# Petitioners Brief — James v. Illinois

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0539%3A5

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 307

## Text

Supreme Court Of Illinois

Tueopore A. GorTrrrRigeD

Appellate Defender
Micuagt J. Pe.cerier
Deputy Defender
Martin 8. CaRLson*
Patricia UNSINN

Assistant Appellate Defenders
Office of the State Appellate Defender
State of Illinois Center

100 West Randolph Street
Suite 5-500

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-5472

*Counsel of Record

Cases Page
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) ............ 12
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)................ 16
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) .......... 16
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)........... passim
Hendrickson v. State, 290 Ark. 319, 719 S. W.2d 420 (1986) ~
16

PMotaanessdas ll

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)............... passim

People v. James, 123 Ill.2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723
(1988). passim
People v. Ricco, 56 N.Y.2d 320, 437 N.E.2d 1097 (1982). 20

ee
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) ............ 12
State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1982)........... 20

State v. Hubbard, 103 Wash.2d 570, 693 P.2d 718 (1985). 20
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)....... passim
United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 20

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ............ 16

Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). ....... passim
?

MISCELLANEOUS

3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1000 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 13
3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 13

opinion of the Sup Court of Illinois (J. A. 24-53)
523, 528 N.E.2d 723. The opinion
t of Illinois, First District, (J.A.

shot in the head and died as a result of this wound. (R. 382,
414-416)

On the night of August 31, 1982, between 8:00 and 8:30

reddish-brown, long and combed straight back. (J.A. 10,
Supp. R. 93, 99-101, 120-121) The detectives questioned
petitioner again at the police station at around 10:30 p.m.
At that time petitioner reiterated that his hair had been
reddish-brown and combed straight back on the evening
of the shooting and also stated that he had gone to the
beauty parlor to have his hair dyed black and curled to
change his appearance. (J.A. 10-11; Supp.R. 94-95,
124-125) While at the police station petitioner also made
statements concerning the shooting. (R. 514; Supp.R.
105-106, 110-112)

Petitioner was 15 years old at the time of his arrest but a
juvenile court

other members group present at the shooting.
All five witnesses were friends and called themselves the
“B Boys,” and all five identified petitioner in court as the
boy who fired the shots. Each witness testified .nat peti-
tioner had long reddish hair worn in a slicked back “butter
style” on the night of the shooting, and four of them
testified that he was an earring. The same four
witnesses also testified that they had seen petitioner a few
weeks earlier at the Bud Billikin Parade and remembered
him because of his red “butter” hair style and earring. (R.
296-302; 341-343, 352; 388, 391-392; 411-412; 430-431, 433)
At trial on was black and was worn in a
natural style. When gave descriptions of the offend-
ers to the police immediately after the shooting, none of
the witnesses said anything about the hair color or style of
the person who fired the shots, (R. 329, 365, 399, 448) but
two of them testified that they did mention the red hair
when they spoke to detectives later on at the police sta-
tion. (R. 364, 402-403)

The final witness called by the State during its case-in-
chief was Detective Glynn. He testified that on the night
of August 31, 1982, during his investigation of the shoot-
ing, he and his partner went to a beauty parlor called
Diane's House of Beauty. While there he spoke to Diane

petitioner's the color
of his hair to + erence ropa
tioner’s hair was black on the day of the shooting. When
the trial court ruled, Fourth Amendment
objection, that counsel
ek of the state-
ments. (Su,> 8. 62-65) a hearing at which
Detectives Glynn testified, the trial court
found that the statements were voluntary
(Supp. R. 128) and renewed Fourth
Amendment use of the statements.
the jury be caumnate —
statements

could be considered only insofar as they reflected on the
Ms. Henderson, he

testified concerning the account of the shooting and description of the
offenders that he received from three of the State's witnesses.
(Supp. R. 66-89)

sidered. [Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No.
3.11 (2nd ed. 1981). J.A. 16)

(1954), Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980) (J.A. 20), and ruled that it would not
create a further exception to the exclusionary rule allow-

ments during closing argument. (J.A. 22-23)

ris, Hass, and Havens, but concluded that it was not
inconsistent with those cases and would not seriously
erode the protection of the exclusionary rule. (J. A. 35-37)

The court also rejected petitioner's contentions that the
jury was not properly instructed on the umited purpose
for which his statements could be considered and that the
prosecution used these statements as substantive evi-
dence during its closing argument. The court held that

With to the State's
os closing argument, the court

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impeachment sanctioned by
Point I of this brief will show that the method
ment employed at petitioner's trial not only permitted but
was based upon the use of his statements as substantive
evidence of guilt in contravention of the holdings in this

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purpose of impeaching

mony. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (phys-
ical evidence Harns v.
New York, 401 U Hass, 420
U.S. 714 (1975 violation of
Miranda rule); 620
(1980) the
fruit of

made

solely

not be

Ay
Net

impeachment contradiction under
which the aim fe te Qowedit the Yitnsed tnstinc cs

asser-
tion as opposed to the first one, that constitutes the pro-
bative end.” Wigmore, supra § 1000 at 957.

* In Walder v. United States, the impeaching evidence was not a

ever, because the heroin had been seized two years earlier and was
unrelated to the charges being tried, 347 U.S. at 62-64, the introduc-

tion of this evidence to impeach presented no risk that it would be
used as evidence of guilt.

14

In this case the State’s contradicting evidence was not
the testimony of another witness, but the petitioner's
suppressed statements, and Jewel Henderson’s testi-
mony the color of petitioner’s hair would be
impeached only if the jury concluded that
contrary statements were true. In short, to be relevant at
all for the purpose of in this context peti-
tioner’s tainted statements had to be used as substantive
evidence of guilt, a use which is constitutionally imper-
missible under the decisions of this Court. United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-628.

The inherent impossibility of limiting the use of illegally
obtained statements toa permissible pur-
pose when they are introduced to impeach a witness other
than the defendant himself is demonstrated by the “limit-
ing” instruction given by the court and the prosecution's
closing arguments in this case. After the trial court ruled
that the State could use petitioner's suppressed state-

contradiction and illustrates that this method of impeach-
ment requires that the contradicting evidence be used
substantively.

Finally, during its rebuttal closing argument the State
abandoned any pretense that petitioner's tainted state-
ments were to be used for any purpose other than as
evidence of guilt:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.

PROSECUTOR: The same way that our con-
sciences us and cause us to act in

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.

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Amendment. [Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-608 (1975). In the oft-
quoted language of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960):

The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its

purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the consti-
tutional guarantee in the only effective way—by

removing the incentive to disregard it.

364 U.S. at 217. Thus, in deciding whether the rule should
be applied in a particular context the Court has sought to
determine whether admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence would encourage violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment and has wei¢hed this likelihood against the costs of
exclusion to the truth-seeking goal of our legal system.
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. at 347; United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906-907 (1984).

the testimony of a defense witness the very nature of the
method of impeachment requires that the statements be

(J.A. 52) (Clark and Stamos, J.J., dissenting) In many
cases, if not most, the prosecution does not require an

incriminating statement from the accused to make out a
prima facie case, and in such cases the inability to use the

19
statement as part of the State's case-in-chief will not serve

under the decisions of this Court there would be only a
limited incentive to risk losing evidence for the State's
case-in-chief because a tainted statement could be used
only for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testi-
mony. By contrast, under the decision below the incentive
to make arrests would be greatly enhanced
as the officers would know that any incriminating state-
ment they obtained could also be used either to inhibit th~
defendant from presenting any evidence in his defense or
as substantive evidence to rebut any defense testimony
that was presented.

20 21
limitations will prove in practice to be illusory is demon-

state-
and combed
straight back on the evening in question, the State was
to elicit his further statement that “ . . he had

necessary to contradict Ms. Henderson, and in the cir-
cumstances of the case amounted to an admission of guilt,
which is exactly how it was used in the prosecutor's clos-

ing argument. (J.A. 13-14)

Reported decisions reflect that on rare occasion other

P 2d 718, 721-722 (1986); State v. Burnett, 637 S. W.2d 680,
689-690 (Mo. 1982); People v. Ricco, 56 N.Y.2d 320, 437

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0539%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.