# Reply Brief — Garcia v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0805%3A6 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Reply Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1985 - **Citation:** 469 U.S. 70 ## Text "ice - supreme Court, us FILED SEP BO 1984 No. 83-6061 STEVAS. KANDER —_—— ae —— ERK IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OcTOBER TERM 1984 JOSE GARCIA AND FRANCISCO GARCTA, Petitioners, vy. UnrTep STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit REPLY BRIEF THEODORE J. SAKOWITZ Federal Publie Defender 301 North Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128-7787 CHARLES G. WHITE 100 N.W. 37th Avenue First Floor Miami, Florida 33125 (305) 649-1023 (Pro hac vice) Counsel for Petitioners atm a PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203 QUESTIONS PRESENTED WHETHER A PROSECUTION UNpberR 18 U.S.C. § 2114 Requires A PostaL NEXUS IN ORDER FOR A CONVICTION To Be SvustTAINeED. A) WuHeTHER THE PLAIN Merantna Doctrine Pro- HIBITS REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WHEN INTER- PRETING 18 U.S.C. § 2114. B) WHETHER CONGRESSIONAL INTENT REQUIRES A PostaL Nexus in Prosecutions or 18 U.S.C. § 2114. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS QuESTION PRESENTED .......-- 600 eee reece eeeeeeees Pogae op COUTEIIED oo ccccccccccsccestesoceeseceouune Posen op AUTIBIORITIED ..c cc cccccccccceccssseessoces ARGUMENT: That Section 2114 of Title 18 requires a postal nexus in order to sustain a conviction .......... A. The plain meaning doctrine does not operate as a rule of exclusion to prevent review of legis- lative intent, as conceded by the Government .. A plain reading of Section 2114 reveals it is AMbIGUOUS ....... 6c eee eee eee eee eee eeeeeee Application of the rule of. Ejusdem Generis to the 1935 amendment to Section 2114 resolves any ambiguity and confirms Congressional in- tent to include a postal nexus requirement ... The Government’s interpretation that Con- gress intended the amended Section 2114 to have a wide scope would lead to absurd results and cause problems in subsequent judicial re- ., , SPPTTTTITIITTICtL ee COUIGRAIOIOEE ooo cc cc ccccccccetecccosesscssesuesesuns iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CasEs: Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) .. Jones v. United States, 72 F.2d 873 .......... Randazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794 (Sth Cir. 1924) . Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1979) United States v. Birrel, 266 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. re United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1907) .... United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1889) ... United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) .... eeonded “eee @ United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch [6 U.S.] 358 (1805) . United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1978) . United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975) .... DTCC UGEUGEGGabsdncheeeseccocevceccs United States v. Stever, 222 U.S. 167 (1911) .. United States v. Yermian, 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984) OrHER Sources: Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) ....... SuTHERLAND Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. es GG Geese seeded ecececroscese United States v. Reeves, 38 F. 404 (C.C.W.D. Texas “eer eee United States v. Spears, 449 F.2d 996 (D.C. App. 1976) —_— IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OcToBER TERM 1984 No. 83-6061 Jose GARCIA AND FRANCISCO GARCTA, Petitioners, we UnNItvTep STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit REPLY BRIEF ARGUMENT THAT SECTION 2114 OF TITLE 18 REQUIRES A POSTAL NEXUS IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION The issue before the Court remains the interpreta- tion of the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2114 after an amend- ment in 1935. The statute had historically applied only to prosecutions for robberies of lawful custodians of mail matter. See United States v. Spears, 449 F.2d 946 (D.C. App. 1971). The antecedents of this statute extended back to 1792 and were enacted by Congress utilizing its power over the post office. Id. at 950. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, el. 7. In 1935 Congress amended the 2 statute (then found in 18 U.S.C. § 320) to include robbing or attempting to rob lawful custodians of mail matter ‘‘or any money or other property of the United States.”’ A. The Plain Meaning Doctrine Does Not Operate As A Rule Of Exclusion To Prevent Review Of Legislative Intent, As Conceded By The Government The Government contends that any inquiry into legislative history is foreclosed because the meaning of the added words are unambiguous. Invoking the so-called plain meaning doctrine, the Government asks this Court to adopt a mechanistic formula of statu- torv construction that precludes a consideration of the actual intent of Congress. Constantly beseeching the Court to apply the plain meaning doctrine as a rule of exclusion, the Government suddenly grace- fully concedes the point. (Resp. Br. 16 n. 4). B. A Plain Reading Of Section 2114 Reveals It Is Ambiguous The Government then confesses a complete mis- understanding of Petitioners’ argument. Part of this misunderstanding consists of the claim by the Gov- ernment that their interpretation of the literal mean- ing of the amended statute is conceded by Petitioners. (Resp. Br. 18). In fact, the amended statute is totally ambiguous on its face. The Government contends that the amended statute contains two eategories of crime separated by the disjunctive ‘“‘or’’. (Resp. Br. 12-14). What is missed by the Government is that under a ‘‘plain reading”’ of the statute, the conclusion is inescapable that there are two disjunctives separating three separate cate- 3 gories of crime: (1) mail matter, (2) money, (3) other property of the United States. There is nothing in the “‘plain meaning’’ of the statute that permits ‘“money’’ to be further modified to mean ‘‘money of the United States.’’ As a matter of fact, such a mean- ing would contradict the clear intent of Congress to inelude money held in the lawful custody of the Post Office, within the ambit of Section 2114. Also, such a reading would be more restrictive than the original statute. There is nothing strained about such an inter- pretation, considering the Government’s apparent position that the first ‘‘or’’ means ‘‘or’’, but the second “or’’? means ‘‘and’’. The meaning of the statute becomes more ambiguous when both ‘‘or’s’’ are given the meaning normally applied to them. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1978) and United States v. Birrell, 266 F. Supp. 539, 542-543 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cited in Respond- ent’s Brief at 13. In that event, each of the three categories should be able to stand alone. Category One and Three (‘‘mail matter’’) and ‘‘other property of the United States’’) make good sense, but Category Two (‘‘money”) is absurd standing alone. The Con- gress would then have enacted a Federal robbery stat- ute without any jurisdictional basis. Obviously, such ambiguity begs for clarification by judicial interpre- tation. It also gives credence to the complaints of the congressmen participating in the floor debates that the amended statute was horribly drafted. 79 Cong. Ree. 7875. Now that ambiguity has been documented, the road is clear to begin the real business of judicial inter- pretation; the determination of legislative intent. 4 United States v. Yermian, 104 S. Ct. 2936, 2944 (1984) (Rehnquist dissent) citing United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch [6 U.S.] 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C. J.). C. Application Of The Rule Of Ejusdem Generis To The 1935 Amendment To Section 2114 Resolves Any Ambiguity And Confirms Congressional Intent To Include A Postal Nexus Requirement There is one rule of statutory construction, which makes the amended statute completely unambiguous. This is the rule of ejusdem generis. Black’s Law Diec- tionery (5th Ed. 1979) defines the rule: [Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. [citations omitted]. Applying this canon of statutory construction to the amended Section 2114 provides the postal nexus in- tended by Congress. Ambiguity disappears and the “plain meaning”’ of the statute can no longer be evoked to stretch the seope of the statute to unheard of dimen- sions. Massive litigation is headed off instantly as Section 2114 settles down into what it was always in- tended to be: the Postal Robbery Statute. The rule of ejusdem generis is not a technical ex- ercise in semantics. It contains its own method of analysis. Sands, SuTHERLAND Statutory ConstRUc- TION, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, § 47.17 et seq. Important to the analysis is the concept of the ‘‘class’’: ‘‘generaliza- tions which associate items for a particular purpose 5 or treatment.”’ 7d. at 110. Essential to the determina- tion of a class remains the intent of the legislature. It was because in other cases, defer.dants neglected legislative intent in determining the scope of the applicable ‘‘class,” that this Court has rejected this argument in the recent past. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1979). United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975). Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936). United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 593 (1907). When the manifest intent of Congress is at variance with a narrow construction of a statute using the rule of ejusdem generis, the above cases show the manifest purpose of Congress controls. Despite the tendency of the Congress to apply broad purposes to the statutes analyzed above, an analysis of the legislative history of the 1935 Amendment does not reveal any broad purpose except the increased protection over the postal function. The ‘‘class’’ re- mains confined within the already wide variety of mail matter originally delineated in the statute. In essence, mail matter belongs to private individuals, not the post office. Surely, any money in the lawful custody of postal officials, coupled with property of the United States in their lawful custody, expands the areas protected by the statute without causing a widening of the scope to create absurd results. (See following section). In the instant case, the Court should follow the analvsis offered by opinions in United States v. Stever, 222 U.S. 167 (1911), and United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1889). 6 D. The Government’s Interpretation That Congress Intended The Amended Section 2114 To Have A Wide Scope Would Lead To Absurd Results And Cause Problems In Subse- quent Judicial Review Future litigants will have a whole range of issues available to add to the congestion of the Federal ap- pellate process if this Court accepts the Government’s position in this case. For example, in the past, judicial interpretation focused on who could have “lawful charge, control, or custody”’ oft mail matter. See, Jones v. United States, 72 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1934). Ran- dazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794 (8th Cir. 1924). "nited States v. Reeves, 38 F. 404 (C.C.W.D. Texas 1889). Using postal regulations as a guide, the term had meaning, but give the statute the scope suggested by the Government, and more questions are raised than answered. Anyone from a confidential informant with heroin provided by the DEA for a reverse sting to a Government maintenance worker whose hammer is stolen at gunpoint could be considered a “lawful eus- todian”’ of ‘‘money or other property of the United States.”’ The jurisdictional basis of Section 2114 changes when the Government’s construction prevails. The power to establish a postal system contained in the Constitution does not automatically extend to “money or other property of the United States,’”’ unless there is some implied limitation. Should there have been some legislative history concerning intent to invoke another power? Should it be assumed, as the Government so ap- pears, that no scienter is required for a conviction under this statute? In the instant case, neither of the petitioners had any knowledge that they were attempt- 7 ing to rob “lawful custodians of. government money,”’ until they were arrested. (See Statement of Facts in Pet. Br. 2-8). While this Court has eliminated scienter in Section 111 offenses (United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975)), query whether such a course of action is advisable when there is twenty-five vear mandatory sentence at stake. Finally, if the Government's position prevails, there would be an immediate loss ef sentencing discretion by the Federal judiciary. By manipulating the charges, the Government could reduce the judiciary to rubber stamping its own sentencing decisions. Consider the potential application to undereover operations. (For instanee, the case at bar). If a Federal law enforce- ment ageney can plant money or drugs on an in- formant, allow him to infiltrate some alleged ‘had guvs,’’ and hope someone gets greedy and tries a ‘“‘rip-off,”’ they could sustain a mandatory twenty-five vear penalty. Contrary to the Government’s contention, under its interpretation, Section 2114 does not “fit harmoniously into the fabric of federal criminal law.’’ ‘Resp. Br. 36). It could easily hecome the statute of choice for over-zealous prosecutors, swallowing whole 18 U.S.C. § 2112. There is no defect ir reasoning underlying the pro- priety of singling out postal employees or other au- thorized custodians of the mail for special protection. (Resp. Br. 11). Historically, letter carriers have travelled the roads of America unarmed. Surely Con- gress was more concerned with deterring violent attacks (even attempted robberies) of postal em- plovees than usually armed Federal law enforcement officers. 8 Most importantly, application of the rule ejusdem generis to the interpretation of Section 2114 com- pletely comports with the legislative history. The ‘snippets’? which petitioners excised from the floor dehates constitute the only clear expressions of Con- gress’ intent. They were made by Congressman Dob- bins, who was perhaps never ordained ‘‘ floor manager,”’ but whose job it was to steer Post Office legislation through the House of Representatives. See 79 Cong. Ree. 7874, for Dobbins leading the debate on another bill requested by the Post Office. The Government’s contention that the issue before this Court was never diseussed in Congress is without merit, and to the extent that it has merit, further discredits the Gov- ernment’s position in light of the striet construction of criminal statutes required by the Constitution. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners ask this (‘ourt to vaeate the conviction as to Count III of the Indictment and enter a judgment of Acquittal as to that Count. Respectfully submitted, THEODORE J. SAKOWITZ Federal Publie Defender 301 North Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128-7787 CHaArLes G. WHITE 100 N.W. 37th Avenne First Floor Miami, Florida 33125 (305) 649-1023 (Pro hace vice) Counsel for Petitioners * --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0805%3A6. Public record. Not legal advice.