# Amicus Curiae Brief — Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0686%3A09 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1990 - **Citation:** 497 U.S. 1 ## Text ARGUMENT. ce tna C ——a IN THE Supreme Court of the United Stites ° *” JOSEPH F. SAPNIOL, JR. OCTOBER TERM, 1989 CLERK <> MICHAEL MILKOVICH, SR., Petitioner, —against — THE LORAIN JOURNAL Co., THE NEWS HERALD and THEODORE DIADIUN, Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC., THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, ASSOCIATED PRESS, CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC., CBS INC., GANNETT CO., INC., THE HEARST CORPORA- TION, MAGAZINE PUBLISHERS OF AMERICA, INC., McCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC., THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COM- PANY, NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., NEWSDAY, INC., NEWSWEEK, INC., THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, REU- TERS INFORMATION SERVICES INC., SEATTLE TIMES COMPANY, SCRIPPS HOWARD, INC., THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOUR- NALISTS, TRIBUNE COMPANY, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., THE WASHINGTON POST AND WESTINGHOUSE BROAD- CASTING COMPANY, INC., IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS Of Counsel: ROBERT D. SACK LESTER E. GREENMAN GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER S. WHITNEY RAHMAN 200 Park Avenue GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER New York, New York 10166 200 Park Avenue (212) 351-4000 New York, New York 10166 Counsel of Record for RICHARD J. TOFEL Amici Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Legal Department 200 Liberty Street, 11th Floor New York, New York 10281 (Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover) — Fae tae Of Counsel: RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, JR. COHN AND MARKS 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for the American Society of Newspaper Editors RICHARD N. WINFIELD ROGERS & WELLS 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 Attorneys for the Associated Press STEVEN W. KORN BENITA BAIRD CELESTE PHILLIPS Cable News Network, Inc. One CNN Center Box 105366 Atlanta, Georgia 30348 DEVEREUX CHATILLON Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc. 47 West 66th Street New York, New York 10023 DOUGLAS P. JacoBs Associate General Counsel CBS Inc. 51 West S2nd Street New York, New York 10019 BARBARA L. WARTELLE Senior Legal Counsel Gannett Co., Inc. 1100 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22234 HARVEY L. LIPTON ROBERT J. HAWLEY The Hearst Corporation 959 Eighth Avenue New York, New York 10019 JOSEPH H. COOPER The New Yorker 25 West 43rd Street 18th Floor New York, New York 10036 LAURA R. HANDMAN LANKENAU & BICKFORD 1740 Broadway New York, New York 10019 SLADe R. METCALF SQUADRON, ELLENOFF, PIESENT & LEHRER $51 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10176 Attorneys for Magazine Publishers of America RICHARD J. OVELMEN BAKER & MCKENZIE 1600 Barnett Tower 701 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Attorneys for the Miami Herald Publishing Company Desra O. FOUST McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. 2100 Q Street Sacramento, California 95816 SANDRA S. BARON GAYLE C. SPROUL National Broadcasting Company, Inc. 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10112 ALBERTO IBARGUEN NANCY E. RICHMAN Newsday, Inc. 235 Pinelawn Road Melville, New York 11747 1735 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 504 Washington, D.C. 20006 CONSTANCE A. HEYMANN NATALIE T. LEVY Reuters Information Services Inc. 1700 Broadway New York, New York 10019 Washington, D.C. 20071 New York, New York 10106 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........cccesecccess i ti SE cccsetcccscecsvcesvceessecce POINT ONE—CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE HAS REPLACED THE COMMON LAW FAIR COMMENT PRIVILEGE IN PROTECTING EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION FROM DEFAMA- Be OED ba cevecedcccccccescccecccos: POINT TWO—IN DRAWING THE _ LINE BETWEEN FACT AND OPINION, THE LODE- STAR MUST BE THE PROTECTION OF THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS AND OPINIONS....... POINT THREE—A STATEMENT OF OPINION DISAGREEING WITH SWORN TESTIMONY DOES NOT FORFEIT CONSTITUTIONAL PRO- POINT FOUR—THE CHALLENGED STATE- MENTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PRO- TECTED EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION.......... SET saceseconvetcecevevececcceuceceeces 17 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: PAGE A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 GE ne vccccccccencqeasedduséceosncéecenseesess 6, 7 Action Repair, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 776 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1985) ......... cc cece eee eee 12 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)............ 23 Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, S00 N.E.2d 794 (1986) ....... ccc ccc c cece eee eeees 24 Amcor Investment Corp. v. Cox Arizona Publications, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985) ...........00005- 12 Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989) ........ 14 Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 721 P.2d 87 (1986), cert. GG, Ge Gee Te Gc cc cccéccccccecececes 14 Bennett v. Transamerica Press, 298 F. Supp. 1013 Gees. GD Mand che cdcbdeceuoncuceseceusesees< 24 Bland v. Verser, 299 Ark. 490, 774 S.W.2d 124 (1989) 15 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., GD Ue GED Gc ccccccccccocescceceed 4, 15, 16, 17 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189 (ist Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 GRRE oc ccccndscccecececcesocecensceesnesesesées 15 Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981) ...... 12, 13 Brooks v. Paige, 773 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1989). ..26, 27 Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1989) .............. ili PAGE Bucher v. Roberts, 198 Colo. 1, 595 P.2d 239 (1979). 14 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977) ......... ccc eee eeeees 21 Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash. App. 29, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 | PEPE PPrrerrrrTiTrr rrr ir ririrriirrir Tee 12 Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 335 S.E.2d 97 (1985) 15 Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d GE, FR ob cccedecccencecosccccccdveccceess 13, 23, 24 Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) 10 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (Sth Gs MD cnccccesececcadcsosbeecncnceseeceséuss 10 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).. 9, 17 Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. ee, Ge Be Oe I co ndcctécecccccooesesee 6 Edwards v. National Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) .......... 24 Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900) 7 El Paso Times v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987)........... 15 Falls v. Sporting News Publishing Co., 834 F.2d 611 GE Gas FRG ac ccccccccccccecccccececscecesoeces 14 Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984) ... 1] Finck v. City of Tea, 443 N.W.2d 632 (S.D. 1989)... 15 Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 402 Mass. 376, S23 .B.3G GSD CIDER) . occ ccccccccccccccccccccess 14 Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 760 P.2d 57 (Mont. SE, cuposseeedereuccoueesuescebcueasdensedeses 14 iv PAGE From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition denied, 412 So. Ge Gee Ee boddecés dacdsbasdadbboosescees< 12 Fudge v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988)........... 12, 13 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)........... 4 Gernander v. Winona State University, 428 N.W.2d oe Gee Gs SS Be cdvccveceseecccscscecs 14 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 Se b600 6h ne nceateucdededecaeesel 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, passim Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982)............. 14 Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 ee © Gee ohn ccacccesstenccuceucasctésacesedés 10 Haas v. Painter, 62 Or. App. 719, 662 P.2d 768, review denied, 295 Or. 297, 668 P.2d 381 (1983)... 15 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, ff EE re ee ne 18 Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 §S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. sé cnkdéecddadbbeskanedesebenssedeéechicetes 15 Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 520 A.2d 147 (R.1. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 63 (1989) . 15 Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356 (D. Colo. 1987), aff’d, 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985)... 14 Hodgins v. Times Herald Co., 169 Mich. App. 245, Gp See Se GD bo cbse bccbesseccesscvcocss 14 PAGE Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 Des Be Gee oc cccccccceccccceccccccccccecocces 27 Hoffman Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 390, 248 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1988) .. 11 Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1977), aff’d, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 12 Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977)........... 21 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 GEE Scccceccceccces: ceccecesocecoocescecess 4, 9, 16 Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y. 548, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 549 N.E.2d 129 (1989)...... 10, 12, 14, 15 Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980) .............. 20 Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) ........ ccc cece cee ees 14 Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. SD OE GED 005 n00500606es6eeesecoeesooseses 12 Jenkins v. KYW, A Division of Group W, Wes- tinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 829 F.2d 403 dL ETOP PPTTTTT TTT ITT TTT TT TTT 13 Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d BBS GOW FRE s cc cccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 15 Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1 (1956)... 6 Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) 14 Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711 (hithe Cie. 96S) oc cccccccccccccccccsccseccces 10, 13, 14 vi PAGE Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. Fe Peccenccesseveovesseoseséberseebessosocoes 11, 12, 13 Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d Fee Ge cdbsccndssecscesecscocccsscdedecovcs 11, 14 Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1190 (1985).. 24 Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)....... 10 Lindsey v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 607 F.2d 672 (Sth Cir. 1979).......... 13, 14 MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 638 P.2d 689 Pe evektievcdebacdscdsndsdsnddabbibedadiésiecs 14 Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960) ............ 7 Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 > Bee ecvbscctcecdscddebsbeddiisdededs adésoecen< 14 Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1981).......... 11 Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977)...... 12, 14 Meridian Star, Inc. v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1332 (Miss. i tdes ieadedssonncdteabedibbendaddbeubieses 14 Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).......... 15 Mittelman v. Witous, 1989 lil. Lexis 172, 1989 Westlaw DE Gy EE caectesecnsondeoesestoeeooroces 11, 14 Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988) ...... 14 Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 eee ee Ge > Edbccccsecedetecosceccece: 13, 19 PAGE Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983) 14 Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 857 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1527 EPPO POPTTTTT TTT TTITTTTTT TTT TTT Le 13 Nash v. Keene Publishing Co., 127 N.H. 214, 498 A.2d BED GFE co cccdcdecocescccscosocccccoccccccecoes 14 Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337 (1983) ........ 0c ee eceeee 11, 14 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 CR oc occccccece cccccccoccoscccccoess 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 19, 23, 26 Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 Gs coseeeeoessccedoes 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 26 Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979) ...... 6.6 ccc ceues 12, 13 Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), petition denied, 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) =14 Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d 60, 520 N.Y.S.2d BIB CITED cc ccccccceccccccccccccccccccceceoccoes 27 Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 GB. TGR cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccceses 11 Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Abadke 1966) 2. occ cccccccccccccccccccccccccecess 6 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 GED coccccsoccccccccccccceesecces 3, 4, 16, 17, 22, 23 Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987)......... tel Ea 20, 21, 22, 26 PAGE Renwick v. News & Observer Pub., 63 N.C. App. 200, 304 S.E.2d 593 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 GO vccccccccccecesecsncecessescecadeoocesocces 15 “ey «olica v. Oswald, | Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788)........ 9 Riley v. Moyed, $29 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987)........... 14 Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 366 N.E.2d 1299, cert. Go, Ge Ws Ee enc cdccnsscoceceesesscex 24 Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983).... 14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).......... 9 Ryan v. Herald Ass’n, Inc., 566 A.2d 1316 (Vt. Seessbebbsnnccesecdésustibnedibledanteckeccces 11, 15 S&W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1105 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)............ 14 Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d Geer Ge ectcnnckcansocdsadsssdBbbbessencctoves 15 Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.), cert. CBee ee > SD whbcccedsébdésotecces 14 Smith v. Levitt, 227 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1955)........ 24 Southern Air Transport v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1989)............. 24 Stepien v. Franklin, 39 Ohio App. 3d 47, 528 N.E.2d Se GE ndenudscasadbudsocscesssessseeeesedse 24, 27 Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988)..... 13, 19 Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid-South Publishing Co., 651 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)....... 15 PAGE Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942)......... . Triggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass’n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 DE, FED Gc ceccccecccccccceccccccceccececes 7 True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986)........... 14 Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 ED ccccceccesencccescocenseccsccccccescecoces 14 Walker v. Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)..... s Walker v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 394 F.2d 800 (8th Ge, BD dccccccccdcccscceocececococesceeccsoss & Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 GIFTED cc ccccdecccetcesscoccccceccoscececcevesose 12 Woods v. Evansville Press, 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. BEE. ccccccsdcccoccesecccccesoccosecocesececcss 14 Yancey v. Hamilton, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1012 Gi. BGEBD . cccccccccccccccccccccccecccsccccccees 14 Yerkie v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 470 F. Supp. 91 (D. OE, Bee ccccccccccecescececcecescesececeeseces 11 Other: 36 C.J. Libel and Slander (1924) .... 2.26.66 eeeene 5 L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation (1978)......... 5, 25 Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defama- tion: Awareness and Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. GBS CIGBG...ccccccccccccccccccccccces 9, 18, 21, 23 Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amend- ment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205 (1976)...........++- 5, 6 Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1221 (IDI) 2. ccccccccccccccccccccccccees 6 PAGE W. Lippman, Public Opinion (MacMillan paperback OE Tee weecccccckcnccssdetobsesbousscoscecotes 18 Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1207 (1949) ..............4.. 5 Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 Rutgers L. Pe, GS Gee Cv cesececcctcccccesesecescscoseese 8, 11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New England Newspa- pers, Inc. v. Healey, No. 88-1939............6645. 22 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (2d ed. Sn co sceccecccecesesoesoocecoeoceceoosoesosees 5 R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems (1980) 19 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566 (1977) ...... 2, 11, 22 Restatement of Torts, § 606(1) (1938) ............... 5 Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion—A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 We Be ER, Ee Ge cccccccsesecceseccesse 5 - = en IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1989 No. 89-645 > MICHAEL MILKOVICH, SR., Petitioner, —against— THE LORAIN JOURNAL CO., THE NEWS HERALD and THEODORE DIADIUN, Respondents. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO > BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC., ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS This brief is respectfully submitted, with the consent of the parties, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, urg- ing affirmance of the decision below of the Supreme Court of Ohio on the grounds that the matter alleged herein to be libelous constitutes opinion and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States there- fore bar Petitioner's action. INTEREST OF AMICI Amici include writers, editors and publishers of newspa- pers, magazines and newswires, and owners of radio and tele- vision stations and networks, involved in communicating 2 news, information and opinion to the American public, and organizations of persons or entities involved in such com- munication. Each of the amici is more fully described in the Appendix annexed hereto. From time to time, amici or their members are targets of libel actions in which the question of legal protection for expression of opinion is an issue. The question presented in this case is therefore a matter of contin- uing and critical concern to amici. They and their constitu- ents will be directly affected by the Court's resolution of the question now before it. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT At common law, opinion was protected from defamation judgments under the doctrine of fair comment. Designed to preserve freedom of debate, fair comment became so entan- gled in caveats and qualifications differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction that it did not adequately serve that goal. As subject to the laws of many jurisdictions, there arose serious danger, similar to that confronted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), of unpopular opinion being punished by unsympathetic local juries employing vague legal standards. Against this backdrop, this Court observed in Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974), that non-actionable, (ii) emphatically repeating the Gertz state- ment in defamation-related cases, (iii) implying that the cross- ing of ‘‘the line between fact and opinion’’ by a communication has constitutional ramifications, and (iv) holding that, at least im cases treating media publications 3 about matters of public concern, the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity, so that an opinion in such a case, which is incapable of being proved false, is necessarily non-actionable. H : 4 | E} ing fact from opinion. See Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987). Finally, as suggested by the logic of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), because of the importance of assuring free debate, in cases where the balance is close, questionable statements should be treated as protected opin- jon rather than actionable assertions of fact. (Point Two.) An opinion should not forfeit constitutional protection solely because it implies an accusation of criminal activity. This is particularly true with respect to statements contradict- ing sworn testimony. Such expression is often simply a state- : general test of whether it conveys information about the outside world or the author's attitude toward such information. It is within the First Amendment protections for doctrine of fair comment. The Court's statement in Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), that “‘fujnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea,” id. at 339, however, has given rise to law that has replaced the fair comment privilege. Opinion is now protected directly by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. All the federal circuits and courts in more than two-thirds of the states adhere to this position. It is rooted in the principles enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and receives support from the Court’s opinions in Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), as well as Gertz. 5 Under the common law, to recover for defamation a plain- tiff was ordinarily required to prove only that a defamatory statement had been published about him. See L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation §5 at 15-16 (1978). In order to escape liability, the defendant had to establish either that the statement was true (‘‘justification’’) or that it fell within the protection of one of several specific privileges, of which ‘‘fair comment’’ was the most prominent. A defendant’s fair comment plea required that he first prove that his statement was indeed comment or opinion,’ precisely the issue that, in the constitutional context, troubled and divided the court below. See, e.g., W. Prosser, Hand- book of the Law of Torts 622 (2d ed. 1955); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion—A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1203, 1204 (1962) (‘‘the availability of the defense of fair comment oftentimes turns upon whether or not a particular statement will be placed into one cubbyhole called ‘fact’ or in another called ‘opinion’ *’); Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1212 (1949) (‘‘the distinction, more often announced than defined, between comments and statements of fact is often crucial to the out- come of fair comment litigation’’). A defendant relying on the common law privilege was also required to establish that his communication was about a matter of public concern; that it was based upon a true or privileged statement of fact or on facts otherwise known or available to the public; that it represented his actual opinion; and that it was not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the target of the opinion. Restatement of Torts, § 606(1) (1938). Additionally, from court to court and state to state, the privilege was hedged about with caveats and qualifications. Courts variously required, for example, that the communica- tion at issue ‘‘not be ‘unreasonably violent or vehement’ or 1 **The terms comment and opinion are used interchangeably in the cases. . ."” Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1227 (1976). Cf. Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc., 418 1).S. 323, 339-40 (1974) apparently treating the words as synonyms; 36 C.J. Libel and Slander § 285 (1924). 6 ‘excessively vituperative’; that it . . . ‘be a reasonable infer- ence from facts truly stated’; that it . . . be presented in a ‘proper manner’ and be ‘based upon reasonable or probable cause’; and especially that it. . . ‘be fair.’ ’’ Hill, Defama- tion and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1229-30 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Typically, “courts [were] content with general statements that the fair- ness or reasonableness of the comment [was] for the jury.’’ Id. at 1233 (footnote omitted). The purpose served by the common law protection for comment was essentially the same as that which later impelled the Court to establish constitutional limitations on defamation judgments: to insure that ‘‘debate on public issues [be] uninhibited, robust and wide-open. .. .”’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).? While the common law tradition was, as members of this Court have recognized, ‘‘rich and complex,’’ see, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, quoting Hill, supra, at 1239), its very richness and complexity rendered the fair comment priv- ilege inadequate to fulfill its purpose of protecting free expression. Thus, under the common law privilege: ¢ A publisher suffered a substantial libel judgment for publishing an editorial referring to the plaintiff— who had accused the city police commissioner of incompetence—as ‘‘infamous’’ and harboring ‘‘a motive.’’ The grounds: that the apparently ample facts 2 See, e.g., Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711, 714 (Alaska 1966) (‘‘freedom of discussion and debate on public issues’’); Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 591, 93 So. 2d 171, 173 (1957) (that “‘matters of a public nature may be freely discussed’’); Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7, 137 N.E.2d 1, $ (1956) (“‘{iJmn furtherance of . . . the right to write freely’’). See also Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1221, 1222-23 (1976). 5 supporting the characterization, none of which the jury was permitted to learn, were not set forth in the edito- rial. A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 271, 176 A.2d 340, 341, 342 (1961). ° A “good government’’ group’s recommendation against a candidate for public office ‘‘because in the last legislature he championed measures opposed to the moral interests of the community’’ was held to be unprotected because the facts—that the plaintiff had voted for anti-temperence legislation—were not stated. The case was remanded for trial as to the ‘‘truth’’ of the opinion. Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 354, 83 N.W. 110, 111, 113 (1900). © Withering, persistent criticism of one Oscar Triggs, a widely known English professor—‘*We cannot boast of having discovered Triggs, for he was born great, dis- covered himself early and has a just appreciation of the value of this discovery’’—was held not, as a matter of law, to be fair comment. “‘[T]he question whether the criticism was fair and just or willfully assailed the repu- tation of the plaintiff, would be for the jury.”’ 7riggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass’n, 179 N.Y. 144, 147, 154, 71 N.E. 739, 740, 742 (1904). ¢ An editorial im a Jewish newspaper, mocking the conduct of a prominent Jewish lawyer affiliated with a competing newspaper for arguing against adjourning a case for the Jewish New Year, saying his behavior made ‘‘all of us Jews look ridiculous,’’ was held actionable subject to a jury determination as to whether an alleged **long-standing feud’’ between the newspapers was ‘‘suf- ficient to rebut the existence of the defense of fair com- ment.’ Maidman vy. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 647, 653, 654, 355 P.2d 265, 267, 270, 271, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619, 622, 623 (1960), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1989). Strongly held views, even on matters of obvious public concern, thus could not be aired with any assurance of safety. A decision to speak out required first a prediction as to what state’s law would govern any ensuing litigation, then a guess as to how a jury would determine issues as vague and subjective as whether the views were the speaker's ‘‘actual opinion,”’’ or were ‘‘excessively vituperative’’ or ‘‘unfair.’’ While the very process of submitting unpopular opinion to scrutiny by courts and juries endangers freedom of speech, the hazard increased dramatically as technology gave birth to publications and broadcasts disseminated widely, often nationally. There arose the threat of six- and seven-figure libel judgments resting on local juries’ findings as subjective and ephemeral as that the criticism was ‘‘unfair’’ or ‘‘unrea- sonable.’”? The danger to press freedom posed by the application of local defamation law to unpopular publications provided the stark backdrop for New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). That decision, of course, concerned defama- tory false statements of fact, not assertions of opinion. In the context of a series of massive libel suits brought by local pub- lic officials against locally unpopular publishers and broad- casters from other parts of the country, id. at 278, n.18 and 295 (Black, J., concurring), the Court held, inter alia, that the common law rule requiring a defendant to prove truth in order to escape liability in such a case was constitutionally insufficient. ‘‘The rule . . . dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and 3 With respect to wire copy or syndicated material, an aggrieved per- son could bring separate actions in many jurisdictions, each applying its own common law standards. See, e.g., Note, Fact and Opinion Afier Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 87- 88 (1981), describing a series of suits brought by a Congressman against newspapers carrying a syndicated column that allegedly accused him of anti- Semitic behavior. Most of the courts held the column to be non-libelous; one held it to be actionable and unprotected by the fair comment doctrine. Swee- ney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942). Cf. Walker v. Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Associated Press dispatch in Walker resulted in at least 15 different lawsuits by the plaintiff against various defendants throughout the United States. Walker v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 394 F.2d 800, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1968) (col- lecting cases). 9 Fourteenth Amendments.’’ Jd. at 279. The antidote: the Court’s holding that a public-official plaintiff must prove “actual malice’ with convincing clarity subject to indepen- dent appellate review before a libel judgment in his favor will be permitted to stand. Had the Sullivan case involved an unpopular editorial rather than an unpopular advertisement—opinion and fair comment rather than fact and ‘“‘justification’’—the result would necessarily have been the same. Large verdicts directed against New York Times editorials critical of public officials in another region of the country, based solely on a pub- lisher’s failure to prove to a local jury’s satisfaction that the article was ‘‘fair’’ or ‘“‘presented in a proper manner’’ or con- stituted ‘‘a reasonable inference,’’ would certainly and in equal measure have undermined the ‘‘unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes ... . Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).* Had such judgments thus threatened to impede the ‘‘free flow of ideas and opinions,”’ which are ‘‘{a}t the heart of the First Amendment,’’ Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988), the Court would doubtless have interceded to ensure protection beyond that offered by each state’s law of fair comment.’ It was not called upon to do so.* 4 The Founders “firmly adhered to the proposition that the ‘true lib- erty of the press’ permitted ‘every man to publish his opinion.’ "’ Curtis Pub- lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149-50 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.), quoting Respublica v. Oswald, | Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788). 5 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, itself had implications for protection of opinion. First, it required plaintiff to prove “‘actual malice.”’ Id. at 280. Insofar as that implies that it is a public official's burden to prove falsity, see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), such a plaintiff cannot prevail if the communication is an opinion that can be proved neither true nor false. See Franklin & Busse!, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825, 855-56 (1984). Second, at footnote 30, the Court observed: ‘‘[A] defense of fair comment must [as a matter of constitutional law] be afforded for honest expression of (footnote 6 appears on next page) 10 Against this legal landscape, in 1974, the Court made its provocative observation in Gertz: We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How- ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). That statement has often been referred to as dictum.’ What- ever the words’ precise force as precedent, however, they have had an extraordinary impact on the law of defamation. On the day the Court rendered its opinion in Gertz, it also decided Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). The Court held that the use of vigorous epithets in the context of a labor dispute could not support a defamation judgment, basing its holding, at least in part, on the Gertz principle that “there is no such thing as a false idea.”’ Jd. at 284. The epi- opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact.’ 376 U.S. at 292. Indeed, the holding in Sullivan was based on the minority fair com- ment rule that misstatements of fact as well as comment about public figures were protected. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). 6 Before Gertz, the Court decided Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresier, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), holding that use of the term ‘“blackmail”’ as an epithet directed at a public figure “‘was not slander when spoken and not libel when [published].’" Jd. at 13. It is not clear from the Court's opin- ion whether it was suggesting that the statement was constitutionally pro- tected because it was opinion, non-actionable because the plaintiff-public figure could not carry the New York Times burden of proving falsity, or pro- tected as a matter of law under an ancient (although uncited) line of author- ity that mere insults are not defamatory (see, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (Sth Cir. 1966)), or otherwise. 7 See, e.g., Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Keller v. Miami Herald Pub- lishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 715 n.11 (1ith Cir. 1985); Immuno, A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, , 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941, $49 N_E.2d 129, 132 (1989). 1] thets were opinion, as such unprovable, and therefore non- actionable. Although the Gertz language when stated was dic- tum, it was thus treated as authoritative by the Court on the same day it was first uttered. Meanwhile, the American Law Institute was considering a revision of the Restatement of Torts. Note, Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Weich, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privi- lege, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 97-99 (1981). When it published the Second Restatement, three years after Gertz, the Institute abandoned the common law defense of fair comment reflected in the 1938 version of the Restatement. *‘The com- mon law rule that an expression of opinion of the . . . pure . . . type may be the basis of an action for defamation now appears to have been rendered unconstitutional by U-S. Supreme Court decisions.’’ Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566 comment c (1977). Jurisdiction by jurisdiction, an avalanche followed. Per- haps attracted by the protection that Gertz offered to full and free public discussion and the relative simplicity of the doctrine, court after court employed the Gertz language as a mandate for a constitutionally based rule providing immunity for expressions of opinion. The fair comment privilege was, simultaneously, al] but abandoned. Some courts explicitly held that Gertz had rendered the fair comment privilege obsolete.’ Some implied as much by refer- ring to the fair comment privilege but then deciding the case 8 Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d $07, $09 (9h Cir. 1987); Pearce v. EF. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1503 (D.D.C. 1987); Yerkie v. Post- Newsweek Stations, 470 F. Supp. 91, 94 (D. Md. 1979); Mittelman v. Wir- ous, 1989 Ill. Lexis 172 at 18, 1989 Westlaw 154272 at 7 (IN. 1989); Ryan v. Herald Ass’n, Inc., $66 A.2d 1316, 1321-22 (Vt. 1989); Hoffman Co. v. E.1. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 202 Cal. App. 3d 390, 407 n.10, 248 Cal. Rptr. 384, 395 n.10 (1988); Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 278 (Miss. 1984); Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 413 n.6, 664 P.2d 337, 343 n.6 (1983); Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N_J. 62, 65, 444 A.2d 1086, 1087 (1982); Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Trib- une Co., 98 N.M. 282, 295, 648 P.2d 321, 334 (Ct. App. 1981). 12 solely on the basis of the Constitution.’ Others considered the constitutional privilege first and then declared that the consti- tutional analysis had rendered superfluous any consideration of defendant's claim of fair comment.” As one court that did first consider fair comment felicitously put it, “‘Much of what we find it necessary to write in this opinion may be lik- ened unto deciding whether or not a base runner touched third when it is clear that he was thrown out at home plate." Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1241-42, n.4 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). In adopting the Gertz-based rule, many courts seemed to bypass the principle that constitutional questions are to be addressed only after a review of state law demonstrates that constitutional consideration is necessary.’ Several circuit courts explicitly stated that the constitutional privilege is to be analyzed before any consideration of state fair comment law.” Other circuits simply considered the constitutional 9 Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 820 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.13 (4th Cir. 1987); Action Repair, Inc. v. American Broadcast- ing Cos., 776 F.2d 143, 146-47 (7th Cir. 1985); Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Orr v. Argus-Press Co, $86 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 358-59 (D. Colo. 1987), aff'd, 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989); Immuno A.C. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y 2d $48, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 549 N.E.2d 129 (1989); Amcor Investment Corp. v. Cox Arizona Publications, Inc., 690 $.W 2d 775, 780-83 (Mo. 1985); From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 54, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition denied, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982). 10 Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, $78 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Camer v. Seattle Post- Intelligencer, 45 Wash. App. 29, 41 n.3, 723 P.2d 1195, 1202 n.3 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 886 (La 1977). 11 See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 160 n.2 (1979), referring in a libel case to “the general principle that dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated before reaching constitu- tional issues.”’ 12 Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Lid., 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 508-09 (Hh Cir. 1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 768 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). 13 question directly, without explaining the departure from ordi- nary procedure.’ In some jurisdictions, indeed, the rule extracted from Gertz, that statements of opinion are never false and can therefore never be actionable, seems to have been adopted as the State’s new common law of fair com- ment. See, e.g., Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1987) (‘California . . . tends to conflate common law principles and constitutional doctrine on the definition of opinion’’); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 7i1, 716 (ilth Cir. 1985) (following Florida law which fol- lows the Gertz-based rule). Now, 15 years afver Gertz, every Federal Circuit," and the courts of at least 36 States and the District of Colum-* 13 Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989); Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). Some circuits follow the traditional rule of considering the non- constitutional fair comment privilege first. Naneveti v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 857 F.2d 96, 106 n.11 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1528 (1989); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 717 (11th Cir. 1985); Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F 2d 1238, 1241-42 & n.4 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1111-14 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). Several in the latter group have criticized the formalistic necessity of considering the obsolete fair comment privilege before resolving the case under the dispositive constitutional privilege. Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1241-42 n.4; Orr, $86 F.2d at 1114. In Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1987), then-Judge Kennedy cited two reasons underlying the Ninth Circuit's policy of proceed- ing directly to the constitutional issue. First, the very state law that would be applied, California's, itself has rejected fair comment analysis in favor of the constitutional privilege. Second, he noted the significant number of federal appellate courts that decide fact/opinion issues in diversity cases under the federal constitutional standard. 14 FIRST CIRCUIT: Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Lid., 840 F.2d 1012 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); SECOND CIRCUIT: Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur $.A., 759 F.2d 219 Q2d Cir. 1985); THIRD Cir- CUITT: Jenkins v. KYW, A Division of Group W, Westinghouse Broadcasting 4& Cable, Inc., 829 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1987); FOURTH CIRCUTT: Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co. , 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Lindsey v. Board of Regents of the University System of 14 bia,’ have held that opinion is constitutionally protected because “‘[uJnder the First Amendment there is no such Georgia, 607 F.2d 672 (Sth Cir. 1979); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Fails v. Sporting News Publishing Co., 834 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1987); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Woods v. Evansville Press, 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986); EIGHTH CIRCUTT: Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989); NINTH CIRCUIT: Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (Kh Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989); TENTH CIRCUTT: Rinsiey v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983) (false light action); ELEVENTH CiR- CUIT: Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1985) (looking to Florida law); D.C. CIRCUIT: Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). 1S ALASKA: Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988); ARIZONA: MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 638 P.2d 689 (1981); CALI FORNIA: Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 34 254, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 721 P.2d 87 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); COLo- RADO: Bucher v. Roberts, 198 Colo. 1, 595 P.2d 239 (1979); CONNECT. CUT: Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); DELAWARE: Riley v. Moyed, $29 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987), DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983); FLORIDA: Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), petition denied, 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); GBORGIA: S4W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1105 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); ILLINONS: Mitteiman v. Witous, 1989 Ill. Lexis 172, 1989 Westlaw 1°4272 (Ill. 1989); INDIANA: Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. I ; KENTUCKY: Yancey v. Hamilton, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1012 (Ky. 1989); LOUISIANA: Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977); MAINE: True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986); MARYLAND: Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. $14, 343 A.2d 251 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) (recognizing a constitutionally based fair comment privilege); MASSACHUSETTS: Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 402 Mass. 376, $22 N.EB.2d 959 (1988); MICHIGAN: Hodgins v. Times Herald Co., 169 Mich. App. 245, 425 N.W.2d $22 (Ct. App. 1988); MINNE- SOTA: Gernander v. Winona State University, 428 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); MISSISSIPPI: Meridian Siar, Inc v. Williams, $49 So. 2d 1332 (Miss. 1989); MISSOURI: Henry v. Halliburton, 690 $.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1985); MONTANA: Frigon v. Morrison-Maierie, Inc., -50 P.2d $7 (Mont. 1988); NEBRASKA: Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 4.1 N.W.2d 298 (1987); NEVADA: Neveda Independent Broedcasting Corp. v. Allen, ® Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337 (1983); NEW HAMP*TIRE: Nash v. Keene Publishing Co., 127 N.H. 214, 498 A.ld 348) __.,, NEW JERSEY: Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982); NEW MEXICO: Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982); NEW YORK: /mmwno AC v. 15 thing as a false idea.’ And while the Court has not explicitly ruled on the application of the Gertz language to protection for opinion, three decisions have been significant. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (product disparagement), the Court quoted Gertz in relation to the First Amendment ‘‘freedom to speak one’s mind,’’ contrasting the ‘‘ideas’’ and ‘‘opin- ions”’ referred to in Gertz with speech “‘to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment does not extend . Id. at 503-04. Notably, the Circuit Court in Bose, 692 F.2d 189 (ist Cir. 1982), had considered whether the defendant's published review of the performance of the plaintiff's audio equipment was opinion protected under the Gertz statement or fact subject to the ‘‘actual malice’’ rule. Finding the fact/ opinion distinction peculiarly difficult ia that case, id. at 193- 94, the Court of Appeals assumed the statement was factual and, exercising independent appellate review, held that “‘actual malice’’ had not been proved. Jd. at 194-97. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y. 548, $49 N.Y¥.S 2d 938, 549 N.E.2d 129 (1989); OHNO: Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986); OKLABKOMA: Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); OREGON: Haas v. Painter, 62 Or. App. 719, 662 P.2d 768, review denied, 295 Or. 297, 668 P.2d 381 (1983) (finding constitutional protection for opinion about public officials); RHODE ISLAND: Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., $20 A.2d 147 (R.1. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 63 (1989); SOUTH DAKOTA: Finck v. City of Tea, 443 N.W. (632 (S.D. 1989); TENNESSEE: Siones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid-South Publishing Co., 651 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); TEXAS: El Paso Times v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987); VERMONT: Ryan v. Herald Ass'n, Inc., 566 A.2d 1316 (Vt. 1989); VIRGINIA: Cheves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 335 S.B.2d 97 (1985); WEST VIRGINIA: Hevelunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 §.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1981). Cases in other states indicate that those states are likely to hold that opimon is constitutionally provected. See ARKANSAS: Bland v. Verser, 299 Ark. 490, 774 S.W.2d 124 (1989) (finding that statements were factual, not constitutionally protected opinion); OWA: Jones v. Palmer Communica- tions, Inc, 440 NW 2d 884 (Lowa 1989) (stating in dictum that opinion is constitutionally protected), NORTH CAROLINA: Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. 63 \ C. App. 200 304 §.B.2d 593 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, S1O NC 312, 312 § E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984). — must bear the burden of proving truth—must fall |. . t© & Constitutional requirement thet the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity . . . before recover- ing damages. 475 U.S. at 776. our political system and an open society.’ * Curtis Publishing Co. v. Burts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (citation omitted). 18 «If a defendani is found liable for defamation wuhout amy awareness that what he has written might be understood as a statement of fact, he has been held hable without fault, a result not permitted by Gerrz See Franklin & Busse, The Plawnn//'s Burden in Defamation Awereness end Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rew. 825, 834-5! (1984). 1? 86