# Amicus Curiae Brief — International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 499 U.S. 187

## Text

gupreme Cour, US |
FILED

CY) JUN 1 280

No. 89-1215 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, J
CLERK

IN THE
Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al.,
Petitioners,

— Vvi—

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.,
Respondent.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
BY TRIAL, LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE

Arthur H. Bryant

(Counsel of Record)

Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-8600

Lucinda M. Finley

SUNY Buffalo Law School
O’Brian Hall - Amherst Campus
Buffalo, NY 14260

(716) 636-2361

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Baimar Legz! Publishing Division, Washington, D.C., (202) 659-3610

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Seems We SUED AREILUS 2. ww te ee
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............

II.

i Se eT a Wig we 6 6 < 6 4 's0 6

JOHNSON CONTROLS’ “FETAL PROTECTION
POLICY” HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH FETAL
PROTECTION AND A LOT TO DO WITH SEX
oe ee ee ee ee

A.

Johnson Controls’ Policy is Based on a Web of
Speculation About the Number of Women Who
Might Get Pregnant and Who Might Have
Children Adversely Affected by Lead. .....

Restricting Women’s Employment Opportunities
Because of The Cape :ity of Women to Become
Pregnant Has Long Been Discredited as Based
on Stereotypes That Trample on Women’s
ee ere a a ee ae

Johnson Controls’ Professions of “Moral
Concern” Are Severely Undermined by the
Amount of Risk to Worker and Consumer
Health That The Company Routinely Tolerates
as an Aspect of Lead Battery Manufacturing. . .

EXPANDING THE BFOQ DEFENSE TO IN-
CLUDE CONSIDERATIONS OF MORAL
CONCERNS AND SOCIAL COSTS, INCLUD-
ING POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY, WILL
EVISCERATE TITLE VII AND UNDERMINE
THE SAFETY-ENHANCING GOALS OF
EG Fates a isp 8 4 4 6 6 6 6 8k 0

10

il
A. The Social Costs of Toxic Workplaces Are
So Open-ended That Consideration of
Them Would Overwhelm Title VII Trials

With Social Policy Judgments Better Left to
oe —

B. Concern About Potential Tort Liability Is an
Improper Component of a Title VII Defense. . .

III. THE ANIMAL STUDY DATA PRESENTED

BY PLAINTIFFS PRECLUDES THE ENTRY
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’

FAVOR. ....220200 68 5 5 ee

CONCLUSION ....+0220556 6 5) eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.S. 2d 571 (App. Div.
TE A Ss woe et ce tt ee

eee

City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,
os 5 kw te htt ee

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
wg on 5 6 8 et

EDF v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ......

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C.

elk 6 5 6 5 oe ee et ee

Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293,
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) .....

Hayes v. Shelby County Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d
I gg 5 6 ce tte et ee

Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) .. .

In Re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 611
Puma. Baas (e.w.N.Y.1965) ...........

In Re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla.
EE SES eee

Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Institute,
Ee

Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
Eg bg we st et tt

20

14

¥, a3

14

20

20

21

4,15

16

16

14

20

16

iV
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) .........

Needham v. White Laboratories, 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.
re sree eas er es ee ee ae

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
ie ere 2 ee eee er ee ee

Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d
1479 DC. Cir. ISEB). cc cc eee

Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
er ee eae a ee ee a

Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) . . .

Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) ...... |

Statutes:
Re es. gcc eee

Legislative History:

110 Cong. Rec. 13825 (June 15,1964) .........
H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) . . .
Sen. Rep. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) . . .

Miscellaneous:

9 Occup. Safety & Health Rptr. (BNA) 339 (Current
Report, Sept. 13,1979) .. 2... 2.6 ee ee ees

Baer, J., The Chains of Protection (1978) ........

Becker, “From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability
Policies,” 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1219(1986) .....

6, 7, 11

20

14

20

3, 13

4,7,9

Vv

Finley, “The Exclusion of Fertile Women From the
Hazardous Workplace: The Latest Example of
Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate,
Neutral Response to an Emerging Social Problem?,”
Proceedings of the N.Y.U. Thirty-Eighth Annual
Nat’! Conf’c on Labor, Ch. 16 (Mathew Bender &
Co. 1985)

Goodman, D. G., “Animal Testing of Carcinogens,” 2
Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews
(Jan.- March 1987)

Gordis, L., Epidemiology and Health Risk Assessment
(1988)

Harrington, J., & Gill, F., Occupational Health
(1987)

McNamara, Eileen, “Factory and Fertility,” Boston Globe
Oct. 17, 1989

Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Reproduc-
tive Health Hazards in the Workplace (1988)

Rall, “Relevance of Results from Laboratory Animal
Toxicological Studies”, in J. Last, ed. Public Health
and Preventive Medicine (12th ed)

2 oe. £6. 8 2 -@

Schuck, P., Agent Orange On Trial (1986)

Scott, Judith, “Keeping Women in Their Place”, in
W. Chavkin, Ed., Double Exposure (1984)

4,15

22

20, 21

20, 22

21

17

No. 89-1215

IN THE
Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBIL ;:,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al.,
Petitioners,

—_— ¥,=—

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.,
Respondent.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
BY TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS’

Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (“TLPJ”) is a national
public interest law firm dedicated to using the skills and ap-
proaches of plaintiffs’ trial lawyers to advance the public good.
Supported by and working through a nationwide network of
over 750 of the country’s outstanding trial lawyers, TLPJ brings
precedent-setting and socially significant cases designed to ad-
vance consumer and victims’ rights, environmental protection
and safety, civil rights and civil liberties, occupational health
and employee rights, and the protection of the poor and the
powerless.

” This brief amicus curiae is being filed with the consent of the parties.
The parties’ written consents are on file with the Clerk of the Court.

2

TLPJ is particularly interested in this case because it
presents the question of whether two battles TLPJ routinely
wages - - the battle against sex discrimination and the battle for
workplace safety - - will be treated as contradictory or, as
Congress mandated, complimentary. In addition, because the
majority below decided the issues presented without a trial, this
case also presents a question of critical importance to virtually
all victims and potential victims of toxic torts: whether courts
may simply disregard the results of animal studies and hold that,
unless and until enough people have been injured or kilied to
permit a statistically significant sample to be epidemiologically
studied. no inference of causation can properly be drawn.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

While we agree with many of the arguments advanced by
the appellants and the other amici, there are three fundamental
flaws in the decision below that are particularly disturbing. We
write separately to stress these three critical, fundamental flaws.

First, both the majority opinion below and, to some extent,
Judge Posner’s dissent utterly distegard the fact that Johnson
Controls’ so-called “fetal protection policy” is nothing of the
sort. In reality, the policy is only tenuously related to fetal
protection and is based on long-discredited stereotypes that
trample on women’s autonomy. Moreover, the company’s
assertions of “mcral concern” for fetal health are severely
undermined by the risks to employee and consumer health that
Johnson Controls routinely creates and tolerates.

Second, both the majority opinion below and Judge
Posner’s dissent seriously err by suggesting that the bona fide
occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) defense is broad enough
to encompass an employer’s “ethical, legal, and business con-
cerns aboui the effects of its activities on third parties” or other
“social costs” like potential tort suits by future children of its

3

employees. The “social costs” related to toxic workplaces are
So open-ended that permitting such costs to be evaluated as part
of a BFOQ defense would overwhelm Title VII trials with social
policy judgments better left to Congress. Furthermore, on this
question, Congress has plainly spoken: “social costs” like
potential tort liability are not proper components of a Title VII
defense.

Third, regardless of whether its interpretation of Title VII
is correct, the majority opinion below improperly entered sum-
mary judgment in Johnson Controls’ favor because it did so in
the face of animal studies presented by plaintiffs that showed
that the ievels of lead exposures from which the company sought
to protect women (in the name of protecting fetuses) are also
dangerous to men. The majority’s wholesale rejection of animal
studies is legally and scientifically untenable. Plaintiffs’ animal
study evidence, without more, requires reversal.

INTRODUCTION

We believe that the Johnson Controls’ policy at issue in
this case, is, inescapably, overt, facial discrimination on the
basis of sex and capacity to become pregnant. Consequently,
according to the clear language and intent of Title VII, as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42
U.S.C. 2000e(k), the only defense available to the employer is
that lack of capacity to become pregnant is a BFOQ; this defense
may only focus on the ability of substaritially all adult women
to perform the work. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400 (1985). The arguments we advance in this brief, however,
are equally applicable to the business necessity defense.
Regardless of whether this Court finds the BFOQ or the business
necessity defense to be mandated by Title VII, the majority

below erred by granting summary judgment in defendant’s
favor.

4

I. JOHNSON CONTROLS’ “FETAL PROTEC-
TION POLICY” HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH
FETAL PROTECTION AND A LOT TO DO
WITH SEX DISCRIMINATION.

The majority opinion below and Judge Posner’s dissent,
like the decisions in Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172, 1189-90 (4th
Cir. 1982), and Hayes v. Shelby County Memorial Hospital, 726
F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (general societal interest in having
enterprises be protective of health of unborn children provides
business necessity for policy excluding women from empioy-
ment), contort facial Title VII law and utterly disregard the plain
language of the PDA.! They do so because of well-intentioned
concerns about fetal health. To properly evaluate Johnson
Control’s exclusionary policy, as well as the arguments about
the relevance of moral concerns and social costs to Title VII
defenses, however, these concerns must be put into perspective.

The admirable concern that our toxic world be made safer
for the sake of future generations, when applied to this case,
merely obfuscates the fact that the connection between the
Johnson Controls policy and the health of babies or fetuses is
tenuous and speculative. What is not tenuous or speculative,
however, is the immediate harmful! impact of the policy on
existing hurnan beings, both male and female. Existing women
are denied well-paying jobs and advancement opportunities and
are branded with tre stigma of being regarded as marginal,
expendable workers. Existing men are virtually foreclosed from
working in tne jobs with the lowest levels of lead exposure, both

‘ Commentators who have analyzed Ulin and Hayes are uniformly critical
of their reasoning, assumptions, and troubling contortions of Title VII law
and precedent. See, e.g., Becker, “From Mujsler v. Oregon to Fetal Vul-
nerability Policies,” 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1219 (1986); Finley, “The Exclusion
of Fertile Women from the Hazardous Workplace: The Latest Example of
Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate, Neutral Response to an
Emerging Social Problem?,” Proceedings of the N.Y.U. Thirty-Eighth An-
nual Nat’! Conf’c 9n Labor, Ch. 16 (Mathew Bender & Co. 1985).

%

5

because women have been transferred into these jobs and be-
cause men’s concerns about reproductive health are ridiculed at
Johnson Controls.?

A. Johnson Controls’ Policy is Based on a Veb of
Speculation About the Number of Women Who
Might Get Pregnant and Who Might Have
Children Adversely Affected by Lead.

Johnson Controls’ designation of its policy as a “fetal
protection policy” is a misnomer. The policy applies whether
or not a fetus is extant. The women to whom it applies are not
pregnant, and many of them have no plans to become pregnant,
or are long past their childbearing days, or are responsible users
of contraceptives. The policy does not protect fetuses other than
in the most indirect, attenuated sense. Rather, what it does do,
directly and immediately, is exclude existing adult women from
entire job categories and promotion opportunities, simply be-
cause women have the biological ability to become pregnant.
All of the professed “moral concern” about fetal health boils
down to the fc'lowing chain of reasoning: because women can
get pregnant, and because some of them might get pregnant, and
some of these who get pregnant might have high blood lead
levels, and then perhaps some of the children born to these
women might have some developmental problems, in order to
avoid this slight possibility, we must refuse to hire al] women
who are physically capable of bearing children.

This major leap - - from the fact that in utero lead exposure
can cause cognitive development and social adjustment

? Donald Penney, one of the named plaintiffs in this Case, charged in his
E.E.9.C. complaint that his ability to bid for low levei lead jobs is greatly
restricted by the Johnson Controls’ Fetal Protection Policy, since it gives
transfer preference to women. He also charged that, when he requested a
leave of absence in order to lower his blood lead levels because he wanted
to father a child, he was subjected to such a level of harassment as to
constitute constructive discharge. J. App. 66-69.

6

problems in children to the conclusion that all fertile, but not
necessarily pregnant, women must be barred from employment
- - is fraught with analytic and policy pitfalls.

B. Restricting Women’s Employment Opportunities
Because of The Capacity of Women to Become
Pregnant Has Long Been Discredited as Based
on Stereotypes That Trample on Women’s
Autonomy.

Justification of restrictions on women’s employment op-
portunities because of their capacity to bear children and atten-
dant concern about social cost and the well-being of future
generations is the most venerable and prevalent excuse for
sex-based emplovment discrimination. This sad fact was fre-
quently recognized by the proponents of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act. See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 95-331, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3 (1978). Indeed, the justifications offered by Johnson Con-
trols and by the majority below bear a startling resemblance to
the long-discredited turn-wf-ihe-century reasoning in Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1°98), in which Chief Justice Brewer,
writing for the Court, upheld a statute limiting employment of
women, out not men, because “healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, [and] the physical well-being of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.” Jd. at 421. And, the restric-
tion was necessary “largely for the benefit of all.” Jd. at 422.
Due to the recognition that excluding women in the name of
“protecting” them and future generations fails to treat women
as autonomous individuals and forever chains them to their
reproductive role, state legislation aimed at “protecting” women
out of jobs was swept aside by Title VII almost twenty years
ago. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1971); J. Baer, The Chains of Protection (1978).

7

It is odd that, in the face of judicial interpretations of Title
VII prohibiting state legislation that “protects” only women
from occupational hazards, the majority below would allow a
private employer to exclude women in the narne of protecting
potential offspring from the risks of only maternal, but not
paternal, employment. Becker, supra, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1220.
It is also distressing that, with the widespread adoption of fetal
protection policies in the last few years, id., women are still,
despite the PDA and the long-ago demise of protective legisla-
tion, being forced to fight for their right to employment over
claims that their childbearing capacity precludes that right. The
subtle shift from the reasoning in Muller that it was women who
were being protected, in the name of future generations, to
Johnson Controls’ reesoning that it is potential fetuses that musi
be protected, does no‘ mask the fact that it is still women who
are being excluded froin employmert.

The historical and contemporary exclusicn of women from
employment because of their childbearing capacity assumes that
women are more socially important because of their reproduc-
tive function, and that their value as workers is marginal. In
essence, women are reduced to their wombs. Moreover, women
are presumed to be less capable and conscientious decision-
makers about their reproductive desires and health than
employers. Thus, fetal protection policies such as the one
implemented by Johnson Controls invariably disrespect
women’s autonomy and individuality. Policies broadly ex-
clusive of all fertile women callously disregard actual
individuals’ plans about marriage and childbearing and fail to
contemplate that many working women are unlikely to have any
more children. Thus, these policies plainly contravene City of
Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978), in that they exalt a generalizable biological difference
between men and women into an excuse for not treating in-
dividual women as individuals.

8

Moreover, Johnson Controls arrogated to itself the judg-
ment that any woman who did exercise her autonomous right to
procreate despite her careful weighing of the risks of lead
exposure versus the risks of unemployment and her family’s
need for her income was acting irresponsibly. Prior to 1982,
Johnson Controis did not broadly exclude all women, because
the company recognized that “not ali women who can become
mothers wish to become mothers,” and that the decision whether
to work in certain jobs “should properly be made by the in-
dividual immediately involved.” J. App. 140. Yet Johnson
Controls regarded its pre-1982 voluntary program, under which
employees were informed of the risks and given counseling, 2
“failure”, because, throughout the company’s plants, eight
women became pregnant in six years. (There is no evidence in
the record that any of these women bore a child that showed any
adverse effects from prenatal lead exposure.) Rather than
regarding the occurrence of a pregnancy as a “failure,” as an act
engaged in by an irresponsible woman (in consultation with her
irresponsible partner), the occurrence of so few pregnancies
during such a long period of time at a large, nationwide company
indicates the success of the previous policy, and the respon-
sibility of autonomous women.

The insult to women’s dignity and autonomy perpetrated
by Johnson Controls is illustrated by the reactions of two women
over fifty who were demoted to lower paying, lower status jobs
at the Johnson Controls plant in Bennington, Vermont. In the
words of a Boston Globe reporter who interviewed them, “[t}he
company’s contention that the mandatory transfer to low lead
exposure jobs was for the protection of her future children sends
a rush of red from [Virginia] Green’s neck to her gray hairline,
prompting her to ask rhetorically whether women are not bright
enough to make sensible choices about their own reproductive
lives. It prompts [Elsie] Nason, now 57 ... [to say] ‘Ridiculous,
and degrading. I’ve been divorced for 16 years. I felt they’d
pointed a finger at me as if I was some shady lady going out and

9

getting pregnant. At my age! They took me off my job for
foolishness and I'l! be mad about it, and the smutty jokes I had
to hear from the men about an old lady like me still having her
period, until the day I die.’” Eileen McNamara, “Factory and
Fertility,” Boston Globe Oct. 17, 1989.

The majority below, however, was concerned that, given
the importance of jobs and adequate income to “better [her]
family’s station in life, it would not be improbable that a female
employee might somehow rationally discount” the risk to her
fetus if she became pregnant. 886 F.2d at 897. This reasoning
overlooks the fact that employers are just as likely to rationally
discount the risk to women and their families from unemploy-
ment or reduced wages, since, once the woman is out of the
workforce, any of her problems are simply no longer of any
concern to the employer. As explained by Professor Mary
Becker, “an employer faced with evidence that a group is
hypersusceptible ... is likely to make the decision to exclude that
group based, not on the costs and benefits to the workers and
their families, but on the employer’s need for members of that
group in its labor force. If the group is very marginal — as
women are in traditionally male jobs — the employer has every
incentive to exclude the group’s members even though the
heightened risks may be very iow ... and the benefits of allowing
the group to work (benefits in this case to both women and to
their children) are very high.” Becker, supra, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
at 1239-40. Title VII and the PDA were enacted to take away
from ¢.iployers the right to make such economic cost-benefit
calculations about a group of workers perceived as marginal
because of a characteristic — childbearing capacity — unrelated
to their ability to do the job.

Another major analytic flaw of Johnson Controls’ focus
only on women as the locus of concern about the health of future
generations is that the present policy totally ignores the male
capacity to impregnate. Men contribute to the health of future

10

generations as well as women, and lead is highly toxic to men’s
fertility and sperm motility. The definition of the policy at issue
in this case as a fetal protection policy means that the concern
about reproductive health remains a narrow one, considering
only one aspect of reproduction, only one way in which adverse
reproductive outcomes can occur. And it means that the
scrutiny will always remain on women, and on their role in
reproduction, to the detriment of men’s reproductive health.

While fears about developmentally impaired children can
loom large in a company’s mind, company decisionmakers are
less likely to think about the children who are desperately
wanted but never get conceived. They are less likely to think
about the miscarriages suffered by a wife of a male worker
because his sperm was damaged by lead exposure. But to the
families who must live with the consequences of lead, the
infertility or the pregnancy loss may be more of a tragedy, more
of an endangerment to physical and mental health, than a wanted
child who turns out to be less intelligent or capable than some
of her peers.

C. Johnson Controls’ Professions of “Moral Concern”

Are Severely Undermined by the Amount of
Risk to Worker and Consumer Health That The
Company Routinely Tolerates as an Aspect of
Lead Battery Manufacturing.

The channelling of all of the company’s concern about
reproductive health onto potential fetuses to the detriment of
existing men and women leads to the untenable conclusion that
only for fetuses — something that only women carry — shall
there be absolutely no risk. The company’s total intolerance for
fetal risk starts to look suspiciously like a justification for
discrimination when all of the other risks that it rationally,
economically tolerates are taken into consideration. Johnson
Controls countenances the high risk of cardiovascular damage
from blood lead levels as low as 10ug/dl to its existing male

——

ae

11

workers. It tolerates the risks to the environment and to the
health of future generations from the disposal of lead batteries
and other hazardous waste from the production process. It
accepts some risk of harm to consumers from defective or
exploding batteries. It tolerates risks to the children of workers
from the workers bringing lead residues home on their clothing.
It tolerates all sorts of risks to workers from innumerable con-
ditions in and around its plants, ranging from slippery floors to
repetitive motion injuries to cigarette smoke. seen from
the perspective of all of the risk that the company is willing to
accept, the “moral imperative” for excluding women because
some of them might some day choose to become pregnant starts
to look more and more like a disingenuous rationalization for
keeping women out of the workplace.

Against this background, which highlights the tenuous
connection between a refusal to hire all fertile women of a broad
age spectrum and protection of the health of future generations,
arguments that “moral concern,” “social cost,” “ethical con-
siderations,” or economic fears about future liability costs
should justify a radical departure from established law govern-
ing facial discrimination under Title VII and the PDA should be
greeted with skepticism. These arguments are no more tenable
a reason for barring women from employment opportunities
today than they were in the early 1970’s when Title VII was used
to discredit the outdated 1908 ideology of Muller v. Oregon.

Il. EXPANDING THE BFOQ DEFENSE TO
INCLUDE CONSIDERATIONS OF MORAL
CONCERNS AND SOCIAL COSTS, INCLUD-
ING POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY, WILL
EVISCERATE TITLE VII AND UNDERMINE
THE SAFETY-ENHANCING GOALS OF
TORT LAW.

Both the majority and Judge Posner, dissenting below,
suggested that the BFOQ defense ought to be broad enough to

12

encompass, as Judge Posner put it, an employer’s concerns with
the “norma! operations” of a business, including “ethical, legal,
and business concerns about the effects of its activities on third
parties,” and such “social costs” as potential tort suits by future
children of employees. Such a wholesale expansion of the
BFOQ defense was squarely rejected by Congress, when the
Senate rejected a proposed amendment to Title VII that would

have allowed discrimination whenever it would be “more

beneficial to the normal operation of the particular business or
enterprise involved or to the good will thereof than the hiring of

an individual without consideration of his race, color, religion,
Sex, or national origin.” 110 Cong. Rec. at 13825 (June 15,
1964). This Court should not let concern about potential harm
to potential fetuses tempt it to open up what is supposed to be
the most narrow defense to facial discrimination.

A. The Social Costs of Toxic Workplaces Are So
Open-ended That Consideration of Them Would
Overwhelm Title VII Trials With Socia! Policy
Judgments Better Left to Congress.

ne At the end of this “social cost” path lies a tangle of
judicially unmanageable speculations, that, if indulged, would
swallow up Title VII’s ban on discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy and capacity to become pregnant. What social costs
Should employers and courts have to consider? And social costs
to whom? And how large, or how certain, must the social cost
be before it becomes a legitimate factor for consideration? If
employers may consider potential risks to fetal health, should
they not also have to consider potential risks to paternal health
and maternal health? What about the costs to women and their
children of unemployment or reduced wages and benefits?
What about the cost to a woman’s esteem and dignity from being
told that she cannot have a certain job simply because she has a
womb? What about the social cost of continuing to label women
as marginal workers, creatures more valued for their reproduc-

13

tive than their productive capacity? What about the social cost
of the perpetuation of some men’s stereotyped attitudes about
women’s productive capabilities and social role? What about
the social cost of perpetuating occupational segregation, and
with it, the wage gap between men and women?

Many of these important social costs flowing from exclud-
ing women from certain jobs can be just as scientifically docu-
mented as the risks to fetuses from lead exposure. Yet to have
to weigh all of these factors in assessing a BFOQ defense would
surely turn Title VII trials into legislative policy sessions,
evaluating the question of which social cost is of greater priority
— the immediate harms to current workers from discrimination,
or the possible future harm to nonexistent fetuses? Congress
has already answered this question, and has made the judgment
that a woman’s ability to do the job is the only relevant factor
for evaluaiing whether she may be excluded because of her
Capacity to become pregnant. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k).

As the above questions illustrate, “social cost” analysis is
entirely open-ended. Thus, allowing “moral concerns” about the
social cost of the risk of materna! employment to fetal health to
enter into either the BFOQ or business necessity analysis will
swallow up Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination. There
is no logical line at which to end acceptance of professed
concerns for fetal health. Just as lead and other toxins may pose
a risk to fetuses, so may stress, fatigue, standing or sitting for
long hours, and exposure to the colds, viruses, and cigarette
smoke of other workers. So, should concern for fetal health
permit employers to refuse to hire women for jobs deemed to be
stressful, jobs that require standing long hours at assembly lines
or service counters or in restaurants? Should employers be able
to use concern for fetal health to justify forced leave for all
women after a certain month of pregnancy, because the stress
and fatigue risks of the job increase at that time? (This practice
was declared unconstitutional when practiced by a public agen-

14

cy in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).) Should taxi and bus companies be able to refuse to hire
women as drivers because, if they got pregnant and if they were
in an accident, it would be not only them but theiz fetuses that
might be injured? (It should be noted that the statistical risk of
getting in an accident given the number of hours spent on the
road by a professional driver is at least as high, if not higher,
than the risk of lead exposure to a fetus.) Should employers be
able to rely on child development studies that claim that very
young children develop better intellectually and emotionally
when given the constant attention of a primary parental caretaker
in the home to refuse to hire women with young children,
because those children will be better off with the mother at home
than with the mother employed? (This sort of policy was
declared to violate Title VII in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971).) It does not take much of a march along
this “parade of horribles” to understand how great an incursion
on women’s employment opportunities the “social cost of pos-
sible fetal harm” defense would permit.

While an employee’s ability to perform the job safely has
been a legitimate BFOQ and business necessity consideration,
this factor properly includes only safety risks to co-workers and
existing third parties such as customers. It cannot include safety
risks even to actual fetuses. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air-
lines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), and Jn Re National Airlines,
434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977), in which courts upheld the
exclusion of pregnant flight attendants from flying during the
advanced stages of pregnancy because of evidence that late term
pregnancy interfered with the ability safely to serve passengers,
but rejected the argument that fetal safety also supported the
exclusion, because judgment about what risks to accept for one’s
future child were best left to the mother and were of no legitimate
concern to the airline. As mentioned in Part I of this brief, this
conclusion is the only one consistent with respect for the
autonomy and individuality of women.

15

After all, it is not the employer, but the woman and her
family, who has to bear both the consequences of job loss or
demotion and the consequences of any ensuing harm to a child.
Those whose lives will be most directly affected by an event are
the ones who should make the decision whether to bear the risk.
Finley, supra, at 16-27-28.

B. Concern About Potential Tort Liability Is an
Improper Component of a Title VII Defense.

Employers may assert that their businesses will be affected,
however, if harm occurs to a child of a female employee, because
that child may sue the employer in tort.4 Concern about tort
liability is essentially a cost concern, and cost has been emphati-
cally rejected as a defense to facial sex discrimination by this
Court in City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, supra. Even those courts that have allowed some
expansion of Title VII defenses because of concern about fetal
health have drawn the line at concern about future tort liability.
As the 11th Circuit explained in Haves v. Shelby County
Memorial Hospital, supra, 726 F.2d at 1553 n.15:

In today’s litigious society, the potential for litigation
rests in almost every human activity. For example,
every employer faces the risk that a pregnant
employee will encounter a workplace activity that
would not normally be hazardous to a nonpregnant
employee, but which could prove injurious to a
developing fetus. These hazards range from slippery
floors to uncontrolled cigarette smoke, asbestos,

> While Johnson Controls has not asserted fear of tort liability as a
justification for its policy, perhaps because liability is so speculative or
because this justification is so clearly precluded by existing law, Judge
Posner suggests that such fear should enter into BFQQ analysis. As an
organization expert in tort law and dedicated to seeing the safety-enhancing
goals of tort law respected, TLP3 is in a unique position to provide guidance
on this matter.

16

known and unknown carcinogenic materials used in
the workplace and a plethora of other hazards of
modern society. The employer is, of course, free to
protect itself from financially ruinous lawsuits by
purchasing insurance and by maintaining the degree
of care required by law.

Because tort liability is a danger pervading everything manufac-
turers such as Johnson Controls Jo, it can hardly stand as an
excuse for facial sex discrimination.

Johnson Controls faces a risk of tort liability for activities
ranging from the manufacture of batieries to the disposal of
batteries. The risk of future suits from subsequently born
children of female employees is actually one of the slightest tort
risks that it faces. The contemplation of these suits requires
several more speculative steps beyond the speculation about the
likelihood that a woman will get pregnant and bear a damaged
child. If that happens, it is speculative whether the child will
sue and, if so, whether the child will be able to mount sufficient
proof of injury caused by maternal lead exposure, given all the
other possible sources of lead exposure and possible causative
factors for impaired development. Johnson Controls faces at
least as great a risk of tort suits by children of male workers
alleging that they were harmed by paternal lead exposure.
Indeed, there have been several notable claims brought alleging
birth defects due to paternal exposure to a toxin. See, e.g. In Re
Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1223
(E.D.N.Y. 1985\(claims of children born to Vietnam Veterans
alleging birth defects caused by paternal exposure to Agent
Orange dismissed for failure to prove causation); Mondelli v.
United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1983) (suit alleging that
paternal exposure to ionizing radiation during atomic testing
caused plaintiff's birth defects); Hinkie v. United States, 715
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983)(same); 9 Occup. Safety & Health Rptr.
(BNA) 339 (Current Report, Sept. 13, 1979) (describing claim

17

brought by male worker that his occupational exposure to DBCP
caused deformities to his child); Judith Scott, “Keeping Women
in Their Place”, in W. Chavkin, Ed., Double Exposure 184-191
(1984) (describing claims of male railroad workers against Long
Island Railroad that their children were born with hip deform-
ities caused by paternal exposure to defoliants, and significant
number of incidents of children of male pesticide workers
fathering children with serious heart defects). In light of the
reality that tort liability can come just as much from the children
of male workers as those of female workers, it can hardly stand
as a defense to a refusal to hire women.

If fear of potential tort liability were to excuse sex dis-
crimination, such a result would undermine the goals of both
Title VII and tort law. It would give the dirtiest, least tech-
nologically efficient, least safety conscious employers a built-in
excuse for discriminating, because the more likely the prospect
of actual tort liability, the stronger the defense to employment
discrimination. Thus, incentives to provide as clean a
workplace as reasonably feasible, to search for improved tech-
nology to even further reduce lead exposure, and to push ahead
with the search for a lead-free battery would be greatly reduced.
After all, so long as women are marginal workers in the formerly
male-dominated lead battery manufacturing process, it will
always appear easier, and less costly for employers to exclude
women than to invest in technological improvements that might
better the health of everyone. For this basic reason, the theory
of law and economics must remain merely a fashionable
academic theory to explain employer actions, rather than be
turned into a loophole in Title VII law excusing employer
actions that keep women in the home or in “women’s work.”

One fundamental tenet of tort law is that fear of liability
is supposed to provide a deterrent to unsafe actions, and an
incentive to constantly improve safety. This goal would be
devastated if speculative tort liability could excuse a refusal to

18

hire women. The goal can only be accomplished if employers
cannot avoid the specter of tort liability by avoiding women.
Rather, employers must be encouraged, through the congruence
of Title VII and tort law, to face up to their potentia! liability by
making the workplace as safe as possible for women and men,
and for the offspring of both sexes.

The responsible employer concerned about the health of
future generation and tort costs has several viable options far
short of excluding women. The responsible employer can meet
all obligations imposed by the tort standard of care, can fully
warn and inform workers of both sexes of the reproductive risks,
and can continue to invest in reasonable technology and equip-
ment to further reduce occupational lead exposure. The respon-
sible employer can also allow workers of both sexes who wish
to procreate to transfer temporarily, at no loss of pay or benefits,
to positions that would enable them to lower their blood lead
levels. The intersection of tort law with Title VII requirements,
far from putting an employer between the proverbial rock and a
hard place, encourages employers to work vigilantly to improve
workplace safety.

iI. THE ANIMAL STUDY DATA PRESENTED BY
PLAINTIFFS PRECLUDES THE ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’
FAVOR.

In order to enter summary judgment in Johnson Controls’
favor, the majority below did not simply misinterpret Title VII.
It also rejected plaintiffs’ substantial evidence of reproductive
harm to male workers by making an assertion that would as-
tound any reputable practitioner of occupational or environmen-
tal medicine. The majority asserted that “animal research
evidence does not present the type of solid scientific data
necessary for a reasonable factfinder to reach a nonspeculative
conclusion that a father’s exposure to lead presents the same

19

danger to the unborn child as that resulting from a female
employee’s exposure to lead.” 886 F.2d at 889-90.

This assertion is odd in light of the fact that the conclusion
about risk to potential fetuses of nonpregnant women was itself
so speculative. It is also curious in light of the fact that the level
of risk Johnson Controls deemed acceptable for women was
zero. But this assertion is also legally and scientifically un-
tenable, because it rejects out-of-hand a type of data routinely
and properly relied on by regulatory agencies in making risk
assessments and experts when assessing causation.

In deciding that the level of lead exposure approved by
OSHA was insufficient to protect a fetus if any of its women
employees were to become pregnant, Johnson Controls was
engaged in the same sort of risk assessment activity that
regulatory agencies themselves are authorized by Congress to
undertake. When OSHA set the lead standard and concluded that
there was no basis for excluding fertile women because men also
faced risks to their reproductive health at equal levels of ex-
posure, it relied in part on animal studies for assessing both male
and female mediated risks. Yet Johnson Controls presumed to
substitute its judgment for the relevant federal regulatory agency
that had engaged in painstaking factfinding by refusing even to
consider an entire type of data relied on by OSHA. Moreover,
the majority below compounded this error by presuming that
judges without scientific training did not even have to consider
the same types of evidence routinely relied on by scientists,
medical experts, and regulatory agencies.

The enterprise of risk assessment remains fundamentally
the same regardless of whether it is undertaken by an occupa-
tional or environmental medicine specialist, a regulatory agen-
cy, a jury, or an employer. Each risk assessor should have to
consider the same types of evidence, particularly a type of
evidence regarded as essential to the enterprise by medical
science. Indeed, this Court has approved the use by regulatory

20

agencies of animal studies, /ndustrial Union Dep’t v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), as has the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on numerous
occasions, see, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548
F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976); EDF v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796
F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Dr. David Rall, the Director of the
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences of the
National Institutes of Health, has observed that animal studies
provide evidence to link a chemical to a disease that “is critical
for the regulatory agencies that must make decisions to control
chemicals, but it [animal study evidence] is also important to the
physician and health care worker who needs to diagnose a
disease that may be caused by a chemical.” Rall, “Relevance of
Results from Laboratory Animal Toxicological Studies”, in J.
Last, ed. Public Health and Preventive Medicine 515 (12th ed).
Results of animal studies showing toxicity, carcinogenicity, and
adverse reproductive outcomes have also been deemed highly
relevant bases for concluding, in tort suits, that a manufacturer
reasonably should have known of the risks to humans and thus
should have warned humans. See, e.g., Needham v. White
Laboratories, 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981); Bichler v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,55 N.Y.S. 2d 571 (App. Div. 1982) (DES cases in which
evidence from animal studies that DES could cross the placenta
and cause cancer and abnormalities in female offspring lead to
conclusion that manufacturers of the drug had a duty to warn
about these risks).

If animal studies are to be precluded out-of-hand, as was
done by the majority below, then the only public health alterna-
tive is for epidemiologists and experts in occupational and
environmental medicine to wait until enough people have been
injured or killed from toxic exposures that a large enough sample
exists for making a statistically significant epidemiological cal-
culation. This approach has been unanimously rejected by the
medical and public health community. L. Gordis, Epidemiology

21

and Health Risk Assessment 37 (1988); J. Harrington & F. Gill,
Occupational Health 99 (1987). It should similarly be rejected
by the courts. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 552
F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (“A civilized
legal system does not require that much human sacrifice before
it can intervene.”)

Animal studies drawn from exposed animal populations
and epidemiological studies drawn from exposed human
populations are complementary, interdependent methods. An
epidemiologist will make an observation of an unexpected
health phenomenon in some humans, which will trigger animal
tests of the suspected agents. If these tests demonstrate toxicity,
then the epidemiologist will use this finding to devise a human
population study. Further animal studies may then be used to
strengthen a causal inference revealed by the human study.
Gordis, Epidemiology. “Without laboraiory studies of animals,
[scientists] could not estimate the substance’s risks under con-
ditions to which the human population may have been exposed,
but for which epidemiologists have not and perhaps cannot
control and for which epidemiological methods may lack re-
quired sensitivity.” P. Schuck, Agent Orange On Trial 236
(1986).

While animal studies are not a perfect predictor of effects
in humans, because of species and dose differences, they are
nonetheless relied upon in the field of environmental and oc-
cupational medicine, and by regulatory agencies, for the follow-
ing reasons:

One of the questions commonly raised about car-
cinogenicity studies is why are animal studies relevant
to humans. Some answers to this question include:

(1) Most known human carcinogens are also
animal carcinogens and many were first found to
be carcinogenic in animals;

22

(2) Animals have long been used in a variety of
toxicity tests and in most cases have been found
to be excellent predictors of human toxicity;

(3) Animals and humans have many of the same
metabolic pathways and responses to injury; and

(4) It is undesirable, to say the least, to use
humans as experimental animals when other
means exist to determine potential risk to humans.

D. G. Goodman, “Animal Testing of Carcinogens,” 2 Occupa-
tional Medicine: State of the Art Reviews -49 (Jan.- March
1987); see also Rall, supra at 516,519. These observations are
no less valid for reproductive hazards that can have teratogenic
effects on fetuses or mutagenic effects on sperm and eggs. See
Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Reproductive
Health Hazards in the Workplace (1988).

The conclusion of the majority below that epidemiological
evidence derived from human populations is inherently much
more probative for determining risk to human beings than
animal studies overestimates the usefulness of epidemiological
studies just as it underestimates the importance of animal
studies. While animal studies present the problem of extrapolat-
ing from one species to another, epidemiological studies present
the problem of jumping from aggregate information about large
numbers of humans previously exposed to predictions about risk
to a particular individual with a different health level exposed
to different amounts under different conditions. The point is not
to disparage the usefulness of epidemiology — it is extremely
useful in making risk assessments and drawing causal inferences
— but to underscore that epidemiology is no more or less
relevant than animal studies for determining causation or assess-
ing risk. Any risk assessment that excludes data from animal
studies —such as the risk assessment of male mediated
reproductive harm engaged in by Johnson Controls and the
majority below — is not a scientifically sound risk assessment.

23

In deciding that the risk to women of adverse reproductive
outcomes was so much greater than the risk to men of adverse
reproductive outcomes from lead exposure that wo.nen should
be barred from jobs, Johnson Controls was functioning essen-
tially as a regulatory agency. It ought to have to rely on the same
kind of evidence that a regulatory agency would have to rely on
in making the assessment of whether there is some risk to men
from the current lead level in certain production jobs. The
standard of “some risk” to men is the appropriate one because,
by acting to exclude all fertile women regardless of childbearing
plans or likelihood, Johnson Controls has effectively set the risk
threshold for women at zero. See dissenting opinion of Judge
Easterbrook, below. Moreover, if Johnson Controls’ professed
concern for the health cf future generations is to be taken
seriously, then the company should have to consider a wider
variety of reproductive risks than those that operate on fetuses
through women. It should have to consider the risk of mal-

* formed sperm that might produce fetal harm or even moscar-

riage, or reduced sperm count leading to sterility in men As
pointed out in Part I, the company’s focus on apriman \ (ema e
mediated risk — the kinds of reproductive harm prese

a fetus has already been created — is inherent) oso e

This narrow focus fails to adequately protect repr

of men and women.

The company’s narrow definition of the types of reproduc
tive risks it will consider, coupled with its failure to consider
animal study evidence about male mediated harm, amounts to a
callous indifference to the reproductive health of men. __.!ure
to consider animal studies is tantamount to saying to men,
“Many of you will have to become sterile, many of you will have
to suffer through your wives’ miscarriages, many of you will
have to shoulder the burden of damaged children, until such time
as medical science produces more studies of men, and con-

clusive studies of men.”

24

The law Joes not and should not require such sacrifice.
The animal study evidence presented by plaintiffs, without
more, requires reversal of the decision below.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Seventh
Circuit should be overturned.

Respectfully submitted,

Arthur H. Bryant

(Counsel of Record)

Tria! Lawyers >: Public Justice
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-8600

Lucinda M. Finley

SUNY Buffalo Law School
O’Brian Hail - Amherst Campus
Buffalo, N.Y. 14260

(716) 636-2361

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0705%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.
