# Amicus Curiae Brief — United States v. Bagley

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0808%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 473 U.S. 667

## Text

» F TLeö“

No. 84-48
—PEE- 31 1984
IN THE SUPREME COURT ALEXANDER L STEVAB,
CLERK
OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, -1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
HUGHES ANDERSON BAGLEY,

Respondent.

|

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

>

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,
Attorney General
KARL S. MAYER
Deputy Attorney General
THOMAS A. BRADY
Deputy Attorney General
CHARLES R. B. KIRK
Deputy Attorney General
6000 State Building
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: (415) 557-3944
Attorneys for State of California

i.

TOPICAL INDEX

PAGE

INTEREST OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3
ARGUMENT

THE BELATED DISCOVERY OF

UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE DOES

nor REQUIRE RETRIAL OF A

CASE WHERE THE EVIDENCE

IS NOT EXCULPATORY AND

AND NONDISCLOSURE IS

CLEARLY NOT PREJUDICIAL 4
CONCLUSION 21

TABLE OF CASES

Bacley v. Lumpkin

(9th Cir. 1983) 71° Ff. 20 1462 2
Rrady v. Mar Lane

885 373 U.S. 83 2
California v. Trombetta

(1984) v. 8.
81 1. r 413

11

Giglio v. United States
112727 405 U.S. 158 6

In re Ferguson

T1971) s Cal.3d 525
96 Cal. Rptr. 594 14

In re Hall
T1981) 30 ca. 30 408
179 Cal. Rptr. 223 13

ii.
TABLE OF CASES
(Continued)

In re Imbler

Ti963) 21. 20 554
35 Cal. Rptr. 293
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908

In re Weber
Ti974) Il Cal.34 703

114 Cal. Rptr. 427

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847

Lutwak v. United States

(1953) 344 U.S. 604
People v. Clauson

(1969) 275 CST. App. 20 699
80 Cal. Rptr. 475

People v. Green
(1982) 130 Cal.App. 30 1
181 Cal. Rptr. 507

People v. Harris
(1°76) 62 Cal. App. 30 859
133 Cal. Rptr. 352

People v. Harris
(1977) 71 Cal. App. 30 959
139 Cal. Rptr. 788

People v. Huskins
1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 859
54 Cal. Rptr. 253

People v. Mattison
115517 11. 1 177
93 Cal. Rptr. 185

18

13

20

14

15

18

19

14

12

111.

TABLE OF CASES

(Continued)

People v. McDaniel

(1976) 16 Cal.3d 156

127 Cal. Rptr. 467

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847

People v. McGowan
(1980) 105 Cal. App. 38 997
166 Cal. Rptr. 725

People v. Randle
118527 130 Cal.App.2d 286
181 Cal. Rptr. 745

People v. Reyes
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 486
116 Cal. Rptr. 217

People v. Sheran
12571 42 Cal. 2d 101
315 P. 2d 5

People v. Wallin
(1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479
177 Cal. Rptr. 303

People v. Williams
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 263
18 Cal. Rptr. 729

Strickland v. Washington
(1984) U.S.
80 L.Ed.2d 674

United States v. Agurs
(1976) 427 U.s. 9

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal

(1982) 458 U.S. 858

PAGE

12

1°

16

19

12

20

16

11

iv.

TEXTS, STATUTES & AUTHORITIES

United States Code
Title 5
§ 522
§ 522a

Title 28
§ 2255

California Penal Code
§ 1181(8)

No. 84-48
PAGE IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
4 UNITED STATES
4

OCTOBER TERM, 1984
5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
- Petitioner,
v.

HUGHES ANDERSON BAGLEY,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In United States courts, criminal

convictions for any recent year may

2.

number approximately 36,000.2/ Criminal
convictions in the State of California for
a similar period may exceed 230,000.2/ The
opinion below is purportedly based upon
federal due process standards established
by this Court in Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83. (See Bagley v. Lumpkin (eth
Cir. 1983) 719 F.2d 1462, 1463-1464.) As
such, the principle established by the
Gecision herein will of necessity apply to
the States and heavily impact upon the
judicial system of California.

/

/

1. Statistics furnished by the
Administrative Office of the Courts for
the year ending June 30, 1°84, indicate
36,104 convictions in federal felony and
misdemeanor offenses, excluding petty
offenses.

2. Statistics furnished by the
Administrative Office of the Court of the
Judicial Council of California for the
year ending June 20, 1983, indicate
233,430 convictions in California felony
and misdemeanor offenses, excluding petty
offenses.

3.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The opinion below creates a reversal
per se rule in the case of any evidence
which was not revealed to the defense in
a criminal case pursuant to pre-trial
"Brady motion" where that evidence might
have been used to cross-examine prosecu-
tion witnesses. By ignoring the prob-
able impact of the undisclosed evidence
upon the outcome of the criminal pro-
ceeding, the opinion below disregards
both past and recent decisions of this
Court which clearly apply a harmless-
error standard in such cases. Further-
more, it creates an unjustified windfall
for criminal defendants who belatedly
chance upon some undisclosed morsel,
with a severe impact upon the judicial
system and the concept of finality. Due
process does not require absolute per-
fection in order to achieve a fair

trial.

4.
ARGUMENT

THE BELATED DISCOVERY OF UNDISCLOSED
EVIDENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE RETRIAL OF
A CASE WHERE THE EVIDENCE IS NOT
EXCULPATORY AND NONDISCLOSURE IS
CLEARLY NOT PREJUDICIAL.

In this case, the defendant made a
pre-trial “Brady motion" seeking informa-
tion including whether or not the Govern-
ment had paid or promised compensation to
witnesses or informants. (719 F.2d, at
1463.) In response, the affidavits of two
Principal witnesses--both of whom were
State law enforcement officers assigned to
work with a railroad--were filed in which
the witnesses stated that neither received
not expected compensation. (Id.) Some
three years after conviction, utilizing
the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
ss 552, 552a), the defendant discovered
that the Government had routinely agreed

to reimburse both witnesses for expenses.

28.) The trial court denied the

Gefendant's motion for a new trial in a

5.

post-trial proceeding (28 9. 8. c.
§ 2255), “having concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that ¢isclosure of the
ATF agreements would not have affected
Bagley’s convict ion.“ (Id., at 1464.)
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that failure to disclose this
information “inhibited Bagley's ability
effectively to cross-examine two impor-
tant prosecution witnesses" because they
were “subject to impeachment for bias
based upon their remunerative relation-
ship with the government." (I.] In
essence, the opinion below holds that
nondisclosure of any evidence “the
defendant could use to conduct an effec-
tive cross-examination" requires rever-
sal. (A.) Yet such a standard is
neither espoused by this Court, nor
required to insure that a defendant will

receive a fair trial.

6. 7.

The standard adopted by the Ninth

A finding of materiality of the
Circuit--any diminution of the defendant's

evidence is required under
ability to cross-examine 4 witness denies

Brad “eS 2 x
due process of law--is tantamount to a —

Later, in United s Agurs (1976)
"per se reversal rule. (Cf. United 0 222 AGUES

427 U.S. 27, 108-110, which involved
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458

nondisclosure of the witness’ criminal
U.S. 858, 866.) Yet this Court long ago

record, this Court commented:
dispatched the notion that every nondis-

"The Court of Appeal
Closure of evidence deprives a defendant

appears to have assumed that
of a fair trial. In Giglio v. United

the prosecutor has 8 constitu-
States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154, this

tional obligation to éisclose

Court stated:

any information that might
"we do not, however, automati-

affect the jury's verdict.
cally require a new trial

That statement of 2 constitu-
whenever ‘a combing of the

tional standéaré of materiality
prosecutors’ files after the

h the ‘sporting theor
trial has disclosed evidence 99 ” 9 Y

tice’ which the Court
possibly useful to the defense of jus

cted in Brady.
but not likely to have changed expressly reje proc

For a jury's appraisal of a

the verdict... .*' [Citation.])

case ‘might’ be affected by an

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ae <a

improper or trivial considera-
tion as well as by evidence
giving rise to a legitimate

doubt on the issue of guilt. If

everything that might influence

a jury might be disclosed, the
only way a prosecutor could éis-
charge his constitutional duty
would be to allow complete dis-
covery of this files as a matter
of routine practice.

„„ . . The mere possibil-
ity that an item of undisclosed
information might have helped
the defense, or might have
affected the outcone of the
trial, does not establish
‘materiality’ in the constitu-
tional sense. (Footnotes

omitted.)

This

Court then declared (at 111-113):

*(T)he judge should not order @
new trial every time he is
unable to characterize nondis-
closure as harmless under the
customary harmless-error sten-
dard. Under that standard when
error is present in the record,
the reviewing judge must set
aside the verdict and Judgment
unless his ‘conviction is sure
that the error 910 not
influence the jury, ot had but
a very slight effect.’
[Citation.] Unless every von-
disclosure is regarded as auto-
matic error, the constitutional

standard of materiality must

impose a higher burden on the

defendant.

10.

"The proper standard of
materiality must reflect our
overriding concern with the
justice of the finding of guilt.
Such a finding is permissible
only if supported by evidence
establishing guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. It necessarily
follows that if the omitted evi-
dence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has not
been committed. This means that
the omission must be evaluated
in the context of the entire
record. If there is no reason-
able doubt about guilt whether
or not the additional evidence
is considered, there is no

justification for a new trial.*

11.

The expression of the applicable prin-
ciples in Agurs was recently reaffirmed
in United States v. Valen -Bern
(1982) 458 U.S. 858, 868. The require-
ment of “materiality” before nondisclo-
sure affronts the Constitution was also
noted in California v. Trombetta (1984)
. s. — 82 L. rd. 2d 413, n. 8 at
422, and has deen described by this
Court as “the widely used standard for
assessing motions for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence“ in Strickland
v. Washington (1984) — U.S. __+ 80
L. rd. 26 674, 697.

Though Strickland die not refer to
California practices, it might well
have. California has several procedural
avenues for attacking @ conviction on
the basis of newly-discovered evidence.
One of this is the statutory motion for
a new trial which by definition is

available on such a basis only “When new

12.

evidence is d@iscovered material to the
defendant, and which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial." (Cal. Pen. Code,
§ 1181(8), emphasis added.) "To entitle a
party to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence it must appear
that the evidence is not merely cumula-
tive, but is material, and that it is such

as to render a different result probably

— —ää— .

on retrial ..-+ +" (People v. Sheran
(1957) 49 C1. 20 101, 111, 315 P. 20 5, 11;

accord, People v. McDaniel (1976) 16
Cal.34 156, 178, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, 481,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847; People »
Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3¢ 177, 188, 93 Cal.

Nptr. 185, 192.) A similar rule prevails
where the new discovery of evidence is the
basis for habeas corpus relief similar to
the section 2255 relief sought dy respon-

dent Bagley here.

13.

*"([Nlewly discovered evidence
does not warrant relief unless
it is of such a character ‘as
will completely undermine the
entire structure of the case
upon which the prosecution was
based.’ [Citation.] [Nlewly
discovered evidence will not
undermine the case of the pros~
ecution so as to warrant habeas
relief unless (1) the new evi-
dence is conclusive, and (2) it
points unerringly to inno-

cense.” (In re Weber (1974) 11

ca1. 3d 703, 724, 114 Cal. Rptr.
427, 433, cert. denied, 429

U.S. 847; accord, In Fe Hall

(1981) 20 Cal.3d 408, 417, 423,

179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 230-231.)
/

14.

In evaluating the gravity of the error,
California courts consider the context in
which the error occurs, and, unlike the
Ninth Circuit here, do not exalt technical
violations in utter disregard of sub-
stance. AS our highest court has noted:
"In considering the materiality of the
evidence, we must look to the entire
record because materiality can only be
determined in the light of the circum-

stances." (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal. 3d

525, 533, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600.) "(T]he
test ... is an objective one based on
all the evidence, old and new, whether any
second trier of fact, court or jury, would
probably reach a ditterent result.”

(People v. Huskins (1966) 245 Cal.App. 2d

859, 862, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255; accord,

People v. Clauson (1969) 275 cal. App. 20

699, 706, 80 Cal. bot. 475, 480.) In

this regard, California follows the lead

15.

of this Court in United States v- Agurs
(1976) 427 U.S. 97, 112-113:

The error“ below concerned the non-
disclosure of what at best might be
termed marginally-impeaching evidence.
In California, XS 2 general rule, ‘evi-
dence which merely impeaches a witness
is not significant enough to make a d1 f-
ferent result probable. (People v.
Green (1982) 130 Cal.App.34 1, 11, 181
Cal. Rptr. 507, 514; People v. Huskins,

supra, 245 Cal.App.24 at 862, 54 Cal.
/
/
/

—
ä — [ͤ—4.—b——

3. The two witnesses apparently
signed what was & standard governmental
contract, and the trial court found that
they “probably „did expect to received
from the United States some kind of
compensation, over and above their
expenses for their assistance, though
perhaps not for their testimony.” (719
r. 2d, at 1462.)

16.

rptr., at 255.)4/ The California rule
recognizes the fact--well-known to trial
lawyers--that technically-impeaching evi-
dence is seldom viewed as any more than
that by either judge or jury. Certainly
the “impeaching” value of the evidence
which the Government did not disclose here
was minimal.

Yet the scope of “error embraced by
the Ninth Circuit is boundless. As this

Court noted of the witness deported in

United States v. Valenzuela-Rernal (1982)
458 U.S. 858, 866-867:

/

/

4. California courts do distinguish
those cases where the impeaching value of
the evidence is 80 devastating that it
totally destroys the credibility of the
sole prosecution witness. (See Freon v.
Williams (1962) 57 cal. 2d 263, 274- , 18

al. Rptr. 729, 736; Peo le v. Randle
(1982) 130 cal. App. 33 566, 293-294,
Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at 563,
Cal. Rptr. at 255.)

17.

"Given the vagaries of a typi-
cal jury trial, it would be a
bold statement indeed to say
that the testimony of any
missing witness could not have
‘conceivably benefited’ the
defense. To us, the number of
situations which will satisfy
this test is limited only by

the imaginations of judges or

defense counsel.” (Footnote
omitted.)
Similarly, almost anything--however

inconsequential to the ordinary eye~-~may
seem monumental to the fanciful cross-
examiner. Hindsight speculation as to

the possible utility of evidence cannot

be the criterion for evaluating error;

even the best counsel may disagree on

18.

that point. (cf. Strickland v.
Washington (1984) — U-S+ _» 80 L.Ed. 28
674, 694-695. It has been California's
experience that the significance of evi-
dence looms larger in loss than in life.
(See, e:, People ¥Y- Harris (1976) 62
Cal.App.34 859, 863, 133 Cal. Rptr. 352,
354.) Were a per se reversal rule to
obtain, the significance of undisclosed
evidence would no doubt receive similar
post-conviction magnification.

What is worse is what the decision
below portends for our judicial system.
The larger the judicial system-- and
California has perhaps the largest of
all--the greater likelihood of error, not
because the system is defect ive, but
because it is staffed by human beings, a
mortal quality of which is to ert.
California cases demonstrate the truism
expressed in In re Imbler (19621 60 C1. 28
554, 567, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 300, cert.

19.

genes. 379 U.S. dos, that “Police
investigators, however, are not infal-
lible ...." ‘Thus we know of cases
where an investigating officer errone-
ously believes that a witness statement
was incorporated in his report, when in
fact it was not and was therefore not
disclosed (People v. Reyes (1974) 12
Cal.34 486, 501-502, 116 Cal. Rptr. 217,
226), or where negatives are over looked
resulting in photographs which are not
printed (People v. Harris (1977) 71
cal. App. 3d 959, 968, 13° Cal. Rptr. 788,
784) , The prosecutor himself may over
look a statement in his own file, which
consequently goes undisclicsed. (People

v. McGowan (1980) 105 Cal.App.3¢ 997,

1001, 166 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727.) These
prospects never end. And neither Coes
the hope of subsequently finding a min-

iscule shred of undisclosed evidence

which serves as a guarantor of release

20.

or reversal. Our highest court once
stated that “[T]he claim of newly dis-
covered evidence as a ground for a new
trial is uniformly ‘looked upon with dis-
favor, for there must be an end to liti-

gation." (People v. Williams (1962) 57

cal. 2d 263, 274, 18 Cal. Ry 729, 736.)

The per se reversal rule of the Ninth

Circuit, however, changes a criminal trial
from a fair search for truth into the
qualifying round of a treasure hunt.

Due process guarantees neither a suc-
cessful outcome nor à letter-perfect
defense. (People v. Wallin (1981) 124
Cal.App.3d 479, 484-485, 177 Cal. Rptr.
303, 306.) Or as this Court has observed,

"A defendant is entitled to a fair trial

but not a perfect one.” (Lutwak v. United

States (1953) 344 U.S. 604, 619.) The
Gecision below demands otherwise.

/

/

21.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State

of California, as amicus curiae in sup-

port of petitioner United States, urges
reversal.

DATED: December 28, 1984

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,
Attorney General

KARL S. MAYER
Deputy Attorney General

THOMAS A. BRADY
ae Attorney Ge al

GE

Deputy Attorney Genera

Attorneys for State of California

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

CHARLES R. B. KIRK, a member of the
Bar of the United States Supreme Court,
hereby certifies that on December 28,
1984, a copy of the Brief of the State of
California as Amicus Curiav in support of
Petitioner vas served by mail upon the
counsel of record for each of the parties
respondent by depositing a copy in the
United States Mail at the United States
Post Office in the Federal Building, 455
Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco,
California, with first-class postage pre-
paid, and properly addessed as follows:

MICHAEL G. MARTIN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1111 3rd Avenue, Suite 280

Seattle, WA 98101

Attorneys for Respondents

DAVID A. STRAUSS

Assistant to Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20503
Attorneys for Petitioner

DATED: December 28,

CHAPLES R. B. KIRK 5

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