# Amicus Curiae Brief — Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0720%3A16 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 498 U.S. 133 ## Text — 12) A __ Sepseme Court, U.S, No. 89-1298 | | FILED ee ; , ‘ 1) UL 38 | 1980 IN THE t Supreme Court of the United spate curd OCTOBER TERM, 1990 ‘RET AT EC INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, Petitioner, Vv. PERRY MCCLENDON, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, AND INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CHARLES ROTHFELD * Acting Chief Counsel BENNA RUTH SOLOMON STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL CENTER 444 North Capitol Street, N.W. Suite 349 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 638-1445 * Counsel of Record for the Amici Curiae WILSOK - Epae Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Section 514 of the Employee Retirement In- come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1144, preempts a state common law wrongful discharge suit in which the plaintiff claims that his employer discharged him to pi'e- vent the vesting of his pension rights. (i) TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED ........ libesnbisiadadctensaatoncasseinnesn | EE STE ERISA DOES NOT PREEMPT THE STATE LAW I cisnssanesatanevcccsstense A. A State Law “Relate[s] To” An ERISA Plan Only If It Regulates The Terms, Conditions, or Administration Of A Plan ................ 1S B. The Legislative History And Policies of ERISA Ee C. ERISA’s Enforcement Provision Does Not Pre- empt Texas Common Law ......................... sihdisnni (ili) iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Page Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 IY ici sn ascamniacaniensniateaaheedahet mueetee 9, 12, 24 Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp. % Ge Ts CE II rtrd Sccicncccnekncanmccgtoeiamiestundeanel 16 California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 RSET ASR ee Soe ee ORE mT Meme em PERT ErR Ns Fret 8, 25 Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 358 Ff 6§ AS 8 OO Eee 15 English v. General Electric Co., 110 S.Ct. 2270 RIN scons daestecinriaihte Mets ata ees mahal Eee 8, 13, 23, 24, 25 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S.Ct. i), eee ER eR OCR TS! 2, 21, 22, 24 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. ‘Coyne, 482 US. 1 4) sional Seti aire aa ace passim Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) —.....-0..... 22 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 26 Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 516 F. Supp. 554 (E.E. SR citi h re ake Oh eae 15 K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) ...... ER aR nee arte whe Iw IE 15 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825 I). eae a arg (remarks of Rep. Dent) (“preemption of the a $ ‘eprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4670; id. at 29,942 (remarks of at’ Hav " a ‘ ¥ pays : i oa ms em (“the displacement of State action in the field 7 it h “a oyee benefit programs”), reprinted at 3 Ley Hist 1771 Boonen d make no difference to the analysis that Connee | ha | c y ’ , } , j J ; ; te ge | , pted the field explicitly rather than by implication. As a re a i é - AS ‘esull, k / i] ¢ . ay if « Pp ’ p , . . » ad . I 13 —— a et Conservation & Development Comm'n nage Si (1968). Just last Term, however, in Ris Clink cieaae sa hagprsieeey similarity to this one, eral law pree oe rejected the contention that fed- pare sd I | mpted a state tort claim brought by an ployee at a nuclear facility who asserted that che had been termin: inated for compl: ini . alning about safety jiolati . The € ourt expla ined that prin lations. age sonar Theva that in some remote way may — te sar ear safety decisions made by those rir berger own nuclear facilities can be said to aed rsh oe ae field. We have no doubt, wage and child go ats ue dean ag nye facilities would not be ween ted oan ¢ nck oon laws could be said to : ; Hall penal ye resource allocation ris on wae hee gt ing on radiological safety. iene English “. General Electric Co., 110 S. Ct. at 227 Instead,” the Court added, “for a state atid ” fall pane the pre-empted zone, it must have some poor — na eBect on the decisions made by those - , or operate nuclear facilities concerning radio- ogical safety levels.” Jbid.° Preemption in the nuclear 5 Petiti ap’s on ( 7 etitioner’s amict Chamber of Commerce et al suggest that thi & ha F « is , unlike the But the point of Section 514. as “to pre- 120 Cong. Rec. 29,932 ot pri- 14 field accordingly is appropriate only when the state law regulates some aspect of nuclear safety—just as pre- emption under ERISA is appropriate only when the state law regulates some aspect of plan benefits or administra- tion. The state law at issue here plainly escapes preemption under this test. It regulates the relationship between the employer and its employee, rather than the ERISA plan." It has no effect whatever on the terms and conditions of the plan, the benefits offered by the plan, the methods by which the plan processes or pays claims, the funding of the plan, or other aspects of plan administration. In- deed. the Texas law’s only arguable connection to peti- tioner’s plan arises from the requirement that some sort of pension system (although not necessarily, as we €X- plain below, an ERISA plan) presumably must be in place for the employee to have a cause of action. But that hardly makes the law an attempt to “regulate” the “terms and conditions” of a plan, or gives the law any effect on the operation of a plan. If this attenuated asso- ciation may be said to affect the plan at all, it plainly does so “in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S, at 100 n.21.' urse, that state laws necessarily do not they are directed at employers. A law requiring that employers make specified contributions to a plan, for example—or, for that matter, requiring that employers create plans offering certein benefits— plainly would fall within the scope of the preemption clause. So would state laws mimicking many of the provisions of ERISA cited by petitioner (Br. 43) and its Chamber of Commerce et al. 91-23). But they would gulate, albeit indirectly, the operation The Texas law at issue here has no 6 We do not suggest, of c¢ “relate to” plans simply because amici (Br. do so because they would re or administration of plans. such effect. rting that “{federal and state | . non-interference laws like RISA-covered plans and are 7 Petitioner is incorrect in asse courts have uniformly found that state that of the State of Texas ‘relate to’ E 15 3. P i j ’ ° 4 re — oe principal attempt to demonstrate that which prohibit ote dhe to” a plan turns on Section 510 its the discharge of a pl: mar ‘ t ier ‘ : OF & plan participant “for a ragga of interfering with the attainment of eny pier an.” 29 U.S.C. $1140. As we understand it mas “ed pe to suggest that a state law “relate|s] of ERISA. Bi 21-24 ee ee ree . 4 . re "at. ut Section 514 (/; ) : . tion ‘ rer . a) requires rela- le Pine not relation to some other provision of JRISA, ere 1S no reason to s law “rel: % re suppose that a state a to Fe within the specific (and as we : ove, specifically define , 5) , ed) meaning of the pr emptio 5 . ( - ee = gina r. The Tex: 8 Si remo Rio itself cited two federal decisions that. r¢ eae ie oh eg = mn identical to the one in this case (Pet. App hie — ves “a a ne explicitly concluded that “New York poss es es 909, pop to ERISA,” Savodnik v, Korvettes, Ine 188 IF oon 2, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), and the s a - TS oe OUP Se vodnik 4 ; ek e second relied on the analysis of aap Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center. 516 F mi ee oe y P . oe Ps 8 Tye). ipeP ane aera 198] Pee see also K Mait Corp. v’. Po) socl nt bate Se | Piper . ee 1987) (recognizing aciion for dismissal ng? : “a rae of retirement benefits without discussing ERTS: wae ~ = It is not at all clear that one of the NOE RT ' Ss om y petitioner actually holds that actions such as thi z con ie , > — wu aid S me are we re en In Conway v. Eastern Associated Cool C ped au My 423. 4297 TW. . P 0TP,, O38 SED ans =. (W.Va. 1986 ) (footnote omitted), the ibe dd ig — at “[t!his area is preempted by Federal ERISA "os ———— such rrony ae See er i ae ge ful discharge] is illegal under 29 U.S.C. $1.40" J . ears "OVE @ = oS 7e . . ; f pl . tie owever, that the court believed ERISA sv) 7 vig ly 9 . . . : ‘ «4 ard . — y favorable treatment by ~rotecting them from Petitioner similarly complains (Br. 20 n.4) that a state prea pags ted Pag to a plan's provisions to determine rer evasion of pension obligations could have been the reason for dismissal of an employee. Under the Texas a however, state courts do not award plan benefits au otherwise apply the plan; as the Texas Supreme Cou *t noted, the plan document is relevant only insofar as it presage explain the motivation behind ithe em. ployer’s] initial termination of [the emplovee].” Pet App. 2a-8a n.2. This use of the plan as evidence hard! ) justifies preemption: “interpretation alone hee et ed u “ ’ . . My 4 . Indeed, the court specifically pointed to state statutes th erie its al ente pension plans for nil lic . Sealed : mae te Pet. App. da. public employees who are not covered by ERISA, 18 stitute regulation of the terms and eoagiogee a Mg a plan. Kilberg & Inman, supra, 62 Tex. L. Rev. at 1500. BR. The Legislative History And Policies Of ERISA Cut Against Preemption. Secti a "s addi- 1. Our understanding of Section 51d ia ) niga 3 tional support from ERISA’s legislative histor — = iev. The evolution of ERISA’s preemption prov 2 we a erhaps unfortunately, become familiar. See Met) ps. ns os Life, 471 U.S. at 745-746; Shaw, 4638 U.S. : — As we explain above, for present purposes pom notable element in the development . the regen Sano " fas é ent of a tes c s ~y language was the abandonme yore prayer prea by ERISA and the substitution of kg c ate 3 ; : ard C ‘cnositive a state law’s regulatory Impac hat makes dispositive a 5 — prt And the significance of this change is og hand by the floor debate, which offers the only useful discu: * ’ ; 1 sion of Section 514(a)’s meaning. Each of ERISA’s principal sponsors decerthed wees 514 as setting aside ‘“non-Federal a —. benefit plans.” 120 Cong. Ree. 29,197 ha py: i. f Rep. Dent) (emphasis added), reprintec et His! 4670. See id. at 29,933 (yemarks of peg con gyri al is , is 5-4746; id. at 29,942 ‘re- reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4745 rb a an arks Sen. Javits), reprinted at 3 Leg. m prea soi examples offered during wedi ma laws that would be superseded—professiona _ ; . / of the contents of legal services — 7 : Ae 29.949 (remarks of Sen. Javits), ry singe = po Hit. 4789: id. at 29,933 (remarks of Sen. Wi aon 8 = rinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4746), compelled sporyratngget = : ; ‘of lans (see id. at 29,942 (remarks of Sen. ‘ sire )s rant at 3 Leg. Hist. 4771), imposition of fiduciary : : Cacti 514(a) was 1 As we note above, the current language of Sect < / t simply a F ; . “ence ‘port s : ‘to mar » Conference Rep . a a ence. For its part, the : end -ritten in conference. . ; : 1980, 93 } h es the statutory language. See H.R. Conf. a cone 165650 ecnoes on ta . ‘ " is Pit, 40o. C 9d Sess. 283 (1974), reprinted at Leg. Hist onyv., ys . has ** . . 19 requirements on plans (see ibid. (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4771), and the like "—thus ali involved attempts to regulate the administration of or benefits offered by plans. While this list is not exhaus- tive, it certainly is suggestive of the sorts of state laws that were thought to “relate to” ERISA plans. Indeed, the one general indication of the manner in which Congress intended the preemption provisions to apply supports our reading. Representative Dent, floor manager for the bill in the House, explained that ERISA’s preemption provisions “followed to a large extent the Same approach as in Public Law 93-222 * * * where the regulation of health maintenance organizations [HMOs] was foreclosed to state authority—section 113(a) [sic].” ™ 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4670. The statute to which Representative Dent referred preempted state laws relating to the creation and organi- zation of HMOs—just as Section 514 of ERISA preempts laws that regulate the terms and conditions of plans. But nothing in that statute reached peripheral state rules of the sort at issue here." "Senator Javits offered the fullest description of Section 514's impact, stating that, “[i]n view of Federal preemption, State laws compelling disclosure from private welfare or pension plans, im- posing fiduciary requirements on such plans, imposing criminal penalties on failure to contribute to plans—unless a criminal statute of general application—establishing state termination insurance programs, et cetera, will be superseded.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29.942 (1974), reprinted at 3 Ley. Hist. 4771. ' Congressman Dent in fact had in mind Section 1311(a). 'SThe statute thus preempted laws requiring medical socict) approval for the creation of HMOs, requiring that physicians constitute a defined percentage of an HMO’s governing body, re- quiring that all or a percentage of physicians in the locale be permitted to participate in providing services for the HMO. or requiring that HMOs meet specified capitalization or other finpn- cial requirements. &7 Stat. 931. 20 2. The legislative history also makes clear why Con- gress made preemption turn on a finding that state law regulates plan terms or administration: the fundamental purpose of the preemption provision was elimination of “the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.” 120 Cong. Ree. 29,933 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4745-4746. See id. at 29,197 (remarks of Rep. Dent) (“eliminating the threat of conflicting and ‘neonsistent State and local regulation”), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4670. Congress thus intended to sweep asidé “multiple and potentially conflicting State laws” so as to ensure “unformity with respect to interstate plans.” Jd. at 29,942 (rc narks of Sen. Javits), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4770-4771. The Court accordingly has recognized that “Tt}he focus of the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit plans.” Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 15. In its most comprehensive analysis of the preemption provision’s pur- poses, the Court explained that the legislative history reflect{s] recognition of the administrative reality of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping appro- priate records in order to comply with applicable re- porting requirements. The most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform admin- ‘strative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and dis- bursement of benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to dif- fering regulatory requirements in differing States. A plan would be required to keep certain records in come States but not in others; to make certain bene- fits available in some States but not in others; to 21 process claims in a certain way in som é e States but not in others ; and to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some States but not in others. Port Halifax, 482 U.S. at 9. The Court therefore found it “clear that ERISA’s pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative prac- tices of a benefit plan will be gov J governed by on set of regulations.” /d. at 11." y only a single Although petitioner (Br. 36-41) and its amici (Br Chamber of Commerce et al. 26-28) struggle gamely to demonstrate that Texas law will have an adverse effect on plans, they do not—and plainly could not—suggest that ‘state law create[s] the prospect that an employer’s administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting re- quirements” (Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 10); “|t]he Com- pany makes no contention that its [state] statutory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its retire- ment plans in uniform fashion.” Jd. at 14. And that should dispose of petitioner’s case, for Texas law accord- ingly “present[s] none of the risks that ERISA is in- tended to address.” Morash, 109 S.Ct. at 1673. It should be added that, even on their own terms, the assertions of petitioner and its amici about the adverse impact of the Texas law are substantially overstated Petitioner seems especially concerned about the possi- 4 This understanding explains why ERISA preempts state laws that regulate plans even when those laws are consistent with the federal statute’s underlying purpose. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739; Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829. Laws that exceed ERISA's minima would subject multistate plans to varying somsioctante ie different States. It should be noted, however, that the prospect of increased administrative or litigation costs cannot justify pre emption where it is not required by the plain terms of Section 514(a). See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-832; compare id at oenaee (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cf. Firestone, 109 S.Ct. at 956 —— 22 bility of punitive damages awards against employers. Asserting that such damages are unavailable in actions brought under Section 502(a)(3) to enforce Section 510 of ERISA, petitioner (Br. 39) and its amici (Br. Chamber of Commerce et al. 26-27) complain that the prospect of punitive damages liability in state tort actions will discourage employers from creating plans. We note that this complaint is premature; the Texas Supreme Court held only that respondent had asserted a proper cause of action, and left open the scope of the remedies available to respondent if he ultimately prevails on the merits of his claim. See Pet. App. 5a.’° Moreover, the premise of petitioner’s argument—that punitive damages are unavailable in federal court—may well be mistaken: this Court has left open the question whether such dam- ages may be awarded under Section 502(a)(3), see Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139 n.5, 144 n.i2 (1985), and there are com- pelling reasons to believe that punitive damages should be available under the provision." 15 Justice Gonzalez noted in dissent that “|t]he court * * * does not resolve whether the plaintiff is entitled to all damages pleaded,” adding that “[t]his is essentially an open question.” Pet. App. ld4a. Justice Gonzalez also explained that, in Texas, “[a]s a general rule, the damages available for common law wrongful termination are contractual in nature.” Jd. at l5a. 16 Both Congress and the Court have made it clear that “courts are to develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations un- der ERISA-regulated plans.’” Firestone, 109 S.Ct. at 954, quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56. See also, ¢.g., Franchise Tar Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4770-4771. In doing so, “ ‘state law where compatible with national policy may be resorted to and adopted as a national rule of decision. .. . Here, of course, there is little federal law to which the court may turn for guidance. State regulation of insurance, pensions, and other such programs, however, provides a pre-existing source of experience and experiment in an area in which there is, as yet, only federal inexperience. * * * [S|tate statutory sources of law will no doubt play a major role in the 23 In any event, even if punitive damages are available in state but not in federal court, it hardly seems likely that the prospect of additional liability for wrongful dis- charges that already are illegal and actionable under fed- eral law will have much of an impact on the formulation and maintenance of plans. Whatever effect Texas law has by “attach[ing] additional consequenecs to retaliatory conduct by employers” surely “is neither direct nor sub- stanual enough to place petitioner’s claim in the pre- empted field.” English, 110 S. Ct. at 2278. After all. as this Court already has made clear, it cannot be the case that a state law—such as a run-of-the-mill state tort or contract law—is preempted simply because it makes it more expensive for employers to operate plans. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-832. The same plainly is true of petitioner’s complaint (Br. 37) that, apart from questions of remedy, varying procedural devices will be applied in state wrongful discharge actions; the suggestion that em- ployers will terminate plans to avoid state jury trials in cases that already may be remedied in federal court is simply incredible.'*? And most important, in neither case development of a federal common law under ERISA.’ ” Massachu- setts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 157-158 n.18 (Brennan. J. concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foeds, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979): United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-357 (1966). And as petitioner’s amici recognize (see Br. Chamber of Commerce ef al. 26-27), this bacheround of state tort law—to which federal courts should refer in defining the scope of the action for violation of ERISA Section 510 —tvpically makes punitive damages available in circumstances such as those in this case. | 7 Petitioner also argues (Br. 37-38) that the scope of the action defined by the Texas Supreme Court permitting recovery “when the plaintiff proves that the principal reason for his termination was the employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits” (Pet. App. 5a)—differs from the substantive scope of Section 510. We find it hard to believe that petitioner seriously advances this contention: if it does, its lengthy exegesis of Section 510 (see Br. 23-24, 26-36), which is premised on “the obvious com- parability between ERISA Section 510 and the Texas law” (Br. 24 does the state cause of action in any sense regulate the terms and conditions of ERISA plans. Of course, a state law that does not “relate to” a plan might nonetheless be preempted if it actually conflicts with a substantive provision of ERISA. Cf. Fort Halijaz, 482 U.S. at 19. But that plainly is not the case here: as the Court noted in a related setting, “[p]aying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.” Silkwood v. Kerr-MeGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984). That understanding is true of ERISA as well, a statute that was, after all, “enacted ‘to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.’” Firestone, 109 S.Ct. at 955, quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90. C. ERISA’s Enforcement Provision Does Not Preempt Texas Common Law. Finally, petitioner (Br. 25-26) and its amici (Br. Chamber of Commerce et a/. 16-17) seem to sugyest thet ERISA’s enforcement provision, Section 510, may of its 24 n.7), would be irrelevant. Indeed, the question presented by petitioner is whether ERISA preempts state laws that permit an employee to challenge a discharge designed to “interfere with his attainment of benefits under an ERISA-covered pension benefit plan.” Br. i. And the Texas Supreme Court’s language does not, in fact, seem notably different from that used by federal courts in describing the cause of action under Section 510. See, e.y., Ursie v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 574 (W.D. Pa.) (condemning “strategy of reducing pension payments from the cor: porate treasury”), aff’d in relevant part, 719 F.2d 670, 6i2 (3d Cir. 1983). In any event, if Texas law does not “relate to” a plan it need not precisely parallel federal law to escape preemption. Cf. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2278. Of course, if state law actually con flicts with a provision of ERISA (see Pet. Br. 28), or prohibits con- duct that is permitted by ERISA, it will be preempted for that reason. See generally Fort Halifar, 482 U.S. at 19; Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524-525. 25 own force preempt Texas common law. This contention is without merit. Where an enforcement provision ap- pears in the same statutory subchapter as an express preemption provision, the latter provision surely defines the scope of preemption.'* In any event, “[{o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law.” ARC America Corp., 109 S.Ct. at 1667. See, e.g., English, 110 S.Ct. at 2280.” Indeed, “{o]rdi- narily, the mere existence of a federal regulatory or en- forcement scheme, even one [that is] detailed * * * does not by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies.” Jd. at 2279. In English, the Court accordingly rejected the conten- tion—identical to the one made by petitioner here—that the omission of a punitive damages remedy from a com- prehensive federal remedial scheme (which provided for reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and at- torney’s fees) should be understood to preempt a state cause of action for punitive damages. Jd. at 2273 n.2, 2279-2280 (interpreting Section 210 of the Energy Reor- ganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a). There is no reason for a different outcome under ERISA. '* Petitioner (Br. 34, 36) and amici Chamber of Commerce et al. (Br. 13-14) seize upon Senator Williams’ statement that “the sub- stantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974), reprinted at 3 Leg. Hist. 4745-4746. But the substantive and enforcement provisions have this effect through operation of Section 514(a); otherwise, the preemption clause would be meaningless. Again, then, the crucial question here is the scope of the “relate to” cliuse. '’ That is true even when the federal courts have exclusive juris- diction to entertain claims under the federal cause of action, as is the case, to give just one example, in actions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the provisions of federal law that were asserted to have preemptive force in ARC America. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, l5(a). 26 It should be added that the reliance of petitioner ( ri 25) and its amici (Br. Chamber of Commerce et al. 14- 15) on Pilot Life is misplaced.” The Court did not a suggest that ERISA’s enforcement provisions Meco have preemptive force; it was conceded that the state a at issue “relate[d] to” an ERISA plan, and the ques “4 before the Court was whether a state-law action chal- lenging the plan’s payment methods “fall under an —_ tien to § 514(a),” the so-called saving clause. Pilot Li “ 481 U.S. at 47-48. And while the Court did look ei e enforcement provisions to help inform its understan ac of the saving clause (see id. at 52), the Court ve “ dispositive that the case involved the claims sett emen process, explaining that the enforcement agony re- flect a “balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in - couraging the formation of employee benefit plans. ; d. at 54. This is wholly consistent with our understanc ne that the preemption of actions challenging plan paymnen terms was a central purpose of the preemption clause. Indeed, the decision in Pilot Life primarily turned on the nature of the claim as one seeking benefits from a plan. The Court’s holding substantially relied on Con- 20 ici Chamber of Commerce et al. also rely (Br. 19-20) on Pree Dep’t of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. _ nae and other cases involving the National Labor prone — 29 U S.C. $151 et seq., to support their argument that the ’ = courts are ousted of jurisdiction here. But those perigee et apposite; they turned on the primary jurisdiction of t Se re Labor Relations Board under that statute and the impo sages the administration of the Act that these pong 9m ~ the in the first instance to the [NLRB].” San Diego But po oe Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 (1959). Bg te Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 USS. “7 - : Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-491 (1955). 21 This clause, Section 514(b)(2)(A), saves from preemption un- der Section 514(a) “any law of any State which regulates ao oe banking, or securities.” See generally Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739-747, 27 gress’s decision to model the Section 502(a) cause of ac- tion against plans and their fiduciaries on Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court noted that, ‘| U|nder the conference agreement, civil actions may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify rights to re- ceive future benefits under the plan, and for relief from breach of fiduciary responsibility. ... [Wlith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only in U.S. district courts but also in State courts of competent jurisdiction. A// such actions in Federal or State courts are to be re- garded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.” Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55, quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974) (emphasis added by the Court). Plainly, the “all such actions” are those brought to recover plan benefits. The Court thus explained that “Congress’ specific reference to § 301 of the LM 0 describe the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA ma clear its intention that all such suits brought by bene- ficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as fed- eral questions governed by §$ 502(a).” Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added). Respondent’s suit, in con- trast, which was not brought against a plan, and does not relate either to benefits ** or to the other terms and condi- tions of a plan, is not affected by the Pilot Life analysis. *2 Although petitioner notes (Br. 42) that respondent at one point sought relief for loss of various benefits, that is not part of the cause of action approved by the Texas Supreme Court. The court noted that petitioner had allowed respondent's pension to vest, and explained that “the pension plan issue is relevant in order to explain the motivation behind |petitioner’s] initial termination of 28 CONCLUSION The judgment of the Texas Supreme Court should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, CHARLES ROTHFELD * Acting Chief Counsel BENNA RUTH SOLOMON STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL CENTER 444 North Capitol Street, N.W. Suite 349 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 638-1445 * Counsel of Record for the July 18, 1990 Amici Curiae respondent.” Pet. App. 3a n.2. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court held that petitioner’s action is not preempted precisely because “the plaintiff acknowledged in his brief to the court of appeals that he is not seeking lost pension benefits but is instead seeking future wages, mental anguish and punitive damayes as a result of the wrongful discharge.” /d. at 5a n.3 (emphasis in original). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0720%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.