescvtvcscusesoseanssecnss 15
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases,

In re, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978) .........-.-.055. 2
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. vy. American

Bar Ass’n, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979) ........ 14
Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs, 600 F.2d 470 (Sth Cir.

MD cue acneeseeesbcetcvaseuscseeaukeneeeence 16
Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir.

Nc secede de ecaben cee eteeus badness canteretean 15
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) ......... 9
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104(D.C. Cir. 1986) ......... 21, 22
Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .......... 13-14
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) ............ 13
Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979) .... 19
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) ............. 9, 13,

18, 19, 23, 25
Johnson vy, Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616
COD cads 0ancceesagianes ooneuiwessasneeaneesse 25
Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 638 F. Supp.
833 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.

GUE: we'ceen des cost dececbastabeeséaeeas ede ess 14, 18
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ............. 13
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Correctional Services,

524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ........... 18, 19, 21, 22
Local Number 93, Int'l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of

Ciudad, G76 US. Fae CIGGED occ cet eccccccccecsen 19
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l Ass’n v. EEOC,

Gy Ge ED odbc e bc odcc bec cccccasecécessas 25
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) ..... 2... 66-6 eae. 24
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) ..............-.. a.
Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), affd,

Die. 06-0403 (Bem. 05, FSG «cc ccc cccccsscccccessses 20
Martin v. Wilks, Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639 & 87-1668 (argued

SS S PTT TS PTT er eT ee 20
May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308 (D.N.J. 1984) .... 18
Nash v. Chandler, 848 F.2d 567 (Sth Cir. 1988) ......... 19

V
Cases — Continued: Page
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400
EN ia Wetke ohh bie eee l ana nele ee ce eu 6, 9, 10, 11, 18
Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427
RB Rn a! pS IP ne ML pe A 9, 12
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council,
I i 16
Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1978) .......... 15

Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986) ..... 17, 19, 22
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367

Cea h as 6 Cos nis cabbeae Reo che cecukdauteneceu 12
Richardson y. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763 (9th

IR ia oho cee ou naeaiiT eee nh UR ae 21, 22
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) ........ 16
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338

(9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) ............ 15-16
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ................. 26
Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) .......... 12
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the

United States, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) .................. 14
United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.

ME We k4 cee bl UGG eenaed saben cadena dues choses 16
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) .......... 25
United States v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016

NS oo) nn ebb inie Wed bd 40 beet Kee Rae ee es 24
Vulcan Soc’y v. Fire Dep’t, 533 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y.

PEA SARK D4. oe dv-oneud 0UkSS AU ON ses cunes Whee cess 24
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of

Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) ............... 19
Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (1ith Cir.

MN pkib abe O00sek ob oud bia Veloce elscceeawabsec. 17
Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 48 F.E.P. Cas. (BNA) 1489

i inten eb: a ie SEMEN E Bk Fue dey opt 17
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

SENS Soon ks 454 oa ob hoo oe os ook oot caves ies 2, 3,4

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const. Amend. V (Due Process Clause) ........... 20
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. II,
§ 204(b), 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) ..... 2... y

Vi

Statutes — Continued: Page

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII,
78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e ef seq.:

§ 706(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-S(e) (1970 ed.) .......... 10
§ 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-S(f)(1) .. 6... eee eee 22
Fs Ge es SD oc ccec ccc ccsescctes passim
Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. 1617 ............. y
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
ef ee SR rr errr 10
ee rink ceceenenvasrecesacuuevess 12
ee et sean ebesenewnn 9, 11, 12, 15
Miscellaneous:
110 Cong. Rec. (1964):
OS SRP OPTI TTT TST TTT Te 10
i PRET TeTTTET rere OL 10
SE exes ccde este teawakesdstcnk was awnekat 10
OR reer eee Tre eT rr Terre TT Te 10
PE edo cn is 6h dedekanny bo00e conn ewe Nemes ei 11
DIE 2 cp acosrvvecsccocnvvesesvucwnees 11
SM Abe CEh bah edecnnes seers nvetneaies kek’ 11
117 Cong. Rec. (1964):
Me ER 8 Bee Se eer ryt 11
OS ES ET Perr eye Tere Cr rene Cee 11
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963) ........ 10, 17
H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ......... 11
H.R. Rep. No. 196, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) ........ 12
H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ........ 12, 13
E. Larson, Federal Court Awards of Attorneys’ Fees
ED aia sean ane Gb oadeld REEE6 BAAN ROSES 68 808 16
S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong. Ist Sess. (1975) ............ 9, 15
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ........ 12, 15, 26

Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Source Book:
Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents
OE. ss wu cbcecuseuneseeeeeeanels% 13, 15

VII

Miscellaneous — Continued:

Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Legislative History

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
GR PUI Sh v6. de awe cu dedewmeescccccac... 11

Tamanaha, The Cost of Preserving Rights: Attorneys’
Fee Awards and Intervenors in-Civil Rights Litigation,
19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 109 (1984) ........... 18, 21, 22

Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Ind. &
ee eee 10

Page

tall

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-608

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION
OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER

V.

ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL.

ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

This case presents the important question whether par-
ties who have not violated federal civil rights law and have
not litigated frivolously may nevertheless be required to
pay attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs who prevail in civil rights
litigation. The United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission have a strong interest in this
issue as principal enforcers of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e ef seq., and other civil rights
laws for which attorneys’ fees may be awarded. In addi-
tion, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) makes the federal government
liable for attorneys’ fees to the same extent as a private
party. Thus, the United States also has a direct interest in
this issue as a potentially liable party. See, e.g., United
States v. Richardson, No. 88-5155 (6th Cir.) (U.S. held
liable for fees as plaintiff-intervenor).

(1)

STATEMENT

1. Respondents, represented by the predecessor union
to petitioner Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
(IFFA), filed this class action against Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. (TWA) in 1970 alleging that its practice of ter-
minating all flight attendants who became mothers, but
not those who became fathers, violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e ef seq. Pet.
App. 2a. Shortly after the suit was filed, TWA dropped its
prohibition on employment of mothers and entered into a
settlement with the predecessor union. That settlement,
however, did not award either backpay or seniority to
class members. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 388 (1982). Disgruntled members of the class ap-
pealed the district court’s approval of the settlement and
won reversal in the court of appeals based on the union’s
conflict in representing both the plaintiff class and incum-
bent flight attendants who were not affected by the “no-
motherhood” rule. Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses
Ass’n, Inc. v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.
1973).

The action was then reinstated with individual class
members substituted for the predecessor union as repre-
sentatives. The district court granted summary judgment
for respondents, ruling that TWA had discriminated
against them on the basis of gender in violation of Title
VII. Pet. App. 3a. The court of appeals affirmed the find-
ing of discrimination, but held that the claims of 92% of
the class members were barred by their failure to file time-
ly charges with the EEOC. See Jn re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir.
1978).!

' The district court had previously permitted TWA to amend its
answer to assert that claims of class members who had not filed timely

3

The parties then reached a second settlement agreement,
establishing a $3 million fund to benefit all class members
and awarding each class member full retroactive competi-
tive seniority.? Pet. App. 3a.

2. Petitioner, representing all flight attendants who
were not adversely affected by the no-motherhood rule,
thereupon intervened as a defendant to object to the settle-
ment on the grounds that (1) the failure of s me plaintiffs
to file timely charges with EEOC left the district court
without jurisdiction to approve equitable relief for them,
and (2) reinstatement of the plaintiffs with full retroactive
competitive seniority would violate the collective bargain-
ing agreement between IFFA and TWA. Pet. App. 3a-4a.
After a hearing, the district court rejected these objections
and approved the settlement. Jd. at 3a-4a.

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the district
court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement and that
the grant of retroactive competitive seniority was a proper
Title VII remedy. Air Lines Stewards & Stewardesses
Ass'n v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164 (7th
Cir. 1980). IFFA then petitioned successfully for cer-
tiorari. This Court consolidated IFFA’s petition with the
respondents’ petition for review of the Seventh Circuit’s
earlier decision holding that failure to file claims with the
EEOC presented a jurisdictional barrier. The Court held
that. the failure to file with the EEOC was not a jurisdic-

charges with the EEOC were barred, but denied TWA’s motion to ex-
clude those class members, holding that TWA’s violation continued so
long as its policy remained in effect. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 388-389 (1982).

> “Seniority” ordinarily determines an employee’s entitlement to
benefits earned during employment. “Competitive seniority,” by con-
trast, “is used to allocate entitlements to benefits among competing
employees,” including shift assignments and vacation scheduling. Pet.
App. 4a n.2.

4

tional defect and that reinstatement of respondents with
full competitive seniority was appropriate. Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).

3. Respondents then sought an award of attorneys’
fees against petitioners under Section 706(k) of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (1982). Although respondents’ at-
torneys had already been awarded some $1.25 million in
fees from a settlement fund established by defendants
(Pet. App. 14a), the district court awarded them an addi-
tional $180,915.84 against petitioner under the statute. Jd.
at 37a, 38a-40a.

Petitioner again appealed, and the court of appeals
again affirmed. The court rejected petitioner’s contention
that it should not have to pay fees because it was not
responsible for the discriminatory conduct that produced
liability. Pet. App. 6a-13a. The court noted that the
language of the statute provides that prevailing parties
should recover attorney fees and does not exclude any
class of litigants from liability. Jd. at 11a. The court also
rejected petitioner’s contention that it had acted in a man-
ner analogous fo a plaintiff when it intervened to protect
its members’ rights, and thus should only be assessed fees
under the same circumstances as would a plaintiff. The
court found that any rule that treated intervenors as “func-
tional plaintiffs” would induce defendants and intervenors
to manufacture appropriate defenses in order to claim im-
munity from fee liability. It concluded that the exception
would therefore undermine Congress’s intent to ensure
that meritorious civil rights complaints are fully litigated,
and suggested that any problems with the fee provision be
addressed to Congress. Jd. at 12a-13a. Finally, the court
rejected the contention that any “special circumstances” —
such as petitioner union’s duty to represent its members’
interests or the fact that respondents had already re-

5

covered a large sum from the defendant —excused peti-
tioner from paying the fee award. Pet. App. 13a-l6a.

The dissent (Pet. App. 18a-21a) stressed that the union
was not responsible for TWA’s discrimination and that it
sought only to assert the collective bargaining rights of in-
cumbent employees. It noted that “it certainly would have
been unusual for [petitioner] to simply ignore a settlement
that substantially altered its contract with TWA and the
job security of its members,” and that the statutory pur-
pose of “encourag[ing) plaintiffs to bring suit against de-
fendants who violate federal law” is not served by an
award against “intervenors like [petitioner] who did not
violate Title VII.” Jd. at 20a-21a. It also concluded that
“denying fee awards against such intervenors will not sig-
nificantly diminish plaintiffs’ ability to attract counsel,”
pointing out that in this case “[respondents’] counsel has
already received more than $1,250,000 from the
$3,000,000 settlement.” Jd. at 21a. The dissent predicted
that the court’s interpretation of the statute would disserve
the goal of fair settlement of civil rights claims by de-
terring employees whose rights were affected by the settle-
ment from asserting their interests. Jd. at 21a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. This case presents the question whether a losing in-
tervenor in Title VII employment discrimination litiga-
tion, who is not alleged to have violated the civil rights of
any party, should be treated as a losing defendant for pur-
poses of the fee recovery by a plaintiff. Section 706(k) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), pro-
vides that a district court may, in its discretion, award at-
torneys’ fees to a “prevailing party” in Title VII litigation.
This Court has invoked three policy considerations in ap-
plying this undifferentiated statutory language in different
contexts.

6

First, the Court has noted that the statute is designed “to
encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to
seek judicial relief.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-402 (1968). This consideration is
qualified by the fact that fees may also be awarded a
defendant under Section 706(k). Thus, the statutory pur-
pose is most accurately described as encouraging plaintiffs
to bring meritorious claims. Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978).

The second consideration follows from the fact that
when a court awards fees to a plaintiff against a defend-
ant, “it is awarding them against a violator of federal law.”
Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418. An award of
fees therefore serves the equitable purpose of redressing a
wrong, and of deterring similar wrongs in the future.

Finally, the fact that the fee provision permits awards to
either “prevailing party” indicates that Congress “en-
trusted the ultimate effectuation of * * * [its civil rights]
policy to the adversary judicial process.” Christiansburg
Garment, 434 U.S. at 419. Fees should therefore be
awarded in such a way as to encourage the consideration
of all competing rights and interests in any dispute.

Balancing these considerations, this Court has deter-
mined that plaintiffs and defendants warrant different
treatment under the fee provision. Losing plaintiffs are re-
quired to pay fees only if their actions are “frivolous, un-
reasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith” (Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 421); losing defendants, by contrast, are or-
dinarily required to pay fees to prevailing plaintiffs,
“unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust” (Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401-402).

B. The same considerations indicate that losing inter-
venors who have not violated any of the plaintiff's civil
rights should also be subject to the standard of Christians-

5

burg Garment. In the case of an intervenor seeking to pro-
tect its own civil rights, all three considerations point to
this result. The intervenor, like the plaintiff, is seeking to
vindicate its civil rights; the intervenor cannot be described
as a violator of federal civil rights laws; and the intervenor
should be encouraged to advance its claims in order to en-
sure a complete consideration of all competing rights and
interests by the court.

The same result should follow if, as was the case here,
the intervenor seeks to vindicate non-civil rights claims
like those grounded in a collective bargaining agreement.
Such an intervenor, like the intervenor asserting a civil
rights claim, cannot be said to be a violator of federal law,
and should be encouraged to come forward in order to
provide a complete adjudication of all claims. Moreover,
an attempt to distinguish between “civil rights” claims and
“non-civil rights” claims would lack any principled basis,
would eucourage evasive pleading, and wouid generate un-
productive litigation.

Although the question is somewhat closer, we also feel
that the same rule should generally apply to an intervenor
who asserts an argument, like the claim made here that the
district court was without jurisdiction to approve the
settlement, that would defeat the plaintiff's right to any
recovery. Like the intervenor who advances arguments
that go only to the scope of relief, the intervenor who
challenges the plaintiff's case on the merits is not a civil
rights violator, and is trying to protect an interest that
should be considered by the court. Moreover, it would be
hard to justify a rule that would apply a different standard
for awarding fees to different types of legal arguments,
where those arguments are advanced by the same person
for the same purpose and are equally meritorious.

C. In short, the considerations that justify the pre-
sumptive assessment of fees against defendants under Sec-
tion 706(k) do not similarly justify the presumptive award

8

of fees against intervenors. As a non-violator of civil
rights laws, a losing intervenor should be treated in the
same manner as a losing plaintiff: it should be assessed
fees only upon a finding that its action was frivolous, un-
reasonable, or without foundation.

ARGUMENT

INTERVENORS SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE PLAINTIFFS
RATHER THAN DEFENDANTS FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING ATTORNEYS’ FEE LIABILITY UNDER
TITLE Vil
This case requires the Court to determine what standard
the courts should apply in civil rights litigation when
awarding attorneys’ fees against an unsuccessful in-
tervenor who has not violated the rights of any other par-
ty. The court of appeals concluded that fees should be
assessed against an innocent intervenor under the same
standard applied to a losing defendant. Petitioner con-
tends that fees should be assessed against it under the
standard applied to a losing plaintiff. Unfortunately, the
language of Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (the Act), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), supplies none
of the distinctions that fuel this controversy. That section
simply states:

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,
and the Commission and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person.

Nor does the legislative history of that provision directly
address the problem.

In the absence of any authoritative guidance from Con-
gress, the discretion conferred upon courts under Section

9

706(k) must be exercised in light of the objectives of the
Act and traditional considerations of equity. See
Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418-419; Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). This Court
has previously determined that unsuccessful defendants
and unsuccessful plaintiffs should be subject to different
standards in assessing requests for an award of attorneys’
fees. Losing defendants are ordinarily required to pay at-
torneys’ fees “unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust” (Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401-402).
Losing plaintiffs, by contrast, are required to pay at-
torneys’ fees only if they bring actions that are “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith” (Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 421).

This Court’s decisions in Piggie Park and Christians-
burg Garment reflect three policy considerations grounded
in the purposes of the Civil Rights Act and general! notions
of equity: (1) encouraging the vindication of meritorious
civil rights claims; (2) deterring violations of the civil
rights laws; and (3) ensuring that all competing interests
and perspectives are fully considered in adversary adjudi-
cation. These considerations suggest that an unsuccessful

> Newman v. Piggie Park concerned a Section 204(b) claim under
Title Il of the Act. However, “{i]n Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, the Court made clear that the Piggie Park standard of
awarding attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff is equally applicable
in an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.” Christiansburg
Garment, 434 U.S. at 417. See also Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of
Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (applying Piggie Park standard to fee
provision of Emergency School Aid Act); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (standards for awarding fees under Section
1988 should be same as those for awarding fees under provisions of
1964 Act). See also S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1975)
(tee provision of amended Voting Rights Act should be interpreted ac-
cording to Piggie Park standard).

10

intervenor who has violated the rights of no other party
should be treated like a losing plaintiff.

A. 1. As the Court stated in Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at
402, the primary purpose of the fee-shifting provisions of
the Civil Rights Act is “to encourage individuals injured by
racial discrimination to seek judicial relief.” Congress pro-
vided for fee awards to successful plaintiffs in order to
“make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious suit” (110 Cong. Rec. 12,724 (1964) (remarks
of co-sponsor Sen. Humphrey)). The provision for fee
awards to private plaintiffs was thought necessary because
Title VII, as originally passed in 1964, did not allow the
EEOC to bring suit to enforce its provisions. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII, § 706(e),
78 Stat. 260.4 Congress determined instead to rely on
private plaintiffs to act as “ ‘private attorney[s] general,’
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority.” Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401 and n.2,
402; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 415.

* As the Court in Christiansburg Garment noted (434 U.S. at 420),
the legislative history of Section 706(k) is “sparse.” The version of
Title VII reported out of committee did not include a fee provision.
See H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). Rather, the pro-
vision was part of the “Mansfield-Dirksen amendment,” a compre-
~ hensive amendment in the nature of a substitute introduced on the
floor of the Senate. 110 Cong. Rec. 11,933, 13,310 (1964). The fee
provision, along with a provision allowing appointment of attorneys
for individual claimants, was apparently inserted after the removal of
a provision that gave the EEOC the power to bring civil claims. Com-
pare Section 707(b) of the House version (id. at 13,168) with Section
706(e) of Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-S(e) (1970
ed.). See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 431, 452-453 (1966). (The power to bring civil charges
was later “returned” to the EEOC by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 104.)

1]

Congress’s desire to encourage the private vindication of
civil rights claims was, however, qualified. Section 706(k)
is not limited to prevailing plaintiffs, but applies instead to
prevailing parties. By allowing awards to parties besides
plaintiffs, the fee-shifting provision was designed also to
“deter the bringing of baseless actions” (110 Cong. Rec.
13,668 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Lausche (referring to
similar Title II provision)). See also id. at 14,213-14,214
(remarks of Sen. Miller (Title II)); id. at 14,214 (remarks
of Sen. Pastore (Title II)). Thus, a more accurate descrip-
tion of the congressional purpose is to encourage the vin-
dication of meritorious civil rights claims.

Given the role of meritorious civil rights plaintiffs as the
“chosen instrument” of Congress (Christiansburg Gar-
ment, 434 U.S. at 418), this Court in Piggie Park deter-
mined that prevailing plaintiffs should ordinarily receive
awards of attorneys’ fees “unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust.” 390 U.S. at 402.
Congress declined to disturb this judgment in 1972, when
it amended Title VII without changing Section 706(k).°
And in 1976, Congress explicitly endorsed the Court’s
reading of the 1964 Act, when it amended Section 1988 to
include a fee provision that tracks the wording of Section
706(k) and directed that the interpretation of the new pro-
vision should follow that given the Civil Rights Act’s pro-

> Although the original House version of the Equal Opportunity
Act made fee awards only to “prevailing plaintiffs” (see H.R. Rep.
No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 32 (1971)), the Congress adopted a com-
prehensive amendment to the bill that left Section 706(k) unchanged,
without debate about that section. See 117 Cong. Rec. 31,979-31,980,
32,110-32,113 (1971); Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 132-147, 314,
326-332 (Comm. Print 1972).

12

vision.® See S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3, 4
(1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6
(1976); sec also H.R. Rep. No. 196, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
34 (1975) (discussing fee provision amendment to Voting
Rights Act).

2. The presumption adopted by Piggie Park in favor
of awards to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs at the expense
of losing defendants also rests on a simple equitable con-
sideration: namely, that those who violate federal law
should redress those whose rights have been violated. As
the Court observed in Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S.
at 418, “when a district court awards counsel fees to a pre-
vailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of
federal law.” The policy of making violators pay fees also
serves the ends of deterrence. As Congress observed, a
provision for shifting the cost of attorneys’ fees to vio-
lators is “ancillary and incident to securing compliance
with the[] [civil rights laws], and * * * fee awards are an
integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such com-
pliance.” S. Rep. No. 1011, supra, at 5. See also id. at 2
(fee awards necessary “if those who violate the Nation’s
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity”);
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (fee awards
under Section 1988 are an integral part of remedies to ob-
tain compliance with Section 1983).

Not surprisingly, this Court has consistently linked fee
awards with liability for civil rights violations.’ Thus, in

® Given this Court’s determination that the language and purposes
of the civil rights fee provisions should be interpreted pari passu
(Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428), we will refer, when appropriate, to the
legislative history of Section 1988. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-381 (1969).

’ Considerations of equity have traditionally guided awards of at-
torneys’ fees. See Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)
(historical practice of granting fee awards “is part of the original au-

13

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), where the
plaintiff won the right to a new trial, the Court held that
no interim award of attorneys’ fees could be made until the
plaintiff had established some entitlement to relief on the
merits. See id. at 758 n.4 (citing Christiansburg Garment,
434 U.S. at 418, for proposition that, when a district court
awards fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff, “it is award-
ing them against a violator of federal law”). Likewise in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Court held
that a partially successful plaintiff should not recover fees
for those portions of a claim on which it did not succeed.
In another context, the Court in Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 171 (1985), stated repeatedly that “fee and
merits liability run together.” See id. at 164, 165, 168, 170;
see also Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir.

thority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation”); see
also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240,
257-260 (1975). The Court noted in Alyeska Pipeline that, under the
“American Rule,” fees are not normally awarded to a litigant absent
“bad faith” by an opponent, “willful disobedience” of a party to a
court order, or the existence of a “common fund” benefitting a group
from which reimbursement to a party bearing the costs of preserving
the fund through litigation may be made. /d. at 257-260. Section
706(k) and similar provisions remove the prohibition against fees;
courts are not restricted to the equitable prerequisites representing the
exceptions to the American Rule. Presumably, however, the discretion
retained by the district court is to be exercised in light of the equities of
the situation.

Congress has continued to emphasize the importance of equitable
discretion in the appropriate administration of the civil rights fee
statutes. See H.R. Rep. No. 1558, supra, at 6, 8; Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Source
Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents 164-171
(Comm. Print 1976) (rejecting amendment mandating awards to
defendants prevailing over bad faith or frivolous suits); id. at 266
(remarks of Rep. Railsback) (emphasizing discretion left to district
court).

14

1976) (concluding on basis of legislative history that no

fee award should follow successful interlocutory appeal ~

because “we cannot believe Congress would have counte-
nanced assessing fees against a defendant absent any
showing of discrimination”) (cited for its legislative
analysis in Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 420).®
3. Finally, in giving effect to the provision for awards
of fees to prevailing defendants, the Court has stressed the
importance of ensuring a full adjudication of the contro-
versy. Thus, the fact that fee awards are available to any
“prevailing party” not only encourages private plaintiffs to
sue but also gives defendants the incentive to mount “a
vigorous defense.” Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at
419. As this Court concluded, “while it was certainly the
policy of Congress that Title VII plaintiffs should vindi-
cate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest

* In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar
Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 1055, 1062-1063 (E.D. Va. 1979), the district
court held that an award of fees against a state bar association or its
officers would be unjust because these defendants, although named in
a suit successfully challenging the constitutionality of the state bar
code they administered, had no power to change the code and had un-
successfully attempted to persuade their co-defendants (the state
supreme court and its chief justice), who did have power to change the
code, to amend it. This Court disagreed with the district court only on
the grounds that the state bar association could be held liable for fees
as an agency that enforced the state bar code; it did not controvert the
district court’s conclusion that, had the state bar association been
blameless, a fee award against it would have been unjust. Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S.
719, 728, 738-739 (1980). See also Annunziato v. The Gan, 744 F.2d
244 (2d Cir. 1984) (award against blameless intervenor would be “un-
just”); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir.
1976) (making no fee award where defendant redressed violation as
soon as possible); Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 638 F.
Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (making no fee award where in-
tervenor innocent of wrongdoing), aff'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d
631 (3d Cir. 1987).

15

priority,’ it is equally certain that Congress entrusted the
ultimate effectuation of that policy to the adversary
judicial process.” Jbid. (citation omitted); see also Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Source Book: Legislative
History, Texts, and Other Documents 268 (Comm. Print
1976) (remarks of Rep. Jordan) (fee award amendment to
Section 1988 meant to “open the judicial process to every-
body who is entitled to use that process * * * [without]
prospect of attorney[s’] fees deterring their enthusiasm”).
B. Although the foregoing considerations were de-
veloped in the context of a traditional bipolar dispute be-
tween a plaintiff and defendant, they also are relevant to
more complex multipolar disputes. Such disputes can take
a variety of forms, and can generate claims for attorneys’
fees between plaintiffs and intervenors, defendants and in-
tervenors, and conceivably even between two intervenors.?

* As Congress has recognized (S. Rep. No. 1011, supra, at 4 n.4),
“{iJn the large majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce
[protected] * * * rights will be the plaintiffs and/or plaintiff-inter-
venors. However, in the procedural posture of some cases, the parties
seeking to enforce such rights may be the defendants and/or the
defendant-intervenors.” See also S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess-40 n.42 (1975) (substantively same notation, concerning fee pro-
vision of Voting Right Act Amendments of 1975).

The courts have in a variety of contexts awarded fees to intervenors
raising civil rights claims as prevailing parties. See, e.g., Commis-
sioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defend-
ant-intervenors in Voting Rights declaratory judgment suit awarded
fees as plaintiffs); Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (same); Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1978) (defend-
ant-intervenors in suit to set aside consent decree awarded fees as
defendants; issue ot applicability of plaintiffs standard not reached);
Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd sub
nom. Bratton vy. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (defendant-intervenors in reverse
discrimination suit awarded fees as plaintiffs); see also Seattle School
Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff-

16

This case does not call upon the Court to lay down a single
rule applicable to all conceivable third-party situations. '°
Rather, it presents only one type of third-party dispute,
albeit an important and recurring one: that between a
plaintiff and an intervenor who has not been found or
alleged to have engaged in unlawful discrimination. In

intervenors in declaratory judgment suit on constitutionality of voter
initiative awarded fees), aff'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 457 (1982);
United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1979) (plain-
tiff-intervenor protecting Hispanic interests in formulation of school
desegregation remedy awarded fees); Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 600 F.2d 470 (Sth Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs-intervenors in
school desegregation case awarded fees); see generaily, E. Larson,
Federal Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees (1981) (discussing status of
intervenor as party for purposes of attorneys’ fees).

'0 This brief addresses an intervenor’s liability for the payment of
attorneys’ fees under Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, and close-
ly related provisions (see note 3, supra). The purposes and policies of
these provisions largely dictate the ultimate liability for the payment
of fees. The purposes and policies of other statutory attorneys’ fees
provisions, however, differ from those underlying the Civil Rights Act
and similar statutes. In particular, the purpose of affording awards of
attorneys’ fees under the “appropriate” standard in numerous environ-
mental laws was to ensure proper implementation and enforcement of
the various requirements of those acts, rather than vindication of a
plaintiff's individual federal rights. See generally Ruckelshaus vy.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). Furthermore, a plaintiff or peti-
tioner may be a successful party in such a suit without establishing a
past violation of law on anyone’s part, because a regulation, permit,
Or program to govern future conduct may be at issue in the liti ,acion.
Therefore, despite this Court’s repeated assertions that attorneys’ fees
statutes should be interpreted pari passu, Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559-560 (1986), the circum-
stances in which an intervenor should bear the burden of payment of
plaintiffs attorneys’ fees may differ under statutory schemes other
than those associated with civil rights. Accordingly, this brief sets
forth the views of the United States only as to attorneys’ fees provi-
sions in the civil rights context.

17

these circumstances, we believe that the foregoing policy
considerations suggest that claims for attorneys’ fees
should be assessed under the standard applicable to unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs rather than defendants.

1. The rationale for treating intervenors like plaintiffs
can be seen most clearly in the case of an intervenor who
claims that some element of the relief sought by the plain-
tiff violates its own civil rights. For example, nonminority
employees may intervene claiming that numerical relief
sought by minority plaintiffs would violate their rights
(see, e.g., Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.
1986)); a group of minority employees may intervene to
oppose a suit brought by nonminority employees challeng-
ing a voluntary affirmative action program (see, eé.g.,
Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d
878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)), or
intervene because it disagrees with another minority group
about a proper remedy.''

In such cases, the policy of encouraging vindication of
meritorious civil rights claims cannot be said to favor

'! Similarly, two classes of plaintiffs might jointly challenge the dis-
parate impact of a hiring procedure, but disagree strongly about the
new test to be fashioned. Cf. Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 48 F.E.P.
Cas. (BNA) 1489, 1494 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (unsuccessful women ap-
plicants for firefighter positions challenged, inter alia, adjustment of
test results made under affirmative action plan for hiring of blacks
and Hispanics). It is frequently the case that removing portions ofa
test that have a disparate impact on one group may actually aggravate
the disparate impact on another group. In general, the increasingly
“fluid” nature of intervention means that minority groups Congress
clearly intended to protect (see H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. 18 (1963)) may increasingly appear as intervenors. See, e.g.,
Baker v. City of Detroit, supra (blacks intervened to protest reverse
discrimination relief); see also Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d
1135 (11th Cir. 1986) (woman attempted to intervene to protest job
awarded to man).

is

18

either the plaintiff or the intervenor, since both are assert-
ing claims grounded in civil rights laws. Insofar as Section
706(k) is intended “to ensure ‘effective access to the
judicial process’ for persons with civil rights grievances”
(Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (citation omitied)), the inter-
venor is in no different posture than the plaintiff. In such
situations, there are, in effect, “two sets of ‘plaintiffs’ each
of which has brought claims in good faith.” Kirkland v.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Correctional Services, 524 F. Supp.
1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

Nor would an award against an innocent intervenor
serve to deter violations of the federal civil rights laws. By
definition, such an intervenor has not violated any of the
plaintiff's rights; it is seeking only to vindicate its own
rights. An award against a party who is not blameworthy
is inconsistent with the equitable considerations that Con-
gress presumably believed would guide the district “ourts
when it gave them the authority to make fee awards in
their discretion (see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)), and that this
Court weighed heavily in establishing guidelines for the ex-
ercise of discretion by those courts. See Piggie Park, 390
U.S. at 402 (prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover
attorneys’ fee “unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust”); Christiansburg Garment, 434
U.S. at 418 (presumptive awards to plaintiff justified be-
cause made “against a violator of federal law”); ~ee also
Annunziato v. The Gan, 744 F.2d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding fact that intervenor “blameless” to be a “special cir-
cumstance”); Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 638
F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); May v. Cooper-
man, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1316-1318 (D.N.J. 1984) (same);
Tamanaha, The Cost of Preserving Rights: Attorneys’ Fee
Awards and Intervenors in Civil Rights Litigation, 19
Harv. C.R.- C.L. L. Rev. 109, 145-150 (1984).'?

'2 But see Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) (defend-
ant who intervened to defend constitutionality of abortion statute

19

Finally, the assessment of fees against an innocent inter-
venor would undermine the objective of ensuring the full
and fair consideration of all conflicting interests and per-
spectives. If attorneys’ fees were routinely awarded against
unsuccessful intervenors, such parties would be dis-
couraged from entering the judicial process. This would
frustrate the objective of ensuring “effective access to the
judicial process” for all those with civil rights grievances.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Reeves, 791 F.2d at 1484; Kirkland, 524 F. Supp. at
1218-1219.

In other circumstances involving third party interests,
this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of en-
suring a full and fair consideration of all affected claims.
See, e.g., Local Number 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986) (“parties who
choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not
dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori may
not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without
that party’s agreement. A court’s approval of a consent
decree between some of the parties therefore cannot
dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors”);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the
Rubber Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239-240 (1982). A rule

liable for fees even though not a wrongdoer); Nash v. Chandler, 848
F.2d $67, $73-574 (Sth Cir. 1988) (State of Texas, which intervened
solely to defend constitutionality of state statute, may be liable for at-
torneys’ fees, but amount must be adjusted to reflect fact that it was
not a wrongdoer); Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.
1979) (intervenor who sought to present alternative school desegrega-
tion plan liable for attorneys’ fees); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(parent intervenors defending constitutionality of abortion statute
assessed fees).

20

that would allow attorneys’ fees to be presumptively
awarded against intervenors would disserve these aims.
Moreover, such a result would be especially odd given that
an intervenor asserting its own civil rights claim could
simply wait until the conclusion of the main case and then
file a separate lawsuit, in which case it would clearly enjoy
the status of a plaintiff for civil rights attorneys’ fees pur-
poses. See Pet. App. Ila-12a.'3

Thus, the policy considerations that this Court relied
upon in Piggie Park and Christiansburg Garment point to
the conclusion that an innocent intervenor who enters a
case solely for the purpose of protecting its own civil rights
should be treated like a civil rights plaintiff rather than a
defendant for purposes of assessing its liability for at-
torneys’ fees.

2. The analysis should be the same in the case of an in-
nocent intervenor who seeks to vindicate rights grounded
in some source other than the civil rights laws. This case
presents one example, insofar as petitioners were seeking

'? Such a result would also have the anomalous result of encourag-
ing, rather than discouraging, fragmentation of litigation and delay in
the development and implementation of a lasting remedy for
discrimination in employment.

Some courts have held that parties who could have intervened in ad-
judication of a consent decree cannot collaterally attack such a judg-
ment later. See, e.g., Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986),
aff'd by an equally divided court, No. 86-1415 (Jan. 13, 1988). It is the
position of the United States (see Martin v. Wilks, Nos. 87-1614,
87-1639 & 87-1668 (argued Jan. 18, 1989)) that such a rule offends the
Due Process Clause and is inconsistent with the scheme established by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.S. Br. 12-27. We will
assume for purposes of this discussion that parties not part of a
previous suit can attack the result of that suit later, insofar as it affects
their interests. Of course, if this Court holds to the contrary in Martin,
all parties will be required to intervene in civil rights litigation to pro-
tect their rights.

21

to vindicate their rights under their collective bargaining
agreement. See also Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (claim that plaintiffs’ action constituted
unconstitutional taking); Richardson v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (claim that consent
decree in Age Discrimination in Employment Act suit
violated collective bargaining rights).

In such cases, there can be no question that the second
and third policies discussed above still favor treating the
intervenor like a plaintiff. Since the intervenor has not
been accused of violating the plaintiffs rights, no
equitable purpose or deterrent function would be served
by routinely awarding fees. And given the complex state of
current civil rights litigation, multiple party participation
is desirable in order to ensure adequate consideration of
the various interests affected. See Tamanaha, The Cost of
Preserving Rights, 19 Harv. C.L.- C.L. L. Rev. at 119. As
the court in Kirkland noted, “[t]he law woul

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_1037%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
