# Record and brief — Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Melody Wilhite

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 474 U.S. 910

## Text

DOCKET

PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS DATE: 102285
CASE NBR 84-1-02016 CFX CASE STATUS: DECIDED
SHORT TITLE Greyhound Lines, Ine. DOCKETED: Jun 28 1985
VERSUS Wilhite, Melody, et al.
Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders
1 Jun 28 1985 D Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
3 1 26 1985 Order extending time to file response to petition until
August 14, 1985.
4 Aug 12 1985 Brief of respondents Melody Wilhite, et al. in opposition
filed.
5 Aug 14 1985 DISTRIBUTED. September 30, 19785
8 Sep 18 1985 X Reply brief of petitioner Greyhound Lines filed.
3 Oet 7 1985 REDISTRIBUTED. October 11, 1985
2 Oct 15 1985 Petition DENIED. Dissenting opinion by Justice White.

(Detached opinion.)
FFP

PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Uuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM R. Saus, III
STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *
DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD,
RIESE & JONES
4200 Seattle-First National
Bank Building
Seattle, Washington 98154
(206) 622-3150

Counsel of Record for
Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Ee — — — — —ů —
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the court below properly denied retroactive
effect to this Court’s decisions in United Parcel Service
v. Mitchell and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters.

A. Whether a federal court of appeals may deny retro-
active effect to a Supreme Court decision when the Su-
preme Court has, without reservation, itself applied the
decision retroactively in the civil litigation before it.

B. Whether a federal court of appeals may deny retro-
active effect to a Supreme Court decision solely because
that decision, which resolves conflict in the federal courts,
prescribes a civil statute of limitations shorter than the
limitations period suggested by lower court precedent.

(i)

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES, AND AFFILIATES

Greyhound Lines, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of
The Greyhound Corporation. The subsidiaries of Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. (except wholly owned subsidiaries)
are: Greyhound Bus Depot of Atlanta, Inc.; Greyhound
Lines of Canada Ltd.; Greyhound-Taseco Saudi Arabia
Ltd.; Jefferson Lines Holding Company; Kerrville Bus
Company, Inc.; Southeastern Stages, Inc.; Springfield
Bus Terminal Corporation; Union Bus Station of Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma; Wilmington Union Bus Station
Corporation; and Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma
Coaches, Inc. The affiliates of Greyhound Lines, Inc. (ex-
cept for wholly owned subsidiaries of its parent, subsid-
iaries, or affiliates) are: Freeport Flight Services Ltd.;
Glacier Park, Inc.; Greyhound Food Management of
Texas, Inc.; Restaura, GmbH; Greyhound Services Saudi
Arabia Ltd.; Armour S.A. E.; Greyhound Computer of
Canada Ltd.; Collins, Collins & Rawlence Ltd.; G. G.
Mor.gagee Corporation; P. T. Gemini Greyhound Leasing
Indonesia; and Tri-State Investment Company. Should
the Court desire disclosure of wholly owned subsidiaries
of these various entities, Greyhound Lines, Inc., will
supplement its list of subsidiaries and affiliates.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES,

AND AFFILIATES
OPINION BELOW
JURISDICTION
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

——— E G nBß ee ee ee ee 3*“—?5ẽtùꝶ

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I,

II.

BY REFUSING TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY
THE PRINCIPLES OF MITCHELL AND
DELCOSTELLO, THE DECISION BELOW
CONFLICTS WITH THE VIEWS OF OTHER
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL ..

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP-
PEALS MANIFESTS A FUNDAMENTAL
DIVISION OF THE CIRCUITS ON THE
APPLICATION OF RETROACTIVITY PRIN-
CIPLES SET FORTH IN CHEVRON OIL CO.
SEES EE a

A. A Substantial Question Is Presented By the
Conflict Between the Court Below and Other
Circuits as to Whether Chevron Applies to
New Principles That This Court Has Itself
Applied Retrospectively 0.

B. A Substantial Question Is Presented by the
Holding of the Court Below, in Conflict With
Other Circuits, That the Mere Existence of
Contrary Circuit Precedent Necessarily Pre-
cludes Retroactive Application of This
Court’s Decisions to Adversely Affected
Litigants

— — K ERE RE HSH R nE RWK R’ R „„ „„

10

12

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

— —————ůů ů —— — —
APPENDIX

Memorandum Opinion of United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, April 1, 19858

Order of Dismissal and Order of Remand, United
States District Court, Western District of Wash-
ington (Seattle), September 9, 1988

Judgment, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, April 1, 1985 3

Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726
rr, ee
Welyezko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. ),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1983) =

la

4a

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Aarsvold v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 724 F.2d 72
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538

17J/%%/ a a il 10
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.

| ES T3 en een ee 6, 7
Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726

F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 198(0))0· 5, 8, 15, 16

Bourquin v. Prophet Foods Co., presently Grey-
hound Food Management, Inc., et al., No. 83-1248

- 10
Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064

I ̃⅛ F!!! — 13
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (19717 passim
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State

Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (194: 18
Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681

P2d G77 (Sth Cir. 10GB) ....................-00.....20....... 16
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) 12

Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 650 F.2d 902
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947

r Re ao nk ar 8
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

GEE, Ge Te Te GID cececeneeveccceneveczccsonscencsecend passim
Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 720 F.2d 857

r 9

Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599
K 9
Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d 1036
(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 707
„ r ee ee en ane 9
Glover v. United Grocers, 746 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (USS.

—— a ee ee ea 15, 16, 18
Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736 F.2d 819
I r 8

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554
TL So NT .

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563

D. - erro 10
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 623 F. 2d

786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 456 U.S. 461 (1982) 16
Lawson v. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers,

698 F.2d 250 (6th Cir.), reh’g denied and veh'g

en banc denied, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69

. ee ee 7,18
Lincoln v. District 9 of International Association

of Machinists, 723 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983 9
Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (19817 6
McNutt v. Airco Industrial Gases Division, 687

r. x
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) 16, 17
Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d

394 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d 451 U.S. 56 (1981)...... 6, 7

Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
f ee 8,9
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)...... 13
Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983). 8
Price v. Southern Pacific Transport. Co., 586 F. 2d

I 8
Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co.,
ea 13-14

Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247
(Iich Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727 F.2d 1116
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984).. 9
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 18 (1964), on
remand, 270 F. Supp. 754 (N. D. Cal. 1967), aff'd
411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), reversed, 396 U.S. 13
rc 12
Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349
,, e rere eeneene mene oe See 8, 15, 16
Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th
D ee een eee 9, 12, 13
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Dur-
ham, 398 U.S. 268 (1969) ..................................... 10

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56
(1981) ........ C ee SET passim
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) 14,17
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103
. .. 10
Vadasz v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 723 F.2d 620 (8th
Cir. 1988) .............. . 10
Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (198) 8, 13
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).......... n 2
r ̃ TTT. 55 3
r 1 3
LR Ee a ee
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a cece. n passim
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04. 1800o 4
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010, et Se ;œmm 3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
C. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor Law (2d
EE // / / nee en an PS Ae eee 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84——

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,
AMALGAMATED TRANS'T UNION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRI OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc., respectfully requests
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgmeat
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 1,
1985.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit is not reported. It is
found in the Appendix at pages la through 3a.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was entered on April 1, 1985. App.
6a-7a. The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been

2

filed within 90 days thereafter. This Court’s jurisdiction
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the “Act”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), provides,
in pertinent part:

. no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior
to the filing of the charge with the Board and the
service of a copy thereof upon the person against
whom such charge is made...

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act (the “LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides, in per-
tinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this

chapter, . . . may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 15, 1979, Melody Wilhite and a fellow
employee at Greyhound's Seattle facility were observed in
a tavern during their lunch break. Having concluded
that the two were consuming alcohol, local Greyhound
management confronted them and allowed them to choose
between vol intary resignation and termination. Wilhite
chose to resign. Soon thereafter, however, she had second
thoughts concerning her decision and enlisted the aid of
her bargaining representative, Local 1384, Amalgamated
Transit Union (“Local 1384”).

On December 17, 1979, Local 1384’s business agent
filed a grievance and requested a hearing on her behalf.
On December 26, 1979, Greyhound management re-

3

sponded by advising Local 1384 that Wilhite had re-
signed and that her resignation had been accepted. After
receiving Greyhound’s response, the business agent spoke
with Wilhite about the grievance on at least two occa-
sions, explaining that Local 1384 would not pursue the
matter because of his determination that her resignation
had been voluntary. The business agent’s decision was
affirmed by the Executive Board of Local 1384 at its reg-
ular meeting in January of 1980.

Approximately 16 months later, on May 26, 1981, Wil-
hite filed this action in the Superior Court of the State
of Washington in King County, naming as defendants
Greyhound, Local 1384, and the International union affil-
iated with Local 1384. Because Wilhite asserted a cause
of action under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, Greyhound removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 1441.

Wilhite’s complaint alleged that Greyhound had
breached its contract with Local 1384 by coercing her
resignation on December 15, 1979. In addition, she
claimed that Local 1384 and its affiliated International
had breached their duty to provide Wilhite with fair
representation subsequent to her resignation. Finally,
Wilhite asserted that Greyhound’s and Local 1384’s ac-
tions discriminated against her on the basis of sex in
violation of the Washington State Law Against Discrim-
ination, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010, et seg.

On June 29, 1983, the district court dismissed the
International from Wilhite’s lawsuit, reasoning that it
owed no duty of fair representation to Wilhite because
it was not her bargaining representative. On that same
day, the court granted Greyhound’s motion for summary
judgment on the sex discrimination claim. The Section
301 suit against Greyhound, the duty of fair representa-
tion claim against Local 1384, and the state law sex
discrimination claim against Local 1384 remained.

1

On June 8, 1983, after submission of the initial sum-
mary judgment motions in this case, this Court an-
nounced its decision in DelCostello v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), prescribing
a six month statute of limitations for hybrid Section 301/
duty of fair representation cases. Accordingly, in mid-
August of 1983, Local 1384 and Greyhound moved to dis-
miss Wilhite’s federal claims on the ground that her
action had not been timely brought under DelCostello.

In response, Wilhite urged that De/Costello not be ap-
plied retroactively, pointing out that the Ninth Circuit
had refused to apply retroactively this Court’s decision in
United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981),
which had announced the statute of limitations princi-
ples overruled in Del Costello. In reply, Local 1384 argued
that DelCostello was entitled to retroactive effect, not-
ing, among other things, that this Court had itself ap-
plied the six month statute of limitations to bar the
claims of two employees in Del Costello.

On September 9, 1983, the district court granted the
motions and entered an order dismissing Wilhite’s fed-
eral claims and remanding her pendant state law sex
discrimination claim against Local 1384 to the State
Superior Court. App. 4a-5a. Because Wilhite had filed
her action one month after this Court’s decision in
Mitchell, the district court concluded that no question
of retroactivity was presented with respect to the three-
month statute of limitations in effect under that case.
App. 5a. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180 (three-month
statute of limitations for action to vacate arbitration
award). Accordingly, the district court found it un-
necessary to address the retroactivity of DelCostello in
holding that Wilhite’s claims were time barred under
Mitchell. App. 5a.

Wilhite appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed in an unpublished
opinion issued on April 1, 1985. App. la-3a. Relying

5

primarily upon its decision in Barina v. Gulf Trading &
Transportation Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1984),
App. 8a-l5a, the court ruled that neither Mitchell nor
DelCostello governed Wilhite’s action. App. 3a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents substantial questions concerning the
circumstances in which principles announced by this
Court should be applied retroactively. The Ninth Circuit,
in conflict with eight courts of appeal, has denied retro-
active effect to this Court’s decisions clarifying the limi-
tations period applicable to hybrid Section 301/duty of
fair representation actions. See United Parcel Service v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) ; DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). This
conflict stems from fundamental differences among the
circuits with respect to the standards to be applied in
determining whether this Court’s decisions apply retro-
spectively. Two courts of appeal have held that this
Court conclusively answers retroactivity questions when
it applies a newly-announced principle to the litigants
before it, as it did in DelCostello. Between these courts
and the Ninth Circuit, there exists clear conflict on the
substantial and fundamental question of the precedential
significance of this Court’s adjudication of cases. In
addition, the Ninth Circuit has parted from other courts
of appeal in denying retroactivity to Mitchell and Del-
Costello solely because those decisions overruled some
lower court precedent in order to resolve conflict and con-
fusion in the circuits. The holding of the court below
creates a per se rule that any new Supreme Court deci-
sion on limitation periods will not be applied retroactively
to adversely affected litigants. This presents a substan-
tial question as to the continued viability of the time-
honored presumption that principles announced by this
Court apply retroactively. Accordingly, review on cer-
tiorari is merited under Rule 17.1 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court.

6

I. BY REFUSING TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY THE
PRINCIPLES OF MITCHELL AND DELCOSTELLO,
THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE
VIEWS OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL

Until 1981, courts divided sharply over the appropri-
ate statute of limitations to apply in hybrid cases alleg-
ing an employer’s breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185,
and a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation.
Agreeing only that the limitations period should be bor-
rowed from state law, see Auto Workers v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966), federal
courts had applied statutes ranging from 90 days, Liotta
v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981), to six years. Mitchell
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev’d 451 U.S. 56 (1981).' These different
approaches resulted from conflicting perceptions of the
nature of these hybrid actions, some courts finding them
to be tort actions, others concluding that they sounded in
contract, and still others finding them to derive from
statutory rights. See 2 C. Morris, ed., The Developing
Labor Law (2d Ed. 1983), pp. 1356-57 (collecting cases).

This Court, however, had foreshadowed a different ap-
proach in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
554 (1976), when it noted that a union’s duty of fair
representation implicated the “integrity of the arbitral
process.” 424 U.S. at 567. Recognizing this principle,
the Third Circuit in 1980 concluded that hybrid Section
301/duty of fair representation suits should be governed
by the state statute of limitations applicable to actions
to vacate arbitration awards. Liotta, 629 F.2d at 906
(disimissing Section 301 action against employer).

Truly scores of decisions applied various “appropriate” statutes
of limitation before Mitchell resolved the issue. They are collected
at 2 C. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor Law (2d Ed. 1983), pp.

1355, et seq. 8

7

The distriet court in Mitchell took this approach in
concluding that an employee’s hybrid action was time
barred. See Mitchell, 624 F.2d at 396. The view was
ultimately adopted by this Court in Mitchell, which re-
versed the Second Circuit and reinstated the district
court’s order dismissing the lawsuit against the employer.
451 U.S. at 64. In so doing, this Court broke no new
ground. Rather, it relied upon the then accepted prin-
ciple that the most analogous state statute of limitations
should control. 451 U.S. at 60. See Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 704-05. The Court
rested its choice of limitations in large part upon the
observation that Hines “strongly supports borrowing the
limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration
awards.” 451 U.S. at 61.

The Court in Mitchell declined to address the conten-
tion that a federal statute of limitations should govern
hybrid actions. 451 U.S. at 60 n. 2. That question was,
however, squarely presented in DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151. Over-
ruling Mitchell, the Court in De Costello determined that
the six month statute of limitations contained in Section
10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), should apply to
actions against both the employer and the union in
Section 301/duty of fair representation lawsuits.

In the brief interval between Mitchell and DelCostello,
few courts had occasion to consider Mitchell’s application
to causes of action accruing prior to that decision. The
Sixth Circuit, however, did apply Mitchell retroactively
based upon its conclusion that this Court’s decision did
not represent a “clean break” with prior decisions, but
merely a clarification of the law on “an issue on which
there is circuit conflict and confusion.” Lawson v. Truck
Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers, 698 F.2d 250, 254 (6th
Cir.), reh’g denied and reh’g en bane denied, cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 69 (1983). Without undertaking any detailed
retroactivity analysis, other courts of appeal also applied

8

Mitchell to pending cases. See, e.g., McNutt v. Airco
Industrial Gases Division, 687 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1982) ;
Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 650 F.2d 902 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1982). The views
of these courts found express approval in Justice O’Con-
nor’s dissent in DelCostello, in which she observed that it
was “quite appropriate to apply Mitchell retroactively.”
462 U.S. at 175, n.2 O'Connor, J., dissenting) .

The Ninth Circuit, however, took a different approach,
holding in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1981), that Mitchell could not apply to
causes of action accruing before this Court’s decision in
that case. Undertaking a cursory analysis purportedly
premised on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971),
the court of appeals held that previous Ninth Circuit
precedent on the statute of limitations applicable to ac-
tions against unions rendered it unjust to apply Mitchell
to existing causes of action against both unions and em-
ployers. 652 F.2d at 1353, citing Price v. Southern
Pacific Transport. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 752-53 (9th Cir.
1978) (in action against union, limitations period ap-
plicable to actions based upon a statute governs). See
also Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726
F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Mitchell
applies prospectively only), App. 12a-13a.

The conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the rest of
the nation has continued since this Court decided Del-
Costello. Every circuit court except the Tenth Circuit
and the District of Columbia Circuit has considered retro-
active application of DelCostello. Every court except the
Ninth Circuit has determined that the case does apply
retroactively. Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736
F.2d 819 (Ist Cir. 1984); Welyezko v. U.S. Air, Inc.,
733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512
(1984), App. 16a-20a; Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d
581 (3d Cir. 1983); Murray v. Branch Motor Express
Co., 723 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105

—

9

S. Ct. 292 (1984); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,
720 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Smith v. General Motors
Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Ernst
v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 707 (1984); Lincoln v.
District 9 of International Association of Machinists, 723
F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Lockheed Georgia
Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727
F.2d 1116 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292
(1984). The Ninth Circuit’s view, as expressed in this
case, stands alone on this issue. See Barina v. Gulf Trad-
ing & Transportation Co., 726 F.2d at 564, App. 13a-
15a; Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984).

This conflict creates manifest injustice, for it results
in differing treatment for similarly situated litigants. In
this case, Wilhite claims to have suffered damage when
Greyhound allegedly coerced her resignation on Decem-
ber 15, 1979. She then waited until May 26, 1981, after
this Court decided Mitchell, to file her suit. Other liti-
gants allegedly suffering injury and filing suit before
Wilhite have been denied relief under the principles an-
nounced in DelCostello. See, e.g., Murray v. Branch
Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d at 1148 (damages allegedly
suffered on April 22, 1976; suit filed on September 13,
1978) ; Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d at 1250
‘‘n consolidated cases, suits dismissed when litigants’
causes of action accrued in April of 1979, May of 1979,
and October of 1979, respectively; suits filed in March of
1980, June of 1980, and May of 1981, respectively).

This disparate treatment presents an inherently sub-
stantial issue because of its effect on the integrity of the
federal judicial process. Litigants contesting federal is-
sues implicating national labor policy should not find
their rights differing from one circuit to the next. That
is, however, precisely the effect of the decision below.
Three courts of appeal have applied De/Costello retro-

10

actively in cases involving Greyhound or its affiliates.
Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563 (5th
Cir. 1985); Bourquin v. Prophet Foods Co., presently
Greyhound Food Management, Inc., et al., No. 83-1248
(6th Cir. June 7, 1985) (unpublished; not to be cited as
precedent) ; Vadasz v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 723 F.2d
620 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Aarsvold v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984). Only in
the Ninth Circuit has Greyhound been deprived of the
right to repose provided by DelCostello. This Court
should therefore grant the writ to resolve the conflict on
this important issue of federal labor law.

II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTS A FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION OF
THE CIRCUITS ON THE APPLICATION OF
RETROACTIVITY PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN
CHEVRON OIL CO. v. HUSON

A court ordinarily “must apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision.” Thorpe v. Housing Author-
ity of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110
(1801). Thus, when confronted with a change in law
occasioned by a judicial ruling, a court must apply the
“new” law even to an “old” case. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at
282. This general rule admits of only limited exceptions.
In civil cases, this Court has held that a judicial decision
will have prospective effect if it meets certain criteria:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively
must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants
may have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-
shadowed . . . Second, it has been stressed that “we
must. . weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-

11

spective operation will further or retard its opera-
tion.” . . . Finally, we have weighed the inequity
imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a
decision of this Court could produce substantial in-
equitable results if applied retroactively, there is
ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice
or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

Chevron Oil Co. „. Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citations
omitted). Using this test, the Court in Chevron declined
to apply to the parties before it a state statute of limita-
tions adopted in that case. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 109.

The court of appeals in this and other cases has funda-
mentally misperceived the nature and scope of the
Chevron analysis, raising issues of substantial importance
in the future disposition of retroactivity questions. As
the Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized, a court of
appeals should not conduct a Chevron inquiry if this
Court has, without reservation, applied the “new” legal
principle to the parties before it. When that has occurred,
as it did in both Mitchell and DelCostello, the courts of
appeal should apply the same principle in the same fash-
ion as this Court. Because the court below refused to do
so, its decision was in error.

Furthermore, even when Chevron applies, its require-
ment that a decision “establish a new principle of law”
is not satisfied by the mere existence of contrary case law
in the federal courts. This Court, recognizing that deci-
sions are presumed to have retroactive effect, has instead
required a sharp break from a near unanimous view of
lower courts. In finding that DelCostello and Mitchell
should be applied only prospectively, the Ninth Circuit
rejected this principle, in conflict with other courts of
appeal. The decision of the court below has thus raised
a substantial question as to the continued viability of the
fundamental presumption in favor of applying the law
in effect at the time of a court‘s decision.

12

A. A Substantial Question Is Presented By the Con-
flict Between the Court Below and Other Circuits as
to Whether Chevron Applies to New Principles That
This Court Has Itself Applied Retrospectively.

To assure rationality and uniformity in decisions, retro-
activity should not be determined on a case-by-case basis.“
As the Sixth Circuit has observed, a contrary view with
respect to DelCostello would have the “unacceptable” re-
sult of “a separate statute of limitations for every section
301 plaintiff with a case pending when DelCostello came
down .. .” Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d at
375, n.6. With this principle of uniformity in mind, both
the Second and Sixth Circuits have found that this Court
disposed of retroactivity questions when it applied Del-
Costello principles to dismiss the claims of Flowers and
Jones, two of the litigants before the Court in that case.
See 462 U.S. at 172 (holding action of Flowers and Jones
“is governed by the six-month provision of § 10(b)”).

2 This Court has generally analyzed retroactivity questions with
a broad frame of reference. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma,
895 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (discussing consequences of retroactivity
for “cities, bondholders and others connected with municipal utili-
ties”). In one unusual case concerning resale price maintenance
under the Sherman Act, the Court did appear to authorize case-by-
case adjudication of retroactivity. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
877 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1964), on remand, 270 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd, 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), reversed, 396 U.S. 1% (1969).
The Court’s second opinion in that case, however, revealed that it
left the door open for prospective application not to similarly situ-
ated litigants, but to parties whose acts were based “on quite
different considerations” than those that guided the defendant
whose conduct the Court had found unlawful. 396 U.S. at 14.
Cf. 411 F.2d at 901 (explaining Court's rationale in other terms;
reversed, 396 U.S. at 14). When thoroughly analyzed, the Court's
decision in Simpson seems to be little more than a recognition that
differing motivations of defendants might distinguish other cases
as a matter of substantive law. The same is not true here, for
state of mind has no bearing upon the appropriate statute of
limitations.

13

In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit noted
that Chevron has only limited application when a court of
appeals considers new principles announced by the Su-
preme Court. Chevron, the Second Circuit wrote, must
guide a court of appeals in considering “a new rule which
our court [has] pronounced. Welyczko v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. The same analysis
would apply to a principle as to which this Court has
“given no indication” on the issue of retroactivity. 733
F.2d at 241, App. 20a. However, the Second Circuit ob-
served that the Court in DelCostello had “applied the
time bar retroactively to govern the very claim at issue
in the case before it.” 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. Noting
that this Court “is well aware of how to avoid the effects
of applying one of its rulings retroactively to the case at
bar,” id., quoting Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
561 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit
found no reason to refrain from applying a rule of this
Court retrospectively “when [the Supreme] Court itself
has given retrospective application to a newly adopted
principle ...” 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. In an en banc
decision, the Sixth Circuit adopted this reasoning. Smith
v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d at 375.

In contrast to the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth
Circuit conducted a Chevron analysis to decide the retro-
activity question, indicating its intent to disregard this
Court’s unconditional disposition of the cases reviewed in
Del Costello. The Ninth Circuit’s approach, however,
bespeaks a fundamental misapprehension of the Court’s
function. This Court decides cases, not abstract princi-
ples. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361
(1911) (the Court’s role is to decide “the rights of liti-
gants in justiciable controversies”). In so doing, the
Court necessarily passes upon the questions essential to
the dispositions it makes.“ See Public Service Commis-

*This Court was aware of the retroactive im
ications
DelCostello, as Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which — 2

14

sion of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952)
(considering appropriateness of declaratory relief, de-
spite lower courts’ failure to consider the issue, because
“that inquiry is one which every grant of this remedy
must survive“

Thus, when the Court found the suit by two employees
in DelCostello to be time-barred, it implicitly held it ap-
propriate to apply the newly announced principle to liti-
gants with cases pending as of that date. To hold other-
wise, as did the court below, verges on a suggestion that
this Court disposes of cases based upon new principles
without regard to the justice of applying those principles.
Such a proposition dramatically understates this Court’s
role in adjudicating the rights of the parties before it.
To paraphrase this Court’s observations in considering
retroactivity of new Fourth Amendment doctrines, “{i]t
would be ironic indeed” if the Ninth Circuit were per-
mitted to reverse judgments applying DelCostello’s rule,
when in DelCostello itself the Court reversed a directly
contrary judgment of the Second Circuit. United States
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555 (1982).

The Ninth Circuit’s divergence from the views of the
Second and Sixth Circuits thus reflects a clear division
on a crucial issue: the degree to which the Chevron
criteria may be employed to deny retroactivity to a prin-
ciple that this Court has itself applied retroactively in
civil litigation. This presents a substantial question whose
resolution will determine the precedential value of this
Court’s future dispositions. The Court should grant the

dressed the retroactivity of Mitchell, demonstrates. See 462 U.S.
at 175 n.2. Furthermore, the fact that the parties in DelCostello
did not raise the question fails to diminish the effect of the Court's
retrospective application of its decision to Flowers and Jones.
When the Court perceives an injustice in applying a decision
retroactively, it plainly has authority to dispose of the problem
sua sponte as an incident to deciding a case based upon the new
principle.

15

writ to reaffirm its primacy in deciding the issues nec-
essarily placed before it.

B. A Substantial Question Is Presented by the Holding
of the Court Below, in Conflict With Other Circuits,
That the Mere Existence of Contrary Circuit Prece-
dent Necessarily Precludes Retroactive Application
of This Court’s Decisions to Adversely Affected
Litigants.

Most courts considering Mitchell’s and DelCostello’s
retroactivity have, like the court below, improperly ana-
lyzed the issue under Chevron. Those courts have, how-
ever, reached a conclusion different from that of the
Ninth Circuit. This division among the circuits stems
from a sharply different view of the extent to which the
existence of circuit court precedent at odds with a Su-
preme Court decision fulfills the first Chevron criterion.
Thus, even if Chevron applies when this Court has im-
plicitly decided the retroactivity question, the decision of
the court below raises a substantial issue as to the nature
of the Chevron inquiry.

The Ninth Circuit has not denied that retroactive ap-
plication of Mitchell and DelCostello would further the
purpose of the rules adopted in those cases. See Barina
v. Gulf Trading & Transportation, 726 F.2d at 564, App.
14a (retroactive application of DelCostello would further
purpose of the rule; Singer v. Flying Tiger Lines, 652
F.2d at 1353 (failing to address this criterion in analyz-
ing Mitchell). The disagreement between the court below
and other circuits thus derives from its application of
Chevron’s first criterion, i e., the degree to which the new
principle represents a clear break from prior precedent,
and the third criterion, i. e., the degree to which applica-
tion of the new principle would have inequitable results.
Because it regards these two inquiries as “closely re-
lated,” Glover v. United Grocers, 746 F.2d 1380, 1382
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S.

16

1985), the court of appeals’ reasoning rests almost ex-
clusively upon its finding that Mitchell and DelCostello
departed from prior precedent. Indeed, that is the thresh-
old question. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381,
n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“An issue of ‘retro-
activity’ of a decision of this Court is not even presented
unless the decision in question marks a sharp break in
the web of the law”); Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) (“unless the
first [Chevron] factor is satisfied, there is no occasion to
consider the other two”), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982), and
cases cited therein.

In deciding that Mitchell broke with prior law, the
court of appeals relied upon Ninth Circuit authority sug-
gesting that a longer limitations period applied in suits
against unions and Eighth Circuit authority on suits
against employers.‘ Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353 (discussing
Mitchell) ; see also Barina, 726 F.2d at 562, App. 10a.
The mere existence of this precedent, however, hardly
suggests that this question of federal law was settled
before this Court gave its guidance. To the contrary,
the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that a review of
early authorities on this issue discloses “proliferating
cases in which the various district and circuit courts were
applying a bewildering variety of local statutes of limi-
tations to cases challenging the conduct of employers and
unions with reference to labor grievances.” Glover v.
United Grocers, 746 F.2d at 1382 (describing situation
before DelCostello).

»The Ninth Circuit's confusion on this issue is illustrated by the
fact that it did not announce a pre- Mitchell“ statute of limitations
for actions against employers until after Mitchell was decided.
See App. 2a; Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353 (applying California's four-
year statute in reliance on Eighth Circuit precedent) ; Christianson
v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1982)
(applying Washington's three year statute of limitations). In these
circumstances, it is difficult to discern how Mitchell could break
sharply even from precedent within the circuit.

17

This Court should dispel the unfortunate notion that
its resolution of such turmoil can give rise to questions
of retroactivity. The first Chevron criterion can be ful-
filled only when a decision of this Court

explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court,
. . . or disapproves a practice this Court arguably
has sanctioned in prior cases, . . or overturns a
longstanding and widespread practice to which this
Court has not spoken, but which a near-wnanimous
body of lower court authority has expressly ap-
proved.

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Mitchell did none of these
things, as even a cursory analysis of that decision shows.

Given the many approaches to this unsettled issue,
litigants (and the judiciary) could hardly point to any
“near-unanimous” view overruled by Mitchell. Nor could
any litigant claim that Mitchell, in applying state stat-
utes governing efforts to overturn arbitration awards,
relied upon unfamiliar principles. Like the lower court
decisions addressing the issue, Mitchell chose an analo-
gous state statute. See 451 U.S. at 60. And in designat-
ing that statute, it looked not solely to questions of public
policy or legislative history, but to its decision in Hines
five years earlier. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 61. Mitchell
thus did not “mark a sharp break in the web of the law.”
See Milton, 407 U.S. at 381, n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Rather, Mitchell was but a part of that seamless web,
relying upon established authority.

By the mere fact that Mitchell clarified confusing
lower court precedent, however, the court of appeals
found retroactivity inappropriate. If that were sufficient
grounds for applying a decision prospectively, the very
fact that “new law” is “new” would be enough to deny
it retrospective effect, no matter how unsettled “old”
law might have been. The Ninth Circuit’s approach thus

would grant prospective effect to any litigant adversely

18

affected by a new decision on statutes of limitation, a
per se result at odds with the painstaking analysis this
Court undertook in Chevron. This would turn on its
head the salutary principle “that we should not normally
have one law for old cases and another for new cases.”
Lawson, 698 F. 2d at 254.

Thus, as the district court held, Mitchell should have
governed this case, which was not even filed until after
this Court decided Mitchell. Consequently, DelCostello,
which extended by three months the applicable statute of
limitations under Mitchell, could have applied retroac-
tively as well. See Glover, 746 F.2d at 1382 (Del Costello
applies retroactively in Ninth Circuit when effect is to
lengthen statute of limitations prescribed by Mitchell).
Because Wilhite’s claim was time-barred under either
decision, the court below erred in reversing the district
court’s dismissal.

This error relates not only to the retroactive applica-
tion of Mitchell and DelCostello. Rather, it reflects a dis-
regard of the stabilizing rule that this Court’s decisions,
even if announcing “new” principles, must be presumed
to apply to all pending and future cases, no matter when
the rights asserted accrued.’ The substantial question
presented by the Ninth Circuit’s abandonment of this
presumption will arise each time that court feels it neces-
sary to apply its eccentric version of Chevron. As a
consequence, this Court should grant the writ to address
this important question of Chevron’s application.

5 Petitioner does not suggest that DelCostello should be applied
to permit collateral attacks on judgments that became final when
now-overruled concepts governed. See Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940) (decision
will not be applied retroactively to permit collateral attack on
judgment as to which no review was sought).

19

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review and reverse the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. Squires, III
STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *
DAVIS, WRIGHT, Topo,
RIESE & JONES
4200 Seattle-First National
Bank Building
Seattle, Washington 98154
(206) 622-3150

* Counsel of Record for
Greyhound Lines, Inc.

June 28, 1985

APPENDIX

la
APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-4212
D.C. No. C81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

GREYHOUND LINES, a corporation; and LocAL 1384,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, a Labor Union; and
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, a Labor
Union,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington

Honorable Walter T. McGovern, Chief Judge
United States District Judge, Presiding

Submitted: December 27, 1984 **

[Filed April 1, 1985]

** The panel is unanimously of the opinion that oral argument
is not required in this case. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Rule 3(f),
Rules of the Ninth Circuit.

2a

Before: GOODWIN, KENNEDY, and FLETCHER, Circuit
Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Melody Wilhite brought suit against both her former
employer, Greyhound Lines, and her union, Local 1384,
Amalgamated Transit Union, alleging breach of contract
by Greyhound and breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion by the union. She filed her complaint in state court
on May 26, 1981, sixteen months after her final day of
work for Greyhound. Defendants removed the action to
the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington and moved to dismiss the action on
the basis of the statute of limitations. The district court,
applying Washington’s three month statute of limitations
for vacating arbitral awards, Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180
(1981), granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and re-
manded plaintiff’s state law claim. From this decision
Wilhite appeals.

When plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, the period of
limitations applicable in Washington to hybrid 301 ac-
tions was three years. Christianson v. Pioneer Sand &
Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1982) (Wash.
Rev. Code § 4.16.080(3)’s three year statute of limita-
tions applies to suits against employers) ; Washington v.
Northland Marine Co., 681 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir.
1982) (Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)’s three year stat-
ute of limitations applies to suits against unions).

By the time appellant had initiated this action, the
Supreme Court had issued its decision in United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), and the
applicable period of limitations for section 301 actions
against employers was the three-month period of limita-
tions set forth in section 7.04.180 of the Washington Re-
vised Code. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 64; Buscemi v.

* This disposition is not intended for publication and shall not
be cited as precedent. Rule 21, Rules of the Ninth Circuit.

3a

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.
1984) ; McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d 1042,
1046 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984).
Mitchell does not, however, govern appellant’s suit against
her employer. Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation
Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, Wil-
hite’s action against Greyhound is controlled by the three-
year statute of limitations applicable when her cause of
action accrued. Christianson, 681 F.2d at 581; Singer v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.
1981).

The district court also erred in applying Mitchell to
Wilhite’s suit against her union. Barina, 726 F.2d at
562; McNaughton, 707 F.2d at 1047-48. The relevant
period of limitations at the time suit was commenced was
three years. Northland Marine Co., 681 F.2d at 586.

After the action was filed, the Supreme Court held that
an employee’s action against either the employer or the
union under the LMRA is governed by the six-month lim-
itations period of section 10(b) of that Act. DelCostello
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
171-72; see 29 U.S.C. 8 160 (b) (1982). DelCostello does
not, however, control the result here, for this court has
refused to give it retroactive application where its effect
would be to shorten the applicable state statute. Barina,
726 F.2d at 563-64; Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); cf. Glover v. United
Grocers, Inc., 746 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (Del-
Costello will be retroactively applied where effect of such
application is to lengthen time in which to file).

Wilhite’s suit, filed sixteen months after the accrual of
her cause of action, is timely as against both defendants.
The order of the district court is accordingly reversed.
Both sides are to bear their own costs on appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

No. C81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,
Plaintiff,
V.
GREYHOUND LINES, et al.,
Defendants.

[Filed Sept. 9, 1983]

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER OF REMAND

This case comes on for consideration before the under-
signed judge of the above-entitled court on the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss. The ground for the motion is the
failure of the plaintiff to file her action within the ap-
plicable limitations period.

The complaint sets forth claims against plaintiff's em»
ployer under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1976), and against
her union for its alleged breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation. Under DelCostello v. Teamsters, 51 U.S.L.W.
4693 (U.S. June 8, 1983), the limitations period applica-
ble to such joint breach-of-contract /duty-of-representation
actions is borrowed from the provisions governing un-
fair-labor-practice claims brought before the National La-
bor Relations Board. This period is six months. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (b) (1976). Judged by this standard, the current
plaintiff’s claim was untimely by ten months. The plain-
tiff argues, however, that the standard announced by the
Court in DelCostello in June 1983 should not retroactively
apply to bar her action filed in May 1981.

5a

DelCostello overturned the longstanding rule that joint
breach-of-contract/duty-of-representation claims incorpo-
rate the limitations period of the most analogous state
law cause of action. It does not appear, however, that
either DelCostello or the question of its retroactivity make
any difference in the question of the timeliness of the
current plaintiff’s actior.

In May 1981 when the plaintiff filed this action, the
question of its timeliness was determined under United
Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981). In
Mitchell, decided in April 1981, the Court held as a mat-
ter of federal law that a joint breach-of-contract/duty-
of-representation action was more analogous to a state-
court action to vacate an arbitration award than it was
to other types of state-law actions. Therefore, the limita-
tions period governing such joint federal claims was to
be that limitations period which governed state-law ac-
tions to vacate arbitrations. In Washington this period is
three months. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180 (1981); see
Engelsberg v. Transcon Lines, 530 F. Supp. 628, 632
(W.D. Wash. 1982). Under Mitchell, it was this three-
month period, incorporated into federal law, which gov-
erned the timeliness of plaintiff’s action. Hence the plain-
tiff's action was untimely when filed regardless of the
retroactivity of the recent DelCostello decision. Mitchell
was rendered prior to the filing of the current lawsuit
and no question of retroactivity is presented.

For these reasons, the plaintiff’s federal claims must be
dismissed as untimely. Since no basis remains for juris-
diction over the pendent state-law claim, the state-law
claim is hereby remanded to the King County Superior
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).

DATED this 9th day of September, 1983.

s, Walter T. McGovern
WALTER T. MCGOVERN
Chief United States

District Judge

6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-4212
DC# CV 81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

—

GREYHOUND LINES, a corporation; and LocaL 1384,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, a Labor Union; and
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, a Labor
Union,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington (Seattle)

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript
of the Record from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington (Seattle) and was
duly submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment

7a

of the said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is
reversed & remanded each side to bear their own costs
on appeal.

A TRUE Copy

ATTEST

Apr. 23, 1985

Clerk of Court

by: /s/ Joseph Williams
Deputy Clerk

Filed and entered: April 1, 1985

8a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-5752

CARMELO REYES BARINA,
Plainti ff-A ppellant,

V.

GuLF TRADING AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, A DIVI-
SION OF GULF Ou. CoRPORATION, a Corporation and
THE NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, an un-
incorporated association,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 7, 1983
Decided Feb. 23, 1984

Before SKOPIL, FERGUSON and CANBY, Circuit
Judges.
CANBY, Circuit Judge:

Barina breught this action against his employer under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
$ 185, and against his union for violating its duty of fair
representation. The district court dismissed the entire
action as untimely. In this appeal, we must decide
whether to apply retroactively the statute of limitations
required by either United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,
451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), or
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

—ͤ—ũ— — — — —

—

ga

— US. ——, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1983).
We conclude that neither Mitchell nor Del Costello should
de applied retroactively. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

Gulf Trading and Transportation Company Gulf
discharged Barina on October 29, 1979. Barina
to his union, the National Maritime Union (NMU).
NMU obtained a settlement of the grievance which af-
forded Barina reinstatement, but not payment of full
back wages. NMU notified Barina of the settlement by
letter on June 11, 1980. Barina disapproved of the set-
tlement and brought suit on June 24, 1981, against Gulf
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and against NMU for violation of
its duty of fair representation. Following the pattern in
hybrid § 301/fair representation actions, the complaint
alleged that the union violated its duty of fair represen-
tation during the grievance proceeding and that the
terms of the settlement violated the collective bargaining
agreement.

Barina’s cause of action accrued on July 12, 1980.
Under the then prevailing law, Barina’s action against

The settlement resulted from an informal grievance proceeding.
Although the settlements involved in Mitchell and DelCostello re-
sulted from arbitration, not an informal grievance proceeding,
nothing turns on this distinction. The same limitation periods
apply whether an employee's grievance is resolved with or without
going to arbitration. McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d
— 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir.

).

The district court selected July 12, 1980, as the date of accrual

had been finally resolved. Barina contends that accrual occurred

10a

Gulf and NMU was timely. Because California law
would have been the source of the applicable limitations,’
Barina had four years to file his suit against his em-
ployer, Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349,
1353 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the four-year limitation
for suits on written contracts provided by Cal.Civ.Proc.
Code § 337), and three years to file his suit against the
union, id. (applying the three-year limitation for suits
“upon liability created by statute” provided by Cal.Civ.
Proc. Code § 338(1)); accord Edwards v. Teamsters
Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.1983). As
Barina filed his action less than a year after it accrued,
his suit féll well within the then prevailing time limita-
tions.

The district court, however, applied United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67
L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), retroactively. It accordingly dis-
missed Barina’s action as time barred. Mitchell held that
the state limitation on challenges to commercial arbitra-
tion applied to suits brought by an employee against his
employer to set aside a labor arbitration decision. The
district court interpreted Mitchell as applying both to
Barina’s claim against Gulf and to his fair representa-
tion claim against NMU. Because California law pro-
vides a 100-day limitation period for challenges to com-
mercial arbitration, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1288.2, the dis-

all are within the limitation period that we apply. We therefore
need not resolve whether accrual occurs when the employee learns,
or should have learned, that his dispute was finally resolved, as the
district court held, or whether accrual occurs when the employee
learns, or should have learned, that the union may have violated
its duty of fair representation. For simplicity, we accept the dis-
trict court’s determination of accrual.

The parties agree that California is the appropriate source
for all relevant state law.

4 Mitchell was decided on April 20, 1981, slightly more than
nine months after Barina’s cause of action accrued.

lla

trict court concluded that Barina’s claims against Gulf
and NMU were time barred.

After the district court’s decision dismissing Barina’s
action, the Supreme Court decided DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, —— U.S. ——, 103
S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). DelCostello holds
that the applicable statute of limitations in hybrid § 301/
fair representation actions brought against the employer
and the union is the six-month limitation period con-
tained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Gulf and NMU argue that, if we
decline to uphold the district court’s retroactive applica-
tion of Mitchell, we should nevertheless affirm the district
court by giving retrospective operation to DelCostello.

ANALYSIS
I. Barina’s suit against NMU

The district court erred in applying Mitchell retroac-
tively to Barina’s claim against NMU. We have held
that Mitchell applies only to the employee’s claim against
his employer and that it does not affect the limitation
applicable to the employee’s claim against his union.
McNaughton v. Dillingham Corporation, 707 F.2d 1042,
1047-48 (9th Cir. 1983) (“McNaughton I”), reh’g de-

ved, 722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1984) (“McNaughton IT”) ;
Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d

— 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1983). Those holdings control

Nor can DelCostello be applied retroactively to bar
Barina’s claim against NMU. We squarely confronted
that question in Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719
F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1983). There we decided

that DelCostello was not to be ied retroacti
cord McNaughton II. * 9

We recognize that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits reached conclusions contrary to Edwards and

12a

Because Mitchell is inapplicable and Del Costello does
not apply retroactively, we reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Barina’s action against NMU.

II. Barina’s claim against Gulf
A. Retroactive application of Mitchell.

In Singer v. Flying Tiger Line Inc., 652 F.2d 1349,
1353 (9th Cir. 1981), we held that Mitchell was not to be
applied retroactively to an action brought by an employee
against his employer to set aside an arbitration decision.
That ruling controls here.“

Gulf argues that Singer should not be followed because
it was effectively overruled by Local 1020 of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. FMC Corporation, 658 F.2d
1285 (9th Cir. 1981), and San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.
1982). In those cases, we did apply the short state limi-
tation applicable to action to set aside commercial
arbitration to claims arising prior to Mitchell. Neither
case, however, discussed the retroactivity issue. More im-

applied DelCostello retroactively. Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983); Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co.,
723 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,
720 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983); Lincoln v. District 9 of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists, 723 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983) ;
Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983),
The Seventh Circuit has also applied DelCostello retroactively with-
out discussing the issue. Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715
F.2d 299, 301-803 (7th Cir. 1983). Edwards v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 36 and McNaughton II, however, establish the law of
this circuit and binds us. We also happen to agree with their

i

* Because the plaintiff was an airline employee in Singer, the
action against the employer was brought under the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., rather than under § 301 of the Labor

U.S.C. § 185. This distinction, which
court in Singer ignored, is without import and does not pro-

13a
portant, both cases involved a union suing

|

to have an arbitration decision set aside on the ground
that the decision did not draw its essence from the collec-
tive bargaining agreements. That cause of action lacks
a fair representation element and thus differs from the
cause of action here and at issue in Mi United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. FMC Corporation, 724 F.2d
815, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, those cases do

not effectively overrule Singer.’

B. Retroactive application of DelCostello
We lack controlling precedent concerning DelCostello’s

,

the district court. Id. at 1047 n. 5.

We reject Gulf's contention that McNaughton I’ reasoning
quires application of California's 100-day limitation apart from ite
reliance on Mitchell. Mitchell is fundamental to McNaughton 18

l4a

from the Supreme Court's prior direction in
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 US. 696, 704-05,
1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), that
cable statute of limitations be drawn from

8 8

:
155

4
7
5
3
S
N
8
:
8
2
8 BE
25

553

=
i
8882

The second Chevron Oil factor does favor retroactivity
in this case. A substantial purpose behind the six-month
limitation developed in DelCostello is to give finality to
labor disputes. 103 S.Ct. at 2294. Affording Barina four
years in which to sue the employer detracts from the
principle of finality. In our view, however, the strength
of the considerations relating to the first and third fac-
tors outweigh that relating to the second factor in this
case. See Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353. We conclude that
Del Costello should not applied retroactively to bar

15a

Singer, Edwards, and McNaughton II confirm our de-
cision not to apply DelCostello retroactively to Barina’s
suit against Gulf. Those cases presented issues analogous
to the one we now decide. In Singer, we confronted the
question whether a 100-day limitation mandated by Mit-
chell should be applied retroactively to an employee’s suit
against his employer; in Edwards and McNaughton II,
the issue was whether De/Costello’s six-month limitation
should be applied retroactively to an employee’s fair rep-
resentation suit against his union. All three cases re-
solved their analogous issues as we do here: they decided
against retroactive application.

Because neither Mitchell nor DelCostello may be ap-
plied retroactively to Barina’s suit against Gulf, the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of Barina’s action against Gulf,
like its dismissal of Barina’s action against NMU, was
erroneous. We reverse and remand for further proceed-
ings.

l6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 999, Docket 83-7976

ROMAN WELYCZKO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

U.S. AR, INC. and THOMAS POMEROY as Chairman of
the International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, Local No. 75, Distriet 141,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Argued March 30, 1984
Decided April 25, 1984

Before KAUFMAN, KEARSE and PIERCE, Circuit
Judges.
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:

Roman Welyczko appeals from the dismissal of his
hybrid claim against his employer for wrongful dis-
charge, and against his union for breach of its duty of
fair representation. The district judge based his action
upon the Supreme Court’s decision in DelCostello v. In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103
S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), which established a
six-month statute of limitations for claims under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a). We hold that the DelCostello decision

17a

has both retroactive and prospective application, and
therefore affirm the dismissal of Welyczko’s complaint.

I

We shall briefly review the facts. The parties have
agreed that Welyczko was an employee of U.S. Air, Inc.
(“U.S. Air“) and that the terms and conditions of his
employment were governed by a collective bargaining
agreement between U.S. Air and the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”).
Welyczko was granted a 90-day medical leave of absence
on May 5, 1975. On or about July 31 of that year, he
wrote to his employer requesting an extension of leave.
He reiterated that request by telegram on August 3. Ap-
proximately three days later, Welyczko received a letter
from a U.S. Air executive, notifying him that his request
for extended leave would be considered only upon receipt
of corroboration from a physician that additional leave
was necessary. Because his doctor was then on vacation,
Welyczko decided to forward to U.S. Air a second copy
of the physician’s note, dated May 5. This document had
accompanied his original application for leave.

U.S. Air refused to accept the copy as adequate sub-
stantiation. Accordingly, when Welyczko did not return
to work, the company terminated his employment on
August 26, 1975. This discharge was made retroactive
to August 5, the day his authorized leave expired.
Welyczko responded by requesting an officer of the IAM
to arrange a special hearing on his discharge, pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreeemnt. The IAM con-
tradicts this by replying that Welyezko was advised that
he himself would have to make a written request for such
a hearing. In any event, the hearing was never held, and
the discharge action became final.

The instant suit was commenced in New York State
Supreme Court on March 5, 1981, and was subsequently
removed to federal court. After DelCostello was decided,

18a

appellees moved for summary judgment asserting that
the statute of limitations adopted in that case should ap-
ply retroactively to Welyczko’s cause of action, which ac-
erued in 1975. On November 1, 1983, in a ruling from
the bench, Chief Judge Munson granted the motion.
Welyczko appeals.

II

In DelCostello, the Supreme Court decided that a uni-
form federal statute of limitations should apply to claims
under § 301 of the LMRA. In the absence of an ex-
pressly applicable federal limitations period, the Court
acknowledged, the “most closely analogous statute of lim-
itations under state law” would normally govern. 103
S.Ct. at 2287. The Court concluded, however, that the
“federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litiga-
tion make [federal law] a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking” in this instance. /d.
at 2294. It therefore held that the six-month time limit
on unfair labor practice complaints under § 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act applied to § 301 claims as
well.

Welyezko's claim must be construed as arising under
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seg., which
governs air carriers in lieu of the LMRA. See 29 U.S.C.
§$§ 142, 152; 45 U.S.C. 8 181. We agree with the Ninth
Circuit, however, that this distinction is “without im-
port.” Barina v. Gulf Trading and Transportation Co.,
726 F.2d 560, 563 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984). The same
policies which led the Supreme Court to apply a federal
statute of limitations to claims under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act apply with equal force to sub-
stantively identical claims under the Railway Labor Act.

We have already applied the DelCostello rule retro-
actively, although the issue was not specifically discussed.
Assad v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 703 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
vacated, —— US. , 104 S.Ct. 54, 78 L.Ed.2d 73
(1983), on remand, 725 F.2d 837 (1984). Our action

—— ͥͤ — ——4——

19a

there was consistent with the “general rule of long stand-
ing” that “judicial precedents normally have retroactive
as well as prospective effect.” National Association of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1976), quoted in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,
623 F.2d 786, 788 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461,
101 S.Ct. 3107, 69 L.Ed.2d 970 (1982). All but one of
the circuits considering the retroactivity of DelCostello
have reached the same result. Perez v. Dana Corp.,
Parish Frame Division, 718 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1983) ;
Murray v. Branch Motor Exprese Co., 723 F.2d 1146
(4th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 720
F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Curtis v. Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 299, 716 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam) (dictum); Storck v. Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local Union No. 600, 712 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1983) (per curiam); Lincoln v. District 9 of the Int'l
Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 723 F.2d 627
(8th Cir. 1983) ; Hand v. Int'l Chemical Workers Union,
712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); contra,
Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, ——- U.S. ——, 104 S.Ct. 1599,
80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984).

III

Appellant urges us to carve out an exception to the
retroactivity principle so that his claim may proceed, ar-
guing that under the three-factor test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the DelCostello
holding should be given only prospective application.
Most of the authorities just cited, however, applied the
Chevron test and found that DelCoste!lo should be ap-
plied retroactively. See Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish
Frame Division, supra, 718 F.2d at 584-85; Mur uy v.
Branch Motor Express Co., supra (adopting reasoning of
Perez); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., supra, 720
F.2d at 860-62; Lincoln v. District 9 of the Int’l Ass’n of

20a

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, supra, 723 F.2d at
629-30. Moreover, in our view this case does not present
circumstances in which the use of the Chevron test would
be appropriate.

Were we asked to decide if retrospective effect should
be given to a new rule which our court had pronounced,
the policy factors enumerated in Chevron Oil would in-
deed be determinative. See United States v. Fitzgerald,
545 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1976). Similarly, had the
Supreme Court given no indication whether DelCostello
should apply retroactively, a Chevron Oil analysis would
also be in order. But these factors are not present here.
The Supreme Court not only adopted a new statute of
limitations in DelCostello; it applied that time bar retro-
actively to govern the very claim at issue in the case
before it. We have noted that “the Supreme Court is
well aware of how te avoid the effects of applying one
of its rulings retroactively to the case at bar.” Cates v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir.
1977). Thus, when that Court itself has given retrospec-
tive application to a newly-adopted principle, “no sound
reason exists for not doing so here.” Holzsager v. Valley
Hospital, 646 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1981). A court of
appeals must defer to the Supreme Court’s directive on
this issue, explicit or implicit. See United States v. Fitz-
gerald, supra, at 582. Certainly, its intended application
is clear in this case.

We therefore decline appellant’s invitation to exclude
his suit from the DelCostello holding. Rather, we adopt
for this circuit the rule that in employment termination
cases, a six-month statute of limitations applies both ret-
roactively and prospectively to wrongful discharge failure
to represent claims. Because Welyczko’s complaint was
filed more than five years after his termination, it is
clearly time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the district court dismissing Welyczko’s complaint.

OPPOSITION
BRIEF

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

a>

AUG 12 1985
No. 84-2016

JOSEPH F SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,
v.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

>

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Curervi M. Lora“
Attorney at Law
3045 California Avenue S. W.
Seattle, Washington 98116
(206) 938-3475
Attorney for Respondent
Melody Wihite

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING co. (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the court below properly denied retroactive
effect to this Court's decisions in United Parcel Service v.
Mitchell and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters.

A. Whether a federal court of appeals my deny ret-
roactivity to a Supreme Court decision, which adopts a
federal statute of limitations, which significantly shortens
the statute of limitations applicable at the time the case
was filed.

B. Whether Mitchell and DelCostello apply im a case
where there has been no ‘‘final and binding” determina-
tion of a grievance, arrived at through the collectively bar-
gained method of resolving the grievance.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW __ i
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
RELIEF REQUESTED __ 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
ARGUMENT __ 3

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
PROPERLY DETERMINED DELCOSTELLO
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROAC-
TIVELY. 5

Il DELCOSTELLO SHOULD NOT BE THE
PRECEDENT USED IN DECIDING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS

— 7
C00 —
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases :
Christianson v. Pioneer Sand and Gravel Co., 1

F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982) — 9
Chevron Oil Co. „ — — Set.

349, 30 L.Ed. 296 (1971) , 4. 3. 6
Cipriane v. City of Houma, 395 US. 701, 89 S.Ct

1897, 23 LEAA 647 (1969) 6
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) 3, 4,5, 6,7
Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719

88 ä —

1599 (1984) . — 4. 6
Engelsburg v. Transcom — Inc., 530 F. Supp.

628 (W.D. Wash. 1982) _ 7,8

— — —

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d
1036 (7th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 707
(1984) 6
Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736 F.2d 819
(Ist Cir., 1984) 6
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,
96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976) 9
Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 292
(1984) 6
Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.,
1983) 6
Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 586
F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978) FE . 6,7,8
Singer v. Flying — Line, Inc., 652 F. 2d 1349
r ̃èê ² T2 A
Smith v. General Motors ra 747 F.2d 372 (6th
Cir., 1984) (en banc) 6
United Parcel Service v. Mitchel’, 451 U.S. 56
e ‚ ‚ . 4, 6. 7, 8, 9
ö
Srarurks:
e .... ae
29 U.S.C. § 185 1 38

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1254(1) Petitioner Greyhound
Lines, Inc., has submitted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to secure review of the judgment and opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in
this proceeding on April 1, 1985.

Initially, this case was filed as a civil action in the
Superior Court for the County of King in the State of
Washington on or about May 26, 1981. The case was re-
moved to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington at Seattle upon the petition of
Greyhound Lines, Inc., on or about June 22, 1981. The co-
defendant in the case, Local 1384, Amalgamated Transit
Union, consented to the removal on or about August 3,
1981.

On August 11, 1983, Local 1384 filed a “Motion to Dis-
miss or for Summary Judgment.’’ On August 18, 1983,
Greyhound Lines, Inc., also filed a Motion to Dismiss or
for Summary Judgment.”

On September 2, 1983, Wilhite filed a memorandum
and affidavit in opposition to these motions. Local 1384
filed a reply memorandum on September 7, 1983. An Or-
der of Dismissal and Order of Remand to the King County
Superior Court’’ was entered by the Honorable Walter T.
McGovern, Chief United States District Judge, on Septem-
ber 9, 1983. Wilhite appealed that order and prevailed on

appeal.

2

2

RELIEF REQUESTED
Wilhite opposes the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
and respectfully requests that this court:
1) Deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, or

2) In the alternative, affirm the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ judgment entered April 1,
1985.

Wilhite further petitions this Court for an award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court Rule 49(2).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On December 15, 1979, Wilhite and a male co-worker
walked two blocks from Greyhound’s Seattle, Washington,
shop to get a sandwich and soft drink for lunch, a com-
mon practice for Greyhound employees. They went to a
tavern, called the Press Box Tavern, which serves hot
home-made soups and sandwiches, and they ordered hot
sandwiches and soft drinks to take out.

Upon return to work, Wilhite and her co-worker were
called into the Superintendent’s office. They were told
that they were fired but could avoid a record of an ‘‘ Alco-
hol Termination’’ by resigning immediately.

Wilhite under duress and without Union representa-
tion, signed a resignation and immediately thereafter ap-
pealed to Local 1384, requesting that a grievance be filed
for discharge in violation of the contract.

Wilhite’s male co-worker, confronted with the same
choice said he would not resign. He was terminated and
also appealed to Local 1384.

The Union requested hearings for both Wilhite and
her male co-worker. A hearing was scheduled for the male
co-worker. As a result of this hearing, he was reinstated
as of December 27, 1979. The hearing officer determined
that the penalty of dismissal was too severe for the al-
leged offense. The company reinstated Mr. Hanson with
full retroactive pay and seniority.

In response to Wilhite’s grievance, Greyhound failed
to schedule a hearing, notifying Local 1384 that Ms. Wil-
hite had resigned and was no longer an employee. Local
1384 made no effort to further represent Wilhite and did
not appeal the Company’s rejection of her grievance with-
in the time limits established by the Collective Bargaining

Agreement.

As a resuit of these actions by both the Company and
Union, Wilhite filed suit in King County Superior Court
for the State of Washington.

— *
~~

This Court grants review on writ of certiorari ‘‘only
when there are special and important reasons.’’ Sup. Ct.
R. 17. This case does not present circumstances justifying
a writ.

Prior to DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the question of the timeli-
ness of suits brought pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 185, was frequently liti-
gated, but always under the sam. guiding principle—the
application of the most suitable and analogous state stat-

+

ute or rule for timeliness. In adopting a new standard,
DelCostello now establishes a federal statute of limita-
tions for suits against employers and unions, commenced
after an employee has exhausted all internal grievance
procedures and administrative remedies.

Petitioner asserts that the issue of retroactivity re-
quires this Court’s clarification. However, for suits filed
prior to DelCostello, this Court already has set forth a
clear and concise policy regarding nonretroactivity. Chev-
ron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.
296 (1971), enumerated the three factors to be applied to
establish nonretroactivity. The ultimate result in Chevron
Oil was to deny retroactivity where the ‘‘new’’ statute of
limitations to be imposed was significantly shorter than the
previously applied statute of limitations.

This Court has remained consistently sensitive to the
need to provide employees adequate time in which to pre-
pare their cases against their employers and their unions.
Most importantly, this Court has refused to apply retro-
actively cases whereby the plaintiffs would be deprived of
their opportunity to obtain redress for wrongs occasioned
them.

Moreover, in denying certiorari in Edwards v. Team-
sters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 [9th Cir., 1983,
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1599 (1984) J, this Court determined
that the exact same issue raised by this appeal did not
warrant the Court’s attention. Significantly, the Edwards
case involved a fact pattern consistent with the DelCostello
and Mitchell cases, unlike the case at hand which raises
significant factual differences, as well as serious equitable
concerns.

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
PROPERLY DETERMINED DELCOSTELLO |
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVE.
LY.

In declining retroactive application of a statute of
limitations, this Court in Chevron Oi Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed. 2d 296 (1971), set forth three
factors to consider:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively musi

establish a new principle of law, either by overruling

clear past precedent on which litigants may have re-
lied . . or by deciding an issue of first impression

whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .

Second, it has been stvessed that “we must. . weigh

the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the

rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

SN ee ee

. Finally, we have weighed the inequity

— by retroactive application, for (here a

decision of this Court could produce substantial in-

equitable results if applied retroactively, there is
ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or
hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

Prior to DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the lower federal courts
had agreed that the applicable statute of limitations in hy-
brid cases alleging an emplover’s breach of a collective bar
gaining agreement under Section 301 of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, should be the applicable state statute of limitations.
The application of state statutes of limitation was, in fact,

the clear, past precedent. DelCostello effectively adopted
a new, federal six month statute of limitations, applicable

to both employers and unions where the employee’s rights

6

under collective bargaining agreements had been pursued.
The cases cited by the petitioner in support of its position
merely demonstrate the application of the clear rules set
forth in Chevron Oil and DelCostello by each of the appel-
late courts. In almost every single case cited by petitioner,
either shorter state statutes of limitation were extended
by DelCostello (Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717
F.2d 1036 (7th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 707
(1984); Murray v. Branch Motor Erpress Co., 723 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 292 (1984);
Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir., 1983);
Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.,
1984) (en hang) J, or the action was filed after DelCostello
was decided (Graves v. Smith's Transfer Corp, 736 F.2d
819 (ist Cir., 1984)).

Also following Chevron Oi, and consistent with this
Court’s prior rulings, the 9th Cireuit Court of Appeals in
Edwards, supra, acknowledged what this Court initially
set forth in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89
S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969)—

It would . . . produce the most ‘‘substantial inequitable

reaulis’’.. . to hold that the respondent ‘‘slept on his

rights” at a time when he could not have known the
time limitation that the law imposed on him.

Chevron Ou, supra, at 108.

Likewise, in the present case, Wilhite filed long before
the decision in DelCostello. She had only the precedent
set forth by Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,
586 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978), as a model for the limitation
on bringing suit. Even Mitchell, decided only a month
before she filed her suit, provided no clue as to the statute
of limitations applicable in her case. Unlike Mitchell, she
was afforded the opportunity to have her case reviewed
by any fact-finding tribunal, which would have resulted in
an appealable, final and binding decision. Moreover, the

7

applicable state statute of limitations was no less than two
years.

Equity dictates the prospective application of De
Costello, Wilhite's claim was diligently pursued un
der the statutes of limitation applicable at the time her
suit was filed. Wilhite’s Breach of Contract/Duty of
Fair Representation claims were filed May 26, 1981, well
within the two year statute of limitations, established by
Price, supra. If either Mitchell or DelCostello were to be
applied to this case, Wilhite will have lost her opportunity
to have her case regarding breach of contract and duty of
fair representation ever adjudicated.

II. DELCOSTELLO SHOULD NOT BE THE PREC.
EDENT USED IN DECIDING THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS CASE.

DelCostello should not be the precedent used in decid-
ing the statute of limitations in this case. First, the Mitch-
ell decision, which was refined by this court in DelCostello,
was made just one month before Wilhite filed her case, and
DelCostello was decided over one year after Wilhite filed
her case. Second, this case does not involve a decision
from an arbitration hearing. Wilhite has never been af-
forded a fact-finding hearing, of any nature, on her breach
of contract/duty of fair representation claims.

The first reason advanced by Wilhite has already
been discussed in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, lac., 652
F. 2d 1349, at 1353 (9th Cir. 1981) and in Engelsberg v.
Transcom Lines, Inc, 530 F. Supp. 628, at 632, (W. D.
Wash. 1982). The Court in the Singer case refused to ap-
ply the rule decided in Mitchell, even though the Plaintiff
had filed his case in 1978 and the Mitchell case was decided
prior to oral argument in the Singer case. The Court
stated, Although the Price decision is not precisely on

point, we believe Singer might reasonably have relied upon
it to conelude that he had three years to file a claim.” 652
F. 2d at 1353. Engelsberg was a case filed in 1980. In this
ease, the Court held that ‘‘the Court is bound by the hold-
ing in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349 (9th
Cir. 1981) to apply a two-year statute of limitations for
the present action. In Singer, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Mitchell characterization would not be applied retro-
actively. Singer found the rule of the Mitchell case
is not one which might have been anticipated.’’ 652 F.2d
at 1353. The Court felt that the Plaintiff in Singer might
reasonably have relied on the Ninth Cireuit’s statement in
Price to conclude that he had a longer period than that
expressed in Mitchell in which to file his suit. The Dis
trict Court went on to state, ‘‘The Singer Court held that
to apply the Mitchell rule retroactively in light of Price
would be inequitable.’’ That Court held that the holding
in Mitchell would be given only prospective effect, and
that the Plaintiff in Engelsberg would be governed by the
Washington catchall statute of limitations, R.C.W. § 4.16.
130, a two year statute of limitations for actions for liabil-
ity created by statute if not provided for elsewhere.

As a second objection to the use of the limitation in
Mitchel’, the Appellant points out that there was no griev-
ance procedure involved in this case. The case was never
submitted to an arbitrator from whose opinion Appellant
might have appealed. Instead, a letter was written to the
Company by the Union, a reply was written by the Com-
pany, and the entire situation was dropped. The grievance
was never pursued. The holding in the Mitchell case was
specifically aimed at providing a statute of limitation for
„ hybrid ‘4 301 and breach of duty suit’ brought by an

employee against both his employer and his union in order
to set aside a ‘final and binding’ determination of a griev-
ance, arrived at through the collectively bargained method
of resolving the grievance.’’ 451 U.S. 56, 66.

This concept is also discussed in Christianson v. Pio-
neer Sand and Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Court diseussed the purpose of arbitration and the
finality of the decision reached by the arbitrator. The
Court went on to say, In the present case, however, the
arbitration process was never reached; in fact, the Union
never even processed appellant's grievances. Therefore,
the concept of finality, which controlled in Hines and
Mitchell, is totally inapposite here.” Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L. Bd.2d
231 (1976); United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56,
101 8. Ct. 1559, 67 L. Ed.2d 732 (1981).

Appellant was never afforded the grievance procedure
which is such an integral part of the decision in the Del.
Costello and Mitchell cases. She was not entitled to have
an arbitrator hear the circumstances and render a decision
in accordance with the collectively barg ined agreement.
She was bound by the unwillingness of the union to pursne
what she felt was a legitimate grievance. To permit the
employer and the union in this case to join forces and
first, to disregard the collective bargaining agreement and
then, to claim protective cover from the statute of limita-
tions developed in cases where the agreement had been
complied with procedurally would strike down the con-
cepts of equity so fervently protected by this Court.

0

10

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of
certiorari should be denied. In the alternative, the deci-
sion of the lower court should be affirmed in this instance.

Respectfully submitted,
Curry. M. Lerrta*®
Attorney at Law

3045 California Avenue S. W.
Seattle, Washington 98116
(206) 938-3475

Attorney for Respondent
Melody Wihite

; *Counsel of Record

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No. 84-2016 YOSEPH F. SPANIOL. 48

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,
v.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384, AMALGAMATED
TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

WILLIAM R. SQUIRES, III
STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE
& JONES

4200 Seattle-First National

Bank Building
Seattle, Washington 98154
(206) 622-3150
*Counsel of Record for

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

—ññ ee a a e.
- 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co. lc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
OPINION BELOW * l
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 2
I. THE ABSENCE OF AN ARBITRATION DE-
CISION IN THIS CASE HAS NO BEARING
ON THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMI-
D 6 2
II. BY REFUSING TO GIVE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
DELCOSTELLO, THE DECISION BELOW
CONFLICTS WITH THE VIEWS OF OTHER
COURTS OF APPEAL ON ISSUES OF EN-
DURING IMPORTANCE , 5 N 3

~]

CONCLUSION .....................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aarsvold v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 545 F. Supp.
622 (D. Minn. 1982), 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984)

Badon v. General Motors, Corp., 679 F.2d 93 (6th
/ eee

Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726
F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984)

Byrne v. Buffalo Creek Railroad Co., 765 F.2d 364
LI...

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (19717

Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681
F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982)

Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 510 F. Supp. 716 (D. Md. 1981), on re-
consideration, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981),
aff'd mem., 679 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
462 U.S. 151 (1983), on remand, 716 F.2d 247
(4th Cir. 1983), on remand, 588 F. Supp. 902
(D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir.
1 — ——˖ f

Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)

Ender v. Chrysler Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1199 (N.D. III. 1983), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 34
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706
NR

Flores v. Levy Co., 757 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1985)

Flowers v. Local 2602, Steelworkers, 671 F.2d 87
(2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
e.. ee

Hall v. Printing & Graphic Arts Union, 696 F.2d
oo | See

Harpp v. General Electric Co., 571 F. Supp. 426
. eh a

McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d 1042
(9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 722 F.2d 1459
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984)

Page

2,3

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
292 (1984) SS ee

Perez v. Dana Corp., 545 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983)

Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 586
F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978

Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247
(11th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727 F.2d 1116
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984)

Scaglione v. Communications Workers of America,
Local 1395, 586 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1983),
aff'd, 759 F.2d 201 (Ist Cir. 1985)...

Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 931 (3d Cir.
r è¾% )

United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56
/ Le

Vallone v. Local Union No. 705, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520 (7th
/ . A

Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1984)...

Wilhite v. Greyhound Lines, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3091 (W.D. Wash. 1983)...

Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 762 1 2d 381
eh ——

STATUTE

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180

Page

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 84-2016

GREYHOUND LINEs, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384, AMALGAMATED
TRANSIT UNION,
Respondente

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

Petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc., submits this reply
brief in support of its petition for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment and opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this
proceeding on April 1, 1985.

OPINION BELOW

The district court’s opinion is now reported at Wilhite
v. Greyhound Lines, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3091 (W.D.
Wash. 1983). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion remains un-
reported.

2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE ABSENCE OF AN ARBITRATION DECISION
IN THIS CASE HAS NO BEARING ON THE APPRO-
PRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Wilhite urges that this Court consider whether the
limitations periods prescribed by United Parcel Service v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), and DelCostello v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983),
apply to cases in which an employee’s grievance has been
resolved short of arbitration. This issue does not, how-
ever, merit the Court’s attention, for the lower federal
courts have resolved the question with remarkable
unanimity.

Prior to DelCostello, numerous lower courts held that
the statute of limitations ordained by Mitchell applied to
cases in which employee grievances were resolved without
proceeding to arbitration. Perez v. Dana Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 950, 951 (E. D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 581 (3d
Cir. 1983); Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93,
96 (6th Cir. 1982); Hall v. Printing & Graphic Arts
Union, 696 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1982); Aarsvold v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Minn.
1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984); McNaughton v. Dillingham
Corp., 707 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied,
722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291
(1984). Recognizing that [a] decision by the union not
to proceed with a grievance is no less final a determina-
tion than an arbitration award,” decisions after Del-
Costello likewise held that the absence of an arbitration
award does not justify application of a different limita-
tions period. Vallone v. Local Union No. 705, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 522 (7th
Cir. 1984); Flores v. Levy Co., 757 F.2d 806, 809 (7th
Cir. 1985); Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation
Co., 726 F.2d 560, 561 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).

. 3

Wilhite suggests that some authority supports a con-
trary proposition, citing Christianson v. Pioneer Sand &
Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982). However, the
Ninth Circuit itself has expressly rejected Wilhite’s read-
ing of Christianson, observing that a longer statute of
limitations for grievances handled without arbitration
“would be inconsistent with the policy of rapid disposi-
tion of labor disputes.” McNaughton, 707 F.2d at 1046.
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently reiterated this princi-
ple, holding that “[t]he same limitation periods apply
whether an employee’s grievance is resolved with or with-
out going to arbitration.” Barina, 726 F.2d at 561 n.1.

The lower federal courts have resolved this question
without hesitation or conflict. Accordingly, there exists
no reason for this Court to exercise its discretion to
review the question presented by Wilhite.

II. BY REFUSING TO GIVE RETROACTIVE APPLI-
CATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DELCOSTELLO,
THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE
VIEWS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL ON
ISSUES OF ENDURING IMPORTANCE

In its petition for a writ of certiorari, Greyhound
urged this Court to consider two issues raised by the
decision below. The first concerned the ability of a lower
federal court to deny retrospective effect to a newly-
announced principle that this Court has itself applied
retroactively. The second related to the propriety of a
retroactivity analysis when this Court resolves wide-
spread confusion in the circuits. Wilhite does not con-
test the importance of these issues. Instead, she attempts
to minimize the circuit conflict over DelCostello’s retro-
activity by suggesting that most cases have applied
DelCostello retrospectively only to extend “shorter state
statutes of limitation... .” Brief in Opposition, p. 6.
Wilhite is incorrect. Many courts have applied Del-
Costello retroactively when the effect was to shorten

4
—

statutes of limitations apparently applicable at the time
of filing. The decision below clearly conflicts with the
views of these courts.’

DelCostello illustrates the route commonly traveled by
cases in which retroactivity has been considered. The dis-
trict court initially ruled that DelCostello’s claim, filed
on March 16, 1978, was timely under a three-year Mary-
land statute of limitations. 510 F. Supp. 716, 720 (D.
Md. 1981). After this court decided Mitchell, the district
court reconsidered and dismissed DelCostello’s claim as
untimely under Maryland’s 30-day limitation governing
actions on arbitration awards. 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md.
1981). After the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 679 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1982), this Court ruled that a six-month statute
of limitations governed hybrid Section 301/duty of fair
representation cases and remanded the case for con-
sideration of DelCostello’s tolling defense. 462 U.S. 151
(1983). On remand, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Del-
Costello’s claim was barred by retroactive application of
the six-month limitations period established by this Court.
DelCostello v. Teamsters, Local 557, 762 F.2d 1219 (4th
Cir. 1985). Similarly, in the companion case to Del-
Costello, the plaintiffs’ claims had initially been held
subject to limitations periods far longer than six months.
See Flowers v. Local 2602, Steelworkers, 671 F.2d 87, 89
(2d Cir. 1982) (describing history of case), rev’d sub

In responding to this argument, Greyhound does not concede
that Mitchell or DelCostello shortened the statute of limitations
governing Wilhite’s claim, which was filed after the decision in
Mitchell. The period applicable to hybrid suits against an employer
in the Ninth Circuit was not settled prior to Mitchell, despite Wil-
hite’s protestation that Price v. Southern Pacific Transport. Co.,
586 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978), supplied definitive guidance. Price
related only to the statute applicable to an action against a union.
The court of appeals specifically decided to “express no opinion with
respect to the California statute applicable to an employee’s cause
of action against an employer in a duty of fair representation
case... .” 586 F. ad at 753.

5

nom. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).

This Court’s decision in DelCostello therefore operated
to shorten, not lengthen, the limitations periods previ-
ously applied to the litigants before the Court. A number
of other courts have similarly applied DelCostello’s six-
month limitations period to dismiss claims filed before
this Court decided Mitchell. See, e.g., Scaglione v. Com-
munications Workers of America, Local 1395, 586 F.
Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 759 F.2d 201 (1st
Cir. 1985) (suit filed in 1977 and amended in 1979);
Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1934) (suit filed on March 5,
1981) ; Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 931, 933-34
(3d Cir. 1985) (applying DelCostello to suit filed in 1980,
despite earlier decision holding six-year statute appli-
cable) ; Murray v. Branch Motor Express, 723 F.2d 1146
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984) (suit
filed in 1978); Ender v. Chrysler Corp., 119 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2299, 2301 (N.D. III. 1983), aff'd mem., 749
F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706
(1985) (suit filed in 1973); Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 292 (1984) (cases filed in 1980); Harpp v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 571 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
(summons served in 1977).

In none of these cases did DelCostello lengthen a
statute of limitations applicable at the time the case was
filed.“ Wilhite’s valiant efforts thus cannot alter the fact
that the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to accept the retro-
activity of DelCostello conflicts with the view of every
other court that has considered the issue. In contrast to

? DelCostello did lengthen the statute of limitations applicable
under Mitchell in the vast majority of states, including Washington,
having statutes applicable to actions to vacate arbitraticn awards.
In all of the cases cited, however, plaintiffs filed their claims before
this Court decided Mitchell.

6

the court below, other courts of appeal have denied retro-
activity only in two strictly limited situations. The Sec-
ond Circuit, alluding to perceived delays by the trial
judge, declined to apply DelCostello to a case filed in
1975, in which trial occurred in June of 1979, nearly two
years before Mitchell. Byrne v. Buffalo Creek Railroad
Co., 765 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1985) (characterizing
case as “unique” and presenting “extraordinary circum-
stances”). The Fourth Circuit, over vigorous dissent,
has created a limited exception to DelCostello’s retro-
activity in one jurisdiction, West Virginia, in which no
state statute of limitations as short as six months was
ever arguably applicable. Zemonick v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 762 F.2d 281, 387 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Cir-
cuit has refused to extend Zemonick to cases arising in a
jurisdiction, such as Washington, having a shorter “stat-
ute specifically applicable to suits to overturn arbitration
awards.” DelCostello, 762 F.2d at 1222, n.3.

Unlike the decision below, the opinions creating these
two exceptions do not undermine the precedential effect
of DelCostello, for the plaintiffs in Byrne and Zemonick
were not similarly situated to Del Costello and Flowers.“
The facts surrounding Wilhite's claim, on the other hand,
are in all material aspects identical to those present in
the two cases in which this Court applied DelCostello’s
principles retroactively. Consequently, the court below
was not free to ignore this Court’s unambiguous applica-
tion of the six-month limitations period to the claims in
DelCostello.

Unlike Zemonick, the plaintiffs in DelCostello and Flowers sued
in states having arguably applicable statutes of limitations of less
than six months. So did Wilhite. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180.
Compare Zemonick, 762 F.2d at 384-85 (distinguishing cases in
jurisdictions having statutes pertaining to arbitrations, where liti-
gants “should have known that a much shorter limitations period
might be held applicable”). Further, unlike Byrne, the plaintiffs in
Flowers and DelCostello faced the statute of limitations defense
long before their cases proceeded to trial. So did Wilhite.

7

The Ninth Circuit’s conflict with other circuits is man-
ifest. That disagreement relates to fundamental ques-
tions, not simply to retroactive application of DelCostello.
The court below has misunderstood the scope of Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), using that case as
a license to reevaluate considered determinations of this
Court.“ Its misapprehension must be corrected now, be-
fore the court of appeals eviscerates the precedential
value of another decision of this Court.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review and reverse the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. Squmgs, III
STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE
& JONES

4200 Seattle-First National
Bank Building

Seattle, Washington 98154

(206) 622-3150

*Counsel of Record for
Greyhound Lines, Inc.
September 18, 1985

* Wilhite’s Brief in Opposition reflects the Ninth Circuit’s erro-
neous use of Chevron Oil, claiming that retroactivity must be denied
whenever “the ‘new’ statute of limitations to be imposed was sig-
nificantly shorter than the previously applied statute of limitations.”
Br. in Opp., p. 4. This per se approach is unmistakably contrary to
precedent of this Court and must be rejected.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RAYMOND L. SAVILLE, Jr. v. WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC CORPORATION anp UNITED ELEC-
TRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS
OF AMERICA, LOCAL 107

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 84-2034. Decided October 15, 1985

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that DelCostello v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (actions brought
under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U. S. C. § 185, are governed by the six-month statute of limi-
tations provided in §10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(b)), applies retroactively. In so hold-
ing, the Court of Appeals followed a prior decision in that
court which relied on the factors outlined in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971), in making that retro-
activity determination. See Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish
Frame Div., 718 F. 2d 581 (CA3 1983). For the reasons
stated in my dissent in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Withite,
No. 84-2016, I would grant certiorari in this case.

Jue

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0945%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
