# Petitioners Brief — Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0720%3A07 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petitioners Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 498 U.S. 133 ## Text No. 89-1298 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1989 INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, Petitioner, V. PERRY MCCLENDON, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER GLEN D. NAGER (Counsel of Record) JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE 1450 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-2088 (202) 879-3939 Of Counsel: Houuis T. HurD WILLIAM T. LITTLE JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE GILPIN, PAXSON & BERSCH One Mellon Bank Center 2300 First Interstate Tower 500 Grant Street 1300 Post Oak Boulevard Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Houston, Texas 77056-3010 (412) 391-3939 (713) 623-8800 Counsel for Petitioner EL A I RE ST RTI TM ~ WHILSON - EPEsS PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) preempts a state common law claim that an employer has unlawfully discharged an employee in order to interfere with his attainment of benefits under an ERISA-covered pension benefit plan. (i) ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The parties to the proceedings in the court below were: Perry McCiendon and the Ingersoll-Rand Company.* * Ingersoll-Rand Company has an interest in the following cor- porate entities and partnerships: Dresser-Rand Company; Dresser- Rand Machinery; Dresser-Rand Italia; Dresser-Rand S.A.; Dresser- Rand Canada, Inc.; Dresser-Rand Compression Services S.A.; Dresser-Rand Service Personnel B.V.; Dresser-Rand Japan Ltd.; Dresser-Rand B.V.; Turbodyne S.A. de C.V.; Dresser-Rand Singa- pore Pte. Ltd.; Dresser-Rand de Venezula S.A.; Dresser-Rand GmbH; Kongsberg Dresser Power, Inc.; Kongsberg Dresser Power Pte. Ltd.; KDP Commercio E. Industrial Ltd.; Kongsberg Dresser Power A/S; Dresser-Rand Holding Company; Dresser-Rand Over- seas Sales Company; Dresser-Rand Sales Company, S.A.; Southwest Industries, Inc.; Turbodyne Electric Power Co.; Tepco/Pembroke Power, Inc.; Dresser-Rand U.K. Ltd.; Dresser-Rand Service S.a.r.e.; Norton/Torrington Ceramic Bearings Company; Nastach, Inc.; Ingersoll-Rand (India) Limited; and Niject Services Company. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES OPINIONS BELOW JURISDICTION STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED STATEMENT ARGUMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS RRR ERE ee ee eee eee ee ee ee eee eee eee) ereeer ete eee eee eee To Oe ee ee eee ee eee err rer ERISA PREEMPTS A STATE COMMON LAW CLAIM THAT AN EMPLOYER HAS DIS- CHARGED AN EMPLOYEE IN ORDER TO IN- TERFERE WITH ATTAINMENT OF BENEFITS UNDER AN ERISA-COVERED PLAN A. The State Common-Law Claim Recognized By FE. CONCLUSION The Court Below “Relates To” An ERISA- Covered Plan Within The Meaning Of Section as eceemnmmnnananne The Structure Of ERISA Confirms That The Cause Of Action Recognized By The Court Below “Relates To” An ERISA-Covered Plan Within The Meaning Of Section 514 Of ERISA.. The Legislative History Of ERISA Confirms That A State Law Making It Unlawful To Dis- charge An Employee For The Purpose Of Inter- fering With Attainment Of Pension Benefits “Relates To” A Plan And Is Preempted .............. Allowing State-Law Based Actions For Alleged Interference With Attainment Of Benefits Un- der ERJSA-Covered Plans Would Impermissibly Burden The Maintenance Of Such Plans ............ The Arguments Advanced Against Preemption Are Without Merit Page 14 18 18 19 21 26 36 41 45 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 | ERATE eens ae ese Roo EEE SERN ERE VY passim Bass v. Retirement Plan of Conoco, Inc., 676 F. Te Ce Es SIRE ccervescreeiereemanieenen 38 Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 358 Ss fF 8, SS eee 44 Coontz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 489 N.W.2d 223 SEIS Tira Se MII :sccshscccsdicsniussssiasiciceeiastdiatpeiitariaieenmein 44 Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 and es TE I lc 44 Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. MII chesicestiscomcisnssncnsiieddeniatad.te ies eccie neee Ri ae ee 44 Folz v. Mariott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. RR MRT TON rt ced RAC TMS DA ote. 25, 39 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 HUTTE: ciccosscccenscosntinadlietiacheiintigiien tienen etter ae 37, 41, 42 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vaca- — fs, © fF SE) | eee 19 Hughes v. General Motors Corp., 825 F.2d 568, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9637 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989) -....00002.0220... 38 International Union UAW Local 91 v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Chio BTIITTED crsapeoncascennsesunsshigtintinmhectnadeasnabieasidetdie iene, 39 K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. STII ' . ton +} stale iaW Ostenslbdu¥ 20 524), the Court has “emphasized that the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans’” (Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47-48), and that “even indirect state action... may encroach upon the ares of exclusive federal concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 525. Specifically, the Court has held that a state law “relates to” an ERISA-covered plan and _ is preempted if it has “a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Aix Lines, Inc., 463 U-S. 85, 97 (1983). The state common-law claim recognized by the court below plainly “relates to” an F RISA-covered plan in this sense. Absent “reference to’ petitioner’s ERISA-covered pension plan, respondent simply would have no cause-of- action at all under Texas law.' Moreover, the purpose und effect of the Texas law is, as the Supreme Court of Texas admitted, to protect “employees’ interests in pen- sion plans” and to ensure that an employer cannot avoid “paying benefits under the employee’s pension fund” ‘Pet. App. 5a). The Texas law thus seeks to insulate from wrongful interference the employee's right to at- tain benefits promised under an ERISA-covered pension plan—the very heart of the plan itself. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 510. Indeed, the law expressly seeks to protect vesting rights under an ERISA-covered plan—substantive rights that ERISA 4 Respondent’s claim under Texas law plainly depends on refer- ence to petitioner’s pension plan and, indeed, to its particular terms. Respondent claims that petitioner terminated him for the purpose of interfering with his vesting under the pension plan. Unbeknownst to respondent, however, he was fully vested under the pension plan at the time of his termination. Thus, the application of the plan’s complex vesting provisions would be the focus of petitioner’s de- fense, since the claim that the employer acted to deprive the em- ployee of vesting is less credible when the employee was already vested at the time of the act. In this way, both the cause-of-action and the defense have a tangible and significant connection to an ERiISA-covered plan: both depend on the existence of the plan and its particular terms, 21 itself requires the plan to afford to employees. As an en- forcement mechanism for benefit rights brought into be- ing by ERISA and provided by an ERISA plan,° the Texas law clearly “relates to” petitioner’s ERISA-covered plan in its very essence and as applied to such plan must be preempted.® B. The Structure Of ERISA Confirms That The Cause Of Action Recognized By The Court Below “Relates To” An ERISA-Covered Plan Within The Meaning Of Sec- tion 514 Of ERISA That this Texas common-law “relates to” an ERISA- covered benefit plan is structurally confirmed by the pro- visions of ERISA that Section 514 states “shall supersede any and all state laws” relating to an ERISA-covered plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The structure of these pro- visions reveals a deliberate effort to secure the rights of employees under pension plans against potential threats to enjoyment of those rights, including improper employer- interference with attainment of promised benefits. In other words, these provisions demonstrate that Congress understood that such laws “relate to” employee benefit plans covered by the statute. -_—__ *The remedy for violation of the Texas law may be back or front pay or other damages paid by the employer. See Pet. App. 5a n.3. But, as with any other law prohibiting a particular kind of employer-conduct, the purpose of the law is not to provide damages but rather to assure enjoyment of rights—here, pension rights. Assuring that employees receive rights under plans plainly “re- lates to” those plans. * That the Texas law is preempted as applied in this case does not mean that it is preempted in all circumstances. ERISA does not apply to governmental plans, church plans, excess benefit plans, or certain payroll practices. See 29 U.S.C. §1003(b): 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b). The Texas law could lawfully be applied to prevent alleged interference with attainment of benefits from any one of these sources, since the law would not in such circumstances “relate to” an ERISA-covered plan. 22 1. As explained above, the principal goal of Congress in enacting ERISA was to ensure that employce benefit promises made by employers are kept. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 510. To that end, Congress secured the right of employees to participate in pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052. Recognizing, how- ever, that mere participation in plans would in many in- stances not secure rights to benefits if benefits could be forfeited upon termination of employment prior to nor- mal retirement age, Congress further provided for vest- ing of employee rights after a specific period of service. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053. Likewise, recognizing that vesting would in many instances be nugatory if employers de- signed plans so as to postpone any meaningful accrual of benefits until attainment of retirement age, Congress also required that pension benefits be accrued more or less ratably over the period of an employee’s anticipated par- ticipation in a plan. 29 U.S.C. $1054. And, recognizing thal vested and accrued pension benefits are of little value to employees if no monies exist to pay them, Congress provided that an employer must make periodic contri- butions to fund any promised pension benefits on an actuarially-sound basis. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082. Finally, (Congress established the plan termination insurance pro- gram, including employer-liability to the Pension Bene- {i's Guaranty Corporation for underfunded pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362. In creating this comprehensive and interrelated scheme of plan protectiens, however, Congress was concerned that there remained at least one way in which an unscrupulous employer might attempt to defeat an employee’s attain- ment of benefits under a pension or other benefit plan: by discharging the employee before he had accumulated the service or otherwise satisfied the eligibility conditions necessary for rights to vest under the plan. See, e.g., 119 Cong Rec. 30044 (19733, reprin'ed in 2 Legislative His- tory of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“Legislative History”) (Comm, Print 1976), at 23 1640 (remarks of Sen. Hartke) (“Is there not a di- rect, positive incentive for every employer to fire a per- son when he reaches 29 years and 364 days of age?’’). Although it considered avoiding the problem by mandat- ing graduated vesting (so that an employer would have no incentive to terminate an employee prior to vesting), see 8S. Rep. No. 383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1973) reprinted in 1 Legislative History 1063, 1088, Congress ultimately decided to address the problem through the enactment of Section 510 of ERISA. See S. Rep. No. 127 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legis lative History 587, 621-622 (“These provisions were added by the Committee in the face of evidence that in some plans a worker’s pension rights or the expectations of those rights were interfered with by the use of eco- nomic sanctions or violent reprisals.) : 119 Cong. Ree. 30044 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, at 1641 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“The Senator from New Jer- sey (Mr. Williams) and I have included an express amendment on that score which would provide a remedy for any person fired such as is provided for a person dis- criminated against because of race or sex, for exarnple, That is section 699A [as Section 510 was then num- bered|.’’), Among other things, Section 510 bars employers from taking adverse employment actions for the purpose of interfering with an individual’s attainment of benefits under a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Section 510 prevents employers from circumventing, and thus gives meaning to, the vesting and other minimum standards established for and contained in pension plans. See 119 Cong. Ree. 30400 (1973) reprinted in 2 Legislative History, at 1836 (remarks of Sen. Hartke) (‘The key to effective pension reform is early vesting, but a vesting provision is no better than the protection employees have against im- proper discharge—including layoff—discipline or other discrimination that puts an employee out of a job before vesting is achieved, thereby defeating his pension 24 claim.”). In addition, it protects the attainment of rights under employee welfare benefit plans. See, CG Vogel, Containing Medical And Disability Costs By Cu'ting Un- healthy Employees: Does Section 510 Of ERISA Provide A Remedy?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1024 (1987). ‘The Congress enacting Section 510 must have understood it to “relate to” the plans that ERISA was seeking to protect and regulate.’ 2. That Congress understood Section 510—and thus any comparable state law—to “relate to” ERISA-covered plans is conclusively confirmed by the parallel provision added to the Internal Revenue Code by Section 1012(a) of Title II of ERISA. See 120 Cong. Rec. 8861 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4273 (comparing Section 510 and parallel Code provisions). Under that provision, which appears as Section 411(d) (1) of om Code, a plan may be required to provide an accelerated vesting schedule if “there has been a pattern of abuse under the plan (such as dismissal of employees before their acerued benefits become nonforfeitable) tending to discriminate in faver of employees who are highly com- pensated... .” 26 U.S.C. §411(d) (1) (A). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 276-277 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History 4277, 4543-4544 ; H.R. tep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legisla'ive History 2584, 2652. Such a direct regulation of the terms of a plan by a parallel provision of Title II of RISA demonstrates that Congress understood Section 510, and thus any comparable state law, indirectly to have this relation to the plan as well. 7 Because of the obvious comparability between ERISA Section 510 and the Texas law, respondent has the unenviable task of per- suading the Court that Section 510 does not “relate to” employee benefit plans—a proposition utterly at odds with the “common sense view” that has principally guided the Court in ERISA preemption cases. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v, Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 740; Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47, 48, 50. 25 3. Finally, there is one other structural indication that Congress understood Section 510 and any comparable state law to “relate to” ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. Section 510 provides that its terms are to be en- forced pursuant to the provisions of Section 502 of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Like the Texas law, Sec- tion 502 provides employment-related remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, front-pay, and damages equal to lost benefits for violations of Section 510 as a deterrent to ensure the payment of benefits under plans. See, C.9., Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015-1020 (W.D. Mo. 1984), Importantly, in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, this Court held that interpretation of the provisions of Sec- tion 514 of ERISA—in that case, the so-called “savings clause” in Section 514(b) (2) (A)—“must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions” of Section 502. 481 U.S. at 52. The Court reasoned (id. at 52, 54) that “{t]he civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for ac- complishing the stated purposes of ERISA,” and that “varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of $ 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.” Thus, it held that the state law at issue in that case—a tort for alleged improper processing of benefits—must be preempted because it overlaps with a claim within the scope of Section 502. See id. at 57. A state law like the one adopted in this case by the Supreme Court of Texas must similarly be preempted: It adds to the remedies available under Section 502 for a claim relating to purposeful interference with attain- ment of benefits under a plan, and thus “completely undermines” “|t|he policy choices reflected in the inclu- sion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme... .” Id. at 54. This is all the more true where the state law, as here, seeks to protect and 26 enforce substantive rights under a plan which were not created—and cannot be created—by state law. C. The Legislative History Of ERISA Confirms That A State Law Making It Unlawful To Discharge An Em- ployee For The Purpose Of Interfering With Attain- ment Of Pension Benefits “Relates To” A Plan And Is Preempted The legislative history of ERISA confirms that a state law making it unlawful to discharge an employee for the purpose of interfering with attainment of pension bene- fits “relates to” ERISA-covered plans and is preempied. Specifically, the legislative history shows that Congress viewed Section 510 as an indispensable component of its comprehensive scheme for the protection and regulation of employee benefit plans; that Sections 502, 510 and 514 were intended to comprise a single interrelated and exclu- sive enforcement scheme to protect rights under plans against improper interference; and that, as ultimately formulated, Section 514 was understood to preempt, at a minimum, any state law attempting to regulate the sub- ject matters treated by ERISA. 1. The bill that eventually became ERISA, H.R. 2, was first introduced in the House by Representative Dent on January 3, 1973. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 3. That bill did not contain any provision like Section 510 of ERISA. Moreover, while it contained a limited civil enforcement section, it allowed participants or beneficiaries to insti- tute civil actions in either state or federal court. See 1 Legislative History, at 34. Finally, it preempted state laws only “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans.” id. at 50-51. On August 2, 1973, Representative Dent introduced H.R. 9824 as an alternative to H.R. 2. See H.R. 9824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 686. Like H.R. 2, H.R. 9824 did not contain a 27 provision like Section 510 of ERISA. Moreover, like H.R. 2, H.R. 9824 authorized civil actions to be brought in either state or federal court. 1 Legislative History at 769-770. But H.R. 9824 did expand the remedies avail- able in such actions to include, as ERISA now authorizes, injunctions against “any act or practice which violates any provision of this Act.” Jd. at 769. Moreover, it ex- panded the preemption provision to encompass both state laws that “may now or hereafter relate to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans,” and state laws “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the vesting of par- ticipant’s benefits in employee benefit plans, the funding requirements for employee benefit plans or the adequacy of financing of employee benefit plans,” and “affect the fiduciary responsibilities of those dealing with the plan and such laws conflict with any provision of this Act.” Id, at 776-777. On October 2, 1973, the House Committee on Edueca- tion and Labor reported H.R. 2 with an amendment that essentially replaced the bill as introduced. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2181. As reported, the civil action provision of H.R. 2—Section 503—was substantially the same as the civil action provision of H.R. 9824. See 2 Legislative History, at 2331-2338. As reported, the preemption pro- vision of H.R. 2—Section 514(a)—was substantially the same as the preemption provision of H.R. 9824, except that it preempted all state laws addressing fiduciary re- sponsibilities, whether they conflicted with ERISA’s pro- visions or not. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2348, 2364. Finally, as reported, H.R. 2 for the first time included among its “Enforcement” rules a provision stating (H.R. 2, 938d Cong., 1st Sess. 161, reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2181, 2341) that: It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right 28 to which he is entitled under the provisions of the plan or this Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such par- ticipant may become entitled under the plan, or this Act. The provisions of section 503 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section. The committee report accompanying the bill described this provision as necessary “to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by this legis- lation.” H.R. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, at 2364. While H.R. 2 was awaiting floor action, the Committee on Edueation and Labor reported out yet another bill, H.R. 12906. See H.R. 12906, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History 2761. The civil en- forcement and non-interference with protected rights pro- visions of H.R. 12906 were nearly identical to the com- parable provisions in H.R. 2. See 2 Legislative History, at 2916-2917. The preemption provisions of H.R. 12906, however, were reorganized to preempt state laws insofar as they “relate to the reporting and disclosure respons!- bilities, and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit plan to which part 1 applies,” and “insofar as they may now or hereafter re- late to the nonforfeitability of participant’s benefits in emplovee benefits pians, . . . the funding requirements for such plans, the adequacy of financing of such plans, portability requirements for such plans, or the insurance of pension benefits under such plans.” See 2 Legislative History, at 2921-2922. On February 26, 1974, the House considered both H.R. 12906 and H.R. 12855, a bill reported out of the Ways and Means Committee. It consolidated the two bills into a new H.R. 2, and passed that bill by a vote of 376 to 4 on February 28, 1974. As passed, the relevant provisions of H.R. 2—Sections 503, 510, and 514—were identical to the provisions of H.R. 12906. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d 29 Sess. (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History 3898, 4047, 4053-4054, 4057-4058. Thus, as passed, H.R. 2 included among its benefit plan protections a provision making it unlawful for an employer purposefully to in- terfere with attainment of rights under plans; allowed that provision to be enforced in either federal or state court; and preempted only certain specifically designated subjects regulated by ERISA. 2. The principal pension reform bill considered in the Senate, S. 4, was introduced by Senator Williams on Jan- uary 4, 1973. See S. 4, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), re- printed in 1 Legislative History 93. As was the case with the initial bill introduced in the House, S. 4 did not con- tain any provision comparable to Section 510 of ERISA. Moreover, Section 603 of S. 4 contained a broad civil enforcement provision entitling any participant or bene- ficiary to sue in state or federal vourt for “appropriate relief, legal or equitable, to redress or restrain a breach of any responsibility, obligation or duty of a fiduciary ” 1 Legislative History, at 183-184. Section 604 entitled a participant or beneficiary to sue in state or federal court “to recover benefits due him . . . or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ” Id. Finally, Section 609 of S. 4 provided that, except for actions to recover benefits or clarify benefit rights, “the provisions of this Act . . . shall supersede any and all laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now ov hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act... .” 1 Legislative History, at 186-188. A summary of tk2 bill stated that Section 609 “provides that this Act supersedes state laws covering the same matters.”’ Jd. at 201. On April 18, 1973, S. 4 was reported out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. S. 4, 93 Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 389. The civil enforcement provisions of the reported bill were essentially the same as the provisions of S. 4 as 30 introduced. Id. at 579-581. The preemption provision of the reported bill was identical in all relevant respects to Section 609 of the bill as introduced. Jd. at 582-583. As reported, however, S. 4 provided as part of its “Enforce- ment” rules (1 Legislative History, at 585) that: Sec, 610. It shall be unlawful for any person to dis- charge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discrimi- nate against a participant or beneficiary for exer- cising any rignt to which he is entitled under the provisions of the plan, this Act, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this Act, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclo- sure Act. The provisions of sections 602 [suits by the Secretary] and 603 shall be applicable. .. . The Committee had heard testimony about instances in which employers had discharged employees to prevent them from vesting under plans. See Retirement Income Secu- rity For Employees Act, 1973: Hearings on S. 4 and S. 75 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, 350 (1973). The committee report stated that Sec- tion 609 was thus necessary “to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by this land- mark reform legislation.” S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 587, 622. On August 21, 1973, the Senate Finance Committee re- ported on S. 1179 as an alternative to S. 4. See S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in i Legislative History 780. This bill contained a provision for civil ac- tions for breach of fiduciary duty. 1 Legislative History, at 950. The bill also authorized the Secretary of Labor to “hear and decide” disputes between participants or beneficiaries and plan administrators with respect to pre- sent and future benefits under the plans. 7d. at 952. As discussed supra at 22-23, however, this bill provided for dl graduated vesting and contained neither a preemption provision nor a non-interference provision. On September 17, 1973, Senators Nelson, Long, Ben- nett, and Bentsen introduced Amendment 496 as a com- promise between S. 4 and S. 1179 and as a substitute for 5. 4. See Amendment No. 496, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 1271. The civil action provisions of this substitute bill—Section 693 and 694—were identical in all relevant respects to Sec- tions 603 and 604 of S. 4 as originally reported. 1 Legis- lative History, at 1490-1492. Similarly, the preemption provision of the substitute bill—Section 699(a)—was identical to Section 609 of the bill as originally reported. Id, at 1493-1494. Finally, Section 699A. which addressed interference with employee rights, was substantially the same as Section 619 of the bill as originally reported (eXx- cept that it added a prohib‘tion against retaliation for — in any proceeding relating to the Act). Jd. at Jb. On September 19, 1973, the Senate took up considera- tion of this substitute bill. Senator Hartke applauded Section 610 of S. 4 as originally reported on the ground (119 Cong. Ree. 30374-75 (1973), reprinted in 2 Legisla- tive History, at 1774-1775) that “[n]o vesting formula will produce real employee protection so long as employers are free to fire employees to defeat pension eligibility.” He argued, however, that these claims should be heard by “an administrative tribunal with some expertise in the subject,” and thus offered an amendment that would have authorized and directed the Secretary of Labor to hear and decide such disputes. See 119 Cong. Rec. 30400, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, at 1835- 1836. Senator Williams, one of the two principal sponsors of the bill, agreed (id. at 1775-1776) that a non- interference provision was essential and pointed out (id.) that such a provision had been included in the bill. He thus concluded (id.) that “|t]he rights of the workers are 32 fully protected under this bill”; and he objected (id. at 1776, 18837) that the proposed administrative tribunal amendment would create an expensive new layer of “‘bu- renucracy” and might lead to the “defeat [of] the present system of private pension plans that are on a voluntary basis.” The Senate agreed with Senator Williams, rejected Senator Hartke’s proposed amendment, and, after other amendments and modifications not relevant here, passed the substitute bill (renumbered as H.R. 4200). See 119 Conz. Rec. 30428, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, at 1881-1882. As passed, the bill included a non-interference provision among its “Enforcement” provisions; authorized that provision to be enforced in either federal or state court: and, in contrast to the House bill, preempted state laws on all subjects addressed in ERISA. ° A conference committee convened and agreed to re- tain the provisions authorizing civil actions by partici- pants and beneficiaries, but decided to limit state court jurisdiction to actions involving claims for benefits and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts over all other ERISA actions. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 75-77 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History 4277, 4350-4352. The conference committee also agreed to retain in the bill's “Enforcement” provisions both a prohibition against interference with attainment of an employee’s benefits and a requirement that the stat- ute’s civil action provisions be used in enforcing that pro- hibition. See 3 Legislative History, at 4350, 4350. Fi- nally, the conference committee agreed to omit any refer- ence to preemption of particular areas of regulation and instead to provide that state laws are preempted to the extent that they “relate to any employee benefit plan”; and the conference committee did so in the face of objections by the Avministration that the preemption provisions of the House and Senate bills were “extremely vague” and “409 broad,” respectively. 3 Legislative History, at 4357; 33 Administration Recommendations to the House and Sen- ate Conferees on H.R. 2 to Provide for Pension Reform (April 1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History 5047, 5145-5146. 4. In the ensuing floor debate, key members of Con- gress made clear the effect of the conference committee’s actions. In the House, Representative Dent stated: Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the res- ervation to Federai authority the sole power to reg- ulate the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regula- tion.... The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifi- cally enumerated, applied this principle in its broad- est sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of sec- tion 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State, subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality thereof—including any professional society or association operating under code of law—which would affect any employee bene- fit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b). 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4670-4671. Similarly, in the Senate, Senator Williams, after de- - scribing the various civil actions available to participants or beneficiaries under Section 502, stated (120 Cong. Ree. 29933 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4745- 4746): A further protection for employees is the prohibi- tion against discharge, or other discriminatory con- duct toward participants and beneficiaries which is designed to interfere with attainment of vested bene- fits or other rights under the bill, or to discourage 34 the exercise of any rights afforded by the legisla- tion.... It should be stressed that with the narrow excep- tions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforce- ment provisions of the conference substitute are in- tended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or incon- sistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local gov- ernments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.... Finally, Senator Javits remarked (120 Cong. Ree. 29935 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4751) that: The conference report represents a series of fun- damental guarantees made to every American worker —-guarantees which will secure for millions of Amer- icans the expectation of a decent retirement income in combination with social security. These guaran- tees are nothing less than a pension “bill of rights” to which every worker—regardless of his occupation, salary or status—is entitled. While the new law does not require employers to install a private pension plan, it would for the first time provide the following 14 basic rights to those working for an employer with a private pension plan. He listed (id. at 4751-4753) under separate headings the basic minimum standards of ERISA with regard to participation, vesting, accrual, and so forth; and the four- teenth right listed (id. at 4753) was “Protection Of Pen- sion Rights Against Employer Or Union Interference”: Every employee is to have the right, enforceable by the Secretary of Labor, to be free from interfer- ence with his pension benefits. This means that he cannot be discharged, fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise interferred with in order to prevent him from receiving pension benefits or attaining eligibil- 35 ity for pension benefits. There are stiff criminal penalties if this type of interference takes the form of force, fraud or violence or threats of this nature. These 14 guarantees to American workers are at the heart of pension reform and provide much-needed and long-denied protections. Senator Javits then concluded (120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4770-4771) that: Both House and Senate bills provided for preemp- tion of State law, but—with one major exception ap- pearing in the House bill—defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation raised the possibility of end- less litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as open- ing the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some par- ticular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme. Although the desirability of further regulation-— at either the State or Federal level—undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emerg- ence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal in- terest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required—but for certain excep- tions—the displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs. 5. This iegislative history confirms that, in enacting Section 514, Congress understood that ERISA would pre- empt, among other things, any state law that, like Section 510 of ERISA, seeks indirectly to protect employee bene- fit rights by prohibiting employment decisions that might otherwise purposefully defeat employee benefit rights un- der ERISA-covered plans. As this Court has noted, “'tihe bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.” 36 Shaw v. Delia Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 98. As the Court has also noted, however, “[t]he Conference Com- mittee rejected these provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.” Jd. at 98. There is no basis in the legislative history for suggesting that, in so expanding the scope of the preemption clause, the conference committee intended to allow state regulation of specific subjects covered by ERISA—such as Section 510’s coverage of actions that purposefully “interfere” with attainment of benefits under a plan. On the con- trary, the legislative history outlined above proves con- clusively that Section 510 was viewed as a critical com- ponent of ERISA’s minimum standards for plans, and indeed, was described as one of the “14 basic rights” con- ferred by ERISA; that Congress deliberately designed Sections 502, 510 and 514 to form an interrelated system for safeguarding employee rights under plans; and that Section 514’s “relate to” language was understood to encompass, among other things, all subject matters reg- ulated by the bill’s “substantive and enforcement provi- sions’’-—such as the subject matters regulated by Sections 510 and 502 of ERISA. D. Allowing State-Law Based Actions For Alleged Inter- ference With Attainment Of Benefits Under ERISA- Covered Plans Would Impermissibly Burden The Main- tenance Of Such Plans The preemption of state laws that, like Section 510, seek indirectly to protect employee benefit rights by pro- hibiting employment decisions made for the purpose of defeating employee benefit rights is consistent with, and indeed mandated by, the purposes of Section 514 of ERISA. As the legislative history makes clear, Congress enacted that provision, and thereby preempted the field of employee benefit plan regulation, in order to save plans and plan sponsors from the administrative and fi- nancial burdens produced by multiple and _ potentially 37 conflicting regulations. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 105 & n.25; see also Fort Halifax Pack- ing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987). Allowing state law-based actions for alleged interference with at- tainment of benefits under ERISA-covered plans, how- ever, would subject plans and plan sponsors to the pre- cise burdens from which Congress sought to spare them. On a procedure level, allowing such state-law based ac- tions would potentially subject plan sponsors to multiple jurisdictional and procedural rules for similar kinds of interference claims. Whereas ERISA mandates that Sec- tion 510 actions be subject to the exclusive jurisdic- tion of the federal courts, state law-based actions of this type would be subject to no such limitation and could be filed in state courts; indeed, using state agencies, the states could establish the very administrative machinery for resolution of such claims that Congress rejected in ERISA as unduly burdensome. In addition, whereas ERISA requires that the Secretaries of Labor and Treas- ury be formally notified of Section 510 actions and al- lowed to intervene at their option, no such requirement exists for claims that may be filed under state law. Finally, whereas ERISA apparently anticipates that Sec- tion 510 claims will be tried by a court, see Pane v. RCA Corp., 8€8 F.2d 631, 635-637 (8d Cir. 1989), similar if not identical state law-based claims may be subject to trial by jury. See K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372-1373 (Nev. 1987). On a substantive level, allowing state law-based actions of this type would mean that different substantive stand- ards could potentially be applicable to the same employer conduct. For examplé; whereas an employer's decision is unlawful under Section 510 only if taken “for the pur- pose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan,” the court below ruled (Pet. App. 5a) that the employer’s decision is unlawful if “the principal reason” for it is a “desire to avoid” paying benefits; and while 38 it is unclear what the court’s formulation wil] ultimately come to mean, it appears, as Justice Couk noted in dissent below (Pet. App. 10a), that the Texas standard allows an individual to avoid summary judgment on the basis of evidence that plainly would not be sufficient to state a triable claim under Section 510 of ERISA. Moreover, under the decision below (Pet. App. 5a), an employer’s desire to avoid contributing to a pension fund is ap- parently sufficient to state a violation of Texas law (even if the employer’s purpose was not to interfere with the attainment of benefits), thus raising the prospect that a reduction-in-force for valid economic reasons would vio- late Texas comon law if the savings were principally in pension funding costs; this is a gross variance from the substantive requirements of ERISA Section 510, and is a clear invasion of the separate funding requirements of ERISA. Other states could alter the substantive standards applicable to Section 510-type claims even further—and in vastly different ways.* * Indeed, to appreciate the vista of mischievous state action that is possible here, one need only imagine decisions in which state courts decide to accept claims that federal courts have rejected under Section £10. See, e.g., Hughes v. General Motors Corp., 852 F.2d 568, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9637 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1535 (1989) (no violation of Section 510 where employer offered early retirement benefits to other employees shortly after plaintiffs voluntarily retired); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1987) (no violation of Section 510 to provide shutdown pensions to employees who lost their jobs due to a sale but not to those who transferred to the employ of the buyer); West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1987) (no violation of Section 510 where buyer refused to hire employees of seller unless they agreed to less generous employee benefits) ; Bass v. Retirement Plan of Conoco, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. La. 1988) (no violation of Section 510 where seller offered improved pension benefits to employees who re- mained after the sale but not to those who transferred to the employ of the buyer and had only deferred vested interests in seller’s plan); Nemeth v. Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (no violation of Section 510 where pension cost was not a “but for’ cause of employer's decision to close one plant 39 Finally, on a remedial level, allowing state law-based auctions of this type would expose plan sponsors to a va- riety of sanctions that ERISA apparently does not authorize. ERISA limits the remedies available in Sec- tion 510 cases to equitable relief such as reinstatement, back pay, front pay, and damages equal to lost bene- fits. See Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015-1020 (W.D. Mo. 1984). It appar- ently does not allow for punitive and emotional distress damages awards. See Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817- 818 (6th Cir. 1987). By contrast, similar if not iden- tical state law-based claims could lead to awards for emotional distress and punitive damages. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d at 1373. State law-based causes-of-action of these types—im- posing potentially different substantive standards of con- duet, with different procedural and proof requirements, as well as possible jury trials and punitive damages— would, contrary to the purposes of Section 514, have serious consequences for the participants of employee benefit plans. Plan sponsors seeking to avoid the lawsuits and concomitant administrative and financial burdens fowing from such a myriad of laws could simply decline to establish plans, or to eliminate any plans that they cur- rently have in existence. Alternatively, they could delay terminating employees until after any benefit rights have vested; but, in doing so, they would be subjecting the plans to unanticipated financial demands and thus ex- posing other plan participants and beneficiaries (conceiv- ably in all 50 states) to increased risks of non-payment. Finally, the plan sponsors could change the vesting or rather than another); Jnternational Union UAW Local 91 v. Park- Ohio Industries, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (no viola- tion of Section 510 where award of benefits distinguished between those who retired before or after a specific date). 40 qualification rules of the plans so as to decrease the like- lihood of interference-type claims being asserted—either by increasing the years-of-service required to qualify for benefits (and thereby reducing the likelihood that a termi- nated employee would be close to qualifying for benefits), or by decreasing the years-of-service needed to qualify for such benefits (and thereby increasing the likelihood that a terminatec employee would already have qualified for the benefits). In doing so, however, the plan spon- sors would effectively be denying some employees benefits that they otherwise would have been eligible to receive, ov be inereasing the risk of non-payment to other plan participsnts ‘or requiring a reduction in the per-capita level of benefits provided to all participants). In short, allowing such laws to be imposed could lead plan sponsors ‘9 take actions seriously detrimental to the interests of come or all plan participants.” Of course. as Congress recognized in enacting ERISA, the minimum standards of the statute, including Section 510, impose burdens of a similar kind and may lead plan sponsors te take comparable actions in response. See, ¢.9., S. Rep. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975), reprinted in 1 Legislative History 1063, 1087. But, as this Court recognized in Pilot Life, in enacting these minimum standards ‘including Section 510), Congress carefully ® An example readily illustrates this point. An employer in an industry where there is rapid turnover of employees within the first two years of employment, but relatively little thereafter, might wish to design its pension plan with 2-year cliff vesting. If this em- ployer were located in Texas, however, and every termination within the first two vears of employment raised the spectre of a state court action, tried before a jury, with a claim for punitive damages, then the employer likely would resort either to 5-year cliff vesting, so as to minimize the credibility of claims of employees who were terminated within the first two years, or to full and im- mediate vesting, so as to avoid the risk altogether. Alternatively, the employer might erect an artificial barrier to termination in Texas where the employee is close to vesting under the pension plan. 41 fashioned the substantive rights, the procedures, and the available remedies so that the burdens thereby created would be tolerable when }alanced against the protections afforded to employees. See 481 U.S. at 54. See also Mas- sachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 184, 147 (1985). Congress carefully avoided creating rights, procedures, or remedies that would “force employers to end their plans or perhaps discourage other employers from beginning them.” 120 Cong. Ree. 29209 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4703-4704 (remarks of Rep. Collier). See also 120 Cong. Rec. 29951 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, at 4797 ‘remarks of Sen. Bentsen) (“The legislation achieves a fair balance between the need to provide adequate protection to exist- ing pension plan participants and the important need to expand pension coverage. The legislation does this by set- ting minimum standards—not ideal standards—which would not impose such severe costs on employers so as to discourage the creation of new plans or actually force the termination of some existing plans.’’). The same can- not be said for the Texas law or whatever patchwork quilt of laws, procedures, and remedies other states might choose to impose. And that is precisely why Section 514 was enacted and must be applied to preempt laws of this type.’” E. The Arguments Advanced Against Preemption Are Without Merit In his brief-in-opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent strives mightily to avoid the inevitable con- clusion that flows from the language, legislative history, and purpose of Section 514. But the arguments that he musters against preemption are without merit. 10 As this Court has recognized, ERISA preemption was designed to free employers from the need to either reduce multistate plans to the lowest common denominator or establish separate plans for each state. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 514, 524-525: Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 105; Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. at 10-13. 42 1. Mimicking the Supreme Court of Texas (Pet. App. 5a n.d), respondent first argues (Opp. Br. 6-7) that he is not seeking lost pension benefits and that “this fact alone is sufficient to defeat preemption.” Of course, this argument conveniently ignores respondent’s prayer in the trial court that, if successful, he be awarded “loss of em- ployee benefits and profit sharing and retirement pro- grams ....” J.A. 6, 15, 68. More importantly, however, this argument ignores the Court’s conclusion in Pilot Life that ERISA-preemption extends beyond claims for benefits—.pecifically, that ERISA-preemption extends, at « minimum, to any claim that is redressable under Sec- tion 502 of ERISA. See 481 U.S. at 52-57 (preemption of state common law action seeking punitive damages for improper processing of a disability benefits claim). A claim for alleged interference with attainment of benefits fits squarely into the category of claims so redressable. 2. Respondent alternatively argues (Opp. Br. 7-18) that preemption is inappropriate because the Texas law regulates only the employment relationship between him- self and petitioner, and neither requires the payment of benefits nor regulates the administrative activities of petitioner’s pension plan. This argument is unfounded. A state law may “relate to” an employee benefit plan, and thus be preempted by ERISA, even though it in terms regulates only the employment relationship ‘and not the terms or the administrative activities of the benefit plan). Just like Section 510 of ERISA, a state law may seek indirectly to protect employee benefit rights by directly regulating the employment relationship—i.e., by prohib- iting employment decisions that might otherwise defeat employee benefit rights under a plan. Where the state law does so by “reference to’”’ an ERISA-covered benefit plan, the law “relates to” an ERISA-covered plan and is preempted."! 11 This case thus does not present the problem posed in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). where the Court 43 Contrary to respondent’s argument, a law may “relate to” an ERISA-covered plan and be preempted even though it directly imposes obligations on only the plan sponsor (2.e., the employer). Many of ERISA’s obligations are imposed only on the plan sponsor. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. $ 1021(dj(1) (requiring employer to notify plan partici- pants and beneficiaries if it fails to nake a payment re- quired to meet minimum funding standards); 29 U.S.C. $1059(a) (requiring employer to maintain records with respect to employees and to furnish information to the plan administrator) ; 29 U.S.C. § 1082/¢c) (requiring em- ployer to make minimum contributions to the plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(f) (imposing a lien for unpaid contribu- tions on all property and rights to property of the em- ployer); 29 U.S.C. $ 1085b (requiring employer to post security for any increase in benefits when a plan is seri- ously underfunded) ; 29 U.S.C. § 1166(2) (requiring em- ployer to notify plan administrator of events that qualify an employee, spouse, or dependent for continuation of health coverage); 29 U.S.C. $ 1363 (imposing liability on the employer when an insufficiently funded plan is terminated) ; 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (imposing withdrawal lia- bility on an employer that incurs a complete or partial withdrawal from a multiemployer plan). These disclosure, funding, and other obligations quite plainly ‘relate to” ERISA-covered plans, and the states clearly cannot reg- ulate the employer-activities to which those obligations are directly addressed. The same conclusion should be true for Section 510 and the employer-activities to which it is directly addressed. A law simply need not directly require the payment of benefits or regulate the administrative activities of the plan in order to “relate to” an employee benefit plan. held that a state law requiring plant closure severance payments neither related to an existing employee benefit plan nor called an ERISA-covered plan into being. The Texas law in this case, by its own terms, relates to an existing ERISA-covered pension plan. 4 As this Court has repeatedly stated, “even indirect state action ... may encroach upon the area of exclusive fed- eral concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 525. Thus, the disclosure and funding rules cited above “relate to” employee benefit plans even though they do not directly require the payment of benefits or regu- late the administrative activities of the plan. Similarly, the state statute at issue in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, which required insurance carriers—i.e., third-parties—io include certain provisions in group in- surance policies that they sold, “related to” ERISA- covered plans even though it did not directly require the payment of benefits or regulate the administration of claims. 471 U.S. at 739. Likewise, the statute held pre- empted in Jlackcy v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv- ice, lne., which barred garnishment of benefits from (RISA-covered plans, “related to’ such plans even though it did not require the payment of any benefit or actually impose an administrative requirement on such plans, 486 U.S. 825, 837-838 (1988). The Texas law at issue is similarly not exempt from preemption simply be- cause it regulates the field of employee benefit plans in an indirect manner. Indeed, the overwhelming number of federal and state appellate courts to address the specific question pre- sente] hy this case have drawn this conclusion. With the exception of the court below, those courts have uniformly found that state non-interference laws like that of the State of Texas “relate to” ERISA-covered plans and are preempted. Sce Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir, 1989); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 659 (3d Cir, 19891; Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 799-800 (9th Cir. 1987); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215-1216 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 US. 968 and 454 U.S. 1084 (1981): Conaway v. Kasiern Associated Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 427 (W. Va. 1986): Coontz v. Gordon Jewelry Cor- poration, 439 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa App. 1989). This 45 judicial consensus is deserving of the Court’s endorse- ment here.'” CONCLUSION The judgment of the court below should be reversed and remanded. Respectfully subnitted, GLEN D. NAGER (Counsel of Record) JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE 1450 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-2088 (202) 879-3939 Of Counsel: Houuts T. HuRD WILLIAM T. LITTLE JONES, DAY, REAV'S & POGUE GILPIN, PAXSON & BERSCH One Mellon Bank Center 2300 First Interstate Tower 500 Grant Street . 1300 Post Oak Boulevard Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Houston, Texas 77056-3010 (412) 391-3939 (713) 623-8800 Counsel for Petitioner JUNE 1990 '2 This judicial consensus stands in harmony with the cases cited by respondent in his brief-in-opposition (at 17-18). In those cases, the termination of employment was alleged to have violated state law for reasons entirely unrelated to any alleged intent to interfere with the attainment of rights under an employee benefit plan; loss of benefits was nothing more than a consequence of the termination and thus did not “relate to” the underlying plan. Those “ases do not bear on cases such as this one—where the termination is alleged to violate a state law that expressly references and depends on the existence of an employee benefit plan, was created for the purpose and with the effect of protecting and enforcing an employee's rights under an employee benefit plan, and creates rights and remedies that encroach upon the comprehensive and exclusive scheme for enforce- ment under ERISA Sections 510 and 502. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0720%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.