# Appendix — Mathews v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0982%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1988 - **Citation:** 485 U.S. 58 ## Text UNITED STATES ¥ MATHEWS 325 Cite we 00) F 2d 325 (uh Cir. 1986) - Cc tery eumnie mie t UNITED STATES of America Piaintiff-Appel'ee y Frederick MATHEWS, Defendant-Appellant No. 85-2904 United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit Argued June 12, 1986 Decided Oct. 9, 1986 Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis- trict of Wisconsin, Thomas J. Curran, J., of accepting thing of value as public official for official act to be performed by him, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bauer, Chief Judge, held that: (1) defendant was required to admit all elements of crime with which he was charged, including io- tent, before he could plead entrapment, (2) exclusion of veniremen who expressed mus- givings about covert tape recordings was proper, and (3) prosecutor gave sufficient Mr - explanation for its use of peremptory; strikes to exclude ali blacks from jury Affirmed 1. Criminal Law ©°37(1) Defendant must admit al) elements of crime with which he is charged, including intent, before he may plead entrapment, declining to follow United States v. Caron 588 F.2d 851 (ist Cir); United States » Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (Sth Cir); United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691 (D.C.Cir.) United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.); Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir.) 2 Jury €°33(2) Exclusion for cause of severa! venire men who expressed misgivings about cov ert tape recordings did not deny bribery defendant constitutiona! right to impartia jury fepresenting cross section of commu nity. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 6 3. Jury © 121 Finding that Government did not inten tionally discriminate when exercising its peremptory challenges to remove al! blacks from jury was sufficiently supported by prosecutor's explanation for remcva! of each individual! juror, fact that key witness es for both sides were black, thus discount ing any advantage a discriminating prose cutor might perceive in striking biacks from jury, and lack of evidence prosecuto: had maintained pattern or practice of strik ing blacks from juries in cases where de fendants were biack Jeffrey A. Kaufman, Gimbe! Gimbe! & Reilly, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant-ap pellant Jan E. Kearney, Asst US. Atty. Mi waukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellee Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and COF FEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges 326 BAUER, Chief Judge The defendant, Frederick Mathews, was convicted of receiving money as an officia of the Smal! Business Administration in violation of 18 USC. § 20l(g), He ap peals, alleging three grounds for reversa! tat the district court erred by refusing to low Mathews to claim entrapment unless Mathews admitted al) elements of the erime, including the element of intent, that the district court erred in excluding for cause severa) veniremen who expressed disapproval! of tape recording conversations without the knowledge of al) parties; and that the district court erred in denying Mathews’ motion for s mistria! based on the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to remove al! black veniremen from the jury We find the district court committed no error and affirm its judgment of convic ton I Mathews was employed in the Milwaukee office of the Sma) Business Administration (“SBA”) as a Business Development Spe cialist in charge of the “8A Program.” The 8A Program is designed to aid smal! businesses owned by socially and econom) cally disadvantaged concerns. Applicants for the 8A Program become clients of the SBA. With the SBA serving as primary contractor and the 8A client acting as sub contractor, the SBA attempts to procure government contracts on behalf of BA chents and to help them perform on the contract The charge of which Mathews was con victed concerns Mathews’ relauvonship with James DeShazer. DeShazer is the presi dent and owner of Midwest Knitting Mills Midwest Knittung Mills was a participant in the 8A Program and obtained severa) con tracts through the SBA. Mathews was DeShazer’s main contact at the SBA The evidence at trial showed that Math ews accepted loans from DeShazer (Math ews says two, the government says more) Mathews claims the loans, including the loan involved in this case, were persona! loans from DeShazer unrelated w Math 803 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2¢ SERIES ews’ duties at the SBA. The government and DeShazer claim the loans were gratu ties required by Mathews to obtain his co operation in SBA matters In support of its theory, the government introduced evidence that included tape re cordings of conversations between Mat! ews and DeShazer discussing the loan tha: resulted in Mathews’ arrest and prosecu tion. These conversations had been covert ly taped by DeShazer under the direction of the FBI which began investigating Math ews in response to s complaint by De Shazer to a Navy purchasing agent regard ing Mathews’ repeated requests for loans The jury believed the government's ver sion of the facts and convicted Mathews of the charge of accepting 8 thing of value as a public official for an official act to be performed by him, a violation of 18 US ( § 201g). The tria) judge entered judgmen: accordingly and sentenced Mathews t three years probation, the first two years to be served under house arrest’ Mathews appeals I Mathews claims the tria! court erred ir denying his motion in limine to present evidence on the defense of entrapment Mathews asks us to reconsider the rule in this circuit that requires a defendant wh wishes to plead entrapment to admit s elements of the crime, including the ele ment of intent United States v. Rodgers 755 F.2d 533, 550 (7th Cir.1985), cert de nied, — US —, 105 S.Ct 3532, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985). He acknowledges that this rule is in accord with the Third, Sixth and Tenth circuits, but argues that a better rule would require a defendant to admit only the acts of a crime, not the intent before being allowed to plead entrapment Mathews cites cases from the First, Fifth and D.C. circuits as examples of decisions that follow this rule. United States + Caron, 588 F.2d 85) (Ist Cir.1978); United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (Sth Cir 1984) (en banc); United States v. Kelly 748 F.2d 691 (D.C.Cir.1984). Mathews does mot ask us to go so far as those circuils UNITED STATES +. MATHEWS 327 Che we 00) Fad WS Ger 1988) Unat he claims allow a defendant to deny al! elements of the cmme and at the same Ome plead entrapment United States v. Dem- ma, 523 F.2d 98) (9th Cir.1975); Crisp « United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir.1958) [1] Although we acknowledge some di- versity of opinion among the circuits, we see no reason to change our rule requiring a defendant to admit all elements of the erime before being allowed to plead entrap ment. When a defendant pleads entrap ment he is asserting that, although he had criminal! intent, it was “the Government's deception [that implanted) the enmina) de sign in the mind of the defendant” Unit ed States v. Russell, 411 US. 423, 436, 93 S.Ct 1637, 1645, 36 LEd2d 366 (1973) United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, S50 (7th Cir.1985). We find this to be inconsistent per se with the defense that the defendant never had the requisite cmm- ina) intent We see no reason to allow Mathews or any defendant to plead these defenses simultaneous!y Ill [2] Mathews also complains that the ex- clusion for cause of severa! veniremen who expressed misgivings about covert tape re cordings created a jury skewed in favor of the government and unrepresentatve of the community. He argues that the tris! judge should have conducted & more exten- sive inquiry into the basis for the venire men's objection to such evidence in order to ascertain whether the veniremen felt they could give the evidence its proper weight despite the inita! reservavons We disagree with Mathews for two rea sons. First, a trial judge's questioning dur ing voir dire is subject to limited review In light of the epecia! circumstances of the situation (to be outlined below) and the great deference that we accord tria! judges in this area, Wainwright » Wit, 469 US 412, 105 S.Ct 844, 83 LEd2d 841, 844 (1985), we see no rearon to overturn the judgment of the trial court on the basis of the exclusion of these veniremen Second. the tra! judge called a side bar during vorr dire to give Mathews’ counse! the opportu nity to suggest an appropmate route for the trina! court \& take regarding these ve niremen. Mathews counse! expressed no objection and asked the court to proceed as it had been before the side bar. We find it Gfficult tw accept Mathews belated allega tions on appea! that the judge's achon tak eo at Mathews’ request denied him hu sixth amendment mght to an imparta! jury representing 8 cross-section of the commu nity A The trial judge was forced to des difficult and all too common situator ing voir dire. The court had properly and methodically questoned the veruremen as a group sbout their limitations and buses regarding the case After its first twenty two questions, the court had excused on!y six persons for cause. The court's twenty third question inquired whether the venrre mer had “any concern about tape recording conversabons when one party w not aware that it is being recorded” (Tria! Tran wml . script at 43). One veniremen expressed concern, and the court questioned her in depth about whether her reservations about the evidence gathering method wou.¢ interfere with her ability to weigh that evidence, whether she stil! had reservatons knowing that she would only hear the tapes if they were found admissible by the court according to the rules of evidence, anc whether her reservatons would remain re gardiess of the nature of the invesagston When the veniremer contnued to express doubt, the judge dismussed her As acknowledged by counse! for both sides, what followed was a cla c case of potents! jurors jumping on th = pportunit) to avoid jury duty by suddenly resizing that they too shared the bias of the venire man just dismissed Several veniremen im mediately brought their newly discovered problem with accepting covert tape record ings to the attention of the trial judge The judge dismissed the first bandwagoner without further quesvoning. knowing the venirermen had heard the examination of the venireman just dismissed The judge 328 dismissed the second and third followers after they offered short explanauons of the bas for their objecbons to taping When a fourth vemreman suddenly discovered 8 deep-seated dutaste for covert taping, the judge questioned her in depth and reit erated that tapes might not even be intro duced into evidence and would only be heard if they were found sdmussibie accord ing to the rules of evidence. The venire men then relented, declared she could give the evidence appropmate weight and was retained on the panel. Undeterred, a fifth venireman took up the mantle and voiced objections to covert taping The court was examining him further when stl another venireman interrupted with quesvons re garding the nature of the tapes Seeing the direction that the voir dire was going, the judge called a side bar. As represented to this court at ors! argument by both counse! (both of whom also served as tria! counsel), the judge asked both par ties for their preferences as to the appro priate manner for the court to dea) with this mass exodus of potenta!l juror Mathews’ counse! admits that he did not object to the actions that the judge had taken up to that point and in fact encour aged him to conunue The judge then dismussed the venireman he had been quer soning and dealt with the remaining four veniremen who claimed that they too disliked covert taping. The judge questioned the first three of these four in depth, released one and kept two The fina! objyectung venwermnan was also re eased With the supply of potenua! jurors now exhausted, the court called s recess. The following day, the veniremen ex pressed no misgivings sbout taping, and the voir dire proceeded without further probierm new B We see nothing wrong with the tris judge's conduct of the voir dire At least six times, the judge conducted in depth questioning in front of the pane! of venire men as @ group regarding the leve! of bias 803 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES necessary to demonstrate cause for being excused from jury duty, bias that mus remain regardiess of the rules of evidence and the instructions of the judge. The judge need not, as Mathews contends. in every case question each juror individus!!) regarding each possibie area of prejudice We review the wor dire only & see “whether the procedure used for tesung impartalty created « reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present.” United States » Dellinger, 472 F.2d $40, 367 (7th Cir.1972), cert dened 410 U.S. 970, 98 S.Cu 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). We “will not find that s tra! cour abused its discretion in conductng vow dire where there is ‘sufficient questoning & produce, in light of the factual situatior involved in the partcular tna! some basis for a reasonably knowledgeable exercise of the nght of challenge United States : Hastings, 739 F.2d 1269, 12773 Tw Ce 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1218, 105 $.Cr 1199, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985) (citatons om: ted) We may only reverse « tra! judges decision on exclusion of veniremen for couse if it i « “clear case” of prejudics error, Wainwright » Witt 469 US. 412 105 S.Ct 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, B44 (1985 The judge's conduct easily satisfies this tumited standard of renew and we accorc ingly decline to disturb the tra! courts decasion Furthermore. Mathews had every oppor tunity to object during voir dire and fae to do so. The judge even asked the parve how they wished him to proceed in hght o! the developing problem with the venire men's bias regarding covert taping Mat? ews. by hus counsel encouraged the judg: to continue as he had been before the sick bar, which the judge did. This is clearly « waiver and more of whatever night Mav ews may have had to object to the conduc of the worr dire Finally, we fee! compelled also to now that we are uncertain what harm Mathew could claim even if the conduct of the vor’ dire would have been unproper The judg did not fail tw exclude for cause & venire mar that Mathews wished excluded (w) UNITED STATES +. MATHEWS 329 Cite oo O83 F 2d 025 (Ce Nee) would have forced Mathews to use a per emptory strike and thus potentally preju dice his case), and the trial judge did not conduct the worr dire eo that a venireman who may or may not have been prejudiced remained on the pane! (which would have resulted in the same harm) Instead, the judge immediately excluded veniremen who expressed some bias against the govern ment without first questioning them fur ther on an individual! basis We are doubt ful whether this harmed Mathews in any way or whether any harm that did result can be the basis of & sixth amendment challenge. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in addressing « situation in which the ap pellant contended that the tria! judge had erred in excusing two jurors for cause on his own movon Moreover, regardiess of the propriety of excusing two veniremen, we would not be inclined to reverse The defendant ented to an array of imparua! jurors to whom he may direct his peremptory cha! lenges but, having been provided with such a panei, he suffers no prejudice if juror, even without sufficient cause, is excused by the Court United States v. Calhoun, S42 F.2d 1004 1103 (9th Cir.1976), cert denied gud nom Stephenson v United States, 429 US 1064, 97 S.Ct 792, SO L.Ed 2d 78) (1977) TV Mathews also contends the tna! court erred in denying his motion for mistria based on the prosecution's use of its per emptory strikes to exclude al! blacks from the jury. We disagree “ The Supreme Court recently addressed th wsue in Batson wv. Aentucky, — US ——, 106 S.Ct 1712, 90 L.Ed 2d 69 (1986 and the principles elucidated there contro! this case. In Batson, the court established that “the State's privilege to strike individ va! jurors through peremptory challenges is subject to the commands of the Equa! Protection Clause,” Batson, 106 S.Ct at 1718, and the Equa! Protection Clause for bids the prosecutor to challenge potenta jurors solely on account of their race or or the assumption that black jurors as « group wil! be unable impartally to consider the State's case aginst a black defend ant” /@ ot 1719. When « defendant « leges the prosecuuon has used its peremp tory challenges in e dwcriminatory fashior therefore. the genera! principles of Equa Protection apply. /d at 1719 The burden is on the defendant inita!!) to make “a prima facie case of purposely dweriminaton by showing that the tota!:ty of the relevant facts gives rise w an infer ence of discriminatory purpose id wt 1721. To make this showing, it is not nec essary for the defendant tw show that the prosecutors eclons m past cases have demonstrated a pattern or pracuce of dis emmuinatory use of peremptory challenges id at 1720-21. “A defendant may ested lsh s proma facie case of purposefu! du crimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosec. tor's exercise of peremptory challenges a the defendant's trial To establish such « case the defendant first must show that he is & member of & cognizable racia! group and that the prosecutor has exercise: peremptory challenges to remove from Ur< venure members of the defendants race /d at 1722-23. Then, “the defendant mus: show Wat these facts and any other rele vant curcumstances rawe an inference Wa the prosecutor used [peremptory che lenges) to exclude the veniremen from the peut jury on sccount of thew rece” /d a: 1723. These “relevant circumstances” may welude @ pattern of peremptory striking black jurors. the prosecutons quesbons and statements during soir dire, and the proseculon s statements and acbons w ex ercusing hw peremptory strikes /d If the trial judge determines that the defendant has made a suffiment pnms fo ove showing. “the burden shifu w the Sue to come forward with a neutral explanavor for challenging black jurors” /d at 1723 Although “the prosecutor's explanation need not mse to the leve! justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” /d at 1723. “the UNITED STATES + MATHEWS 331 Che ow 0 F 2d 25 (Ce Ne she along with the other people who had raised similar objections yesterday, | struck for, | think probably self-evident reasons, that type of evidence w going be important to my tris) and | believe that it will be very difficult for me to get a fair hearing on my side of the case if there are people who just plain believe that is not mght under any circumstances no matter what the judge should instruct them With respect t© Ms. Phenix, | noted this morning when | came into the court room, I thought yesterday afternoon, as s matter of fact, that | would like to keep her She is @ sort of basic Milwaukee person on paper at least, what we know of her. This morning she was late in coming, she was not the only one, but she was among people who (arrived) af ter two o'clock Gus afternoon when the jury was supposed to be here in their seats And this indicated to me a lack of commitment to the importance of thu proceeding That was one of the reasons why | felt that given a choice between Ms. Phenix and another juror, | would select a juror who evidenced more of s commitment In addition to that, while watching her in Une courtroom she did not seem to be attentive to the proceedings at hand | know this is always very difficull & judge these Uungs on the basis of such 8 short exposure to 8 person, but that was my impression of her That is the reason why | decided t strike her My last strike as | mentioned a few moments ago, was Mr. Robinson. | be lieve that is his name, Declinton Robin son The reason why | struck him os [admittedly « personal) one | don't know what is going to happen to me if | put this on the record, but | am going to anyway because the Court needs lo know my reasons Mr Declinton was sitting directly & my mght only @ space of approximately four feet from me, and bot) yesterday and today he spent « very great dea! of time in examining me in e way which | felt was in the end becoming rather hos tile Now, | realize that the is « sudje tive judgment, but it was very marked u me, Judge It was something that | no ticed and felt was rude for one thing, and indicated one of two things, either he was going to be very strongly in support of my position or he was going to be very strongly against my position. Under those circumstances | felt that there were other jurors who more fit the pro file of & juror that | was looking for There is always « thousand other things, but | fee! that at least this much should be placed on the record at this point because | fee! that it would have been to my sdvantage, rather than my disadvantage to have had black jurors or this particular jury, because my witness @s, too, your Honor, my most importan' witness, Mr. James DeShazer, is like Mr Mathews, black, and | fee! that i important that he get « fair hearing. an so | gained nothing. | gained nothing have to select my jurors one at & Ume, as | eee it and those are my reasons Trial Tr. pp. 83-86. Following this expls nation, the judge asked Mathews attorne) for his response, and he pointed out Wa! other white jurors had also been late bu! had not been struck by the government The judge then proceeded to weigh the factors put forth by both sides as wel! as other surrounding circumstances The judge stated that he agreed that the firs venireman struck had given particular’) hesitant responses to the judge's inquir following the venireman's initia! objectior to covert taping and that the peremptor strike was “wel! justified” With regard & the second black venireman struck, th« judge aiso agreed that the person had der onstrated s pointed disinterest in the pro ceedings evidenced not only by her tard ness but also by her posture and demeanor With regard to the third venireman struck the judge noted that the prosecutor's exp's nation was subjective and not based or factors that the court had also observed but that th did not necessarily undermine her explanation The court then consider-< the explanation in light of other surround 330 prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stat ing merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption—or his intuitive judgment—that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race” Jd Neither may the prose cutor satisfy his burden “by denying that he had « dwcriminatory motive or ‘affirm ing his good faith in individual! selections id at 1723 (citations omitted) The prose cutor's explanation must be “clear and rea sonably specific,” it must contain “ ‘legit imate reasons for exercising the cha! lenges,” and it must be “related w the particular case to be tried” /d at 1723 n 20 The defendant, of course bears the ulti mate burden of proving intenvona! disenm ination. Jd at 1721 and 1723-24 The duty to determine whether such a showing has been made i entrusted to the sound discretion of the tria! courts who are expe menced in supervising voir dire ld at 1723 For purposes of review on appeal, Bar son reminds us that “‘s finding of inten tons! discrimination is @ finding of fact enuUed to appropmate deference by a re viewing court,” and that, “[s)}ince the tris judge's findings in the context under con sideratuon here largely will turn on evalua won of credibility, reviewing court ord narily should give those findings great def erence.” Jd at 17245 21. Thus, we may only reverse the tra! judge's determination that the prosecution's peremptory cha lenges were not motivated by intentona discrimination if that determination is clearly erroneous. United States v Tuck er, TTS F.2d 186, 142 (7th Cir 1985), cert denied — US —, 106 S.Ct 8398, 92 L.Ed 2d 742 (1986 B (3) Applying these principles w the facts here, we have no doubt that the tra 1. Because we find the tris! judge's condu of the proceedings below setislies Batson) re quiremenu. we need not (end ecapressly & mot) decide whether Bewon applies retros se com Ser Allen + Uvely to Nerd, 803 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES court properly dened Mathews motor f mistrial! based on the prosecaton's use of peremptory challenges’ The judges quiry wes careful and thorough and hu underlying findings were reasonable and consistent. The tria! court's altumate find ing that the government did not intenuona ly dweriminate when exercising iu perem> tory challenges cannot be said to be clear', erroneous The trial judge. without the benefit of Batson's specific guidelines undertook thorough inquiry im response to Mathews pretria' motion challenging the goverr ments use of its peremptory cha enges & remove al) blacks from the jury After hstening to Mathews objection outside ure presence of the jury. the judge asked the prosecutor for her response The prosec. tor then explained in some deta.’ the bas for each of her strikes against the thre black veniremen We recount r full as an example of the type of explana ton that sausfies Saison’ requiremeru that such explanations be clear and reas ably specific, contain legitimate reasor and be related to the partcular case I did have reasons. The choice tha made this morning was an unusualy ¢ ficult one, and as [defense counse!’ is probed'y aware. the genUeman one the genUemen who was among the pe ple that | just mentoned was my las strike, and one over which | hesitated a some jength it is always very diff to describe your reasons why y or do not choose a juror Wher you read cases that say you are supposed to t& what your reasons are !| think ths mus be written by people who never tried « case, but | will do the best | can With respect to the lady, Mrs. Switze: she was (among) those people who ind calec & grave reservauon wilh respect k her ability t adequately look at and ar prawe the tape recording evidence and t here haw u c™oose No 83-659) — US — 06 SC: 28% 9) LEdld 1 986) (Rewer does oo an ply retreectively to collateral etack on conv teor The court noted the witnesses for both aides m Ue which would discount any ny circumstances ie Bey case were Diack advantage that « ducrminating prosecutor might perceive in striking blacks from the ury. The court noted that there was nc evidence that the prosecution had mair ined & pattern or practice of striking acks from juries i cases where the de fendants are bisck, and further commented that We courts persons: experence showed the contrary. Finally, the court noted Unat the demeanor of the prosecutor while exercising her peremptory challenges the Gme that she wor doing calec Wat she Was NOt Simply SLrlking enireman because they were Dieck but was engaging in « carefu! process of delib erauon based on many factors In light of a! of these circumstances, We judge denied for mews anc mn Mathews motor The judge's inquiry fits easily into the established in Batson Ir before the court We format hus Mo Mathews put facts that he is Diack (@ cognizable rece group) and that the prosecution usec per emptory challenges © strike members of his racial group from the jury. Mathews also noted thal the government eliminate a!) blacks from the jury, not just « few. as additions! evidence of the prosecutions dis criminatory motive. Although we need n de, Une Wri! budge apparently Wreatec prime facie evidence of intent 80 Ge this as sufficient he government exercuing its peremptory challenges The sdge then gave the prosecution & chance s éucriminatory to rebDut thus inference with a neutra: expla nat for challenging the black veniremer This the government did with an explana tion the clear was reasonably specific latec © We paertculer case hearing Mathews response & We expianston, considered a!! relevant circum stances and ruled that Mathews carned hw ullumate burden of proving ds intent contained leguumate reasons was anc wee re The judge afue hac a enminatory - Batson clear critere as estadishec © reason to overturn as proper we see 603 FEDERAL REPORTER The judge's inquiry was basec on He id SERIES erroneous the vdges den 7 Ma - mot for msi y In sum, we find it was not error for the tra! judge to require Mathews to admit a elements of the cmme including intent be fore allowing hirn w plead entrapment was not error to exclude for cause severe expressed mugivings re garding the use of covert tapings, and was not clearly erroneous for the judge & deny Mathews motion for mistria) based on the prosecution's alleged discrnminator challenges. The de veniremen whe use of peremptory { the district court w AFFIRME ———E © }" oma mn) 0 sror United Stintes Court o ~~ _ _ + a - : nm , we ve . ™ - ag ¥ ry - oo 2 yi be bd . A* te 7 Pa: rm : s* Ld 7 : . . af p AY - A ea : 6 - € ee - ace . " . . - * . - . : a , . j ne . = . 6 4erea ‘ > e er ‘ ° - ea ~ 4 gee for rehearing en banc file e adove-e Z - 7, - > C . 2 act rne : . -@ . s - = “ . se “ as re este 6 6 ° . s s Ze tre ris ct pane ave . ' -e . ehear 2a suggest : re nes zg ¢ ~ 4 rding IT 1] HERE : RE the the at ese e renear g enc suggest : renee g € a e e8 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0982%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.