# Record and brief — Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 370

## Text

DOCKET

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING, IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE
WILL BE ISSUED,

&

De BS5-164-CFX Tithe: Je Se Stringtellows Jresr Et ales Fetitioners
-atuss GRANTED Ve
Concernecs Neigndbors in Actions et al.
pcketesz: Court: united States Court of Apceals
ugust 14 1985 Tor the Ninth Circuit
Counsel ror setitioner: MullikensDavid Le
Counsel Tor respondent: wWoochersFrederic Des Solicitor
General
try Date Note Proceecings ans Oroers
FOO OOS OS OC OOS OOOO S OS OOOO OOSOSS OS SOSS SO CSSSSOESOOOOSCOCSOCECESOCOCOSSSSCOececeoeee
|
1 May Chkennaquist, “ay
; 20s 1V085).
Fo Au3 1 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari files.
« Aug 12 1985 vrcer extendins time to tile response to setition until
wctover siv 1985.
5 Oct U0 ives vrcer Trurtner extending time to tile response to
retIition until Decemoer 20, 1985.
6 Dec 11 1¥85 vroer Turtner extending time to tile response to
PETITION until February 28, 1986.
7 Fec 10 1¥Be¢e wrcer further extending time to file response to
ReTITION UNTIL April 2%, 1¥BE,.
5 Aor 2 19806 Sup>cemental oriet of petiticners J, Strinctellows et al.
Tilec.
y Aor 11 19806 wroer turtner extensing time to tile response to w
wetTITION until May ids 19806.
J Aor 1171 1986 ihe adove extension acplies to all respondents.
1 May 7 1989 orivet of Fesponcent United States in onvosition tilec.
2 May 13 19B6é wIST¥IDUTED. May 2¥, 1936
c May 12 198% K Briet of respondents Concerned Neicnvors In Actions et al.
1M Oprosition tilec.
~ Jun 2 1980 Fetition GRANTED. Limitec to Question 1 peresertec sy the
° petiticn.
ieee eee eee PPP PPPS S SS CSLSSCTCCTCOCCCOCTCOCC.. See
s May 19 1966 “OCDgINg received.
8 Jul 117 19806 vrcer extending time to file briet of petitioner on the
merits until July 314 1966.
7h Jul 3U 1986 aecora tiles.
jJ Jul 3U 19386 certified copy of original record anc proceedings (20x)
received.
Jul 31 1986 JOINL appendix tiled.
Jul 31 1986 briet of petitioners J. stringtellows et al. filed.
Jul 31 1986 Brier of respondent United States supporting petitioner
Tilec.
Jul 28 1986 mOTION tO Gismiss writ of certiorari as to setitioners
alumax Ince and Hunter Engineering Inc. only and order
Jul 28 1986 vf dismissal oursuant to Rule 53 of this Court.
(8/32/06). :
Aug 12 1¥B6 & mOt1O" Of the Solicitor General tor civicec arcument

PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
~ CERTIORAR

October Term, 1984

J. B STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC.;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER CoO.,

Petitioners,

VS.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY

STEVEN P. McDONALD
ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite _1200
701 “B* Street, Suite 2100 Washington, D.C. 20036-1594
San Diego, California 92101 (202) 828-4400

(619) 236-1234

(Additional counsel are listed on signature pages)

July 30, 1985 “Counsel of Record for Petitioners

y
Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 00!

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Is an order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right immediately appealable?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit err in reversing the district
court’s holding. that Intervenors, an individual and a
corporation, could intervene permissively but not as of right
in this action in which the United States and the State of
California seek relief concerning the clean-up of a waste
disposal site?

PARTIES BELOW

Plaintiffs-Appellees:

United States of America
State of California

Defendant-Appellees:

J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.

Stringfellow Quarry Co., Inc.
Stringfellow Quarry Company

Paul Hubbs

Lucille Hubbs

E. Moe McCook

Alcan Aluminum Corp.

Alumax, Inc.

- BKK Corporation

Capri Pumping Service

General Electric Co.

General Steel and Wire Co.

Hunter Engineering, Inc.

McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Montrose Chemical Corporation of California
National Distillers & Chemical Corp.
NI Industries, Inc.

Northrop Corporation

The Deutsch Company

(Continued on next page)

Quemetco, Inc. TOPICAL INDEX

Rainbow Canyon Manufacturing Corp.

: Page
Rheem Manufacturing Co. |
Rockwell International Corp. ) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Rohr Industries, Inc. : PARTIES BELOW
Standard Dredging Corp. | ERE EI RN eee ROTTEN 2
Stauffer Chemical Co. | JURISDICTION 2
bons sseetion . oe | STATUTES INVOLVED osesssssssssscsssssssssssssesessensesnsseenee 3
ee | STATEMENT OF THE CASE o0...sccceccssssscsssssssccsssssscssssssvees 4
| REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......cccs0000000 10
Intervenors-Appellants: )
EEE SS ee ICRC. A RE 26

| APPENDIX

Order Entered By the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (filed March 18,
oer pabitenl _ : ca ) Se ercicenilaiidetiinhibiesdadiniinicadtetiiinaibiiivntsipieamuiaanincenenees A-1
t t t t
7 raerprpete ten ee ee Opinion of the United States District Court for

t titi i t forth in the A dix. mer . ‘ :
ee the Central District of California (filed

Concerned Neighbors in Action
Penny Newman )

| iii ites A-3
| Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed June 4, 1984) ............ A-22

! Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed Sept. 6, 1984, after
| CIID ccrcencesieentsnsorennsinsitinictinntnmectitninameceses A-26
| Order Entered By The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying
Reconsideration En Banc (filed Oct. 26, 1984) .. A-28

at Se Fee EAS ES Oe Se aN A-30
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioners ............ A-46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R.

en 12, 13, 18
Cobbledick v. United States

EEE . 11, 18
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay

Be Se ITED ctrsiiccecinenevecncesnemmmingumnensse 14, 18
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council v. Pennsylvania

674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982)... 23
EEOC v. United Airlines

ey 2 eS ee, Be ee 22
Estelle v. Gamble

BS REESE 7 ew eT eee 24
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

ESR EEC 24
Flanagan v. United States

eee 24
Forsyth v. City of Hammond

Se Sy III cnet ninicrinesnticnsemesenninedesecnngens 23, 24
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.

EE 11, 16
Kartell v. Blue Shield

687 F.2d 543 (Ist Cir. 1982) oo... eeeeeeees 16, 18
Myers v. Bethelehem Shipbuilding Corp.

ee Sy Me MEE slnitineitedennictenccerncnncccsnnccsemnmecetioene 24

ee ee eae

NAACP v. New York
RE en 22

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co.,
690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir. 1982) .... 23

Pennsylvania v. Rizzo
530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom.

Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania

I aii rstercerinsaiaensncetenensceemenmnel ».. 23
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.

606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979) ...... 15, 16, 18
State of California v. Block

FS &, Re. 8, 15
United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries

I ia scssenineeenntenensnnees 12
United States v. General Motors Corp.

EE EE ee TE 24
United States v. Hooker Chemicals of Plastics Corp.

749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) 00... 19, 20-25
Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

$42 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976) ............ ecodatens 22
Wade v. Goldschmidt

673 F.2d 182, 196 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) ............... 23
Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.

ee GF me Be A | 7, Seen 17, 18
Williams v. Morgan

of ¢ 2 x . sn 12

—iv— : —
Statutes TE EE A EES a TOR 5
a TEE AE A aT Re RENT RN 5
ES Se om 3
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen- TD id ccrenincemasnbiamninmsedenneenttansnenencouseusenennassonnn 8
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 i 5
(“CERCLA”)
§ 104(a)(1), 42 US.C. § 9604(a)( 1) 1 3, 5 42 US.C.§ 1331 SOCCER EEE EEE EEE EERE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE HEHE RHEE ES 5
§ 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) ..n..ecccceceeceesescesees 3, 5 a ciicitaiiliseceness - eiiiidineaiiidtiiiaiiesnintiulieetis 5
§ 107(a), 42 US.C. § 9607(a) I a ccsccinselsissensiesinattiamiciba dailies 15
§ 113), 42 U.S.C. § 96130)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure State
SIT IIE Giuicudishiietsehitacensecotininesdinentionnn
FE 6, 16 California Health & Safety Code
Federal Water Pullution Control Act (the “Clean § 25358.3 SOCCER OEE EEE E EEE TERETE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE SESE SEES NEES E EE EEE EEES 5
Water Act” or “CWA”) SS) 25300-25395 CORREO E EEE EEE EEE EEE E EEE EE EES 5
§ 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(C)(1) ceecccecescessesseeseene 4
vam § 04a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) ceeccccessscssseee 4, 5, 19 Other Authorities
wmmmS SOS, 33 USC. § 1365 nercrecsrernssnenneneenenn 4, 6
: 3B Moore’s Federal Practice at 24-163
aeaap anal Environments: Potisy Act ) a 12, 14
Rs ID icsseicscctsstcinccnctecencessitisocons 15 |
H. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong.
a. and Recovery Act Ne ceuamsebunnommnnes 25
ne 4 S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong.
§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) -.ocececseesseeens 4, 5, 19 ER NN 25
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) Supreme Court Rules
§ 1431(a), 42 U5S.C. § 300i(a) ho 4, 5, 6, 19 Rule 18 Tee CUCU CSE e ee eee Tee ere eee eee eet ee eee eee ee eee) x
§ 1449, 42 USC. § 300j-2 EE 4, 6 SE oe

the United States to require compliance with such

requirement, but in any such action in a court of

the United States any person may intervene as a

matter of right; or

(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior

to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of

such action to the Administrator.
Notice required by this subsection shall be given in such
manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
No person may commence a civil action under
subsection (a) of this section to require a State to prescribe a
schedule under section 300g-4 or 300g-5 of this title for a
variance or exemption, unless such person shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the State has in a substantial
number of cases failed to prescribe such schedules.

8. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3

Imminent or substantial public endangerment;
removal or remedial actions; testing and investig-
atory actions and studies; contracts

(a) Whenever the director determines that there may be
an imminent or substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or to the environment, because of a release
or a threatened release of a hazardous substance, the
director may do any or all of the following:

_(1) Order any responsible party or parties to take
appropriate removal or remedial action necessary to protect
the public health and safety and the environment. No order
under this section shall be made to an owner of real
property solely on the basis of that ownership.

A-45

(2) Take or contract for any necessary removal or
remedial action.

(3) Request the Attorney General to secure relief that
may be necessary to abate the danger or threat. The
superior court of the county in which the threat or danger
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant therelief which the
public interest and equities of the case may require.

(b) When the director determines that a release of a
hazardous substance has occurred or is about to occur, the
director may do any or all of the following:

(1) Undertake those investigations, monitoring, surveys,
testing, and other information gathering necessary to
identify the existence, source, nature, and extent of the
hazardous substances involved and the extent of danger to
the public health or environment.

(2) Undertake those planning, legal, fiscal, economic,
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investiga-
tions which are necessary or appropriate to plan and direct
response actions, to recover thecost of those actions, and to
enforce this chapter.

(c) Whenever there is a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, the director may
take or contract for any necessary removal or remedial
action and may take or contract for any actions authorized
by subdivision (b), in compliance with the provisions of this
chapter, including, but not limited to, subdivision (b) of
Section 25355.

A-46

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES OF
PETITIONERS

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioner
Alumax, Inc.:

Alumax Aluminum Corporation
Alumax Aluminum Sales Corporation
Alumax Bauxite Corporation
Alumax Building Specialties Corporation
Alumax Culvert Corporation
Alumax Dispatch Corporation
Alumax Export Corporation
Alumax Extrusions, Inc.
Alumax Fabricated Products, Inc.
Alumas Foil Industrial Redevelopment Corporation
Alumax Foils, Inc.
Alumax of Georgia, Inc.
Alumax of Maryland, Inc.
Alumax Mill Products, Inc.
Alumax Mobile Home Products of Florida, Inc.
Alumax of New South Wales, Inc.
Alumax Pacific Corporation
Alumax Quebec, Inc.
-Alumax Recycling Group, Inc.
Alumax Remelt Corporation
Alumax 6100 South Broadway Redevelopment Corpora-

tion

Alumax of South Carolina, Inc.

A-47

Alumax Technical Services, Inc.
Alumax Warehouse Corporation
Alumax of Washington, Inc.

Alumet Corporation

Alumet Holding Corporation

Decatur Aluminum Company, Inc.
Eastalco Aluminum Company
Eastalco Share, Inc. at

Hillyard Aluminum Recovery Corporation
Homefront, Inc.

Intalco Aluminum Corporation

K & S Products, Inc.

Kawneer Company, Inc.

Kawneer France, Inc.

Mt. Holly Plantation, Inc.

Quaker State Manufacuring Company
Resource Products Corp.

Sailor Mfg., Inc.

Texas Aluminum Company, Inc.

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of BKK
Corporation:

BKK Company of Nevada, Inc. (d/b/a Sun Television)
El Segundo Solid Waste Co., Inc. (d/b/a Eagle Refuse)

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Montrose
Chemical Corporation of California:

Chris Craft Industries, Inc.

A-48

Stauffer Chemical Corporation

Subsiffaries and Affiliates of Northrup
Corporation:

=

Alabama Industries, Inc.
Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.(CASA)
DSD International DISC, Inc.

DSD International, Inc.

Electronica Basica, S.A. (ELBASA)
Fuller-Shuwayer Co., Ltd.

Northrop A viation Sales, Inc.
Northrop Data Systems, Inc.
Northrop Global, Inc.

Northrop Hueneme Corporstion
Northrop Intercontinental, Ltd.
Northrop International Airezait, Inc.
Northrop International Finance, N.V.
Northrop International, Inc.
Northrop International Services, Inc.
Northrop Korea Investments, Inc.
Northrop Overseas Services, Ltd.
Northrop Product Sales, Inc.
Northrop Radio Services, Inc.
Northrop Services, Inc.

Northrop Support Systems, Inc.
Northrop Technology Enterprise Co.
Northrop Universal, Ltd.

Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.

A-49

__N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vleigtuigenfabriek
Fokker

Page Communications Engineers, Inc.
747 NOC I, Inc.

747 NOC II, Inc.

747 NOC III, Inc.

747 NOC IV, Inc.

Tiger Insurance Company, Ltd.
Wilcox Aviation Sales, Inc.

Wilcox Electric, Inc.

World Wide Wilcox, Inc.

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of The Deutsch
Company: )

Bowthorpe Holding, Limited

Compagnie Deutsch

Deutsch Aerospace Fittings Corp.

Deutsch Electromechanical Industries, Limited

Deutch Real Estate Development, Inc.

Nikko Deutsch

Permaswage S.A.

Sharir Precision Engineering, Limited

The Deutsch Company Electronic Components Division
The Deutsch Company Metal Components Division

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rheem
Manufacturing Co.:

Rheem Canada, Inc.

A-30 A-51

Rheem Puerto Rico, Inc.

Europlastique S.A.
Rheem Textile Systems, Inc. Flexible, Inc.
Romolus Holding Company Hills-McCanna Company
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rockwell magnon Ce. £46.
International Corp.: Industrias Erlo, S.A. de C.V.
Industrias Teluq, S.A.
AJ. Sage and Co., Pty. Limited Maine Electronics, Inc.
Amforge, Inc. Manufacturers Leasing Associates XX XV
Arpel, S.A. Metalpan S.A.
Atomics Internationa’, Inc. Metalurgica Carabobo, S.A. “Metalcar”
Audco-Rockwell lialiana S.R.L. MGD Graphic Systems, Inc.
Automotive Axles Limited Moligal Productora de Assentos de Automovel, Limitada
Autonetica, S.A. M.P. O’Rourke Pty., Limited
Autonetics, Inc. Narland Corporation
Braseixos S/A North American Aviation, Inc.
Brasprenas S/A North American Rockwell Corporation
Camdan Investment Trust, Limited Nottrim Services Limited
Collins International Service Company Naud Corporation
Collins Radio Company PHI Magnetronics Limited
Collins Radio Company of Japan, Ltd. Press Kogyo-Rockwell Co., Ltd.
Collins Radio Constructors, Inc. Racticon Corporation
Collins Systems International Inc. Rocketdyne Corporation
Compagnie Industrieiie de Mecanisaes, S.A. Rocketdyne, Inc.
Componantes Automotrices Rockwell-Standard y Com- Rockitt, Ltd.
pania Limitada ~ Rockwell Aerospace & Electronics, Inc.
Constantine Insurance Company, Ltd. Rockwell (Bermuda) Ltd.
Dina Rockwell Nacional S.A. Rockwell Cerdans, S.A.
Electronic Fabriek N.V.

Rockwell-Collins (Australasia) Pty. Ltd.

A-52

Rockwell-Collins (Far East) Limited
Rockwell-Collins (U.K.) Limited
Rockwell-Collins de Mexico, S.A.
Rockwell-Collins de Nogales, S.A. _
Rockwell-Collins France S.A.
Rockwell-Collins G.m.b.H. :
Rockwell-Collins International, Inc.
Rockwell-Collins Italiana S.p.A.
Rockwell CVC OMEVI S.p.A.

Rockwell do Brasil Industria e. Comercio Ltda.

Rockwell Financial Services Corporation
Rockwell Golde G.m.b.H.

Rockwell Golde Italiana S.p.A.

Rockwell Graphic Systems Limited
Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc.

Rockwell International Corporation
Rockwell International Credit Corporation
Rockwell International G.m.b.H.
Rockwell International Holdings Limited
Rockwell International Limited

Rockwell International Manufacturing Pte. Ltd.

Rockwell International of Canada Ltd.
_ Rockwell International Operations, Inc.

Rockwell International Overseas Capital Corporation

Rockwell International Overseas Corporation

Rockwell International Pension Trustees Limited

Rockwell International S.A. (France)
Rockwell International S.A. (Switzerland)

A-53

Rockwell International Sales Corporation
Rockwell International Systems, Inc.

Rockwell International Taiwan Company, Ltd.
Rockwell International Trading Company
Rockwell International Ventures, Inc.
Rockwell Limited

Rockwell Manufacturing Company
Rockwell-Maudslay Limited

Rockwell Mexicana, S.A.

L— /

Rockwell-Rimoldi da Amazonia, Industria e Comercio

Limitada ‘

Rockwell Rimoldi Espanola S.A.
Rockwell Rimoldi France S.A.
Rockwell-Rimoldi G.m.b.H.
Rockwell-Rimoldi (Great Britan) Limited
Rockwell-Rimoldi of America, Inc.
Rockwell-Rimoldi S.p.A.

Rockwell Shuttle Operations, Inc.
Rockwell-Standard Corporation
Rockwell-Standard de Venezuela C.A.
Rockwell Standard of Australia Limitea
Rockwell Systems Graphiques, S.A.
Rockwell Telecommunications Inc.
Rockwell Thompson Limited

Rockwell Transmission Company
Rockwell U.K. Limited

Rockwell Valves Limited

Rockwell Valves S.A.

A-M4

Rockwell Walther Australia Pty. Ltd.

Rockwell Western Trade Corporation

R.O.R. - Sevem S.A.

Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Europa) B.V.

Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Manufacturing) Limited
Rubery Owen-Rockwell Limited

Ruedas de Venzuela S.A.

Sapart, A.G.

Sasab Ag Eschen

SCI Aux Pres Renard

S.C.I1. Volta

S.C.I. de Sully sur Loire

Serrature Auto Ferroviarie Edili SpA.

Serrature Auto Meridionali Stampi Attreature SpA.
Setec S.p.A.

Silvant Plastics Limited

Smith-Blair Inc.

Societe d’Execution Rationelle de Mecanique Automo-
bile s.a.r.l.

Sumlock Anita Services Limited
Tamet Compania Anonima
Tokyo Buhin Rockwell Co., Ltd.
Truflo G.m.b.H.

' Tyseley Estates Limited

W. B. Bumpers Limited
Wescom-Alco Associates
Wescom Leasing Corporation
Wescom (U.K.) Limited

A-55

Wilmot Breeden Australia Nominees Pty. Ltd.
Wilmot Breeden (Australia) Pty Limited
Wilmot Breeden Continental, S.A.

Wilmot Breeden Employees Trust Limited
Wilmot Breeden Group Properties Limited
Wilmot Breeden (Holdings) Limited

Wilmot Breeden International, Inc.

Wilmot Breeden Limited

Wilmot Breeden (Pressings) Limited

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rohr Industries,
Inc.:

International Transportation Systems, Inc.
Rohr Aero Services, Inc.

Rohr Credit Corporation

Rohr Finance Corporation

Rohr France, S.A.

Rohr Industrial Systems, Inc.

Rohr Southern Industries, Inc.

San Diego Prestressed Concrete Co.
Transportation Insurance Limited

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Weyerhauser
Co.:

Camac Veneer, Inc.
Cargal Hellas E.P.E.
Cartonneries du Forez
Cartonpack, S.A.

A-56

Centennial Homes, Inc.
Chehalis Western Railroad Company
Columbia & Cowlitz Railway Company
Combustion Power Company, Inc.
Cornerstone Development Company
Curtis, Milburn and Eastern Railroad Company
de Bes’ Insurance Ltd.
Descartes S.A.R.L.
DeQueen and Eastern Railroad Company
Dixieline Builders Fund Control, Inc.
Dixieline Lumber Company
Dropsy Carton S.N.C.
Duma, Inc.
Fisher Lumber Company
Golden Triangle Railroad
Great Northern Insured Annuity Corporation
Green Arrow Motor Express Company
Kennedy Bay Timber Sendirian Berhad
Marmont Realty Company
Mississippi & Skuna Valley Railroad Company
Mountain Tree Farm Company
Norpac Export Inc.
North Pacific Paper Corporation
Oregon Aqua-Foods, Inc.
Oregon, California & Eastern Railway Company
Pacific Hardwoods, Sdn. Bhd.
Pardee Construction Company
Pardee Construction Company of Nevada

A-57

Par-West Financial

Quadrant Development Limited

Quill Corporation

Scarborough Construction, Inc.

Scarborough Corporation

Seyfert International, S.A.

Shemex International B.V.

Shemin Nurseries, Inc.

Silam Forest Products Sdn. Bhd.

Societe Nouvelle des Papeteries de La Haye
Texas, Oklahoma & Eastern Railroad Company
The Baboock Company

The Capricorn Corporation

The Giddings Company

The Giddings Mortgage Investment Company
The Quadrant Corporation

Trendmaker Homes, Inc.

ver Bes’ Insurance Co.

Westminster Company

Westwood Associates

Westwood Escrow Company

Westwood Insurance Agency

Westwood Insurance Agency of Arizona, Inc.
Westwood Securities Company

Westwood Shipping Liftes, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.
Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd.

Weyerhaeuser Capital Corp. N.V.

A-58

Weyerhaeuser China, Ltd.

Weyerhaeuser Construction Company
Weyerhaeuser Export, Inc.

Weyerhaeuser (Far East) Limited
Weyerhaeuser GMBH

Weyerhaeuser International, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser Italia, S.R.L.

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Arizona
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Nevada
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Texas
Weyerhaeuser Overseas Finance Company
Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company
Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company of Nevada
Weyerhaeuser S.A.

Weyerhaeuser (U.K.) Limited

Weyerhaeuser Venture Company

Wight Nurseries, Inc.

Winchester Homes, Inc.

SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF

Supreme Court, U.S. |
} FILED
No. 85-184 ~— APR 2 1008

IN THE JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*"
October Term, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO,;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER
COo.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY
STEVEN P McDONALD Suite 1200
ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite 2100 Washington D.C. 20036

701 “B” Street (202) 828-4400

San Diego, California 92101

(619) 236-1234

(Additional counsel are listed in the Appendix.)

March 28, 1986 *Counsel of Record for Petitioners

Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc. / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457

TOPICAL INDEX
Page

5 The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No
Justification For The Conflict Between The
Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And
The Decisions Of This Court And Three
I a ceatilenetanbncntanee 2

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From
The Intervention Standards Established By
This Court and by Other Circuits .............cccceeees 5

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo
Standard Of Review Conflicts With The
Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review
Adopted by this Court and Other Circuits .......... 6

B. The Standard Used By the Ninth Circuit
For Determining Adequacy Of Repres-
entation Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With
The Established Standard Used Every-

where Outside the Ninth Circuit «0.0.0.0... 7
ac I os ried ccrodiaiciaideipsitnlanbllannageieesenncencecase 9
APPENDIX
List of Parties Joining in the Filing of this
TIT sic sn ictininsttetlaienminciidineeiphinesennasincsense A-1

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed Feb. 18, 1986) ............. A-5

—

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R.

Se Wea Fee CORD cece 3, 4
California v. Block

690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) .........0000.... 3, 4
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo

530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom. Fire Officers Unim v.

Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921 (1976) ............. ee. 8

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
Ga Wi: Gee GE. ettiniseintsntieiominnine 3, 4

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higgison

RS 8: Fo Bs ee = x
EEOC v. United Airlines

515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) .......0.0.0.0... 6-7
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

GaP Te Gk Oe CED vicdiscccstcietenoianinies 4
Kartell v. Blue Shield

fs & f) £- | eee 3
NAACP v. New York

SES DR Beee. Be CCD cemtiicinention 6
New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United Gas

Pipeline Co.

oe Me Be A 8

— Wi

Page
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller
—— a 2 ee ee. ener 4
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.
ES, , 3
United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp.
749 F.2d 968 (2nd Cir. 1984) ...... 5, 7-8
Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
See aes BO, SEO CU CR. TGF) ...0000000000000.02.... 6
Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.
ME ES MED 1. .cs, ccccsnssencccscesconsooes 3
Statutes
ceca caepnscnstinnieccusseoseecsnccesessos 2
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ca aceinc cen nsecgeénnsontcccescounsocsecnes 6-8
SET AD 5-8
Other Authorities
Supreme Court Rules
aaa caccenssmsconstesesessnnsesescosencosnee 2

No. 85-184

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING COQO,;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER
CoO.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

Pursuant to Rule 22.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, Petitioners hereby submit this supplemental brief to
invite the Court’s attention to the opinion entered in this
matter by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on
February 18, 1986.' The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which is
reproduced in the appendix hereto,” provides f urther
justification for this Court to exercise its discretion to issue
a writ of certiorari directed to the Ninth Circuit and to
reverse or vacate the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

I

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No
Justification For The Conflict Between ‘The
Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And The
Decisions Of This Court And Three Other

Circuits

As set forth more fully in the Petition For a Writ of
Certiorari filed herein, three different circuit courts of
appeals have held that orders granting: permissive
intervention but denying intervention as of right are not
appealable orders under 28 US.C.§ 1291. See, Petition For
a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

| The Ninth Circuit entered its judgment in this action on March 18,
1985, in the form of a two paragraph order which simply announced the
result reached by the Ninth Circuit. In the March 18, 1985 Order, the
Ninth Circuit stated that its opinion would follow. A Petition for a Wret
of Certiorari was filed with this Court shortly before the jurisdictional
time limit for seeking review of the March 18, 1985 judgment expired in
"le in Circuit’s February 18, 1986 Opinion was certified for
publication but has not yet appeared in the Federal Reporter.

for the Ninth Circuit, dated July 30, 1985 [hereinafter “Pet.
Cert.”] at 11-18 citing Kartell v. Blue Shield, 687 F.2d 543
(ist Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979); Wheeler v. American Home
Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891 (Sth Cir. 1977). Such holdings
follow directly from this Court's analysis in Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen y. Baltimore of Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519
(1947), and from the collateral order standards set forth in
Coopers & Lybrand vy. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).

Confronted with the conflict between the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit in this action and the law established by this
Court and three other circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in its
February 18, 1986 opinion, makes an astonishing election.
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit elects not to offer any
rationale as to why its rule of law is more reasoned than
that established elsewhere; it elects not to try to distinguish
this case from others previously decided; and it elects not to
offer any rationale for modifying or adjusting the law
established by this Court and by three other circuit courts
of appeals. Instead, it elects to ignore all non-Ninth Circuit
decisions and to ignore any obligation to explain the conflict
created by its decision in this action. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit ignores Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand, Kartell,
Shore and Wheeler altogether, citing only a single Ninth
Circuit decision — California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776
(9th Cir. 1982), which also igwores Brotherhood and its
progeny — in support of its judgment. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit opines simply, ‘“‘we have previously held that an
order denying intervention as of right is a final appealable
order, notwithstanding a simultaneous grant of permissive
intervention, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir.
1982), and are bound by that holding.” Appendix to
Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition For a

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit [““App.”] at A-10, A-11.

By blindly adhering to Block (and by refusing to
reconsider the rule of Block en banc, as requested by
petitioners), the Ninth Circuit has created an inconsistency
between Ninth Circuit decisions and the decisions of this
Court, and a direct conflict between Ninth Circuit decisions
and the decisions of three other circuit courts of appeals.

After the Ninth Circuit entered its March 18, 1985
judgment in this action, this Court, in Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, _. U.S. —, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985), again
examined and applied the collateral order standards of
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In
Koller, this Court held that orders disqualifying counsel in
civil cases are not appealgble. In so holding, the Court
reconfirmed that “{t}he collateral order doctrine is a
‘narrow exception’ [to the final judgment standard of 28
U.S.C. § 1291] whose reach is limited to trial court orders
affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence
of an immediate appeal.” _ U.S. at —; 105 S. Ct. at 2761
quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 US.
368, 374 (1981). Consistent with its election to ignore
Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand and the relevant decisions
from the various circuit courts of appeal, the Ninth
Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion does not acknowledge
or make any effort to square its March 18, 1985 judgment
with this Court’s analysis in Koller.

Petitioners respectfully submit that this is a case that so
plainly and inexplicably departs from established law that it
cries out for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, and
possibly, a summary reversal. At a minimum, a writ of
certiorari should be used, and the case remanded to the
Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Koller.

—

II

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From The
Intervention Standards Established By This
Court And By Other Circuits

The Ninth Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion creates
(or perpetuates) two major inconsistencies between the law
of the Ninth Circuit and the holdings of this Court and of
other circuit courts of appeal. The first conflict exists
because the Ninth Circuit held that intervention orders
under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Rule 24(a)(2)”) are reviewed under a de novo
standar@ «yhile this Court and other circuit courts of appeal
review such orders under an abuse of discretion standard.

The second conflict created by the Ninth Circuit relates
to the burden that members of the public bear in showing
inadequacy of representation by federal and _ state
governments in actions commenced by such governments to
protect and assert public rights. The Ninth Circuit held that
the burden of showing inadequacy of representation under
Rule 24(a)(2) in such cases is satisfied if the applicant for
intervention makes the “minimal” showing that the
representation “may be” inadequate, while othér courts of
appeals have held that a presumption of adequate
representation exists in such cases and that the burden is
satisfied only by “a strong affirmative showing that the
sovereign is not fairly representing the interests of the
applicant.” Compare, U.S. v. Stringfellow, App. at A-16
with United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
749 F.2d 968, 985 (2nd Cir. 1984).

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo
Standard Of Review Conflicts With The
Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review
Adopted By This Court And Other Circuits

In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held
that orders granting or denying intervention under Rule
24(a)(2) are reviewed under a de novo standard of review.
App. at A-12. This holding is inconsistent with the decisions
of this Court and other circuits.

This Court has held specifically that an order denying, on
timeliness grounds, a Rule 24 motion to intervene must not
be set aside by a reviewing court absent an abuse of
discretion. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973)
(‘(Timeliness under Rule 24] is to be determined by the
court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that
discretion is abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed
on review.””) Timeliness, like inadequacy of representation,
is one of the four prongs of the Rule 24(a)(2) intervention
standard.

Moreover, at least three circuit courts of appeal have
held that orders denying Rule 24(a)(2) intervention on any
grounds, including adequacy of representation, must be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. 749
F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984) (“it is now the rule in this
circuit that denials of motions to intervene as of right under
Rule 24(a)(2) also are to be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard”); Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976); (“The test on
review [of an order denying intervention under Rule
24(a)(2)] is whether the district judge abused his discretion
in denying the motion for intervention”); EEOC vy. United

Airlines, 515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) (‘“‘we find no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that
the appellants’ interests are adequately represented”).

The Ninth Circuit’s unexplained departure from the
abuse of discretion standard creates inconsistency and
uncertainty in the law relating to intervention under
Rule 24. A writ of certiorari should be issued in this case to
secure uniformity and consistency of law throughout the
nation on this issue.

B. The Standard Used By The Ninth Circuit
For Determining Adequacy Of Rep-
resentation Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With
The Established Standard Used Everywhere
Outside The Ninth Circuit

In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held
that the burden borne by a citizen to show inadequacy of
representation by the federal and state governments in an
aciion commenced by such governments to assert public
rights is satisfied if the citizen makes a “minimal” showing
that the existing representation “may be” inadequate. App.
at A-16. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, this standard
“clearly conflicts” with the standard applied in other
circuits. App. at A-16.

Indeed, every circuit (other than the Ninth Circuit) that
has considered this issue has recognized something akin to a
“presumption of adequate representation” in cases where
the government sues in its parens patriae capacity and has
acknowledged the more “stringent burden” placed on
applicants for intervention in such cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968,

a oe

985 (2d Cir. 1984) (‘we agree with the Third, Fifth and
District of Columbia Circuits that, in litigation of this sort,
a greater showing that representation is inadequate should
be required”); New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co. 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir.
1982) (citing, with approval, a District of Columbia circuit
case for the proposition that ‘where governmental parties
are already present in case, private parties must make more
than a minimal showing of inadequate representation”’);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d
738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“to intervene in a suit in district
court in which a state is already a party, a citizen or
subdivision of that state ... must demonstrate that its
interest is in fact different from that of the state and that
that imterest will not be represented by the state”);
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, (3rd Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921
(1976) (“‘a presumption of adequate representation gener-
ally arises when the representative is a governmental body
or officer charged by law with representing the interests of
the absentee”’).

The Ninth Circuit's desire to justify the result announced
in its March 18, 1985 order has created a standard for
intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in the Ninth Circuit that is
radically different from the standard used everywhere else
in the nation. The Ninth Circuit’s standard is not one that
was compelled by application of logic or public policies to a
pending case; rather, it is an after-the-fact standard created
to explain an otherwise inexplicable result in a case decided
a full year ago. The Ninth Circuit’s standard, and the
opinion which created it, will cause nationwide
uncertainties and inconsistencies in all cases involving
intervention under Rule 24. For this reason, and for the
other reasons set forth in the Petition For a Writ of

Certiorari on file herein, a writ of certiorari should be
issued in this action.

Ill
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that a writ of certiorari

be issued and the decision of the Ninth Circuit reversed or
vacated.

Respectfully submitted,

David L. Mulliken
of Latham & Watkins
Counsel of Record for Petitioners

APPENDIX

The following parties join in the filing of this Supplemental
Brief :

LATHAM & WATKINS
David L. Mulliken (Counsel of
Record for Petitioners)
Steven P. McDonald
Robert P. Dahlquist

LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
Maureen E. Mahoney

Counsel for Petitioner
Montrose Chemical Corporation
Of California

HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE &
McAULIFFE
Richard L. Goff
Rene P. Tatro
44 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94101

Counsel for Petitioners Alumax,
Inc. and Hunter Engineering

McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN &
ENERSEN
Barry P. Goode
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner
Rohr Industries

CHASE, ROTCHFORD, DRUKKER

& BOGUST
Vincent Fish
606 South Olive Street
Los Angeles, California 90014

Counsel for Petitioner
Weyerhaeuser Co.

LEWIS, D’AMATO, BRISBOIS &
BISGAARD
Christopher P, Bisgaard
Suite 300
261 S. Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

Counsel for Petitioners
J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.

Stringfellow Quarry Company

and Stringfellow
Quarry Co., Inc.

FOLGER & LEVIN
Michael A. Kahn
Douglas Sullivan
50 California Street
San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner
The Deutsch Company

A-3

LaFOLLETTE, JOHNSON,

SCHROETER & DEHAAS
Robert E. Kelly

320 North Vermont Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90004

Counsel for Petitioner
Rainbow Canyon
Manufacturing Corp.

PACHTER, GOLD & SCHAFFER
Cliford L. Schaffer

6th Floor

6420 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90048

Counsel for Petitioner
Post Transportation Co.

MUNGER, TOLLES &
RICKERSHAUSER
Peter R. Taft
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioners
Northrop Corporation and
Rockwell International Corp.

A-4

SIDLEY & AUSTIN
Charles S. Vogel
Robert I. McMurry
2049 Century Park East
Los Angeles, California 90067

Counsel for Petitioner
BKK Corporation

McCUTCHEN, BLACK, VERLEGER
& SHEA
Richard Doty
Michael Hickok
600 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioner
Rheem Manufacturing Co.

A-5

For Publication

é
‘

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
wv

FILED

FEB 18 1986

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 84-5684

D.C. NO. CV-83-2501-MML

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiff -Appellees,
vs.

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, Jr., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,

Intervenors-Appellants.

OPINION

A-6

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Malcolm M. Lucas, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 1985
Pasadena, California

Before: GOODWIN and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges,
and SOLOMON, District Judge*

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Concerned Neighbors in Action (“CNA”) and _ its
chairwoman, Penny Newman, appeal the district court's
denial of their motion to intervene as of right in an action
brought by the United States and the State of California
against thirty-one parties who are allegedly responsible for
release of hazardous wastes from the Stringfellow Acid Pits.
We conclude that the district court erred in finding that
appellants failed to meet the requirements of intervention
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(.). !

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CNA is a nonprofit organization consisting of over 400
residents of Glen Avon, California and its surrounding
communities. The organization was founded in 1979 in
response to releases of hazardous wastes from Stringfellow.
CNA was formed to ensure adequate clean-up of the acid

* Gus Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the Distriet of
Oregon, sitting by designation.

' On March 18, 1985, we issued an order reversing the court's denial
of appellants’ motion and directing the court to grant appellants leave to
intervene as of right. We stated in that order that we would file an
opinion at a later date.

pits; to monitor the performance of government agencies
involved in clean-up efforts; and to protect the health and
well-being of its members who, according to appellants,
have all been exposed to hazardous wastes deposited at
Stringfellow. Penny Newman, in addition to being the
chairwoman of CNA, is a resident of Glen Avon.

Stringfellow is a 20-acre hazardous waste disposal site
constructed by the State of California and located one mile
from Glen Avon. According to appellants’ proposed
complaint in intervention, dumping of hazardous waste into
the acid pits began in 1956 and continued until closure of
the site in 1972. During this period, approximately 34
million gallons of hazardous wastes were dumped into the
site by more than two hundred parties, including agencies
of the federal government.

As early as 1969, it became apparent that the hazardous
waste was noi being confined to the site and was escaping
into the adjacent Pyrite Creek through which surface water
flows down into the community of Glen Avon. In March,
1S69, heavy rains caused the site to overflow, discharging
contaminated water into Glen Avon. Heavy rainfall during
the winter of 1977-78 caused similar overflowing. In 1978,
the State of California released 800,000 gallons of
contaminated water into Pyrite Creek, which in turn
drained into the Streets of Glen Avon. Additional flooding
resulted from heavy rains in 1979 and 1982.

In April, 1983, the United States and the State of
California brought suit against thirty-one defendants,
including the former owners of the site and other private
parties who generated or transported wastes which were
dumped at the site (“the waste-generators”). The two
governmental entities sought to enjoin the release of
hazardous wastes from Stringfellow pursuant to the

“imminent hazard” provisions of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982); the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982);
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),
42 US.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1982); and the Safe Drinking
Water ACT (“SDWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300)-10 (1982).
They also asserted claims for cost recovery pursuant to both
state and federal law.”

In July, 1983, CNA and Newman (hereinafter collective-
ly referred to as “CNA’”’) moved to intervene as of right,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(1) and 24(a)(2). In the
alternative, CNA moved to intervene permissively, pur-
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P 24(b). In its complaint in
intervention, CNA asserted claims against the plaintiff state
and federal governments as well as the thirty-one waste
generators named as defendants in the existing action. In
addition to joining in the plaintiffs’ claims for relief, CNA
sought additional injunctive i viief against both the plaintiffs
and the defendants, including permanent abatement of the
hazard by total removal of the hazardous substances from
the site, and the conducting of health studies.

The district court denied CNA’s motion to intervene as
of right, concluding that neither Rule 24(a)(1) nor Rule
24(a)(2) provided a basis upon which to grant intervention.
With respect to Rule 24(a)(1), which provides for
intervention as of right “when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene,” the district
court reasoned that although the “citizen suit” provisions of

2 In August, 1983, several waste-generators asserted counterclaims
against both governmental parties.

A-9

the SDWA, the RCRA and the CWA provide for citizen
intervention as of right in certain types of actions, these
statutory rights of intervention do not apply to suits such as
this which have been brought by the United States pursuant
to the “emergency powers” provision of the SDWA, the
“imminent hazard” provision of the RCRA, and the
“emergency relief” provision of the CWA. Accordingly, the
court concluded that Rule 24(a)(1) did not authorize CNA
to intervene.

The district court also denied CNA’s motion under Rule
24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as of right

when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.

The district court concluded that CNA had failed to show
that it would be practically disadvantaged by disposition of
the litigation or that the existing parties would not
adequately represent its interests.

Notwithstanding its denial of CNA’s motion to intervene
as of right, the district court granted CNA leave to
intervene permissively, reasoning that since CNA’s
proposed complaint in intervention and the complaint filed
by the United States and California raised common
questions of fact and law, permissive intervention was
appropriate. However, the court imposed conditions upon
its grant of permissive intervention. CNA claims that those
conditions severely limit its ability to influence the results of
the litigation. Specifically, the district court’s order
prohibited appellant from (1) asserting any claims not

A-10

already asserted by the original parties; (2) intervening in
the original parties’ cost recovery claims; and (3) initiating
any motion or discovery, unless appellant had conferred
with the original parties and had secured the concurrence
of at least one of them in the proposed mofien or discovery.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In this appeal, CNA raises two issues, only one of which
we need address. First, it contends that the district court’s
determination that it failed to make the requisite showing
under Rule 24(a)(2) was erroneous. Second, and in the
alternative, it contends that the district court erred in
finding that the statutes pursuant to which the original
plaintiffs brought this action confer upon it no right of
intervention. Because we reverse the district court’s denial
of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not rule on
appellant’s statutory right of intervention claim.

Ill. APPEALABILITY OF THE DISTRICT
COURT’S ORDER

The waste-generators challenge our jurisdiction over this
appeal. They contend that an order denying intervention as
of right but granting permissive intervention is not a “final
decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982),
and hence is not appealable. They also contend that because
appellant availed itself of the benefits of permissive
intervention by filing briefs and pleadings, it is, in effect,
estopped from appealing the district court’s denial of its
motion to intervene as of right.

We reject the waste-generators’ contentions. First, we

“have previously held that an order denying intervention as
of right is a final appealable order, notwithstanding a

simultaneous grant of permissive intervention, California vy.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982), and are bound by
that holding. > Second, CNA’s participation in the litigation
aS a permissive intervenor does not estop it from timely
appealing that portion of the order denying intervention as
of right. * A party is not required to reject the benefits of a
judgment it deems inadequate in order to preserve its right
to appeal, so long as the party does not consent to the
judgment. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312
(1960);° United States for Use & Benefit of H & S
Industries, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764-65 (7th
Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly
Broadcasting Co. 414 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1969); 9 J.
Moore & B. Ward, Moore’s Federal Practice 1 203.06, at 3-
26 (2d ed. 1985). Here, although it may have unwillingly
participated in the igation as a permissive intervenor,
CNA made if clear that it was not consenting to the denial
of its right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Moreover, to

3 The governments and several of the waste-generators originally
moved, before a motions panel of this court, to dismiss CNA’s appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. Neither party brought California v. Block, supra to
that panel’s attention, due to the fact that the case is not annotated under
Rule 24. The panel decided the jurisdictional issue against CNA,
dismissed the appeal and issued an opinion for publication. CNA then
moved for rehearing on the ground that the order of dismissal was in
conflict with Block. The panel agreed. It withdrew its opinion, held that
we had jurisdiction over CNA’s appeal and ordered, in an unpublished
memorandum, that the appeal be calendared for a hearing on the merits.

* We note that CNA, unlike the applicant in Block, has demonstrated
that its limited status as a permissive intervenor impedes its ability to
fully prosecute its claims. In Block, we stated that the applicant had
failed to show with any specificity that it was prejudiced by the court's
actions in granting it permissive intervention status.

A-12

hold otherwise would force CNA to give up one important
right in order to preserve another.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF
APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO INTER-
VENE AS OF RIGHT UNDER RULE
24(a)(2)

A. Standard of Review

Although the waste-generators contend that the district
court’s denial of appellant’s motion to intervene as of right
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, we
traditionally conduct a de novo review of such orders. See,
e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527
(9th Cir. 1983); Washington State Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Smith v.
Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1981); Idaho y.
Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980); County of
Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Legal
Aid Society v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1980);
Johnson v. San Francisco United School District, 500 F.2d
349, 352-54 (9th Cir. 1974). We do so because our review of
the district court’s decision involves application of a rule of
law to the established facts, and because the issue primarily
' involves consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact
and law. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 101 (1984).
See also 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1902 (1972).

A-13

B. The Validity of the District Court’s
Decision

Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for
intervention. Washington State Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.
1982); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1904. We have
adopted a four-part test to determine whether applications
for intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) should
be granted. An order granting intervention as of right is
appropriate if (1) the applicant’s motion is timely; (2) the
applicant has asserted an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the
applicant is so situated that without intervention the
disposition may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its
ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s
interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties.
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at 527; County
of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d at 438. In applying this test
we are guided primarily by practical considerations. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee note (“if an
[applicant] would be substantially affected in a practical
sense by the determination made in an action, [the
applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene
.... ”). The parties dispute neither the timeliness of CNA’s
application nor its interest in the property at issue.
Accordingly, we will address only the remaining two parts
of the test.

A-14

1. Extent to which denial of
appellant’s motion to intervene as
of right impairs its ability to
protect its interest.

In support of its showing that disposition of this action
may have a practical adverse impact on its interests, CNA
points to the effect that any decision in this case would have
on subsequent claims it might bring against the original
parties. CNA correctly points out that “(uJnder the doctrine
of stare decisis, appellate rulings of law become controlling
precedent and, consequently, affect the rights of future
litigants.” McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201. In light of this
potential stare decisis effect, CNA contends that its absence
from this litigation could, as a practical matter, result in its
being precluded from litigating several of its claims against
the governmental parties. > We agree.

The prospect of stare decisis may, under certain
circumstances, supply the requisite practical impairment
warranting intervention as of right. Smith v. Pangilinan,
651 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Atlantis
Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29
(Sth Cir. 1967); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1908 at

* The issues, the determination of which might affect any suit
appellant might subsequently bring against appellees, include (1) the
causal relationships between the parties and the current conditions at the
dumpsite; (2) the liability of each party under the various environmental
Statutes and common law causes of action, including the liability of the
responsible government agencies; (3) the availability of certain alleged
Statutory and equitable defenses to liability; (4) the liability of certain
individuals on an alter ego theory for the actions of corporate entities

under their control; and (5) the remedies avaliable under the relevant
statutory schemes.

i

A-15

515-17. Here, because of the issues of fact and law that are
common to (1) CNA’s complaint in intervention, (2) the
governments’ original complaint and (3) the waste-
generators’ counterclaims, resolution of the liability
questions would, as a practical matter, bear significantly on
the resolution of CNA’s claims against any of the original
parties in a subsequent related action. Cf. Atlantis
Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d at 826-29.

Our analysis is also influenced by the divergent remedial
schemes sought by the original parties and CNA. In
addition to abatement of the hazardous waste releases from
the Stringfellow site and reimbursement for funds expended
in response to the imminent hazard sought by the original
plaintiffs, CNA seeks to obtain additional injunctive relief
against the 31 named waste generators and the original
plaintiffs, including permanent abatement of the hazard by
removal of all hazardous substances from the site. In
addition, CNA seeks the inclusion of health studies in any
remedial program devised as a result of this litigation.

The disposition of the present litigation will, as a
practical matter, establish the applicable remedial scheme.
CNA has a palpable interest in that scheme. Where, as here,
a prospective intervenor has demonstrated a clear interest
in the remedial scheme, and where the _ prospective
intervenor seeks to obtain remedies that differ from those
sought by the original plaintiffs, it is reasonable to conclude
that disposition of the litigation may impair the prospective
intervenor’s ability to protect its interests. That the remedy
established in the present litigation may be challenged in a
subsequent action does not detract from our conclusion. See
Johnson v. San Francisco United School District, S00 F.2d
at 353 (where, in desegregation action brought by parents of
black children, remedy sought by plaintiffs would affect

interests of Chinese children, threat of impairment held
sufficient to warrant intervention despite ability of
intervenors to challenge adopted remedy in subsequent
lawsuit); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle
561 F.2d 904, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“it is not enough an
deny intervention under 24(a)(2) because applicants may
vindicate their interests in some later, albeit more
burdensome, litigation”’).

_ Because of the possible stare decisis effect of this
litigation, and because of CNA’s palpable interest in the
remedial scheme, we hold that CNA has adequately
demonstrated that disposition of the litigation may, as a
practical matter, impair its ability to protect its interests.

2. Adequacy of Representation by
Existing Parties

Finally, we must determine whether CNA’s interest in
this litigation can be represented adequately by the original
plaintiffs. In finding that the original plaintiffs adequately
represented CNA’s interests, the district court applied the
Standard of United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp 749 F.2d 968, 987 (2d Cir. 1984), under which an
applicant must make a “strong showing” of inadequate
representation when the purported representative is a state
or the federal government. However, this standard clearly
confliets with the law of this circuit. Consistent with
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528
538-39 (1972), where the government was the purported
representative, we have held that “the requirement of
inadequacy of representation is satisfied if the applicant
shows that representation of its interests ‘may be’
inadequate and ... the burden of making that showing is
minimal.” Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at

528; see also Legal Aid Society v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 50
(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, SOO F.2d at 353-54.

In evaluating whether there ‘extSts an original party that
will adequately represent CNA's interests, we consider
three factors: whether the interests of a present party to the
suit are such that it will undoubtedly make all of the
intervenor’s arguments; whether the present party is able
and willing to make such arguments; and whether the
intervenor would offer any necessary element to the
proceedings that the other parties would neglect. County of
Fresno vy. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1980);
Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1977).

Because the thirty-one generators have brought counter-
claims on the issue of liability against the original plaintiffs,
the district court reasoned that each of the relevant factors
weighs in favor of adequate representation. The district
court concluded that either the original plaintiffs or the
original defendants possessed interests such that CNA’s
arguments would undoubtedly be made; that either the
original plaintiffs or the original defendants would be able
and willing to make these arguments; and that because of
the relative positions of the original parties, intervention by
CNA would not contribute any necessary element to the
proceedings that would otherwise be neglected. The district
court’s analysis is defective. ;

When a party possesses interests adverse to those of a
prospective intervenor, the party cannot adequately
represent the intervenor’s interests. See Sanguine, Ltd. v.
United States Department of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419
(10th Cir. 1984) (an applicant may meet burden of showing
inadequate representation by showing that the representa-
tive has an interest adverse to the applicant); Stadin v.
Union Electric Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962)

A-18

(same); 7A Wright & Miller, supra, §-1909 at 524-25
(absentee cannot be required to look for adequate
representation from an opponent; if all existing parties are
adverse, then absentee is not adequately represented); cf.
United States v. Board of School Commissioners, Indianap-
olis, Indiana, 466 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 909 (1973) (representation is adequate if, inter alia,
representative does not have or represent an interest
adverse to the proposed intervenor); Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc. v. Watt, supra, 713 F.2d at 528 (that defendant
representative had previously been head of plaintiff
organization raised question concerning adequacy of
representation sufficient to support intervention). Although
the original plaintiffs and defendants certainly have an
interest in attempting to place the blame on each other, it
does not necessarily follow that CNA’s claims will be
prosecuted as vigorously as they would be if CNA were
granted leave to intervene as of right. First, by engaging in
independent discovery CNA might uncover facts that
would affect the remedy in a manner favorable to it or
would materially influence the settlement. Secondly, each
party may be reluctant to advance an argument that would
support a finding of liability against its opponent, but might,
at the same time, expose that party to an increased risk of
liability. Finally, where, as here, a third party seeks to press
claims against both the plaintiffs and the defendants in
ongoing litigation, there exists a genuine possibility that, in
the absence of intervention, the existing parties will
“bargain away” the third party’s interests rather than
vigorously represent those interests at the possible expense
of their own liability. Indeed, should settlement become a
viable alternative in this litigation, it is highly unlikely that
this “division of representation” would result in a
settlement that would adequately address CNA’s interests.

Moreover, CNA seeks to proceed on the theory that
plaintiffs and defendants are jointly and severally liable. As
a practical matter, neither plaintiffs nor defendants, who
respectively seek to impose liability exclusively on the
opposing party, will represent this particular interest.

Finally, CNA seeks remedies that neither existing party
has contemplated. Thus, even were we to credit the district
court’s novel “division of representation” theory, it would
not dispose of the issue of representation with respect to
devising an appropriate remedy.

We conclude that CNA has carried its “minimal burden”
with respect to a showing that its interest might be
inadequately represented.© Because of our finding that
CNA is entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not
rule on the question of its statutory right to intervene under
Rule 24(a)(1). We note, however, the persuasiveness of its
argument that it is afforded such a right under the citizen
suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 6972 (West Supp. 1985).’

6 Moreover, CNA would in all likelihood meet the “‘strong showing”
standard of United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
supra, if that standard were applicable. Because CNA seeks to bring
claims against the United States and the State of California, its interests
are adverse to those of the plaintiff governments. Whether or not the
state and federal plaintiffs are characterized as suing in parens patriae,
the fact remains that they oppose certain claims that CNA seeks to
assert. This case is thus clearly distinguishable from Hooker, in which
the applicants’ interests were aot adverse to those of the plaintiff
government. We note as well that if CNA’s argument for citizen
intervention in government-initiated imminent hazard actions under
RCRA is correct, see infra at 16-17, RCRA itself negates Hooker's
presumption that governmental representation in such actions is

adequate. | |
7 In support of its claim of a statutory right to intervene, CNA argues

A-20

We reverse that portion of the district court’s order
denying intervention as of right; vacate that portion of the
order granting CNA the right to intervene permissively;
and remand the matter with instructions to grant CNA
leave to intervene as of right.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

that Congress intended the 1984 amendments to RCRA, which were
enacted subsequent to the initiation of appellant's suit, to clarify citizens’
rights under existing law to intervene in government-initiated imminent
hazard actions. See 130 Cong. Rec. $9152 (daily ed. July 25, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Mitchell); S. Rep. No. 98-284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 56
(1983). The Senate version of the amendments explicitly provided for
such intervention. 130 Cong. Rec. S9208-09 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
The Conference Committee imposed limitations upon citizens’ right to
commence imminent hazard actions in addition to those of the Senate
version, and restructured section 6972 in accordance with those
additional limitations. The revised structure altered the reference of the
intervention subsection, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E), so that that
subsection now authorizes intervention in citizen-initiated imminent
hazard actions, while omitting reference to government-initiated
imminent hazard actions. CNA argues that the apparent elimination of
the right to ‘ntervene in government suits was inadvertent, since such
elimination would be contrary to the stated legislative purpose of the
1984 amendments. CNA further contends that we should interpret the
1984 amended citizen suit provision consistently with evident
Congressional intent, rather than according to its literal terms, see
Barnes v. Donovan, 720 F.2d 1111, 1113-14 (9h Cir. 1983); Heppner v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 665 F.2d 868, 872 (%h Cir. 981); United
States v. Babcock, 530 F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and that that
intent clarifies the law existing at the time this suit was commenced, see
May Department Stores Co. v. Smith, 572 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); In re Adams, 761 F.2d
1422, 1427 (%h Cir. 1985). Although CNA’s position appears to have
considerable merit, we do not now decide its validity.

~ OPPOSITION
BRIEF

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS
© Vv.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI! TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT II .
Assistant Attorney General

PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.
Assistant to the Solicitor General

DIRK D. SNEL
ANNE 8. ALMY
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

AYP

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a district court order granting per-
missive intervention, but denying intervention as of
right, is immediately appealable to the court of ap-
peals.

2. Whether the court of appeals erroneously held
that certain private parties were entitled to inter-
vene as of right in an action brought by the United
States and the State of California seeking to abate
and clean up a waste disposal site.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
as easiaermnnncsocoonee 1
a nsmanrsuasscovcosonazes 2
EELS EEE 2
I _scanessvgnecovecssoncssos 9
a sessnenctqnenocooonan 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Abney Vv. United States, 431 U.S. 651 .......... ae 10
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &

i cnemstnemecones 11
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 -....................... 7,8, 13,14
Carson V. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 .......... 7
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

a cscsesenaecrccngeocons 9,11
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 ........ 10, 12, 14
County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 _............ 14

Diamond Vv. Charles, No. 84-1379 (Apr. 30, 1986).. 16-17
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.

a. scncnccscensecescoce 11
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson,
XT STN 15

Exxon Corp. Vv. Hunt, No. 84-978 (Mar. 10, 1985) .. 17
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.

Neen sceunmenepeccese 10
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 —................ 9, 10
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 ............-...----00...... 10
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 687

ES SS 7,13
Mitchell v. Forsyth, No. 84-335 (June 19, 1985)... 10
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas

Pipe Line Co., 600 F.2d 1208 ................................ 15
Nixon V. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 781 ............................ 10
Pennsylvania V. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, cert. denied,

Nees vemessnnnncossce 15

+
Cases—Continued :

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, No. 84-127

Page

GD Te, TR weer cetcccctinscrnicnntesernamntied 9,10, 11, 13
7,13

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F.2d 354 ..........
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S.
RSA Ce eB ieee nent es. ere cn ola eS Pa ro brn eT
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
as SU CO els
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 _.............
Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 582
ee A es a ee

Constitution, statutes and rules:
U.S. Const. :

Amend. V (Double Jeopardy Clause) —..............
Amend. VI (Speech or Debate Clause) ..............

Clear Water Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1251 et
seq.:

§ 311, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. IT) 1821 — 2002...
as ee rears I asccnessnenctntnantnanannnsmencenenreunen
§ 505, 33 U.S.C. 1365 ._....... pipryettiinitienienenanateios
§ 505 (b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (b) (1) (B).....

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980:

§ 106 (a), 42 U.S.C. 9606 (a) ......... Laieeadinidnieipiptadensen
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IT) 9607 |...
§ 207(a), & UBL. Seer Ge) «...................-......---

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6901 et seq.:

§ 7002, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6972 ............ s

§ 7002(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 6972(b)

ERI ge a: aor | 7 ee a

§ 7003, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6973

Safe Drinking Water Act:

ere ere eee eee eee ee

§ 1481, 42 U.S.C. 8008 «on eeccccccccccccsssessseeccccceee™

OD eri Ge Cis ID cc sce ncccesiteccenssensensnnencnetes
§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. 300j-8(b) (1) (B) -.0....

10

15
10

13

17
10
10

> mm CO OD

wr w

> & CO

a

Vv
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
ST Oe rr 7,10
I arn cacincenctnenioteeatiinmeins 7
By ee CI TED IID ncevecitssccccecrennceccnesepeesonss 14
NE 4
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479-3496 (West 1970 & Supp.
SEE a Ee ee ES... See 3
Cal. Health & Safety Code:
ES ae 3
§§ 25300-25395 (West 1984 & Supp. £985) iia 3
Fed. R. Civ. P.:
a lien 5, 15
EET SEES Ce SE EE 3,5
NS SEE ae 4, 6, 15, 16
EE. 2 ee ee re 4,5, 6
I al sal aedchaibialigtipenmmanl 14
TTT iste sceessnchenetseshleenttninbeatiahgiiiaibieiaiiiniiin 3
Miscellaneous:
131 Cong. Rec. :
H11619 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) ........ — 17
$12184 (daily ed. Sept. 26,1985)... 17
H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) al 18
15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure (1976 & Supp. 1985) . 14

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-184
J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW

The igjtial opinion of the court of appeals dismiss-
ing the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction
(Pet. App. A22-A25) is unreported. The second
opinion, withdrawing the initial opinion (Pet. App.
A26-A27), is unreported. The order of the court of
appeals reversing in part and vacating in part an
order of the district court, and remanding the case
to the district court (Pet. App. Al-A2) is reported
at 755 F.2d 1383. The final opinion of the court of
appeals (Pet. Supp. Br. App. A5-A20) is reported at

(1)

2

783 F.2d 821. The opinion of the district court (Pet.
App. A3-A21) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on March 18, 1985. On May 30, 1985, Justice Rehn-
quist extended the time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari to and including August 1, 1985,
and the petition was filed on that date. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254

1).
” STATEMENT

1. Petitioners are defendants in an action brought
by the respondents United States and the State of
California to abate the release of hazardous sub-
stances from the Stringfellow Acid Pits, an aban-
doned toxic waste disposal site near Riverside, Calli-
fornia. The suit, originally filed on April 21, 1983,
names 28 persons, corporations, or entities as defend-
ants who either generated or transported wastes that
were dumped at Stringfellow Acid Pits or who owned
or operated the pits dufing the period of dumping
(E.R. 356-367).' Some of the defendants have coun-
terclaimed against a variety of state agencies and
the United States Air Force and Navy (E.R. 614).
In addition, some of the defendants have filed third-
party complaints naming more than 100 entities as
third-party defendants (E.R. 613).

As amended, the complaint alleges 11 separate
claims for relief, but the relief sought falls into only
two general categories. First, under the “imminent
and substantial endangerment” provisions of the
applicable federal environmental statutes and under

1 E.R. refers to the Excerpts of Record filed in the court of
appeals.

California tort law,’ the complaint seeks an injunc-
tion requiring the defendants to “abate the release
and threatened release of hazardous substances” and
to “undertake such action as may be necessary to
remedy the conditions which have caused or may con-
tribute to or present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health, welfare and the
environment” (E.R. 400-401). The second form of
relief sought by the plaintiff governments is reim-
bursement of the funds spent by the United States
and the State of California for response, removal,
and remedial costs and for damage to natural re-
sources.*

2. On July 15, 1983, respondents Concerned
Neighbors in Action, a nonprofit corporation, and
Penny Newman sought leave to intervene (E.R. 55,
108).* Respondents claimed that they had the right
to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (1),
on the basis of the citizens suit provisions of the vari-
ous federal environmental statutes that are involved

2 Section 504 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
1364; Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
42 U.S.C. 300i; Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6973;
Section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. 9606(a); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 205 (West
1979) ; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479-3496 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).

5 Section 311 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 1321;
Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a); Cal. Health
& Safety Code §§ 25300-25395 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986).

* Although the United States and the State of California are
also respondents to the petition under Sup. Ct. R. 19.6, we will
hereinafter refer to Concerned Neighbors in Action and
Penny Newman as respondents.

4

in this suit (E.R. 67).° Alternatively, they argued
that they were entitled to intervene as a matter of
right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2), because
they had interests which could be practically impaired
by this suit and because their representation by the
existing parties was inadequate (E.R. 70-82). Fi-
nally, respondents asserted that they should be per-
mitted to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)
because they sought to raise claims that have common
questions of law and fact with those already presented
by the government plaintiffs in this case (E.R. 83).
The proposed complaint in intervention (E.R. 99)
named the same defendants as does the government
plaintiffs’ complaint, and the first nine claims for re-
lief parallel those of the government plaintiffs (E.R.
146-165). The remaining eight claims for relief
(Numbers 10-17), however, present claims that had

not already been plead by the governmental plain-
tiffs.°

° CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b) (1) (B) ; SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 300j-
8(b) (1) (B) ; and RCRA, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 6972(b) (2).

® The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth claims were brought pur-
suant to the citizens suit provisions of CWA, SDWA, RCRA
(33 U.S.C. 1365; 42 U.S.C. 300j; 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II)
6972) and allege that the defendants and so-called third-party
defendants had violated certain regulatory provisions or re-
quirements promulgated under those Acts (E.R. 165-171).
The thirteenth and fourteenth claims for relief allege public
and private nuisance and apparently claim a cause of action
on such a theory against the Air Force under the Federal
Torts Claims Act (E.R. 171-175). The fifteenth and sixteenth
are apparently claims sounding in state tort la~ -‘nder negli-
gence and strict liability theories (E.R. 175-177). The seven-
teenth is an action for inverse condemnation against the State
of California for taking Penny Newman’s property without
just compensation. Federal jurisdiction for this claim is
alleged under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (E.R. 178).

5

The government plaintiffs supported respondents’
motion to intervene insofar as they sought permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b), on the condition that
the respondents should be permitted to raise and ad-
dress only those claims that had already been as-
serted by the plaintiffs and defendants (E.R. 254).
The government plaintiffs opposed respondents’ mo-
tion to intervene as a matter of right, and suggested
that, should the court grant intervention as of right
pursuant to Rule 24(a), “it should place the same
conditions on the intervention as of right” as the
plaintiffs proposed for permissive intervention (E.R.
254).

Several of the petitioners also opposed intervention
as of right but suggested that permissive intervention
could be granted if certain conditions were imposed
(E.R. 228). The conditions suggested by petitioners
were more extensive than those requested by the
plaintiff governments. In addition to limiting the
claims to those raised by the original parties, peti-
tioners sought to deny intervenors the opportunity to
participate in the cost recovery aspects of the litiga-
tion and to limit their participation to the remedial
aspects of the case (E.R. “°5-236). The petitioners
also requested limitations on discovery and motions
initiated by respondents (E.R. 237-238).

3. The district court granted respondents permis-
sion to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)
(Pet. App. A3-A21). However, the district court
concluded that the citizens suit provisions of the vari-
ous federal statutes did not grant respondents the
right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1) (Pet. App.
A5-A14). The court also ruled that respondents’ in-
terests could be adequately represented by the exist-
ing parties (id. at A15-A18). Accordingly, the court

6

denied respondents’ motion to intervene as of right
pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) (Pet. App. A18).

In granting permissive intervention under Rule
24(b), the district court imposed several conditions
on respondents in this litigation. First, as both the
government plaintiffs and petitioners had requested,
the district court found that the additional claims
that respondents sought to raise would “burden and
expand an already complex litigation” (Pet. App.
A19). Accordingly, respondents were permitted to
litigate only those claims that had been raised by the
original parties (ibid.). Second, as requested by the
petitioners, the district court found that respondents’
interest in the cost recovery claims under Section 107
of CERCLA, Section 311 of the CWA, and state law
was akin to the interest of a taxpayer (Pet. App.
A20). Accordingly, because the court concluded that
respondents lacked standing to sue on that basis, the
court refused to allow them to intervene as to those
claims. Finally, to minimize delay and confusion in
discovery, the district court restricted respondents’
right to initiate discovery or motions (ibid.). The
court emphasized that the intervenors would never-
theless be able to participate in discovery and to re-
ceive copies of all materials the same as any other
party (ibid.).

4. Respondents filed a notice of appeal from the
district court’s order. On May 1, 1984, the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal (Pet. App. A23). On
June 4, the court issued an opinion explaining the
basis for its May 1 order (Pet. App. A22-A25). The
court of appeals ruled that the district court’s order
was not an appealable final order because “[respond-
ent’s] interests are protected adequately by their par-
ticipation as permissive intervenors” (id. at A24).

7

Relying upon Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts,
Inc., 687 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1982), and Shore v.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979),
the court also held that the restrictions imposed by
the district court upon respondents’ participation in
the suit did not render the district court’s order im-
mediately appealable “absent obvious prejudicial er-
ror,” which the court did not find (Pet. App. A24-
A25). Finally, relying on Carson v. American
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981), the court of ap-
peals rejected respondents’ argument that the district
court’s order was immediately appealable under 28
U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) as a denial of injunctive relief.
The court found that respondents had failed to dem-
onstrate that they would suffer any serious, irrepar-
able injury from the district court’s order or would
be unable to challenge that order at some later point
in this suit (Pet. App. A25).

On respondents’ petition for rehearing, the court of
appeals issued an order withdrawing its June 4 opin-
ion and ruling that the district court’s order was
immediately appealable (Pet. App. A26-A27). The
court explained (id, at A26) that a prior Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753
(1982), had ruled that intervention orders like the
one at issue in this case were immediately appealable
under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The court of appeals denied
a suggestion for rehearing en banc filed by one of
the petitioners and set an expedited briefing schedule
for the appeal (Pet. App. A28-A29).

On March 18, 1985, shortly after oral argument on
the merits of respondents’ appeal, the court of appeals
issued an order reversing the district court’s denial
of respondents’ motion for leave to intervene as of
right and vacating the order granting permissive in-

8

tervention (Pet. App. Al).’ The order expressed no
view as to the appropriateness of the conditions that
had been imposed by the district court on respondents’
participation as permissive intervenors, and the order
did not address the propriety of imposing conditions
on respondents’ intervention as of right (id. at A2).
The order stated that “[a]n opinion will follow”
(ibid.).

Eleven months later, on February 18, 1986, the court
of appeals issued its opinion (Pet. Supp. Br. App.
A5-A20). On the question of appellate jurisdiction,
the court of appeals reiterated its vig that it was
bound by its prior ruling in California v. Block, su-
pra, that orders denying intervention as of right and
granting permissive intervention are immediately ap-
pealable (Pet. Supp. Br. App. A10-Al1l). On the
merits, the court of appeals ruled that respondents
had to make only a minimal showing that the existing
parties—the federal and state plaintiffs and petition-
ers—would not adequately represent their interests
(id. at Al6). The court found that petitioners had
made this showing because of the existence of counter-
claims and third party claims against agencies of the
plaintiff governments (id. at A16-A19).

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1985, petitioners, the
owner, generator, or transporter defendants in the
underlying action, filed the present petition for a
writ of certiorari from the order of the court of ap-
peals reversing and vacating the decision of the dis-
trict court. On April 2, 1986, petitioners filed a sup-

7 Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the
order of the court of appeals reinstating respondents’ appeal.
No. 84-999 (filed Dec. 20, 1984). However, petitioners later
dismissed the petition after the Ninth Circuit entered its
March 18, 1985, order.

9

plemental brief in support of their petition for a writ
of certiorari addressing the February 18, 1986, opin-
ion of the court of appeals.

ARGUMENT

1. The ruling of the court of appeals that the dis-
trict court’s order denying their motion to intervene
of right, but granting their motion for permission to
intervene, was immediately appealable is plainly
wrong, and is in conflict with the decisions of three
other courts of appeals and, in principle, with those
of this Court. Accordingly, the Court should grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari on Question One.
The Court may also wish to consider summary re-
versal.

a. Because an order denying a petition to inter-
vene of right but granting a petition for permission
to intervene obviously does not terminate the litiga-
tion, the district court’s order to that effect is ap-
pealable only if it fits within the “collateral order”
exception to the final judgment rule articulated by
this Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). As this Court has em-
phasized, the collateral order doctrine permits im-
mediate appellate review of a trial court order only
when observance of the final judgment rule “ ‘would
practically defeat the right to any review at all.’”
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the collateral order
doctrine has been limited to “trial court orders af-
fecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the
absence of an immediate appeal.” Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, No. 84-127 (June 17, 1985), slip op. 6.
To qualify as a decision excepted from the final judg-
ment rule by Cohen, an order, at a minimum, “must

10

conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve
an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote
omitted); accord, Richardson-Merrell, slip op. 6;
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265; United States v. Holly-
wood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982); Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,
375 (1981). In applying that standard, the Court
has ruled that a trial court order denying a right to
be free of trial itself may be immediately appealed.*
On the other hand, the Court has not permitted an
immediate appeal where the right in question can be
vindicated by a later reversal of an adverse judgment,
or where prejudice is a component of the showing
necessary to establish a violation of the right.’ Taken
together, these cases confirm that the collateral order
doctrine is “ ‘narrow exception’ ” to the finality rule
imposed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. 1291, applicable

8 E.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, No. 84-335 (June 19, 1985),
slip op. 12-18 (qualified immunity from liability in damages) ;
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-743 (1982) (absolute
immunity from suit) ; Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-
508 (1979) (absolute immunity from a criminal prosecution
under the Speech or Debate Clause) ; Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 659-662 (1977) (immunity from a criminal
prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause).

°E.g., Richardson-Merrell, slip op. 16 (disqualification of
counsel in a civil case) ; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ris-
jord, supra (refusal to disqualify counsel in a civil case) ;
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. at 267-270 (refusal to dis-
miss the indictment in a criminal case on the ground of alleged
p~osecutorial vindictiveness) ; United States v. MacDonald, 435
U.S. 850, 860 (1978) (refusal to dismiss the indictment in a
criminal case on speedy trial grounds).

11

only to a “‘small class’ of prejudgment orders.”
Richardson-Merrell, slip op. 6.

Leaving aside the question of whether respondents’
appeal would qualify under the first two criteria, it
is clear that the district court’s order does not satisfy
the third criterion under Cohen, because an order de-
nying a litigant the right to intervene but granting
it permission to intervene is fully reviewable upon an
appeal from a final judgment. Although this Court
has not addressed the precise question presented here,
the Court’s decision in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519
(1947), provides guidance on this issue. There, the
Court explained that a party ordinarily may not ap-
peal from an order denying leave to intervene be-
cause, by not being allowed to participate in the case,
“the applicant is not legally bound or prejudiced by
any judgment that might be entered in the case. He
is at liberty to assert and protect his interests in
some more appropriate proceeding.” 331 U.S. at 524.
By contrast, an applicant is adversely affected by
the denial of his intervention motion “where a stat-
ute or the practical necessities grant the applicant an
absolute right to intervene,” because there is “no
other way in which he can better assert the particular

interest which warrants intervention” (ibid.). That

order also “has the degree of definitiveness which
supports an appeal,” because the petitioner “cannot
appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the
proceeding unless he does intervene” and becomes a
party to the case. /bid. As far as that party is con-
cerned, therefore, “the lawsuit is all over.” Dickin-
son v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513
(1950). Accordingly, an order denying a petition to
intervene of right that wholly excludes a party from

12

the suit is immediately appealable, because that order
is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468
(footnote omitted).

By contrast, litigants, such as respondents, who
have been granted permission to intervene are parties
to the lawsuit and therefore have the right to appeal
from the entry of a final judgment. To this extent,
it is immaterial that such litigants have been denied
the right to intervene. If a district court does not
impose any restrictions on a permissive intervenor’s
opportunity to participate in the litigation, the ques-
tion whether that party had the right to intervene
effectively becomes moot. On the other hand, if the
district court does impose such restrictions, a per-
missive intervenor may challenge the district court’s
denial of its petition to intervene of right, as well as
the limitations imposed on its participation, follow-
ing the entry of a final judgment.

In the meantime, the only burden imposed on par-
ties such as respondents from being forced to await
the entry of a final judgment is the possibility that
all or part of the case on the merits will have to be
retried if the district court’s decision is reversed.
However, this is simply the normal consequence of
delaying appellate review of interlocutory trial court
orders until the entry of a final judgment. Congress
concluded that the overall benefit to the legal system
that results from the final judgment rule outweighs
the risk that delaying appellate review of the district
court’s decision on such matters will require a new
trial. As this Court has explained, “[i]mplicit in
§ 1291 is Congress’s judgment that the disfrict judge
has primary responsibility to police the prejudgment
tactics of litigants, and that the district judge can

13

better exercise that responsibility if the appellate
courts do not repeatedly intervene to second guess
pre-judgment rulings.” Richardson-Merrell, slip op.
11 (emphasis in original).

b. We agree with petitioners (Pet. 14-18) that the
court of appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with
decisions of the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits. In
those cases, the courts held that orders allowing a
party to intervene and making the intervenor a party
to the case, but limiting the intervenor’s opportunity
to litigate the case, are not immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. See Kartell v.
Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 687 F.2d 543,
548-550 (1st Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., 606 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1979); Wheeler v.
American Home Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 896-
897 (5th Cir. 1977). Those courts reasoned that as
long as the intervenor has the right to appeal from
an adverse final judgment, effective review can be
had, at that time, concerning the trial court’s ruling
on the party’s motion to intervene and the limitations
placed on its participation. See, e.g., Shore, 606 F.2d
at 357; Kartell, 687 F.2d at 549-551.

Indeed, in its initial opinion in this case the Ninth
Circuit followed the First Circuit’s decision in Kar-
tell and the Second Circuit’s decision in Shore and
held that the district court’s February 17, 1984, order
was not immediately appealable (Pet. App. A24).
On rehearing, the court simply ruled (id. at A26)
that it was bound by its earlier decision in California
v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).*° However,

In Block, the district court denied a party’s petition to
intervene of right, but granted that party permissive inter-
vention. 690 F.2d at 760. The applicant challenged the dis.
trict court’s refusal to permit intervention of right on appeai
from the entry of a final judgment. The court of appeals held

14

that decision simply stated (690 F.2d at 776) that
the denial of a petition to intervene of right is im-
mediately appealable and did not explain why an
order of that type was appealable where the appli-
cant was granted leave to intervene. The final opin-
ion of the court of appeals in this case simply reiter-
ated its earlier conclusion that California v. Block,
supra, was controlling (Pet. Supp. Br. App. A10-
All)." Thus, the court of appeals has failed to
offer any reason why a party to a lawsuit may im-

that the applicant’s appeal was untimely, on the ground that
an order denying intervention of right is immediately appeal-
able. Jd. at 776. In so ruling, the court did not consider the
hybrid nature of the district court’s order, as evidenced by
the decision upon which the court in Block relied, which in-
volved a denial of a petition to intervene of right that wholly
excluded the petitioner from participating in the case. See
690 F.2d at 776, citing County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d
436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980).

"The court of appeals noted that the respondents had
demonstrated that the conditions placed on their intervention
by the district court were burdensome (Pet. Supp. Br. App.
All n.3). But the court of appeals did not address the condi-
tions placed on the grant of intervention in its opinion. More-

over, the restrictions or conditions placed on respondents’ —

participation can be challenged in an appeal from a final judg-
ment. Respondents are thus in the same position as a party
who has had one or more claims dismissed or who has been
limited in the scope of discovery that it may undertake.
Orders of that type may not be immediately appealed. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914, at 542, 567-568 (1976
& Supp. 1985). If the validity of the conditions placed upon
intervention are both crucial to the future conduct of the case
and questionable as a matter of law, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. II)
1292(b) provides an appropriate avenue for seeking immedi-
ate appellate review of such interlocutory orders. See Cooper
& Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474.

wees mannii

we

15

mediately appeal an order denying that party’s peti-
tion to intervene of right. Because the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s erroneous ruling conflicts with the decisions of
other courts of appeals and is inconsistent with the
principles that the Court has applied to similar ques-
tions of appellate jurisdiction, review by this Court
is warranted.

2. Question Two of the petition is concerned with
the merits of the court of appeals’ determination that
the district court erred in denying respondents leave
to intervene as of right pursuant to F . Civ. P.
24(a). Petitioners claim (Pet. Supp. Br. 5-8) that
the court of appeals’ standard for establishing in-
adequate representation by existing parties—a mini-
ma! showing—is erroneous and inconsistent with the
standard employed by the Second Circuit in a sim-
ilar case, United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plas-
tics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (1984), and with decisions
of other courts of appeals on the question whether
private parties must demonstrate more than a slight
possibility that they will be inadequately represented
by a governmental litigant before such parties have
the right to intervene under Rule 24(a) (2). See, e.g.,
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) ;
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631
F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pennsylvania v.
Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 921 (1976).”% Of course, the government has

12 The court of appeals reasoned that the government plain-
tiffs were not adequate representatives because they were the
subject of counterclaims filed by the generator defendants
and because they opposed certain claims that respondents
sought to raise. Pet. Supp. Br. App. A17-A19 & n.6. For the
reasons given in the text, however, we do not believe that this
case provides a suitable vehicle to resolve this matter.

16

a substantial interest in the maintenance of reason-
able rules governing the entry of private individuals
into litigation that is initiated by the government
and that involves public rights. Thus, in an appro-
priate case in the future, we may urge the Court to
examine the Ninth Circuit’s doctrine corcerning in-
tervention of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2)
in such cases.

However, it would be inappropriate to consider
that question in this case because, as we have shown,
the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide it
in the interlocutory posture of this case. Even apart
from that dispositive consideration, we would not
urge the Court to grant the petition as to Question
Two because the factual posture of this case does not
provide a suitable vehicle for review of this ques-
tion. When respondents sought to intervene in the
district court, both the petitioners and the govern-
mental plaintiffs agreed that respondents should be
permitted to intervene as parties to the litigation
(see page 5, supra), and there has never been
any dispute in this case over that question. Rather,
it has been our position throughout this litigation
that the essence of the dispute between respondents
and the other parties is whether the district court
can impose conditions on respondents’ intervention,
such as limiting their opportunity to raise additional
claims, to participate in the cost recovery aspects of
the litigation, and to initiate discovery or motions.
See pages 5-6, supra.” The court of appeals did not

18 Although the district court denied respondents’ motion to
intervene in the cost recovery aspect of this suit on the ground
that respondents lacked standing as to this subject, the district
court’s ruling was vacated by the court of appeals. Accord-
ingly, this case does not present the issue mooted in Diamond

17

decide whether the conditions that were imposed by
the district court were valid; the court of appeals
simply held that respondents were entitled to inter-
vene. It is unclear at this time whether that ruling
will have any practical significance in this case be-
cause the court of appeals explicitly left open the
question whether the district court on remand may
impose the same or similar limitations on respond-
ents’ participation as intervenors of right (Pet. App.
A2). Accordingly, the court of appeals’ ruling that
respondents are entitled to intervene in this suit
does not presently appear to be of any substantial
practical importance in this case.

Review of this question by this Court is also un-
necessary at this time because the questions whether
private parties like respondents should be allowed
to intervene in hazardous waste abatement and cost
recovery suits and, if so, whether their participation
may be limited are presently before Congress in the
legislation providing for reauthorization of and
amendments to CERCLA. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
No. 84-978 (Mar. 10, 1985), slip op. 5 n.6. The
Senate passed the Superfund Improvement Act on
September 26, 1985. 131 Cong. Rec. S12184 (daily
ed. Sept. 26, 1985). Section 150 of that bill would
add a provision to CERCLA that would provide for
conditional intervention of right in government in-
itiated CERCLA and RCRA actions. The House
passed the Superfund Amendments of 1985 on De-
cember 10,,1985. 131 Cong. Rec. H11619 (daily ed.
Dec. 10, 1985). Section 113(i) of the House Bill
would provide for intervention of right in CERCLA

v. Charles, No. 84-1379 (Apr. 30, 1986), slip op. 13-14,
whether a party seeking to intervene in district court must
satisfy Article III requirements as \.:ll as those of Rule 24.

18

actions. The bills, both renumbered H.R. 2005, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1985), are presently before a con-
ference committee. To be sure, the prospect and
timing of a final enactment of the CERCLA Amend-
ments is presently uncertain, and there is also no
assurance that Congress will include a provision au-
thorizing statutory intervention in the final enact-
ment. Nonetheless, for the present, the question
whether parties like respondents ought to he permit-
ted to intervene of right in hazardous waste abate-
ment suits is currently before Congress, and final
enactment of an intervention provision would make
review of this question by this Court unnecessary."

Yor all of these reasons, review of Question Two
by this Court would be inappropriate at this time.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted limited to Question One. The Court may
wish to consider summary reversal on that question.
In all other respects, the petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General

PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.
Assistant to the Solicitor General

DIRK D. SNEL
ANNE §. ALMY
MAY 1986 Attorneys

1 We will of course inform the Court of any further legis-
lative developments that may affect this case.

W ov. Ss. covernwenr PRINTING OFFICE; 1986 491507 20208

OPPOSITION
BRIEF

\ | Supreme Court, U.S.
(4) Pa
ST)
No. 85-184 MAY 12 1986
- SPANIOL, JR.
IN THE JOSEPH Fx

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., et al.

Petitioners,

vs.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

FREDRIC D. WOOCHER

JOEL R. REYNOLDS*

CARLYLE W. HALL, JR.

JOHN R. PHILLIPS

LISA FOSTER

CENTER FOR LAW IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST

10951 W. Pico Boulevard

Los Angeles, CA 90064

(213) 470-3000

Counsel for Respondents

*Counsel of Record for Respondents

oe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED ....

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....+46-s
OPINIONS BELOW . + . . . . . © . .
STATUTES INVOLVED .....+s+-«s +»

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....-. -»

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT...

I.

II.

III.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
HAVE EFFECTIVELY MOOTED THE
ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION

THE DECISION BELOW IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT AND THE OTHER
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS ..

A. Appealability of the
Court's Order Denying
Respondents’ Right to
ERGOEVOROG «2 2 2c ew ce ew we

B. Respondents’ Right to
Intervene Under Fed. R.
Ci9. Be SetO) (2) « © co os

ADDITIONAL PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS
MILITATE AGAINST ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN THIS
CASE ee ae a ae a ae

CONCLUSION .. ++. 6 © © © © « «

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

page
Cases

Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods,
572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978) .. 45

Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947
Ere |

Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police,
578 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1978) . 42,43

Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519
ns «= 5 « « 89,27,26,29,30,31

Campos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co.,
536 F.2d 970 (lst Cir. 1976) .. 21

Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co.,

386 U.S. 129 (1967) ....... 42
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
4 U.S. 463 (1978) ..... . 31,32

Corby Recreation, Inc. v.
General Electric Co.,

581 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978) .. 26

Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp.,
427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1970) .. 43

Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148
(1964) ._ © *#* « > . . . . . . . 29-30

Greene v. Union Mutual Life

Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19
~~~. 5 6 6 © 6 ¢« ¢« « @h

ii.

Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of
America, 473 F.2d 118
(D.C. Cir. 1972) . 2. « « « « «

Ionian Shipping Co. v. British
Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186
(2d Gar « 1970) . . . . . . .

Johnson v. Township of Bensalem,
609 F.Supp. 1340

fee BOs BOOP «© © © 6 6 8

Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, Inc.,
687 F.2d 543 (lst Cir. 1982)

LaRouche 'v. Federal Bureau of

Investigation, 677 F.2d 256
8 Ula ‘

McClune v. Shamah,

593 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1979)

NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345
(1973) 7 e 7 . . . . . . . .

National Farm Lines v. I.C.C.,
564 F.2d 381 (loth Cir. 1977)

New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102
ae “eee Seay « é¢ © © @ 6 lt

NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904
ese Gases S977) . - ole

NRDC v. United States Nuclear

Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341
[AUGe WEEs SUPE) se ee eees

a iii.

Nuesse v. Camp, 128 U.S. App.
D.C. 172, 385 F.2d 694
(>.C. Cis. 1967) « «© © © © © « 46942

Richardson-Merreli, Inc. v. Koller,
_ U.S. _, 105 S.Ct. 2757
(1985) a ° e ° ° o o a a . ° . 31,32

Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt,
F. 5 (9th Cir. 1983) .. 25

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery
Inc., 606 F.2d 354

Co.
ee oe sw wg gp ee SM

Spangler v. United States,
415 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1969) .. 30

Stadin v. Union Electric Co.,
309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962) .. 43

State of California v. Block,

690 F.2d 753
(9th Cir. 1982) . . «. « « « « « : 10,25

Trbovich v. United Mineworkers of

America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) .. 42

United States v. Hooker Chemicals
& Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968
(2d Cir. 1984) .. . 38,39,40,43,47

United States v. Oregon,
745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984) .. 45

United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,
56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972) .. 42

United States v. Stringfellow,
738 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986) .. 3

iv.

United States v. Stringfellow,

755 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) .. 2-3
United States v. Stringfellow,

20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2233

‘pen Gale Sewer ce ee tb eo eo ow o See

United States v. Stringfellow,
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1659
(C.D. C@l. 1964) « «© © ec ce eo oc « 3

Van Hoomissen v. Xerox

Corporation, 497 F.2d 180

eee SUED cs ce ewe cee ee
Wheeler v. American Home

Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891
(SER Cig. 1977) «© © we we we we ow wo oe 8S

Statutes and Rules

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. $3 9601-
esr Caeeer ec sc ee eo ee eo eo e SS

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616 .. 11,15

Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
8... 2a eee 4,12,16,17,23

28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . «© © « © © 13,29,37

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 24(a) oe © © © © oe ew h el|6Cpassim
a ee a ae ee | |

Miscellaneous

Superfund Amendments of 1985,
H.R. 2817, §$ 113, reprinted in
131 Cong. Rec. H11619 (daily ed.
Dec. 10, 1965) . « © « « « « « 186,23

Superfund Improvement Act, S.5l,
reprinted in 13l Cong. Rec.
$12184 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
Apes) sce eevee e ee ee 4,17,23

S. Rep. No. 98-284, 98th Cong.,
BG6 BOGG. SG (29GS) « « eo sw eo wo o

7A Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure
(1972) + . . > . - . - + . 42,43,44

130 Cong. Rec. $9152 (daily ed.
July 25, 1984) (remarks of
Sen. Mitchell) ....... « «20,40

vi.

No. 85-184

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR., et al.

Petitioners,

vs.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION, et al.,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Respondents Concerned Neighbors in

Action and Penny Newman ("respondents")
respectfully request that this Court deny
the petition for writ of certiorari,
seeking review of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding
on February 18, 1986.

—

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the simultaneous grant of
limited permissive intervention deprive
an applicant of the right to an immediate
appeal of a final order denying interven-
tion as of right?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in
concluding that respondents have met the
requirements for intervention as of right

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)?

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals denied petition-
ers' motion to dismiss the appeal on
September 6, 1984 (reported unofficially
at 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2233 (9th Cir.
1984)). On March 18, 1985, the Court of
Appeals entered its judgment on the
merits in this action with an opinion to
follow, reversing the District Court's
denial of respondents’ right to intervene

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 755 F.2d

2.

1383 (9th Cir. 1985). On February 18,
1986, the Court of Appeals issued its
full opinion, holding (1) that the denial
of intervention as of right is a final
appealable order and (2) that respondents
have met the requirements for interven-
tion as of right under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a) (2). 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1986). The opinion of the District Court
denying respondents' right to intervene
but grantine limited permissive inter-
vention was issued on February 17, 1984
(reported unofficially at 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1659 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).

All four opinions are reproduced in
the Appendices to the July 30, 1985 Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari ("Pet.
App.") and the March 28, 1986 Supplemen-
tal Brief in Support of the Petition

("Pet. Supp. App.").

STATUTES INVOLVED
The relevant statutes are set forth
as an Appendix to the Petition, at A-30
to A-45. However, the correct version of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972,

as amended, is reproduced in the Appendix

hereto, at A-l1 to A-3. Also included in
the Appendix, at A-4, is the Superfund

Improvement Act, S.5l, 3 150(c).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition arises out of an action
filed on April 21, 1983 by the United
States and the State of California
("plaintiffs") seeking clean-up of the
Stringfellow Acid Pits, the largest
hazardous waste dumpsite in the United
States, and reimbursement for any
government funds expended in abating the

hazards. Thirty-one waste generator,

3
-
4

transporter, and owner-operator indivi-
duals and companies were named in the
action as defendants.

On July 15, 1983, respondents
Concerned Neighbors in Action and Penny
Newman2/ filed a motion seeking leave to
intervene as of right on behalf of the
residents and property owners in the
communities surrounding the dumpsite.

Pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal

i/ Concerned Neighbors in Action
("CNA") is a nonprofit corporation estab-
lished under the laws of California. It
comprises and represents over 400 members
who are residents, taxpayers, and prop-
erty owners in the communities surround-
ing the Stringfellow Acid Pits that are
served by the Chino III groundwater basin
in Riverside County, California. CNA's
primary purposes and interests include
ensuring the full clean-up of the Acid
Pits, monitoring the performance of
government agencies responsible for the
clean-up, and informing the public of
such matters. More broadly, CNA has
encouraged and assisted in the develop-
ment of sensible public policies regard-
ing the handling of toxic wastes. Penny
Newman is chairperson and co-founder of
CNA and a 17-year resident of Glen Avon.

Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24") and various federal environmental
statutes, respondents based their appli-
cation on the fact that they are the
persons most directly endangered by the
imminent hazard caused by releases of
toxic wastes from the Acid Pits. Because
of their constant and unavoidable proxi-
mity to the site and their reliance upon
the area's endangered groundwater supply
for personal and agricultural uses,
respondents alleged that they have an
undeniable interest in the outcome of the
proceeding, an interest which has not
been -- indeed, could not be --
adequately represented by the existing
parties to the action, all of whom caused
Or contributed to the creation of the
hazard. Respondents asserted that
because the disposition of this action
will inevitably determine the course for

Clean-up of the Acid Pits, the extent of

6.

the abatement of the associated hazards,
and the allocation of liability for the
consequences of those hazards, their
interests would as a practical and legal
matter be impaired without their full
participation in this action.2/

On February 17, 1984, the District

Court denied respondents' motion for

2/ In support of their application,
respondents lodged their proposed Com-
plaint in Intervention, asserting claims
not only against the 31 defendant gener-
ators, transporters, and owners of the
dumpsite ("defendants"), but also against
the appropriate agencies of the plaintiff
governments, who were largely responsible
for the creation and maintenance of the
hazard and who for years have ignored
their duty to clean up the Stringfellow
Site. Respondents also filed supporting
declarations describing in detail their
longstanding interest in the subject
matter of the litigation and the basis
for their contention that, due to a
number of substantial and well-documented
conflicts of interest between the exist-
ing parties and respondents, neither the
Plaintiffs nor defendants could ade-
quately represent respondents' interests
in this action.

leave to intervene as of right.2/ Al-
though conceding that respondents have an
important “protectable” interest in the
subject matter of the litigation and
acknowledging the serious "conflicts of
interest" between respondents and the
existing parties, the District Court

concluded nonetheless that respondents

were not entitled to intervention as of
right, reasoning that they could be
adequately represented on some of their
claims by plaintiffs and on others by
detendants. The District Court then

nominally granted respondents leave to

3/ Order Granting Leave to Inter-
vene (Pet. App. A-3). Although denomi-
nated by the District Court as an order
granting intervention, that title refers
Only to its grant of limited permissive
intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(b). See discussion infra at II.A.
There is no dispute that the District
Court denied respondents' application for
leave to intervene as of right, and it is
that denial which the Ninth Circuit
reversed in its February 18, 1986 deci-
sion that is the focus of the Petition.

8.

intervene permissively under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(b), but placed such restrictive
conditions on their participation that
they were in essence relegated to the

status of amici curiae.4/

Following respondents' timely filing
of a notice of appeal, plaintiffs and
defendants moved to dismiss, which
motions were initially granted by the
Court of Appeals. On September 6, 1984,
however, the Court granted respondents’
petition for rehearing, vacated its

previous dismissal, and reinstated the

4 The court imposed the following
limitations on respondents' participation
in the action: (1) they may assert no
claims or requests for relief that have
not been asserted by the existing par-
ties; (2) they may not participate in
cost recovery claims; and (3) they may
not initiate any motions or discovery
without first (a) meeting and conferring
with all other parties to the action, and
(6b) obtaining the concurrence of at least
one existing party to the initiation of
such motion or discovery. None of the 33
Other parties is subject to these
limitations.

appeal. Relying on its prior decision in

State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d

753 (9th Cir. 1982), the Court held that
"[djenial of intervention as of right is
a final appealable order, despite the
grant of permissive intervention."
Opinion, at 1 (Pet. App. A-26). Defen-
dant and petitioner herein Montrose
Chemical Corporation then applied for
reconsideration by the panel and by the
Court en banc, which application was
denied in an order dated October 26,
1984. (Pet. App. A-28.)

Following briefing and hearing of the
appeal on the merits, the Court of
Appeals issued an order on March 18, 1985
reversing the District Court's denial of |
intervention as of right and vacating the
grant of permissive intervention. (Pet.
App. A-l.) On February 18, 1986, the
Court of Appeals issued a full opinion

setting forth the reasons for its prior

10.

order and holding specifically (1) that
the denial of intervention as of right is
a final appealable order; and (2) that
petitioners have met the requirements for
intervention as of right under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2). (Pet. Supp. App.

A-1.)

REA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0876%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
