# Record and brief — Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 478 U.S. 421

## Text

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY

AT THE TIME OF FILMING.

IF AND WHEN A

BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE

WILL BE ISSUED.

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5 May "6 1985
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6 May 17 1985
7 May 23 1985
8 May 23 1985
9 Jur 18 1965
10 Jun 18 1985
11 Jut 26 1985
12 Jul 26 1985
13 Jul 22 1985 x
14 Aus 8 1985 X
15 Seo 121985 xX
1¢ Oct 7 1985
7 NOV 11985
18 Nov 17 1985
20 Nov 13 1985
22 Nov ¢€0 1985
23 Nov 27 1985
24 Dec 2 1985
25 Dec 6 1985
26 Dec € 1985
28 Dec 9 1965
29 Dec 12 1965
32 Dec 2€U 1985

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GRANTED

Title: Local 28 of the Sheet Metal horkers' International
Association anc Local 28 Jcoirt Accrerticeshic
Comritteers Petitioners
Ve
Eaqcual employment Opporturity Comrissions, et al.

Court: Uunitec States Court of Appeals

tor the Second Circuit
Counsel tor periticner: Golds-Martin PF.

Counsel tor responcert: Solicitor Gererals KaéhrelLawrerce
Steohen,s Schwarz JrercFrecerick AseOes

7

Sherwood,>.°eter

Note Preceecirgs anc Crcers

~“—- Piano Moving, etc. v.

Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984) ............. 19-20
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) ........ 20
McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187

SU 261 SabuaGinater tl ron wei es eo 16
National Black Police Association, Inc. v. Velde,

712 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1983)............... 14
National Maritime Union v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive

Corp., 737 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1984)......... 12 n.7
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) ........ 16
Penfield Co. of California v. S.E.C., 330 U.S.

| i scart et adied aera aR A 16
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

Se ee I ab bi. voted ei unk peeee eas 20 n.14
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

Be We i ID oi o's doc cans dubecccesvan 20 n.14
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,

ee I ea Wu cawhu oes oce sft 15
Rios v. Enterprise Association of Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) ....... 14

Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) ...... 14

vi

Cases
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).....

United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d
i Snr rer. ere

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).....

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
RE GI 0 ic V ieee dihencescebucssssaencsns

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443

cols seen endaued oss |

Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, No.
83-3091 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1985) .............

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).......

Constitutional Provisions

WD. Goomt. wet. T, GR, Ge. BD wn cc ccccc cr ecseces
U.S. Comet. ast. TT, §3, cl. B... 2... eee eeeee.
6 vids cseccvccsedcseccuce
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Statutes
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
§703(j), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) ..........----.
§706(g), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) ...........--.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, §401(a), 29 U.S.C. §40](a) ..........
Rules
ees 2 eeerrererrrrr rere er reer re
ee. @ Se Serre rrrererr rer rere

ll

19

16

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser TerM, 1984

LOCAL 638... ., LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL
WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,
Petitioners,
— against —
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International
Association and its Joint Apprenticeship Committee (“JAC”),
respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered in this proceeding on January 16, 1985.

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (A-1-52)! is officially
reported at 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985) and is unofficially

' References as to the Appendix to this petition are referred to herein as (A- ).

reported at 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466 (2d Cir. 1985).
Other reported decisions in this case, also included in the Ap-
pendix, are as follows: United States v. Local 638 et al., 337
F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Local 638 et
al., 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Local
638 et al., 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 et al., 401 F. Supp.
467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd as modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1976) (Feinberg, J., concurring); Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission v. Local 638 et al., 421 F. Supp. 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Local 638 et al., 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting) .’

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was entered on January 16, 1985. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article I, §9, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution provides:

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.

Article III, §3, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish-
ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall

* Earlier proceedings in the state courts are reported as follows: State Com-
mission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1964); State Commission For Human Rights vo. Farrell, 47
Misc. 2d 244, 262 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); State Com-
mission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 799, 263 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1965); State Commission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 52
Misc. 2d 936, 277 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd, 27 A.D.2d
327, 278 N.Y.S.2d 982 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 974, 228 N.E.2d 691,
281 N.Y.S. 2d 521 (1967).

work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except dur-
ing the Life of the Person attainted.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... .

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part:

No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the !aws.

Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §2000e-5(g), provides in pertinent part:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as :nay be appropriate, which may
include, but is not lirnited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay (payable
by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice), or anv other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

Section 703(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(j), provides:

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-
preted to require any employer, employment agen-
cy, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin of such individual or group on account

of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer, referred or classified for employment
by any employment agency or labor organization, ad-
mitted to membership or classified by any labor
organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any ap-
prenticeship or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any
community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in any community, State, sec-
tion, or other area.

Section 401(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §401(a) provides in pertinent part:

The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it con-
tinues to be the responsibility of the Federal Govern-
ment to protect employees’ rights to organize, choose
their own representatives, bargain collectively, and
otherwise engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Summary

Since 1975, Petitioners, a labor union and its joint appren-
ticeship committee, have been living under an elaborate race-
conscious affirmative action program designed to integrate the
sheet metal industry in New York. The centerpieces ot the pro-
gram are (1) a nonwhite membership quota of 29%,
denominated a “goal”, and (2) a court-appointed Administrator
(i.e. a special master) who governs Petitioners with respect to
the program on a daily basis, at their expense. As a result of
their failure to meet the goal, Petitioners have row been held
in contempt, largely for failing to comply with ministerial pro-
visions of the program. An expanded race-conscious affirmative
action program has now been ordered in which fines and

penalties will fund education, training, counselling and financial
to govern. Petitioners have been warned by the district court that
if the nonwhite membership “goal” is not met by August 31, 1987,
they “will face fines that will threaten their very existence.”
(A-123). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals distinguished
and limited this Court's recent decision in Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), and affirmed, but
stayed its mandate pending this petition.

Facts and Prior Proceedings

Sheet metal workers are skilled artisans who fabricate sheet
metal into ducts and conduits to convey heating and air-
conditioning through offices and homes. Local 28 is a union af-
filiated with the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association.
The JAC is an apprenticeship committee composed of labor and

are sons or sons-in-law of present or deceased members of the
Union.” (A-421). In 1971, the United States brought suit against
Oe pe tr ag lgeermee ty or Sai

violated engaging in discriminatory hiring prac-
tices regarding the employment of nonwhites.‘

* The case was severed as to each of the defendant unions to
ne aa prior to trial and

* The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was substituted as nam-
ed plaintiff for the federal government. 532 F.2d at 824 n.2 (A-210). The
New York City Commission on Human Rights was granted leave to intervene
in the action against Local 28. 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). (A-394-401).
The New York State Division of Human Rights, initially named as a third-
party defendant, realigned itself as a plaintiff. 753 F.2d at 1175. (A-6).

The district court found that Local 28 and the JAC had
discriminated against nonwhites in violation of Title VII, largely
by following long-established practices of filling positions in the
industry with friends and relatives. 401 F. Supp. at 476. (A-330).
On August 28, 1975, the court entered an Order and Judgment
(the “O & J”) (A-300-316), which required Local 28 and the JAC
to refrain from discriminatory practices in the future and (a)
established a nonwhite membership goal of 29% to be reached
by July 1, 1981; (b) appointed a special master, called an Ad-
ministrator, with broad supervisory powers, who was to propose
and implement an affirmative action plan to govern Petitioners’
employment practices; (c) required Petitioners to administer
“hands-on” nondiscriminatory tests for journeymen; (d) ordered
Petitioners to keep extensive records of applicants to the union
or apprenticeship program; (e) directed Petitioners to issue tem-
porary work permits on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (f) ordered
Petitioners to conduct a publicity campaign to increase nonwhite
awareness “f employment opportunities within the union.

The Administrator submitted an Affirmative Action Program
and Order (AAPO) which established interim annual goals for
nonwhite membership in Local 28, detailed the mechanics for
the conduct of the testing and apprenticeship programs and set
forth elaborate record-keeping requirements for Local 28 and the
JAC. AAPO was approved by the district court and substantially
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.’ 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Feinberg, C.J., concurring). (A-207-229).

Thereafter, a Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order
(RAAPO) was entered in 1977. (A-182-206). RAAPO preserved
the interim membership goals in AAPO, the detailed testing,

* The Court of Appeals modified the district court's order to the extent it had
required that one of the three union representatives to the JAC be replaced by
a representative of minority descent and that three nonwhites be admitted to
the apprenticeship program for every two whites admitted. The Court held that
these remedies constituted quotas of a nature forbidden by Title VII. Judge
Feinberg concurred in the result and the disapproval of the racial quotas. He
wrote separately to stress the difference between racial quotas and goals, and
to note his approval of the 29% figure in the district court order because it was
a goal. (A-227-229).

“4

record-keeping and reporting requirements and the mandated
publicity campaign program to attract nonwhite applicants. A
divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed RAAPO. 565 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1977). (A-160-181).

Judge Meskill dissented (A-169-181) on the ground that the
findings of discrimination, which had been approved by the
earlier Court of Appeals decision, had been improperly deriv-
ed from employment statistics which violated this Court's in-
tervening ruling in Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977). These statistics utilized a population base
restricted to New York City as opposed to the wider geographical
area from which the union actually attracted applicants, and
the findings were in part based upon discriminatory practices
which occurred prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII
does not apply to acts or practices which occurred prior to its
effective date. Judge Meskill concluded that the failure to app-
ly the Hazelwood criteria “cast substantial doubt on the existence
of illegal discrimination by these unions. . . .” (A-169).

For the next several years, Local 28 and the JAC were govern-
ed by the O & J, RAAPO and the day-to-day dictates of the
Administrator. The Administrator approved the size of each of
more than 60 classes of apprentices, the major entry point into
the industry. (A-42). These classes consisted of approximately
45% persons of minority extraction. (A-43). From April 1977
to April 1982, a period of extreme economic distress for the New
York Sheet Metal Industry (A-23-24, 46), total nonwhite
membership in Local 28 increased from 6.1% to 14.9% , while
total membership declined. (A-480).

Despite the substantial increase in nonwhite membership, in
April 1982, as the extended July 1982 deadline for reaching the
nonwhite membership goal approached, the City and State in-
itiated contempt proceedings against the Petitioners, claiming
they had failed to achieve the requisite 29% “goal”. (A-441-477).

The contempt proceeding was clearly premised on the failure
to meet the requisite percentage of minority membership, which
was treated as a quota. Nevertheless, the district court purported

to hold Petitioners in civil contempt for (1) underutilization of
the apprenticeship program; (2) failure to conduct the general
publicity campaign ordered in RAAPO; (3) adoption of a job
protection provision in the collective bargaining agreement that
favored older workers during periods of unemployment (older
workers’ provision); (4) issuance of unauthorized work permits
to white workers from sister locals; and (5) failure to maintain
and submit certain records and reports. The district court im-
posed a fine of $150,000 and assessed costs and attorneys’ fees.
(A-149-159).

In holding Petitioners in civil contempt, the district court
observed that it was not placing primary emphasis on any one
of the above violations but “that the collective effect of these
violations has been to thwart the achievement of the 29% goal
of non-white membership. . . .” (A-155-156).

In April 1983, the City commenced a second contempt pro-
ceeding before the Administrator, charging Local 28 and the
JAC with violating certain ministerial provisions of the O &
J] and RAAPO: (1) Local 28’s tardy submission of various records;
(2) submission of certain inaccurate data by Local 28 and the
JAC,* and (3) Local 28’s failure to serve the O & J and RAAPO
on certain contractors. (A-127-148). No act of racial discrimina-
tion was alleged in the second contempt proceeding.

The district court adopted the Administrator's recommenda-
tion that Local 28 and the JAC be held in contempt and assess-
ed additional penalties. (A-125-126). On September 1, 1983,
the district court issued an order establishing an Employment,
Training, Education and Recruitment Fund (the “Fund”)
(A-113-118), which was “for the purpose of promotion, employ-
ment, training, education and recruitment, and shall be used
solely for the benefit of nonwhites.” (A-114). The Fund was to
be financed in part by the $150,000 levied against Petitioners
in the first contempt proceeding, plus additional administrative

* The sum total of the “inaccurate data” enumerated by the Administrator
consisted of describing “Kaplan” as a Spanish surname and “Marquez” as a
“white” surname. (A-132-133).

ee

expenses and a further fine of $.02 per hour for each journeyman
and apprenticeship hour worked. Its stated purpose is to create
a tutorial program summer jobs, counselling and support ser-
vices, and financial support solely for nonwhite apprentices and
journeymen.

By separate order (A-111-112), the district court adopted an
Amended Affirmative Plan and Order (AAAPO) (A-53-107)
which altered RAAPO in various ways, including: (1) com-
puterization of records to be monitored by an independent ad-
visor to the Administrator; (2) extension of the Plan’s coverage
to include merged locals and their JACs; (3) a requirement that
one nonwhite apprentice be indentured for each white appren-
tice; (4) a requirement that contractors employ one apprentice
for every four journeymen; and (5) replacement of the appren-
ticeship testing program by a three-member selection board,
with one representative selected each by the court, JAC and
the respondents. AAAPO continues the office of the Ad-
ministrator. The expenses of the entire affirmative action pro-
gram, including the fees of the Administrator (at $150 per hour),
his office and administrative expenses, and expenses of the selec-
tion board are all to be borne by Petitioners.

AAAPO also adopted a 29.23% nonwhite membership “goal”;
the slight change from 29% resulted from the merger of several
unions into Local 28. In a memorandum and order
adopting the 29.23% “goal” (A-119-124), the district court stated
that if the Petitioners fail to achieve the percentage by August
31, 1987, they “will face fines that will threaten their very ex-
istence.” (A-123).

The Court of Appeals affirmed all findings of contempt
against Local 28 and the JAC, save one. The exception was the
inclusion of the older workers’ provision in the collective
bargaining agreement, which the court held could not form the
basis for contempt because it had never been implemented. In-
asmuch as the only contempt finding against the Association
was occasioned by its agreement to the older workers’ provi-
sion, all findings and sanctions entered against it were revers-
ed. The Court affirmed all contempt remedies against Local 28

10

and the JAC, including the Fund created only to benefit non-
whites. The adoption of AAAPO was similarly affirmed with
two modifications. First, AAAPO’s requirement that the JAC
indenture whites and nonwhites on a 1:1 ratio was reversed.
Second, the court clarified selection board procedures to avoid
possible confusion as to whether such procedures can be utiliz-
ed before the 29.23% nonwhite membership goal is reached.

Judge Winter dissented and voted to reverse AAAPO and all
findings and remedies. He found “that Local 28 had the ap-
proval of the administrator for every act it took that affected
the number of minority workers entering the sheet metal in-
dustry” (A-38); that the 29% “goal” was, in fact, “an inflexible
racial quota” which is illegal and unconstitutional (A-38-39);
that the only allegation even remotely justifying “the extraor-
dinary sanctions imposed” was the allegation of underutiliza-
tion of the apprenticeship program over which the Ad-
ministrator had total control (A-39); that the finding of
underutilization was based on a statistical analysis which the
entire panel and all parties agreed was erroneous (A-43); that
Local 28 has improperly been effectively placed in receivership
and denied its right of self-government (A-38, 45); and that the
race-conscious contempt remedies are inconsistent with this
Court's decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), and are of “questionable constitutional
validity.” (A-44, 48).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Judge Winter, in the opening lines of his dissent, outlined
the reasons for this Court to grant certiorari:

This case, which raises sensitive constitutional issues
regarding the judicial imposition of racial quotas, con-
troversial questions of statutory interpretation con-
cerning so-called reverse discrimination as a remedy
under Title VII, and more mundane yet important
legal issues as to the use of the contempt power,
divides this court for a third time. EEOC wv. Local
638, 565 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill J.,

11

dissenting); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 833
(2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, C. J., concurring).

(A-38).
I

THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE
LEGALITY OF COURT-IMPOSED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS UNDER TITLE VII

In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
200 (1979) the Court reserved the issue of “what Title VII re-
quires or . . . what a court might order to remedy a past viola-
tion of the Act.” It appeared that the issue was resolved in
Firefighters Local Union No.1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984). The Court’s opinion, written by Justice White, in which
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell join-
ed, exhaustively considered section 706(g) of Title VII and its
legislaive history and held that courts could not order race-
conscious quotas or remedies except to make whole actual vic-
tims of discrimination. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. In a concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor expressed her agreement with this
holding. She concluded that judicial remedies for Title VII viola-
tions were to be employed “only to prevent future violations
and to compensate identified victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion,” (as was done in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-74 (1977)) and that the
“District Court had no authority to order the Department to
maintain its current racial balance or to provide preferential
treatment to blacks.” 104 S. Ct. at 2593-94.

Justice Blackmun’s dissent, in which Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall joined, also considered the issue fully. Clear-
ly, the Court intended to resolve the issue, but the Courts of
Appeals and District Courts which have considered the issue
since Stotts, including the Court of Appeals in the present case,

12

have refused to read Stotts as precluding race-conscious affir-
mative action as a judicial remedy under Title VII. Vanguards
of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, No. 83-3091 (6th Cir. Jan.
23, 1985) (cf. dissent of Kennedy, C.J.); Kromnick v. School
District of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Diaz v. American Telephone &
Telegraph, 752 F.2d 1356, 1360 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1984). Deveraux
v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481 (D. Mass. 1984). These cases restrict
Stotts to situations involving bona fide seniority plans.

The majority opinion below limits Stotts even more severe-
ly. The blatantly race-conscious program judicially imposed
since 1975, the Fund order providing benefits solely to non-
whites, and the nonwhite membership “goal” compelling Peti-
tioners to discriminate against whites or “face fines that will
threaten their very existence” cannot be justified under Justice
White's analysis. Nor can Judge Pratt’s three-pronged attempt
to distinguish Stotts withstand scrutiny. It is an unfair reading
of Stotts to limit it to bona fide seniority plans, “make whole”
as opposed to prospective relief, and cases where there has been
no finding of intent to discriminate. (A-30-31).

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the issue of
whether Stotts is limited as the Court of Appeals held below.
The present case squarely raises the issue. The legality of the
O & J and RAAPO are before the Court because Petitioners have
now been held in contempt for alleged noncompliance with
these decrees.’

AAAPO and the Fund Order raise the issue directly. These
decrees cannot be justified as civil contempt remedies, the per-
missible breadth of which they vastly exceed. (See Point III,

’ A contempt proceeding requires consideration of the legality of the underlying
order. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); National
Maritime Union v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp. , 737 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1984);
Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital & Training, Inc. , 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir.
1980); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336
(3rd Cir. 1976).

tenet “—_

13

infra). As the entire panel of the Court of Appeals recognized,
they can be justified, if at all, only as Title VII remedies.

This case is of great national importance because the deter-
mination of this issue will have enormous impact on the
numerous court-imposed plans presently in effect. See, e.g.,
Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F. 2d 482 (4th
Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d
Cir. 1980).

Regardless of whether this Court intended the limited reading
of Stotts which the majority in the Court below adopted, this
petition for certiorari should be granted. If the important issue
of whether district courts may impose race-conscious plans under
Title VII was not decided by Stotts, it should be decided in this
case. If the Court were to determine that such remedies may
be imposed, the guidelines for such orders should be address-
ed. In the present case the decrees far exceed the bounds which
this Court has fixed for voluntarily-adopted affirmative action
programs,* and vioiate the Congressional prohibition against
employers granting preferential treatment to any group on the
basis of a racial imbalance. Title VII, Section 703(j), 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-2(j).

I

THE FUND ORDER AND AAAPO
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION

A. Equal Protection of the Law

The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the
equal protection limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on
actions of the federal governinent and its agencies, including
judicial orders, and prohibits the federal government from

* United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) adopted
a three-pronged test for voluntarily-adopted plans. (1) They must be
“specifically designed to break down patterns of racial discrimination”; (2)
they must not “unnecessarily trammel” the rights of whites; and (3) they must
be temporary.

14

discriminating between individuals or groups. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Schlesinger v. Bullard, 419 U.S.
498, 500 n. 3 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
National Black Police Association, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984).°

The race-conscious quota in AAAPO and the race-conscious
Fund order deny equal protection of the law to present and
future white members of the union and white applicants to the
apprenticeship program by mandating benefits solely to non-
whites. The nonwhites benefiting from the program are not
identifiable victims of past discrimination, and the whites
discriminated against by the program are not persons who prac-
ticed discrimination."

AAAPO requires the Petitioners to achieve a racial balance
of 29.23% nonwhite members by 1987, and the court has
threatened them with dire consequences if the percentage is not
realized. (A-123). In affirming the O & J in 1976, the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in practice
the mathematical membership goal would require Petitioners
to exclude whites from membership solely on the basis of race.
532 F.2d at 827. (A-216). The Court of Appeals held that such
reverse discrimination was permissible.

In the Court of Appeals decision to which this petition is ad-
dressed, the majority simply states its conclusion that the race-
conscious program does not violate the Constitution. (A-29). Its
only authority is its own decision in Rios v. Enterprise Associa-
tion of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629-31 (2d Cir.
1974), which itself contains no reasoned discussion of the issue.
The majority ignores the fact that Petitioners will obviously be

* Equal protection analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976).

” Judge Winter observed in his dissent that the Fund order has the effect of
holding “Local 28 responsible for improving the quality of public education
in New York.” 753 F.2d at 1195. (A-50).

15

required to engage in overt reverse discrimination to meet the
nonwhite membership “goal” mandated by the district court.

As Judge Winter states in dissent, the orders of the district
court are of “questionable constitutional validity. See Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-320
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).” (A-48). In Bakke, Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court for less than a majority. In
his learned discussion of the application of the equal protec-
tion clause to affirmative action programs, he concludes that
strict racial quotas and other broad racial benefits constitute
unconstitutional reverse discrimination unless tailored to make
whole identified victims of past discrimination, in a manner
which has clearly not occurred here.

The Court should grant certiorari to address the application
of the equal protection clause to the orders of the district court.

B. Corruption of Blood

The construction of Title VII adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals has the effect of making the Civil Rights Act an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder. The reverse discriminatory impact on
innocent white workers occasioned by AAAPO and the Fund
order visits upon them the sins of past discrimination by others.
This construction of Title VII is contrary to basic principles of
individual accountability, and is specifically outlawed by the
prohibition against bills of attainder and corruption of blood
contained in art. I, §9, cl. 3 of the Constitution.

Bills of attainder punish either named individuals or classes
of persons, without judicial proceedings. The practice of “cor-
ruption of blood,” abolished by art. III, §3, cl. 2, continued
the punishment to the heirs of the person attainted. This Court
has repeatedly voiced its objection to such discriminatory legisla-
tion. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,
53 U.S.L.W. 4225, 4238 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985) (Stevens, J. dissen-
ting) (“The Framers that no one ought to be con-
demned for his forefathers misdeeds . . . . ”); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)

16

(“ . . . if any fundamental assumption underlies our system,
it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable.”) Guided by these
fundamentals of our jurisprudence, the Court has declared un-
constitutional legislation that abridged the rights of identifiable
classes of individuals to employment. United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).

The Court should grant certiorari to address the dimensions
of these constitutional rights and their application to the Civil
Rights Act.

Il

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED EMASCULATE THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT AND DENY DUF PROCESS TO
PETITIONERS

Judicial sanctions for civil contempt are wholly remedial and
may be imposed only to compel compliance with prior orders
of the court or to compensate the complaining party for actual
losses proved to have been suffered by him. McComb v. Jackson-
ville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304 (1947); Penfield Co. of
California v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947). Contempt remedies
which are punitive in nature may be imposed only in a criminal
contempt proceeding, Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941),
brought under Rule 42, Fed. R. Crim. P., in which the defen-
dant is afforded the protections of Due Process applicable to
a proceedings. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
( ).

The entire panel in the Court of Appeals agreed, and all par-
ties concede, that such procedures were not followed in this case.
(A-25). The remedies must thus be justified as sanctions for civil
contempt, or they cannot be upheld."

'' Alternatively, Respondents may argue, certain provisions could be justified
as remedies under Title VII. See Point I, supra.

17

In upholding the remedies imposed here, the majority paid
lip service to the standards enumerated above, but so departed
from their application as to emasculate ‘he differences between
civil and criminal contempt and sustain criminea] sanctions
against the Petitioners without Due Process. In addition, the
Court of Appeals has created a precedent with potential broad
applicability which departs from well-settled principles.

The Court of Appeals misconstrued the nature of compen-
satory civil contempt remedies, and then clearly implied that
if the sanctions imposed can be said to have compensatory or
coercive “components”, then the inquiry ends without even ex-
amining other aspects of the penalty which have neither feature.

The fines imposed here are to be used to provide tutorial,
counselling and financial supp«rt for nonwhites. The majority
approved these fines as a compensatory civil contempt remedy
despite the fact that no proof was presented that any identifiable
person was damaged. Indeed, ao proof of damage of any kind
was

The “coercive component” found by the Court of Appeals suf-
fers from a similar infirmity. The orders continue until the
29.23% nonwhite membership “goal” is reached, which the
Court of Appeals found provided Petitioners with the requisite
opportunity to purge themselves of the contempt. But the con-
tempt was purportedly not based on Petitioners’ failure to meet
the “goal”. Thus a civil contempt remedy which coerces them
to reach the “goal” is a gross departure from settled principles
of civil contempt remedies.

In actuality, Petitioners have been punished criminally
without the procedural requirements of such a proceeding, and
thus without Due Process. This Court should grant certiorari
to restate the principles of civil contempt.

2 In his dissent, Judge Wiater reasons with compelling logic that petitioners
were in reality held in contempt solely for their failure to meet the 29% racial
quota. (A-38-48).

IV

THE DISTRICT COURT'S USE OF STATISTICAL
EVIDENCE VIOLATED TITLE VII AND DUE
PROCESS

The district court's 1975 finding that petitioners violated the
Civil Rights Law is the underpinning for all the proceedings which
have followed. Two years later this Court decided Hazelwood
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) and held:
(1) events which predated the Civil Rights Act could not be used
as evidence of the Act's violation; and (2) proof of a pattern of
discrimination by statistical evidence must be logically consistent
and must be drawn from relevant geographical locations. The
original district court decision in the present case violated both
of these requirements. This departure was the basis for Judge
Meskill’s dissent from the court's affirmance of RAAPO. Inasmuch
as Petitioners have now been held in contempt for violating the
O & J and RAAPO, the propriety of the evidence upon which
they were based is ripe for review by this Court.

The misuse of statistics was repeated, and thus compounded,
in the 1982 contempt finding. Proof of the only charge which could
be construed as a discriminatcry practice, the underutilization of
the apprentice program, was based upon statistics which all par-
ties and the entire panel of the Court of Appeals agree were
misunderstood by the district court. (A-15-16). The majority below
overlooked this failure by stating that other facts substantiated
the finding, which they do not.”

The facts are logically analyzed in Judge Winter's dissent.
(A-38-52). As he demonstrates, the proof concerning underutiliza-
tion of the apprentice program is additionally deficient. It
overlooks the role of the Administrator who has final authority
with respect to the utilization of the apprentice program, and who

approved each new class of apprentices.

“ Thus, for example, the percentage of unemployed apprentices had drop-
ped to 0% by 1981, the time when it is claimed they were not being utilized.

Clearly, they were utilized fully.

This Court should review the procedures followed by the
district court in drawing conclusions from statistics without
carefully considering“. . . all of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), including whether acts ap-
proved by the Administrator can be contemptuous.

Vv

THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR CON.
STITUTES UNJUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE WITH
THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

AAAPO continues the office of the special master, called an
Administrator, originally appointed in the O & J, with broad
supervisory powers over Petitioners’ compiiance with the affir-
mative action plan. Thus, with respect to key elements of its
internal affairs — hiring and employment — Petitioners have
been placed under what Judge Winter characterized as a
receivership. (A-38, 45). This infringement of the union's
statutory right of self-government began in 1975 and will con-
tinue until August 1987.

The Court should grant certiorari to consider the extent of
judicial power to interfere with the internal management of a
union as a part of the remedial action ordered under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. The issue was addressed by the Court
of Appeals in 1976 on appeal from the O & J (532 F.2d at 829).
(A-220). It then approved the suspension of self-government as
“necessary”, with little discussion and without citation of
authority. In its decision to which this petition is addressed, the
Court of Appeals again considered the issue and adhered to its
earlier position.

The appointment and continuation of the Administrator
possessed with broad powers “to exercise day-to-day oversight
of the union’s affairs” (A-220) constitutes an unwarranted denial
aa ne
by Section 401(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §401(a). Cf. Local No. 82,

20

Furniture & Piano Moving, etc. v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557
(1984). Before approving an order which abridges this right,
a court should be required to find that erforcement of its orders
by use of traditional remedies is unavailing.

Rule 53, Fed. R. Civ. P., empowers the court, in exceptional
circumstances, to appoint a special master to ensure compliance
with its orders. The text of Rule 53(b), however, counsels
restraint in the use of a special master: “A reference to a master
shall be the exception and not the rule”, accord, Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 272 (1976), and this Court has employed
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to vacate improvident
references to a special master. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1957).

The Court should grant certiorari to review this judicial in-
trusion in the internal affairs of a union.

CONCLUSION

A decade ago, petitioners were found to have violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, largely on the basis of statistical
evidence of a kind which has since been disallowed. A well-
intentioned but ill-conceived series of orders and judgments are
all hinged upon this questionable finding. Petitioners have been
ordered to comply with racial quotas under penalty of extinc-
tion; ordered to fund and administer a blatantly race-conscious
affirmative action program; been adjudicated in contempt on
the basis of evidence which does not withstand scrutiny; been
subjected to civil contempt penalties which deny Due Process
because they are in reality criminal penalties; have endured an
unjustifiable denial of self-government; and have been subjected
to the daily interference of a court-appointed Administrator.

“ See also Pennhurst State School & Hospital o. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54
(1981) (White, J. dissenting in part) (“In any event, however, the court should
not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the first in-
stance which patients should remain and which should be removed”). In its
subsequent opinion in Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1964), this Court reserv-
ed decision on the propriety of the order appointing the special master as it
may have violated principles of comity.

are “ee ee

21

Throughout this decade, it has never been shown that Petitioners
have discriminated against even one identifiable person, or that
the purposes of the Civil Rights Act could not have been achieved
by a simple injunction.

Moreover, the end is not in sight. There is no apparent course
of action which Petitioners could follow which would end the
— interference, the endless litigation and the great finan-
ci ain.

e
This Court should grant certiorari, vindicate Petiticners’
rights, and fix the rules so that the numerous civil rights pro-
ceedings brought throughout the nation do not result in similar
departures from the law and the Constitution, and cause many

others the loss of basic freedoms.
Dated: New York, New York
April 16, 1985

Respectfully submitted,
WiLuiaM RorTHBERG Martin R. Gotp
—_ & ROTHBERG (Counsel of Record)
Brooklyn, New York 11241 a eng =
(718) 624-2200 Gowp, FARRELL & Marks

New York, New York 10017
(212) 697-9895

Co-Counsel for Local 28

595 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 935-9200

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Dated January 16, 1985..............

Amended Affirmative Action Program and Order
Entered November 4, 1983 ..................

Order Entered October 13, 1983 Setting Forth
Procedures for Implementing Order
Establishing Employment, Training, Education
and Recruitment Fund......................

Order Entered September 1, 1983 Adopting
Amended Affirmative Action Program and

Order Entered September 1, 1983 Establishing
Employment, Training, Education and
Ee

Memorandum and Order Entered September 1,
1983 Imposing 29.23% Nonwhite Membership

Order Entered August 24, 1983 Holding Local 28
and the JAC In Contempt and Imposing

Administrator's Memorandum Decision Entered
June 9, 1983, Finding Local 28 And the JAC
Violated O & J and RAAPO.................

Decision of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Entered August 19, 1982
Holding Petitioners In Contempt .............

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Dated October 18, 1977..............

Page

Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order Dated
NS oc oie kee 68 ata ees

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Dated March 8, 1976 ................

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Dated November 25, 1975

Order and Judgment Entered August 25, 1975 ...

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Dated July 18, 1975 .....

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Dated July 7, 1972 ......

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Dated June 14, 1972.....

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York Dated January 3, 1972...

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the County of
New York Dated August 24, 1964 ............

Notice of Motion Dated April 16, 1982..........

Affidavit of Charles R. Foy in Support of Motion
ir Rs cn ecb de nccscahudsacenseyes ss

Affidavit of Sheila Abdus-Salaam in Support of
Motion for Comtempt ........ ccc ccccceees

Page 22 of Defendants’ (Petitioners’) Reply
es os ee deena ene ee

Page 19 of Plaintiffs’ (Respondents’) Reply
SE cectucaweenseuasdsekaebhaudes

Page

A-182

A-l

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111 — Aug. Term 1983

(Argued: April 13, 1984 Decided: January 16, 1985)
Docket Nos. 82-6241, 82-6243, 83-6353, 83-6357,
83-6295, 83-6299

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plainti ff-A ppellee,
and THE CITY oF NEW YorRK,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-A ppellant,

—against—

LOCAL 638 .. . LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS’
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 28 JoINT AP-
PRENTICESHIP . . . , SHEET METAL AND AIR-CONDI-
TIONING CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK
City, INc.,

Defendants-A ppellants-Cross-A ppellees.

i

LOCAL 28,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

—against—

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION oF HUMAN RIGHTs,
Third-Party Defendant-Plaintiff-A ppellee.

A-2
LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,
Fourth-Party Plaintiff,
—against—

New YorK STATE DIVISION oF HUMAN RIGHTS,
Fourth-Party Defendant.

Before:
MANSFIELD, WINTER, and PRaTT, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from several orders of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York,
granted by the late Judge Henry F. Werker, finding de-
fendants in contempt of court, imposing both compensa-
tory and coercive fines, and adopting an amended affirma-
tive action plan to govern defendants’ employment
practices. Cross-appeal by plaintiff City of New York
from an order establishing for defendant union a non-
white membership goal of 29.23%.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with the opinion. Judge Winter
dissents in a separate opinion.

Otto V. OBERMAIER, New York, NY (Ron-
ald C. Minkoff, Obermaier, Morvillo &
Abramowitz, Edmund P. D’Elia, NY,
NY; William Rothberg, Brooklyn, NY,
of Counsel), for Defendants-Appellants-
Cross-Appellees Local 28 and Local 28
Joint Apprenticeship Committee.

A-3

MARTIN R. GoLD, New York, NY (Jane G.
Stevens, Deborah Sherman, Gold, Farrell,
& Marks, NY, NY; William Rothberg,
Brooklyn, NY, of Counsel), for Defen-
dant-Appellant Sheet Metal and Air Con-
ditioning Contractors’ Association of New
York City, Ine.

SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM, New York, NY, Assis-
tant Attorney General of the State of
New York (Robert Abrams, Attorney
General of the State of New York, Rose-
marie Rhodes, Allen D. Aviles, Assistant
Attorneys General, NY, NY, of Counsel),
for Plaintiff-Appellee State Division of
Human Rights.

CHARLES R. Foy, New York, NY (Frederick
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel,
Francis Caputo, NY, NY, of Counsel),
for Plainti ff-A ppellee-Cross-A ppellant City
of New York.

WARREN Bo DUPLINSKY, Attorney, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, Wash-
ington, DC (David L. Slate, General
Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate
General Counsel, Barbara Lipsky, Acting
Assistant General Counsel, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, Wash-
ington, DC, of Counsel), for Plaintiff-
Appellee Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

PRATT, Circuit Judge:

Defendants, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’
International Association (Local 28), the Local 28 Joint

A-+

Apprenticeship Committee (JAC), and the Sheet Metal
and Air Conditioning Contractors’ Association of New
York City (contractors’ association) appeal from several
orders of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, granted by the late Henry F.
Werker, Judge, which (1) held all defendants in contempt
of court for violating numerous provisions of the Revised
Affirmative Action Program and Order (RAAPO) gov-
erning defendants’ employment practices relating to non-
whites (black and Spanish-surnamed workers); (2) im-
posed both compensatory and coercive contempt fines to
be used to fund supplemental training for nonwhite ap-
prentices; and (3) adopted a new Amended Affirmative
Action Plan and Order (AAAPO) proposed by plaintiffs.
The City of New York (city) cross-appeals from an order,
incorporated in AAAPO, establishing a temporary non-
white membership goal for Local 28 of 29.23%. As to
Local 28 and the JAC, we affirm all but one of the con-
tempt findings and all of the sanctions ordered below; as
to the contractors’ association, we reverse the only con-
tempt finding attributable to it, and reverse the award of
administrative expenses, costs, and attorneys fees against
it. We also affirm, with two modifications, the AAAPO
entered by the district court. Because Judge Werker’s
findings with regard to the membership goal contained in
AAAPO were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the cross-
appeal.

These appeals and cross-appeal! arise from yet another
attempt to force Local 28 and its JAC to correct the dis-
criminatory practices they have used to keep nonwhites
out of Local 28. As we have stated before, “Local 28
and the JAC are no strangers to the courts”, EEOC v.
Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1976), and for a
more complete history of this protracted struggle we refer

the uninitiated reader to the many earlier opinions deal-
ing with these defendants. £.g., State Commission for
Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Mise. 2d 958 (New York
Cty. 1964) ; State Commission of Human Rights v. Far-
rell, 47 Misc. 2d 244 (New York Cty. 1965) ; State Com-
mission of Human Rights v. Farrell, 52 Misc. 2d 936
(New York Cty. 1967), affd, 27 A.D.2d 327 (1st Dep’t),
affd, 19 N.Y.2d 974 (1967); United States v. Local 638,
Enterprise Association, etc., 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. -
1975), affd as modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976);
EEOC v. Local 638, 421 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977).

I. BACKGROUND

Local 28 is a union composed of workers who per-
form sheet metal work in the New York metropolitan
area. At the time this litigation was instituted Local 28
represented sheet metal workers only in New York City;
but in 1981 it merged with several of its sister locals and
now represents sheet metal workers in New York City,
in Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York State, and
in Essex, Passaic, Hudson, and Bergen counties in New
Jersey.

The JAC is a management-labor committee respon-
sible for operating the Sheet Metal Work Apprenticeship
Training Program (apprenticeship program), a four-year
program designed to teach sheet metal skills. A student
entering the apprenticeship program is indentured, and
upon graduation becomes a journeyman.

The contractors’ association, as its name implies, is
a trade association of building contractors who perform

sheet metal work in New York City. Although not named
in the original complaint, the contractors’ association was
joined by the court to permit complete relief. EEOC v.
Local 638, 532 F.2d at 824 n.3.

A. Prior Proceedings.

This action was instituted in 1971 by the United
States Department of Justice under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. (1982),
against Local 28 and the JAC to enjoin a pattern and
practice of discrimination i nonwhites. Shortly
thereafter, the Equal t Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) was substituted as plaintiff, the city inter-
vened as a plaintiff, and the New York State Division
of Human Rights (state), initially named as a third-
party defendant, realigned itself with the EEOC and the
city. After a three-week trial in 1975, Judge Werker
found that Local 28 and the JAC had purposefully dis-
criminated against nonwhites in violation of Title VII.
EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. at 486.

The district court found that the discriminatory
methods used by Lucal 28 and the JAC effectively ob-
structed every route that nonwhites might use to gain

|
:
:
i
:
:

neyman’s examination; (3) transfer from a sister local;

and (4) organization of nonunion shops coupled with
certification of both employer need and worker ability.

Judge Werker found that a majority of Local 28’s

members were admitted through the apprenticeship pro-
gram. He further found that entry of nonwhites into

—. we ae ae

that program had been blocked by the JAC and Local 28
by using invalid entrance exams, by requiring that appli-
cants possess a high school diploma, and by inquiring into
applicants’ arrest records. Significantly, Judge Werker
also noted that proof of the plaintiffs’ case was made
extremely difficult because the union refused to keep re-
cords showing each applicant’s race and national origin
as required by EEOC regulations.

Judge Werker further found that the local had im-
peded the other avenues of entry into the union by using
invalid journeymen’s examinations, by refusing to accept
nonwhite transfers from sister locals while issuing tem-
porary work permits primarily to white workers, and by
selectively organizing only those shops having a high
percentage of white employees. /d. at 476-87. In July
1975 Judge Werker entered an order and judgment
(O&J) which not only prohibited the defendants from
discriminating against nonwhites seeking union member-
ship, but also ‘a) appointed a special master, called an
“administrator”, to propose and implement an affirmative
action plan to govern defendants’ employment practices;
(b) established a nonwhite union membership goal of
29% to be reached by July 1, 1981; (c) directed defend-
ants to administer a nondiscriminatory “hands-on”
journeymen’s examination at least once a year; (d) di-
rected defendants to issue temporary work permits on
a nondiscriminatory basis; and (e) ordered defendants to
conduct a publicity campaign designed to increase non-
white awareness of employment opportunities in the
union. Jd. at 489-90.

On appeal, we affirmed Judge Werker’s finding that
Local 28 and the JAC had intentionally violated Title VII,
but reversed two provisions of the relief ordered in the

A-8

O&J and in the Affirmative Action Plan and Order
(AAPO), which was adopted by the district court during
the pendency of the appeal from the O&J. EEOC V. Local
638, 532 F.2d at 833. After remand, Judge Werker
adopted a Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order
(RAAPO) to reflect the modifications this court made to

the O&J and AAPO. We subsequently approved RAAPO.
EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 36.

Generally, RAAPO incorporated the provisions of the
O&J. It also established intermediate nonwhite member-
ship goals in order to accomplish the ultimate 29% goal,
and ordered defendants to develop the apprenticeship pro-
gram, to increase and maintain nonwhite enrollment, to
maintain detailed records regarding union employment

practices, and to submit
en periodic reports summarizing

B. The Contempt Proceedings and AAAPO.

On April 16, 1982, the city and state moved in the
district court for an order holding Local 28, the JAC, the
contractors’ association, and 121 contractors in contempt
for failing to comply with the O&J, RAAPO, and two
orders of the administrator. Specifically, plaintiffs al-
leged that defendants had violated the O&J and RAAPO
by not achieving the 29% nonwhite membership goal by
July 1, 1982, and that the failure was due to defendants’
numerous violations of the district court’s orders. De-
fendants cross-moved to terminate both the O&J and
RAAPO. A hearing was held on June 10, 1982, at which
both sides submitted voluminous exhibits and live testi-
mony to detail how the O&J and RAAPO had operated
over the previous six years.

A-9

In August 1982 Judge Werker held defendants in
civil contempt. Although nonwhite membership in Local
28 was only 10.8% at the time of the hearing, he did not
rest his contempt finding on failure to meet the 29%
membership goal by the date ordered in RAAPO. In-
stead, he found that defendants had “failed to comply
with RAAPO * * * almost from its date of entry”. Spe-
cifically, Judge Werker found that “(five) separate
actions or omissions on the part of the defendants have
impeded the entry of non-whites into Local 28 in contra-
vention of the prior orders of this court.” Those five
were (1) adoption of a policy of underutilizing the ap-
prenticeship program to the detriment of nonwhites; (2)
refusal to conduct the general publicity campaign ordered
in RAAPO; (3) adoption of a job protection provision
in their collective bargaining agreement that favored
ole*r workers and discriminated against nonwhites (old-
e: workers’ provision); (4) issuance of unauthorized
work permits to white workers from sister locals; and
(5) failure to maintain and submit the records and re-
ports required by RAAPO, the O&J, and the adminis-
trator. After discussing these points Judge Werker
concluded: “Based on the foregoing violations of the
orders of the court and the Administrator, I have no
other recourse but to hold the defendants in civil con-
tempt of court.” He did so “without placing primary
emphasis on any one of the violations of the RAAPO and
O&J”, and he noted, “I am convinced that the collective
effect of these violations has been to thwart the achieve-
ment of the 29 percent goal of non-white membership in
Local 28 established by the court in 1975.”

“(Tlo remedy the past noncompliance of the defen-
dants”, Judge Werker imposed a fine of $150,000 to be

A-10

placed in a training fund to be used to increase nonwhite

membership in the apprentivestip program and, ultimate-
ly, in Local 28. The court directed administrator to

On April 11, 1983, the city brought a second contempt
proceeding, this time before the administrator, charging
Local 28 and the JAC with additional violations of the
O&J and RAAPO, as well as orders of the administrator.
By the conclusion of the hearing these charges were dis-
tilled into three categories: (1) Local 28’s failure to
provide the records required by the O&J and RAAPO in
a timely fashion; (2) failure by both Local 28 and JAC
to provide data that was accurate, and (3) Local 28’s

puterized recordkeeping system to be maintained by out-
side consultants and that they should make further con-
tributions to the training fund whose details were stil!
under consideration.

After reviewing the arguments of the parties, the
record of the hearing held before the administrator, and
the objections to the findings of the administrator, Judge
Werker adopted the recommendation that Local 28 and the
JAC be held in civil contempt for the additional viola-
tions. He deferred ruling on the amount of fines to be
imposed unti] the administrator could submit his recom-

A-1l

mendations regarding the training fund, but he immedi-
ately ordered the JAC and Local 28 to pay the cost of
outside consultants to monitor computerization of the

local’s records.

In September 1983 Judge Werker entered two more
orders. One adopted the administrator’s propasal to
establish an Employment, Training, Education and Rez
cruitment Fund (the fund). The other adopted the Amend-
ed Affirmative Action Plan and Order (AAAPO) pro-
posed by the plaintiffs and the administrator.

The training fund was to consist of the $150,000 fine

required the contractors’ association and the JAC, jointly,
to pay the fund’s administrative expenses. The general
purpose of the fund was to compensate for defendants’
underutilization of the apprenticeship program by en-
couraging the participation of nonwhites.

them to stay in the trade and to upgrade their skills; (4)
to provide financial support to any employer who cannot
afford to hire additional apprentices to meet the “~
of one apprentice to every four journeymen required

the court; and (5) to provide incentive or matching funds
to attract additional governmental or private job training

a Fate eee « . oe

A-13

II. DISCUSSION

A. Liability for Contempt.

It is well settled in this circuit that a party may be
held in civil contempt for failure to comply with an order
of the court if the order being enforced is “clear and un-
ambiguous, the proof of noncompliance is ‘clear and con-
vincing,’” and the defendants have not “been reasonably
diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what
was ordered.” Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 931 (2d
Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832
(1981). It is not necessary to show that defendants dis-
obeyed the district court’s orders willfully. McComb v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) ; Dono-
van V. Sovereign Security Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
1984).

When we previously reviewed the district court’s
1975 O&J and RAAPO, we affirmed the general provisions
of each. EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 31. After re-
examining the specific provisions of those orders that de
fendants are now charged with violating, we are satisfied
that they are clear and unambiguous. Indeed, defendants
do not even claim that the burdens imposed by the O&J
and RAAPO were unclear; instead they offer other de-
fenses to excuse their admitted noncompliance.

1. Challenges to the First Contempt Proceeding.

As to those findings in the first contempt proceeding
that relate to the issuance of unauthorized work permits,
failure to propose and conduct a general publicity cam-
paign, adoption of the older workers’ provision, and the
record keeping violations, Local 28 and the JAC virtually
concede the facts showing those violations, but offer three

A-14

arguments to excuse their noncompliance. They first
argue that, under 7 41(a) of RAAPO, the disputes about
unauthorized work permits and failure to conduct the
general publicity campaign have been resolved before the
administrator and thus are moot. Next, again relying
on 7 41(a), they argue that plaintiffs failed to complain to
the administrator about the older workers’ provision and
the recordkeeping violations, and were thus barred from
doing so after 30 days. Finally, as an alternative, they
argue that laches should bar plaintiffs from complaining
about any of these four violations. Not one of these
arguments has merit.

Our examination of the record convinces us that de-
fendants’ disputes with plaintiffs and the administrator,
with regard to the general publicity campaign and the
unauthorized work permits, were never resolved. Judge
Werker correctly rejected defendants’ second argument
when he pointed out that 1 41(b) provides that “the par-
ties may make a complaint to the administrator”, thus
showing that while 1 41(a) provided one means to resolve
disputes, it was not the only means, and its 30 day limita-
tion period could not bar plaintiffs from complaining to
the district court about the older workers’ provision and
recordkeeping violations.

On their alternative laches defense Local 28 and the
JAC argue that plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in assert-
ing the contempt claims, that the delay was inexcusable,
and that their failure to act quickly prejudiced defen-
dants. Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 614
F.2d 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
Initially, although plaintiffs may have been in the best
position to bring defendants’ violations to the attention
of the district court, it was the defendants who were

A-15

charged with reasonable diligence and making energetic
efforts to comply with the orders of the court. Their
attempt to shift the onus of inactivity to plaintiffs is mis-
guided.

Even if we were to entertain the laches defense, how-
ever, it would fail, for plaintiffs did not sit quietly by
while defendants refused to comply with the district
court’s orders. Instead, they complained, albeit infor-
mally, to defendants and to the administrator on many
occasions. Defendants had ample notice that plaintiffs
were dissatisfied with their efforts, and they cannot
credibly claim they relied on plaintiffs’ “inaction”. De-
spite repeated urgings by plaintiffs and the administrator,
defendants ignored, or at best made only minimal efforts
to comply with, the district court’s orders. Moreover,
plaintiffs initially pursued measures less drastic than
contempt in their attempt to urge defendants toward
compliance. See United States v. United Shoe Corp., 391
U.S. 244, 249 (1968). Defendants’ laches defense there-
fore fails, and the district court’s findings of contempt
with regard to the issuance of unauthorized work permits,
failure to propose the general publicity campaign, and
record keeping violations are affirmed. For other reasons
discussed below, however, we reverse the finding with
respect to the older workers’ provision.

Local 28 and the JAC raise a more credible challenge
to the district court’s finding that the apprenticeship
program was underutilized. To show that the apprentice-
ship program was underutilized after the O&J was entered
in 1975, Judge Werker sought to compare the number of
apprentices indentured between 1971 and 1975 with the
number indentured between 1976 and 1981. In so doing,
however, he mistakenly compared the total number en-

A-16

rolled in all four years of the program during the period
before the O&J, 1971-75 (2,164) with the number inden-
tured, that is the new enrollees, during the period after
the O&J, 1976-81 (334). Defendants seize upon this
error to argue that the district court’s entire finding of
underutilization was clearly erroneous, and that the con-
tempt order must therefore be reversed. We disagree
with defendants’ conclusions.

Contrary to the argument advanced by Local 28 and
the JAC, Judge Werker’s finding of underutilization does
not hinge entirely on his mistaken statistical comparison
of the pre- and post-judgment figures. That factor was
only a small part of the overall evidence showing under-
utilization of the apprenticeship program. Other evidence
showed that after the O&J was entered:

@ There was a sharp increase in the ratio of
journeymen to apprentices employed by contractors. It
rose from 7:1 before the O&J to 18:1 by 1981. The ratio
generally recognized by the industry was 4:1, a ratio that
Local 28 indicated it would follow when it registered its

apprenticeship program with the New York State Depart-
ment of Labor.

(2) The average number of hours worked annually

by Local 28’s journeymen increased dramatically from
1,066 in 1975 to 1,666 in 1981.

(3) The percentage of unemployed apprentices de-
creased from 6.7% in 1977 to 0% by 1981.

(4) Between July 1981 and March 1982 the union
issued more than 200 temporary work permits, predomi-
antly to white journeymen.

(5) Defendants refused to conduct the general pub-

licity campaign that was designed to attract nonwhites to
the apprenticeship program.

A-17

In short, despite a need for more apprentices demon-
strated by items (1) through (4) above, defendants
refused to advertise the apprenticeship program and
thereby help fill the need. This evidence solidly supports
Judge Werker’s conclusion that defendants underutilized
the apprenticeship program. Moreover, any lack of more
specific figures with respect to utilization of the appren-
ticeship program is attributable to defendants’ failure to
comply with the reporting requirements of the court's
order, Defendants may not benefit from this non-compli-

Defendants’ final challenge to the first contempt pro-
ceeding focuses on the older workers’ provision. They
contend that the district court clearly erred in finding
that provision violated the paragraphs of the O&J which
enjoined defendants from doing any act with the purpose
or effect of discriminating against nonwhites. Defen-
dants contend that the older workers’ provision was never
implemented, and therefore did not have any effect—dis-
criminatory or otherwise—on nonwhites. We agree.

Paragraphs 1, 7, and 21(g) of the O&J enjoin
Local 28, the JAC, and the contractors’ association from
engaging in any act “which has the purpose or effect of
discriminating [against nonwhites]”. During negotia-
tions on their collective bargaining agreement, Local 28,
the contractors’ association, and individual employers
agreed to amend their labor agreement to provide pro-
tection for Local 28 members who were over 52 years of
age. They entered into a memorandum of agreement
which included the following provision:

During periods of unemployment, there shall be

a ratio of one man to every four men (1:4) to be
fifty-two (52) years and older in the shop and field.

—_ Cet «44.

A-18

The essence of this provision was to ensure that one
older worker over 52 would be employed for every four
workers employed. There is no claim that its purpose
was to discriminate against nonwhites. Instead, plaintiffs
claim that this older workers’ provision was merely dis-
criminatory in effect, because the percentage of nonwhites
in the protected age group was very small as a result of
defendants’ past discriminatory practices. However. de-
fendants introduced evidence, not contested by plaintiffs,
showing that the provision had never been applied in
practice. Thus, although plaintiffs proved through the
testimony of Dr. Harriet Zollner that, if implemented, the
provision would have had a disparate impact, defendants
established that no such impact had ever occurred.

Plaintiffs, therefore, failed to prove that the older
workers’ provision had either a discriminatory purpose or
present discriminatory effect, and Judge Werker erred in
holding Local 28, the JAC, and the contractors’ associa-
tion in contempt for merely agreeing to the older work-
ers’ provision. “{A] district court, in exercising the
awesome power of contempt, must turn square corners”.
United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir.
1984). We therefore reverse the contempt finding against
all defendants with regard to the older workers’ provision.
If the district court concludes that the provision will have
a potentially discriminatory effect, it may strike the provi-
sion from the collective bargaining agreement and thereby
insure that its discriminatory impact will never be felt.

However, on this record even such a mild injunctive
remedy may be unnecessary in the absence of more facts
with respect to the older workers’ provision. On oral
argument we were told that the provision had been, or
was about to be, removed from the collective bargaining

A-19

agreement entirely. Moreover, in a motion made shortly
before oral argument, defendants asserted that the versicn
of the older workers’ provision that was actually incor-
porated into the collective bargaining agreement had ap-
plied only to journeymen and not to apprentices. If the
provision no longer exists, or alternatively, if it applies
only to journeymen and if there is no evidence to suggest
that the provision will have a discriminatory effect on

then there is no reason in this action to grant

criminate against nonwhites. If the adopted provision

older workers’ provision was the only alleged contemptu-
ous conduct attributed to the contractors’ association.
Because of it Judge Werker ordered the contractors’ asso-
ciation and the JAC to pay jointly for the administrative
costs of the training fund. Since there was no contempt
in this regard, however, there is no basis for any relief
against the contractors’ association. We leave it to the
discretion of the district judge to determine how the con-
tractors’ association's share of those costs should be re-
allocated between Local 28 and the JAC.

Similarly, we reverse the court’s award of attor-
neys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs as against the contrac-

A-20

tors’ association. As will be discussed in II.B., infra,

To sum up on the first contempt proceeding, we
affirm the district court’s findings with regard to four of
the five bases for its decision. We reverse insofar as a
contempt finding was based on the older workers’ provi-
sion, and we remand to the district court to determine the
status and effect of that provision. We also reverse all
relief granted against the contractors’ association. We

now turn to the second contempt proceeding.

2. Challenges to the Second Contempt Proceeding.

Local 28 and the JAC raise various challenges to the
second contempt proceeding conducted before the adminis-

RAAPO, (c) that the administrator waived any reporting
requirements as to the merged locals, and (d) that the

plaintiffs complaint about inaccurate man-hour reports
was barred by laches.

(a) Local 28 was charged with violating an order of
the administrator requiring it to serve the O&J and
RAAPO on each employer by mail that was “certified,
return receipt requested. Copies of the certification cards
are to be provided to the parties upon their receipt by
Local 28.” At the second contempt hearing, piaintiffs

+
a8
ee
F

Le
it
‘ Hi
uit
i
tT

{c) Defendants also argue that the administrator

waived the reporting requirements as to merged locals.
We find no evidence in the record to support a waiver.

A-22

On the contrary, the administrator urged Local 28 to
have its records include data on the merged locals, bu
defendants ignored him.

(d) Finally, defendants urge laches as a bar to
plaintiffs’ complaints about inaccurate man-hour reports
because “the city should have been aware that the JAC’s
apprentice manhour reports were inaccurate’. Again
defendants misconstrue the obligations of the parties: it
is defendants who are charged with the duty to comply
with the court’s orders, not plaintiffs. Defendants can-
not complain simply because plaintiffs did not discover
defendants’ errors sooner, for they disregarded the court’s
orders at their own peril. See McComb v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 192. Defendants’ laches defense
also fails because they have pointed to no evidence show-
ing either reliance on plaintiff's inactivity, or prejudice
resulting therefrom.

In sum, on the second contempt proceeding, the dis-
trict court’s determination that defendants had violated
several provisions of the O&J, RAAPO, and the admin-
istrator’s orders was supported by clear and convincing
evidence which showed that defendants had not been

reasonably diligent in attempting to comply with the
orders of the court and the administrator.

In his dissenting opinion, our colleague, J
Wises, alpen the view Get Sate Wate

co

lutely no basis for the claim of apprenticeship under-

A-23

utilization once the economic circumstances are taken
into account”. We think such a view treats Judge
Werker’s approach to the contempt issue too narrowly.
For over 15 years both the federal and state courts have
sought to require Local 28 to end its unlawful diserim-
ination against minorities. While the factor of under-
utilizing apprentices may in one sense be viewed, as
Judge Winter describes it, as “the centerpiece of the con-
tempt finding”, it assumes that position only because it
is not only a partial cause of the lack of sufficient pro-
gress in integrating the union but also a point at which
the success or failure of the program can be readily
measured. In other words, failure to have the appren-
tices employed is both an independent cround for con-
tempt and a symptom of the effects of defendants’ other

kinds f contemptuous conduct. @ -“

Many of the uncertainties about underutilization
that are urged by defendants are due in large part to
the union’s noncompliance with the reporting provisions
of RAAPO. Had the union complied promptly and accu-
rately with the recordkeeping and reporting require
ments the picture as to underutilization would be clearer.

Nor are the difficult economic circumstances of the
sheet metal workers an adequate justification for the
union’s continued discrimination. Even if it were true,
as Judge Winter states, that the union “faced an excruci-
ating reduction in demand for its services in the years
in question”, that circumstance would not justify the
union’s discriminatory favoring of journeymen over ap-
prentices, a fact that is crystal clear from (1) the tre-

mendous increase during the relevant period in the ap-
prentice :journeymen ratio from 1:7 to 1:18 and (2) from

A-24

the decline in percentage of unemployed apprentices dur-
ing the period 1977-1981 from 6.7% to 0%. One of the
principal reasons for revising the original AAPO into
RAAPO was to adjust for the “changed working and
employment conditions in the sheetmeta! industry. in New
York City, including the present severe and widespread
unemployment in the industry”. RAAPO % 1.

to integrate its membership, we think the combination

of violations found by Judge Werker below amply demon-

strates the union’s foot-dragging egregious noncompli-

ance with the O&J and RAAPO and adequately supports

a
A

i

A = rT,

A-25

B. Contempt Remedies: The Fund and the Order to
Computerize Records.

“Generally, the sanctions imposed after a finding of
civil contempt serve two functions: to coerce future
compliance and to remedy part noncompliance.” Vuitton
et Fils v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir.
1979): see United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). “The measure of
the court’s power in civil] contempt proceedings is deter-
mined by the requirements of full remedial relief.” Me-
Comb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 193-94. With
these principles in mind, consider Local 28's and the
JAC’s challenges to the relief imposed by the district
court to remedy defendants’ contemptuous conduct. This

convincingly numerous violations of the O&J, RAAPO,
and orders of the administrator, Judge Werker was faced

the prior orders of [the district) court.”

that it will remain in existence “until the [29%
ship goal) ° * ° is achieved”. Paragraph 5 further pro-

finding underlying the two contempt proceedings is re-
versed, the entire remedy must be vacated) While this
might be a tenable argument if the fines had been im-
posed for multiple findings of criminal contempt, see

A-27

In the first contempt decision the district court found
that the defendants had committed five violations of prior
court orders: underutilization of the apprenticeship pro-
gram, reporting violations, failure to conduct the general
publicity campaign, unauthorized issuance of work per-
mits, and adoption of the discriminatory older workers’
provision. We have reversed the last finding because the
conduct proved does not violate a clear order of the court.
However, the older workers’ provision presents a problem
separate from the other violations. Since that provision
was not implemented, it had no past impact on the appren-
ticeship program, and since it will not be applied in the
future no purpose would be served by permitting its
reversal to undermine the fund order. Indeed, defendants
virtually concede in their brief that the fund order was
aimed primarily at the finding that the apprenticeship
program was underutilized. Thus, we conclude that re-
versal on the older workers’ provision is not fatal to the
fund order because the remedies ordered are amply war-
ranted by the other findings of contempt, and we affirm
them on the basis of those findings.

Finally, the JAC and Local 28 have not challenged
the order which requires them to pay the cost of monitor-
ing the computerized recordkeeping system. We there-
fore affirm that order. We turn now to the parties’
various challenges to certain provisions of AAAPO.

C. Challenges to AAAPO.

In November 1983 Judge Werker approved the third
version of the affirmative action plan (AAAPO), which
affects Loca] 28, its JAC, the locals that had been merged
into Local 28, their JACs, and all contractors who use the
union’s sheet metal workers. AAAPO modified RAAPO

A-28

in six significant ways. It (1) increased the nonwhite
membership goal from 29% to 29.23% to reflect the addi-
tion of the merged locals; (2) established an apprentice
to journeymen ratio of 1:4; (3) created a three-member
apprentice selection board; (4) imposed an indenture
ratio of one nonwhite for every white admitted to the
apprenticeship program; (5) permitted work to continue
on developing new selection procedures, but barred their
use until the membership goal could be accomplished; and
(6) incorporated the order requiring defendants to bear
the cost of an advisor to monitor the computerization of
Local 28’s records.

AAAPO was a response by the district court to three
developments in this case: first, Local 28’s failure to meet
the 29% nonwhite membership goal by July 1, 1982;
second, Local 28’s contemptuous refusal to comply with
many provisions of RAAPO; and third, the merger of
several largely white locals outside New York City into
Local 28.

Local 28 and the JAC challenge the district court’s
adoption of AAAPO, however, contending that: (1)
AAAPO contravenes Title VII and the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment; (2) AAAPO unduly
interferes with union government; and (3) the district
court abused its discretion by adopting five of the six
provisions of AAAPO described above. On its cross-
appeal the city contends that the findings underlying the
district court’s adoption of the 29.23% interim nonwhite
membership goal were clearly erroneous, and that the
figures should have been higher.

Since entry of the O&J in 1975, the district court has
retained jurisdiction “to enter such orders as may be

“o

A-29

necessary to effectuate the equal employment opportufi-
ties for non-whites and other appropriate relief’; conse-
quently, additional violations of Title VII were not needed
to trigger modifications of the remedies that were orig-
inally ordered. See United States v. Local Union No. 212,
472 F.2d 634, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1973). Any changes
made by the district judge were to be guided by the
sound exercise of his equitable discretion, see Rios Vv.
Enterprise Association of Steamfitters Local 638, 501
F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974), and our task is not to exer-
cise our own discretion, but to determine whether the dis-
trict judge has abused his. Association Against Discrim-
ination V. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 279 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. $988 (1982).

Defendants’ first challenge to AAAPO need not de-
tain us long. Defendants contend that the core provisions,
which constitute the affirmative action program, violate
Title VII and equal protection. We disagree. This court
has consistently held that appropriate affirmative action
measures are not proscribed by Title VII, see Association
Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d at
280; EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 827; Rios v. Enter-
prise Association of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d at
629-31, or by the constitution. /d. at 628 (citations
omitted). Moreover, this court has twice upheid the
affirmative action provisions of RAAPO, EEOC v. Local
638, 582 F.2d at 829-33; EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at
33-36, and we therefore reject any challenge to the parallel
provisions contained in AAAPO.

Finally, we believe that defendants’ attempt to rely
on Firefighters Local Union No, 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct.
2576 (1984), is misplaced. Defendants argue that Stotts
eliminates all race-conscious relief except that benefitting
specifically identified victims of past discrimination. We

A-30

do not accept defendants’ expansive interpretation of that
opinion.

In Stotts, a federal district court enjoined the city
of Memphis from laying off black fire department em-
ployees in accordance with the seniority system contained
in the collective bargaining agreement governing rela-
tions between the city and its employees. The black
workers had been hired pursuant to a year-old consent
decree settling prior charges of employer discrimination.
The consent decree did not find that Memphis had vio-
lated Title VII, and did not identify any particular em-
ployee who had suffered from the alleged discrimination.
In granting the injunction, the district judge found that
although the seniority provision was not adopted with
discriminatory intent, it nevertheless had to give way to
the consent decree because of the discriminatory effect that
would result from the city’s use of the seniority system.
Id, at 2581-82. The district court’s injunction was
affirmed on appeal to the sixth circuit, 679 F.2d 541 (6th

Cir. 1982), and the Supreme Court reversed. 104 S.Ct
at 2590. |

Stotts can be distinguished from the present case in
at least three ways. First, the ancien atten ordered
by the district court in that case was in direct conflict
with a bona fide seniority plan that was protected by
, 703(h) of Title VII. Jd. at 2587. In our case § 703(h)
is not involved because there is no seniority plan in con-
flict with the remedies imposed by AAAPO or the fund
order. Second, the court’s discussion of $ 706(g), par-
ticularly relied on by the defendants here, related only
to the “make whole” relief ordered in the district court,
id. at 2589, and did not address prospective relief like
that ordered in AAAPO and the fund order. Third, in

A-31

Stotts there was no finding of any intent to discriminate,
id. at 2581, whereas in this case we have affirmed the
district court’s finding that defendants have intentionally
discriminated against nonwhites. These three factors
significantly distinguish Stotts from the case at bar and
undercut defendants’ reliance on that case. Thus, de-
fendants first challenge to AAAPO fails.

Local 28’s complaint that the obligations imposed by
AAAPO will interfere with its right to self-government
need not detain us either. We have rejected this conten-
tion on previous appeals, e.g., EEOC v. Local 638, 532
F.2d at 829, and we reiterate that the government of
Local 28 will be returned to its members as soon as it
ends it unlawful discrimination against nonwhites. Until
that time the government of Local 28 must remain sub-
ject to the supervision of the district court and the ad-
ministrator.

There being no merit to defendants’ first two con-
tentions, we turn to defendants’ challenges to the specific
remedial provisions added by AAAPO.

1. The 29.22% Nonwhite Membership Goal.

We reject defendants’ attempt to characterize the
membership goal as a permanent quota, because the pro-
vision at issue is clearly not a quota, but a permissible
goal. See Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d at 628 n.3.

This circuit has a well-established two-pronged test
for the validity of a temporary, race-conscious affirmative
action remedy such as a membership goal:

There must first be a “clear cut pattern of long-

continued and egregious racial discrimination”. Sec-

ond, the effect of reverse discrimination must not be

A-32

“identifiable”, that is to say, concentrated upon a
relatively small, ascertainable group of non-minority
persons.
EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 828 (quoting Kirkland v.
New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d
420, 427 (2d Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 531 F.2d
5 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 :1976)).

A race-conscious goal in AAAPO passes this test as
it did in RAAPO in 1976. This court has twice recog-
nized Local 28’s long continued and egregious racial dis-
crimination, EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 825; EEOC
v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 36 n.8, and Local 28 has pre-
sented no facts to indicate that our earlier observations
are no longer apposite. Certainly, the effects of the
union’s discriminatory conduct have not been eliminated,
for its nonwhite membership is still only 10.8%. There-
fore, Kirkland’s first prong has been satisfied.

We think the second prong has been satisfied as well,
because the effects of the affirmative action remedies in-

—_—— EEE

A-33

dies will be in place only uncil the effects of the past

discrimination have been eliminated, see United Steel
Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09

(1979), and because AAAPO will cease when those effects

On cross-appeal, the City of New York has also chal-
lenged AAAPO’s goal, but for a different reason. It
contends that the district court’s adoption of the 29.23%

posed, we would have to affirm the 1:4 apprer.tice :journey-
men ratio because we are not reversing, but affirming, the
underutilization findings by the district court.

A-34

Going further, however, the 1:4 ratio is a critical
element in AAAPO because it helps insure that defendants
will not underutilize the apprenticeship program in the
future. Because of the ratio employers will be motivated
to hire more apprentices and they will have the court’s
assistance in overcoming union opposition; the union faces
further contempt penalties if it does not cooperate in
meeting the ratio; and the JAC will have to admit more
apprentices to its program in order to meet the increased
demand for apprentice labor. Moreover, additional jobs
available to apprentices will, in time, help to attract
larger apprentice classes.

Finally, we think the 1:4 ratio requirement is reason-
able and flexible—reasonable, because it reflects a ratio
that the industry has historically followed: flexible, be-
cause exemption from the ratio in particular cases may

be obtained upon a proper showing. Thus, we affirm the
1:4 ratio provision of AAAPO.

3. Apprentice Selection Board.

It is charged with selecting both nonwhite and white
apprentices to enter the apprenticeship program.

Defendants claim that the selection board provision
will have an adverse impact on the union’s freedom to
govern its own affairs. We have rejected this argument
when raised in prior challenges to similar provisions,
EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 33-34, and we find it
no more pe.uasive here. Since it is an interim measure,

A-35

the board can be disbanded as soon as the nonwhite mem-
bership goal is reached. Unlike a provision rejected by
us in the 1976 appeal to this court, EEOC v. Local 638,
532 F.2d at 830, the racial makeup of the board under
AAAPO is not prescribed. This selection board is more
analogous to the board of examiners approved in RAAPO.

4. Elimination of the Apprentice Examination.

Paragraphs 25-28 of RAAPO ordered defendants to
develop and administer apprentice entrance examinations
validated by the EEOC, and in the amended affirmative
action plan proposed by plaintiffs these requirements were
carried forward. However, in his order adopting AAAPO,
entered on September 1, 1983, Judge Werker eliminated
the provisions in plaintiffs’ proposal that called for ad-
ministration of apprenticeship examinations. He found
that many had complained of the tests’ adverse impact on
nonwhites, that agreement on the tests’ validity was vir-
tually impossible, and that the tests were costly to admin-
ister. AAAPO takes a new approach to the apprentice
selection procedure. It substitutes the selection board
discussed above, and also orders defendants to work with
industrial psychologists to develop objective, nondiscrim-
inatory selection procedures.

On appeal, the EEOC contends that paragraph 15 of
AAAPO prohibits the use of the new selection procedures
to be developed, even if proven nondiscriminatory, until
the 29.23% membership goal is reached. Although we do
not necessarily agree with the EEOC’s narrow reading
of AAAPO, in order to eliminate any possible confusion,
we direct that paragraph 15 of AAAPO be amended to

state:

A-36

15. Upon termination by court order of this AAAPO,
or at such earlier time as the court may order, the

in italics).

With this provision the defendants may use new selection
procedures at any time after they prove to the district
court that they are nondiscriminatory.

5. The Nonwhite to White Indenture Ratio.

In order to insure that adequate numbers of non-
whites are taken into the apprenticeship program, the
district court provided in AAAPO that the JAC must
indenture one nonwhite apprentice for every white appren-
tice. Local 28 and the JAC, joined by the EEOC, chal-
lenge this 1:1 indenture ratio as an abuse of the district
court’s discretion. We agree.

We have recognized that temporary hiring ratios may
be necessary in order to achieve integration of a work
force from which minorities have been unlawfully barred.
Association Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport,
647 F.2d at 283; United States v. City of Buffalo, 633
F.2d 643, 646-47 (2d Cir. 1980). However, such race-
conscious ratios are extreme remedies that must be used
sparingly and “carefully tailored to fit the violations
found”, Association Against Discrimination Vv. City of
Bridgeport, 647 F.2d at 281, and we will approve such
ratios only where “no other method was available for
affording appropriate relief”. Vulcan Society of the New
York City Fire Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Com

A-37

mission, 490 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 482 F.2d 1333,
1341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).

Here, other methods do seem to be available. To be-

with, defendants have voluntarily indentured 45%
S p classes since January

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Ill. CONCLUSION

We affirm all but one of Judge Werker’s findings of
contempt against the defendants. We reverse and re-
mand for further proceedings Judge Werker’s finding that
agreement to the older workers’ provision violated the
O&J and RAAPO. Because that is the sole finding of
contempt against the contractors’ association, we reverse
the contempt relief and the awards of administrative ex-
penses, attorneys’ fees and costs ordered against it. We
affirm, however, all of the contempt relief ordered against
Local 28 and the JAC. We also affirm, with two modifi-
cations, the AAAPO adopted by Judge Werker. Finally,
we affirm the order, incorporated in AAAPO, establishing
a temporary, nonwhite membership goal of 29.23%.

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economic conditions into account. The RAAPO replaced
the first affirmative action plan and order (“AAPO”),
which dictated fixed numbers of apprentices to be in-
dentured periodically, but which the administrator found
to be unrealistic in view of the sheet metal industry's
depressed economic conditions.’ After the district court
approved the O & J and RAAPO, Local 28 appealed and
challenged the provisions relating to the apprenticeship
program as unduly intrusive on the union’s self-govern-
ment. This court rejected that argument and Judge
Smith’s opinion expressly stated that the “{i]ndenture of
apprentices . . . is appropriately subject to administrator
oversight. The balancing of the need for training workers
against existing economic conditions is appropriately left

: The AAPO, which was superseded by the RAAPO, called for:
(1) the indenture of 100 apprentices in February, 1976, 200 in

July, 1976, and 200 each year thereafter; (2) the rotation of
apprentices through jobsites in order to equalize employment
among apprentices; and (3) a ratio of one apprentice for every

four journeymen.
None of these requirements were met because of an egregiously

JAC indentured only 53 apprentices in February, 1976, none in
July, 1976, and 36 in all of 1977. In addition, the JAC stopped

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A-42

to his informed discretion.” 565 F.2d at 35 (emphasis
added).

The union’s obligation under RAAPO, therefore, is
to report on the number of apprentices indentured and
to obey any decision by the administrator altering that
number on his own initiative or upon objection by the
plaintiffs. After final entry of the O & J and RAAPO,
the union informed the administrator and the plaintiffs
virtually every month of the number of apprentices in
the program.’ Those reports are in the record. On no
occasion did the administrator order the union to increase
the number of apprentices indentured. Nor did the
plaintiffs object to the numbers submitted, as the pro-
vision for notice to them contemplated and as they had
the clear power to do under Paragraph 15 of the O & J."

For all that appears in the record, the level of
utilization of the apprenticeship program, the centerpiece
of Judge Werker’s contempt finding, was never a serious
issue between the parties before the district judge’s

: Apprentice class sizes were reported by the JAC to the Ad-
ministrator and the plaintiffs on April 6, June 2, June 18, 1976;
March 4, April 4, May 9, June 8, July 13, August 3, September 7,
November 7, December 7, 1977; January 6, February 27, April 11,
May 15, June 6, July 6, August 4, September 12, October 4,
November 3, December 4, 1978; January 10, February 13, March
14, April 4, May 9, June 14, August 16, September 18, October
i9, November 21, December 14, 1979; January 21, February 22,
March 17, April 23, May 23, June 17, July 23, August 7, Sep-
tember 10, October 9, Nowember 12, December 16, 1980; January
21, February 18, March 10, May 5, June 9, August 3, August 4,
September 17, October 13, November 13, December 9, 1981; Jan-
wary 11, February 8, March 22, April 7, May 10, 1982.

A-43

decision. The claim of underutilization was not even
raised by the plaintiffs in their motion for contempt. The
issue literally crept into the case only when Local 28
attempted to show its good faith by relying in its brief
in response to the contempt motion on its efforts to recruit
minorities into the apprenticeship program and on the
fact that every apprenticeship class after entry of the
O & J began with 45% minority members. The plaintiffs
addressed the apprenticeship issue for the first time in
their reply brief and only then asserted underutilization
as a ground for contempt. In the hearing before the
district judge, the size of the apprenticeship program was
mentioned only by the union, again to demonstrate its
good faith efforts.

With the issue thus in the posture of an afterthought,
the district judge seized upon certain statistics relating to
total apprenticeship enrollment and found as a fact that
the union deliberately reduced enrollment in the program
after final entry of the O & J following our decision in
October, 1977. Everyone, including the plaintiffs and the
majority, concedes that these statistics were misunder-
stood by the district court and do not support the con-
clusion reached. Moreover, in drawing that conclusion,
the district judge made no reference whatsoever to the
elaborate procedures established in the O & J and RAAPO
to determine the size of the apprenticeship program, to
the administrator’s plenary authority in that regard, to
the fact that Local 28 was never ordered by the adminis-
trator to increase the number indentured, or to the plain-
tiffs’ opportunity to object as contemplated by the
RAAPO.

The majority now affirms the district court on the
grounds that its finding is not clearly erroneous. How-

A-44

ever, it treats the finding not as one of a deliberate
evasion of the O & J and RAAPO by reducing the
number of apprentices enrolled after their entry but
rather as a more general finding of underutilization not
involving an actual reduction of apprentice enrollment.
This alteration of the district court’s finding is necessary
because the number of apprentices enrolled after final
entry of the O & J did not generally decline.’ The majority
also does not discuss the relationship of the O & J and
RAAPO to the union’s obligations with regard to the ap-
prenticeship program. Since it also does not state what

by the operation of the apprenticeship program, one can
infer only that the contempt in its view lies not in any
failure to comply with the elaborate provisions of the
O & J and RAAPO but solely in the failure to reach
the 29% racial goal.

Respectfully, I believe the majority is in error in so
concluding because the union’s obligation with regard to
the apprenticeship program is clearly limited to compli-
ance with the specific provisions of the O & J and RAAPO.
Indeed, rigid enforcement of the 29% goal without regard
to economic or other circumstances is not consistent with
the O & J and RAAPO, with our prior decisions in this
very case, with Title VII, or probably with the Constitu-
tion.

5 Enrollment after entry of the orders was as follows:

1977 36
1978 49
1979 30
1980 77
1981 143

Our decision affirming the RAAPO was rendered on October 18,
1977. The enrollment of 36 apprentices in 1977 was specified in
the RAAPO itself.

A-45

Since the O & J and RAAPO became effective, Local
28 has essentially been in a receivership so far as admis-
sions to membership or job referral are concerned. In
the words of Judge Smith, the administrator has the
power “to exercise day-to-day oversight of the union's
affairs.” 532 F.2d at 829. The practical function of the
29% goal is not to impose some overweening obligation
on the union but to guide the administrator in determin-
ing what Local 28 is to do under the 0 & J and RAAPO.
There is simply no reason whatsoever for a court to de-
prive a union of its self-governance and impose on it
the costs of judicial administration of its affairs only to
deny that compliance with the decisions of the court-
appointed administrator fulfills the union’s obligations.
The majority’s use of rhetorical assaults and punitive
sanctions against Local 28 simply cannot be reconciled
with its failure to utter even muted criticism of the ad-
ministrator who repeatedly authorized the supposedly
contumacious acts and continues in office to this day.

Judge Smith’s second opinion also explicitly recog-
nized that the number of apprentices indentured must be
determined by the administrator in light of “existing
economic conditions,” 565 F.2d at 35. The majority “re-
jects” the so-called “tacit premise” of this dissent that
difficult economic circumstances may justify reducing the
number of new apprentices and thus the number of new
minority members. In doing so, of course, it is rejecting
Judge Smith’s prior ruling in this very case.

As the record amply demonstrates, Local 28 faced
an excruciating reduction in demand for its services in
the years in question. In fact, the reason for the adminis-
trator’s revision of the fixed enrollment requirements of
the AAPO, see note 2, supra, was “the present changed

A-46

The record also demonstrates that the level of utiliza-
tion of the apprenticeship program was consistent with
existing economic circumstances. Although the majority
notes a “dramatic” increase in average hours worked
annually by a journeyman from 1975 to 1981, the number
of journeymen in fact fell from 3,670 to 2,163 in roughly
the same period. Even with this enormous decline in
journeymen, the average number of forty-hour weeks
worked by a journeyman in a calendar year was as fol-
lows:

1970 — 52
1971 — 51
1972 — 35
1973 — 31
1974 — 28
1975 — 26
1976 — 25
1977 — 26
1978 — 31
1979 — 37
1980 — 42

Emphasis has also been placed upon the fact that the
unemployment rate among apprentices has declined. How-
ever, during 1974 and 1975, when that unemployment

A-4+8

in a growing industry. Its use is thus also subject to
prevailing economic conditions.

For these reasons, there has not been a “clear and
unambiguous” order of which there is “clear and con-
vineing’” evidence of non-compliance, prerequisites to a
contempt judgment. Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924. 93]
(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied, 454 US. 330
(1981). The frustration of the plaintiffs, the district
court, and the majority at the union’s failure to reach
the judicially mandated racial balance even while comply-
ing with the O&J and RAAPO is perhaps understandable.
However, in light of the facts that large numbers of
journeymen did not work during the period in question
or worked only meager hours, reactive finger pointing at
Local 28 is a faintly camouflaged holding that journey-
men should have been replaced by minority apprentices
on a strictly racial basic. This is at odds with Fire-
fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984), which rejected such a use of racial preference as
a remedy under Title VII. Resort by a federal court to
such a strict racial quota in circumstances such as this
seems to me also to be of questionable constitutional valid-
ity. See Regents of the University of California v.
Ti 438 U.S. 265, 287-320 (1978) ( opinion of Powell,

I alse disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the
establishment of the “education fund.” The district court
ordered the union to finance the fund as part of the con-
tempt sanction without making factual findings as to the
need for the fund. As stated by the court, the fund will
be used to provide tutorials and counseling for first year
minority apprentices, to finance various methods of re-
ducing dropouts among minority apprentices, and to im-

A-49

prove the curriculum at vocational and technical schools.’

The district judge’s order reads in part:
6. The Fund shall be used for the following purposes:

a. Establishing a tutorial program of up to 20 weeks
duration for nonwhite first-year apprentices.

b. Creating part-time and summer sheet metal jobs for
nonwhite youths between the ages of 16 through 19 who are
currently enrolled in or have successfully completed, within
the past year, a sheet metal vocational or technical education
program or a program in an allied trade requiring the use
of tools, math or drafting, such as carpentry.

c. Paying the expenses, including any lost wages, of non-
white members and apprentices of Local 28 for their services
as liaisons to vocational and technical schools having sheet
metal programs. The duties of the liaisons shall include, but
not be limited to, the following: working with the schools to
upgrade the sheet metal program, arranging trips to sheet
metal shops and field sites, counseling the students on methods
of entry into Local 28 and working with participants in the
program set forth in paragraph 6(b) above. The JAC train-
ing coordinators and union officials shall cooperate fully with
the liaisons in the effort to carry out this program.

d. Appointing a counselor or counselors, whose duties shall
include, but not be limited to, the following: monitoring the
progress of nonwhite apprentices at each JAC school and on
the job, providing nonwhite apprentices with personal and job-
related counseling and assisting nonwhite apprentices in adjust-
ing to their school and work environments to help ensure their
successful completion of the Apprenticeship Program. The coun-
selor(s) shall be selected and supervised by the Administrator
subject to approval by plaintiffs and the Court. Defendants
and all Local 28 contractors shall cooperate fully with the
counselor(s). Every two months, and at the end of each ap-
prenticeship term, the counselor(s) shall submit to the parties,
the Administrator and the Court a report detailing the progress
of nonwhite apprentices and setting forth recommendations to
resolve any problems nonwhite apprentices may be encountering.

e. Providing stipends to unemployed nonwhite apprentices
while they attend their regular apprentice class and any addi-
tional classes that will be offered to such apprentices pursuant
to the AAAPO.

f. Establishing a low-interest loan fund for nonwhite first-
term apprentices who demonstrate financial need.

g. Providing stipends to unemployed nonwhite journeymen
while they take advanced courses to upgrade their skills.

[Footnote continued on following page]

A-50

I do not quarrel with the potential usefulness of such a
fund as social policy. However, its central factual premise
seems to be the lack of qualified minority applicants able
to enroll in and complete the apprenticeship program, an
implicit finding by the district court that Local 28 has
done all it reasonably could with regard to the training
of minority apprentices. If a lack of qualified applicants
exists—and if it does not, it is difficult to understand the
purpose of the fund—the remedy is not to hold a private
organization such as Local 28 responsible for improving
the quality of public education in New York.

Many of the other claims of contempt also rest on a
shaky foundation. For example, with regard to many of
the alleged failures to comply with reporting requirements,
Local 28 argued that the administrator had determined
that it was not required or able to make such reports. The
district judge rejected this argument on the grounds that
the administrator had no power to grant such relief, a

[Footnote continued from previous page]

h. Providing financial reimbursement to any employer who
has demonstrated to plaintiffs’ satisfaction that it cannot afford
to hire an additional apprentice to meet the one-apprentice-to-
every-four journeymen requirement of the AAAPO.

i. Providing incentive or matching funds to attract addi-
tional funding from governmental or private job training pro-
grams, such as the Dislocated Worker Program established
pursuant to Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1658.

j. Additional expenditures may be made from the Fund
upon a showing by any party that such an expenditure would
serve to increase the nonwhite membership of the union and
the Apprentice Program, or to provide support services to non-
whites. The party submitting authorization for withdrawal of
monies from the Fund must first circulate a written proposal
to all other parties and the Administrator detailing the amount
requested and how the money would be expended. If all parties
agree to such a proposal or, if the parties cannot agree, and
the Administrator determines that the proposal should be
funded, the Administrator shall authorize the withdrawal of
an appropriate amount from the Fund.

|

questionable ruling in light of RAAPO § 15. Other claims
of contempt are based on firmer grounds but do not war-
rant the extraordinary remedies invoked here. Only so
much can be made, for example, of a use of first class
rather than certified mail or an isolated issuance of work
permits. (The majority surely makes the most of it in
implying that 200 unauthorized permits were issued. The
district court’s finding was that 13 such permits violated
the RAAPO.) The failure to undertake the publicity
campaign followed the administrator’s failure to respond
to Local 28’s request for advice on the content of the
campaign in light of the limited apprenticeship ‘Spaces
available. Since the administrator was to supervise the
campaign under the terms of the RAAPO, the union’s
failure to go forward is rather less blameworthy than it
seems to the majority. In any event, since each appren-
tice class had 45% minority membership, the lack of a
publicity campaign seems inconsequential.

I would remand the case to the district court for a
full reexamination of the contempt charges as well as of
the newly revised affirmative action program. Regrettably
the district judge failed to give careful scrutiny to the
record or to the prior history of this case before reaching
his conclusions. His legal and factual determinations with
regard to the apprenticeship program were taken literally
from the air and showed little understanding of what the
O & J and RAAPO actually provide. This is evident in
his disregard of the administrator’s final authority as to
the size of the apprenticeship program, and also in his
failure to examine the administrator’s rulings with re-
gard to reporting requirements. The newly revised pro-
gram approved by the majority imposes the same kind
of hard and fixed numerical requirements as were found

unrealistic in the AAPO, without any serious explana-

A-52

tion of why they did not work before. Affirmance requires
us to enforce the 29% goal as a fixed quota requiring the
replacement of journeymen by apprentices on a strictly
racia! basis. Believing this to be inconsistent with our

prior decisions in this matter and with Title VII itself I
dissent.

A-53

71 Civ. 2877 (HFW)
AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAM AND
ORDER

Vnited States Bistrict Court
Southern Bistrict of New York

EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, and
THE City OF NEw YorK,

Plaintiffs,
— against -
Loca. 638 ... LocaL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP
COMMITTEE ... SHEET METAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING

CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF NEW York City, INC., ETC..

Defendants.

Introduction

1. The parties in this case are the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (““EEOC’’), the City of New York
(“City”), the New York State Division of Human Rights
(““State’’ ) (collectively “Plaintiffs” ), Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers International Association (“Local 28°’), Joint
Apprenticeship Committee New York City, the Joint
Apprenticeship Committee Essex-Passaic Counties, New Jersey,
the Sheet Metal and Air-Conditioning Contractors Association of
New York City, Inc. (“Contractors Association” ), (collectively

A-54

~ Defendants”), all those contractors who were named as
Respondents in the civi! contempt motion that was decided on
August 16, 1982 and who are listed in Appendix “A” and marked
with an asterisk (collectively “Respondents’). the Joint
Apprenticeship Committee Nassau-Suffolk Counties, New York.
the Joint Apprenticeship Committee Hudson-Bergen Counties.
New Jersey, Association of Sheet Metal Contractors of Northern
New Jersey (“ASMCNN”), SMACNA of Long Island, Inc.
( SMACNA”), and all individual contractors listed in Appendix
“A” who are currently in contractual relationship with Local 28
or who subsequently enter into such a relationship. This
Amended Affirmative Action Program and Order (“AAAPO” or
“Amended Program” ) supersedes the Revised Affirmative
Action Program and Order (“RAAPO”) entered on January 19,
i977.

2. This Amended Program encompasses Local 28, former
Locals 10, 13, and 55 (“former locals” ) which merged into Local
28, the Apprentice Program and Contractors’ Associations in
agreement with Local 28, as stated in the Stipulation and Order
dated May 17, 1983, annexed hereto as Appendix “B”. Local 28's
territorial jurisdiction includes New York City, Nassau and

Suffolk Counties, New York, and Hudson, Bergen, Essex and
Passaic Counties, New Jersey.

3. The goal of this Amended Program is to assure that Local
28's non-white’ membership reaches at least 29.23%, that
substantial and regular progress is made toward this goal and that
all members and apprentices of Local 28 share equitably in all
available employment opportunities in the industry.

4. The goal shall be measured against the total membership
of Local 28, including that of the former locals. For the purpose
of measurement, total membership shall include: (a) all
journeymen members; (b) all pensioners, reduced or limited
members who, while receiving any retirement benefit from Local
28, the Sheetmetal Workers’ International Association or any

“Apprentice Program” shall refer to the JACs collectively

*“Non-white” as used in this AAAPO means black and Spanish-surnamed
individuals.

A-55

former local’s pension program have been employed as om
metal workers by a Local 28 contractor within three (3) —_
prior to the date of the most recent membership census; ( 4 -
members or participants in the Apprentice Program; and (d) .
individuals who (i) have been offered admission to an

membership in Local 28 but have exercised their option,
pursuant to Paragraph 41 of this Amended Program or pursuant
to a parallel policy adopted by Local 28, to defer such eget
and membership, and (ii) at the time of measurement : e
aforesaid deferment option has not been exercised for more than

two (2) years.

5. Defendants are to implement this Amended Program so
that the goal shall be attained at the earliest possible date, but no
later than August 31, 1987.

6. The Amended Program shall remain in effect until such
time as the membership of Local 28, including the former locals,
has reached 29.23 percent and the Court, upon motion of the
defendants issues an order terminating AAAPO.

i i 28 reaches
7. Until the non-white membership of Local .
29.23%. admission to membership in Local 28 shall be attained

only through:

a) successful completion of a hands-on journeyman test
administered pursuant to Paragraphs 33 through 40;

or

b) completion of the Apprentice Program pursuant to
Paragraphs 8 through 27; or

c) transfer in accordance with the International Union
Constitution and Ritual; or

d) organization of non-union shops; or

i ithdrawal card

) the deposit of a previously obtained wi
‘ with the I Executive Board of Local 28 and compliance
with the relevant provisions of the International Union

Constitution and Ritual.

Apprentice Programs

8. No JAC shall maintain an apprentice program longer than
four years. Each JAC shall maintain an apprentice program
which shall be equivalent to the program conducted by JAC-
New York City. The terms and conditions of such apprentice
program shall be as set forth in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (‘Standard Form of Union Agreement ... between
Local 28 .. . and Sheet Metal Contractors”), and the Sheet Metal
Workers Joint Apprenticeship Committee Essex-Passaic
Counties Trust and Indenture, the Sheet Metal Workers Joint
Apprenticeship Committee Hudson-Bergen Counties Trust and
Indenture, the Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Committee Trust
and Indenture, the Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 28 Joint
Apprenticeship Committee Nassau-Suffolk Counties Trust and
Indenture, and the rules and regulations thereunder except as
modified by the Order and Judgement (“O&J”’), the provisions
of this Amended Program, or orders of the Administrator
pursuant to his powers under the O&J and this Amended
Program.

9. a) The JACs shall utilize the standardized application
form, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Appendix C.
Applications for each apprentice program shall be made
available to all interested persons and accepted from any
qualified candidate. A qualified candidate is defined as: any
person who is physically fit for sheet metal work and who has or
will have attained the age of 17 by the date of indenture of the
next scheduled apprentice class, is not older than 35 years of age,
and is a citizen or permanent resident alien.

b) Consecutively numbered application forms for each
Apprentice Program shall be available at the offices of each JAC
and any union office during normal business hours and at the
offices of the organizations and institutions listed in Appendix D.
Application forms shall be provided automatically to the groups
in Appendix D at least 30 days before the opening date for
applications for each apprentice class. Defendants shall update
Appendix D yearly by adding groups, including those suggested
by the plaintiffs, and correcting addresses if new addresses are
known. An updated Appendix D shall be submitted by the

EE ——--

A-57

defendants to the plaintiffs and the Administrator by September
15th of each year. Application forms shall also be made available
upon request to any government employment office or minority
community organization. Application forms also shall be
available by mail upon written request. Completed applications
shall be accepted in person or by mail at the offices of each JAC
or any union office. The time for filing applications for a
particular apprent

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0903%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
