# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pattern Makers v. NLRB > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0773%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1985 - **Citation:** 473 U.S. 95 ## Text PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH America, AFL-CIO, AND ITs ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS, * Petitioners, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WILLIAM B. PEER 1899 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 MarsHaA S. BERZON MICHAEL RUBIN 177 Post Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, Ca. 94108 Of Counsel: LAURENCE GOLD Gporce KAUFMANN (Counsel of Record) 2101 L Street, N.W. 815 16th Street, N.W. (202) 637-5390 Wiso . Eres Printine Co.. Inc. . 769-0096 - WaswincTon. D.C. 20001 ee QUESTION PRESENTED Is the National Labor Relations Board granted the au- thority by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, to invalidate provisions in union constitutions and bylaws requiring union members to retain their membership during a strike or lockout or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent? (i) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EE. 1 ee 2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED DB — 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 3 .. 3 B. The Proceedings in the LKR 4 C. The Court of Appeals Proceedings 8 7 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 8 I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CON- FLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN MACHINISTS LOCAL 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (1984) 8 Il. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS IN- CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF bans 8(b) (1) (A) OF THE NLRA . ~ 15 OO ee 19 (iii) iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F.Supp. 907 (S.D. r A eee sn tae eee 17 Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 % 7, 12. 14 Ewald v. Medical Society, 70 Misc. 615, 128 N. V. S. SD Gaels GO, GD —..—— 17 Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 262 U.S. 274 eee 18 Leon v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 350 F.Supp. 877 C—O ⁊ 17 Machinists Local v. Labor Board, 362 US. 411 (1960) . 18, 19 Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 231 NLRB EE . Snes 5 Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 263 NLRB ee one owe 4, 5, 6 Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 .. 8, 9, 10 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 — 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 ——A= 7, 9, 12, 13, 14. 15 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir., 1979) eels 5 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 US. 423 (1969) 1 „5 ) Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 44 Barb. 231 (N.Y. 1864) 1 1 17 STATUTES National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. : § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 ——— passim § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) _. passim MISCELLANEOUS National Labor Relations Board, Legislative His- tory of the Labor Management Relations Act of SS ee eee 17 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1983 No. 83- PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NorTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, AND ITS ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS, 4 Petitioners, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, and its Rockford and Beloit Associations hereby petition this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review the judgment in Pattern Makers’ League et al. v. Na- tional Labor Relations Board, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. No. 83-1045; Dec. 21, 1983). OPINIONS BELOW The National Labor Relations Board’s decision and or- der in this case is reported at 265 NLRB No. 170, and is reprinted at pp. 9a-44a of the appendix (hereafter “App.”) to this petition. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion and judgment is reported at 724 F.2d 57 and is reprinted at App. la-8a. JURISDICTION * The opinion and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit were issued on De- cember 21, 1983. On April 10, 1984, Justice Stevens signed an order extending the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to and including May 18, 1984. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu- tual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent — L t may be . agreement requi mem p in a r organi- zation as a condition of employment as authorized in section § 8 (a) (3) of this Act. Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A), provides: It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of this Act: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. The Facts All members of petitioner Pattern Makers’ League (hereafter “the League” or “the Union”) take an Oath of Membership obligating them to adhere to the Union’s “Constitution, Laws, Rules and Decisions.” App. 30a. And, League Law 13 provides: (N]o resignation or withdrawal- from an Associa tion, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent. [App. 28a, n.3.] This amendment to the Union’s governing laws was rati- fied in August 1976 by a membership vote after “ap- propriate notice procedures” (App. 30a), and became ef- fective in October 1976 (id.). The following year, on May 5, 1977, petitioners Rock- ford and Beloit Associations (hereafter “the Local Unions”) commenced a strike against the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association, a multiemployer association. All members of the Local Unions received notice of, and all but one participated in, the secret ballot vote author- izing the strike. App. 30a. All striking members re- ceived between $125 and $150 a week in strike benefits. Id. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the restriction on resignation contained in League Law 13,’ some eleven union members attempted to resign their membership dur- ing the strike aiid then returned to work while the strike was still in effect. App. 27a-28a, 29a-30a. The direct result of their actions, according to unrebutted testimony, was that the strike was prolonged, and that it became necessary for the Local Unions to accept a contract embodying substandard wages and benefits. App. 31a. There is no contention . . that the members who tendered their resignations were unaware of the restrictions on resignation imposed [by League Law 13.“ App. 38a-34a. B. The Proceedings in the NLRB After a decision by an Administrative Law Judge, the NLRB, “having determined that this and another case involving the right of a labor organization to impose restrictions on a member’s right to resign presented is- sues of importance in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act” (App. 9a), set both cases for oral argument in tandem on January 16, 1980 before the After rearly three years of consideration, the compan- ion case, Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 263 NLRB 984 (1982), was decided by the Board on Sep- tember 10, 1982, with the decision in the instant case 5 14 days preceding the commencement of a strike is un- enforceable.” Members Fanning and Zimmerman found that “a union tion conduct, and found an unfair labor practice on that theory. 231 NLRB 115 (1977). On review the Ninth Circuit rejected the Board’s construction of the clause as “hypertechnical,” concluding that the provision “is a restriction on a members right to resign.” NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1979). Because the Board majority had not reached the question whether a union constitutional provision restricting resignation would be valid, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Board. Pursuant to the remand, the Board accepted as the law of the case the Ninth Circuit's construction of the Machinists’ provision (263 NLRB, at 984 n.4), and proceeded to decide “whether a union can. pursuant to an internal rule prohibiting resignations during «a strike or within 14 days preceding its commencement. lawfully im- pose a fine on members who tendered resignations and returned t» work during the course of a strike (id. at 984). i f F 2 i a 5 xt 1 f + a5 i Le Fa ft bership, a subject expressly excluded from of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the proviso within the ambit of a union’s control over its i 7 Member Jenkins filed a dissenting opinion in Pattern Makers, as he did in Dalmo Victor. He stated: I would find that League Law 13, as applied herein, is a reasonable and narrow restriction on the employees’ right to resign their union membership, and is within the ambit of the Union’s control over its internal affairs. Accordingly, I also would find that the fines imposed pursuant to League Law 13 on the 10 employees who crossed the Union’s picket lines were lawful and not in violation of the proserip- tions of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. [App. 22a.) C. The Proceedings in the Court of Appeals The Unions sought review of the Board’s decision inso- far as that decision invalidated League Law 13 in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court upheld the Board’s ruling. The Seventh Circuit began from the premise that the instant case is one present ling] an apparent conflict be- tween two fundamental policies underlying the NLRA” which the court identified as the right of employees to refrain from collective bargaining activities and the right of unions to regulate their internal affairs without con- gressional or court interference (App. 3a-4a). The court below acknowledged that this Court has twice explicitly left open the question whether union constitutional pro- visions restricting resignations during a strike period are enforceable under the NLRA. See App. la and Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1973); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972). Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit viewed the very eases which had declined to decide the question, as well as an earlier case, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), as establishing that “[a]n employee’s right to resign cannot be overridden by union interests in ‘group solidarity and mutual reliance’” (App. 6a). Further, while the court below acknowledged that “(t]he Union 8 plainly has power to control its internal matters by en- i 2 3 f i ‘ to resign [as] personal [and not] . . merely an inter- nal matter’” (App. 7a). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN MACHINISTS n 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212. A. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Cireuit are in square conflict as to whether the NLRA grants the NLRB the authority to rule—as the Board did in Dalmo Victor and then in this case (see pp. 4-7 supra) —that union restrictions on resignations during a strike are invalid. Dalmo Victor itself was reversed by the Ninth Circuit in Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (Feb. 14, 1984). The Ninth Circuit ex- pressly noted that the Seventh Circuit had, in this case, approved the Board’s rule (id. at 1217, n.5), and ex- pressly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s holding and its reasoning. Unlike the court below, the Ninth Circuit viewed the new Board rule against union restrictions on resignations during a strike as one which “frustrates federal labor policy in important respects.” 725 F.2d, at 1215. Rely- ing on NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), the Ninth Circuit stressed that: [Nleither Congress nor the [Supreme] Court gave individual members license to avoid union rules de- signed to protect the welfare of the bargaining unit. [This is why] Congress . . enacted the proviso to $8(b) (1) (A), which reserves to unions the power The NLRB’s petition for rehearing in Machinists Local 1327, filed March 26, 1984, is presently pending. to make reasonable rules regarding the retention and acquisition of membership. [725 F.2d, at 1216.) Further, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the view of the Board, echoed by the Seventh Circuit in this case (App. 3a-4a), that this Court has, subsequent to Allis-Chalmers, established “a balancing test” allowing “either the Board or the courts to conduct an ad hoc weighing of the al- legedly competing interests described in the main text of §8(b)(1)(A) on the one hand, and the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) on the other.” 725 F.2d at 1216-17. And the Ninth Circuit explicitly, and emphatically rejected as “false” the basic premise of the Board and of the court below—that there is a “conflict between the employee's right to resign union membership and the union’s inter- est in making rules regarding the acquisition and reten- tion of membership.” 725 F.2d at 1217; see also id., at n.5 (noting that the Seventh Circuit in this case assumed the same conflict as did the Board): — These rights are preserved in § 7 and § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act, respectively. Because both the em- ployee’s right and the union’s interest are policies that have been “embedded” in the labor laws for over 35 years, neither can “impair” or “override” the other within the of Scofield. They must and ‘o—coexist. 725 F.2d at 1217 (emphasis in origi: 94 — Finally, unlike the Board and the court below, the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that “ ‘the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union- member contract’” (725 F.2d at 1218, quoting Granite State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217), maintained that, under the § 8(b) (1) (A) proviso, the member’s obligation is, under the present circumstances, also no less than the obligation the union constitution and laws establish: [T]he terms of the contract before us condition the member’s t to resign on his promise not to break the strike. the member can escape his obligations 10 by pleading, when the union attempts to collect the fine, that he is no longer part of the union, then the terms of this contract mean little. [725 F.2d at 1218. } B. The conflict between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit concerns an important and recurring ques- tion central to the national labor policy. Indeed, this Court has three times addressed issues concerning union fines imposed upon employees who, in violation of union rules, work during a strike, expressly leaving for later decision the precise question presented in this case. In Allis-Chalmers, supra, the question was whether a union that fines members who cross a union’s picket line and return to work during an authorized strike violates § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. This Court held that, even though $7 does otherwise protect the right of employees to refrain from joining in strike activity (388 U.S., at 178), such union discipline of strikebreaking mem does not constitute the “restraint or coercion” made un- lawful by § 8(b) (1) (A). First, the Allis-Chalmers Court ruled unanimously (see 388 U.S., at 199 (White, J., concurring)) that the refraining from work..g for the struck employer—is in no way at odds with national labor policy, but, rather, is one the union has every right to impose: Integral to . federal labor policy has been the 2 8 2 : 1 55 f 3 ＋ upon its terms, and Itlbe power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent. ” Provisions in union 11 constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of the Taft-Hartley amendments. [388 U.S., at 181.] Similarly, it was common ground that “the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) preserves to the union the power to expel the offending member.” 388 U.S., at 183; emphasis sup- plied; id., at 190; id., at 199 (White, J., concurring) ; id., at 199-200 (Black, J., dissenting). In that case, however, the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) did not in terms apply, be- cause the anti-strikebreaking rule was not enforced by a sanction directly affecting membership but, instead, majority in that case, after surveying the background of the main body of § 8(b)(1)(A), determined that the 1947 Congress did not intend in that section to inter- fere with “the relationship of a union member to his own union” (id., at 191): Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to which he re- 10 i! 155 ri : F f i 211 7111 ; i [ : i ; 1 tions in which attempted to discipline employees for violating the union’s rule against strikebreaking after i 2 ce : 1 l after engages in conduet which the rule pro- scribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct. in Grenite State Board, the penalty for working during the strike was imposed after the strike began, by a vote at a membership meet- ing (409 U.S., at 214), while in Booster Lodge, the union's constitu- tion expressly prohibited members from strikebreaking (412 U.S., at 84). * Aside from the quotation in the text, these instances are as 13 and the same number of times in the five-page Booster (1) Under §7 of the Act the employees have “the right to re- frain from any or all” concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those com erted activities. We have here no problem of construing a union's constitution or bylaws defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member may resign from the union. We have, therefore, only to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institu- tions—the right of the individual to join or to resign from association, as he sees fit. 409 U.S., at 216 (emphasis supplied) (The court of appeals’ reference to this passage as supporting an absolute right under the NLRA to resign from labor unions (App. 5a) ignores the underlined sentence, and thereby grievously dis- torts this Court’s evident meaning—viz., that as a contractual mat- ter union members, like other members of voluntary associations, may resign their membership absent a valid restriction on resigna- tion.) (2) [T)he power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union member contract. When there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former member than it has over the man in the street. [409 U.S., at 217 (emphasis supplied) (3) [When a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. [409 U.S., at 215 (emphasis supplied (4) We do not now decide to what extent the contractual rela- tionship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as here, there are no restraints on the resignation of members, we conclude that the vitality of §7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the action he endorsed in May.... [409 U.S., at 217-18 (em- phasis supplied). (Again, the court below distorted the Court’s meaning in this pas- sage by relying on the immediately succeeding phrase—that a union members “§ 7 rights are not lost by a union’s pleas for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission o its regime” (409 U.S., at 218, quoted App. A——-)—while ignoring the Court’s explicit limitation of this observation to circumstances other than those here present.) 14 Lodge opinion.’ In sum this Court has explicitly left for another day the question whether the NLRA limits the right of unions to limit resignations through properly promul- gated provisions in their constitutions and bylaws. Gran- ite State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217; Booster Lodge, supra, 412 U.S., at 88. Now that the NLRB has decided that question and the Board’s rule has precipitated a square conflict in the circuits, the appropriate day for de- termining the question twice left open by this Court has arrived. Those instances are: (1) Neither [the union's] constitution nor its bylaws contained any provision expressly permitting or forbidding such resigna- tions. 412 U.S., at 86. (2) Since in [Granite State Board] there was no provision in the Union’s constitution or bylaws limiting the circumstances in which a member could resign, we concluded that the mem- bers were free to resign at will and that §7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, protected their right to return to work during a strike commenced while they were union members. [412 U.S., at 87-88. (3) Here, as in [Granite State Board,] the Union's constitution and bylaws are silent on the subject of voluntary resignation from the Union. And here, as there, we leave open the question of the extent to which contractual restriction on a member’s right to resign may be limited by the Act. [412 U.S., at 88. (4) Since there is no evidence that the employees here either knew of or had consented to any limitation on their right to resign, we need “only to apply the law which is normally re- flected in our free institutions—the right of an individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit.” [412 U.S., at 88. (5) The Union contends, however, that a result different from [Granite State Board] is warranted in this case, even though its constitution does not expressly restrict the right to resign during a strike. [412 U.S., at 88-89 (emphasis supplied). 15 II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS INCON- SISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE AND LEGISLA- TIVE HISTORY OF § 8(b)(1)(A) OF THE NLRA. Allis-Chalmers, supra, makes clear that the substantive rule of conduct enforced in this case—that union mem- bers who work for the struck employer during a duly authorized strike are subject to union discipline—is con- sistent with national labor policy.* If the Union’s rule against resignations during a strike is equally valid, it follows that the Union was simply exercising its au- thority to fine an individual who was a member at the relevant time for violating the Union rule against strike- breaking, and was therefore, under Allis-Chalmers, acting lawfully. As Aliis-Chalmers also recognized, a union does not vio- late § 8(b) (1) (A) simply by interfering in some manner with “the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7],” including the right to refrain from concerted activity. Employees have, as the Court in Allis-Chalmers noted (388 U.S., at 178), a right protected under §7 of the Because Allis-Chalmers has already decided this question, the heavy reliance of the court below on Scofield, supra, is misplaced. The question in Scofield (394 U.S. at 424-426) was whether a par- ticular union substantive rule of conduct rule is so inconsistent with national labor policy that the rule may not be enforced in any manner, whether by fine, expulsion, or otherwise, and the purpose of the mode of analysis set out therein was to determine whether the work rule in question there met that standard. Here, that ques- tion has already been resolved, in favor of the union rule of con- duct, by Allis-Chalmers. The open question is whether that other- wise valid rule may be applied against individuals who resign in violation of a union restriction on resignation. Contrary to the suggestions of the court below (App. 4a), Scofield in no way addressed this issue. The Scofield court did observe that, in the case before it, the union member was free to leave the union at any time. 394 U.S., at 430. But, as this Court later recognized in Granite State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217, this observation in Scofield simply “indicates that the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union-member contract.” 16 Act to refuse to join in a strike. But the existence of a § 7 right was only the beginning of the analysis in Allis- Chalmers, not, as in the opinion below, its end point. As Allis-Chalmers recognized, for there to be a violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) there must be, in addition to some im- pedence of a right otherwise protected under §7: (1) “restraint or coercion”; and (2) a kind of union action not within the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A), which protects “the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem- bership therein.“ Although the Seventh Circuit failed to so acknowledge, there is no escaping the point that in this case, unlike Allis-Chalmers, the plain words of the § 8(b) (1) (A) pro- viso encompass rules of the kind at issue here. A rule re- quiring a member to retain his or her membership dur- ing a strike period is surely a rule regarding “retention of membership.” Indeed, it is more clearly such a rule than an expulsion provision, which all agree is encom- passed in the proviso: An expulsion provision ccncerns not “retention of membership” but the inverse—loss of mem- bership.““ * As we have seen (pp. 10-11, supra), Allis-Chalmers recognizes that enforcement of a rule against strikebreaking would indubitably be valid, because the ability of unions to expel members is protected by the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A); only because a fine rather than ex- pulsion was involved did the Court proceed to decide whether there was “restraint or coercion” and conclude that there was not. 10 It is also significant that the language of the proviso speaks in terms of “impair[ing| the right of a labor organization to pre- scribe its own rules.” Thus, Congress did not simply say that § 8(b) (1) (A) shall not prevent unions from prescribing rules of certain types. Instead the proviso is couched in terms of preserving intact of preexisting right. This language suggests a realization that there was a preexisting body of law regarding that “right,” and that the intent was simply to leave that body of law intact. And, indeed, there is a body of common law which enforces non- arbitrary resignation restrictions in voluntary associations in cir- 17 The evident meaning of the plain language of the § 8 (b) (1) (A) proviso is reinforced by the history of the Taft-Hartley Act which shows a conscious decision by Congress to excise from the House bill any provision that could be read as forbidding unions from limiting resig- nations by members. As it passed the House, the bill that became the Taft-Hartley Act contained “right to refrain” language identical for present purposes to that contained in the final Act (H.R. 3020, Soth Cong., Ist Sess., § 7(a), I National Labor Relations Board, Legisla- tive History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Leg. Hist.”), at 176), and also contained two provisions dealing specifically with the obligation to con- tinue union membership: First, the House bill would have made it an unfair labor practice for employers and labor organizations, “by intimidating practices, to inter- fere with the exercise by employees of rights guaranteed in section [7] or to compel or seek to compel any indi- vidual to become or remain a member of any labor or- ganization” (H.R. 3020, supra, § 8(b) (1), I Leg. Hist. 178-79 (emphasis added) ); second, that bill would have made it an unfair labor practice for a union “to deny to any member the right to resign from the organization at any time” (H.R. 3020, supra, § 8(c) (4), I Leg. Hist. 180). cumstances very similar to the present ones. See, e.g., Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 44 Barb. 231 (N.Y. 1864) (enforcing rule of a landowners’ association that no member may resign as long as he continues to own or occupy certain land); Leon v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 350 F.Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973) (enforcing a rule of a mutual advertising association that no auto dealer may resign from membership except with the consent of a majority of the associa- tion’s members); Ewald v. Medical Society, 70 Misc. 615, 128 N. V. S. 886, 888 (N.Y. App. 1911) (enforcing rule of a county medical society that no member charged with ethical violations may resign while such charges are pending); Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F.Supp. 907, 921, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (upholding a ruling requir- ing two years notice or consent of the Board of Directors for a resignation to be valid). 18 No equivalent to the § 8(b) (1 (A) proviso was contained in the House bill. In putting together the final version of the statute, the Conference Committee left out both the foregoing at- tempts in the House bill to regulate union rules limiting resignations from membership, and, at the same time, included the § 8(b) (1) (A) proviso, which in its ordinary meaning validates such union rules. Thus, as in Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960) (which involved, like this case, an NLRB attempt to read into the general language of 88 0b) (10 (A) a restriction on certain union activity) : Plainly, the [union’s] conduct in the instant case would have been prohibited if the House bill had be- come law. But the House conferees abandoned the House bill in conference and accepted the Senate proposal. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, Soth Cong. Ist Sess., 42... . “It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces. This is relevant in that it counsels wariness in finding by construction a broad policy . . . as such when .. it is clear that those interested in just a condemnation were unabie to se- cure its embodiment in enacted law.” IId., at 289- 90. This is a case, then, in which there is no room for the ad hoc balancing approach adopted by the Board and ap- proved by the Seventh Circuit. Rather, Congress struck the balance in 1947, and determined that whatever the reach otherwise of 87 and of 58 0b) (10 (A) of the NLRA, unions retain the common-law right of voluntary associations to require, as a condition of membership, a commitment to remain a member during the periods crit- ical to the success of the collective effort. Since “the commodation between [the] competing factors has ready been made by Congress” (Machinists v. Labor 19 Board, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960)), the Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in order to resolve the conflict between the circuits and to restore the accommodation Congress struck. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, WILLIAM B. PEER 1899 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 MARSHA S. BERZON MICHAEL RUBIN 177 Post Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, Ca. 94108 Of Counsel: LAURENCE GOLD GEORGE KAUFMANN (Counsel of Record ) 2101 L Street, N.W. 815 16th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20087 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 637-5390 APPENDIX la APPENDIX UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 83-1045 PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, and Its RocKForD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS, * Petitioners, * NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ¥ end Respondent, ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION, Intervening Respondents. Argued Sept. 27, 1983 Decided Dec. 21, 1983 Before BAUER, ESCHBACH and COFYEY, Circuit Judges. 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972). We find such In May 1976, Petitioner Pattern Makers’ League of North America (the Union) amended its constitution by adding the following provision: “13. No resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.” This provision, dubbed League Law 13, was ratified in Au- gust 1976 by the membership of the various member as- sociations of the Union. On May 5, 1977, the Union stuck members of In- tervenor Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association (the Employer), a multi-employer bargaining unit con- sisting of eleven companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of patterns for casting. The trike ended Decem- ber 19, 1977, when the parties agreed on a new collective bargaining agreement. Eleven employees, ten from the Beloit Association and one from the Rockford Association, tendered their resig- nations to the Union during the strike. The first employee resigned on September 11. He returned to work for the Employer on September 12 and on that day the Union expelled him. After the strike ended, the Union sent letters The National Labor Relations Board ruled that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1974), ; : | 5 in Machinists Local 1327, International Asso- ciation ~f Machinists, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Vic- tor), 268 N.L.R.B. 141 (1982), petition for review filed, Nos. 82-7580 & 82-7701 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982). In Dalmo Victor, the Board determined that a union's constitu- tional provision prohibiting members from resigning during a strike or within fourteen days preceding its was invalid and thus unenforceable. The aH afl Ti gif parent between two fundamental policies under- picket lines, and violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by imposing a fine and excessive fees and dues on an employee as a I HKAT LILIU submitting his and by attempting to cause an em- ployee’s discharge from employment for failing to comply with the provisions of the union-security agreement. The Union has not challenged these rulings before this court, and, accordingly they are summarily enforced. The Board in Dalmo Victor recognized the competing interest of the union in reflecting the will of the majority of its members and fashioned a rule allowing the union to impose a 30-day notice of resignation requirement on its members. Two members of the Board in the majority of the case before us—Chairman Van de Water and Hunter—concurred in Dalmo Victor, agreeing that the union rule impermissibly restricted the members’ right to resign, but arguing that the 30-day rule announced by the majority was arbitrary and inconsistent with the NLRA and interpretive Su- preme Court rulings. The issue of the validity of a Board— fashioned 30-day notice provision is uot presented in this case. 8 : f 1 12 25 felt iu 10 21 veil 510 5215 i 5 I ; ag ial 11 0 ˖ Ein BESS 9 b tH 10 0 tire g 7 1 7 | i b Supreme Court, in considering the parameters of a union’s authority, has developed an analysis that dis- tinguishes between union rules that touch wholly “in- ternal” affairs and rules that affect “external” activities. Scofield, 394 US. at 429-30, 89 S.Ct. at 1157-58. The Scofield Court stated that “it has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating §8(b)(1).” Id. at 429, i f f + 5a fundamental policies of the NLRA. For example, in Granite State many union members resigned during a strike and returned to work. The union levied fines against those workers for violating a membership resolu- tion that any member aiding or abetting the employer during the strike would be subject to a fine. The Supreme Court ruled that the union’s fines frustrated the over- — riding right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit ... .” Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216, 93 S.Ct. at 387. Similarly, in Booster Lodge the union sought court enforcement of fines it im- posed on employees who had resigned from the union. The employees had returned to work despite a union con- stitutional provision prohibiting strikebreaking by union members. The union argued that the obligation to refrain from strikebreaking bound union members notwithstand- ing their resignations. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89, 93 S.Ct. at 1964. The Supreme Court stated : In order to sustain the Union's position, we would first have to find, contrary to the determination of the Board and of the Court of Appeals, that the Union constitution by implicetion extended its sanc- tions to nonmembers, and then further conclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we are no more disposed to find an implied post-resig- nation commitment from the strikebreaking pro- scription in the Union’s constitution here than we were to find it from the employees’ participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in [Granite State]. Id. at 89-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1964-1965 (footnote omitted). Although the unions in Granite State and Booster Lodge did not restrict resignations, the Court’s rea- soning applies equally here. The Section 7 right to re- frain from union activities encompasses the right of members to resign from the union. See, e.g., Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216, 93 S.Ct. at 387; NLRB v. Ma- 6a chinists Local 1327, International Association of Ma- chinists, 608 F.2d 1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 53' F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1976). We think that because League Law 13 completely suspends an employee’s right to choose not to be a union member and thus no longer subject to union discipline, it frustrates the overriding policy of labor law that em- ployees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities. An employee’s right to resign cannot be over- ridden by union interests in “group solidarity and mutual reliance in situations in which a collective effort is necessary to achieve a particular result” upon which the Union so heavily relies. Petitioners’ br. at 9-10. Although a union has a powerful interest in maintaining its strength during a strike, see N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175 at 181, 87 S.Ct. 2001 at 2007, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, an employee’s Section 7 rights “are not lost by a union’s plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime.” Granite State, 409 U.S. at 218, 93 S.Ct. at 387. See id. (Burger, C.J., concurring) ([The institutional needs of the Union, important though they are, do not outweigh the rights and needs of the individual.“ An employee’s right to resign not only is guaranteed by Section 7, but also is supported by an employee’s own strong interests. Among those interests are an employee’s freedom to change his or her mind about the useful- ness or effectiveness of a strike, such as when an em- ployer has been able to replace the strikers, or an em- ployee’s desire to return to work for completely per- sonal reasons, such as family hardship. A union rule compelling membership fully subject to union authority improperly infringes upon these interests. Moreover, forced continued membership distorts the balance be- tween encouraging collective activities among workers and protecting individuals from coercion. The Union plainly has power to control its internal matters by enforcing rules reflecting the will of the ma- 7a jority of its members. See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181, 87 S.Ct. at 2007. When an employee is a full union mem- ber he or she is subject to those rules; when that em- ployee resigns, the union’s power ends. J as the Union’s power may not extend to an employge’s post- resignation activities, it also may not extend to forbid an employee from resigning. An employee’s decision to resign is personal; a union rule requiring retention of membership cannot be considered merely an “internal matter.” Accordingly, a union cannot compel membership during a strike under the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A) in derogation of an employee's right to choose whether to be a part of such concerted activity. The Union’s second argument in support of League Law 13 is its theory of “mutual reliance”: because the Union members relied on each other when voting to strike, they waived their Seetion 7 right to abandon the strike by resigning from the Union. The Union stresses that each member joined the Union or retained Union membership with the knowledge that resignations were prohibited during strikes or lockouts. The Union claims the union-employee relationship is thus voluntary antl enforceable. The Supreme Court, however, gave this mutual reli ance theory “little weight” in Granite State, 409 U.S. 217, 93 S.Ct. at 387, and determined that, in the absence of a union rule restraining resignations, Section 7 re- quires that Union members remain free to change their | minds and resign during a strike. In that case union members voted to strike and, soon after the strike began, voted unanimously to fine strikebreakers. The First Cir- g cuit concluded that union members who voted had waived their right to resign without penalty in the in- terest of allowing the union to maintain strike dis- cipline. 446 F.2d 369, 372-74 (lst Cir. 1972), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 385, 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972). The 8a Supreme Court decided that the employees’ interests took precedence. We can discern no qualitative difference between em- ployees agreeing not to aid or abet a company during a the their minds about remaining members of the union. III The Supreme Court held in Scofield that a union rule setting a ceiling on the production for which union members could accept immediate pay did not contravene any policy of the NLRA. The concept that union members were free to leave the union and escape the rule vas central to the Court's analysis. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430, 89 S.Ct. at certed activity and is unable to prevail on the other mem- bers to change the rule, then he may leave the union and obtain whatever benefits in job advancement and extra pay may result. Id. at 435 at . fundamental principle is the embodiment of individuals’ Section 7 rights and safeguards the balance between in- dividual rights and the collective power of the union. The principle applies to the circumstances presented in this case. The petition for review is denied. ENFORCEMENT GRANTED. It is the same thing to say that a rule prohibiting resignations during strikes is designed to strengthen the union's power through strike solidarity. 9a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE \ NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Case 33-CB-1132 PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, and Its RocKFoRD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS and ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION DECISION AND ORDER On November 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Gerald A. Wacknov issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondents, Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, Rockford Associa- tion, and Beloit Association, filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a brief in support thereof, as well as a brief otherwise in support of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision. On December 12, 1979, the Board, having determined that this and another case, involving the right of a labor organization to impose restrictions on a member’s right to resign, presented issues of importance in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, scheduled oral argument for January 16, 1980. Thereafter, on January 16, 1980, Respondents, the Gen- eral Counsel, the Charging Party, and the American 1 Machinists Local 1827, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), 268 NLRB No. 141 (1982). 10a Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi- zations,” presented their oral arguments before the Board. tached Decision in light of the exceptions, arguments, and, for the reasons stated cided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions the Administrative Law Judge,’ as modified herein. The principal issue in this case involves the question of whether Respondents violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act by imposing fines on members who tendered resignations and returned to work during the course of a strike in apparent contravention of Respondents’ rule prohibiting resignations during a strike or lockout or when one appeared imminent. The pertinent facts reveal that, in May 1976, Respond- ents, in an attempt to end what they viewed as “a regular pattern of strikebreaking by employers,” adopted and ratified an amendment to their constitution, known as League Law 13, which provided that “no resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a 2 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization appeared as amicus curiae and argued orally on be- half of Respondents’ position. The Administrative Law Judge, inter alia, found that Respond- ents had violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening em- ployees with physical harm and loss of accrued pension benefits if they crossed the picket line, and had violated Secs. 8 (b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A) by imposing a fine and excessive fees and dues on employee William Kohl after expelling him from membership ‘or having submitted his resignation. No exceptions were taken to that i Fe 27 K these findings. The Administrative Law Judge, however, also found Re- spondent Beloit Association had not sought to have employee John Nelson discharged for failing to comply with the terms of a union- security agreement, as alleged by the General Counsel. The General Counsel has excepted to this finding. For the reasons more fully discussed, infra, we find merit to the General Counsel's exception. time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.” There- about a strike against Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Asso- ciation, a multiemployer association, and its individual members which culminated on December 19, 1977, with lawfully intrudes into the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act and that, consequently, the fines imposed thereunder are unlawful and in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Respondents, on the other hand, assert that League Law 13 constitutes a valid exercise of their right to enact internal union rules governing the acquisition and retention of member- ship, as set forth in the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A) They therefore argue that the fines imposed on those in- dividuals who resigned returned to work during the Ad- . 11 5 5 ; fn. 3, supra, employee Kohl also tendered his re-ignation during the strike, was expelled from the Union, and was subsequently fined. As stated, however, no exceptions were taken to the Administrative Law Judge's findings concerning Kohl. 13a 115 iii 38 1133 — —4 — 8 and violative of Section 8 (b) (10 (A of the 135 tity 11510 e n 111 ti 11117 ti i peal d., al. op., pp. 10-11. In Dalmo V that, while a member has a Sec. 2 — a 1122 FG i I 11 12 3. 111“ 15 ee ET te fie aig: e 1115 i 27 sities 5 i i fi | 111 11 14747 l it i + ; : 1 ff if f 11 g Tr 1 2 1113 a E 33 1221 Hiri 5 rE sf is e 111121 : 14a We also find, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that Respondent Beloit Association unlawfully sought to have employee John Nelson discharged from his position with Atlas Pattern Works (hereinafter Atlas) for failing to comply with the provisions of the union-sec- urity agreement. The record in this regard reveals that Nelson began working for Atlas in March 1977, and never became a member of Respondent Beloit, which rep- resented Atlas’ employees. On or about January 14, 1978, Nelson tendered to Respondent Beloit a check represent- ing dues for the month of January 1978.“ However, on January 17, 1978, Respondent Beloit returned the check to Nelson with a letter stating that, since he was not a union member, it could not accept dues from him which he did not owe. That same day, Respondent Beloit sent Atlas a letter informing it that Nelson had failed to com- ply with the terms of the union-security agreement that went into effect on December 19, 1977, and requested that Atlas “take appropriate action to rectify this situation.“ The General Counsel alleges that Respondent Beloit’s letter to Atlas concerning Nelson constituted a request for his discharge for failing to meet his obligations under the union-security agreement and that Respondent had breached its fiduciary duty to inform employees of their obligations under such agreements. The Administrative Law Judge disagreed with the General Counsel noting that the letter to Atlas was sent 3 days before Nelson’s discharge could actually have been requested under the agreement and further noting that no attempt to dis- charge Nelson or interfere with his job tenure was made * Under the terms of the union-security agreement executed on December 19, 1977, employees were required to become members within 30 days of employment. An identical letter concerning Kohl's failure to comply with the union-security agreement was sent by Respondent Beloit to Atlas just 3 days before th Nelson letter. The Administrative Law Judge found that that letter amounted to an implied request for Kohl’s discharge and violated Secs. 8(b) (2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. As noted in fn. 3, supra, no exceptions were taken to this finding. 15a upon the expiration of the required period. He also found that Respondent Beloit had not breached any fidu- ciary duty owed to Nelson and concluded that it had not violated Section 8(b) (2) or 8 0b (1 (A of the Act, as alleged. As noted, we disagree with that finding. It is well settled that a union seeking to enforce a union-security provision against an employee has a fidu- ciary duty to inform that employee of his obligations so that the employee may take the steps necessary to pro- tect his job.“ That duty, the Board has held, requires that a union provide the employee with “a statement of the precise amount and months for which dues [are] owed, as well as an explanation of the methods used in computing the amount,” plus “an opportunity to make payment.“ As evident from the above facts, Nelson, al- though apparently unaware or uncertain of what his obligations were under the union-security agreement, nevertheless made a good-faith effort to comply with those obligations by tendering his dues to Respondent Beloit on January 14. However, instead of advising Nel- son of the extent of his obligations under the new con- tract when it rejected his tender of dues, Respondent Beloit chose merely to inform him that he was not a union member and that consequently he did not owe any dues. Under these circumstances, we find that Respond- 1% Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers & Helpers Union, Local 572, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (Ralphs Grocery Company), 247 NLRB 934 (1980). d. at 935. It is apparent from Respondent Beloit's letter to Atlas, when viewed in light of the former's refusal to accept Nelson's tender of dues, that Respondent Beloit equated Nelson's continued employ- ment with Atlas, under the terms of the union-security clause, with his becoming a full member of its Association. However, the Board in this respect has long held that “while contracts requiring mem- bership as a condition of employment are lawful within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(a) (3), a union cannot lawfully compel l6a ent Beloit has not fulfilled its fiduciary duty of inform- ing Nelson of his obligations under the union-security agreement executed on December 19, 1977." stated, that an identical letter concerning Kois s failure similarly to comply with the terms of union-security agreement amounted to an implied for his discharge. We see no reason why the Nelson Ee ee ee ere especially when viewed in light of Respondent Beloi breach of its fiduciary duty owed to Nelson. For above-stated reasons, we find that Respondent Beloit the discharge of an employee except for his failure to pay quired dues and initiation fees.” Hershey Foods Corporation, NLRB 897 (1973). le at $3 57 ent’s part to notify Nelson of his obligations under the new con- tract since “an employee is not presumed to be on notice as to the extent of his obligations to the union during successive terms.” See Conductron Corporation, a subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 183 NLRB 419, 425 (1970), citing N.L.R.B. v. Inter- national Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO (General Motors Corporation), 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Moreover, in light of Respondent Beloit’s rejection of Nelson's tender of dues on the ground that he had no dues obligations, we 17a lawfully sought to have Nelson discharged and in so doing violated Sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 0b 1A) of the Act. | ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, Wash- ington, D.C., Rockford Association, Rockford, Illinois, and Beloit Association, Beloit, Wisconsin, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving force or effect to League Law 13. (b) Restraining or coercing employees who have re- signed from Respondents by imposing fines on such em- ployees for working during a sanctioned strike. (ec) Causing or attempting to cause Atlas Pattern Works or any other employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of its employees for failure to comply with the terms of a union-security clause without adequately advising them of their obligations, in viola- tion of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. d Imposing fines and other penalties upon former members for conduct in which they engaged after their effective resignation from Respondents, as conditions of regaining union membership under the provisions of a union-security clause, and attempting to cause an em- ployer to seek an employee’s compliance therewith. (e Threatening employees with physical harm, prop- erty damage, a loss of pension benefits, or any other re- prisals for working during the course of a sanctioned strike. AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.” 19a Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 33 suf- ficient signed copies of said notice for posting by employer-members of the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Job- bers Association, if the employers are willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Said copies, after being duly signed by Respondents’ author- ized representatives, shall be returned forthwith to the Regional Director. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 33, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith. Date, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982 JOHN R. VAN DE WATER, Chairman Don A. ZIMMERMAN, Member RoBERT P. HUNTER, Member NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD [SEAL] 20a MEMBER FANNING, concurring and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority in all respects save that I do not find that Respondents violated the Act by “giving force or effect to League Law 13,” which simply pro- hibits resignations from the League during a strike or when one is imminent. As I explained in Dalmo Victor,” a labor organization’s restrictions on resignation are rele- vant in cases involving union discipline of employees only to the extent that the labor organization defends that the employee is a union member and had consented to be bound to union rules. Where the restriction is not a valid one—and I agree that League Law 13 is not—it may not be relied upon as a bar to resignation; in that case, the labor organization cannot defend its action as one taken against a member. The League Law does not, however, have any impact on the employment relationship and, therefore, does not violate any law or policy this Agency is charged with enforcing. It is a procedural rule purporting only to regulate the release of a member from the Union’s rolls. Neither Section 8(b)(1)(A) nor the Act in general regulates the purely internal affairs of labor organiza- tions.“ The proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) stakes out the limit of Federal restriction in this area and leaves 15 Machinists Local 1327, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), 268 NLRB No. 141 (1982), sl. op., p. 8, fn. 13. 16 Before the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, which come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, the Supreme Court observed that “the protection of union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of ny such power has been expressly denied.” Interna- tional Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958). ployer’s involvement in commerce even in cases where a labor organization is the respondent. There is no basis for concluding that a union rule, which on its face only regulates union membership rolls, may not be maintained without violating the Act. League Law 13 has no effect on the employment relationship, and its maintenance should not be unlawful simply because the League sought to rely upon it to show a binding union-member compact which had, in law, been vitiated. Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982 JOHN H.FANNING, Member NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 17 Local 283, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple- ment Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO (Wisconsin Motor Cor- poration), 145 NLRB 1097, 1133 (1964). 18 Scofield, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423 (1969). MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part: I join in all my colleagues’ findings except their affirm- ance of the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the . fines imposed on the 10 employees who resigned from Re- spondents during the strike and crossed Respondents’ picket lines to return to work violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. For the reasons set forth in my separate dissenting opinions in Machinists Local 1327, International Associa- tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), 263 NLRB No. 141 (1982), and 231 NLRB 719 (1977), I would find that League Law 13, as applied herein, is a reasonable and narrow restriction on the employees’ right to resign their union membership, and is within the ambit of the Union’s control over its internal affairs. Accordingly, I also would find that the fines imposed pursuant to League Law 13 on the 10 employees who crossed the Unions’ picket lines were lawful and not in violation of the proscriptions of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982 HOWARD JENKINS, JR., Member NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD — 23a APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT give force or effect to League Law 13. WE WILL NOT impose fines and other penalties upon former members for conduct in which they engaged after resigning their membership from the League or its As- sociations. WE WILL NOT impose such fines and other penalties upon former members for conduct in which they engaged after resigning their membership, as conditions of re- gaining union membership under the provisions of a valid union-security clause, and WE WILL NOT attempt to cause employers to seek employees’ compliance therewith. WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause employers to discharge o otherwise discriminate against employees who have not complied with the terms of a union-security agreement without first adequately informing employees of their obligations under said agreement. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with physical harm, property damage, a loss af pension benefits, or any other reprisals for working during the course of a sanc- tioned strike. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au- thorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL rescind the fines and/or other similar penalties levied against employees who effectively resigned t i | PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NortH America, AFL-CIO, and Irs ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS (Labor Organization ) Dated By (For Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO) Dated By (For Beloit Association ) Dated (For Rockford Association This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days be directed to the Board’s Office, Savings Center Tower, 16th Floor, 411 Hamilton Avenue, Peoria Illinois 61602, Telephone 309-671-7081. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DIVISION OF JULGES BRANCH OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA Case No. 33-CB-1132 PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, AND ITS ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS and ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION Lynne E. Gilfillan, Atty., Peoria, III., for the General Counsel. William B. Peer, Atty., Washington, D.C., for the Re- spondents. DECISION Statement of the Case GERALD A. WACKNOV, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to this matter was held before me in Rockford, Illinois, on August 16, 1978. The charge was filed on January 23, 1978 by Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association (herein called the Pattern Jobbers Association), and thereafter on March 7, 1978 a complaint and notice of hearing was issued alleging a violation by Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, and its Rockford and Beloit Associations (herein called the Respondent Unions) of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). On Respondent Beloit Association are and have been at all times material herein labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. The Unfair Labor Practices A. The Issues The principal issues raised by the pleadings are (1) whether Respondent Unions violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act by fining employees for returning to work dur- ing the course of a strike, after said employees had been expelled from or had tendered resignations to their re- spective Respondent Unions; (2) whether Respondent Beloit Association violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and Sec- tion 8(b) (2) of the Act by attempting to cause an em- ployer to discharge employees for their failure to join the Union; and (3) whether Respondent Unions threatened members in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. B. The Facts On or about May 5, 1977 the Respondent Rockford and Beloit Associations commenced a strike against the Pat- tern Jobbers Association and its individual members. The strike ended on or about December 19, 1977 when nego- tiations culminated in a new collective-bargaining agree- ment. Between September 11 and December 2, 1977 ap- proximately 11 employees individually tendered written resignations to their respective Respondent Unions, and thereafter returned to work for their employers. On September 11, 1977 William Kohl became the first member to tender his resignation. On September 12, 1977, apparently the date Kohl urned to work, he was expelled from membership by Respondent Beloit Associ- ation. On September 26, 1977 four additional employees tendered their written resignations, and thereafter the Respondent Unions received letters of resignation from ap- proximately six additional individuals.“ Apparently, only Kohl was expelled from membership.“ Pursuant to League Law 13 of the Respondent Pattern Makers’ League of North America the remaining resignations were not accepted by the Respondent Unions, and each individual was thereafter notified of this action in writing by letter dated January 26, 1978, which letter also advised that at a special meeting held on January 23, 1978, a sub- stantial fine, approximately commensurate with his earn- ings, had been levied against him for returning to work during a strike.“ ‘Al’ ‘at two of the letters of resignation are perfunctory in nature, . erely advising Respondent Unions of the member’s resig- nation. One letter contains expressions of dissatisfaction with union officers and negotiators, and in another letter the member expresses his continued belief in unions but regretfully states “it has come down to my family and a hardship.” 2 The record umwer whether employee Lannie McDonald was also expelled. League LA 13 proves: No resignati. or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or ata time when a strike or lockout appears imminent. The record does not contain Respondent Beloit Association's rationale for responding to Kohl’s resignation letter with immediate explusion, rather than invoking League Law 13 against Kohl, thus prohibiting his resignation. tion.” by letter dated February 1, 1978, apparently pursuant to Kohl’s request, Respondent Beloit Association furnished Kohl with application forms and advised him „ FEREPIRE J 1 ain 5 tH a5 lt fist 1 1 rf Es 8 F F 4 ; 2 4 collective-bargaining agreement, requesting that the em- ployer take appropriate action to reetify this situation.“ On the same date, Respondent Beloit Association returned to Nelson a check for union dues which he had previously submitted, stating, “Since you are not a member of this Association [the Union] can not accept any payment from you for dues you don’t owe.” Donald L. Hansen, business agent of Respondent Beloit Association, testified that neither he nor any union steward or official notified Nel- 80a his obligation to join the Union under the terms col lective-bargaining agreement or that his dis- would be requested absent compliance therewith. ship was approved in early February, 1978 after the pay- ment of the appropriate admittance fee and dues require- ments for new members. League Law 13 became embodied in the laws of Re- the various associations, including the members of Re- defections from membership which, during the of numerous prior strikes, caused substantial harm to the League and its members. Thus, the return to work of former members during the course of strikes resulted in the inability to negotiate successor contracts, de- functness of associations, and the acceptance of substand- ard terms in collective-bargaining agreements. F week in benefits.“ Hansen further testified that all mem- bers are required to take an Oath of Membership obligat- ing them to adhere to the “Constitution, Laws, Rules and Decisions” of the League and its associations; all mem- bers, including those who later tendered their resigna- tions, received due notice and all but one attended the strike vote which was conducted by secret ballot; and, 5 However, Pattern Makers League Law 35, clause 3, states that the monetary assistance benefit for strikers shall be only $40 per week. There is no record evidence clarifying this apparent dis- as a direct result of the defection of approximately 25 percent of the initial strikers, the strike not only was prolonged but it became necessary to accept a contract 4 Unions tember 1977“ and was attended by about 50-60 7 H 11. tt assessed a fine of $15,000, and that until such a fine paid his pension would decrease year by year until noth- ing was left of it.“ The precise date of the meeting is unclear. Gabelhausen admitted stating that crossing a picket line and “possibly creating a non-union shop” could ultimately effect em- ployees pensions. % N. L. K. B. v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO (International Paper Bor Ma- chine Co.), 409 U.S. 213 (19738). 29 V. L. R. B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The Board majority in Ex-Cell-O found it unnecessary under the circumstances therein to “rule on the question of what, if any, provision in a union’s constitution or by- laws limiting the time or manner of resignation would pass muster under the Act,” but enunciated certain stand- ards which must be met in order to provide the manda- tory “reasonable accomodation” between the often con- flicting interests of the union and its members during a strike. Thus, the Board majority in interpreting and applying Supreme Court decisions states that any rule imposing restraints on members’ rights to resign during a strike must be precisely tailored to the union’s needs and therefore no broader than necessary to serve the union’s legitimate interests, and must accord “weight to the competing considerations which may necessitate resig- nation during a strike,” such as economic hardship.” {Emphasis supplied. ] There is no contention by the General Counsel that League Law 13 was improperly enacted or that the mem- 1! See Granite State Joint Board, supra; Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423. See also, Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (O.K. Tool Com- pany, Inc.) 2215 NLRB 651; General Teamsters Local 439, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (Loomis Courier Service, Inc.), 237 NLRB No. 84. 34a bers who tendered their resignations were unaware of the restrictions on resignation imposed therein. While there are various infirmities inherent in League Law 13 or in the failure of the Respondent Unions to uniformly apply it to all members who tendered their resignations,” it is clear that this Law fails to comply with the Board’s standard enunciated in Ex-Cell-O that such a provision 12 Thus, it appears the Law would prohibit resignation or with- drawals during strikes by members who are leaving the industry or who may have secured jobs with other non-struck employers, and would further prohibit resignation even if the strike were unprotected. See Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 1127 (New York Telephone Company), 208 NLRB 258. Fur- ther, the language precluding resignations when a strike “appears imminent” is so vague and susceptible to such varying interpreta- tion as to severely limit the statutory right of members to resign even prior to a strike vote and possibly even prior to the commence- ment of negotiations. Such indefinite limitations placed upon an employee’s statutory right to resign may run afoul of the Board’s requirement that in order for such limitation to be binding a mem- ber must have actual knowledge of or have indicated his consent to be bound by his contractual commitment vis-avis the Union. See Ex-Cell-O Corporation, supra; Loomis Courier Service, Inc., supra. It would appear that such a requirement presupposes some particularity regarding these commitments so that a member may timely and effectively resign. Compare the constitutional prohibi- tion in Machinists Local 1327, International Association of Ma- chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), 231 NLRB No. 115. Moreover, by couching the member’s obligation in such uncertain terms, the Union may have breached a fiduciary duty to “deal fairly” with employees whom the Union represents. See Loomis Courier Service, Inc., supra, slip opinion p. 7. Finally, the Respondent Unions did not consistently invoke and perhaps waived their “right” to invoke League Law 13. Thus, as noted above, William Kohl was the first member to tender his resignation. He was expelled from membership immediately thereafter, prior to the other individuals involved herein having tendered their resignations. Under such circumstances the remain- ing employees would quite reasonably believe that, similarly, League Law 13 would not be invoked to prohibit their resignations. Indeed, the record shows no notification to them that their resignations were unacceptable until January 26, 1978, well after the conclusion of the strike and months after the tenders of resignation. 35a must accord weight to circumstances necessitati - nation during a strike. The blanket prohibition of — nations or withdrawals during strikes embodied in League Law 13 permits of no exceptions or qualifications, obviously according no weight whatsoever to the compet- ing considerations often confronting striking employees. Thus, I find that League 13 is an impermissible encroach- ment on employees’ statutory right to resign union mem- bership and that the fines imposed thereunder are in violation of the Act. Local 1384 United Automobile, Aero- space, Agriculture Implement Workers (Ex-Cell-O Corpo- ration), supra. But cf. Machinists Local 1327, Interna- — Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers FL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), supra, and the dissenting opinions therein. During the course of discussing ble methods dealing with anticipated —— dt ae — a President Romelfanger voiced his agreement and elabor- ated upon the statement of one member, who remarked that some of the men on the picket line could get pretty hostile, adding that it had sometimes happened that strikebreakers end up with broken arms or broken legs. Similar statements were made, in similar coniexts, by Vice President Gabelhausen and Business Manager Bunk at various union meetings. Further, it was, at the least, —— suggested by Gabelhausen that employees would ose a day of pension benefits to which they were entitled for each day they worked during the strike. I find that the statements attributed to Romelfanger Gabelhausen and Bunk, were made substantially as wit- American Lumber Sales, 229 NLRB 414, 416. 86a no effort was made by any union official to dispel such reasonable beliefs. Moreover, when Bunk was asked whether his remarks concerning broken windows and damage to cars of employees constituted a threat, Bunk replied, “Take it for what it is worth,” clearly indicating that indeed such was the case. I find that the aforemen- tioned statements constitute conduct violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act as alleged. See Service Em- International Union Local 254, AFL-CIO, 218 NLRB 1399; Progressive Mine Workers of America, Dis- trict No. 1, 188 NLRB 489. The Genera! Counsel submits that the letters from Respondent Beloit Association to Atlas, the employer of Kohl and Nelson, were requests for the discharge of these employees for failure to comply with the union security provisions of the new contract. Further, the General Counsel maintains that by making such a request to the employees’ employer Respondent Beloit Association breached a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with the em- ployees affected, which duty, at a minimum, requires that a union inform the employee of his obligations under a union security provision in order that he may protect his job tenure. Hansen testified that the letters to Atlas regarding Kohl and Nelson were designed to prompt Atlas to, in turn, cause Kohl and Nelson to comply with the con- tract’s union security provisions.“ The letter regarding Nelson was sent to Atlas 3 days prior to the time that Respondent Beloit Association could have requested his immediate discharge, and was not inconsistent with Han- sen’s testimony regarding the purposes of the letter. Upon 14 See Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc., 286 NLRB No. 55, slip opinion pp. 5-6. 15 The record does not contain the wording of the union security provisions. 87a the expiration of the appropriate period, the record shows no attempt to cause the discharge of Nelson. Further, the record strongly indicates that Nelson was aware of his obligations; indeed Nelson had previously tendered a check for dues prior to his becoming a member. Most importantly, the job tenure of Nelson was not disrupted in any fashion, and he continued in the employ of Atlas and thereafter became a member of the Respondent Be- loit Association. Eased upon the foregoing, I find the record evidence insufficient to support the complaint al- legation that Respondent Beloit Association unlawfully attempted to cause Atlas to discharge Nelson. Nor does it appear that Respondent Beliot Association breached a fiduciary duty to Nelson. However, the facts regarding Kohl are quite different. It is not in dispute that Respondent Beloit Association ex- pelled Kohl from membership immediately upon receiv- ing his letter of resignation. Thereafter, Respondent Be- loit Association sent a letter to Atlas urging that Kohl comply with the union security provisions of the centract by becoming a member of said Union. However, unlike the treatment of Nelson, Respondent Peloit Association thereupon erected a barrier to Kohl’s compliance with the contract requirements by conditioning his membership in the Union upon the payment of substantial sums for back dues obviously imposed for periods during which Kohl had no dues obligation,“ a readmission fee of $500, and an additional amount of $4,200 for damages. It is clear that all such amounts were imposed as a penalty for con- duct in which Kohl was engaged after having effectively resigned his Union membership. Therefore, having con- ditioned membership, mandatory under a valid union security clause, upon the payment of such apparently un precedented and excessive amounts and by attempting to cause the employer to seek Kohl’s compliance therewith % According to the Laws of the Pattern Makers’ League, 8 months advance dues are customarily required of new members. 38a upon the implicit threat of discharge, Respondent Beloit Association has violated Section 8 (1)(A) and 8(b) (2) of the Act.“ International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District No. 71 (Whitaker Cable Corporation), 224 NLRB 580; Local 1936, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, (NCR Corpor- ation), 229 NLRB 243; Business Machine Technicians and Engineers Section, Brotherhood of Airline and Steamship Clerks, AFL-CIO (NCR Corporation), 235 NLRB No. 86. Conclusions of Law 1. The Pattern Jobbers Association is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and(7) of the Act. 2. Respondents Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, Rockford Association, and Beloit As- sociation are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By maintaining as an obligation of membership and by invoking League Law 13 against members, which law unreasonably precludes members’ effective resignation during a strike or when a strike appears imminent, Re spondents have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 4. By imposing fines against former members who had duly resigned prior to returning to work during the course of a strike, Respondents have violated Section 8 (b (1) (A) of the Act. 17 While the complaint alleges only the unlawfulness of the fine, I find that the back dues and excessive readmission fee required of Kohl as a condition of becoming a member of the Union are likewise tantamount to unlawfully imposed fines. Whether Respordent Beloit Association could lawfully impose a reasonable readmission fee based on nondiscriminatory considerations is a matter properly left for the compliance stage of this proceeding. See Metal Workers’ Alliance, Incorporated, (TRW Metals Division, TRV, Inc.), 172 NLRB 815. 39a 5. By conditioning admission in the union, under the loit Association has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b) (2) of the Act. 6. By threatening employees with reprisals in the form of physical harm or loss of accrued pension benefits, Re- spondents have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) of the Act. The Remedy Having found that the Respondents engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I recommend that they be required t to conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuan Section 10 (e) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend d: pattern Makers’ League of North Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, Rockford Association and Beloit Associa- tion, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving force or effect to League Law 13. (b) Restraining or coercing employees who have resigned from Respondents, by imposing fines on such employees for working during a sanctioned strike. Threatening employees with physical harm, property damage, a loss of pension benefits, or any other reprisals for working during the course of a sanctioned strike. (d) Im fines and other penalties upon former mentee ta amish to es Gar caged ces lt effective resignation from Respondent, as conditions of regaining union membership under the provisions of a union security clause, and attempting to cause an em- ployer to seek an employee’s compliance therewith. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act: Mak- (a) Expunge from the Laws of the Pattern ers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO any reference to League Law 13 1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section adopted the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and —— — —— — E for all purposes. sion fee imposed upon William Kohl as a condition of his regaining membership in the Beloit Association, and so notify Kohl of such action. (d) Expunge from the records of said employees any reference to fines levied against them for post-resig- nation conduct. (e Post at their business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked Appendix.“ Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 33, after being duly signed by auth- orized representatives of Respondents, shall be posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and shall be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (f) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 33 sufficient signed copies of said notice for posting by em- ployer members of the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association, if the employers are willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after In the event that the Board’s Order is ( forred by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA- TIONS BOARD” shall be changed to read “POSTED PURSUANT TO 4A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP- PEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.” Lr tives, returned forthwith to the Regional ie) Notify the Regional Director for Region 33 in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondents have taken to comply herewith. Dated: NOVEMBER 21, 1978 % Gerald A. Wacknov GERALD A. WACKNOV Administrative Law Judge 43a APPENDIX JD-(SF) -276-78 NOTICE TO MEMBERS [SEAL] [SEAL] PosTEeD By ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE HEARBY NOTIFY YOU that League Law 13 of the Pattern Makers’ League of Nerth America, AFL- CIO, has been found to unlawfully prohibit employees from resigning their membership from the League or its Associations during the course of a strike or when a strike appears imminent. WE WILL NOT give force or effect to League Law 13 and it will be expunged from the League’s body of laws. WE WILL NOT impose fines and other penalties upon upon former members for conduct in which they en- gaged after resigning their membership, as conditions of regaining union membership under the provisions of a valid union security clause and WE WILL NOT attempt to cause employers to seek employees’ complaince there- with. WE WILL rescind the fines and other similar penalties levied against employees for their post-resignation activ- ity of working during the course of a strike, and notify said employees that such fines and penalties have been rescinded. WE WILL expunge from the records of said employees any reference to fines levied against them for post-resig- nation conduct. property damage, loss of pension benefits, or PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NortH AMeRicA, AFL-CIO, and Its ROCKFORD AND Be Sr ASSOCIATIONS (Unions) Dated By (For Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO) ; Dated By ‘ (For Beloit Association ) Dated By (For Rockford Association This is an Official Notice and Must not be Defaced by Anyone may be directed to the Board’s Office, Savings Center Tower—16th Floor, 411 Hamilton Avenue, Peoria, IL 61602. Telephone Number— (309) 671-7091. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0773%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.