# Respondents Brief — Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0641%3A07

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 491 U.S. 1

## Text

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner
vs.

UNION GAS COMPANY, Respondent

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Robert A. Swift
(Counsel of Record)

R. Goodman
KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.
2400 One Reading Center
1101 Market Street

PA 19107

(215) 238-1700

Lawrence Demase

ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN,
DUFF & HASLEY

900 Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412) 434-8610

7
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether CERCLA’ language unmistakably expresses
Congress’ intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity?

2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal
courts from asserting jurisdiction only in diversity of citizen-
ship cases between a defendant state and a citizen of a differ-
ent state’?

3. Whether Article I of the Constitution empowers Con-
gress to abrogate state immunity to private lawsuits?

4. Whether state consent to suit is a prerequisite to con-

gressional abrogation?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... ..
PRARSREER GE GRD GUED « ok cc cv cscctceeseseasneuneane

CERCLA’ Language Unmistakably Expresses
Congress’ Intention to Abrogate Eleventh
Amendment Immunity ....................

A. The Purpose of CERCLA Is To Redress a
Festering National Environmental Prob-

B. CERCLA’ Language Satisfies the Clear
DREGE GHD. «0 04 cc cacenuacdanenenee

C. Construing CERCLA To Permit Persons To
Sue States Promotes the Purposes of the
GMB .cccceccescecsencasesuennneeee

The Eleventh Amendment Precludes Federal
Courts From Asserting Jurisdiction Only in
Diversity of Citizenship Cases Between a
Defendant State and a Citizen of a Different
BREED . ccccccncscccecescenueane

A. As Drafted in 1787, the Constitution Did
Not Provide for State Sovereign Immunity
im PEE CARNE .. . « ccnnedeaseuuseueas

B. The Eleventh Amendment Precludes
Federal Court Jurisdiction Only in Actions
Brought by Individuals Against States
Based on Diversity of Citizenship .......

Hans v. Louisiana Should Be Overturned

D. Overturning Hans v. Louisiana Will Have a
Salutary Effect on Eleventh Amendment

PEED. oo 6 cccacnsceesanueeeee

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14

16

III. Article I of the Constitution Empowers Con-

gress to Abrogate State Immunity to Private
ek ceca wcecccsoccce ce

A. Prior Decisions of This Court Have Ac-
knowledged the Constitutionality of Article
CLE. Se uewdeecscuscccees

B. Principles of Federalism Require That Con-
gress’ Plenary Power Under Article I Not
Be Dismissed By a Judicial Inability to En-
force Its Enactments ..................

IV. State Consent Is Not a Prerequisite to Congres-

ees cece concciceces

I Ee

25

25

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Page
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985) .......... 9, 11, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 20, 22, 23
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) 17, 21, 22

County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.
1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1104 (1983) ......... 25

Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare
v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.

SD Miincisevoisesanetess 9, 10, 11, 16, 23, 27
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ................ 23
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

Ss cick Golwhutekbusasesecune’ 11, 23, 27, 28, 29
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,

ak Gf rere 17, 30
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980)......... 6, 20-25, 27
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 ........ 22
Mayle v. Pennsylvania, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709

CD ingas cd 666s Konsened OSEN ENS oneeets 20, 24
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

CD é nha khives's dnd él bealesad eee as 20

In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied sub-nom Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S.Ct.
Ns «ct iss dn 9 wining eekine et Seeeieiee 25-27

Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, reh. denied,

Se : ES 5 io cd csv dwacddienae neces 7
Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.

E+ cthGucand ss denis dud eee eens ean 26
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)........... 22

New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812)... 20

iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Cases Page
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
ET En Serre yee Ween BMC Ata. 21
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) ............. 26, 30
Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d
I ncaa ok dee es a 26
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
I ii nk on cues cae eeaaw veswadcivds 9, 23
Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903) .................. 29
Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 286 (1810) .... 20
South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) ........ 30

United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas 1), 792
F.2d at 383 (3rd Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 107 S.Ct.
aNd de pba dideeds vans 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas I), 832
EEE Re tee 9, 12, 26, 31

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ...... 10

United States v. Freeman, 680 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.N_Y.
SEE occu bay Gecasaieninyexmbeewieb bese cess 10

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem-
ical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ........ 3]

Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Trans-
portation, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987) .. 9, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27

Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F.Supp. 955
SIS ode dig ded coc eclcen clewuh badue 10

CITATIONS—(Continued )
eons TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Statut Page
Coneaean ae

B. Principles of Federalism Require that Congress’
Plenary Power Under Article I Not Be Dimin-
ished By A Judicial Inability to Enforce Its En-
actments

Congress’ powe” under Article I to subject states to suit in
federal court manifests itself in the interplay among Article I,
the Supremacy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. If, as
the Constituiion declares, the Constitution and laws made by
Congress are to be the supreme law of the land, Congress
must have authority to regulate the conduct of the states
under Article |, and the judiciary must have authority to

15. See Field. “The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrines,” 126 U. Pa. L._Rev. 1203, 1233 (1978)

29

enforce Congress’ laws.'© Sovereignty cannot inhere in au-

thority bereft of the means of enforcement. Only if construed
as a narrow jurisdiction preclusion clause is the Eleventh
Amendment consistent with this concept.

The Constitution cannot be read on a timeline with the
Eleventh Amendment as a watershed controlling under
which provision of the Constitution Congress can regulate
states by making them subject to private suits for money
damages. To do so would impinge on Congress’ ability to
establish uniform federal policy and regulate the states re-
garding its primary governmental functions specified in Arti-
cle | yet permit Congress to regulate the states in areas tradi-
tionally peripheral to Congress’ role. Such an interpretation
would be illogical. As this Court stated in Prout v. Starr, 188
U.S. 537, 543 (1903):

The Constitution o the United States, with the several
amendments thereof, must be regarded as one instru-
ment, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal
validity. It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the
immunity of the individual states from suits by citizens
of other states, provided for in the Eleventh, were to be
interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which
confer power on Congress to regulate commerce among
the several states, which forbid the states from entering
into any treaty, alliance or confederation, from passing
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the
obligation of contracts ... —all of which provisions ex-
isted before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,
which still exist, and which would be nullified and made
of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the
passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional
Sateations

16 See Tribe. “Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation
and Regulation.” 89 Harv. L Rev. 682, 694 (1976).

30

The non-unitary concept of the Constitution espoused by
Pennsylvania and amici has its basis in a misreading of
Fitzpatrick. While Fitzpatrick drew upon the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment post-dated the Eleventh, it did so
only to make the point that the states willingly surrendered to
Congress broad powers traditionally within the states’ sphere
notwithstanding the existence of the Eleventh Amendment.
Fitzpatrick did not eviscerate the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article 1, §8, by limiting judicial enforcement of
otherwise proper congressional enactments. The Eleventh
Amendment, by its own terms, cannot limit congressional
power since it is directed solely at judicial power

Again, this case illustrates the harm that would be
wrought by a limitation on Congress’ power to render states
liable to private parties for cleanup costs. Because the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA causes of
action, private parties like Union Gas are limited to suing in
federal court. If a state cannot be sued by private parties,
private parties will resist or delay voluntary cleanup of a site
in hopes that the EPA will undertake the cleanup and sue the
state. Likewise, a state will have an incentive to avoid funding
a cleanup in hopes that private parties will do so. The result-
ing standoff frustrates the congressional scheme and unduly
strains the limited resources of the Superfund trust fund.

The states’ protection from congressional abuse of its
Article | power is found in the structure of the Constitution
itself. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) As this
Court observed in Garcia, Congress consists of senators and
representatives elected in each of the fifty states, and they are
responsive to states concerns. Supra, 469 U.S. at 550. “It is no
novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Govern-
ment was designed in large part to protect the States from
overreacting by Congress.” Id. at 551. States’ direct linkage to
federal lawmakers insures that the states interests will be
considered. Furthermore, federal law-making does not occur
in a vacuum—states frequently take a direct role in lobbving
congressmen and presenting testimony supportive of their
position, as they did when CERCLA and SARA were enacted.

The framers of the Constitution properly envisioned a

3]

judiciary whose jurisdiction was coextensive with Congress’
Article | powers, and the Eleventh Amendment should not be
construed to distort that vision.

IV. STATE CONSENT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO
CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION

State consent to suit is superfluous where, as in
CERCLA, Congress abrogated state immunity to suit. Unlike
Parden, it is unnecessary to imply Pennsylvania's consent to
suit for participating in a federally regulated area since Con-

gress unmistakably expressed its intention to subject states to
liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA.

The clear statement rule is a standard of judicial inter-
pretation—it was not intended as a general notice provision.
CERCLA, as originally enacted, put states as well as other
individuals and entities on notice that they were “persons”
who could sue and be sued under section 107(a). Thus, Penn-
sylvania received as much notice as Union Gas and all other
“persons” of their rights under CERCLA.'’ The mere fact that
CERCLA imposes liability based on a person's status creates
no unfairness to states that is not visited on all other persons.
If, as numerous lower courts have held, CERCLA'’s imposition
of retroactive liability is constitutional under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause,'* notice is irrelevant and no
Eleventh Amendment issue is even implicated.

17. The notice issue raised by Pennsylvania is also irrelevant since
both before and after passage of CERCLA, the seepage of coal tar from the
Brodhead Creek site continued while Pennsylvania was an owner and oper-
ator of the site.

18. See US. w Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810
F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir 1986) and cases cited therein.

32

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of
appeals in Union Gas II should be affirmed and the case
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

July 11, 1988

Respectfully submitted,

Robert A. Swift"

Marguerite R. Goodman

KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.
1101 Market Street, Suite 2400

Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 238-1700

Lawrence Demase

ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN.
DUFF & HASLEY

900 Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 434-8610

Attorneys for Respondent
Union Gas Company

“Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0641%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
