# Jurisdictional Statement — Bowen v. Owens > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0927%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement - **Published:** January 1, 1986 - **Citation:** 476 U.S. 340 ## Text OPY <5 = = rs cx =a 84-1905 | pre cut us No... 84. 3905 - > 1985 | ALEXANDER | TEVAS CLERK In the Supreme Court of the a en — J OCTOBER TERM, 1984 SECRETARY ARET M AND HUMAN MARG HECKLER OF HEALTH SERVICES, APPELLANT ENTA M. OWENS, @T AL. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT ( FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT CHARLES FRIED Acting SOotLk RICHARD K. WILI Acting Assistant Att KENNETH 8S. GELLEI Deputy Solicitor Ger EDWIN S. KNEEDLE! Ass sfan}w fe) ths WILLIAM KANTER CARLENE McINTYRI \ftorneys Depart nev} 7 EY Wasi noto? De i) QUESTIONS PRESENTED “i I] PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS The appellant is Margaret M. Heckler, the Secretary Health and Human Services ~ } 1} 4 ne named appellees are Buenta M. Owens and Kennet} R. Owens. The district court certified a class represented by those named appellees, consisting of (App nfra, 3la Ajli persons who (1) were divorced from an individual who was covered under the Social Security Act and who predeceased the claimant; (2) remarried at age 60 or thereafter; and (3) have filed an application in accord ance with the time frames described in Pub. L. N: 95-216, § 336(c)(1) and (2); and (4) have been or will be denied survivor's benefits, as surviving divorced spouses, for any month after December, 1978, provided that such persons (A) applied for such benefits on or af er August 20, 1982, or (B) applied for such benefits prior to that date and either had not received an ini- tial decision denying those benefits prior to that date or ll) had received an initial decision denying those bene fits prior to that date and their right to seek adminis trative or judicial review of the denial of their benefits had not expired as of August 20. 1982 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Opinions below l Jurisdiction l Constitutional and statutory provisions involved 2 Statement 2 \. The statutory and regulatory framework 2 1. Substantive provisions 2 2. Procedural provisions 5 B. The proceedings in this case 7 The questions are substantial 11 Tonciusion 27 Appendix A la Appendix B 13a Appenaix C 29a Appendix D 30a Appendix E dda Appendix F 47a Appendix G 48a Appendix H 19a Appendix | 50a Appendix J 52: Appendix K d4a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ases Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 2 imbrose v. Califano, [1980] Unempl. Ins. Rep. © 17702 ) 5 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 9g Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 4, 14, 17 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 3 Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 passim Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 22, 25 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 18 (III) Continues Zs ty of Ne / fr ywev. [)) ( asets } ] j York ¥< Heck CT. 123 U.S. 22 '.2d 729 fed State S. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 Heckler v. Day, No. 82-1371 (May 22, 1984 Heckler v. Lopez No. 84-115 (Dee. 10. 1984 No. A-707 (Apr. 30, 1984 125 2 2d LSU Mar LOD50 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 121 Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455 Le hma Vv. Naksh an, 153 ULS Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. Mathews v. Kldrida 424 U.S. 319 Mental Health Ass'n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 Munro v. United States. 303 U.S. 36 Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 22) Sorano Vv. lL nate d State &- 156 35? U.S No. 83-1266 l’nited States Vv. Bo sle, 1985) [) Un 1985) l’nited States v. She rwood. : l’nited States v. Testan. 424 U.S. 392 l’nited States Railroad Retirement Board \ ited States v. Kubrick. 444 U.S. ited States Vv. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 15, Bradli u. 14() L)_S. 4S Salfi. 122 | Vance \ We » ni be rgerv. Zahlocki Vv. Redhail. 134 U.S. 374 Constitution, statutes and regulations: U.S. Const. Amend. V (Due Process Clause) (Jan. 9, lS. 749 G 1, 16, —— et ~~ _ ~ fo fo ws —" i — bo bo to ly ites and regulatior _ontinued Page > | ‘ | | i! Rights Act of 1964, 1 Il, 42 Ss. +) / ‘yey 2000e et seq Le .~ IN j SOClal Set 202. 42 U.S ¢ 1()? 2 y 202(b), 42 U.S.C. 402(b y 202(e), 42 U.S.C. 402(e)(3 », 54a > 2ZU2Z(e)(1)( A), 42 U.S.C. 402 (e)(1(A Z, 4 2072(e (3). 42 US. s;O2Z(eK3 ' y ZUZ(e (3) A). 42 U.S.C. 402(e VBA : 202(e)(4), 42 U.S.C. 42(e)(4 2,4 y 202(e)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. 402(e 4A § 202(f), 42 U.S.C. 402(f », 5Dda » 202(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 402(H01 ‘ 202(f)(1)( A), 42 U.S.C. 402(f) 1) A 2a s 202(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. 402(f)(4 3, 5 202(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. 402(f)(5 5 4 203(a V3 VC), 42 U.S.C. 408(a V3 16 » 2POD(a). 42 U.S.C. 405(a » 7 205(b). 42 U.S.C. 405(b > 205(2), 42 U.S.C. 405( 9 216(b), 42 U.S.C. 416(b Ld 216(c), 42 U.S.C. 416(e)(5 15 § 216(d), 42 U.S.C. 416(d Zlb(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 416(d)(2 i > 216(f), 42 U.S.C. 416(f 5 > 216(¢)(5), 42 U.S.C. 416(2)(5 L5 social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 ef seq 24 | 3 | 28 ZO01 et seq os sta 620 ‘ - Ch. 666, 55 Stat. 1360 eq y Z0Z, 55 Stat. 1363 Ya > 202(¢)(1 > Stat. 1364 » 202(e)(1)( A). 53 Stat. 1365 S 2OZ(T)(1). 53 Stat. 13266 ) Ch. S09, & 101(a). 64 Stat. 482 Statutes and regulations—Continued: Pub L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1013 et seq.: Pub. Pub. 20 C. Section 403. section 404. Section 404. Vi § 307(b), 72 Stat. 1031 § 307(c), 72 Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 et seq.: Stat. 1031 § 308(a), 79 Stat. 375-376 § 308(b)<(1), § 308(b){2), § 308(c), 79 § 333(a)(1), § 333(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 et seq.: 79 Stat. 376-377 79 Stat. 377 Stat. 377-378 . 79 Stat. 403 79 Stat. 404 § 107(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1343 § 114(b)(1), L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 ef seq.: § 334(d)(1), 86 Stat. 1348 91 Stat. 1545 § 336(a)(3), 91 Stat. 1547 § 336(b)(3), 91 Stat. 1547 336(c)(1), 91 Stat. 1547 § § 337(a), 91 L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 ef seq.: Stat. 1548 > 131(a)(2), 97 Stat. 92 . > 131(aX(3\ A), 97 Stat. 92 > 131(b)(2), 97 Stat. 93 } 131(d)(1), 97 Stat. 93 § 301(b)(1), 97 Stat. 111 § 301(b)(4), 97 Stat. 111 F ibe: 3 § 3 § 131(b)(3)(A), 97 Stat. 93 3 3 336 900(a)(5) 900(b) Sections 404.902-404.904 Section 404. Section 404. Section 404. 902(k) . 905 909(a)(1) Page 3 3 4 3 4 om . : . Vij Statutes and reguiations—Continued Page Sections 404.907-404.92)] 6 seciion 404.91] 29 Section 464.920 6 Sections 404,.923-404.926 7 Sections 404.944-404.965 6 Section 404.927 7 Section 404.9233(b)\(1) 6 Section 404.955(a) h Section 404.955(b) a Sections 404.967-404.983 4) section 404.968(a)(1) 6 Section 404.98] 6 Section 404.982 29 Sections 404.987-404.995 25 section 404.987(a) 25 Miscellaneous: 10 Fed. Reg. 53385 (1975) 20 10 Fed. Reg. 12161 (1982) 5 H.R. Rep. 213, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) , H.R. Rep. 728, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939) 2 H.R. Rep. 95-702, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-837, 95th Cong., 2¢ sess. (1977) 17 S. Rep. 734, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939) 2 S Rep. 98-466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess \ 1984 } 24 In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States OcTOBFR TERM, 1984 No MARGARET M. HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. APPELLANT BUENTA M. OWENS, @T Aw. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT OPINIONS BELOW The December 23, 1983 order of the district court granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment (App., infra, la-12a) and the August 28, 1984 order of the district court certifying the class (App., infra, 13a-28:) are unreported The order of the district court holding the relevant provi- sions of the Social Security Act unconstitutional (App., infra, 30a-43a) also is unreported JURISMCTION The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 44a-46a) was entered on December 20, 1984, and the order ot the dis- trict court denying the Secretary’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was entered on February 6, 1984 (App., infra, 47a). A notice of direct appeal to this Court was filed on March 7, 1985 (App., infra, 48a), and an amended notice of appeal was filed on March 9 1985 (App., infra, 49a). By or- der dated April 30, 1985, Justice Rehnquist extended the time within which to docket the appeai to and including June 5, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252 CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Se 202(e 1A). (e4). and (f(1)(A) and (5), and 205(g) of the Social Security Act are reproduced at App nfra STATEMENT The Social Security Act was amended, effective January 1979, to permit a surviving widowed spouse who remarries I 4% y afte 60 to receive monthly survivor’s benefits based on age the deceased spouse’s earnings account. However, until Jan- ry 1984, a surviving divorced spouse who remarries was not entitled to receive survivor's benefits based on the former spouse’s account. The district court held that this dis tinction ia effect from 1979 through 1983 was irrational and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. and it ordered relief in this action under 42 [1.S.C. 405(¢) to a nationwide class that includes individuals who did not exhaust their administrative remedies or seek judicial review within 60 days of receiving the final decision if the Secretar, 4. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK !. Substantive Provisions The statutory provisions at issue in this action were the product of a step-by-step evolution of provisions for survi vor’s benefits for spouses and former spouses under the 5o cial Security Act a. The Social Security Act, as enacted in 1935, provided only primary benefits for qualified wage earners. Ch. 531, $§ 201 et seq., 49 Stat. 622 et seq In 1939. Section 202 of the Act was amended to provide secondary benefits for wives, dependent children, widows and surviving dependent par ents. Ch. 666. § 202. 53 Stat. 1363. The purpose of these mendments was to afford more adequate protection to the wage earner’s family as a unit by furnishing benefits to fam members who may have been dependent upon him. H.R Rep. 728, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1939); 5 Rep. 734, 76th f no let Secs {9 1] 14349 See (alifano Vv Jobst. 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977): Califano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199. 208-209, 213 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J.). The Act as so amended provided that widows and other secondary benefi- claries would lose their entitlement to monthly benefits if they remarried. § 202(e)(1)(A), 53 Stat. 1365; see also > 202(c)(1) and (f)(1), 53 Stat. 1364, 1366. In 1950. Congress added Section 202(f) to the Act to provide survivor’s benefits for widowers. Ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 482.' As in the case of widows, widowers lost their entitlement to benefits upon remarriage. 64 Stat. 485 (§ 202(f\1)(A). In 1958, however, Congress enacted an exception to this remarriage rule, pro- viding that if a widow or widower married an individual who also was entitled to receive secondary benefits under the Act, he or she would not lose the entitlement to survivor's benefits. § 202(e)(4)(A) and (f)(4) of the Act, as added by Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 307(b) and (c), 72 Stat. 1031. Compare (‘alifano v. Jobst. 4134 U.S. $7, 51 (1977). b. In 1965, Congress amended Section 202(b) and (e) to ermit a surviving divorced wife aged 60 or over to receive widow's benefits. However, unlike in the case of a widow, a surviving divorced wife could receive widow’s benefits only if she had received support from the deceased wage earner and had been married to him for at least 20 years. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(b)(1), 79 Stat. 376-377. See also § 216(d) of the Act, as added by Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(c), 79 Stat. 377-378.° As under the preexisting rule affecting widows Congress provided that a surviving divorced wife could not receive widow's benefits if she remarried, unless she mar- rieu a man receiving secondary benefits as a dependent wid- ower or parent or as a disabled child aged 18 or over > 202(e)(3)(A), as amended and renumbered by Pub. L. No A widower was entitled to receive benefits only if he had previously received one-half of his support from his wife. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), this Court held that the requirement that widowers, but now widows, show such support unconstitutionally discriminated on ¢ the basis of sex. Congress thereafter repealed the dependency require ment for widowers. Pub. L. No. 95-216. § 334(d\(1). 91 Stat. 1545: 42 U.S.C. 402(11(1). See Heckler v. Mathews. No. 82 1050 (Mar. 5, 1984). slip op. 2 Congress similarly amended Section 202(b) of the Act to make a di vorced wife eligible for wife’s benefits, subject to the same durational and support limitations. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(a), 79 Stat. 375-376 ~U4 fix t Z i4 Stal ii it at tne ime time on ¥¢ _ ed the remarriage rule as it applied to widows ind widowers. Congress provided that lf a widow or wid ower. after reaching age 60, married an individual who wa not entitled to benefits under the Act. he or she would not ose the entitiemel to Oe it ilthough the benefits vould ne reduced To ov i tne primal Vayve earnel s penefit 02(e\(4) and (f\(5) of the Act, as added by Pub. L. N ~~ ; i ] mn / j 4% Strat hs and 14° ine re iuirement that re 1} or reed wife establish that ar va ipported Tne aecet sec Wave earner lI order to ‘_ ‘ ‘ i‘ ov henefit in equent was elimi! ited I 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 114(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1348. See Calif Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 291-293 (1979 ly My f neres agall amended the relevant pro\ if the Social Security Act. it revised Section 202(: : mn yh iy tne \ect to nrovide tnat la Widow or widow remarri¢ ifter attaining age 60 the marriage wWili De deemed not to nave ecurred [Ol purposes of entitlement Ti i’ ai Herne fits Pub | NO 95-216. > ool als ind b 4G] Stat 154 ¥ hy amenament wa effective ror nontn penetit | yVabie beginning In lanuary 1979 entitled to unreduced survivor's benefit if he or she remarries after age 60. Congress also amended section 216014 .) ot tine \et to reduce from ZU to 1() vears the period during whicn a sur\ ving divorced wife must have neen marred to tne primary wage earner in rder to he ¢ ly nie Tor witow benefits Pub Ni 95-216 . 337 a 9] . ; Stal 154s Dut il retained the provision inf Sectiol ZUZ( 1A) that weneraliv barred a irviving divoreed wilt 1? wri rece iVilt {? ry rie fits pon re marriave \ithough Congress had permitted surviving divorced "1 o . . ; wives to receive Widow 8s DeneTits In certain circumstances, | ‘ } y +} 1? , henefit ‘ : ir ng ay reed wits " iid nate ‘ he marred a pe! n recs ng id-age henefits ne would me ¢ pipie tor Vv Té nenetit mm hner new nusband 8 account \ riginally enacted, the relevant age for widowers was 62 That age aq; not t I I re read } hand ‘ 4 , : } 1O80) [nem ° 5? (“(*} tor (7,ene? leter ec th this Court in A efended under t rt raing ne secretal pro! enefits t 1) od reed | ne vere pl ied Latute see ibid 2) CFR 1 kb nation of gender-based d section ZOA(T)(] t ting ‘To, voreed husbands eligible for x. | Hip MI if tal | il. Fina n 1s mere tnat if rit I re ‘ oy we HUT } rece Henefii vA ind widowel e sect Act, as amended and redesig : LSlia Z a \ [ . Yi Sta Je. 9 ind | \ i! De! I the appe f a i ry ryt i Vici ? i } Ve) 2. Procedural Provisions ‘ aif tol if rT amici tne SOCla SeCCU | \ afr } lant lo special procedurt secretal he pri pa la 1.dmini tratl e Tt lew Sec LOD H mae? wt cn tne se rs v of fact. and dec! I appiyineg tor a paymen' na rrer pr Vide tnat if the na yecretar preliminat ci ford him a rignt to a hearing Pursuant to he horit ‘LO make lit ind regulal 6 (42 U.S.C. 405(a)), the Secretary has fleshed out these gen eral statutory directives by establishing a four-step administrative procedure for review by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of claims for benefits: the initial deter mination (20 C.F.R. 404.902-404.904); de novo reconsidera tion (20 C.F.R. 404.907-404.921); an evidentiary hearing be fore an administrative law judge (ALJ) (20 C.F.R 404.944-404.965); and discretionary review by the Appeals Council (20 C.F.R. 404.967-404.983). The Secretary’s deci sion rendered at the initial determination, reconsideration, or ALJ hearing stage is expressly made “binding” on the claimant unless he seeks further administrative review within 60 days. 20 C.F.R. 404.905, 404.909(a)(1), 404.920, 404.933(b)(1), 404.955(a), 404. 968(a)(1) “These four steps exhaust the claimant’s administrative remedies. Thereafter, he may seek judicial review in federal district court.” Heckler v. Day, No. 82-1371 (May 22. 1984). slip op. 3. Under Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), the claimant, after the “final decision” of the Secretary made “after a hearing,” may obtain judicial review of the final de cision “by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.” If the claimant does not seek judicial review within 60 days of the Appeals Council’s decision, the adverse Appeals Council’s decision (01 the ALJ’s decision if the Appeals Council denied review) is expressly made “binding” on the claimant. 20 C.F.R 404.955(b), 404.981 The Secretary has carved out only “one exception” to the exhaustion requirement. Heckler v. Ringer, No. 82-1772 (May 14, 1984), slip op. 2 & n.2. This exception is in the form of an expedited administrative appeals procedure, under which the Secretary will formally waive the requirement that the individual claimant fully exhaust his administrative remedies through the Appeals Council stage if the individu- al’s claim for benefits has been denied at the reconsideration level, if he does not dispute the Secretary’s findings of fact or interpretation or application of controlling law, and if the claimant alleges (and the Secretary agrees) that the only fac tor precluding an allowance of the claim is a statutory provi sion that the claimant contends is unconstitutional. In such a LUALIOI i represental f I e -ecretal ! entel ’ rmMmai agreement vitr tT hie rel qua lImant iaemir . 4 reconsideration decision to be the Secretal s “Tinal ae ior 1 irpose ~ | SC@KING te aire PW DHNDUrsuUual yy. US. 15g). 20 C.F. R. 404.923-404.926. The ulmant ther ha HU) da fini a"? nh ft 2e } i r"¢ eV Jt) { ; : 14 47 8B. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASI I i. Appellee Buenta Ow: Vas marr 1 MuUuSSé da n YS al divorced from |! ! 468. in LOTS il ©€ at I Hi. she marned appellee Ke etn Uwe ludd ned n une 14 LYS? (py lu sf) LOS? Ruenta Owe ippile | TO) i? ne divorced wite s Dene;nts mn tne Das f Judd’s ear ne account He} cCialm Was cel i (on UOetonber 14. |OUR? RR enta wens requested ami! tral e re ! eral ’ That 1 nia ontending that ne Statutol Drovision adenvyinege dene its De iuse oI her remarriage wa l] nstitut na He} alm avail was aenied | reconsideratiol letern I dated December 7 LYSZ Ap! / la, loa-li4a B.R. 2, 6-7, 9-10 Ruenta Owens requested tna ner Clall ™ } eT’ ler the expedited administrative appeals p edure | ed by the Secretary's regulations, discussed above ee pag 6-7. supr 3.R. 9. The designate representative L Une Secretary determined that it would be appropriate t Ist Lnis procedure, and he entered nto an agreement with he to that effect dated Marc} LYSS Ay } nira Wla-ola he agreement states that Buenta Owens accepts tne fa jal determinations of the Secretary as contained in the re consideration determination of December 7. 1982. on the wage record of Russell B ludd ’ That sne ais accepts tne secretary s interpretation and application of the Social Secu rity Act contained i t he above-referenced reconsiderat dgeterminatior and that except for the statutory provisiol B.1 eter re ra rij ' : ul! appellee Buenta Owe it wa | - wr S¢ nstitut naiit She naiienves ths rignt f ths laimant to benefits has been established by the laimant L. al 20a Un tnis ‘ isis. the agreement pro\ des tna tine al e-referenced reconsideration determination re] resents the final decision of the secretary that the agret i nt “constitutes a waiver t tne almal ana’ tne Secre tar t the necessit | pursue the remainil stens of the Adan ’ strativée Appe ; CERsse mn ti at ans r AS 60 da\ within which to file a action to raise Une nstitutiona Ssue d. at 50a-5la). Buenta Owens the! filed the mnten piated \i' actiol nthe U1 ted States L) Strict ' irt tor tne Central District of Califorma on Apmi 19, [YS56, seeking t represent a nationw 1¢ ass surviving divorced spouses (_ompialnt © 6 Appellee Kenneth Uwens was marned | Dorothy | Owens in 1934 and was divorced from her in 1978. He the married appellee Buenta Owens in 1978, when he was 60 vears old. On July 15, 1982, Kenneth Owens apphed for sur vivor’s benefits based on the earnings account of his first wife. who had since died. His claim was denied at the initia! determination stage and in a reconsicderatl May 12. 1983S He hkewise requested to use the expedited Le administrative appeais procedure ind oO! November 23 1985, a representative of the secretary entered into an wreement with him under that procedure. App., m/fra, i4a Do 59a.53a- K.R. 1-2. 14-18, 31, 34. On January 6, 1984 Kenneth Owens then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Centra! District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory provisions. His class action subsequently was consolidated with that filed by his wife App., wfra, l3a, loa 2? a In the action brought by Buenta Owens, the district eourt at first rejected appe ees onstitutional challenge to the statutory provisions in an opinion dated December 25 , 1983—before Kenneth Owens filed suit (App., mm/fra, la-l2a The court rejected the contention that strict scrutiny of tI challenged provisions was required pecause they created a ‘disincentive” to marry (id. at 5a-7a). The court explained that this Court has applied strict scrutiny oniv when the government “created substantia! legal obstacles to entry into 9 or exit from the marital state” (id. at 6a, citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371 (1971)). By contrast, the district court ob- served, this Court has applied the rational basis standard in reviewing provisions of the Social Security Act that deny benefits to some persons, but not others, based upon their marital status (App., infra, 6a, citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), and Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 \977)). Applying the rational basis test, the court sustained the statutory distinction (App., infra, 7a-12a). It reasoned that, as in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57-58, Congress reasonably could decide to take one step at a time in removing the perceived hardship of the remarriage rule—iifting it as to widowed spouses effective January 1979 and as to surviving divorced spouses effective January 1984 App., ifra, 10a-11a). b. Buenta Owens then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. While that motion was pending, the court, by or- der dated August 28, 1984, certified a nationwide class of surviving divorced spouses who remarried after age 60 and who were denied monthly benefits for any month after De- cember 1978, provided that the claimant’s application was filed on or after August 20, 192 or the time within which to seek review of a decision denying his claim had not expired on that date (App., infra, 13a-28a; see id. at 28a, 44a). The district court acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. 405(g) was the exclusive source of jurisdiction over the suit and that, under Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975), a class may be certified only if all of the members satisfy all of the require- ments for judicial review set out in Section 405(g). Never- theless, the court included in the class individuals who had not exhausted their administrative remedies or who had not sought judicial review within 60 days of the final decision denying their claims for benefits. Citing the Secretary’s regulations under which appellees Buenta and Kenneth Owens had entered into an agreement with the Secretary waiving exhaustion with regard to their claims for benefits, the court held that the Secretary had waived exhaustion for all class members, without regard to whether the Secretary had entered into a comparable agree- 10 ment with them (App., infra, 17a-18a). The court further held that a court in any event may excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement on a class-wide basis where the constitutionality of a statutory provision is at issue (id. at lSa-19a). Similarly, the court treated the 60-day requirement as an ordinary statute of limitations and held that running of the 60-day period should be tolled retroactively as to all class members on a nationwide basis as of October 19, 1982, the date on which appellee Buenta Owens sought administrative reconsideration of the initial determination denying her claim for benefits (App., infra, 20a-21a). In the court’s view, the filing of this “single administrative complaint” by Buenta Owens gave the Secretary adequate notice of the constitu- tional contention and an opportunity to evaluate its effects on similarly situated persons (id. at 21a). Accordingly, tne court included in the class any individual! who had a live claim for benefits pending administratively on or after Au- gust 20, 1982, which was 60 days before Buenta Owens re- quested reconsideration (id. at 22a) but more than eight months before she filed suit. ec, After it certified a nationwide class, the court, by opin- ion and order dated October 5, 1984, reversed its prior rul- ing on the merits and held unconstitutional the challenged distinction between surviving widowed and divorced spouses (App., infra, 29a, 30a-43a). The court again acknowledged that “[t]he one step at a time argument has considerable al- lure in this instance because it literally describes Congress’ actions here” (id. at 39a). But this time the court found that justification insufficient. The court explained that “Congress must have a rational basis for each step it takes” and that the statutory distinction “must stand or fall on whether Con gress rationally might have assumed that widowed spouses are generally more dependent on income from the deceased wage earner than are surviving divorced spouses” (id. at 10a). The court expressly agreed with the Secretary that Congress rationally could so assume (id. at 42a). But the eourt nevertheless held that the challenged distinction was irrational because Congress chose to treat surviving wid- owed spouses and surviving divorced spouses the same upon 1] the death of the primary wage earner, and there was. in the court’s view, no “logical basis” to distinguish between them upon their subsequent remarriage (ibid.). The court there- fore enjoined the Secretary from applying the challenged provisions to appellees Buenta and Kenneth Owens and other eligible class members, to pay retroactive benefits to them, and to determine and assure payment of survivor’s benefits to other class members within 120 days (id. at +4a-46a). THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL The district court has held several provisions of an Act of Congress unconstitutional. That holding is plainly wrong. This Court has made clear that Congress rationally could de- termine that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each other than do couples whe remain married. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 188 (1976). As the district court in this case expressly acknowledged, Congress also rationally could determine that this difference continues after the death of the primary wage earner (App., infra, 42a). If this much is conceded, Congress surely can draw this same dis- tinction in determining whether surviving spouses and former spouses should be entitled to benefits even after they remarry. Contrary to the district court’s apparent belief, the fact that Congress, in its discretion, has chosen to treat wid- owed and certain divorced spouses in a similar manner for one purpose (their entitlement to survivor’s benefits upon the death of the primary wage earner) does not mean that the two categories are constitutionally indistinguishable for all purposes or that Congress is somehow estopped from treating them differently as regards their entitlement to sur- vivor’s benefits upon remarriage. The particular statutory distinction appellees challenge existed only during one relatively brief portion of the ex- tended period over which Congress has adjusted and ex- panded the respective eligibilities of spouses and former spouses to receive Social Security benefits. If the district court had limited the impact of its decision in this case by awarding benefits only to the two named appellees, it might have been appropriate for the Secretary to forgo an appeal, 12 because Congress now has eliminated the particular distinc tion the court invalidated. But rather than limiting its hold- ing. the district court compounded its error by ordering re- lief to a nationwide class that includes numerous individuals who did not exhaust their administrative remedies or seek judicial review within 60 days, and who thereby effectively abandoned their individual claims for benefits. This holding is flatly inconsistent with the plain language of 42 U.S.C 405(g), implementing regulations, and this Court’s decisions The district court’s cavalier disregard of these explicit juris- dictional prerequisites unfortunately is typical of the ap- proach by a number of lower courts in the face of this Court’s clear pronouncements, most recently in Heckler v. Ringer, No. 82-1772 (May 14, 1984). The result has been substantial disruption of the orderly administrative review of claims for benefits under the vast Social Security pro- gram. These issues therefore independently warrant review. 1. The district court clearly erred in holding that the stat- utory distinction between surviving widowed spouses and surviving divorced spouses who remarry is unconstitutional. Indeed, that holding is foreclosed by this Court’s decisions in Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), and Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). a. The legal principles governing the resolution of this case are firmly settled. Where, as here, a statutory classifi- cation does not impinge on a fundamental right protected by the Constitution,” the classification is unconstitutional only if “the varying treatment of different groups or persons IS SO unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legiti- mate purposes that [the Court] can only conclude that the ®° ‘The district court correctly held that the statutory provisions denying survivor’s benefits to divorced spouses who remarry do not impermissibl) impinge on the exercise of a fundamental right to marry merely because they create a distinction on the basis of marital status (App., infra, 5a-7a, 26a-38a). In fact, this Court, applying the rational basis test, already has sustained the constitutionality of the general rule terminating entitlement to secondary Social Security benefits upon marriage, even though such provisions “may have an impact on a * * * beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others.” Califano v. Jobst, 134 U.S. at 58. See also id. at 54 legislature’s actions were irrational.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). See. e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson. 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981): United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980). This conclusion has particu lar force in the distribution of Social Security benefits, be cause “|glovernmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are ‘not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Con gress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbi trary power, not an exercise of judgment.” Mathews v. Dy Castro, 429 U.S. at 185, quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). b. In this case, the statutory classification plainly is the product of a careful “exercise of judgment” by Congress, not a “display of arbitrary power.” Each of the factors on which the denial of benefits to appellees was based—their divorce and their subsequent remarriage-—long has been utilized in determining eligibility for secondary benefits under the So- clal Security Act, and each has already been sustained by this Court as an independently sufficient basis for distin guishing between classes of potential beneficiaries. In Califano v. Jobst, supra, the Court held that the uni form rule prior to 1958, under which Social Security benefits payable to all secondary beneficiaries were terminated upon remarriage, was “unquestionably valid.” 434 U.S. at 54. The Court in Jobst considered that rule in the context of the eli gibility of a disabled person to receive child’s benefits after remarriage, but the Court’s observations are equally appli cable here (id. at 53): Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an important change in economic status. Traditionally, the event not only creates a new family with attendant new responsibilities, but also modifies the pre-existing relationships between the bride and groom and their respective families. Frequently, of course, financial independence and marriage do not go hand in hand. Nevertheless, there can be no question about the validity of the assumption that a married per- son is less likely to be dependent on his parents for sup- port than one who is unmarried. 14 Similarly, in the present context, Congress rationally could conclude that a surviving divorced spouse who remarries is less likely to be dependent on the resources of the former spouse than one who does not remarry. For this reason, Congress’s decision to terminate a surviving divorced spouse’s entitlement to benefits upon remarriage is, in itself, plainly rational. The district court did not dispute that Congress constitu tionally may terminate a person’s entitlement to secondary benefits upon remarriage. But the court held that Congress was foreclosed from doing so after 1979 with regard to sur viving divorced spouses who remarry after reaching age 60 because Congress in 1979 permitted widowed spouses who remarry at that age to receive survivor's benefits. The court concluded that Congress could not rationally distinguish be tween widowed and surviving divorced spouses in this man ner (App., infra, 42a). This holding ignores both the signifi eance Congress long has placed on divorce as it affects eligibility for Social Security benefits and this Court’s con clusion that it is constitutional for Congress to do so. In Mathews v. De Castro, supra, the Court unanimously sustained the constitutionality of provisions of the Social Se curity Act that provided for the payment of benefits to a married woman under age 62 whose husband retires or be comes disabled if she has a minor or other dependent child in her care, but not to a divorced woman. The Court explained (429 U.S. at 188): Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the eco- nomic and personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily it means they will go their separate ways. Congress could have rationally assumed that di- vorced husbands and wives depend less en each other for financia! and other support than do couples who stay married. See also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 289-293 (1979) This same rationale applies to the survivor's benefits at is sue here. Congress rationally could determine that a di vorceed spouse in general would be less dependent upon the primary wage earner at the time of the latter’s death than would a spouse who remained married to the wage earner DOS€ ’ acking In ! ul justificatior Pile Nestor, 363 ~ ‘ 1960). Compare Frnt 444 S. at 178 & n. ll e aIstrict rt i wt express iwreed with the Sex i nat oress rationa 11d assun tnat surviving ~ “4 ire venera ess epel ent po! the re ~ ‘ re | eased primal wage earner than are V1G \ 2a). But the irt held that be : e { oTes na nosen | treat tne tw itegories tne ’ a eat! ne primal Wage earnel t ild _ wes hem upon their subsequent remat R his reasoning is seriously flawed . i atter, the dist irt was mistaken in its ¢ premise that Congress in 1979 treated divorced ~t f al is SI ises WI remained marned to tne vage earner [tor purposes letermining eligibd 1 re henefits mon tre i@all I the wage earner \ ae Vile 1 rece ‘ survivors benefits muy il sme e¢ irrieda the wage earne! for LU vears: the i] requirement for a widow or widower Was a yeal ripss {jf 1s ( neTress id not view the two categories e equa entitied | rece e secondary Den fits In any event, the fact that Congress, in its discretion ‘ edt treat tnis narrow 2roup of divorced wives in a manner similar to widows and widowers by making them ell gible for survivor’s benefits does not mean that Congress ac illy found them to be indentically situated even in that set ng. Far less does it render the two groups constitutionally ndistinguishable or estop Congress from treating them dif ferently for other purposes. In the present context, for ex ample, Congress might well have believed that there were sufficient similarities between the two groups to warrant similar treatment upon the death of the primary wage earner. notwithstanding the existence of substantial differ ences as well, or that considerations of uniformity or ease of administration warranted similar treatment for that pur it Such a judgment cannot constitutionally disable Con gress from responding to the residual differences between the two groups in determining their continued entitlement to rvivor’s benefits remarniage Ipor —— ee eee ee —ee ee - eee * this conclusion is especially compelling when it is consid ered that Congress often must proceed one step at a time wnen ¢ xpanding or adjusting benefits and entitlements un ler this “complex statutory scheme ftano v. Jobst. 434 ; ) ( OnvTess IAS done S00 1 several! respects that bear directiv on this case. F irs Congress often has delayed before conforming the entitlement of divorced spouses and irviving divorced spouses to that of wives, husbands, wid ws, and widowers. That delay may be explained by a belief tnat the tatter nave a stronger eq litabie claim to receive iat were originally intended for members of the wage earners family than do persons for whom those family ties have been broken. Cf. United States Railroad Retir nent Board v. Frnt 149 U.S. at 178 second, Congress has moved cautiously and incrementally n modifying the remarriage rule under the Social Securit Act. See ( alifay v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 54-57. As the district urt acknowledged, the House version of the bill enacted in ivi i contained an “across-the-bDoaru elimination of the ger al remarriage rule, covering all secondary beneficiaries ncluding but not limited to widows and surviving divorced pouses nis was a “broad change that in its first vear of nave created “an estimated 670.000 yperation alone would new pene ficianes at a cost of 31.3 Dillion in additional! bens tits App nira fa-4a. citing H.R Rep 95-702, 95th Cong., lst Sess. Pt. I at 47-48 (1977). id. Pt. II. at 73). No simiiar provision was contained in the Senate bill. and it is not surprising that it was deleted in Conference in favor of a more modest provision to repeal the remarriage rule only for widows and widowers. See H.R. Conf Rep. 95-837, 95th cs (Long 2d Sess i¥7 7). Congress pre sumably belheved that widows and widowers had the strongest claim to receive benefits after remarriage, and it chose to “concentrate lim ited funds where the need is likely to be greatest” (Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 296 jurt observed in a nearly identical context Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57-58 ” a Jf - ~~ f _ Congress could reasonably take one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the gen eral marriage rule without accomplishing its entire ob ect ‘ rm Le “ame piece I legisiatiol V pe Cini ri 4x |S. 4585. 489 You) ke ven if it mignt have been wiser to take a larger step the ep (_ongre did take was in the right direction and had no ve rse mpact on persons ke the appre lle« (‘ongress might well be deterred from taking measures lO al eviate what it believes to be the greatest hardships or ineq nfties in the Somali Security ct and similar iegisiation it it adecisions ti proceed n this iLIoOUus fas! ion are invalidate d hecause thev d not go tar enougn The Constitutior pre imes that sent some reason to intel antipathy even im DY? vident decisions W eventually De re tified nv tine wmMo ratic process ind that idicia ntervention 18 generalil\ inwarranted natter how unwisely [the Court] may think i pO ial Drancn Nas acted Vance v. Bradley 40 US. at 7 his fait! nthe democratic process was vindicated nm the present case, because Congre enacted legisiation to elin nate tne ustinction appelet cnalenge most | mont! j ; , thy . trict int ler red rye qaistinet ] mconstitutlons ta hye mistrict court a , eariv erred i ts tn shold cer tif ition Oot a is \ the district ¢ irt itsell recoenized App nr lLba-lba i] roder tor a ciass to De certined each member of the proposed class must individual salisiy ne requirement tO? miicial re ew f ut 2 | s,{ LOD. go see | I nasark 142 US. 68 701 A979 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). Yet the court roceeded to certify a class in utter disre gard of the ¢ xpiicit requirement n 47 LS libig) that each class membel must have received a “Tin aecisio! of the Secretary on nis wn individual claim for benefits and may obtain idicial re ew ony y filing a civil action within 6V days ol that fina 1. The Court held in S fi that the meaning of the tern al decision in 42 US. Wo(g is left to the Secretar to flesh out by regulation” and that she may “specify such re suirements for exhaustion as |s|he deems serve |her| own terests in effective and efficient administration (422 U.S. at 66 & n.9). As the Court recognized, governing regulations final! required for judicial review is ly achieved only after the ALJ hearing and Appeals Council vages are completed id. at 765) see 20 C.F.R 104.900(a)(5). See also Heckler v. Ringer, slip op. 2. There is no allegation in the complaint in this case that the unnamed class members actually pursued their administrative remé dies through the Appeals Council stage to obtain the requl site “final decision.” The district court therefore “was with ut Jurisdiction over so much of the complaint{s] as concern the class, and it should have entered an appropriate order of dismissal.” Salfi, 422 U.S. at 764 Instead of ordering dismissal of the class claims, however, the court excused all of the unnamed class members from the exhaustion required by tine Secretary s regulations based n the court’s own view that exhaustion would be futile App., mfra, 18a-19a). The district court’s action was flatly inconsistent with Salf here, the Court held that the re quirement that the Secretary have made a “final decision” on the individuai’s claim for benefits is a “statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite” that “may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion of futility such as that made by the District Court here” (422 U.S at 766 (emphasis added )) The Court did observe in Salfi that ‘‘wihile a court may not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the contrary onciusion of the Secretary, * * * it would be inconsistent with the congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from de termining in particular cases that full exhaustion of internal review procedures is not necessary for a decision to be ‘final’ within the language of § 405(g).” 422 U.S. at 766-767 (em phasis added). The Court concluded that the Secretary prop erly could make such a determination where she has satisfied herself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statu tory provision that bars payment (id. at 765, 767), that “th claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a dif lerent section of the Act” (id. at 765), and that all other is sues have been resolved in favor of the claimant without the need for a hearing (id. at 767). See also Heckler v. Ringer, slip op. 14-16 & nn.11 & 12. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion (App., infra, 17a-18a), however, the Secretary i: this case clearly did not make such a determination and ac cordingiv did not walve the exhaustion requirement for ¢ | of the unnamed membpe! i the clas Following the decision in Sa/fi, the Secretary promuigated the regulatk : discussed above that establish a pl cedure ‘ or walving t} exhaustion requirement in the circumstance { identified in Saif e., where the Secretary has determined that all other issues bearing on the individual's claim for ben efits have been resolved and that the n issue Darring pay ment is a statutory provision that the claimant contends l! mnstitutional. Pursuant to this procedure the Secretar entered into a formal agreement wit! appe llees | suenta and Kenneth Owen tipulating to the existence of these cond tior is regards their particular claims for benefit nd lesignating the respective reconsideration decisiol le! ng those claims as the Secretar inal Gecisio! ior purpose of judicial revi minder 42 U.S.f 1>( g But there ! egation if L? Con | ialnt TMAL Lire Secreta} na entered nto a con paral i¢ iwreement wit! i! r tre l! immed ; mem ! | promu ting the regulat estan ning the expe tec ippea procedure +} Secretar explained that where tl Spe hed maivior nave Deel il hed ne 11a tf nfident that the particular claim [for benefits had beet pre sented at a suffiment nen i to afford the agen an OF oritunit rres erro?) | Nave ; mpiet« rey re thn respect tne tact iw. and Dp ipie alternative Das¢ entitlement ind ts ! ire nationa iniiormit 1) Fed Reg eld, 14 ; . TT Dare Sally $22 | ~ il 4 ly ic! rceumstance Tre serretary ceterminedt irtner! adm | trative review would te e/a?’ muti ji (I The ©® proce dures thus a ire that the question of exhaustion of admu ‘ra e remedtie Tselil wi ay nresented to al | exnre ! lled 1p I ne oec;re iT and nat te 11 re ta i ry : | : re ' uiT | : ; ir’ : ‘ : ror ' nifa ; etal ¥. it 76 he Secreta! is specifi hat the ds il of : ar que rsue ne ¢ ec) ippea edaure ‘ OL t he mgnt Te rative or jud ul review MT Keg bebe iY ee 2) CLF .! M4 SOS 24 thority to proceed where that 60-day requirement has not been met. Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455, 1460-1461 (4th Cir. 1985); Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 121 (4th Cir 1982).'° Compare United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118 (1979): Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1988): Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232-233 (1887) Other courts, however, have reached a contrary conclusion, See, e.g., City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 737-738 (2d Cir. 1984) (question “not free from doubt,” but holding that 60-day requirement is not jurisdictional); Men tal Health Ass'n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 973 n.19 (8th Cir 1983). That conflict warrants resolution by this Court. Even if the 60-day requirement in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) were not regarded as a jurisdictional prerequisite in the strictest sense,'' that consequence would furnish no support for the district court’s novel “tolling” rule in this case. Statutorily mandated limitations on the time within which a person may bring a suit against the government must be strictly con strued, and the courts are not at liberty to fashion toiling The holding in Hunt v. Schweiker,supra, tnat the 60-day requirement in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is jurisdictional in nature was cited with approval in the extensive discussion of the requirements ol 2 US. 10512) in the Senate Report on the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 ef seg. See S. Rep. 98-466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984) ' In Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763-764, and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 328 n.9 (1976), the Court described the 60-day requirement as a “statute of limitations” that was waived by the Secretary because it was not raised in district court. However, these statements were dicta, because in each instance the claimant had sought judicial review within 60 days. App. (at 1. 9. 17-20), Weinberger v. Saifi, No. 74-214 (Oct. Term 1974); App at l 3, 14), Mathews \ Eldndae No 74 204 (Oct Term 1975) Moreover in other circumstances, the Court has held that the congressionally imposed condition that a suit against the government be filed within a specified time period is not subject to waiver under the usual rules affecting the waiver of a statute of limitations defense. Munro v. United States, supra Finn v. United States, supra. In any event, even if the 60-day require ment in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is not “jurisdictional” in the sense that it Is not waived even where it is not raised as a defense, a court is not free to ex cuse compliance with that requirement where, as here, it 1s invoked by the government in the tnal court ——— ee - : rules that Congress has not prescribed Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-276 (1957). Indeed, in this case. the fact that Congress expressly vested in the Secretary, but not the courts, the authority to extend the 60-day filing pe riod where circumstances warrant strongly indicates that (Congress intended to foreclose the duplicative fashioning of tolling rules by the courts. Cf. United States v. Locke, slip op. 9 n.10. Governing regulations reinforce this conclusion, for they expressly provide that an individual forfeits his right to judicial review if he does not file within the 60-day period, unless he establishes “good cause” for the Sec retary to extend that period. 20 C.F.R. 404.900(b), 404.987(a) The district court’s holding on the 60-day issue also is di rectly contrary to this Court’s ruling in Califano v. Sanders, supra. After the 60-day period has expired, the claimant may obtain further consideration of his claim only by re questing the Secretary to reopen the adverse administrative decision. See 20 C.F.R. 404.987-404.995. This Court held in Sanders that the Secretary’s determination not to reopen an adverse decision that the claimant had allowed to become fi- nal and binding is not subject to judicial review. The Court explained that a contrary holding would “frustrate the con gressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on the initial claim for benefits”—a limitation that the Court regarded as an aspect of a “policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims.” 430 U.S. at 108. The nationwide tolling rule fashioned by the district court in this case would frus- trate that congressional policy choice far more severely than would judicial review of the denial of an individual request to reopen, which the Court foreclosed in Sanders c. The ruling by the district court on the exhaustion and 60-day requirements in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) has the effect in this case of requiring the Secretary to reopen numerous administrative decisions that the individual claimants in- volved allowed to becoine final and binding against them when they failed to seek further review in accordance with the requirements of the Act and implementing regulations. The Department of Health and Human Services estimates 4 na nere are approximately 1,UUv ich individuals. Other ivts have ordered a similarly sweeping intrusion 1.to the viministration of the Social Security Act In class actions Uf isand tT ind lua who had abandoned then wn ; " henefit ~~ os 4 f iy ( New Yori \ Heckler p Heckle (51 F.2d 943 (Sth Cir. 1984 These jurisdictiona ies are of broad importance in the ad : tral " rTTng “wy } ~ 4 init Act and independent ’ ’ rs A ’ ‘ ' int » CONCLUSION rrobadt il chic I | j e 7 rey : ‘ } re pe ar idl . ‘ [ ‘ | ; , . 7 : : i kK sé + ' la APPENDIX A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CV 83-2436-WMB BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIF! MARGARET M. HECKLER. ETC... DEFENDANTS [FILED DEC. 23, 1983} ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT in this action, plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of that portion of Title II of the Social security Act which pro vides that widows aged 60 and over may remarry and retain their social security benefits while surviving divorced spouses of that age lose their benefits if they remarry. Both parties have stipulated to the facts as set out in earlier administrative proceedings. Each side now moves for sum mary judgment I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Buenta M. Owens, was divorced from her hus band of more than 30 years, Russell B. Judd, in 1968. In 1978, at the age of 61, plaintiff married Kenneth R. Owens her present husband. Her former husband, Mr. Judd, died on June 19, 1982. Thereafter, the plaintiff applied for social security benefits on Mr. Judd’s account The Department of Health and Human Services denied plaintiffs application on the ground that plaintiff was mar ried at the time of her .pplication. Plaintiff sought reconsid eration but the Department again denied plaintiffs applica tion on the same grounds ine part tnen pul ied an eX! gj appea I'he iwreed tnat Lire ‘Jit it ! (il } ite Line i} if section Z0c \ ind (¢ } i tne Socia \ | Vi} (wet mnrend rmhart tne pro 7 tutional tnat permit i widow to remar»r! il nereatter without atiecting elgipiill DULL a l? reed Vile Wart remarries iT ive rh or Tnerealtlet ‘ pipie ior Sul yy penetit ral ript | Adi I Proceedings at 2 © ( r untill Oring lit unaer Une Der irat ludgt Ds ' 4 . »H()] yp 1976 ee King , ole ara ne nalienged statutol scneme nmconstitutiona plaintiff remains entitled to benefits despite her ren Piaintiff further seek in injunct n preventing Cc from denving benefits t 7 ng d reed spoust marry at age ov or olde! and al raer mandating endant pay piaintill ti e peneiits pre UsiVwenle ntiinue Those henefit nto tne Tuture li. DISCUSSION \. The Legislative Scheme and History Congress passed the Social Security Act in 1935 providing benefits for qualified wage earners. Pul 1-271, 49 Stat. 620, 622-24 (1935). Secondary benet ‘ , " ‘ ’ cre : th i! i | rent De} ; ¢ eDpe!l ent por eal. rimna? Vayve-earnel \ 76-279. 52 Stat. 1360. 1264-66 (1939). Unde it that time econdal neneticiaries iost their pen chang n tneir marita tatu i Dp! son na KNOW is The ypenera marriavt rilié | orig rorry The rilie rie ied i pre nm i at entities Vou se Their penefits iIpon remarriayvt > ost it Ur pl : : iter amended, whic! naleng . | i ill | ‘ i 4 i : ié : ; rT ave be " ] ne re I | Lnese ross-! { | J al ne ar? ive ’ ’ " ‘ . ‘ . : MY 1 re « : " t)4 4 ’ ZZ ‘ ’ ‘ ’ " j ‘ " > g>T ij : ryt Ve , ‘ a : : 7~ i? > - ; ; =f of ; ; | Vs : é ° i(iUua!l LIO4 \ eo 7 7 : : " : " : " " > : - 7 : ” : ’ ni ne = il i ri } ; ; srit : : : : >? - ’ >» . : . : ‘ : rs : ’ 4 m gy i~ : : : é ss Ds . . ' - : | : $. 7 K he Standard : “ : : i “ " , ry ‘ ‘ 4 i,t : ‘ : "7 j j > j ‘ : _ : : ‘ at eaffirn o the larry yy As | ‘ ’ ~ sr? : ° ~ : ' : ry “3 ) ’ ’ ’ 7 : : ~ — —' ‘ j ’ ; : : , ure ‘ : im , : : ' W he! \ : - \ i? rit y) ws : ; : | : - : , ~ ‘ ‘ ’ , . > . yt : : > : 7. ' ' il : : " , > ¢ ’ ” . { . . \ ' Vi ~“e a. \ i» ~ ; oft Leviev ~ : a ~) . ’ -, oy ; : > ‘ " " " " : ‘ " " : =) | ~ > : . ’ a " : ' ‘ | : : j : ; . ; : ss : | . rs; ; > 7 | ' no . : : ci ' r? ‘ ry : , , rn at : ‘ . a ; : ryvé : i¢ : : 4! ; : 7 ichil ; - ‘ ye? ‘ iret a 1 a na re wisest ' | if) ‘ } ‘ rey | livorced spouses repre the mo ht t mart p , nparate treatment f+) ryt ‘ ’ mary " ; ’ : : " : ay rroct | ’ ' : : ‘ regoing aucnor int | riers ‘ vA \ re ry ' yt ° , : Ui : : )) ’ ’ ’ ’ : . ' tia eva Tha Ke marriage more o Ke Tie supreme (Co ina Lf ' ’ 7 ’ ; ’ y ’ . _.av_tb ik « ‘ : gt " ii) } ; aay ’ ; revu aT ; ’ ry Rational Hasis ’ : : tis : if aririe’? 7 ‘ ’ ‘ ‘ ners : ; « ‘ "mF ra ’ Lhe} . ” F ; , =? Lyf) a rs entit lac f ty {9G a. : ' ; Tiere : | \ ité | rhe vint ~ > nypotne e it ryle ry : ’ ’ ' ad i’ 7 : ’ . ney Y rs " : : ; a rT rs) ted TF for ey Toal, I ae ’ ng : ’ : i) \ ’ : + ‘i : ; ; ; ; W) 2p trong pre ’ is) iy yt : : : na | | ; ’ ’ . | ar yt) nyret i ‘ 7 ’ . 1a : ry tt, ' ’ i | yt Hest ; : sf ; 144 ‘\™ | (pis Applied eee for , fO } d 1466, 1471 (9 83). lh find a sta i lla ri : : Da I our Pe ne that there nceival mate pur] Wou Ist ’ TT a ' LAL re nen j 7 Ten 1th ‘ ‘ ‘ | | ‘ nyare? ' . 1 ra ni ! narrate ti | WIaOW ind YC res ‘ WItn re irviage aiter atta yr the age Piaintiff u eta ire | ‘ ie exer ’ iY . 1) ise vA rie A} : eal Shae it rema rai : eXpicatl la leTern : lif 1 : pie DAS ‘ TATULOT | Lf ' > : : ' | | a gag : : i’ reed DOUSE ror ther oie iv ¢ c"* e primal ind .) that ¢ : na ' have cde eq} rye 4) | : ’ : : : \ . aT 7 ’ yw Ve. it at Ts an r owt. heneftit fi» i] Ler | ! ree ise |. Assumption of Varying Dependence " ‘ . ‘ , | : 7 ; i¢ . ' ; | | " ern ‘ ’ " J / ‘ : in ; : ttomryt , eneat , , . " : term? : : : " " ryrs lem lent | : . rly hy) , ‘ : | rs , ; jw eal ’ : ve : rT rhe : ir ~ 7 " ’ " ‘ 4 mu De ¢ f I retere! : 110na ‘ Bas ver Te? | er tie ne " , ting " ; " , fo \ ‘ ane endant cites Mat ) r the prop: ngress may rationally assume livorced w ein ’ 1¢ | ih | ’ ryTie’? ’ ih : rried uw . | wt ret , +, = _—_——— ; . , : ’ ; : : ; eT i? ie? hy. : : : -, j : ) : : ; : : ‘7 . . ' : ; ry A a” : le ry ; ™ | ox : ‘ .' a ; , ; + . , : | : : : " . : ; ¥ ; er y ry)? * #s . a>’) ’ " ai a. »¢ , j ; : ry oy b ; hy er \ 7 ’ , ret " . . ; : a : ; + : : 4 zs. : ‘ , > r former hu . — ‘} : : . ; —_ A : : : . ' ; if : : : : 7 ? . 7 . : ~ — ‘ : + 4 ive ea >" : ; . _ ta , , - 4 J . i 7 " : | : oreteornt | ; ‘ 4 , , . > T _ : " a toy ; cng . : . : e) : : : ; : : Pact thea: ay : . : ‘7 ’ : rY ei ’ , - . 1 re : : Yr hee : \ . ‘ _ " R : ' . : ‘ ry ; " : len” of providing benefits to the institutionalized it could rationally limit the provision to those for wi federal government was already paying out funds at 238. The Court noted that, “lalwarding this type ‘fits inevitably involves the kind of line-drawing that some comparably needy person 0 itside the favored ld he Court took a similar approach in Califa regard to the general marrage rule enacted as var Social Security Act. The Court held Congress could reasonably take one firm ste} the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by t! e eral marriage rule without accompusning its entire ePctive |} tne same piece OT egvisiat Citat mitted! Even if it mght have been wiser t Lak arger step, the step Congress did take was in the r rection and nad no adverse mpact on persons ‘ lobsts | »S. al yf >> Se : a ») } ()) thoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955 tne refiorm may t step at a time, addressing itsell to the phase of the p which seems most acute to the legisiative mind he remarriage rule may be similariy justified. Cong In tact, taken a one sls it a time approacn Lo f on, removing It aS tO WIGOWS OU and Ver il O77 al irviving divorced spouses 60 and over in 1983. Altho he interim the different treatment between the t ips May seem unwarranted, even uniair, Unis is the s leVitabDie line drawing whnicen a court inder rational! must tolerate. The Court finds that the distinctior n widows and surviving divorced spouses drawn b C. § 402(e 1) A), and 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4) Is const al aS a rational step Dy step approac! ») remed ( em or the remarriage rule H emp. li Rptr. (CCH) © 14,296 (D uh 19% rt found S il Secur \ r } enefit rrat | e! ne | ! rhe y* l2a lil. CONCLUSION The statutory distinction between widows and surviving divorced spouses of which plaintiff complains does not in volve invidious discrimination nor does it so impinge upon the fundamental right of marriage as to warrant strict scru tiny. Thus the distinction need only be supported by a ra tional basis. This may be supplied by a one step at a time congressional approach to eliminating the hardships of the remarriage rule Based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD JUDGED, AND DECREED that (1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and 2) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED DATED: DEc. 23. 1983 S/ Wm Matthe “ Ryrne Jr WM. MATTHEW BYRNE. J] United States District Judge court ated that the governme had offered explanation for the dis tinction between these groups ol women and found that the listinctior served neither to encourage valid marriages nor discourage divorce. The ourt found the statutory distinction irrational and lative of the equal protection component if due process Evans is distinguishable because there the ourt apparent was no presented and did not consider the one step at a time rationale considered and relied pon Dy the (Court in this actior APPENDIX B UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR] CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ¢ ALIFORNIA No. CV &83-2436-WMB FILED AUG. 28, 1984 ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS In these consolidated class actions, plaintifi constitutionality ol certain provisions ol Act of 1977 which provide that hallenge the Lhe social Securit\ on remarriage, widowed spouses may receive survivors benefits but divorced survi\ ing spouses may not.’ The parties have stipulated to the facts as set out in earlier administrative proceedings and the oniv issue In the ca se is the const lenged provisions. Plaintiffs now inder Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(¢)(1 itutionality of the chai move fol I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Buenta M. Owens was divorced trom Russe! Judd. her husband of more than 30 vears. in 1968. In 1978 plaintiff married Kenneth R (ywens,. ner present husband. Her former husband. Mr. Judd. died at the age of 61. — ee oe —_—_ —-_ l4da June 19, 1982. Thereafter, plaintiff applied for social security benefits on Mr Judd’s account The Department of Health and Human Services denied plaintiffs application on the ground that plaintiff was mar ried at the time of her application. Plaintiff sought reconsid eration but the Department again denied plaintiffs applica tion on the same grounds The parties then purs led an expedited appeal process They agreed that the sole issue in di pute is “che application of section 202(e) 1) A) and (e)(4) of the Social security) Act Mrs. Owens contends that the provision is unconstitu tional in that it permits a widow to remarry at age 60 or thereafter without affecting eligibility, but a surviving di vorced wife who remarries at age 60 or thereafter is then in eligible for survivors benefits.” Transcript of Administrative Proceedings at 2. © ( Plaintiff, Kenneth R. Owens, was divorced from Dorot} L.. Owens, his wife of more than 34 years, in 1978. He ma ried pl untiff, Buenta Owens (then Buenta Judd) in 197% when he was 60 years old. On July 15, 1982. he applied ior survivors benefits on the account of his first wife. who had ince died. His claim was denied on the ground that plaintiff was married at the time of his application Mr. Owens requested reconsideration of the decisior which was denied on May 12, 1983. The Secretary and Mr Owens thereafter entered into an agreement on Novembe! 23, 1983 stating that except for the provisions of sections 202(f)(1 A) and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security Act, the pro visions which are challenged by Mr. Owens in this actior Mr. Owens had established his right to survivors’ benefit The agreement also waived further administrative appeals Plaintiffs brought separate Class actions under the Declar atorv Judgment Act ® US. 28 2201, 2202 (1976 Mrs Owens seeks a deciaration that former sections Z0Z( }) and 202(e)(1)(A) of the Act, the sections that distinguish betwee! widows and surviving divorced wives on remarriage. are un constitutional and that she remains entitled to benefits de spite her remarriage.“ Mr. Owens seeks a declaration that —— ; ’ ivmryvy and Decause there 1s no ral tion Detween divorced i! ny pouses On remarriayve p untill se" Irom den nv penetrits to 1? : } mt iormer sections 2Ucz\1 imilar distinction betw i isbands on remarriag’ Ul] tled to benefits. Pla ms violate the Fift! are unconstl mcits Ait Amendment vt | 7 penet;it pre wou aqenied al fits into the fut re. The cases |! untilfs now move tor certificatior , All persons who (1) were ad Vr Was ered Inder tne Soca ry)? ie } +} , nit ) predeceased © Clalilia hs re . , , nereaiter; and ») Up an ap] ince With tne time tIrame i¢ ; > 95-216. 2% 336 l) and (2 nave il ! enetit : il rit i] ry nT iTT ey? 1 ‘ ryey 1) & DISCUSSION Section 405(¢ Z ynre ii) > ’ > - ~ ri tar lire! re ~ etal / ~Y Lh : ~ fies three prered rirst, there must after a hearing. S : TWO ¢€ ements : resent at cy? 1 1 nearing exna 14 2] iY fH . -. anthin 60) davs aft ; j ’ ry nied " ff < rs dence 764. The | e2rT ta iT pl sed emer > . ne nresel ‘ . ~ 7 I : —s > > ‘i ' ; = @ . > 7 7 : Ve } . I tit : >)? "7 - ab’) ry . : . ; . . | Pa : : Exhaustion ~ ’ if : if ai ae : ~ ‘ : : ~ es — = = -_ ———————— iia | | . . ‘ ‘ cy ’ i ‘ ' : ole imag Una : pDiaint Mi DTe : ; . . ’ ' : : : ; sul | A : re | rv ry in ,if ij ‘ ‘ ' . a Pe ind Ul retore uth eq. Line i! inct rT i} " : ) ry rrrye yr yT ear : ’ ; Y at ; wid i} : ’ “? | ‘ irl expre ea aout is | whetner ~ongress had i ‘ j ‘ — eh 4) ; =, , ; ’ ‘ if ippi\ em iv ruk as pres neg IDs : : ; : ° ’ ’ 7, rue " J by iw lf irther it 4 > 5 > >» ~ . ’ , , ‘ if rer : ' i 7 if , ' j q*2y : ‘ ii ’ 7 ; J : : ~ ae | : i“ ’ vs ; i Fi ctuy | : +) ; : ’ ’ ; " ‘ :) in ry - ’ Iv ’ iw ‘ ’ 7 st) e it re ’ : : : 4 : ipl is : ny it) al : | ; na juest : ‘ ; ; ; iLeTa : it i! ‘ im, «tor Dennett iM isé : : > . . ’ > ; ’ . , ‘ " er " " " il : ’ ot " lt ant ' ; : bh * ; : | : : ’ " ’ « vs ‘ 17 ; rei . . +? . ' =) : : All nler A ‘ estat i rhe Nappy at aay hy} ia rule : : AN are ’ av : iT a ° T ] : if bani : ’ | na lé : | sé gay ‘ ; iné if Ke ‘ it lla juest : ' : ‘? : ‘4 : rn : iil : r Tere nut ratlne? ‘ a7 " 4 -_. . . ™ | ‘4 ; eu ‘ : ‘ 4 a ' ’ “Tie b ’ » — > > : | - | ain ’ ' : rh | : : : lia : iri eT ' . +) mt? ; : , r? ; : ‘ ' ry ; ’ ; | re ry) in riji¢ napi yi : ak ’ " 1} ry ? ; —. | : : a ane ' - ; - Ae 7 : : > : . . : | : ra : ; il s\4t | : : st : " yt ™ ' ’ rs ry : a? r« ‘ ’ hy r rie wt } an nat the hi iv rule ma . - . : - : : : ; ’ ; : : : ri 7 : : +) ; : " : ’ " ; ’ ; : sie i( Ah?) : : : : : Nere na mee! : ' Wi Lr il if Lal : ’ : " ‘ ‘ si) rs iu : 4°) : * ; : . . : | : , : ’ ’ : : a. ’ ; : ’ . R a iggest i ‘ enue require : ; ‘ : : | mi | ni : ipl : ‘ ” i Dia aA ‘ ‘ a | ar ‘ rt , " : " ; ‘ : av ‘.- ’ ’ j J : ‘ ' : J ’ ris : i? : ; > ‘ ‘ ‘ . ry : . : : . . eal . : silt. : : . ee —e Ad ary ropriate fina! injunctive or corres] nding declaratory re with respect to the class as a whole.’ ‘laintiffs have requested a declaration that tne challenged yvisions are unconstitutional! and seek an injunction gainst their application. The Secretary contends that etheless, this action is essentially a suit for damages yment of lost benefits—and therefore certification under (2) is inappropriate. The Secretary argues that the rs st for a declaratory judgment in this case does not itself ke (b)(2) certification proper: the declaratory relief must respond to injunctive relief, not merely be a substituts damages. See Pension v. Terminal Transport ¢ 634 2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuc! 1446 FF. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ul. 197% However, an injunction against application of the cha ged sections 1s necessary to afford the rehef requested uintiffs may receive Social Security terms of the Social Security Act. If the remarr age rule not declared unconstitutional, the Secretary is obligated der the statute to deny any application for bene fits. Thu injunction and declaratory judgment is required to e1 operation of statutory scheme which in the absences I ‘+h an injunction would require a finding of ellgit I Plaintiffs’ position is supported by mar ases I rts have enjoined provisions of the Social Security A efore ordering the payment of benefits. See e.¢., Bol: lifano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 417-18 (W.D. Tex. 1978), Orie r grounds euh pido fs rey wie ' Is j 145 ' ~ 287 179 D az \ Wernhe roe 1 SUDD if ~ | ) Fla wy) ; : — 4 j io) »>-ludge coul re (] ) The 0 syne ratheu v. Thaz. 426 U.S. 67 (1976 Plaintiffs’ position is further supported by the decis fano v. Yamasaki. There, the plaintiffs sought an nu ction ordering the Secretary to hold a hearing p! ! \ attempt Lo recoup henefits alleged Yy erronre ih. Da t. The Secretary ary ied that an injunction was unnec ry because the Court could simply reverse the Secreta! ’ cision to not hold such a hearing. The Court disagreed and id that the district wrt nad the power to issue an injun " noting +} at aT ’ inct ¥ A 4S nec “—* ’ , DY! ‘ , ryé oo Se ee Zha rights of class members and prevent repetitive litigation 142 U.S. at 705-06. Such concerns are clearly present in this Cane Finally, plaintiff has shown another basis for the issuanc of injunctive relief: plaintiffs’ mght the iaWSs In He Kier \ Mathe Os, plaintiff challenged certain provisions of the Social Securit to equal treatment under 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984 Act as being based on an unconstitutional gender-base 1 clas The Secretary argued that plaintiff had no stand ing to request an injunction against the statute because he ' no benefits. The Court disagreed, noting that sification could receive even if no benefits could be paid out, plaintiff was entitled to recelve mandate of equal treatment under the laws. /d. at 1395. Thus, he had standing to seek an injunction against op f the allegedly discriminatory statute eration of This action similarly claims that the Social Security Act inconstitutional provides for unequal treatment VM athe us miy imjunctive iffs with the mandate of equa! Thus, both because plaintiffs would or deciaratory reliel can provide treatment to which the claim they are entitied be entitled to such relhef if the prevall and because an ll inctior ; necessary to provide tor the payment ol benefit the proposed propel! ertifiable under Rul 2h Wo ( Section 1505 he Secretary finally argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1303 pronib ts class certification. This section provides that “|1i|/f any pro 10n of this chapter, or the application tnereol to any per on or circumstance, 1s held invalid, the remainder oi the napter, and the application of such provision to other per ons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby) he rues that absent ciass members constitute secretary arg other persons inder section 1505 and therefore anv dec! n by this court cannot apply to them. The Secretary cits 1O rm ase support tor this proposition (Jn its tact section 1303 does not bar class actions: indeed : lent about class certificatior he statute simp pro cle hat a court may only hold certain provision f Tith ' tat t oce : 1 AS Lo Line parti netore uHtia the court. In a properly certified class action, all class mem bers should be considered before the court. Therefore, they are not “other persons’ under the statute and section 1303 does not prevent the judgment in a class action to apply tnem Further, the Secretary’s interpretation of section 1303 is inconsistent with Congressional intent. The Supreme Court has described section 1303 as a “strong severability clause which “evidences a congressional intent to minimize the bur dens Impose d DY a declaration of unconstitutionality upon in nocent recipiencs of yovernment largess " Califano \ Westcott, 443 U.S. 76. 90 (1979). The intent of the section is to prevent the denial of benefits to absent parties, not to prevent class actions seeking extensicn of benefits to mem pers ol a class allegedly unconstitutionally excluded from receiving such benefits. See Cimaglia v. Schweiker. 555 | Supp. 710, 713 (S.D. Fla. 1983) nally, It is necessary to co! sider the consequences of the Secretary s interpretation of section 1303. Section 1303 applies to all of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States Code which includes not only the Social Security Old Age and Disability Program, but also Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income and other federal! benefit program If the See retary s inter pretation is correct the Supreme Court and lower courts have over the years incorrectly certified classes in the mar actions brought in these areas. Given the lack of support for the Secretary's interpretation of both tin language and in tent of the statute, the Court declines to make such a drasti holding LD). Scope of the Class he Court must finally decide if the proposed class should be certified on a nationwide basis. This decision is committed to the discretion of the Court. Yamasak 142 U.S. at 7038. li exercising its discretion. the court should consider whether there is ongoing litigation in other districts and whether the issues pre ented are such that it would be pre ferable to have them aliudicated by different courts in different factual con , Lea Considering these factors, the Court finds that nationwids certificai.on is appropriate in this case. The Court is not aware of any ongoing litigation in other districts involving the same issue. Further, the only issue presented In the cas¢ the facial constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Social Security Act. Thus, there is no possibility of dit ferent factual contexts arising which might affect the out come of the questions presented Finally, a nationwide class would provide the most efficient means of reaching a final resolution of the application of the remarriage rule to all per sons affected by the rule. See McClure v. Harms, 503 |! Supp. 409, 413 N.D. Cal. 1980). rev'd on other grounds. 102 S. Ct. 1665 (1982). For these reasons, the Court finds that the class should be certified on a nationwide basis CONCLUSION or the foregoing reasons, [IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs’ motion fo class certification is GRANTED and the named plaintill Ruenta Owens and Kenneth Owens shall represent the fo Ail persons who (1) were divorced from an individua who was covered under the Social Se rity Act and wh predeceased the claimant 2) remarried at age 60 o7 thereafter: and (3) have filed a application in accord ince with the time frames described in Pub. L.N 95-Z16, 2 336(0)(1 ind (2): and (4) have been or wi m™ denied survivors benefits, as surviving divorced spouses, for any month after December, 1978, provided fnhat such persons applied for such benefits on or afte August 20. 1982 o1 compieted the administrative appea process following a denial of such application on or after ? ¢ ; \ugu t Zu iva APPENDIX ¢ UNITED STATES DISTRI ENTRAL DISTRICT OF ¢ MARGARET HECKLER. } : ‘ { be? a | ORDER y neard and I ered (Une Court now GRANTS plaintiff f the 1) ember ? IU fing it finds that plaintiff is corre: on petween Widow ind i! y former section 2ZUZ(e4 t Une 1509, 1547 (1977), must be rational Dasi he statute ma That . ongrTress lid inKet ting the hardships of the remar 2(e)(1)(A) of the Act, 79 Stat Tne irl must Alsi f' larat step Congress e | Lake Re ecem De 25, 1YS5 was Dass ! IS HEREBY VACATED. 7 roler ET): Se ‘ , 4 "s Matthew A 7 ’ rYy\é ’ : 7« ty.) : i] ’ ’ APPENDIN ORDER = —_ — — — —_ — ’ ‘ rié ' ’ TF ’ ; : t4 : ig : : ; | ‘ 7 : , - ’ > ‘i > : Vi ' A's ; : | : | : “ ; ’ 4 4 ' - — : ‘ 4 : : - ’ : ' t L. : ; : " : -? ’ J : - bm ; : ’ . y ; , ’ " : | ; - 7. ; \ : . " : a ' 7 ; | 7 a4 ij rpind ft tt Le | I beg | xv isialive ™« here sree Hi 39a onstitutionality. de Castro, 429 U.S. at 185. In applying the rational basis test, the Court need not ascertain the actual wpose of the statute. The Ninth Circuit has held [A] court may hypothesize legislative purposes: “where there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our in quiry is at an end. It is, of course, ‘constitutionally ir relevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,’ [citation omitted] because [the Si preme Court} has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.” l/nited States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S 166, 179, 101 S. Ct. 453, 461, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980 Rrandwein v. California Board of Osteopathic Examiners = F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to find a statute nstitutional under the rationa! basis test, a court need only etermine that there is a “conceivable legitimate purpose which would justify the distinctions made in the state’s regu wtory schen 2.” /d. at 1471 4s noted above, the legislative history of the challenged visions is silent on the reason for the disparate treatment widowed and surviving divorced spouses with regard to emarriage after attaining the age of 60. Plaintiffs urge that he failure to extend the remarriage rule exemptions to sur ing divorced spouses was not only unexplained at the e of passage but remains rationally inexplicable today Defendant argues ‘hat Congress rationally could have distin guished between widowed spouses and surviving divorced spouses on the basis of their differing dependence on the pri wry wage earner. Defendant further urges that Congress betinction represents the sort of “one step at a time” ap ach to problem-solving that the Supreme Court has often wproved under rational basis analysis. -.g., Schweiker Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981 1. One Step At A Time he one step at a time argument has considerable allure in s instance because it literally describes Congress’ actions re. In 1977, Congress considered exempting both widowed wel surviving divorced spouses from the remarriage rule but resolved only to exempt widows and widowers. Then in a — : . - — —_ . 7 Ha ivs, Congress decided to extend the relief to surviving d yvorced spouses As piaintifis note, howe rr, the tact that Tongress moved me Lep al a time in Its efforts to alleviate the hardship ) tne remarriage rule does not in and ol itsell provide a ra tional basis for the statutory distinction here. Congres must nave a rational Dasis tor each step it take ina ast where the Supreme Court has used the phrase “one step at a time it has found ar ndepe nadent rational Dasis tor initial egisia ¢ te} Schweike? VW or ib0 U.S. 221. 238 LYS] rational tor Tonegre LO De f e those alread receiving primary federal! aid in Institutions are most need and limit supplemental! relief to them); C alifan Jobst, 434 | “ 1'7 ¥ » 1977 rational ts neneve recipient 7 i¢ pendent child henefits who marry other re pient ire more need tnan recipient wno mar? pe! ] not entitied t benefit Vv an Lee Optu if Oklahoma. 348 | > 1s /-Y1 (health col aeratior provide rational ba it) tate Trestlrictiol 1 vyno ma fit ‘ evia ‘ ang) ieTrsé hu tne tatutor listinection between widowed spouss and irvi ng divorced W f erected ov tormer sect ! AZ 1) and (f)(5) must stand or fal m whnetner Conere rationa mignt nave i imed that widowed DOUSK art general more depende! ym income from the deceased Wage earner tnal ars ir’ ne a orceqd pous¢ ‘he Supreme Court has recognized that the pr Ol econdal penefnit inder the ocial Securit Act not pari ti a general welilaré cneme pdased o1 ndividualized need Nut an attempt to alle ate general probie! of economic ce penden r dist? pNuting we efit Lo Lnose perso! pre med I rT lependent Instead of requir ng individualized pr | n case-DV-case Dasi (__ongre nas elected to use Imp : teria ich a we and maritai statu to determine probdabi adependemn Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53. Thu i cnalienged | on must be examined with reference to the general ! tionaie ior tn LaLuLory criteria, not whether the ind jatior I the plaintil!i under tne itute al ele! inpi¢ Defendant points to the gislative hi , e Tith irgue tnat ners as traditiona x onived a dep Za that unmarned mother Act, could rationally have assumed would be less dependent pon their husbands than marned mother 143 U.S. at 292 Defendant urges that the above authority establishes that ‘ or uid rationaliv fave a imé that a ‘ pouse ire it lependent upon primary wage earners thal t} e st married. Defendant further mtends ¢ yr nt rational peneve tl distinctior tinue alter Ut! leat é Vay irne}! Lnat i? ya rceuw WV | hy pre iImeqd ‘ ~ } pende nt thal Lf ‘ VT rt A W ¢ hye ‘ ur? ivrTrees Howe Vey Sat na v¢ | 10 not comport with these assumptior nder fort ect " sivas | an ’ ' | ’ viel we } : 7 ng ' Ise nitially rece i! ' enefit iy ™ nervy ti reTtiect i? is j pi ' ependel rere! ePrwersr Tne Tw oy Ip ‘ ng T lexi | — re : “ aent uly Upol eat! 1 Ure rial Vas earner. 0 Ip marriage does the groups treatmer erg \ : a | mes retain (ther re efit Dui il livorced spoust e their hu n order hallenged pi nm the ground of an assumed dep } ; , oT would have have ha : rea ’ 1 " ‘ nat wid 4 ind | | Ouse : e Lhe rrve leyvrTe ' ein ‘ | | ‘ rimat} Vave ¢ rnet le] ‘ ' ' ’ ‘ ’ ec ‘ rye ‘ " : . ere! lA ' et ' il ' rt | : b : mn are ri ipparani rm i} ‘ ‘ oy ¢ ' ia rat nai distil nwa ’ : ' iv . | ’ , lid} yw a Tet : eat ip | we earner, Not Ol ul , riage. Vi r der nees mig! ' ‘ Vee! Vidow ’ ia il : | reed Ou i¢ itt Li 7 Ca ' erence e erased | rria i e bel ‘ ris Ai Thiarriaye : : rT ' : : ' ; ‘ ; init \ . Vs >? ; : ’ 1) ; ' ’ | b | ‘ : | : rat : : ' ' met La ving divorces ‘ ' vid fundame! Ih trv as ‘ hye : ’ wa’ »* \ ? ry ’ MLS il ' ec] }S¢ | : ™~s if 7 : " . 7 oy CONCLUSION tory distinction bet pouses ol whic piall s discriminatiol or al mght of marnags istinction need on ynstitutional. The ’ | ( ongrTres i ef} for both widows tne! remarriage ry ’ y pene rimer ‘ Alvar Act are unconstitult e, IT IS HERE! ECREED tha APPENDIX | loa 6) Defendant, her agents, and employees shall take all reasonable steps, within 120 days of the entry of this Judg ment, to determine the entitlements to survivors’ benefits, to calculate the amounts thereof, and to assure payment of said amounts to class members who applied prior to the date of the entry of this Judgment, retroactive from the respec tive dates on which their eligibilities should have been estab lished had defendant not applied the invalid classificatory scheme (including benefits for al! months of eligibility through the month prior to the month in which prospective benefits are paid, pursuant to paragraph 7 below). (7) Consistent with this Judgment, for those class mem bers whose entitlements have been determined pursuant to paragraph 6 above, defendant, her agents, and employee shall begin paying said class members the prospective bene fits to which they are entitled beginning with the calendar ith following the calendar month in which full retroactive benefits have been paid. Dated: This 20th day of Dec, 1984 s/ Wm. Matthew By rne. Jr WILLIAM MATTHEW BYRNE. JR nited States District Judges Approved As To Form NATIONAL SENIOR C'riZENS LAW CENTER s Gill Deford’ GILL DEFORD Attorneys for Plaintiffs *As per telephonic authorization given 12/19/84 ROBERT C. BONNER United States Attorney FREDERICK M. Brosto, JR Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division S George H Wu GEORGE H. Wt Assistant United States Attorney Att rneys for Defendant a _ 7a APPENDIX F CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAI Case No. CV &83-2436-WMB CV 84-154-WMB BUENTA OWENS. ET AI SEC. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVIC! Present Hon. Wm Matthew Bryne Jr, (Judg: D. Hostith (Deputy Clerk) Rosa Treibach (Court Reporter Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Gill Deford Neal Dudovitz Attorne\ ; Present For Defendants (,eorge Wu, AUSA Proceedings. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ( ounsel are present and the motions are art ué dd to the Court. Both the motion for sanctions and the motion to alter or amend the judgment are denied sa APPENDIX G UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. CV &83-2436-WMB BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIF!} MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT KENNETH R. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFFS MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT FILED MAR. 7, 1985] NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendant Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Serv ices, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final Order entered in this action on Febru ary 6, 1985. The appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 DATED: This 7th day of March, 1985. KOBERT C. BONNER United States Attorney FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR Assistant l/nited States Attorney ("hiet Cian] Division ~ George H. Wu GEORGE H. Wi Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Defendant a APPENDIX H UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. CV &83-2436-WMB BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFI MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DEFENDANT No. CV 84-0154-WMB KENNETH R. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFFS MARGARET HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT [FILED MAR. 9, 1985] AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendant Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Serv ices, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final Order entered in this consolidated ac tion on February 6, 1985. The appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 125: DATED: This 8th day of March, 1985. ROBERT C. BONNER United States Attorney FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division ~ George H. Wu GEORGE H. Wt Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Defendant . i APPENDIX I AGREEMENT The Secretary of Health and Human Services, hereinafter called the Se retary, and Buenta M. Owens, hereinafte1 called the claimant, hereby agree in accordance with the pro visions of chapter III of title 20 of the Code of Federal Regu lations, part 404, section 404.923 through 404.928 to all of the following A. The claimant accepts the factual determinations of the secretary as contained in the reconsideration deter miuation of December 7, 1982, on the wage record of Russell B. Judd, social security number 490-10-018 copy attached) B. The claimant accepts the Se retary s interpreta tion and application of the Social Security Act contained in the above-referenced reconsideration determination except as indicated in paragraph C below. C. The sole issue in dispute is the application of sec tion 202(e)(1)(A) and (e)(4) of the Social Security Act Section 202(e)(1)(A) provides that the widow and every surviving divorced wife may receive survivors benefits if along with other requirements they are not married Section 202(e)(4) modifies the non-marriage require ment in 202(e)(1)(A) it states that, “If a widow, after at taining age 60, marries, such marriage shall, for the purposes of paragraph (1), be deemed not to have occurred.” Mrs. Owens contends that the provision is unconstitutional in that it permits a widow to remarry at age 60 or thereafter without affecting eligibility, but a surviving divorced wife who remarries at age 60 or thereafter is then ineligible for survivors benefits. This provision denies Mrs. Owens the right to receive sur viving divorced wife’s benefits because she remarried, even though such marriage occurred after she had at tained age 60. D. Except for the provisions of section 202(e)(1)(A) and (e)(4) of the Social Security Act, which have been challenged by the claimant as indicated in paragraph C of this agreement, the night of the claimant to benefits has been established by the claimant Kk}. The above-referenced reconsideration determina tion represents the final decision of the Secretary with Dla respect to the claimant in accordance with section 2U2(g) of the Social Security Act F. This agreement constitutes a waiver by the claim ant and the Secretary of the necessity to pursue the re maining steps of the administrative appeals process G. The claimant has 60 days following the date the agreement is signed Dy or on behalf of, the Secretary within which to file a civil action in a U.S. District Court pursuant to section 203(g) of the Social Security Act on the issue stated in paragraph C of thi agreement Signed Buenta M. Owens BUENTA M. OWE) f {7 mant Date: February 11, 1983 Secretary of Health and Human Serv Signed William F’. Cooper De puty Diree fo ‘Bia Date: March 3, 1983 APPENDIX J AGREEMENT The Secretary of Health, and Human Services, hereinafter called the Secretary and Kenneth R. Owens, hereinafter eallled| the claimant, hereby agree in accordance with the provisions of ( hapter Ill of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Part 404. sections 404.923 through 404.928 to all of the following \. The claimant accepts the factual determinations of the Secretary as contained in the reconsideration deter mination of May 12, 1983, on the wage record of Dorothy L. Owens, Social Security Number 568-20-9248 opv attached B. The claimant accepts the Secretary s interpreta tion and application of the Social Security Act contained in the above-referenced reconsideration determination, except as indicated in paragraph CU below C. The sole issue in dispute is the application of se , ; | Dc) it y+] : , tions 202(f)(1)A) and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security D. Except for the provisions of sections 202(f)(1)(A) and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security Act which have been challenged by the claimant as indicated in paragraph CU of this agreement, the nght of the claimant to surviving livorced husband’s benefits has been established by the ‘laimant Ek. The above-referenced reconsideration determina- tion represents the final decision of the Secretary with respect to the claimant in accordance with section 205(¢} of the Social Security Act fF. This agreement constitutes a waiver by the claim ant and the Secretary of the necessity to pursue the re maining scope of the administrative appeals process _ ooa G. The claimant has 60 full days following the date the agreement is signed by, or on behalf of, the Secre tary within which to file a civil action in a U.S. District Court pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act on the issue stated in. paragraph C of this agreement. Signed Kenneth R. Owens KENNETH R. OWENS Claimant Date October 27, 1983 Secretary of Health and Human Services Signed James E. Forbus Acting Deputy Associate Commissioner for Re fire rie ni and Nu rmvnpVores Insuran 4 Date: November 23. 1983 o4a APPENDIX K CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 2. Section 202(e) of the Social Security Act, as in effect when this action was filed and as codified at 42 U.S.C. 402(e), provided in relevant part: Widow’s insurance benefits (1) The widow (as defined in section 416(c) of this ti- tle) and every surviving divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an individual who died a fully insured individual, if such widow or such surviving divorced wife— (A) is not married, (3)) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 but has not attained age 60 and is under a disabil- ity (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which be- gan before the enc of the period specified in para- graph (5), (C)(i) has filed application for widew’s insurance benefits, or was entitled to wife’s insurance benefits, on the basis of the wages and self-employment in- come of such individual, for the month preceding the month in which he died, and (I) has attained age 65 or (II) is not entitled to benefits under subsection (a) of this section or section 423 of this title, or (ii) was entitled, on the basis of such wages and self-employment income, to mother’s insurance bene- fits for the month preceding the month in which she attained age 65, and (D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance amount of such de- ceased individual, shall be entitled to a widow’s insurance benefit for each month,* * *. oa (4) If a widow, after attaining age 60, marries, such marriage shall, for purposes of paragraph (1), be deemed not to have occurred. » - . 3. Section 202(f) of the Social Security Act, as in effect when this action and as codified at 42 U.S.C. 402(f), pro vided in relevant part: Widower’s insurance benefits (1) The widower (as defined in section 416(g) of this title) of an individual who died a fully insured individ ual, if such widower— (A) has not remarried, (B)(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 but has not attained age 60 and is under a disabil- ity (as defined in section 423(d) of the title) which be- gar before the end of the period specified in para- graph (6), (C) has filed application for widower’s insurance benefits or was entitled to husband’s insurance bene- fits, on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such individual, for the month preceding the month in which she died, and (1) has attained age 65 or (II) is not entitled to benefits under subsection (a) of this section or section 423 of this title, (D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance amount of his de- ceased wife, shall be entitled to a widower’s insurance benefit for each month, * * * (5) If a widower. after attaining age 60, marries, such marriage shall, for purposes of paragraph (1), be deemed not to have occurred. 1. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as codified at 42 U.S.C. 405(g), provides: Judicial review Any individual, after any final decision of the Secre- tary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a 56a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secre- tary may allow. Svch action shall be brought in the dis- trict court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his princi- pal place of business within any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District of Co- lumbia. As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision com- plained of are based. The court shall have power to en- ter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the deci- sion of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, be- cause of failure of the claimant or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any reguiation pre- scribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations. The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time orde. additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such addi- tional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the ). Jia original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions. Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shali survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Secretary or any va- cancy in such office. Section 216(d) of the Social Security Act, as in effect when the action was filed and as codified at 42 U.S.C. 416(d), provided in relevant part: Divorced wives; divorce (1) The term “divorced wife” means a woman di- vorced from an individual, but only if she had been mar- ried to such individual for a period of 10 years immedi- ately before the date the divorce became effective (2) The term “surviving divorced wife” means woman divorced from an individual who has died, but only if she had been married to the individual for a period of 10 years immediately before the date the divorce became effective. (4) The terms “divorce” and “divorced” refer to a di- vorce a vinculo matrimonil. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0927%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.