# Record and brief — Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 477 U.S. 597

## Text

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IF AND WHEN A

Oe 85-289-CFX Title: United States Department cf Transportations et al.,s
tatus: GRANTED Petitioners
' Ve
Paralyzed Veterans of Americas et al.
ocketed:
ugust 20 1985 Court: United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General
Counsel tor responcent: ParkersDouglas Les Davison-Calvin
ntry Date Note

Proceedings and Orders

1 Jul 11 1985 Application tor extension of time to file petition arc

orcer granting same until August 26 1985 (Whites July

137 1965).
; 2 Aug 20 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
6 Seo 11 1985 urcer extending time to file response to petition until

September to accommodate bedridden
persons? Is it discriminatory to answer any of these
questions in the negative? Will the operation of hydraulic
lifts on buses involve stigmatizing effects on the persons

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cordingly, our holding today is a narrow one which
must be understood in the unique context of two
intersecting considerations. First, we are interpret-
ing a statute that was explicitly addressed not merely
to enhancing employment and ending discrimination
but to expanding the mobility of handicapped per-
sons, to reducing barriers to transportation. Second,
we are concerned with the appropriate regulation of
an industry that is an integral part of a “program
in activity” of a very special kind. In fact, the analy-
sis of what constitutes “federal financial assistance”
in this case, and the related question of how properly
to apply section 504 to the airline industry, turn in
significant part upon the specific and “special” ways
in which, whether directly subsidized or not, all air
carriers are inextricably intertwined with the fed-
erally-funded “program or activity” of commercial
air transportation. Even at its most doctrinal, this is
a case, above all, about access to airplanes and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

1. Exclusive Operating Certificates

In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB properly
disposed of the argument made by petitioners and
others that all certificated air carriers should be sub-
ject to section 504 because they receive federal finan-

who use them? If so, is that a discrimination solely by
reason of handicap within the meaning of § 504?

Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831
(D. Colo. 1978). See also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d
644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982); American Public Transit Ass’n v.
Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).

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cial assistance in the form of “operating certificates
giving exclusive domain over valuable air routes.” ”

While an operating certificate may be of some
value, it no longer gives airlines exclusive do-
main over routes, see section 1601(a) (1) (C) of
the Act. It therefore presents a situation similar

- to Gottfried v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where it
was held that broadcast licenses do not count as
financial assistance within the meaning of sec-
tion 504.”

As appropriate as the Board’s reliance upon our
holding in Gottfried was, however, that case merts
a brief discussion here, not only because it represe.its
an important earlier construction of the statute, but
also because its holding must be understood in its
appropriate—and somewhat limited—context.

In Gottfried this court remanded to the FCC a
challenge to the license renewal of a public television
station on the ground that the Commission had failed
to inquire specifically into the station’s efforts to
meet the programming needs of the hearing im-
paired.” Its obligation to do so, the court noted, was
founded upon section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
to which the public station was bound by virtue of
its receipt of federal financial assistance.” The court

* Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
%1 Jd,

* Gottfried v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 655 F.2d
297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Com-
munity Television of S. Cal., 459 U.S. 498 (1983).

* The assistance in Gottfried was both indirect (‘‘congres-
sional appropriations channelled ... through . . . the Depart-

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expressly held, however, that Congress did not “in-
tend broadcast licenses to count as ‘financial assis-
tance’ within the meaning of section 504.” * Accord-
ingly, it declined to remand a parallel challenge to
the license renewal of seven commercial stations to
which, it concluded, section 504 did not apply.”

In so doing, this court in Gottfried reviewed the
“legislative heritage” of section 504 and of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 upon which it was modeled and
discovered “no reference to the FCC or to any other
government program involving issuance of federal
licenses.” °° Moreover, we noted that in its original
regulations issued for the guidance of all federal
agencies, HEW “never explicitly classified broadcast
licenses as financial assistance,” *’ even though not
only federal “funds” but “services of Federal person-
nel” and “real and personal property or any interest
in or use of such personal property” and other less
obviously “financial” assistance was so included.”
Finally, we observed that the Justice Department,
which had recently been designated by Executive Or-
der as the agency responsible for coordinating fed-
eral efforts to implement section 504, had specifically
held that “ ‘[t]he term “Federal financial assistance”
. . - does not include licenses, for example, since li-

ment of Commerce and the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing’), id. at 655 F.2d 306, and “more direct and traditional”

(restricted program grants to the particular station from par-
ticular federal agencies) , id. at 307.

* Id, at 312.

% Jd. at 301, 312.
* Id, at 312, 313.
*7 Jd. at 314 n.63.

% Id. at 314, citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(h), 85.3(e) (1979).

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censes are not Federal assistance grants, contracts,
loans, or cooperative agreements.’ ’”

In relying upon Gottfried to justify its rejection
of the argument that operating certificates granted
to carriers constitute “federal financial assistance”
within the meaning of section 504, therefore, the
Board was correct.’” The license-specific nature of
Gottfried’s holding and rationale, however, limits its
applicability when considering other types of federal
financial assistance.*”

2. Favorable Tax Treatment

Petitioners note that “[f]rom its inception, the
commercial aviation industry has received substan-
tial direct and indirect assistance from the federal
government,” and that “[m]ost of the major airlines”
received direct subsidies “in their early years.” ”

% Jd. at 314 n.65 (quoting Nondiscrimination Based on
Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementing
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Executive
Order 11914, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,632 (June 3, 1980) ).

10 This is not to say that broadcast or other federal licenses
cannot be of great value. It has been suggested that even
twenty years ago television broadcast licenses were worth
$1,500,000, see Levin, Economic Effects of Broadcast Licens-
ing, 72 J. Pot. Econ. 151 (1964), and it has been argued
that granting such a license is the functional equivalent of
“Government subsidization of broadcasters,” Columbia Broad-
casting Syst., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’] Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 174 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Our holding in
Gottfried was made in the face of such suggestions and argu-
ments, which are less weighty here, since airline operating
certificates are no longer exclusive.

101 See, e.g., infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text
(discussion of Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.).

12 PVA Brief at 13.

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Currently, they argue, such federal financial assist-
ance takes the form not only of money subsidies un-
der certain sections of the Federal Aviation Act but
also of special investment tax credits made avail-
able to “certain railroads and airlines” by the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)(8) (1976
& Supp. V 1980). Respondents, by contrast, find it
“inconceivable” that Congress “intended to place
nondiscrimination obligations on every commercial
enterprise enjoying some form of favorable tax treat-
men 9? 103

Petitioners find support for their position in Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), which held “that assistance pro-
vided through the tax system is within the scope of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” since

[i]n the absence of strong legislative history to
the contrary, the plain purpose of the statute is
controlling. Here that purpose is clearly to elim-
inate discrimination in programs or activities
benefitting from federal financial assistance.
Distinctions as to the method of distribution of
federal funds or their equivalent seem beside the
Pe

The three-judge court in McGlotten ruled that the tax
exemption provided fraternal orders by section 501
(c)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code, “[s]ince it is
available only to particular groups . . . operates in
fact as a subsidy in favor of the particular activities
these groups are pursuing. It thus falls within the

108 Respondents’ Brief at 29.

1% McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C.
1972) (three-judge court) .

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coverage of the Civil Rights Act.”*” By direct and
legitimate analogy, petitioners suggest, the invest-
ment tax credit available to railroads and airlines in
particular by section 46(a)(8) constitutes sufficient
federal financial assistance to airlines so “subsi-
dized” ** to trigger coverage by section 504.

In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB failed to
address the tax subsidy argument. To this court, re-
spondents argue that McGlotten is petitioners’ “sole
authority,” that it “has had no case law progeny,”
that its discussion of Title VI and “federal financial
assistance” was merely “dictum” in a case that was
really about the state action doctrine and the equal
protection clause, and that in its recent decisions
holding that tax exemptions and tax deductibility do
indeed constitute “a form of subsidy that is admin-
istered through the tax system,” Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,

1% Id. at 462. McGlotten noted also that the deductibility of
charitable contributions to § 501(c) (8) fraternal orders “op-
erates in effect as a Government matching grant,” id. (cita-
tions omitted) and therefore, like the exemption available
to such groups, constitutes a “grant of federal financial assist-
ance.” Jd. The court concluded that the fraternal organiza-
tions in McGlotten, which excluded nonwhites from member-
ship, were subject to Title VI.

106 McGlotten observed that “the deductions provided in the
Code are not all cut from the same cloth. Most relate primarily
to the operation of the tax itself, and thus would not consti-
tute a grant of federal financial assistance.” Jd. at 461. In
this case, however, the Code provision is highly specific, re-
lating not to the “tax itself” but to “airline property . . . used
by the taxpayer directly in connection with . . . the furnish-
ing or sale of transportation as a common carrier by air
subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board or
the Federal Aviation Administration.” 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)
(8) (E) (1976 & Supp. V 1980).

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544 (1983), the Supreme Court “conspicuously failed
to invoke” McGlotten.“” None of these arguments is
convincing. Both in Regan and Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Supreme
Court affirmed McGlotten’s fundamental approach.
More important, we think, is the possibility that Con-
gress did not intend, by granting a limited tax in-
centive to a particular industry or group, to thereby
encompass every such industry or group, or, for that
matter, individual within some ever-widening and
potentially almost limitless definition of “federal
financial assistance.”

It is true that the industry-specific nature of the
accelerated depreciation allowance permitted airline
property may obviate that danger in this case. But
it is also true that the exemptions and deductions at
issue in McGlotten, Bob Jones, and Regan were of a
much more fundamental nature than the modest in-
centive to capital expenditures to which petitioners
point here.** To find that the government could force
an airline to comply with a federal antidiscrimination
mandate solely because it takes advantage of section

107 Respondents’ Brief at 29 n.17. Respondents fail to note
that a crucial companion case tec Regan prominently credits
McGlotten with prompting Congress to enact a Code pro-
vision denying tax subsidies to segregated social clubs. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, —— n.26 (1983)
(“Section 501(i) was enacted primarily in response to that
decision.’”’).

108 We note, for example, that the discussion of charitable
exemptions and deductions in Bob Jones emphasizes their
historic importance and fundamental nature, and that neither
Regan nor Bob Jones discusses any (of the multitude of)
Code provisions other than plenary exemptions and deducti-

bility of the sort applied exclusively to non-profit organiza-
tions.

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46(a)(8) tax credits would be to find the govern-
ment impotent to compel such compliance if any air-
line should elect to forego such credits. If Congress
did intend handicapped citizens to have access to air
transportation and to apply the nondiscrimination
principles of section 504 to all carriers, we would
violate that intent by holding that a carrier could
avoid compliance through its accountant, or that Con-
gress would be giving a green light to discrimination
if it ever chose to enhance federal revenues in this
deficit-plagued era by closing tax loopholes or sim-
plifying the Code.

3. The National Air Traffic Control System

If interpreting every de minimis tax incentive as
sufficient “federal financial assistance” to trigger the
coverage of federal antidiscrimination statutes would
be overbroad in its consequences and reach, petition-
ers’ argument that the government’s expenditure of
some two billion dollars annually to provide airlines
with a national system of air traffic control seems, by
contrast, appropriately narrow and specific.” This
program employs, on a twenty-four hour basis,
highly-trained air traffic management personnel who
monitor and control takeoffs, landings, and en route
flights of civil and military aircraft in order to as-
sure safe and expeditious air transportation. By di-
rectly financing the operation of twenty-five control
centers, more than four hundred terminal control

10 Tn 1983 and 1984 the federal government allocated $2.2
billion and $2.3 billion, respectively, for the operation, instal-
lation and maintenance of the air traffic control system. Ex-
ecutive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, Appendix to the Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment, 1984 at I-Q27.

39a

facilities, and additional flight service stations, as
well as by administering its flight standards and
medical fitness programs, petitioners argue, the fed-
eral government provides financial assistance that is
“absolutely critical to the operation of the air-
lines.” 110

It cannot be seriously disputed that the safe and
efficient operation of commercial air transportation
depends in great measure (if not, as petitioners
assert, “entirely”) upon “the proper functioning of
the national air traffic control system.” ™ One can
scarcely imagine a modern airline representing to
its customers that a regularly scheduled flight will
leave at a time certain and arrive reliably at its des-
tination if this “essential service” *” provided by the
FAA did not exist. Moreover, this crucial assistance
may reasonably be considered “financial.” Defini-
tions of “federal financial assistance” issued by both
the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Justice state explicitly that the
term encompasses

any grant, loan, contract, . . . or any other ar-
rangement by which the agency provides or oth-
erwise makes available assistance in the form
of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal person-
nel; or (3) Real and personal property or any
interest in or use of such property... .1

110 See PVA Brief at 14.
111 Td, at 18.

1122 United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org., 653 F.2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).

18 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(e) (1983) (Department of Justice).
Most federal agencies construe “federal financial assistance”

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Consequently, petitioners’ argument that the federal
air traffic control system is an “arrangement” that
“provides or otherwise makes available assistance in
the form of . . . services of Federal personnel” leads
reasonably to the conclusion that the system does in-
deed constitute federal financial assistance to all com-
mercial air carriers. It follows, therefore, that any
and all carriers making use of the federal air traffic
control system should be subject to any regulations
promulgated under section 504.

Respondents attack this argument on _ several
grounds. First, they contend that “regulatory his-
tory and common sense” makes it clear that the
current “services of Federal personnel” language
really means “the loan or detail of Federal person-
nel to carry out functions which private (7.e., air-
line) employees would otherwise have to perform,
e.g., fly airplanes.” ** We are not persuaded, how-
ever, that the language of the Justice Department’s
implementing regulations should be taken to signify
anything less than the plain meaning of the words
themselves. ‘As a general matter, courts eschew nar-
row interpretations of remedial statutes. Instead,
remedial statutes are normally accorded broad con-
struction in order to effectuate their purpose.” *” As

at least as broadly. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Part 1040.3(0) (1984)
(Department of Energy) ; 22 C.F.R. § 142.3(h) (1983) (De-
partment of State) ; 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1983) (Department of
Education); 38 C.F.R. § 18.408(h) (1983) (Veterans Ad-
ministration).

114 Respondents’ Brief at 25.

115 Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681
F.2d 1376, 1880 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1591
(1984) ; accord, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968);
Ayers v. Wolfinberger, 491 F.2d 8, 16 (5th Cir. 1974).

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the Senate report on the 1974 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act explained, “section 504 was en-
acted to prevent discrimination against all h-ndi-
capped individuals . . . in relation to Federal assist-
ance in employment, housing, transportation, educa-
tion, health services, or any other Federally-aided
programs.” "* To that end, section 504 and the civil
rights statutes with which it shares a common lan-
guage and heritage must “be liberally construed in
order that their beneficent objectives may be real-
ized to the fullest extent possible.” *”

Respondents’ more substantial line of attack re-
iterates a point first articulated by the Board in
justifying its Final Rule below: “It is the position of
the FAA, with which we concur, that its air traffic
control services are not financial assistance to air-
lines. Rather, they are services provided to the pub-
lie generally to ensure flight safety.” ‘* The federal
air traffic control and safety programs, respondents
suggest to this court, must be considered

in the general category of “public goods.” They
are the goods and services from which all citi-

11¢ 5. REP. NO. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388 (emphasis added) ;
see also S. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEwWs 7312, 7404.

117 United States v. El Camino Community College Dist.,
454 F. Supp. 825, 829 (C.D. Calif. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1278
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980), citing
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05
at 392 (4th ed. 1974) (‘To this end, courts favor broad and
inclusive application of statutory language by which cov-
erage of legislation to protect and implement civil rights
is defined.”) ; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
1971).

118 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

42a

zens and businesses benefit .... Thus, for ex-
ample, the government may assure clean air
through a variety of means, Federally financed
or operated. But the recipient of the benefit can-
not be precisely located, and no one enjoys an
exclusive benefit. The air controllers help to
assure “safe skies’; this “assists” airlines more
directly than it assists other enterprises; yet it
also assists all enterprises that use the airlines
or fly private planes in the course of their busi-
ness. It also protects those on the ground from
plane crashes. It does not, however, amount to
“Federal financial assistance.”

If, as PVA seems to assume, Congress had
wanted to cover every enterprise benefitting
from a federal program, it would have said so,
but it did not.’”

It is true that in important respects the provision
of air traffic controllers might be analogized to the
provision of highway patrolmen or traffic signs or
signal; federal funding of such programs would not
be likely to be considered the sort of “Federal finan-
cial assistance” sufficient to bring every private
trucking business or other enterprise that used the
highways within the scope of section 504. On the
other hand, respondents concede that the air control-
ler program “assists” airlines more directly and
extensively and specifically than other enterprises.
Moreover, as petitioners observe, it would be absurd
to exempt a federally-funded local transit authority
or school system from compliance with section 504
on the ground that public transportation benefits pas-
sengers as well as transit systems and, like public

19 Respondents’ Brief at 27, 28 (citations omitted).

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education and safe air travel, it is a “public good.” ”°
The fact is that the air traffic control system is in-
dispensable to the very existence of modern commer-
cial aviation, and that if it were not provided by the
federal program now in place, it would have to be
provided, and paid for, by the airlines themselves.™

It is at this juncture, however, that our analysis
must be informed by the Supreme Court’s resolu-
tion of a related problem in a case that has been de-
cided since we heard oral argument in this matter. In
Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984),
the Court construed the language of Title IX’s prohi-
bition against sex discrimination in any “education
program or activity” that is “receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance” in a manner that compels us to focus
less on the mode of assistance than on the “program
or activity” being assisted. In particular, although
the Court warned that nothing in Title IX justified
“making the application of the nondiscrimination
principle dependent on the manner in which a pro-

120 See PVA Reply Brief at 8-11.

121 See id. Indeed, some recent proposals to substitute a
privately owned and operated system of air traffic control
would lead, presumably, to just such a result—that is, airlines
would contract with and pay for the services of the private
program operator(s). The “assistance” provided the air-
lines in the form of the FAA’s flight standards program,
however—certifying aircraft, pilot competence, etc.—is more
purely regulatory in nature, and therefore more analogous
to the Gottfried analysis, see supra at notes 90-101 and ac-
companying text. To require a private company to acquire
a license or adhere to a federal standard, and then to call
the costs of regulation and of monitoring compliance a “bene-
fit” to the regulated company which amounts to “financial
assistance,” would constitute bootstrapping and would exceed
the boundaries of liberal statutory construction in the inter-
ests even of remedial action and civil rights.

44a

gram or activity receives federal assistance,” *” it.

emphasized as well that an agency’s authority to reg-
ulate under Title IX was limited by “the program
specific nature of the statute.” ** Thus, even if the
“economic ripple effects” of federal financial aid to
a college’s students resulted in additional funds for
the institution’s general operating budget, a plural-
ity of the Court held, per Justice White, that only
“the College’s own financial aid program . . . may
properly be regulated under Title IX.” *

The implications of the Grove City analysis for the
case before us are not completely clear. To the ex-
tent to which petitioners argue that a national air
traffic control system would have to be provided at
the airlines’ own expense if it were not provided by
the federal government (i.e., that this federal pro-
gram has “economic ripple effects” that make addi-
tional funds available for other airline operations),
the Grove City plurality would appear to be unsym-
pathetic. And if the federal air traffic control sys-
tem is the “program or activity” which is deemed to
receive “federal financial assistance,” then the pro-
gram-specific mandate of Grove City would imply

12 Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1984).
123 Td. at 1221.

124 Jd. at 1221, 22. Otherwise, the plurality reasoned, “an
entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one
of its students received a small BEOG [Basic Educational
Opportunity Grant] or because one of its departments re-
ceived an earmarked federal grant. This result cannot be
squared with Congress’ intent . .. [W]e have found no per-
suasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the
Department’s regulatory authority follow federally aided
students from classroom to classroom, building to building,
or activity to activity.” Id.

——

45a

that only that particular system—its personnel prac-
tices and physical facilities, for example—could be
regulated under section 504. If, on the other hand,
the “program or activity” at issue is deemed to be
that of commercial air transportation as engaged in
by the air carriers, and if the air traffic system is
deemed—via its personnel and facilities—to be the
“federal financial assistance” provided to that pro-
gram, then any “program specificity” problem with
petitioners’ argument is avoided.

Such a problem is not before us in the instant case,
however, because we need not reach it to hold that
the CAB erred as a matter of law in failing to apply
its section 504 regulations to all commercial air car-
riers. We base this holding upon the federal govern-
ment’s funding of airports and “airways,” upon the
necessary and inextricable integration of these facil-
ities with all commercial air carriers and, above all,
upon the clear intent of Congress in passing the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 and the effort cf appropriate
agencies to effectuate the mandate of section 504 in
the unique context of commercial air transportation.

4. Federally Assisted Airports

The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,
49 U.S.C. § 1714, as amended, authorized the Secre-
tary of Transportation “to make grants for airport
development” in order ‘to bring about, in conform-
ity with the national airport system plan, the estab-
lishment of a nationwide system of public airports
adequate to meet the present and future needs of
civil aeronautics ....”” To this end Congress es-
tablished the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, mon-
ies from which are used to construct, acquire, lease

125 49 U.S.C. § 1714(a), as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

46a

and improve facilities and equipment used in civil
aviation, currently in the amount of several billion
dollars annually.“* Grants received by airports are
not “earmarked” but are “obtained through the use
of a single project application to cover all airport
improvement projects contained in the airport’s an-
nual expenditure program.” Typical capital proj-
ects undertaken with the substantial federal finan-
cial assistance so obtained have been airport land
acquisition, runway construction, passenger termi-
nals, airport lighting, airport access and service
roads, electronic and visual approach aids, taxiway
construction, obstruction removal, and fire/rescue
equipment and buildings.* It is undisputed that this
extensive federal financial assistance to airports sub-
jects them to the nondiscrimination mandate of the
federal civil rights laws, including section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”

The critical question then becomes whether, as re-
spondents contend, the scope of section 504 “extends
to the threshold of the planes themselves, but not

126 49 U.S.C. § 1742, as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

127 Between 1982 and 1984 an estimated $17 billion were
available for apportionment by the Secretary. Estimates of
actual disbursements, consistent with a statutory formula
now based, inter alia, upon the number of passengers em-
planed at a particular airport, were about one third that
amount. See PVA Brief at 17 n.14; 49 U.S.C.A. § 2206(a) (1)
(West Supp. 1984) (codifying the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671, Sept. 3,
1982).

128 National Transportation Policy Study Commission Final
Report, National Transportation Policies Through the Year
2000 (June 1979) at 187-88.

129 See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief at 29, 30 (citing the Title
VI regulations of DOT and FAA and DOT’s section 504 regu-
lation).

eee

47a

beyond.” *° Such a result is required, respondents
argue, by virtue of “longstanding administrative in-
terpretation,” Supreme Court precedent, and a case
in our own district court which “has squarely held”
that the indirect assistance provided airlines using
federally-funded airports did not trigger the cover-
age of section 504.“ We consider, and reject, each
of these arguments in turn.

First, the longstanding and, until this proceeding,
consistent interpretation of federal civil rights stat-
utes has supported the position not of respondents
but of PVA. For example, in applying its Title VI
regulations to federally assisted airports, the Depart-
ment of Transportation explicitly included

restaurants, snack bars, gift shops, ticket count-
ers, baggage handlers, car rental agencies, lim-
ousines and taxis franchised by the airport spon-
sor, insurance underwriters, and other busi-
nesses catering to the public at the airport.”

If these businesses are construed as receiving federal
financial assistance by virtue of federal aid to air-
ports, it is nonsensical to exclude the air carriers
themselves, which surely are businesses “catering to
the public at the airport.” Indeed, in its own sec-
tion 504 rulemaking, DOT explained that its regu-
lations apply, inter alia, to ticket counters, boarding
devices, baggage check-in and retrieval, and teletype-
writers, “all of which are owned and operated by the

130 Jd, at 30.
131 Jd, at 30-81.
182 49 C.F.R. Part 21, Appendix C (1984).

48a

airlines at most airports.” ** DOT’s decision in 1979
not to extend its own rules to air carriers’ in-flight
activities obviously was a result of the CAB’s asser-
tion of such authority at that time, and of DOT’s
commendable effort to avoid redundant, overlapping

regulations:

Following publication of [DOT’s] NPRM, repre-
sentatives of the DOT, FAA, HEW and the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) met to discuss the
respective legal authority and responsibilities for
improving the accessibility of air travel to hand-
icapped persons. Following this meeting, the
CAB determined that it had statutory authority
to issue regulations governing air transportation
of handicapped persons .... Action by the CAB
... would ensure the uniform provision of serv-
ices and equipment by the airlines, needed to
accomplish accessibility to air travel for handi-
capped persons... .'™

Of course, the CAB’s initial interpretation of its
rulemaking authority under section 504 was consis-
tent with this expectation. Its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking assumed that all certificated carriers
would be covered, and invited comment specifically
only as to whether small commuter carriers with
planes of fewer than thirty seats should be ex-
empted.** This initial position of the CAB was in

188 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Feder-
ally-Assisted Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefit-
ting from Federal Financial Assistance, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442,

“ar (May 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOT Section 504
ules].

4 Td. at 31,451 (emphasis added).

135 See supra note 35; Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,405.
Commenting in this regard on the CAB’s proposed section

49a

fact consistent with its own “longstanding admin-
istrative interpretation” of its Title VI regulations
as covering programs “including’”—but not limited
to—those receiving direct money subsidies, and as
applying not only to “money paid” but to “other
federal financial assistance extended.” ** The Board’s
sudden reversal in this regard was contrary not only
to the interpretation of other agencies in this context,
but to its own.

A more substantial argument advanced by re-
spondents is based upon two recent Supreme Court
cases, one of which was sub judice at the time the
instant petition for review was heard. In North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982), the Court concluded “that an agency’s au-
thority under Title IX both to promulgate regula-
tions and to terminate funds is subject to the pro-
gram-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902.” *” Thus,
respondents argue, “[w]hile an airline may utilize a
federally-funded program, i.e., airport operations, it
is not a federally funded program itself by virtue of
the airport’s receipt of aid.” ** North Haven’s em-
phasis upon “program specificity” was, as we have

504 rules, DOT urged the more inclusive coverage: “We do
not believe application of Part 382 should be limited... .
DOT believes that handicapped travelers should not be de-
prived of air transportation [on planes of less than 30 seats],
unless a carrier can show that, because of aircraft structure
restrictions, certain types of handicapped passengers cannot
be safely accommodated.” Comments of the U.S. Department
of Transportation before the Civil Aeronautics Board at 4, 5
(Sept. 13, 1979), J.A. 78, 79.

136 14 C.F.R. § 379.2 (1983).
137 456 U.S. at 538.
188 Respondents’ Brief at 32.

50a

noted, reaffirmed by the Court’s more recent decision
in Grove City College v. Bell.’ But it is also true
that in its North Haven opinion the Court expressly
did ‘‘not undertake to define ‘program’” “° and that
in Grove City the plurality emphasized not only that
the student financial aid at issue was “sui generis”
but that the intent of Congress in passing Title IX
was central to its analysis.“ In considering what we
believe must also be termed the sui generis nature
of commercial air transportation, as well as the
intent of Congress in passing the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, combined with the postenactment adminis-
trative and legislative construction of section 504, we
find that the regulations promulgated in this case
must be applied to all air carriers using federally-
funded airports in their “program or activity” of
providing commercial air transportation.

Airports and airlines are inextricably inter-
twined.*” The indissoluble nexus between them is the

189 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
140 456 U.S. at 540.
141104 S.Ct. at 1221, 23.

142 For example, as the Board itself has observed, at some
airports “a single airline may have its own terminal building”
and substantial parts of the airport’s physical plant may be
“carrier-owned.” In other cases “the design of most of the
facilities, perhaps even including parking facilities, may well
be under the airlines’ control [including control “over their
selection, design, construction or alteration”], even if the
property is leased from an airline authority.” Final Rule,
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940. Especially in the case of the larger,
most widely used airports and air carriers, the structural, and
a fortiori the functional, integration of airport and air carrier
is self-evident. As has been noted, “in the airline industry,
two inputs (airline services and airport services) are required
to produce a single output (air transportation).” Note, Air-

5la

provision of commercial air transportation. Although
airports may lease space to gift shops and airlines
may publish in-flight magazines or own a chain of
resort hotels, when it comes to the “program or
activity” of providing air transportation to the trav-
eling public, the two entities are so functionally in-
tegrated that they become one. While it may be the
case, as respondents urge, that the airline as a cor-
porate entity does not become a federally-assisted
“program” by virtue of its use of federally-assisted
airports, its “program or activity” of providing com-
mercial air transportation certainly does. Thus, sec-
tion 504 may or may not reach the practices of a
hotel owned and operated by an airline company;
but it certainly must reach, in our view, the treat-
ment afforded a passenger who boards that company’s
aircraft at, deplanes to, and reaches his destination
safely and efficiently only because of, a federally-
funded airport. Just as the plurality in Grove City
distinguished the college’s financial aid program
from other programs within the institution, an air-
line’s commercial aviation program, its activity in
actually carrying passengers from one place to an-
other, may be distinguished from its other programs
or activities.

Respondents attempt to avoid this holding, finally,
by pointing to a case in our district court which
“squarely held” ** that to “hold that commercial air-
lines fall within section 504 merely because of assist-
ance provided to airports would expand improperly
the accepted proposition that section 504 is limited to

line Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319
n.1 (1983). See also the Board’s initial definition of “facility”
in its Proposed Rule, supra note 27.

143 Respondents’ Brief at 30.

52a

direct recipients of Federal funds.” ’** The Board
quoted in full and explicitly relied upon this language
from Angel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.”
We reject it on at least three grounds, and declare
Angel squarely overruled.

First, even if “airlines” on a company-wide basis
are not covered by section 504, we believe their pro-
grams and activities providing commercial air trans-
portation are, as noted above. Second, Grove City
directly undermines any notion that coverage of fed-
eral antidiscrimination statutes is in any way—
much less as an “accepted proposition”—“limited to
direct recipients of Federal funds.” As the Court
held unambiguously in Grove City:

Nothing . . . suggests that Congress elevated
form over substance by making the application
of the non-discrimination principle dependent on
the manner in which a program or activity re-
ceives federal assistance. There is no basis in the
statute for the view that only institutions that
themselves apply for federal aid or receive
checks directly from the federal government are
subject to regulation.’

Third, Angel depends for its holding upon an un-
justifiably broad reading of Gottfried v. FCC, a case
which, as we have discussed in some detail, is license-
specific in its holding and rationale, and which in the
consideration of federal financial assistance to air-

4 Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 519 F. Supp.
1173, 1178 (D.D.C. 1981).
145 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

46 104 S.Ct. at 1217.

53a

ports and air transportation is thoroughly inappo-
site.'*’

5. Additional Considerations: The Special Ad-
ministrative and Legislative Context

Our holding today that section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 applies to all commercial air car-
riers and that the CAB erred in restricting the ap-
plication of its section 504 regulations to those few
small carriers receiving direct money subsidies is
buttressed by several unique features of this case.
These include the particular concern evidenced by
Congress for the right of handicapped persons to
travel and to have the greatest possible access to
employment opportunities, the regulatory inconsis-
tencies manifested by the Board in the proceedings

147 See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text. Similarly,
respondents’ reliance upon Disabled in Action v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1982),
must fail, not for one but for at least three reasons. First, in
holding that the Baltimore [Orioles] Baseball Club, as a non-
exclusive lessee of a federally-assisted municipal stadium,
was not subject to section 504 obligations, the Disabled court
pointed repeatedly to Angel, which we have criticized, and to
the ‘indirect” nature of the aid involved, which cannot be
weighted so heavily after Grove City. Second, the court’s
analysis in Disabled centered upon problems of enforcement
and compliance, implicating issues not only of “directness”
but of “affirmative action” not present in the instant case
(Club legally powerless to make “extensive physical altera-
tions demanded by plaintiffs,” id. at 685). Third, in no sense
was access to baseball games as central a concern of Congress
in enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as was nondiscrimi-
natory access to vital modes of transportation and, thereby,
to employment opportunities that might otherwise be denied
solely on account of handicap. See infra notes 148-156 and
accompanying text.

54a

below, and the recent reaffirmation by Congress of
its commitment in this area through its passage of
the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984.

Our starting point in this case must be not only
the statutory language,’** which in the case of sec-
tion 504 must be accorded “the scope that its origins
dictate, . . . a sweep as broad as its language,” ™”
but the statute as a whole. So concerned was the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 with transportation in par-
ticular that it “established within the Federal Gov-
ernment the Architectural and Transportation Bar-
riers Compliance Board” composed of, among others
appointed by the President, the heads of the Depart-
ments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Transpor-
tation, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, In-
terior, Defense, and of the General Services Admin-
istration, Postal Service, and Veterans Administra-
tion. This Board [hereinafter ATBCB] was charged
particularly with the task of reducing “architectural,
transportation, and attitudinal barriers” in, inter
alia, “public transportation (including air, water,
and surface transportation whether interstate, for-
eign, intrastate or local).” *° Consequently, it was
not surprising that a 1974 Senate report should list
transportation as one of five itemized areas to which
section 504 was meant to apply.’™

148 See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520

(1982) ; Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 487 U.S.
322, 330 (1978).

49 456 U.S. at 421, citing United States v. Price, 389 U.S.
787, 801 (1966).

150 29 U.S.C. § 792(a), (b) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
151 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

55a

Congress was well aware in passing the 1973 Act,
so much of which was aimed at vocational rehabilita-
tion, that “even [if] the maximum employmerit op-
portunities for the handicapped [were] fully created,
they could not be filled without the ability of handi-
capped individuals to get to their jobs.” *” Obviously,
today more than ever, air transportation is a neces-
sary element in securing and performing many
jobs.*** So even if transportation per se had not been
singled out by Congress in section 502 of the 1973
Act, and even if the Act’s administrative creation,
the ATBCB, had not testified in favor of giving the
broadest possible reading to section 504 in the pro-

ceedings below,’* any fair reading of the Act reveals

152 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., lst Sess., reprinted in 1973
U.S. CopE Cona. & AD. NEws 2076, 2122.

158 As explained by the comments of the United Cerebral
Palsy Associations during the CAB’s rulemaking proceedings
below:

[t]he American people are dependent on air travel for
vital opportunities [since] many people must travel by
air in order to perform their jobs. Clearly, access to
air travel is not a luxury[;] it is vital to anyone wish-
ing to participate in the mainstream of society.

J.A. at 166.

154 The ATBCB not only supported PVA’s position on the
meaning of “federal financial assistance” and the proper scope
of section 504, see Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937, but
vigorously criticized the CAB’s initial decision to deliberately
avoid any requirement of structural changes in aircraft. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text. That decision, the
ATBCB argued,

seriously weakens the effect of the services requirements.
A disabled person’s theoretical right to air travel is mean-
ingless if he or she cannot board the plane, go from the
entry to his or her seat conveniently and with dignity,

56a

that maximizing employment opportunities—and
therefore minimizing barriers to transportation—for
the disabled goes to its very heart.’ As the com-

travel about the cabin, and use the lavatory. From our
inquiries it is apparent that technology for equipment
and alterations to facilitate such access and use does
exist, especialiy in the industrial design divisions of the
airlines. We urge the CAB to act quickly to promulgate
requirements both for inexpensive retrofitting and for
structural design of new aircraft.

Comments of United States Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board before the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Sept. 5, 1979, J.A. at 146, 148.

455 This is not to say that section 504 requires profound or
extremely costly “affirmative action” in the form, for example,
of extensive structural modification of aircraft. See supra
note 154, and note 17 and accompanying text. In the context
of educational programs the Supreme Court has noted that
“neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals
an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all
recipients of federal funds,” Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, so that “substantial modifications”
in programs of a nursing school were not required in order to
accommodate a devf applicant for admission. Jd. Relying
upon Davis, this court has held that regulations that “require
extensive modifications of existing systems and impose ex-
tremely heavy financial burdens on local transit authorities”
are not valid under § 504. American Public Transit Ass’n v.
Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But we recog-
nized in Lewis, as the Supreme Court had in Davis, that “the
line between impermissible discrimination and optional affirm-
ative action is a fine one,” 655 F.2d at 1277, and that a
“refusal to take modest, affirmative steps to accommodate
handicapped persons might well violate the statute.” Jd. at
1278. In the instant case we are presented with just such
modest steps,with an agency so finely attuned to expense that
it explicitly eschewed any request for structural modifications,
see supra note 154, and with an agency so acutely aware of
the need for case-by-case decisionmaking that it deferred to

57a

ments of the Act’s “own” agency put it to the CAB:
“Accessible transportation is often the key to a dis-
abled person’s employment, education, recreation, and
access to social services. Without the right of access
to transportation, all other civil rights are meaning-
less.” 156

We find additional support for our holding today
in what might best be termed the need for regulatory
consistency and rationality. The CAB’s discussion of
its section 504 authority, and particularly of its
rather sudden reversa! of position between 1979 and
1982, was inadequate, vague and contradictory. Not
only was its reliance on Angel (and that case’s mis-
reading of Gottfried) misplaced,’*” but even on its
own terms the Board’s analysis was turgid. Claim-
ing to reject the “restrictive reading of our jurisdic-
tion put forth by the airlines,” the Board insisted
that it was “adopting an approach . . . that repre-
sents a compromise between applying the rule to all

the air carrier’s discretion and the need for flexibility at every
turn. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. In
Lewis, by contrast, the rules in question were acknowledged
by the agency itself, in so many words, to be “ ‘extraordi-
narily expensive,” (requiring “extensive” modifications of
existing systems, including, inter alia, accessibility to wheel-
chairs of every new bus or subway car “regardless of cost,”
and elevators and other additions to existing subway sta-
tions). 655 F.2d at 1278. The case before us is not Lewis. In
any event, both Lewis and Davis go to the substantive nature
of the regulations and “the kind of burdensome modifications”
they may require, id., not to the jurisdictional scope of agency
rulemaking under § 504.

156 Comments of the Architectural and Transportation Bar-
riers Safety Board, Sept. 5, 1979, J.A. at 146, 147.

187 See supra notes 90-101, 144-147 and accompanying text.

58a

carriers and having no rule at all.” ** The form this
“compromise” took, of course, was to apply only the
general antidiscrimination provisions (Subpart A)
to all airlines,’ while applying the specific, substan-
tive provisions (Subparts B and C) to subsidized car-
riers only,’” claiming without any citation to author-
ity that “[t]hose carriers subject only to the general
provisions of Subpart A should look to the specific
requirements of Subpart B as guidance for meeting
their general obligation not to discriminate.”
Respondents are unclear, as the Board was, about
the source of the CAB’s conclusion that non-subsi-
dized carriers “‘should look to” Subpart B. They point
to the duty of every air carrier to provide “adequate
service” under section 404(a) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act ** as supplying the “requisite authority to
apply general provisions” to non-subsidized car-
riers.’** But they do not—and, we believe, cannot—
explain why section 404(a), if it authorizes the ap-
plication of Subpart A, will not extend to Subparts
B and C, which give the general provisions substance
and teeth. They do not—and, we believe, cannot—
explain what “look to” means, or why it is that, as
respondents contend in their brief, “non-subsidized
certificated carriers could not ignore the specific re-
quirements applicable to the suusidized carriers.” **

158 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

159 See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.

160 See supra notes 30-45, 68-78 and accompanying text.

161 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937-38.

162 Respondents’ Brief at 4; 49 U.S.C. §1874(a) (1976).
163 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

164 Respondents’ Brief at 11.

59a

In fact, they could do precisely that if the CAB’s view
of the scope of section 504 in this case were affirmed
by this court.’®

In the proceeding below, the CAB rightly rejected
the airlines’ assertion that its proposed rules “merely
duplicate existing FAA regulations.” ** It correctly
characterized the primary purpose of the FAA rules
as ensuring passenger safety, reasonably deferred to
the FAA’s in-flight safety expertise where it was ap-
propriate to do so,’” and noted that its own aim was
“not merely to ensure that the disabled are carried
safely, but to ensure that they face no unreasonable,
nonsafety-related obstacles to travel. To that end, this
rule covers issues . . . that are not reached by the
FAA rules.” ** The Board’s admirable sensitivity to
the work of other agencies and the need for consis-
tency in removing unreasonable obstacles to travel,
however, did not extend far enough. It was aware
that regulations of the Department of Transportation

165 Even if the specific requirements of Subpart B were
considered important interpretive guidelines by courts con-
struing Subpart A’s application to all carriers, they would
not be agency rules binding airlines with the force of law.
Private suits seeking enforcement of the Subpart B require-
ments, in actions for both injunctive and monetary relief,
might not be available to the vast majority of handicapped
persons who must travel by air. See Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1978) ; see also Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248 (1984). The Subpart C
regulations authorizing cease and desist orders and the assess-

ment of civil penalties for noncompliance would not, of course,
be in force.

166 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,938.
167 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
168 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,938.

60a

already required all certificated carriers to comply
with section 504’s mandate in the operation of, inter
alia, ticket counters, boarding devices, and baggage
check-in and retrieval.’ It was aware, indeed, that
DOT had relied upon the CAB’s earlier assertion of
section 504 authority and was now urging the Board
to exercise it.” Nevertheless, the CAB refused to
recognize the full measure of its own authority, lead-
ing to the absurd result that handicapped persons are
protected from discrimination in air transportation
only up to the door of the aircraft—that is, so long
as they are not being transported in the air. Our
holding today obviates any such nonsensical outcome
and vindicates the clear congressional purpose.

In addition, restoring the scope of section 504 rule-
making authority to the dimensions originally con-
templated by the CAB will vindicate that agency’s
hard and conscientious work in fashioning substan-
tive requirements through these proceedings. The
nondiscrimination rules will now actually apply to a
meaningful number of handicapped travelers. The
specific regulations fashioned with great sensitivity
in order to minimize expense and regulatory burden
will no longer fall—not only most heavily but ex-

169 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

170 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. In
commenting upon the CAB’s rules, the DOT urged the Board
to ensure that “the regulations of both agencies [would] be
compatible.” J.A. at 76.

171 In addition to its specific transportation-related goals, in
1974 Congress made plain its objective that section 504 “be
administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform, and
effective Federal approach to discrimination against handi-
capped persons would result.” S. REP. No. 1297, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEWs at 6391.

6la

clusively—upon those small (subsidized) airlines
least able to carry the load. And certain otherwise
anomalous aspects of the rules, which appear to have
been drafted sometimes with all carriers in mind,
sometimes with only the small, subsidized carriers in
mind, can now be rendered more uniform and con-
sistent when, on remand, the regulations are in part
repromulgated and applied consistently with this
opinion.*”

Finally, we note that our holding as to the scope
of section 504 in the unique context of commercial
air transportation is consistent with the recent action
of Congress in its Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
Act of 1984.’* That statute provides in its section
14, “Access for Handicapped Persons,” that the Sec-
retary of Transportation, when exercising authority
previously the CAB’s,

shall consult with the Architectural and Trans-
portation Barriers Compliance Board established
under section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, prior to issuing or amending any order,
rule, regulation or procedure that will have a
significant impact on the accessibility of com-
mercial airports or commercial air transporta-
tion for handicapped persons.’

Of course, to mandate a consultation with the ATBCB
is not to mandate an acceptance of its recommenda-
tions, which in this case were to require not only a
broad reading of section 504 but also affirmative ac-

172 See, e.g., infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.

18 Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Oct. 4, 1984).

174 98 Stat. at 1711.

62a

tion in the form of the structural modification of
aircraft.'” Still, this recent demonstration of the con-
tinuing concern of Congress for the accessibility not
only of commercial airports but also of “commercial
air transportation” for handicapped persons is sig-
nificant.'” It suggests strongly that the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 was designed and is still intended to
protect handicapped air travelers as a matter of law
not only before they board an aircraft and after de-
planing, but while they are inside the airplane as
well. And it reinforces our view that Congress meant
and still means handicapped persons to be free from
discrimination whenever reasonably possible—-not
merely when, in the special context of air transpor-
tation, handicapped passengers happen to fly a small
subsidized airline to a remote town, or are lucky
enough to find a large carrier treating them fairly
out of courtesy.

B. The Substance of the Rules

As we have already indicated, the record in this
case suggests that in its promulgation of specific,
substantive regulations the CAB worked conscien-
tiously and, in an area characterized by great indi-
vidual variability and acute sensitivity, managed rea-
sonably to resolve many difficult problems.'” This
characterization applies equally to the Board’s prom-
ulgation of the two specific sections of the substan-

175 See supra note 154.

176 Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier
statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).

177 See, e.g., notes 54-63 and accompanying text.

63a

tive regulations that petitioners challenge here.’™
However, because certain aspects of the challenged
Rule would have been drafted differently if the Board
had properly construed the scope of its rulemaking
authority under section 504, we remand the regula-
tions in part for reconsideration in light of today’s
holding.

1. The Definition of “Qualified Handicapped
Person”

Under the CAB’s final regulations, only a “quali-
fied handicapped person” is protected by section
504.’ The statute itself uses the term “otherwise
qualifitd handicapped individual,” *° which the Su-
preme Court has defined as “one who is able to
meet all of a program’s requirements in spite of his
handicap.” **

In the context of air transportation, the Board’s
regulation now defines such an individual as a hand-
icapped ** person

178 See notes 64-66 and accompanying text.

177 Amended Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 51,858. As noted
supra note 64, this definition incorporated minor changes.
from the Final Rule, in order to accommodate, for example, a
“person” who was not a “passenger” (e.g., someone merely
seeking information), and in order to clarify an earlier phrase
designed to minimize “arbitrary or impulsive” reactions by
airline personnel resulting in requests “beyond standard prac-
tices.”” Instead, the Amended Final Rule mandates that “re-
quests of airline personnel must be safety-related or necessary
for the provision of air transportation to be considered rea-
sonable” for the purposes of the rule. /d.

180 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).

181 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
406 (1979).

182 See supra note 28.

64a

(1) Who tenders payment for air transporta-
tion;
(2) Whose carriage will not violate the require-
ments of the Federal Aviation Regulations
. or, in the reasonable expectation of
carrier personnel . . . , jeopardize the safe
completion of the flight or the health or
safety of other persons; and

(3) Who is willing and able to comply with
reasonable requests of the airline personnel
or, if not, is accompanied by a responsible
adult passenger who can ensure that the re-
quests are complied with. A request will
not be considered reasonable if—

(i) It is inconsistent with this part; or

(ii) It is neither safety-related nor neces-
sary for the provision of air transpor-
tation.**

Petitioners contend that by selectively imposing re-
quirements on handicaped persons which are not iin-
posed upon other passengers and prospective passen-
gers, the CAB’s definition of “qualified handicapped
person” violates section 504. In addition, they argue
that the definition lacks objective guidelines or cri-
teria that would limit arbitrary, unreasonable, dis-

188 Amended Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 51,858 (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. § 382.3). This definition is to be applied with
respect to the provision of air transportation only. The CAB’s
definition “with respect to the provision of related services”
(such as access to flight information) requires that a handi-
capped person meet “the essential eligibility requirements for
receipt of those services.” Amended Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg.
at 51,858 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(d)). Petitioners
do not challenge the legality of the latter definition.

65a

criminatory requests or demands by airline person-
nel.***

The record reveals, and it is uncontested, that nu-
merous incidents of arbitrary refusals of service and
of irrational decisions by airline personnel concern-
ing the qualifications of handicapped individuals have
occurred.** Unwarranted assumptions and stereo-
types have clearly caused airline personnel to dis-
criminate against disabled passengers.” Yet, the rec-
ord suggests that the Board was sensitive to such
concerns and others voiced by handicapped individ-
uals and their representatives,’ and it is far from
clear that amending the definition of “qualified hand-
icapped individual” would provide any remedy more

18% PVA Brief at 51; see supra text accompanying note 54.

185 See, e.g., Letter from Al Van Nevel to President, Ozark
Airlines (May 17, 1979), J.A. at 175 (airline refused to begin
flight after discovering five hearing-impaired persons on
board); Letter of Marianne J. Cashatt, Director, Special
Services, Virginia Department of Rehabilitative Services to
CAB (Nov. 12, 1979), J.A. at 69 (on-board attendant re-
quired for person who needed no assistance once aboard the
plane) ; see also Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1984, at A-17, col.
2 (airline charged with discriminating against passengers
who are both blind and deaf by forcing them to travel with a
companion).

186 See, e.g., Comments of National Federation of the Blind
to the CAB, J.A. at 174 (blind couple asked to sit on blankets,
apparently due to assumption that all handicapped people are
incontinent) ; Letter of Nancy L. Kaye, Ph.D. to Congress-
man Robert Kastenmeier (March 14, 1980), J.A. at 66 (“air-
line personnel shouting at me because they believe I am deaf,
speaking slowly because I may be mentally impaired and/or
using a condescending tone of voice because they assume I am
Ga aaa 2 Be

187 See, e.g., notes 13, 35, 61-63 and accompanying text.

66a

meaningful than that provided by the rules as they
now exist.

Decisions involving safety, especially, require the
granting of a certain amount of discretion to airline
personnel. Individuals differ considerably, sometimes
dramatically, in their abilities as well as in their dis-
abilities. What is an unreasonable or unwarranted
request when made of one handicapped person may
be perfectly legitimate when made of another. Be-
cause of the unique nature of every individual, be-
cause of the infinite variety of disabling conditions
and the varying extent to which they may handicap
a particular person, the vesting of some discretion
in airline personnel to make case-by-case determina-
tions is unavoidable. This is especially so where, just
as individuals differ, so do airlines and aircraft. A
wide-bodied jet may present different safety con-
cerns or space limitations than a smaller jet or a
much smaller piston-powered aircraft.** In this situ-
ation, some discretionary decisionmaking on the part
of airline personnel is inevitable.

The risk that arbitrary or irrational decisions may
occasionally be made, of course, follows the grant of
decisional discretion as night follows the day. The
final regulations promulgated by the CAB, however,
have significantly limited the discretion of airline per-
sonnel." For example, section 382.13(a) of the Final

188 As respondents note, even carriers using essentially
identical aircraft may utilize alternative design configurations
for the plane’s interior, for example, utilizing denser seating
arrangements or less room for carry-on luggage than their
competitors. Respondents’ Brief at 37.

189 This is so despite the fact that, as explained supra notes
54-63 and accompanying text, maximum flexibility was
granted to airlines in several specific instances. The Board

67a
Rule sreates a presumption that every handicapped
person is a “qualified handicapped person unless a

carrier has a reasonable, specific basis for doubting
those qualifications.” °° Moreover,

A carrier shall not refuse transportation to the
handicapped person unless an agency or em-
ployee designated by the carrier to make such
determinations and familiar with the carrier’s
standards and procedures for such determina-
tions reasonably believes on the basis of avail-
able information, including any presented by the
handicapped person, that the person is not a
qualified handicapped person.

Section 382.13(e) requires that “[t]he name of the
employee designated by the carrier to refuse service
or require an attendant . . . shall be made known to
ticket and reservation agents, who shall inform any
person who requests that name.” *”’ From the outset,
any request made of a handicapped person must be
reasonable and either “safety related” or “necessary
for the provision of air transportation.” * And, of
course, no carrier may “[e]xclude a qualified handi-
capped person from or deny that person the benefit
of any air transportation or related services that are
available to other passengers... .” '™

did not, we believe, ever lose sight of the “strong counter-
vailing interest” of the handicapped. See supra note 62.

1 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949 (emphasis added).
1#1 Jd. (emphasis added).
192 Td.

198 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.

14 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948 (§ 382.5(a)); nor
may a carrier provide “separate or different” services that are

68a

Thus, we are not presented with a case of un-
bridled discretion but instead with a situation where
discretionary, case-by-case decisions are mandatory.
We are not presented with a case involving relatively
unambiguous distinctions based upon gender or race
but instead with the endless complexities of handi-
capping conditions. And we ave not presented with
regulations applying to any service—or even any
transportation—industry but to a unique industry
that carries its clients tens of thousands of feet
above the earth at hundreds of miles per hour. Safety
and “air transportation” requirements go to the very
essence of commercial aviation and must be applied
not only to handicapped persons but to all passen-
gers.’” In its efforts to do so without discrimination,
the Board sought to define “qualified handicapped
person” in a manner that “removes the subjective
aspects of the standard to the maximum extent possi-
ble consistent with our need to defer in the first in-
stance to the reasonable judgment of carrier person-
nel on safety questions.” *” In that regard, it has
succeeded. We surely cannot say that “the agency’s
decision . . . manifests a clear error in judgment,” *”
or that the definition challenged here in any way

unwanted or unnecessary. Jd. (§ 382.5(b)); see supra notes
23, 24 and accompanying text.

195 See, e.g., Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (emphasizing strong and comprehensive concern of
Congress for “maximum possible safety” in the air).

196 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,939.

#7 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458,
472 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Allegheny
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 758 (1972).

69a

lacked “a rational basis.” *** Accordingly, petitioners’
challenge to the definition is denied. If arbitrary or
unreasonable decisions do occur under that definition
or the regulations to which it applies, the remedy lies
in enforcement proceedings or other corrective action
under Subpart C of the Rule.’”

198 National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. CAB,
618 F.2d 819, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reviewing court
“must affirm the challenged regulations unless we find that
the Board’s decision was ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ or in
excess of its statutory authority, or adopted without observ-
ance of the procedure required by law’’).

1 This “compliance” subpart of the Final Rule, see supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text, modified the original pro-
posal by, inter alia, making it

clear that individual complaints will be processed accord-
ing to the Board’s standard enforcement procedures, and
that the Board may assess civil penalties or issue an order
to cease and desist rather than withdraw financial
assistance.

Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,947. Evidently, the Board was
concerned that withdrawal of federal subsidies (the only
“assistance” it considered at the time) might be too draconian
a sanction in certain cases.

“In withdrawing financial assistance,” the Board reasoned,

the Board is limited to a suspension or termination of
financial assistance to the particular program or ac-
tivity with respect to which there has been a finding
on noncompliance. In the case of a carrier receiving
separate subsidies under section 419 of the Act for serv-
ing several eligible points, we view this limitation as per-
mitting us to withdraw the subsidy only for the route or
routes where the violation occurred. Carriers receiving
subsidy under 406 of the Act would not benefit from this
limitation to the same extent because the financial assist-
ance they receive is intended to help their entire system.
Thus, a violation of any part of their subsidy-cligible

70a
2. The Forty-Eight Hour Notice Requirement

Section 382.15(c) of the CAB’s final regulations
permits airlines to require all handicapped passengers
who will need “extensive special assistance” to notify
the airline forty-eight hours in advance of their
flight.2% “Extensive special assistance” was defined
in the Final Rule as including:

(1) Medical oxygen for on-board use;

(2) Boarding and deplaning assistance using
mechanical boarding lifts, aisle chairs, other
special equipment, or requiring the presence of
more than the usual complement of personnel;
and

(3) Ground wheelchairs at facilities where
they are not usually availabie.*”

In response to further comment from groups repre-
senting the handicapped, the Board amended its Fi-

system may justify the withdrawal of the section 406
subsidy.
Id.

In view of our holding today, this sort of hair-splitting
about federal financial assistance to commercial air carriers
becomes moot and will be deleted, we assume, on remand.
Correspondingly, however, the Board’s decision to emphasize
that such options as cease and desist orders and the assess-
ment of civil penalties are available to the agency as sanc-
tions of air carriers found to violate the Rule becomes even
more important. We assume that denying an offending car-
rier access to federally-assisted airports in general or to a
particular airport on a particular route is likely to be a sanc-
tion seldom applied, at the agency’s discretion, primarily in
egregious cases.

200 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.

201 Id. Cf. supra note 37 and accompanying text (Proposed
Rule).

Antu

Tla

nal Rule to prohibit carriers from refusing assistance
“on the ground of inadequate notice if the service
or equipment is available with the lesser notice
given.” ** Petitioners nevertheless challenge the
forty-eight hour notice requirement as arbitrary,
overbroad, discriminatory and inconsistent with the
mandate of section 504.”

We disagree. Here again, a balance must be struck
between furthering the nondiscriminatory purposes
of section 504 and allowing for the prar‘icalities of
providing special assistance. As we have noted, the
Supreme Court (in the context of education) and
this court (in the context of urban mass transporta-
tion) have held that extensive, extremely expensive
modifications of existing programs may impose such
substantial affirmative burdens that they cannot be
required under section 504.** The record reveals that
with respect to its advance notice rule, as elsewhere,
the Board conscientiously and rationally sought to
implement section 504 in a manner likely to be rea-
sonable and effective.*” As a reviewing court, we can

202 Amended Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 51,858. The final
regulations also indicate that a carrier may not refuse to
provide “extensive special assistance” if necessary equipment
or personnel can be made available “by reasonable efforts

. .. without delaying the flight.” Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at
25,949 (§ 382.13(d)).

208 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 155.

205 Here the Board was being especially solicitous of the
small, subsidized airlines which were, in its opinion at the
time, the only carriers to which its regulations would apply.
It expressed its concern “that Federal regulatory require-
ments not be so burdensome that airlines will be discouraged
from volunteering to provide essential air service to small

72a

require no more.*”

Nevertheless, it is clear that when the CAB fash-
ioned this rule, the Board was assuming its appli-
cation primarily to small air carriers—those least
likely to be able to provide special assistance without
suffering a substantial financial burden.” It con-
ceded that “some carriers now provide such services
on 24 hours’ notice,” but argued that “many, espe-
cially smaller carriers, may not be able to do so.” *™
Respondents expand upon this point by noting the

undue burdens for small airlines operating at
small airports or airfields where facilities and
equipment are extremely limited. For example,
if an airline operates between a number of small
facilities that do not receive Federal financial
assistance and do not provide ground wheel-
chairs, it should not be required to maintain a
wheelchair at each airport.”

If such reasoning formed the basis of the forty-eight
hour notice requirement below, that requirement will,
of course, need to be reconsidered on remand. Under
our holding today, such small carriers will be a
minority of the carriers subject to the regulations
implementing section 504. Should the rule be re-
drafted in accordance, for example, with the com-
ments regarding notice requirements made by both

communities or be forced out of business altogether.” Final
Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940.

206 See supra notes 197, 198 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 205.

208 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,945.

209 Respondents’ Brief at 42, 43.

73a

the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Com-
pliance Board *”° and the Department of Transporta-
tion," an exemption may need to be provided for the
small carriers.

3. The Rule on Remand

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided for
the sunset of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
transfer to other agencies, effective January 1, 1985,
of those CAB functions that are to continue.*” As

210 The ATBCB saw “no need to set a time limit on notice
that a wheelchair will be needed, as it is a simple matter to
have these available. It may be reasonable to require four
or five hours’ notice when a lift will be needed so that the
airport can assure its availability; but in an emergency,
where the handicapped passenger cannot give the required
notice, the airline should be required to board the passenger in
some manner. We understand the need for advance notice
for oxygen and special meals. However, we urge that the
notice requirement . . . be limited to 24 hours (the notice
now required by several airlines such as American and United
[and TWA’, .... It is our hope that when services for the
handicapped are more fully integrated into routine air travel,
advance notice will become unnecessary.” Comments of the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
before the Civil Aeronautics Board, supra note 156, J.A. at
151, 152.

211 The DOT stated that “the 48 hours advance notice sug-
gested by the Board is unduly long. Provision of wheelchairs
would not appear to require any unusual effort or training on
the part of airline employees; and many airlines already pro-
vide wheelchairs for handicapped passengers during boarding
of aircraft, without advance notice . . . Any advance notice
requirement which may be imposed should be filed by each
carrier and justified to the Board as reasonable.” Comments
of U.S. Department of Transportation before the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, Sept. 13, 1979, J.A. at 81-82.

12 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).

T4a

specified further by the Civil Aeronautics Board Sun-
set Act of 1984, the vast majority of functions per-
formed by the Board before it ceased to exist have
been transferred to the Department of Transporta-
tion.”* Among these transferred functions—and sub-
stantial enough in the consideration of Congress to
have been one of sixteen prominently captioned sec-
tions—was the furtherance of “the accessibility of
commercial airports or commercial air transporta-
tion” to handicapped persons.” *** On account of our
holding today, vacating the CAB’s restrictive reading
of its rulemaking authority and ordering any regu-
lations promulgated under section 504 to be applied
to essentially all air carriers, the DOT will have an
opportunity, on remand, to fashion a Nondiscrimina-
tion Rule that is consistent with its current regula-
tion of airports, its own understanding of the CAB’s
regulatory authority over air carriers as expressed
throughout these proceedings, and the intent of Con-
gress.”

On remand we expect the DOT to act with expedi-
tion. We have affirmed the specific provisions of the
CAB’s regulations challenged by petitioners. The De-

218 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-443, 98 Stat. 1703; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, Transfer of Civil Aeronautics Board Functions to DOT,
49 Fed. Reg. 46,006 (Nov. 21, 1984).

214 See supra notes 173, 174 and accompanying text.

215 See supra notes 132, 134, 169-176 and accompanying
text. The intent of Congress, indeed, will be vindicated in
several respects: not only will handicapped persons have
greater access to commercial air transportation, but unneces-
sarily confusing—in some cases duplicative or overlapping, in
other cases inconsistent or nonsensical—regulations will be
rationalized under the aegis of a single agency.

75a

partment may, as we have indicated, wish to take
another look at certain aspects of the Final Rule that
appear to have been drafted with small carriers in
mind. It may wish then to specify certain exemp-
tions for such carriers if changes are made to re-
flect the wider applicability of the rules to this na-
tion’s major commercial airlines. Certainly the De-
partment will need to make some non-substantive
deletions of language, and it may wish otherwise to
economize editorially. By now, however, a dozen years
have passed since Congress enacted section 504.” It
is time that a handicapped person’s right of reason-
able access to nondiscriminatory commercial air
transportation had the force of law.

III. CONCLUSION

The regulations promulgated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to implement section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 are vacated with respect to
the Board’s determination that they could be applied
only to air carriers receiving direct money subsidies
from the federal government.*"’ They are affirmed in

216 The CAB and other agencies have sometimes seemed
reluctant to act upon their statutory obligations in this area,
requiring prodding from other agencies, the President, and
the courts. See swpra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. In
this regard the DOT has been generally more vigorous, as
reflected in its regulation of airports, its early willingness to
regulate air carriers if the CAB had not asserted its own
jurisdiction, and its comments in the proceedings below.

"17 In a recent case involving air safety this court similarly
found the FAA’s “attempt to limit artificially its regulatory
authority . . . unreasonable.” Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d
638, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Mikva, J.). We have been pre-
sented in the instant case, as we were in Bargmann, essentially

with an agency’s refusal to exercise its discretion, based
on its belief that it has no power to do otherwise. In this

76a

all other respects, but remanded to the Board’s suc-
cessor agency, the Department of Transportation,
with orders to redraft the rules to the extent neces-
sary to apply them to all commercial air carriers in
a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

situation, while the agency has the first word on its regu-
latory jurisdiction, it does not have the last. It is well
within the tradition of our review of agency action...
to make an independent inquiry into an agency’s allega-
tion that it lacks the statutory authority to act.

Id. at 641 (citations omitted). See also Exxon Corp. v. FTC,
665 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1981); NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d
432 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976); National
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Where, as here, the agency’s own “first
word” has been inconsistent—construing its own authority
first broadly, then narrowly—this court’s obligation of inde-
pendent inquiry on review is greater still, and any deference
due the agency on the jurisdictional issue is correspondingly
minimized.

77a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term 1984

No. 83-1055

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.
Vv.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ET AL.

[Filed April 26, 1985]

ORDER

Before: WALD and MiIkvaA, Circuit Judges, and
BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge

Upon consideration of respondents’ petition for
rehearing, it is
ORDERED, by the Court, that the petition is
denied.
Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT
GEORGE A. FISHER, CLERK

By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner
ROBERT A. BONNER
Chief Deputy Clerk

78a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 83-1055

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA,
AMERICAN COALITION OF CITIZENS WITH
DISABILITIES, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND,
PETITIONERS

v.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
RESPONDENTS

REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION, INTERVENORS

On Respondents’ Suggestion For Rehearing En Bane

[Filed April 26, 1985]

Before: ROBINSON, Chief Judge, WRIGHT, TAMM,
WALD, MIKVA, EDWARDS, GINSBURG, BORK,
SCALIA and STARR, Circuit Judges.

Respondents’ suggestion for rehearing en banc has
been transmitted to the full Court. A majority of the
judges of the Court in regular active service have
not voted in favor thereof. Upon consideration of the

foregoing, it is

'

79a

ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that the sug-
gestion is denied.
Per Curiam

A dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Bork
is attached and is joined by Circuit Judges Scalia
and Starr.

80a

Bork, Circuit Judges, with whom Circuit Judges,
SCALIA and STARR join, dissenting: The panel opin-
ion in this case conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211
(1984). For that reason, this case should be reheard
en bane.

In a final rulemaking, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(“CAB”) determined that only those airlines receiv-
ing a direct subsidy under the Federal Aviation Act
are federally assisted within the meaning of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982). This court held, however, that all activities
of commercial airlines are federally assisted pro-
grams or activities because the airlines make use of
airports that accept federal funds under the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act of 1982. Thus, all air-
lines, regardless of whether they receive direct fed-
eral assistance, are subject to section 504. The court
vacated CAB’s rulemaking and ordered CAB to prom-
ulgate regulations pursuant to section 504 to be ap-
plied to all airlines. Airlines are transformed into
“recipients” of federal assistance, according to the
panel, because airports and the facilities are “inex-
tricably intertwined” with and “indispensable” to air
travel. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. CAB, 752
F.2d 694, 712, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

This reading of section 504’s statutory language
would make every commercial enterprise a “re-
cipient” of federal aid when it merely makes use of
a service or facility that receives any federal assis-
tance. That idea has great potential. Trucking and
bus companies use federally constructed and main-
tained highways, and their businesses are thus inex-
tricably intertwined with a federally assisted pro-
gram. Many electric companies rely on dams con-

OO _

8la

structed and maintained with federal funds, With-
out the National Weather Service farmers would be
unable to plan, protect, and cultivate their crops in
an effective manner. It ought surely to be true that
federal funding of federal courts results in the regu-
lation of law firms since courts are inextricably in-
tertwined with and indispensable to lawyering.

It is clear that the panel has not followed the deci-
sions in Grove City and North Haven Board of Edu-
cation v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). These decisions
are especially apposite because they interpret civil
rights legislation upon which section 504 was mod-
eled. As the panel opinion recognized, “courts have
duly noted the extent to which the language of [sec-
tion 504 of the Act] corresponds to that of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, frequently applying
the case law developed in those areas to the resolu-
tion of problems arising under the Rehabilitation
Act.” 752 F.2d at 707 (footnotes omitted).’

1 Section 504 provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination wnder any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance ....

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (emphasis added).
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partic-
ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (emphasis added).
[Continued]

82a

In North Haven, the Court concluded that Title
IX’s reach is limited by its “program-specific” lan-
guage. The Court rejected an institution-wide ap-
proach, as inconsistent with the language and legis-
lative history of the statute. 456 U.S. at 536-38.

In Grove City, the Court again rejected the insti-
tution-wide approach and defined “program or ac-
tivity” by limiting coverage of Title IX to only those
“programs or activities” specifically funded by the
federal government, even if those programs were
part of a larger whole. 104 S. Ct. at 1220-21. The
Court held, therefore, that tuition grants to students
did not allow the grant agencies under Title IX to
regulate all programs at the school. The purpose of
tuition grants is to assist the school’s financial aid
program and that is the only program considered to
have received federal funds under Title IX. Jd. at
1221. Under Grove City, the airlines here are clearly
not “recipients” of federal funds. The airports are,
and the ground activities of the airlines integral to
the operation of the airport may be, subject to sec-
tion 504. However, the non-airport activities of the
airlines, such as in-flight procedures, are outside the
scope of that section.’

1 [Continued]
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ....

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1982) (emphasis added).

2 Indeed in previous regulations under Title VI, the Federal
Aviation Administration recognized that in the case of aid to
airports, the scope of “program or activity receiving Federal

ew nes a mee ee re

83a

The panel’s attempts to distinguish this case from
Grove City are wholly unpersuasive. It would un-
duly extend this dissent, however, to deal with those
contentions in detail. The Supreme Court has been
over this ground, and we ought to accept, rather than
evade, its conclusion.

I would grant the petition.

assistance” only reached operations at the airport and not air
transportation :

(2) The operator of an airport who is the recipient of
Federal financial assistance is bound by the condi-
tions and covenants in the conveyance that prohibit,
among other things, discrimination for reason of
color, race or national origin in admission of the
public to waiting rooms, sightseeing areas, sanitary
facilities, and any other facilities under the control
of the airport operator himself.

14 C.F.R. § 15.5(c) (2) (1968). The successor regulation, 49
C.F.R. Part 21, Appendix c(a) (2) (1984), was expanded to
clarify that any activity physically taking place in the airport
was covered even if the airlines leased or bought the space.

84a

APPENDIX D

EXCERPTS FROM THE PREAMBLE TO THE
FINAL RULE PROMULGATED BY THE CAB

14 CFR Part 382

[Special Reg. SPR-189, Enactment of Part 382;
Dockets: 34030, 39963]

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap
AGENCY: Civil Aeronautics Board.
ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The CAB is adopting new rules to
prohibit un!awful discrimination against disabled air
travelers and to implement section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. The purpose of the rules is
to ensure that handicapped persons receive adequate
air transportation service, without unjust discrimi-
nation based on handicap.

DATES: Adopted: June 3, 1982. Effective: Sub-
part A on June 15, 1982. Subparts B and C on Sep-
tember 13, 1982, except for §§ 382.11, 382.12, and
382.15 which will take effect on December 12, 1982.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

About this rule—David Schaffer, Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, Rules and Legislation Division, Civil
Aeronautics Board, 1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20428, 202-673-5442; about a spe-
cific instance of discrimination—Consumer Assist-
ance Division, Office of Congressional, Community,
and Consumer Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1825

85a

Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20428,
202-673-6047.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: By SPDR-
70, 44 FR 32401, June 6, 1979, the Board proposed
rules to ensure that handicapped travelers have ade-
quate access to air transportation and to prohibit un-
just discrimination against them. These rules imple-
ment section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. 794, which prohibits discrimination against
otherwise qualified handicapped persons in activities
or programs receiving Federal financial assistance.
In SPDR-70, the Board proposed general rules pro-
hibiting discrimination, and specific rules to limit air
carviers’ discretion to refuse to carry disabled passen-
gers or to require them to be attended, to require air-
lines to provide certain services and assistance to
handicapped travelers on request, and to establish
compliance procedures. The notice also requested
comment on whether the Board should require low-
cost structural modifications of aircraft to increase
their accessibility.

We received a large number of comments from air-
lines, groups representing disabled people, govern-
ment agencies, flight crew unions, and others. In ad-
dition, many individuals commented on the proposed
rule. After reviewing the comments, we have de-
cided to adopt the basic framework of the proposed
rules, but to make changes in several of its provi-
sions. The following discussion covers both general
jurisdictional issues raised by the commenters and
changes in individual provisions.

Jurisdictional Issues

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies only
to air carriers that receive Federal financial assist-

86a

ance. In SPDR-70, however, the Board proposed, in
the alternative, to apply this rule to all subsidized
and unsubsidized certificated air carriers and air
taxis, or to all these carriers in their operations with
aircraft of more than 30 seats. The Board relied on
section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act as authority
for the broader coverage. That section requires car-
riers to provide “adequate service” and prohibits
them from engaging in unjust discrimination.

The Air Transport Association (ATA) and sev-
eral individual airlines objected to the Board’s adop-
tion of rules on the handicapped. They contended
that the Board should not adopt such a rule because
the regulations of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) in this area are adequate. Dual regula-
tion, in their view, would be redundant, confusing,
and, in some cases, conflicting. If such a rule were
adopted by the Board, the carriers argued that it
should apply only to subsidized airlines, because sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies only to air-
lines that receive subsidies directly from the Board.
They also oppose the broader coverage of the proposal
because the basis for that approach (section 404) is
slated to expire when the Board sunsets. Citing Con-
tinental Airlines v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1974), some carriers argued that the Board’s adop-
tion of the proposed regulations would violate sec-
tion 401(e) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act.

Other sommenters, however, disagreed. In joint
comments, the Disability Rights Center and several
other groups representing the disabled (hereinafter
the DRC commenters) argued that all airlines re-
ceive direct and indirect Federal financial assistance
in the form of air traffic control services, airport de-
velopment grants, operating certificates giving ex-

87a

clusive domain over valuable air routes, and tax sub-
sidies (special investment tax credit treatment un-
der 26 U.S.C. 46(a)(8)), and therefore should all be
subject to this rule. The U.S. Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, a Fed-
eral agency responsible for promoting accessibility
for the handicapped, agreed with this position. Al-
though the Civil Aeronautics Board is not the source
of this assistance, the DRC commenters stated that
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(now Health and Human Services), in its role as
coordinator of administrative implementation of sec-
tion 504, has designated the Board as the agency re-
sponsible for government-wide implementation of the
statute with respect to airlines, and argued that
Board rules should govern their activities.

The DRC commenters also defended the Board’s
jurisdiction to apply the rule to all airlines under the
Federal Aviation Act. They pointed out that the
Board relied on the adequate-service provision of
section 404(a), as well as the nondiscrimination pro-
vision in section 404(b). The requirement that air-
lines provide adequate service is not scheduled to ex-
pire. They stated that Congress intended the Board
to regulate until its sunset, and that Congress has yet
t» consider the issue of whether various consumer
protection functions of the Board will transfer to its
successor agencies. While acknowledging that section
401(e) (4) of the Act limits the Board’s authority to
restrict carrier discretion. in changing schedules,
equipment, accommodations, and facilities, the DRC
commenters distinguished the Continental case from
the situation here. In Continental, they argued, the
Board’s action in establishing fare differentials based
on seating configurations did not further any statu-

88a

tory goals. Here, in contrast, section 401(e) (4) must
be balanced against section 404, as the court did in
Capital Airlines v. CAB, 281 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir.
1960), holding that the Board could order airlines to
operate more flights in order to provide adequate
service.

After considering the comments of the DRC, we
have decided that we cannot accept their very broad
definition of “Federal financial assistance.” In our
view, only subsidy paid under either sections 406 or
419 of the Federal Aviation Act qualifies. While an
operating certificate may be of some value, it no
longer gives airlines exclusive domain over routes, see
section 1601(a)(1)(C) of the Act. It therefore pre-
sents a situation similar to Gottfried v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir.
1981), where it was held that broadcast licenses do
not count as financial assistance within the meaning
of section 504. Although airports may be recipients
of Federal financial assistance and therefore subject
to the rules of the Department of Transportation is-
sued under section 504, this does not mean that air-
lines serving those airports are also covered. In Angel
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 519 F.Supp.
1173, 1178 (D.C. 1981), the court stated that to
“hold that commercial airlines fall within section 504
merely because of assistance provided to airports
would expand improperly the accepted proposition
that section 504 is limited to direct recipients of Fed-
eral funds.” It is the position of the FAA, with which
we concur, that its air traffic control services and
other programs are not financial assistance to air-
lines. Rather, they are services provided to the public
generally to ensure flight safety.

Some commenters cited cases involving Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as justification for a

89a

broad reading of ‘Federal financial assistance” in
the Rehabilitation Act. They noted that both are
civil rights statutes and therefore should be given a
broad interpretation, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971). While section 504 was modeled on
section 601 of Title VI, the Civil Rights Act viewed
as a whole has a broader remedial purpose than the
Rehabilitation Act. This may call for a narrower
interpretation of financial assistance as employed in
the latter statute. See Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corporation, 502 F.Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Even
accepting the broad reading, however, the “indirect
assistance” cited by the DRC does not qualify as
“Federal financial assistance.” In congressional hear-
ings and floor debates prior to the adoption of the
Civil Rights Act, speakers interpreted that term as
referring to “funds” expended by the Federal gov-
ernment (Civil Rights: Hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2731
(1963) (statement of Attorney General Kennedy)
and “public moneys out of the Federal Treasury,”
110 Cong. Rec. 6430, March 26, 1964 (statement of
Senator Humphrey) rather than to the type of in-
direct assistance cited by the DRC. A Justice De-
partment study completed at the request of Con-
gress in anticipation of the debate on Title VI listed
the programs that would qualify as Federal financial
assistance. The only CAB program listed was the
section 406 subsidy program. See 110 Cong. Ree.
13380-13382, June 10, 1964. Section 419 was not
listed because it was not enacted until 1978. While
the Justice Department admitted that this list may
not be exhaustive, it indicates that there are limits
to the term “Federal financial assistance.”

We also do not concur with the restrictive reading
of our jurisdiction put forth by the airlines, Enact-

90a

ment of the Rehabilitation Act reflects a national
policy to ensure that disabled people have a reason-
able opportunity to participate in the activities that
others take for granted. Accommodating this group
of potential travelers is an important element of
providing adequate service, as required by section
404(a) of the Act. Unnecessary or arbitrary distine-
tions among passengers on the basis of handicap
constitute unjust discrimination in violation of sec-
tion 404(b) of the Act. It is our position that the
prohibition of section 404(b) encompasses discrim-
nation against handicapped passengers, that the Re-
habilitation Act is the best source of interpretative
guidance as to what is allowed and not allowed in
this area as a matter of national policy, and that
therefore the principle of that Act should be consid-
ered incorporated into section 404(b). Although sec-
tion 404(b) sunsets on January 1, 19838, the ade-
quate-service provision in section 404 (a) continues.

We are adopting an approach to the jurisdictional
question that represents a compromise between ap-
plying the rule to all carriers and having no rule
at all. Relying on section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act and the requirements of section 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, we find the requisite authority to
apply general provisions in Subpart A of this rule
prohibiting discrimination against handicapped pas-
sengers to all certificated air carriers and to those
commuter carriers that receive a subsidy from the
Board. The specific requirements in subparts B and
C of this rule, however, will apply only to those car-
riers receiving subsidy from the Board under sections
406 or 419 of the Act, in recognition of the limited
jurisdictional basis of section 504. Those carriers
subject only to the general provisions of Subpart A

9la

should look to the specific requirements of Subpart B
as guidance for meeting their general obligation not
to discriminate.

Having decided to limit Subparts B and C of this
rule to carriers receiving subsidy from the Board, a
question remains as to which carriers will be covered.
Both the local service carriers (Frontier, Ozark, Pied-
mont, Republic and Republic West) as well as the
other carriers receiving subsidy under section 406 of
the Act (Air Midwest, Skywest, Alaska Airlines,
Wien Air Alaska, and Kodiak Western) are covered.
Any carrier receiving subsidy under section 419(a)
(5) or (b) (6) of the Act for providing essential air
service to a small community must comply with the
specific provisions of this rule. Also, any carrier that
receives assistance through one of these carriers is
subject to Subparts B and C. See § 85.3(d) of the
HEW guidelines.

Some carriers receive compensation for losses un-
der section 419(a)(7) of the Act when the Board
orders them to continue providing essential air serv-
ice that they wish to terminate. These carriers must
continue to provide that service until the Board finds
another carrier to provide it and allows the incum-
bent carrier to terminate as planned. The question
whether payments to these carriers constitutes Fed-
eral financial assistance has been the subject of sev-
eral comments in Docket 39963. Motions to file late,
to intervene, and to file otherwise unauthorized docu-
ments were submitted in that docket, all of which we
are granting here. |

Docket 39963 was initiated by a letter dated July
15, 1981, from the Board’s General Counsel to all
carriers that received payments under section 419.
This letter was required by an order of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of the Central District of California in

92a

Paralyzed. Veterans of America, et al., v. William
French Smith, et al., No. 79-1979 WPG. The Court
ordered the Board to inform all subsidized carriers
within 10 days that they were obligated to comply
with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act even though
the Board had not yet issued its final section 504
rules. Due to the short time in which to act, the Gen-
eral Counsel sent the letter to all carriers that had
received any payments under section 419 without
attempting to decide whether all those payments con-
stituted financial assistance under the Rehabilitation
Act.

After receiving this letter, Delta Air Lines peti-
tioned for review. It argued that the compensation
for the losses it incurred after being required to con-
tinue service in the Boston-Preque Isle market did
not constitute financial assistance such as to subject
it to section 504. United filed an answer in support
of Delta’s petition. USAir filed a similar petition in
connection with the forced service of one of its Alle-
gheny commuters at six upstate New York and Ver-
mont communities. The Air Transport Association
of America, on behalf of 13 airlines, also filed a peti-
tion calling for a narrow reading of financial assist-
ance. On the other side, Neil Jacobsen and the Para-
lyzed Veterans of America filed in support of a broad
definition of financial assistance. They renewed the
argument, disposed of above, that all airlines are
recipients of indirect subsidies in addition to the
direct subsidies under section 419.

Compensation for losses is typically paid to car-
riers only for the short time (about 6 months) that
they are being required to continue the essential air
service. It is often not clear whether the carrier has
suffered any losses that would entitle it to compensa-
tion until it has been permitted to end that service.

93a

The short-term and after-the-fact nature of this com-
pensation makes it impractical for these carriers to
comply with the specific requirements of Subparts B
and C of this rule. The Board has therefore decided
not to apply these subparts to carriers receiving pay-
ments under section 419(a) (7).

In light of this decision, it is unnecessary to deter-
mine whether compensation for losses constitutes Fed-
eral financial assistance under section 504. Recipi-
ents of these payments will have to comply only with
the general prohibition against discrimination in Sub-
part A of this rule. This is no more than would be
required of them under section 404 of the Federal
Aviation Act in any event.

The Commuter Airline Association of America
(CAAA) now the Regional Airline Association of
America, and Air Atlantic, a commuter carrier, ar-
gued that the rule should not apply to any commuters
as they are already facing increasing regulatory bur-
dens. CAAA stated that rules requiring provision of
equipment at each airport or modification of aircraft
would have a disproportionate effect on commuters.
According to CAAA, surface transportation is a vi-
able alternative to most commuter flights, which av-
erage 111 miles.

We do not agree that commuter airlines have no
obligation to serve handicapped travelers, especially
when they receive public money to provide service.
Many of the rules adopted here do not impose affirm-
ative costs and burdens, but merely prohibit unrea-
sonable limitations on travel by the handicapped. To
the extent that costs are imposed, these can be taken
into account in establishing the commuter’s subsidy
rate.

We recognize, however, that rules requiring the
provision of special services and equipment may be

94a

proportionally more burdensome on commuter air-
lines than on larger carriers. These rules may impose
costs on commuters that outweigh their benefits. For
that reason we have decided to apply this rule only
to commuters receiving subsidy from the Board.
That is the minimum requirement of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. This approach is consistent with the Regu-
latory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. 96-354, which requires
agencies to consider flexible approaches to the regula-
tion of small businesses.

We do not agree with the airlines that the author-
ity of the FAA over travel by the disabled is exclu-
sive. We of course recognize the FAA’s jurisdiction
over flight safety issues, and our rules defer to that
agency’s expertise in several respects. In any event,
the Rehabilitation Act and Executive Orders 11914
and 12250 call for us to issue regulations governing
carriage of the handicapped by carriers that we sub-
sidize.

Our rules do not merely duplicate existing FAA
regulations. While one purpose of the FAA rules
(14 CFR Part 121) is to prevent arbitrary refusals
of service to disabled passengers, their primary goals
is to ensure that airline procedures for carrying the
handicapped are safe. The aim of the Board’s rvee,
on the other hand, is not simply to ensure that the
disabled are carried safely, but to ensure that they
face no unreasonable, nonsafety-related obstacles to
travel. To that end, this rule covers issues, such as
provision of services and boarding assistance and
limits on the airline’s right to require a passenger to
be attended, that are not reached by the FAA rules.

Nor do our rules conflict with those of the FAA
or the Department of Transportation (DOT) gener-
ally. Where the potential for conflict is greatest, we
have explicitly deferred to the DOT or FAA rules.

95a

Where DOT, in its comments, suggested areas of
potential overlap or conflict, we have made changes.
DOT did not raise any objection to the Board’s gen-
eral exercise of jurisdiction in this area.

Finally, we agree with the DRC that these rules
do not violate section 401(e) (4) of the Act. In our
view, the impact they will have on airlines’ facilities
or accommodations is clearly justified by the other
statutory goals to be achieved, Capital Airlines v.
CAB, supra.

* * * * *

R wv. & GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFice. 1985 461531 10263

OPPOSITION
BRIEF

6)

No. 85-289 Tf —
Court, U.S
: —FiLED
re P 26 1006
Supreme Court of the Rnited
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL,

OCTOBER TERM, 1985 CLERK

,

cE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

*DOUGLAS L. PARKER
Institute for Public Representation
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 624-8390

ARLENE BATTIS
Paralyzed Veterans of America
801 18th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 872-1300

*Counsel of Record

EST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether federal financial assistance
to commercial air transportation renders
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 applicable to the treatment and
service of disabled passengers by

commercial airlines.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...ccecccccees i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..cccccccccces iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...cececees iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..cececees 1

ARGUMENT:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION REACHES A
SENSIBLE RESULT WHICH
HAS MINIMAL EFFECTS
ON THE AIRLINES AND
WHICH CARRIES OUT
THE INTENT OF
CONGRESS @eeeeeeoeaeseeeee@ 10

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IS LIMITED
TO ITS FACTS AND DOES
NOT PROVIDE AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR CLARI-
FICATION OF GROVE
CITY COLLEGE v.
BELL ccoccccccccccccccs 15

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION DOES NOT
CREATE A CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
WHICH REQUIRES RESO-
LUTION BY THE SUPREME
COURT eeeeeceaeaeaeoeeoeea ese 20

CONCLUSION eeeeeoeceaeneeeeeeeeeeeeee 27

iv

Cases:

396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C.
1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975) wccccccccseees

’
104 S, Ct. 1211 (1984) ween

‘Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1984) eeeeeeeeeenseenweeeneseeneeee

North Haven Bd. of Education v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) ....

Statutes and Regulations:

Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
92 Stat. 1705, et Seq. cecvees

Civil Aeronautics Board
Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703,

et seq. eeeeeeaeaeaeeoeveeeeeee ee 8

Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§404(b), 49 U.S.C. §1374(b)
(1976) eeeeeeoeaceaeeeeeeeeeeeeee@

19

16,17,
18

20,21,
22,23,
24

18

4,22,
23

23

Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§504, 29 U.S.C. §794
(1982) @®eeeseeceaeaeeeeeeoeeeeeeee¢e

44 Fed, Reg. 32,402 (1979) ......

Miscellaneous:

Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1985, H.R. 700, 133 Cong.
Rec, H131 (daily ed. Jan. 24,

1985) eeeeoeeaeveeveeeeeeeee ee eee

S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6373 eeeeoeeeeeeeeenenee

18

14

No. 85-289

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners' Statement of the Case

is inadequate in three respects. First,
the government misstates the court of

appeals’ holding. The court of appeals

did not hold that commercial airlines are
subject to Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 simply
"because the airlines have the use of
federally assisted airports." Petition
at 3. Rather, the court held that
Congress intended to provide financial
assistance to the program or activity of
commercial air transportation, and that
the flying of passengers on airplanes is
an inseparable part of that program or
activity. The court recognized that the
Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") had
violated Congress' intent in adopting
rules which allowed disabled people to
use ground facilities at airports, but
which did not protect disabled people
from discrimination if they wanted to fly
on commercial airlines. In light of this
Congressional intent, the court held that
airlines cannot be allowed to deny
disabled people the benefits of the

program of commercial air transportation

Second, the petition does not reveal
the extent to which the CAB changed its
position on the central issue in this
case in the course of its rulemaking.
Basic to the structure of the rules
proposed in 1979 was the CAB's decision
that under Section 504 “all passengers,
regardless of handicap, should be given
reasonable access to commercial air
transportation...." 44 Fed. Reg. 32,402
(emphasis added). The 1979 proposed
rules would have applied to al] carriers,
and would have exempted only aircraft
with 30 or fewer seats. When the Final
Rule was adopted in 1982, however, the
CAB had reversed its position: rather
than exempting small aircraft, it
exempted large ones, by failing to apply
its rules to major airlines.

The court of appeals found the CAB's
explanations for this radical change

"inadequate, vague and contradictory."
Petition App. at 57a. The government's
effort to explain this change in its
Statement of the Case is equally
inadequate. The government suggests,
Petition at 12-13, that the CAB
reevaluated its jurisdiction in the
course of rulemaking due to a
"contraction of the Board's statutory
authority" by the Airline Deregulation
Act, which provided for the sunset of
section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act. However, the CAB was fully aware of
that statutory change well before it
began its rulemaking in 1979: the
Airline Deregulation Act was passed in
1978.

The rule finally adopted reflects
the CAB's inability to explain its change
of direction and its continued
ambivalence about the nature of its

authority. The 1982 Final Rule was an

admitted “compromise” that appeared to
prohibit discrimination, but did not
apply any specific obligations to the
airlines. Rather, the rule cryptically
suggested the airlines “look to" the
specific requirements of the rule for
guidance, but did not explain the legal
basis for such a suggestion. Petition
App. at 58a.

In short, in reviewing the
rulemaking record, the court of appeals
was not presented with a consistent and
logically supported agency position. The
court dealt with a rulemaking in which
the CAB initially appeared to want to
prohibit handicap discrimination by major”
airlines, but then changed its position
without an adequate explanation. Despite
these problems, the court of appeals
deferred to the CAB's expertise on the
substantive provisions of the rules.

However, since the CAB did not appear to

have a clear idea of its own
jurisdiction, and since the issue of the
scope of Section 504 was a legal one, the
court of appeals correctly made an
independent inguiry into the question of
the agency's authority. Petition App. at
75a n.217.

The government's Statement of the
Case also fails to advise the Court of
current regulatory proposals by the
Department of Transportation ("DOT")
which are relevant to an assessment of
the practical impact of this case.
Subsequent to the argument of this case
but prior to the court of appeals
decision, the DOT submitted proposed new
Section 504 regulations to the Department
of Justice for approval. A copy of what
respondents believe are those proposed
rules, which are not in the record in
this case, has been submitted to the
Clerk of the Court simultaneously with

the filing of this response. Those
proposed rules are significant because
they would have made the rules presently
before this Court applicable to all
commercial air carriers.

In proposing these new rules, the
DOT stated, "The Department believes that
it is appropriate that all carriers be
subject to the entire regulation.... As
a policy matter, it is reasonable to
apply the same set of standards, and a
common set of enforcement procedures, to
all carriers, whether or not they receive
a subsidy." Office of the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (undated)
("Proposed Notice") at 4. The Department
also recognized, “The primary function of
an airport is to enplane and deplane
passengers bound to and from other
destinations. An airport cannot be said

to operate for the fair use and benefit

of the public, without unjust
Giscrimination, if would-be passdengers
cannot benefit from and participate in
this primary function: obtaining air
transportation services." Proposed
Notice at 7. In evaluating the practical
impact of its proposed rule, the DOT
stated, "It is unlikely that makin 33, at 335.20/ The airlines therefore

20/ "Because the incumbent airlines can
generally refuse to sublease terminal space to
other airlines, the incumbent airlines, rather
than the airport, control access at airports
where all terminal space has been leased."
Airline Deregulation, Airport Regulation, supra
p. 53, at 333. See also Patterson, Airport
[footnote continued]

56

control the development of the airport,
participate in its management, and
directly operate many of the facilities
offered to the public on the airport site.
One commentator concluded in analyzing the
economic interconnections between airports
and airlines, “[iJn fact, the long-term
lease agreements may be viewed as a form
of vertical integration between an airport
and the incumbent airlines." Id. at 333

n.87.21/ In claiming the court of appeals

20/ [footnote continued]

Funding - Approaches for Spending the Surplus in
the Trust Fund, 47 J. of Air Law and Commerce
519, 541 n.185 (1982). Airlines are of course
further involved in airport management and
operation when they buy and sell access to air-
port gates, when they construct their own
terminals adjacent to the runways and taxiways,

and when they transfer "slots" at crowded airports.

21/_—=This de facto control of airlines over air-
ports vitiates the government's suggestion that
airlines “cannot control the airport operators'
decisions to accept or reject federal financial
assistance." Pet. Br. at 29. Of course, even
if airlines did not exercise such control, they
can properly be required to comply with non-
discrimination requirements as a condition of
using the federally constructed airports. DOT's
[footnote continued }

57

decision is overbroad, the government
ignores this unique interrelationship,
which differentiates the airport/airline
relationship from any of the others
mentioned by the government or by Judge
Bork.

The government also ignores the
Critical role of congressional intent in
defining the scope of a particular program
Or activity. In

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0890%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
