# Amicus Curiae Brief — Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0739%3A12 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1991 - **Citation:** 499 U.S. 144 ## Text ee & acne gig “2 x 7 L. A TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAB SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 0. UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THE TENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY UPHELD THE COMMISSION’S DECISION ___. A. a The Commission Is an Autonomous Adjudicative Tribunal That Is Neither Subordinate to the Secretary Nor Obligated to Defer to the Secre- tary's Interpretation of Her Regulations The Tenth Circuit’s Scope of Review Was Prop- erly Limited to Determining the Reasonableness Expertise of the Commission Deference to the Commission Maintains the Political Balance Between Business and Labor Interests Struck by the OSH Act... This Court's —— . ——— Liability of Respondent ... Page ii 10 12 14 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 482 F.2d 150 WM nl Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Federal Energy Reg- ulatory Comm'n, 878 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1989) American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. — W B&B Insulation, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 9 ——ů̃ Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983) . Bowman — “Jee. * Arbansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (7 Bradley v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963) .. Brennen v. . Occupational ‘Safety end ‘Health Re- view Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1974). Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974) Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm n, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 19795 Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 19755 — Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp,, 803 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1986) Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co. 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) Brock v. Chicago Zoological See’y, 820 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1987) . * Brock v. Williams Enterprises of G. Ine. 832 F.2d 567 (11th Cir. 18877 „„ñ, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) .. Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir. 1978) . Director, Office 1 Workers’ “Compensation Pro- grams v. General Dynamics Corp., 900 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1990) . = Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 us. 429 (1943). tas Page 11 14 11 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61 Ee Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315 CE Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. EE Estate of Simmie v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 93 CC EE Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 (19900: Fluor Constructors v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 861 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1111 Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970 ——— Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th EEE Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126 (10th r . Marshall v. Western Elec. Inc., 565 F.2d 240 (2d EEE EE Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879 (5th EE ES Nickell v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. . Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268 EEE Saginaw Mining Co. v. Mazzulli, 818 F.2d 1278 SES LT Secretary of Labor v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 ä Si bla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. r .. United Steelworkers v. Schuykill Metals Corp., 628 F234 314 (Sth Cir. 1967) ................................ Page 12 11 9, 12 11 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Page Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409 1 — ne eee Seen 11 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933 6 STATUTES: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 70 8 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (a), (b) ................ . 6 Internal Revenue Code, r .. 10 e . 10 e . TE 12 26 U.S.C. § 7443 (b), (e), (f)) 6 e . 10 r . EE TIS 10 Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, r X...... 5 r — 5 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 J EE . passim I — 4 ee 6 ES ⁊ sae 6 REGULATIONS: 1111 ee 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (19717 passim S. Rep. No. 181, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. Sees 6 OS ee 4,6 MISCELLANEOUS: Tax Court Rule 142, 26 U.S.C. foll. § 7458 6 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1990 No. 89-1541 ELIZABETH H. DOLE, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 1 Petitioner, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION and CF&I STEEL CORPORATION, Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit BRIEF OF AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS The American Iron and Steel Institute (“AISI”) respectfully files this brief as amicus curiae in support of Respondents. Written consents have been obtained from counsel for Petitioner and Respondents pursuant to Su- preme Court Rule 37.3. The letters reflecting consent have been filed with the clerk’s office. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The American Iron and Steel Institute is a national trade association whose 40 domestic member companies account for approximately 80 percent of the raw steel production of the United States. The issue presented by this case is relevant to issues commonly encountered by AISI’s member companies. AISI’s member companies have a strong interest in the interpretation and enforce- ment of regulations governing coke production, such as those at issue in this case, because coke production is important to the manufacture of iron and steel. AISI was a party to the development of and the initial chal- lenge to the coke oven emissions standards that were the basis of the citation issued by Petitioner the Secretary of Labor the Secretary“ to Respondent CF&I Steel Corporation. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Oc- cupational Safety and Health Admin., 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Properly formulated, the question facing this Court is whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit utilized the appropriate standard of review in its review of the decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission the Commission“). The answer to that question is yes. The Commission is an autonomous independent adjudi- catory beard that is neither subordinate to the Secretary nor obligated to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of her regulations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Commission is, therefore, fundamentally dif- fereat from any of the boards created by Congress under other statutory schemes that the Solicitor General claims to be analogous. Moreover, the independence the Commission enjoys from the Secretary was a conscious legislative choice to break a political deadlock that existed between labor and management over passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Commission’s role in the statutory scheme is far more substantial than a mere finder of fact as the Secretary would have it. This Court should not destroy the political balance struck by Congress; rather, it should enforce the legislative compromise. Congress intended that the decisions of the Commission be reviewed under the narrow “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. Consist- ent with this standard, the Tenth Circuit properly held that the Commission’s decision was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit also appropriately deferred to the specialized expertise of the Commission in matters of oc- cupational safety and health. The Commission is due the same level of deferential review granted to other specialized tribunals, such as the United States Tax Court. Finally, since the Commission only decided that the Secretary had charged Respondcnt under the improper regulatory provision and not that no violation had oc- curred, upholding the Tenth Circuit would not, as the Solicitor General suggests, sanction the activity which brought about the charge in the first place. ARGUMENT UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF RE- VIEW, THE TENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY UPHELD THE COMMISSION’S DECISION Petitioner’s arguments can be distilled into a simple syllogism: The Secretary is the policy-making authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (“OSH Act”); the Commission has only adjudicatory authority. When the policymaker dis- agrees with an adjudicatory body over the interpretation of a regulation, the policymaker’s interpretation must prevail. Therefore, in this case the Secretary’s interpre- tation is entitled to judicial deference, and the Tenth Cir- cuit erred in according deference to the Commission’s in- terpretation. Petitioner’s reasoning is simple enough, but 4 it does not accurately portray existing law nor properly state the issue before this Court.“ The proper issue is the appropriate standard of review to be used by a court of appeals reviewing a decision of an independent, specialized adjudicatory tribunal—in this case, the Commission. In deciding that question, this 1 Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Com- pensation Programs (“Pepceo”), 449 US. 268 (1980), relied on by the Solicitor General, does not support the broad proposition for which the Solictor General cites it. Pepco, and the cases cited therein, involved appeals from a nonindependent adjudicatory tri- bunal that is fundamentally different in makeup from the Com- mission. Other cases supporting deference to the policymaker re- lied on by the Solicitor General involved direct appeals from an agency or department to a court. Different issues are involved when the statute has interposed an autonomous expert tribunal between the policymaker and the courts. 2? Implicit in Petitioner’s formulation of the question presented is the assertion that, where the Secretary and Commission dis- agree, the proper role of the Court is to review directly the reason- ableness of the Secretary’s actions. Such a position flatly contra- dicts the plain language of the OSH Act, which provides that per- sons, including the Secretary, may obtain review only of a “final order of the Commission.” 29 U.S.C. 5 660 (a), (b). In other words, at issue is not the Secretary's view but the Com- mission’s decision. Were it otherwise, the Commission would be only a fact-finding body with authority similar to an administra- tive law judge. There is nothing in the legislative history to support this result, even though it is inherent in the Solicitor General’s formulation of the issue. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, upon which Petitioner relies, is unlike the OSH Act in this regard because its legislative history explicitly provides that “the Secretary's interpre- tations of the law and regulations shall be given weight by both the Commission and the courts.” S. Rep. No. 181, 95th Cong., Ist Seas. 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3401, 3448 (emphasis added). This admonition suggests that the Secre- tary’s actions under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act mmy be directly reviewed by courts; there is no similar suggestion in the OSH Act. Petitioner, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compen- sation Act the “LHWC Act”) establishes a Benefits Re- view Board (“Benefits Review Board”) which is com- posed of members who are appointed by the Secretary for no fixed term and who serve at her pleasure. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b); Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). The Bene- poena records and has no investigatory or contempt power. See 33 U.S.C. §921 (establishing authority of Benefits Review Board). Thus, the Benefits Review Board is but an appendage of the Secretary. Indeed, it has been char- acterized as a quasi-judicial body of “lesser dignity.” Kalaris, 697 F.2d at 396 n.82. The decisions of tri- bunals such as the Benefits Review Board are therefore properly accorded no special deference by the courts. Saginaw Mining Co. v. Mazzulli, 818 F.2d 1278, 1283 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. General Dynamics Corp., 900 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1990). In contrast, the Commission is composed of members who are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a fixed term and are removable by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. 29 U.S.C. § 661(a)}, (b. Unlike the Benefits Review Board, the Commission is authorized to promulgate its own internal rules, to order deposition testimony, and to subpoena records, and has certain in- vestigatory and contempt powers. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 661(g)-(i) with 33 U.S.C. 5921. Thus, in its makeup and authority, the Commission is more like the United States Tax Court Tax Court”), the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Mine Safety Commission”), and other specialized independent tribuals that play a significant policy role apart from individual departmental or agency heads. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b), (e), (f; 30 U.S.C. § 823/a), (b. However, unlike either the Mine Safety Commission or the Tax Court, which have been instructed by Con- gress to defer to the head of the administrative agency whose decision they are reviewing,’ the Commission is, in the words of its sponsor, Senator Javits, “an autono- mous, independent commission which, without regard to In the legislative history of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, Congress unambiguously stated that “the Secretary's interpretations of the law and regulations shal] be given weight by beth the Commission and the courts.” S. Rep. No. 181, 95th Cong Ist Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong 4 Admin. News 3401, 3448. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the taxpayer has the burden of proving the invalidity of the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner's determination of tax deficiency, which is presumptively correct. Tax Court Rule 142, 26 U.S.C. foll. § 7453 (1989). Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F 2d 879, 882 (Sth Cir. 1989). 7 the Secretary, can find for or against him on the basis of individual complaints. See Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (1971) (“Leg- islative History”) at 463.* In contrast, nothing in the OSH Act or its legislative history suggests that the Commission is to accord defer- ence to the Secretary or treat the Secretary’s actions as presumptively correct. Indeed, as courts have held under the OSH Act, the Secretary has the burden of proving all elements of an alleged OSH Act violation, which suggests that the Commission owes no deference to the Secretary. See, e. g., B&B Insulation, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Re- view Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1975 * See also Legislative History at 462 (Commission is al utono- mous and independent” and “is expressly set forth to be an inde- pendent commission”) (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 463 (Commission “would not be a Labor Department instrument”) (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 473 (“an independent enforce- burden of proof on the Secretary, the Commission stated that “Commission case law on burdens of proof is in no way affected by the deletion of present § 2200.73 .. parties . may continue to be guided by that case law.” 51 Fed. Reg. 32,002, 32,013 (1986). 8 B. The Tenth Circuit’s Scope of Review Was Properly Limited to Determining the Reasonableness of the Com- mission’s Interpretation The OSH Act does not set forth the standard of ju- dicial review of Commission decisions. Given the absence of any specific congressional direction, AISI believes that the Commission’s final decision should be subject to the standard of review of final agency action governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706. That was the standard the Commission's sponsor stated would govern Commission decisions. According to Senator Javits, the Administratice Procedure Act ap- plies anyway, whether the Secretary is the enforcing agent or the Commission is the enforcing agent.” Legis- lative History at 463. Under the APA standard, courts must uphold agency action unless it is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Numerous appel- late courts have subscribed to precisely this standard in reviewing Commission decisions. F. g., Fluor Construc- tors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 861 F.2d 936, 939 (6th Cir. 1988); accord Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1986); Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. Cities Serv. ence to the Secretary as required by the legislative history of the LHWC Act. See Secretary of Labor v. Cannelton Indus, Inc., 867 F.2d 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ; Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co. 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986). * Another possible standard, raised in passing by the First Cir- cuit, would be de novo review with “the court making up its mind independently about the rule’s meaning,” Donevan v. A. Amorello 4 Sons, lune, 761 F.2d 61, 63 (ist Cir. 1985). Neither the First Circuit, nor any other court, has seriovsly considered such a course of action, which would overturn gene ally accepted principles of administrative law. See, e.g. Federal i «bor Rela- tions Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 8. Ct. 863 (1990); Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. „. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 878 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1989). Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Marshal! v. Western Elec. Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977) (reviewing court’s “role ‘is to decide whether the Commission’s interpretation of the regulation is un- reasonable and inconsistent with its purpose, the normal standard for review of the interpretation of a regula- tion by the agency charged with its administration?“ (quoting Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Re- view Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Cir. 1974))." By definition, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sye., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). The Tenth Circuit properly limited its review to exam- ining whether the Commission's interpretation of the coke oven respiratory regulation was reasonable. Pet. App. 9a-lla.* Cireumscribed as it was by the narrow scope of review mandated by the APA, the Tenth Circuit was correct to limit its inquiry to the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation without ruling on the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation, to which the Commission is not obligated to defer.” In Brock v. Chicago Zoological Soc, 820 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1987); United Steelworkers v. Schuykill Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1987); and Brock v. Williams Enterprises of Ga., Inc., 882 F.2d 567 (1ith Cir. 1987), relied upon by the Solicitor General, the Seventh, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits did not address the appropriate scope of review of Commission deci- sions. * References to “Pet. App.” refer to the appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in this Court on April 2, 1990. * Although the Tenth Circuit stated that “it is certainly possible to reach an alternate interpretation of the ambiguous regulatory ei eg: 42 11225 25732 213 2 By e e ea e e 'H l ien th eee i i Hue Wee itt t lit an ; 28 2 tells 11 i iel 11473 iI . fap fl. 121 5 1881113 + li 7222 +L 1115 Z 12075 Heal 75 ind IId (REA 1 1 4 „ ne Be tt in; Ae E Ta HE i 41142135 I A 1175 1111244 ai path 7 Hint FT et 1 fit : 5 141 ite 17132 rH Hall 1 e Aig 212 He 1111 e 11 ie lili cH Hall: 1 it i i 513 F.2d 713, 715-716 . Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1332, 1334 n.1 ‘Commission entitled to great deference in interpretation of OSH Act regulations; “is founded primarily on the special expertise” of Commission it | | , | U.S.C. $8 7401-7410) ; this, however, is a distinction without tical significance. ; if l fl it i | ; : 1199 (7th Cir. 1974)); Dunlop o. Rockwell Jnl, 540 F.2d 1283, (6th Cir. 1976) ‘(court owes Commission's 3 : IE istory at 193. The bill that had been re- Senate sssuring a fair and independent method of furthering the purposes of the OSH Act. As Representative Scherle The true goal of any occupational safety and health legislation can be simply stated. It is to foster im- proved standards of safety and health for workers, and to do it in a way that is both reasonable and Legislative History at 1014.“ The need for fairness that was identified by Representative Scherle was a prime % The committee bill to which Representative Scherle objected an independent adjudicatory commission. This faults that the Representative identified with bill followed] the oversimplified F 883 2 5 : While labor unions supported this scheme, it was roundly criticized by employers. As Senators Dominick and Smith noted in their dissent in the Committee Report, “the bill is opposed by the Administration, employers, State occupational health and safety agencies, and by national standards producing organizations while its primary support comes from the leadership of large unions.” Legislative History at 200. These Senators objected to the fact that the Committee’s bill settled [all functions, including stand- ard setting, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review” in the Secretary of Labor. /d. In contrast, Senator Javits’ amendment, which was added on the floor of the Senate, established the Commission, which Repre- measure of reassurance .. . by so simple a means as an autonomous enforcement board . I see no reason why we should not do it.” Legislative History at 470 (statement of Senator Javits). 14 motivating factor behind the Javits amendment. The notion that an independent Commission would be fair to both labor and business interests prompted Senator Jav- its’ amendment. To adopt the Secretary’s position in this case would be to reduce the Commission’s function to that of a fact finder and remove the keystone to winning business acquiescence to the OSH Act. As the Seventh Circuit has reminded us, when a legis- lative provision is the result of a compromise, it is not the function of a court to undo the political balance which has been reached: {[W]here a statute strikes a political balance but administration of the statute is entrusted to an agency that may not embody that balance, it is dan- gerous to defer automatically to the agency’s view. An agency that may be dominated by one faction in the legislative struggle that led to enactmert of a compromise is not authorized to hand that faction a victory that was denied it in the legislative arena through the efforts of another faction. The court must enforce the compromise, not the maximum position of one of the interest groups among which the compromise was struck. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1983). E. This Court’s Decision Does Note Relate to Any Lia- bility of Respondent Finally, the Solicitor General suggests that to uphold the Court of Appeals would permit Respondent to escape liability, although it had been explicitly warned and had violated the Act. Brief for Petitioner at 37. The Com- mission, however, did not suggest that Respondent’s fail- ure to provide properly fitting respirators did not violate the Act. All it held was that the Secretary had charged Respondent under the wrong provision of the Regula- tions. See Pet. App. at 40a-44a. This is precisely what 15 one would expect from a commission established to pro- vide “an effective and fair method of enforcement,” of the OSH Act. Legislative History at 880 (emphasis in original)“ The Tenth Cireuit was therefore correct to uphold the Commission’s decision. CONCLUSION The Tenth Circuit exercised appropriate judicial re- view over the Commission’s order and, accordingly, its decision should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, Of Counsel: BARTON C. GREEN ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, III * AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL CHRISTOPHER W. MAHONEY INSTITUTE DIANE L. GILDERSLEEVE 1133 15th Street, N.W. BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C. Washington, D.C. 20005 1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700 (202) 452-7143 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 789-6000 Counsel for Amicus Dated: September 19, 1990 * Counsel of Record The Commission’s job is to reach the proper result, not to reach the result advocated by one of the parties simply because of who that party is. See General Dynamics, 900 F.2d at 510 (defer- ence to agency head in role of litigant would deprive claimants of impartial review). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0739%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.