# Opposition Brief — William George Bonin v. California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 494 U.S. 1039

## Text

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:

(s) JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
No. 88-7381 “ORIGINAL

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1988

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of California

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General
of the State of California

RICHARD B. IGLEHART,
Chief Assistant Attorney General

HARLEY D. MAYFIELD,
Senior Assistant Attorney General

JANELLE B. DAVIS,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General

STEVEN H. ZEIGEN,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 700

San Diego, CA 92101

Telephone: (619) 237-7679

Attorneys for Respondent

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED © TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Was petitioner denied his right to effective Page
assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest arising from
@ purported literary rights fee agreement and from the fact recep cot ancane :
counsel had previous contact with a witness for the prosecution? eee :
2. Did the prosecutor's argument to the jury during a ee : j
the penalty phase constitute prejudicial error within the meaning Te ee ee , 7
of the Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. ___, 96 L.Ed.2d 440? ee et 7 )
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS f
Petitioner, William George Bonin, is a prisoner 6
incarcerated under judgment of death at the California State , pattie Rg crt hn aaceeneen seaveuence
Prison at San Quentin, California. Respondent is the People of ne m
the State of California. 4“ Saubiundens 6¢ uatennen” 19
B. Discussion 21
II THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT DURING THE PENALTY .
PHASE WAS NOT VIOLATIVE OF BOOTH V. MARYLAND 25 ~
CONCLUSION 28
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Page Petitioner seeks review of an opinion of the California . ’
Cases , Supreme Court affirming his judgment of death. (People v. Bonin
Booth v. Maryland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808.) ;
(1987) 482 U.S. 496 24-26 |

JURISDICTION
Brien v. United States -
(lst Cir. 1982) 695 F.2d 10 21, 23 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Cha v. California section 1257(3).
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 27
CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Cuyler v. Sullivan
(1980) 446 U.S. 335 24 United States Constitution, Sixth, Eighth and
Dukes v. Warden . Fourteenth Amendments.
(1972) 406 U.S. 250 24
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Glasser v. United States
(1942) 315 U.S. 60 22, 23 In an information filed by the District Attorney's
Holloway v. Arkansas Office of Los Angeles County on January 2, 1981, appellant was

(1978) 435 U.S. 475 20, 22, 23
charged with multitudinous offenses and special allegations. (CT
People v. Bonin

(1989) 47 Cal.3d 808 20, 22, 23 1556-1596.)
Schmerber v. California In count I, appellant was charged with the murder of
(1965) 3864 U.S. 757 25

Donald Hyden in violation of Penal Code section 187. Two special
South Carolina v. Gathers

(June 12, 1989, 88-305) __—s U.S. 26 circumstances were alleged; namely, multiple murder pursuant to
Strickland v. Washington Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and murder in the
(1984) 466 U.S. 668 21 :

course of a robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code
United States v. Winkle
(10th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 605 22, 23 within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision
Wainwright v. Sykes (@)(17). (CT 1556-1557.)
(1976) 433 U.S. 72 25

In count II, appellant was charged with the crime of
Wood v. Georgia

(1981) 450 U.S. 261 20, 21 robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code of Donald
Zant v. Stephens Hyden; it being further alleged that appellant with intent to
(1983) 462 U.S. 862 26

inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Donald
Hyden within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1558.)

In count III, appellant was charged with the murder of
David Murillo in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code.
Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple murder pursuant
to Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and to murder in
the course of a robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal
Code within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision
(a)(17). (CT 1559-1560.)

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In count IV, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery of David Murillo in violation of section 211 of the Penal
Code; it being further alleged that appellant with intent to
inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon David
Murillo within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1561.) ;

In count V, appellant was charged with the murder of
Robert Wirostek in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code. A
multiple murder special circumstance was alleged pursuant to
Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3). (CT 1562-1563.)

In count VI, appellant was charged with the murder of
Darin Kendrick in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code.
Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple murder pursuant
to Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and murder in the
course of a robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code
within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision
(a)(17). (CT 1564-1565.)

In count VII, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery of Darin Kendrick in violation of section 211 of the
Penal Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the
intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon
Darin Kendrick within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.
(CT 1566.)

In count VIII, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of Sean King in violation of section 187 of the Penal
Code, there also being a special circumstance alleged of multiple
murder within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision
(a)(3). (CT 1567-1568.)

In count IX, appellant was charged with the murder of
“John Doe” in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code; there
also being a multiple murder special circumstance alleged
pursuant to section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) of the Penal Code.
(CT 1569-1570.)

In count X, appellant was charged with the murder of
Markus Grabs in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code; it

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being further alleged special circumstances as to multiple murder
pursuant to section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) of the Penal Code,
murder in the course of a robbery in violation of section 211 of
the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2
subdivision (a)(17) and murder in the course of sodomy in
violation of section 286 subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of the Penal
Code within the meaning of Penal Code sections 190.2 subdivision
(a)(17) and 190.2 subdivision (br). (CT 1571-1572.) In count
XI, appellant was charged with the crime of robbery of Markus
Grabs in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code; it being
further alleged that appellant with the intent to inflict such
injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Markus Grabs within
the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT 1573.)

In count XII, appellant was charged with the crime of
sodomy in violation of section 286 subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of
the Penal Code upon Markus Grabs. (CT 1574.)

In count XIII, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of Thomas Lungren in violation of section 187 of the Penal
Code. Special circumstances were alleged as to -wltiple murder
special circumstances pursuant to section 190.2 subdivision
(a)(3) of the Penal Code, as well as murder in the course of a
robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211 and in the course
of mayhem in violation of Penal Code section 203 within the
meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17). (CT
1575-1576.)

In count XIV, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery of Thomas Lungren in violation of section 211 of the
Penal Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the
intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon
Thomas Lungren within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.
(CT 1577.)

In count XV, appellant was charged with the crime of
mayhem upon Thomas Lungren in violation of section 203 of the
Penal Code, it being alleged that appellant with the intent to
inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Thomas

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Lungren within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1578.)

In count XVI, appellamt was charged with the crime of
murder of Charles Miranda in violation of section 187 of the
Penal Code. Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple
murders pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a) (3)
and murder while in the course of a robbery in violation of
section 211 of the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code
section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17). (CT 1579-1580.)

In count XVII, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery upon Charles Miranda in violation of section 211 of the
Penal Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the
intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon
Charles Miranda within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.
(CT 1581.)

In count XVIII, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of James Macabe in violation of section 187 of the Penal
Code. Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple murder
within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a) (3)
and murder in the course of a robbery in violation of section 211
of the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2

subdivision (a)(17). (CT 1582-1583.)

In count XIX, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code upon James
Macabe; it being further alleged that appellant with the intent
to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon James
Macabe within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1584.)

In count XX, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of Ronald Gatlin in violation of section 187 of the Penal
Code; special circumstances being alleged as to multiple murder
pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and
murder in the course of a robbery in violation of section 211 of
the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2
subdivision {(a)(17). (CT 1585-1586.)

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In count XXI, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery upon Ronald Gatlin in violation of section 211 of the
Penal Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the

intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon

Ronald Gatlin within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.
(CT 1587.)

In count XXII, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of Harry Todd Turner in violation of section 187 of the
Penal Code. Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple
murder pursuant to section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and as to
murder while engaged in the crime of robbery in violation of
section 211 of the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code
section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17). (CT 1588-1589.)

In count XXIII, appellant was charged with the crise of
robbery upon Harry Todd Turner in violation of section 211 of the

Penal Code; it being further alleged that appellant with intent
to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Harry
Todd Turner within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7.
(CT 1590.)

In count XXIV, appellant was charged with the murder of

Steven Wood in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code.
Special circumstances were also alleged as to multiple murder
pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) and
murder while engaged in the crime of robbery in violation of
section 211 of the Penal Code within the meaning of Penal Code
section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17). (CT 1591-1592.)
; In count XXV, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery of Steven Wood in violation of section 211 of the Penal
Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the intent to
inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Steven
Wood within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1593.)

In count XXVI, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder of Steven Wells in violation of section 187 of the Penal

Code. Special circumstances were alleged as to multiple murder

pursuant to section 190.2 subdivision (a)(3) of the Penal Code
and as to murder while engaged in the crime of robbery in
violation of section 211 of the Penal Code within the meaning of
Penal Code section 190.2 subdivision (a)(17). (CT 1594-1595.)

In count XXVII, appellant was charged with the crime of
robbery of Steven Wells in violation of section 211 of the Penal
Code; it being further alleged that appellant with the intent to
inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury upon Steven
Wells within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7. (CT
1596.)

Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special
allegations. (CT 1599.) A motion pursuant to section 995 of the
Penal Code was granted as to counts V and IX only--those counts
dealing with the murders of Robert Wirostek and “John Doe.” (CT
1562, 1569, 1604.)

On July 29, 1981, a motion for change of venue was
denied. (CT 1610.)

Jury selection began October 19, 1981, (CT 1622), with
jury trial beginning on November 2, 1981.) (CT 1631.)

A motion pursuant to section 1538.5 of the Penal Code
and, in the alternative, to quash and traverse the search
warrant, was denied. The court also refused to suppress the
testimony of witnesses Munro and Miley. (CT 1632.)

A defense motion to dismiss tie great bodily injury
allegations pursuant to section 12022.7 of the Penal Code in
counts II, IV, VI, IX, XII, XV, XVII, XIX, XXI, XXIII and XXV of
the robbery counts was granted on December 18, 1981. Appellant’s
motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1118 was denied. (CT
1695.) A similar allegation was subsequently stricken from count
XIII. (CT 1699.)

Jury deliberations began December 28, 1981. (CT 1700.)
On January 6, 1982, jury verdicts were returned as follows: In
count I, appellant was found guilty of murder in the first
degree. As to the special circumstances, the jury found that the

murder of Thomas Lungren was not true; the murder of Markus Grabs

was true; that the murder of Sean King was not true; that the
murder of David Murillo was true; that the murder of Charles
Miranda was true; that the murder of James Macabe was true; that
the murder of Ronald Gatlin was true; that the murder of Harry
Todd Turner was true; that the murder of Steven Wood was true;
that the murder of Darin Kendrick was true; that the murder of
Steven Wells was true; and that the murder of Donald Hyden,
committed while engaged in the crime of robbery, was true. (CT
1975-1977.) The jury also found appellant guilty of robbery of
Donald Hyden in count II. (CT 1977.)

The jury found appellagt guilty of the murder of David
Murillo and found it to be of the first degree. The finding of
the special circumstances were the same as those of the Donald
Hyden murder except that they also found the murder of Donald
Hyden also to be true. (CT 1977-1979.) The murder of David
Murillo was found to have been committed while appellant was
engaged in the crime of robbery. (CT 1977-1979.) Additionally,
appellant was found guilty of the robbery of David Murillo in
count IV. (CT 1979.)

Appellant was found guilty of murder in the first
degree of Darin Kendrick. The finding of the multiple murder
circumstance was the same as the murder of Donald Hyden except,
of course, it included the murder of Donald Hyden. The special
circumstance alleging that appellant was engaged ir the crime of
robbery was found to have been true. (CT 1979-1981.) Appellant
was also found guilty of the robbery of Darin Kendrick in count
VI. (CT 1981.)

Appellant was found not guilty of the murder of Sean
King. (CT 1982.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of Markus Grabs. The special circumstance relative to multiple
murder was the same as that of Donald Hyden except, of course,
the murder of Donald Hyden was included as a special

circumstance. (CT 1982-1983.) The special circumstance was also

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found to be true that appellant killed Marcus Grabs while engaged
in the crime of robbery. (CT 1983.)

“The sodomy special circumstance was found to be untrue.
(CT 1984.) Appellant was found to be guilty of robbery of Markus
Grabe in count IX, but not guilty of sodomy of Markus Grabs in
count X. (CT 1984.)

Appellant was found not guilty of the murder of Thomas
Lungren in count XI, not guilty of the robbery of Thomas Lungren
in count XII and not guilty of the mayhem of Thomas Lungren in
count XIII. (CT 1984-1985.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of Charles Miranda and the special circumstances were found to be
true relative to the multiple murder as to Donald Hyden except,
of course, for the special circumstance relative to the murder of
Donald Hyden. (CT 1985-1986.) The special circumstance that the
murder was committed while appellant was engaged in the crime of
robbery was found to be true. (CT 1987.) Appellant was also
found guilty of the robbery of Charles Miranda in count XV. (CT
1987.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of James Macabe and the special circumstances relative to
multiple murder were found to be true as with Donald Hyden
except, of course, for the special circumstance relative to
Donald Hyden. (CT 1987-1989.) Additionally, the special
circumstance was found true that the murder was committed while
appellant was engaged in the crime of robbery. (CT 1989.)
Additionally, appellant was found guilty of the robbery of James
Macabe. (CT 1989.)

Appellant was also found guilty of the first degree
murder of Ronald Gatlin in count XVIII. The special circum-
stances relative to multiple murder were the same as Donald Hyden
except, of course, as to the one alleged relative to Donald
Hyden. (CT 1989-1900.) Additionally, the robbery special
circumstance was found to be true and appellant was found guilty
of the robbery of Ronald Gatlin in count XIX. (CT 1991.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of Harry Todd Turner in count XX. The multiple murder special
allegations were found to be true and were the same as Donald
Hyden except, of course, for the special circumstance concerning
Donald Hyden. The robbery special circumstance was found to have
been true and appellant was also found guilty of the robbery of
Harry Todd Turner in count XXI. (CT 1991-1993.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of Steven Wood in count XXII and the multiple murder special
allegations were found to have been true as in the case of Donald
Hyden except, of course, for Donald Hyden’s special circumstance.
The robbery special circumstance was found to be true and
appellant was also found guilty of the robbery of Steven Wood in
count XXIII. (CT 1993-1995.)

Appellant was found guilty of the first degree murder
of Steven Wells in count XXIV and the multiple murder special
circumstance was found to be true as in the case of Donald Hyden
except, of course, for the special circumstance concerning Donald
Hyden. The robbery special circumstance was found to be true and
appellant was found guilty of the robbery of Steven Wells in
count XXV. (CT 1995-1997.)

The penalty phase of trial commenced January 14, 1982.
(CT 2002 et seg.) On January 20, 1982, the jury returned ten
death verdicts as to the murders of: James Macabe, Donald Hyden,
Steven Wells, Darin Kendrick, Steven Wood, Harry Todd Turner,
Ronald Gatlin, Charles Miranda, David Murillo and Markus Grabs.
(CT 2078-2079. )

On March 12, 1982, appellant's motions for new trial
and to modify the penalty were denied by the court with the trial
court’s reasons noted in the record. (CT 2083-2086, 2089-2094.)

Thereafter, the trial judge ordered that appellant
should be put to death as to counts I, III, V, VIII, XIV, XVI,
XVIII, XX, XXII and XXIV. (CT 2093.) The court further provided
that should appellant's sentences be reduced to life
imprisonment, with or without the possibility of parole, each

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sentence was to run consecutively as permitted by Penal Code
section 669. (Id.)

Appellant was also sentenced on the non-capital
matters. (CT 2092-2093.)

Upon automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court,

the judgment was affirmed in its entirety. (People v. Bonin,
Supra, 47 Cal.3d 808.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

“As a result of his activities in Southern
California in the years 1979 and 1980, defendant -- who
was then in his early 30's -- was dubbed the ‘Freeway
Killer’ and his murders the ‘freeway killings.’ After
he was tried in this Los Angeles County proceeding, he
was tried in Orange County action No. C-47500. There
he was convicted of the first degree murder and robbery
of Dennis Frank Fox, Glenn Barker, Russell Rugh, and
Lawrence Sharp; as to each murder count a multiple-
murder special-circumstance allegation was found true;
and for each murder he received the penalty of death.

“The evidence introduced at the guilt phase of
this action -- insofar as it concerns the crimes of
which defendant was convicted -- tells the following
story.

“On August 6, 1979, the nude body of 17-year-old
Marcus Grabs was found in Malibu Canyon near Las
Virgenes Canyon Road; except for the victim's backpack,
no clothing or other identifying evidence was
discovered at the scene. Grabs had been killed by
multiple stab wounds on August 5. The body showed
signs of beating about the face and elsewhere and
exhibited ligature marks on one ankle as well as on the
neck.

“On August 27, 1979, the nude body of 15-year-old
Donald Hyden was found in the area of Liberty Canyon

near the Ventura Freeway; no clothing or other

10

identifying evidence was discovered at the scene.
Hyden had been killed by ligature strangulation about
August 25 or 26. The body showed signs of beating
about the face and elsewhere, exhibited ligature marks
on at least one ankle and wrist as well as on the neck,
and revealed indications of sexual activity before
death.

"On September 12, 1979, the nude body of David
Murillo was found alongside the Ventura Freeway near
the Lemon Grove overpass; no clothing or other
identifying evidence was discovered at the scene.
Murillo had been killed by ligature strangulation about
September 9 or 10. The body showed signs of beating
about the face and elsewhere, exhibited ligature marks
on the wrists as well as on the neck, and revealed
indications of sexual activity before death.

“On February 3, 1980, the nude body of 15-year-old
Charles Miranda was found in an alley in downtown Los
Angeles; no clothing or other identifying evidence was
discovered at the scene. Miranda had been killed by
ligature strangulation the same day. The body showed
signs of beating about the face and elsewhere,
exhibited ligature marks on at least one ankle and
wrist as well as on the neck, and revealed indications
of sexual activity before death.

"On February 6, 1980, the fully clothed body of
12-year-old James Macabe was found near Walnut Drive in
Walnut in front of the Pomona Freeway; no identifying
evidence other than the clothing was discovered at the
scene. Macabe had been killed by ligature
strangulation on February 3. The body showed signs of
beating about the face and elsewhere, exhibited
ligature marks on at least one ankle and wrist as well
as on the neck, and revealed indications of sexual

activity before death.

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"On March 15, 1980, the nude body of 19-year-old
Ronald Gatlin was found near Central Avenue in Duarte;
no clothing or other identifying evidence was
discovered at the scene. Gatlin had been killed by
ligature strangulation on March 14 or 15. The body
showed signs of beating about the face and elsewhere,
exhibited ligature marks on at least one ankle and
wrist as well as on the neck, and revealed indications
of sexual activity before death.

“On March 25, 1980, the nude body of 14-year-old
Harry Todd Turner was found in an alley in Los Angeles;
no clothing or other identifying evidence was
discovered at the scene. Turner had been killed by
ligature strangulation sometime on or after March 20.
The body showed signs of beating about the face and
elsewhere, exhibited ligature marks on the neck, and
revealed indications of sexual activity before death.

“On April 11, 1980, the nude body of 16-year-old
Steven Wood was found in an alley in Long Beach near
the Pacific Coast Highway; no clothing or other
identifying evidence was discovered at the scene. Wood
had been killed by ligature strangulation on April 10
or ll. The body showed signs of beating about the face
and elsewhere and exhibited ligature marks on at least
one ankle and wrist as well as on the neck.

“On April 30, 1980, the nude body of 19-year-old
Darin Lee Kendrick was found on Avalon Street in Carson
near the Artesia Freeway; no clothing or other
identifying evidence was discovered at the scene.
Kendrick had been killed by ligature strangulation and
a stab wound to the upper cervical spinal cord on April
29 or 30. The body showed signs of beating about the
face and elsewhere and exhibited ligature marks on at

least one ankle and wrist as well as on the neck.

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“On June 3, 1980, the nude body of 18-year-old
Steven Wells was found behind a gasoline station in
Huntington Beach; no clothing or other identifying
evidence was discovered at the scene. Wells had been
killed by ligature strangulation on June 2. The body
showed signs of beating about the face and elsewhere,
exhibited ligature marks on at least one ankle and
wrist as well as on the neck, and revealed indications
of sexual activity before death.

“In order to establish that it was defendant who
had perpetrated the killings, the prosecution called to
the stand Gregory Miley and James Munro.

“Miley, a sexual partner of defendant and about 19
years old at the time relevant here, testified that it
was defendant who was responsible for the death of
Miranda and Macabe. Specifically, he said that he was
with defendant as defendant was driving a van he owned
on the night of February 2, 1980; defendant picked up
Miranda in Hollywood in the early morning hours of
February 3. and consensually sodomized him in the back
of the van; defendant whispered to Miley, ‘The kid's
going to die,’ and then started to tie up the youth;
defendant asked, ‘What does your dad want for you? How
much do you think we can get for ransom” Maybe a
couple thousand?’ and Miranda responded, ‘I don’t think
I can get that much’; defendant asked, ‘How much money
do you have?’ and Miranda replied, ‘About $6';
defendant told Miley to take the money, and he
complied; Miley said, ‘Well, why don’t you let the kid
go?’ and defendant answered, ‘Mo, man, he'll know the
van and he'll know us’; with Miley's help defendant
proceeded to beat Miranda and to strangle him with a
shirt and to crush his neck with a jack handle;
defendant and Miley dumped Miranda's nude body in an

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alley and disposed of his clothing in various
locations.

“After doing the deed, Miley continued, defendant
said. ‘Well, I'm horny again. I need another one, '
Miley responded, ‘Oh, man, no way, I don’t want to do
it no more. I just want to go home,’ but defendant
went ahead and eventually picked up Macabe in
Huntington Beach in the early afternoon of the same
day, February 3, 1980; not long afterwards, defendant
and the boy engaged in consensual sexual activity in
the van; the trio then drove on; again defendant and
the boy engaged in consensual sexual activity; soon,
however, defendant started to tie up Macabe; he asked,
‘What could you get for ransom?’ and stated, ‘This is a
kidnap’; the boy tried to fight back; with Miley's help
defendant proceeded to beat Macabe and to strangle him
with a shirt and to crush his neck with a jack handle;
defendant and Miley dumped Macabe's fully clothed body
onto the side of a road and took money from his wallet;
defendant then threw the wallet out of the van’s
window.

“Miley admitted that he had been arrested and
charged with the first-degree murder of Miranda and
Macabe. He also admitted that he had been allowed to
enter a plea of guilty to those charges with concurrent
sentences of imprisonment for 25 years to life on the
condition that he would testify truthfully against
defendant.

“Munro, who -- like Miley -- was a sexual partner
of defendant and about 19 years old at the time
relevant here, testified that it was defendant who was
responsible for the death of Wells. Specifically, he
said that he was with defendant as defendant was
driving his van on June 2, 1980; defendant picked up
Wells as he was hitchhiking and participated in mutual

14

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consensual oral copulation with him in the back of the
van; the trio eventually arrived at defendant's home in
Downey; there, defendant and Wells continued their
sexual activity, and Munro joined in; soon defendant
persuaded Wells to allow himself to be tied up;
defendant took from Wells's wallet $10, which was all
the money it contained, and also various items of
identification; with Munro's help he then beat Wells
and strangled him with a T-shirt, disposed of his
clothing and other property, and eventually dumped his
body behind a gasoline station; defendant told Munro
that he was the ‘Freeway Killer,’ that Miley was one of
his partners in crime, and that he had committed about
14 murders in the course of his activities.

“Munro admitted that he had been arrested and
charged with the first-degree murder of Wells. He also
admitted that he had been allowed to enter a plea of
guilty to second-degree murder with a sentence of 15
years to life imprisonment on the condition that he
would testify truthfully against defendant.

“The prosecuti.n also introduced evidence of
extrajudicial admissions by defendant linking him to
the crimes charged. Among other witnesses it called
David Lopez, a reporter for Los Angeles television
station KNXT. Lopez testified that defendant admitted
that it was he who killed the 10 young men and boys
named above as well as others, Scott Fraser and Ray
Pendleton, acquaintances of defendant, each stated that
defendant said that while driving his van he picked up
Grabs and in the course of a sexual encounter killed
the youth. Jailhouse informers testified to various
admissions on the part of defendant. Other witnesses
gave testimony to the effect that defendant said he
would not leave witnesses to his criminal activity

alive.

15

es eS en ; % 7 * a

“The prosecution presented expert testimony to the
following effect; the bodies of Miranda, Wells and Wood
each bore a kind of triskelion-shaped fiber that was
not common but was consistent with carpeting in
defendant's van; the bodies of Gatlin, Grabs and Macabe
each revealed the presence of foreign hair that matched
defendant's; the body of Gatlin bore a seminal fluid
stain that could have been made by defendant; and the
van and defendant's home were stained in several placed
with human blood.

“The defense generally tried to show that the
prosecution had not carried its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Particularly, it attempted to
discredit the witnesses who testified against
defendant.

“At the penalty phase the prosecution presented
evidence in aggravation. Some of that evidence related
to prior adjudicated felonies. Defendant committed
sexual attacks in late 1968 and early 1969 against 12-
year-old Lawrence B., 14-year-old William J., 17-year-
old John T., and 18-year-old Jesus M. As a result of
his activities, he was convicted of molesting and
forcibly orally copulating Lawrence B., kidnapping and
sodomizing William J., sodomizing John T., and forcibly
orally copulating Jesus M., and was committed to
Atascadero State Hospital as a mentally disordered sex
offender amenable to treatment. In 1971 he was
returned to court, declared unamenable to further
treatment, and committed to prison. In 1974 he was
released. In 1975 he committed a sexual attack on 14-
year-old David M. Later that year he was convicted of
forcibly orally copulating the boy and was sentenced to
prison. In 1978 he was paroled. The prosecution also
introduced evidence relating to the Orange County
killings, attempting to prove that in late 1979 and

16

early 1980 defendant killed, and committed other
offenses against, Dennis Frank fox, Glenn Barker,
Russell Rugh, and Lawrence Sharp.

“In mitigation the defense presented evidence to
the following effect. Defendant's father caused the
family serious problems as a result of drinking and
gambling. At age 10 defendant was in trouble and was
sent to a detention home; while there he was sexually
molested. At age 12 he stole a truck and was put in
custody. Later, he joined the armed forces, served in
Vietnam, and was decorated. A psychologist opined that
defendant could function in the structured setting of a
prison -- and only in such a setting -- and that there
he could be productive.” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47
Cal.3d 808, 820-824.)

Petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right

to effective assistance of counsel. There has never been a
showing there existed a literary rights fee agreement between
counsel and petitioner and, in any event, as the California
Supreme Court concluded, petitioner failed to demonstrate
counsel’s performance was adversely affected by either this
circumstance or the prior contact with the witness, James Munro.
There was no objection during the prosecutor's argument
to the jury concerning his reference to the impact of the murders
on the families of the victims. Moreover, this argument was
framed in the context of the CALJIC No. 8.84.1(a), involving the
facts of the case. In this regard, the prosecutor's reference in
no measure parallels the victim impact statement scrutinized by
this Court in Booth v. Maryland, supra. Lastly, even if the
prosecutor's reference to the impact on the families of the
victims during his argument to the jury during the penalty phase
was Booth error it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Chapman v. California (1968) 384 U.S. 18, 34.)

/

17

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ARGUMENT
I

PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL _
Despite his unequivocal request for attorney Charvet,

Petitioner contends he was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel on two grounds: (1) the existence of a
literary rights fee arrangement between himself and counsel and
(2) the contacts counsel had with prosecution witness James Munro
prior to petitioner's trial. On neither of these grounds should
petitioner prevail.

A. The Facts Surrounding The

Substitution of Attorney

The request for substitution of attorney was first made
September 3, 1981, before Judge Ringer. (RT Al 102.) The matter
was eventually set for September 14, 1981, before Judge Keene.

On that day, the motion was again brought. Deputy
District Attorney Norris vehemently expressed his opposition on
three grounds. First, it was argued this substitution was
nothing more than a dilatory tactic designed to prejudice the
People’s case against appellant. It was pointed out by the
prosecution they had been prepared since May 4th, only to have
the court grant two continuances of time over their objection.
(RT Al 111-114.) Secondly, the prosecutor contended Charvet had
a conflict of interest in the case because he had previously been
in contact with witness Munro and considered representing him.
This contact, it was asserted, had involved discussions with
Munro about the facts of this case. (RT Al 115-116; 125-128.)
Lastly, Norris referred to the retainer agreement between Charvet
and appellant which purported to involve the attorney retaining
any future literary rights there may be in the case. (RT Al 116-
117, 124.) In support of his assertion the substitution was
merely an attempt to delay the trial, the prosecution introduced
a taped conversation between appellant and two of his friends.
While the tape itself was not transcribed into the record, it is

18

el es ee ey eee ee wee: eee ,

‘

apparent appellant told his friends if Charvet were not
substituted in appellant would ask to go pro per and then request
a six-month continuance, after which appellant would request
another attorney to represent him. (RT Al 128-129.)

Mr. Hanson, after acknowledging he was never
appellant’s attorney of choice, voiced no opposition to the
substitution. (RT Al 108-109.)

Appellant specifically requested Charvet as his
attorney. (RT Al 109.)

On his behalf, Charvet indicated his contacts with
Munro were minimal and involved nothing that would affect his
being able to defend appellant. (RT Al 118-120.) He also
indicated appellant waived “all semblance of any type of conflict
of interest,” and would be willing to say so on the stand. (RT
Al 120-121.) As concerned the issue of any book arrangement with
appellant, Charvet refused to discuss details, stating instead
that if the only asset of an accused was a book right, he could
use it to get the attorney of his choice. (RT Al 123.)

After hearing argument and listening to the
prosecutor's tape, the trial court asked appellant why he wanted
Charvet as his attorney. Appellant responded, *. . . I feel like
I have a much better rapport with Mr. Charvet than I do with any
other attorney, at this point.” (RT Al 134.) Appellant had
“personal vibes” which precluded him from discussing certain
aspects of the case with Hanson. (RT Al 135.)

Thereafter, the trial court, in no uncertain terms,
concluded appellant’s attempt at substituting Charvet in as
attorney was, indeed, a delaying tactic. In addition, the court
was “deeply concerned” with the contact Charvet had previously
with Munro; finding there was a conflict. (Ibid.) Unless
ordered to do so by an appellate court, trial was to proceed with
Hanson as counsel. (RT Al 136; see comments by court on RT Al
138.) Appellant then acknowledged that if Charvet were not
permitted to act as his counsel, appellant would proceed as his
own attorney, although he could not guarantee he would be ready

19

aa Se ae te ae ek ay ee eee! OE Sef in da

to proceed to trial on the date the trial was to begin, one week
hence. (RT Al 139-140.)

On September 21, 1981, Charvet again attempted to come
in as the attorney of record. Apparently, a writ of mandate
filed with the Court of Appeal had been denied. Charvet
expressed his intention of filing a petition with the Supreme
Court. The trial court solustentiy agreed the issue should be
decided by the Supreme Court. Again, it was indicated that were
Charvet not accepted as appellant’s counsel of record, appellant
would proceed pro per. It was also noted, appellant would not be
prepared for trial, but if given the choice between Hanson as his
attorney, and proceeding pro per, appellant would choose the
latter course. The trial court continued the matter for
approximately 30 days, to October 19th. At that time, trial was
to begin in one of three manners: with Charvet as appellant's
counsel, with Hanson 4s appellant's counsel, or with appellant as
his own attorney, with Hanson acting as advisory counsel. It was
clearly contemplated there would be some ruling from the Supreme
Court on the propriety of Charvet serving as appellant’s
attorney. (RT Al 141-147.)

Thereafter, on October 19, 1981, Charvet was
substituted in as appellant’s attorney. Appellant expressly
indicated it was his desire Charvet represent him. (RT 1 1-2.)

B. Discussion

In its decision, the California Supreme Court, in
accordance with American Bar Association dictates, recognized
that a “'grave conflict of interest can arise .. .‘” when a
lawyer is given the rights to publish a book about the offenses
for which he represents the accused. (People v. Bonin (1989) 47
Cal.3d 808, 836.) In analyzing the trial court’s action, the
California Supreme Court paid close attention to the mandates of
this Court by acknowledging the trial court has an obligation
when it knows or reasonably should know of the possibility of a
conflict of interest to make an inquiry into the matter. (Ibid,
citing, inter alia, Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272;

20

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Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 484.) When the court
fails to fulfill its obligatio. in this regard Wood error has
been committed. Reversal ‘« required, however, only when it has
been shown there was an actual conflict which adversely affected
counsel’s performance. (Id., at pp. 837-838, citing Wood v.
Georgia, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 272-274; Brien v. United States
(1st Cir. 1982) 695 F.2d 10, 14-15; Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692.)

The California Supreme Court determined there was
insufficient evidence upon which to conclude the trial court knew
or should have known a literary rights contract existed. The
crux of this aspect of the court’s holding was that given the
complete absence of anything but speculation, finding the trial
court had an obligation to inquire under these circumstances
would create an “intolerable” burden on trial courts since in
almost every case a conflict was “'possible.’* (People v. Bonin,
supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 838.)

While petitioner assails this conclusion, the fact
remains nothing in his analysis of the scenario in Wood
demonstrates any error in the conclusion drawn by the California
Supreme Court. In Wood the conflict was flagrant. The attorney
representing the owner of an adult book store, also represented
the employees of that store who had been convicted of selling
lewd materials. The probation of the employees had been revoked
because the owner of the store had decided not to pay the
employees’ fines as promised, electing instead to challenge the
propriety of the fines on constitutional grounds. (Id., at pp.
263-264; 266-267.) There was, then, an unmistakable, actual
conflict of interest which clearly adversely affected the
interests of the defendants.

While petitioner asserts the California Supreme Court
“dodges” the holding of Wood in reaching its conclusion, nothing
could be further from the truth. Petitioner's selection of
private counsel to represent him created no semblance of

impropriety but for the fact petitioner was indigent. There was

21

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no other “evidence” of any kind to indicate the existence of such
an agreement. To suggest counsel’s refusal to reveal the source
of his fee with petitioner is stronger evidence than that
presented in Wood is patently insupportable.

As concerns the conflict due to counsel's contacts with
the witness Munro, the California Supreme Court concluded the
trial did fail in its obligation to inquire as required by Wood.
(People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 838.) While the trial
court had initially recognized the conflict and denied the
requested substitution, on the first day of trial the
substitution was permitted. (Id., at p. 839.) Despite
petitioner's specific request to be represented by Charvet, and
despite petitioner's presence at the hearing in which Charvet’s
contacts with Munro were discussed, the California Supreme Court
determined the trial court had the obligation to ensure
petitioner had knowingly waived any conflict of interest
concerning his attorney of choice. (Id., at pp. 839-842.)

Relying on this Court's actions in Wood, and a similar
understanding of Wood by the court in United States v. Winkle
(10th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 605, 611-612, the California Supreme
Court found the error was not reversible per se. Accordingly,
the court undertook an examination of counsel’s performance,
particularly as it concerned dealing with Munro at trial. In
this regard the court was unable to find any inkling of an
adverse effect on counsel's performance. Nor could the court

even conjecture such a problem. (People v. Bonin, supra, at p.

843.) Thus, the court refused to reverse.

1. In an apparent oversight, the California Supreme Court
failed to note petitioner's waiver to any conflict attaching to
attorney Charvet’s previous contact with Munro. In response to
the prosecutor's request petitioner make an on the record waiver
of any conflict the court specifically addressed petitioner on
this issue and received a specific waiver. (See RT I 90-91.) In
light of the California Supreme Court‘s decision, respondent will
examine the question of whether reversal was mandated. Given
what appears to be a specific waiver of the conflict issue as it
pertains to contacts with Munro, however, respondent submits this
question is moot.

22

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Petitioner's assertion this case is analogous to
Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60 and Holloway v.
Arkansas; supra, 435 U.S. 475 is untenable. In Glasser, the
court appointed the same counsel to represent co-defendant
Kretske over the objections of defendant Glasser. Despite
defendant Glasser’s objections, the court undertook an
exanination of the record and concluded that attorney “Stewart's
representation of Glasser was not as effective as it might have
been if the appointment had not been made.“ (Glasser v. United
States, supra, 315 U.S. at p. 76, emphasis added.) Clearly, the
California Supreme Court was unable to reach the same conclusion.

In Holloway, the trial court appointed the same counsel
to represent three defendants accused of rape and robbery,
despite the objection of counsel that the defendants told him
there could be conflicting interests. After first acknowledging
it is not per se violative of the constitutional right to
effective counsel to permit joint representation, the court
interpreted Glasser as mandating reversal when, over objection by
the defendant or his attorney, the trial court requires joint
representation. (Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. at p.
488.)

In this regard, the circumstances of each case must be
deemed significant. Here there was neither an objection by
petitioner or his counsel, nor was there any compulsion counsel
jointly represent the witness, Munro. Any conflict stemmed from
Munro's contacting the attorney about possible representation.

In this context, then, the proper remedy is that undertaken by
the California Supreme Court; an examination of the record to
determine whether there was any adverse effect on counsel's
performance.

As the California Supreme Court noted (People v. Bonin,
Supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 843), this understanding of the Wood
holding was revealed in Brien v. United States, supra, 695 F.2d
10, 15, fn. 10, and United States v. Winkle, supra, 722 F.2d at

pp. 611-612. In the latter case, it was defense counsel who

23

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= oe en ee eee eee ee ee ee

brought up conflict and the appellate court did note problems
developing during trial for the attorney based on his previous
representation of a government witness. Under such
circumstances, the court ordered a remand, rather than a reversal
to permit the trial court to determine whether counsel‘s
performance was adversely affected.

That the California Supreme Court chose the proper path
is best exemplified by the conclusion reached by this Court in
Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335. There, this Court
concluded a defendant who raises no objection to the conflict at
the trial level must demonstrate both an actual conflict and
prejudice. When a defendant has demonstrated an actual conflict
has adversely affected the adequacy of his counsel's
representation, there is no need to demonstrate prejudice. (Id.,
at pp. 349-350; see also Dukes v. Warden (1972) 406 U.S. 250,
256.) In the instant case, while the California Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court that a conflict existed, the
threshold showing of any adverse effect on counsel's performance
was never made.

When, as in the instant case, there is not only an
attempted waiver of any conflict (footnote 1, supra) but there is
no forced joint representation of co-defendants with conflicting
interests, a reversal is not warranted in the absence of a
showing counsel's conflict prejudiced his representation of
petitioner.

II

THE PROSECUTOR‘S ARGUMENT DURING THE PENALTY
PHASE WAS NOT VIOLATIVE OF BOOTH V. MARYLAND

Petitioner contends the prosecutor's argument to the
jury during the penalty phase, in which reference was made to the
effect of the murders on the families of the victims (RT 5491-
5493), was violative of this court’s pronouncement in Booth v.
Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 which overturned a Maryland statute
mandating the use of victim impact statements. Petitioner's
comparison does not work, procedurally or substantively.

24

o~

Initially, it must be noted petitioner cannot now raise
this issue since there was no objection at trial. This Court has
previously recognized the failure to object at trial, even to
errors of constitutional magnitude, precludes them from being
raised on appeal. (See, Schmerber v. California (1965) 384 U.S.
757, 765-766, fn. 9; Wainwright v. Sykes (1976) 433 U.S. 72, 86-
90.)

Assuming the merits of petitioner’s claim are addressed
there are three substantive bases which conclusively refute
petitioner's conclusion. First, petitioner is complaining about
an argument which was relevant under CALJIC No. 8.84.1(a) ( CT
VIII 2010-2012) which told the jury to consider “the
circumstances of the crime of which defendant was convicted in
the present proceedings and the existence of any special
circumstance[{s] found to be true.“ In talking about the effect
on the victims’ families, the prosecutor made specific reference
to the victims’ ages, as well as the dehumanizing manner in which
they were murdered. In this regard, then, the prosecutor's
argument was proper.

In this same vein, the VIS employed in Booth cannot
validly be compared to the argument of the prosecutor below. In
Booth, the VIS read to the jury contained information concerning
the emotional and personal problems caused the family as a result
of the crimes. (Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 499-
500.) It noted the family members had described the victims as
being *“‘butchered like animals.’'* The granddaughter of the
victims opined the defendant could never be rehabilitated.
(Ibid.) The jury was permitted to hear this report over defense
counsel's objection the information contained in the VIS would
inflame the jury in its selection of the appropriate penalty.
(Ibid. )

Unlike the personal expressions by the family members
in Booth, the prosecutor's argument below was directed at the
circumstances of the offense, both as to the age of the victims

and the manner in which they were murdered. While the district

@ P et =r — a ls | ee —._ (. 7 , »
a ee ice ee

attorney did refer to the effect on the families, it was on their families. In the context of petitioner's offenses, the

: certainly a logical argument given the fact each of the victims prosecutor’s argument was neither Booth nor Gathers error.
: was a young son. This Court in Booth found the VIS misdirected Finally, even assuming the prosecutor's argument passed
the jury’s consideration to the character of the victim and the over the line of propriety it is clear any error was harmless
effect on the family. (Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. at p. beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386
504.) The court also sought to avoid the imposition of the death U.S. 18, 24.) The sheer magnitude of petitioner's crimes and
penalty being dependent on the eloquence and persuasiveness of their attendant indignities to the sanctity of life were
the victim's family, rather than on the circumstances of the } appalling. Had the brief reference to the effect on the victims’
offense. (Id., at p. 505.) Nothing in the prosecutor's argument families been removed from the prosecutor's argument, the jury’s
to the jury runs afoul of these sentiments. The jury was not penalty decision would have been the same. :

advised to impose the death penalty because of the effect on the
families, but rather that such an effect was a natural by-product

of the murder of such youthful victims. Contrary, to

petitioner's conclusion, then, the prosecutor’s argument did oN
direct the jury to give individualized consideration to the

appropriate penalty based on the characteristics of petitioner

and the crimes he committed. (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S.

862, 879.)

7 a ee a ae ee

Nor do the prosecutor's statements run afoul of this

Court’s recent decision in South Carolina v. Gathers (June 12,
1989, 88-305) ___ U.S. __. There the prosecutor went to great

lengths to describe to the jury the type of person who Gathers
had murdered. By referring to the victim’s voter registration

+ _~ = 2. ot ek ee

card and by reading from a religious tract carried by the victim,
this Court found that under the rationale of Booth, the
prosecutor had introduced factors about the victim the defendant
might not have known. (Slip opn., pp. 5-6.) ;
In the instant case the prosecutor briefly commented on
the impact of the murders on the families of the victims. This
was done in the context of their age, a factor petitioner would
know. Each of petitioner's victims was young and while
petitioner may not have known their exact age, it would not be
difficult to surmise the boys were the young sons of their
parents, whose degrading murders would leave an indelible imprint

od _ ee oe ~~ ey ae — aA). a? \5 6 2 |
= ; ’ Te ee eS
F
*

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
requests the petition for certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General

of the State of California

RICHARD B. IGLEHART,
Chief Assistant Attorney General

HARLEY D. MAYFIELD,
Senior Assistant Attorney General

JANELLE B. DAVIS,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General

RSD

Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

SHZ:ab
6/13/89
SD89XU0004

28

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL

Attorney: No: 88-7381

October Term, 1988
JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP WILLIAM GEORGE BONIN
Attorney General of
the State of California Petitioner,

STEVEN H. ZEIGEN
Supervising Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 700

Vv.

San Diego, California 92101 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
Respondent .
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, say: I - a citizen of the United States, am
18 years of age or over, employed in the County of San Diego in
which County the below Ban 2 "mailing oc , and not a party
s being 110 West A

to the yy cause, business
Street, te 700, San Diego, California 92101.

I have served the within BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

as follows: To Joseph F. Spaniol, Clerk, Supreme Court of the

United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, an original and NINE (9)
ies, of which a true and correct copy of the document filed in
s cause is hereunto affixed; AND, by placing one copy in a

rom, Ce envelope addressed for and to each addressee named as

follows:

William Dean Freeman

ty State Public Defender
107 South Broadway, Suite 9111
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Each envelope was then sealed and with the postage prepaid
ited in the United States mail by me at San Diego,
California, on the /¥ day of June, 1989.

There is a delivery service by United States Mail at each place
so addressed or regular communication by United States Mail
between the place of mailing and each place so addressed.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.

Dated at San Diego, California, June /7, 1989.

Subscribed and sworn to before me

‘DOE UPRE NORE TPETEG AOU T0041 URN POR omen eDenN ORGAN edn
this 15> day of June 1989. JEAN M. EURNS 3

NOTARY PUBLIC - CAUFORNIA
COUNTY C? SAN DIEGO

commision expires Sept. 17. | 99! F
UPTO

we
—. 7

William George Bonin

APPEARANCE FORM

SUPRE...c COURT OF THE UNITEL STATES
No. 88-7381

People of the State of California

(Petitioner or Appellant)
The Clerk will enter my appearance as Counsel of Record for

(Respondent or Appellee)

The State of California

who IN THIS COURT is

(Please list names of all parties represented)

D Petitioner(s) £3 Respondent(s)
DC Appellant(s) D Appeliee(s)

I certify that I am a member of the of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Signature a

©) Amicus Curiae

J

(Type or print) Name Steven H. Zeigen

OM. OMs. OMrs. ODO Miss

Firm Office of the Attorney General

Address 110 West A Street, Suite 700

City & State__San Diego, CA Zip_92101_

Phone (619) _237-7679

CO-73A

ONLY COUNSEL OF RECORD SHALL ENTER AN
APPEARANCE. THAT ATTORNEY WILL BE
THE ONLY ONE NOTIFIED OF THE COURTS
ACTION IN THIS CASE. OTHER ATTORNEYS
WHO DESIRE NOTIFICATION SHOULD MAKE
APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH COUNSEL

_OF RECORD.

ONLY ATTORNEYS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE
BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES MAY FILE AN APPEARANCE FORM.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL REQUESTED
INFORMATION BE PROVIDED.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0563%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.