# Amicus Curiae Brief — Sullivan v. Zebley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1990
- **Citation:** 493 U.S. 521

## Text

No. 88-1377. JOSEPH ©. SPAMIOL, JR.

In the
Supreme Court of the United States.

OctToser Term, 1989

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, Secretary
or HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.
PETITIONER,

*.

BRIAN ZEBLEY, eT AL..,
RESPONDENTS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Brief of the Commonwealths of Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania, the States of Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,

Indiana, lowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,

Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New

New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont and W yoming, and the District of
Columbia, Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents.

JaMES M. SHANNON,

Attorney General,
SUZANNE E. DURRELL,*
JUDITH FABRICANT,

Assistant Attorneys General,

One Ashburton Place,
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 727-2200
*Counsel of Record
See inside cover for additional counsel

BATEMAN @& SLADE. Ie BOSTON. MASSACHUSETTS

Don Siegelman, Attorney Genera!
State of Alabama

Douglas B. Bailey, Attorney Genera
State of Alaska

Robert K Corbin. Attorney Genera

State of Anzona

john Steven Clark. Afforney Genera
State of Arkansas

Clarme Nardi Riddle, Acne Amorn

State of Connecticut

Charlies M. Oberty, III. Attorney Gener

State of Delaware

Herbert ©. Rend. Sr 4ctine ( orporati

Charlies L. Reichel, Deputy Corpora
Appellate Division. District of Columba

Neil F. Hartigan. Attorney Genera
State 1 Iilino

Lime Pearsor arr Ne en

State of Indiana

Thomas | Mille 4 | vie ‘serie?

State of lowa

Robert T. Steph 1 rive en.

State of Kansas

Stat { Marviand

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
SUMMA ’.Y OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S UNDULY
RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO SSI
ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
FOR CHILDREN SHIFTS TO THE
STATES COSTS THAT CONGRESS
HAS DECIDED SHOULD BE BORNE
AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL.

A. Welfare Programs.

1. Aid to Families With
Dependent Children.

2. General Assistance.

B. Specialized State-Funded
Health Care Programs.

C. Other Health Care Costs.
D. Additional Long-Term Costs.

II. THE COURT NEED NOT DEFER TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF
THE GOVERNING STATUTE.

CONCLUSION

Page

10

31

37

Cases

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982)

American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63 (1982) 34, 35,

Avery v. Heckler,
584 F.Supp. 312 (D. Mass. 1984),

aff'd, 762 F.2d 158
(lst Cir. 1985)

Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416 (1977)

Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
485 U.S. 399,
108 S. Ct. 1255 (1988)

Board of Governors, FRS

v. Dimension Financial Corp
474 U.S. 361 (1986)

Burlington Northern R. Co.
v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
481 U.S. 454 (1987) 35, 35n,

Chevron U.S.A... Inc, v.

Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984) 32,

12

22

35

34

36

34

City of New York v. Heckler,

578 F.Supp. 1109 (E. D. N. I.),

aff'd, 742 F. 2d 729

(2d Cir. 1984),

aff'd sub nom.,

Bowen v. City of New York,

476 U.S. 467 (1986) 11

DeLeon v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services,
734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984) 5n

Dickerson v. New Banner
Institute, Inc.,
460 U.S. 103 (1983) 35n

Dixon v. Heckler,
589 F.Supp. 1512

(8. D. N. I. 1984) 12

a Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984) 35n

＋

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc
458 U.S. 564 (1982) 35n

Holden v. Heckler,
584 F.Supp. 463 (N.D. Oh.),

remanded, 754 F.2d 372

(6th Cir. 1984) 12
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421 (1987) 32, 33
Lukhard v, Reed,

481 U.S. 368 (1987) 4n

iii

Page

Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635 (1986) 5n

Marcus v. Bowen,

696 F. Supp. 364

(N. D. 111. 1988),

appeal pending,

No. 89-2717 (7th Cir.) 32, 37

NLRB v. United Food and

Commercial Workers Union,

484 U.S. 112,

105 S.Ct. 413 (1987) 32, 33

Regents of University of
California v. Public
ions Board,
485 U.S. 589,
108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988) 33, 34

Rodriguez v. U.S.,
480 U.S. 522 (1987 35n

Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U.S. 34 (1981) 11

Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971) 2

zebley v. Bowen,
855 F. 2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988) passim

iv «

Federal Statutes and
Legislative Sources

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982)

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) (1982)

42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982)

42 U.S.C. § 607 (1982)

42 U.S.C. § 607(b),

as amended by Act of

Oct. 13, 1988, Pub. L. 100-485,
Title IV, and Act of

Nov. 10, 1988, Pub. L. 100-647,
Title VIII

42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1982)
42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982)

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) (A)
(1982) 15, 36,

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) (ii)
(1982)

42 U.S.C. § 13963 (a) (10) (A) (i)
(11 (1982)

Act of Sept. 19, 1984,
Pub.L. No. 98-460

1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 3046-62

Page

l7n
18
17

21

2In
10

17n

37n

22

13

5n

5n

Federal Statutes and
Legislative Sources (continued)

H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92nd Cong.,

2d Sess., reprinted in 1972

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 4989 3. 12,

H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92nd Cong.,

2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

State Statutes
Mass. Admin. Code Tit. 106,
§ 312 (1988) 20

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 117,
§§ 1-25 (1986) 20

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E,
§ 6B (Supp. 1988) 27n

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118F,
§§ 15, 17 (Supp. 1988) 27

Mass. St. 1989, c. 240, § 2, items
0321-1600 and 0321-2000 5n

Md. Ann. Code Art. 88A, §§ 65A, 65B 20

Miscellaneous

N. Hobbs, et al., Chronically Ill
Children and Their Families,
pp. 62-10) (1985) 29, 30

»- 73 «

- Miscellaneous (continued)

"Survey of Disabled Children

Under SSI Program”, Social

Security Bulletin, January, 1980,

Vol. 43, No. l, p. 10 17

United States Department
of Health and Human Services,

Characteristics of State

Assistance Programs for

SSI Recipients, (1989) 13, 14, 19n
United States Department of Health

and Human Services, Characteristics
of State Plans for AFDC (1988) 2 In

Urban Systems Research and

Engineering, Inc., Characteristics
(U.S. Department of Commerce,

National Technical Information
Service, 1983) 20n

- wii -

No. 88-1377

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary
of Health and Human Services,
Petitioner,

v.

Brian Zebley, et al.
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Amici curiae submit this brief

Support of respondents. Amici urge this

in

Court to affirm the judgment de lo,
which invalidated the Social Security
Administration's ("SSA's") policy’ te-
garding eligibility of disabled children
for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")
benefits.

As this Court has recognized, each
state has a “quasi-sovereign interest in
the health and well-being - both phys-
ical and economic - of its residents in
general.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.

vy. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982). Where the interests of children

are concerned, the states’ interest is
particularly strong; indeed, “[(t)here is
no more worthy object of the public's
concern” than protection and aid for de-

pendent children. Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 318 (1971).

The states’ interest in the welfare
of their children is most acute with re-
spect to those whose needs are greatest,
and whose families are least able to
provide for them, so that they are most
dependent on the benefits provided by
the various levels of government. As
Congress expressly recognized in enact-
ing the Social Security Amendments of
1972, children who are both poor and
disabled, and the families of such chil-
dren, are among the neediest and most
disadvantaged. H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92nd
Cong., Ind Sess., seprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4989, 5133-34.
Amici therefore have a strong interest
in these children's access to the bene-
fits granted them by federal statute.

In addition to their concern for the
welfare of their citizens, the states

*

have a strong interest in protecting
themselves from undue fiscel burdens.
Because of their commitment to the wel-
fare of their neediest citizens, the
states operate various partially or
wholly state-funded health and welfare
programs, to which applicants rejected
from federally-funded programs may turn
for assistance. To the extent’ that
these state-funded programs fill a gap
in federal coverage caused by unlawful
rejections, the federal administrative
policies that cause those rejections
have the effect of shifting costs from

the federal level to the states.+/

l/ The policy challenged in this case
may be seen as part of a larger effort
to shift costs of welfare programs from
the feder government to the states.
Although e of these efforts have been

upheld, see, eg. Lukhard v. Reed, 481
U.S. 368 (1987) (plurality) (upholding

(footnote continued)

abe

Such cost-shifting subverts the will of
Congress, to the detriment of both the
states themselves and their neediest

citizens. Amici have strong interests

(footnote continued)

restrictive application ot statutory
change in income standard for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children); Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (up-
holding statutory change restricting
Food Stamp eligibility), many have been
overturned, eitber by court decision or
by legislative enactment. See. 8.8.

DeLeon vy. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984)
and cases cited at 937 (restricting or
invalidating Social Security Adminis-
tration's Continuing Disability Review
program); Act of Sept. 19, 1984, pub. L.
No. 98-460; 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3046-62 (restricting Continuing.
Disability Review program and mandating
alteration in other Social Security Ad-
ministration policies). In order o de-
fend themselves against the fiscal im-
pact of such cost-shifting, several
states have found it cost-effective to
fund programs of :egal assistance for
persons claiming eligibility for certain
federal benefits, e.g., Mass. St. 1989,
c. 240, § 2, items 0321-1600 and
0321-2000, allocating funds for that
purpose.

* *

in correcting such erroneous cuministra-
tive policies.

In this case, SSA has adopted an ap-
proach to determining disability in
children that is so rigid and restric-
tive as to exclude many children who are
severely disabled. The consequences of
this policy are devastating to those
children and their families, and harmful
to the states’ interests as well. Amici
therefore urge this Court to affirm the
judgment below, which invalidated SSA‘s
policy and enjoined its further

application.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. In enacting the 881 statute,

Congress intended to relieve the states
of the fiscal burden of caring for the
disabled, and to assume that burden at

83

the federal level. Congress include”.
low-income disabled children in the SSI
program in order to provide for the spe-
cial costs of their care, and to ensure
that those costs would not fall to the
states (pp. 10 to 14).

By applying an overly restrictive
standard for disability determinations
for children, SSA has excluded from the
SSI program low-income children suffer-
ing from severe disabilities. In this
manner, SSA has shifted to the states
certain costs of the care of such
children, and has thereby thwarted the
will of Congress (pp. 14 to 16).

Children who are erroneously denied
SSI benefits and asseciated Medicaid
coverage often fall beck on Aid to Fami-

lies with Dependent Children ("AFDC"),

or state-funded general assistance and
medical assistance programs. Such erro-
neous denials thus increase the costs of
these programs to the states. In addi-
tion, such children may receive
assistance from various specialized,
state-funded health and human services
programs, thereby draining the resources
that would otherwise be available
through those programs for services to
others. State and local governments may
also bear the costs of health care for
such children through subsidies to pub-
lic hospitals or to private hospital un-
compensated care programs. Disabled
children who do not receive care may
suffer increased life-long dependency on
publicly- funded services with consequent

costs to the states (pp. 16 to 31).

II. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that SSA's regulations reflect an
erroneous interpretation of the govern-
ing statute, and are therefore invalid.
In evaluating SSA's policy, the Court
need not defer to the agency's interpre-
tation, because congressional intent can
be determined through traditional tools
of statutory construction. Since SSA's
regulations conflict with congressional
intent as so determined, they must fall
(pp. 31 to 34).

The process of statutory construc-
tion must begin with the plain meaning
of the statutory terms. Here, the plain
terms of the governing statute require
that eligibility standards include each
child who suffers from any impairment or

combination of impairments of comparable

severity to those that would disable an
adult. In violation of this statutory
requirement, SSA limits eligibility to
those children whose impairments meet or
equal its listing of impairments, with-
out providing for any individual deter-
mination of the functional effects of
each child's impairment or combination
of impairments. SSA‘s policy thus con-
flicts with the plain terms of the stat-

ute (pp. 34 to 37).

ARGUMENT
I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
UNDULY RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO SSI
ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS FOR CHIL-
DREN SHIFTS TO THE STATES COSTS THAT

CONGRESS HAS DECIDED SHOULD BE BORNE
AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL.

The SSI program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1383c (1982), was established by Con-

gress in 1972, to replace earlier state-

10

administered programs of aid to the ei-
derly, blind and disabled. See
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
38 (1981). In replacing state programs
with an entirely federally-funded
program, Congress indicated its inten-
tion to relieve the states of the costs
of providing such aid, and assumed that
cost at the federal level.

Fiscal relief to the states was no
accidental effect of the statute;
rather, one of Congress's expressly
stated purposes was to relieve state
and local governments of the soaring
costs" of existing programs for the
disabled. City of New York «. Heckler,
578 F.Supp. 1109, 1121 (E.D. N. v.).
aff'd, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984),
aff'd sub nom., Bowen v. City of New
York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986), citing legis-

-ll-

lative history of the 1972 Act. See
also Dixon v. Heckler, 589 F.Supp. 1512,
1516 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Holden v. Heckler,
584 F.Supp. 463, 467, 486 (N.D. Oh.),
remanded, 754 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984);
Avery v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 312, 316
(D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 158
(lst Cir. 1985).

As established by Congress, the SSI
program provides financial assistance
not only to adults disabled from sub-
stantial gainful employment, but also to
disabled children who live in households
with very low income. Congress included
low-income disabled children in the SSI
program, although they had not been in-
cluded in earlier disability programs,
in recognition of the extraordinarily
high cost of their daily care. H.R.
Rep. No. 231, 92nd Cong. 20 Sess., re-

elie

printed in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4989, 5133-34. For the low-income
family of a disabled child, SSI cash
benefits can meet the otherwise prohibi-
tive costs of specialized day care,
skilled home care, rehabilitation pro-
grams, special equipment, and other es-
sential goods and services necessitated
by the child's condition.

In addition to cash assistance for
such purposes, and even more crucial for
many families, SSI coverage in the over-
whelming majority of states conveys au-
tomatic eligibility for Medicaid, assur-
ing the disabled child's access to ur-
gently needed health care. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (II) (1982);
see also United Sta es Department of
Health and Human Services,
| 3 F State Assis —

2.

grams _for SS] Recipients, (1989),

p. 110. For low-income families of

children who require frequent and cost-
ly medical treatment, the importance of
such ceverage cannot be overstated.
Even the rare low-income family that has
access to private health insurance,
through employment or otherwise, may de-
pend heavily on SSI-based Medicaid cov-
erage to ensure a disabled child's ac-
cess to medical care; insurance may
leave a significant portion of charges
uncovered, may exclude necessary spe-
Cialized services, or may even exclude
the child entirely because of his or her
condition.

Despite Congress's expressed inten-
tion to guarantee SSI benefits for dis-
abled children, and thereby to relieve

the states of the costs of their care,
SSA has adopted a rigid, restrictive ap-
proach to e:igibility determinations for
children that effectively excludes many
whose conditions do in fact disable them
severely. Although the statute by its
terms requires comparable treatment of
adults and children in disability deter-
minations, 42 9. C. 5 1382c(a)(3)(A)
(1982), SSA subjects children to a more
restrictive standard than adults, te-
quiring only children to demonstrate
medical findings that meet or equal
those included in its listings of pre-
sumptively disabling conditions, and
providing no mechanism for evaluating
the combined effect of multiple impair-

ing conditions on children.

2.

As s result, large numbers of chil-
dren whose impairments are comparable to
ones that would disable adults from sub-
stantial gainful employment are denied
SSI benefits, in contravention of the
Statute. Many of these low-income, dis-
abled children and their families turn
to state programs for assistance with
the financial burdens arising from their
impairments. Thus, through its cdminis-
trative policy, SSA has circumvented
Congress's intention to assume these
burdens at the federal level, and has
shifted them to the states.

A. Welfare Programs.

Re Aid to Families With

Dependent Children

Erroneous denials of SSI benefits to

disabled children impose a wide variety

216

of direct and indirect burdens on state
budgets. The most direct costs appear
in welfare programs partially or wholly
funded by the states.

Many children who are financially
eligible for SSI are members of families
who also qualify for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). See,
@.g., “Survey of Disabled Children Under
SSI Program", Social Security Bulletin,
January, 1980, Vol. 43, Wo. tl, op.
10.4/ Approximately half of the fund-
ing for AFDC benefits comes from the
state. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982).

2/ The proportion of SSI eligible fami-
lies who also qualify for AFDC varies
from state to state, because AFDC finan-
ciel eligibility criteria vary among the
states, while SSI financial eligibility
is uniform nationwide. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602
(a)(7), 1382 (1982).

=, =

The amount paid to a family on AFDC
depends on the number of persons in the
AFDC assistance unit. Since a child re-
ceiving SSI is autometically excluded
from the assistance unit, that child's
SSI eligibility reduces the size of the
unit for AFDC purposes, and consequently
reduces the financial burden on the
state. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24)
(1982) .27 Conversely, if the child is

erroneously excluded from 881, and

3/ For example, an AFDC-eligible family
with two children would be treated for
AFDC purposes as a family with one child
if the second child were on SSI. The
family would receive the child's SSI
benefit, plus an AFDC grant for the
other family members. If the second
child were denied SSI benefits, however,
the family would be treated as having
two children and would receive a higher
AFDC grant. The increased AFDC grant
would not be enough to offset the lost
SS. benefit, so both the family and the
state would suffer an economic loss.

-18-

therefore remains in the AFDC unit, the
state's AFDC burden is higher than it
would be otherwise be. For the family,
however, the denial of SSI coverage out-
weighs the additional AFDC benefit,
Since SSI payments are uniformly higher
than the incremental AFDC payment for an
additional family member . 4/

4/ In states that supplement 881
payments and that include children among
those eligible for such supplements, the
cost of AFDC benefits for these children
may be at least partially offset by
reduced SSI supplements. The fiscal
impact on states of such offsets varies
widely because of the greatly varying
size of, and eligibility requirements
for, supplements paid by the states.
See United States Dept. of Health and

Human Services, Characteristics of State
Assistance Programs for SSI Recipients

(1989).

-19-

. General Assistance.

Many states also operate general as-
Sistance programs that provide both cash
benefits and medical assistance to low-
income families not eligible for AFDC.
Ea. Md. Ann. Code Art. 88A, §§ 65A,
65B; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 117, §§ 1-25
(1986); Mass. Admin. Code Tit. 106,
§ 312 (1988).2 These programs are
operated and funded completely by the

states and local governments, wit.: no

37 As of 1983, at least forty-two
states had general assistance programs
and at least thirty-four states had med-
ical assistance programs for which chil-
Gren wrongfully denied SSI could qual-
ify. Urban Systems Research and Engi-
neering, Inc., Characteristics of Gen-
eral Assistance Programs 1982 ( U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Techni-
cal Information Service, 1983).

-20-

federal contribution to either the cash
benefit or the medical assistance.

In states that do not participate in
the AFDC-Unemployed Parent ("AFDC-UP")
program, see 42 U.S.C. § 60/ (1982),
general assistance may be the only wel-
fare program available to children in

87 Even in states

two-parent families.
that do have the AFDC-UP program, some
families who do not meet the particular
requirements of that program may be eli-

gible for general assistance, medical

6/ As of 1988, twenty-eight states and
other jurisdictions operated AFDC-UP
programs; twenty-six did not. United
States Department of Health and Human
Services, Characteristics of State Plans
for AFDC (1988). A modified form of the
AFDC-UP program will become mandatory
for all jurisdictions as of October 1,
1990. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b), as amended by
Act of Oct. 13, 1988, Pub. L. 100-485,
Title IV, and Act of Nov. 10, 1988, Pub.
L. 100-647, Title VIII.

afte

assistance, or both. See generally

(1977).

SSI coverage for a disabled child
reduces general assistance payments to
the child's family by decreasing the
amount of general assistance for which
the family is eligible. Conversely, im-
proper denials of SSI coverage increase
the burdens on general assistance
programs, to the states’ fiscal detri-

17 In states not adopting the

ment.
Medicaid-Under 21 program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (1982), any med-

ical benefits to these children

7/ For example, the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Welfare noted dra-
matic increases in the number of inca-
pacitated adults receiving General Re-
lief during the years 1981-1983, when
the Social Security Administration im-
plemented a nationwide ,rogram of re
viewing earlier SSI disability determi-
nations.
222.

also are funded solely by the states;
those states thus suffer an even greater
fiscal drain from improper denials of

881.87

B. Specialized State-Funded Health
Care Programs.

In addition to AFDC and general as-
Sistance programs, a wide variety of
state-funded health and human service
programs bear increased burdens when

children are erroneously excluded from

8/ Improper denials of SSI eligibility
to children increase the states’ AFDC
and general assistance burdens through
an additional, less direct mechanism.
Without funds for the purchase of ser-
vices, a disabled child's need for con-
stant, specialized care may prevent a
parent from working, thus rendering the
entire family dependent on state-funded
benefits. For many such families, SSI
benefits could make employment -- and
economic independence -- possible by
funding alternative care for the dis-
abled child.

289.

881. In Massachusetts, for example,
three programs sponsored by the
Department of Public Health ("DPH"),
funded solely by the Commonwealth, pro-
vide limitod quantities of goods or ser-
vices to children with special medical
needs.

The “Home Health Care” program pro-
vides intermittent at-home assistance in
the care of multiply handicapped chil-
dren, particularly after surgery or at
times of emergency, thus promoting the
ability of families to care for their
children at home. The “Early Interven-
tion“ program provides a variety of spe-
cialized rehabilitative therapies, to
promote maximum long-term development of
children with developmental delay.
Under the “Special Medical Needs” pro-
gram, DPH has provided chronically ill

-24-

or physically impaired children with
one-time grants of up to five thousand
dollars for medical procedures or
1€habilitative equipment.

Funds for these and similar programs
are limited, however, and services are
provided only subject to availability of
funds. To the extent that families can
use SSI benefits to purchase these ser-
vices, or that Medicaid reimbursement is
available as a result of SSI eligibil-
ity, limited state resources can be used
for services to other equally needy per-
sons. Conversely, for disabled children
who are erroneously denied SSI benefits,
such limited state-funded programs may

be the only alternative.“

9/ Similarly, state-funded mental
health and mental retardation services,
respite care, case management, and

(footnote continued)
.

S. Qther Health Care Costs.

Even when disabled children who are
erroneously rejected from SSI and
corresponding Medicaid coverage do not
participate in state-funded programs,
dhe costs of whatever health care they
receive ultimately falls, at least in
part, upon state and local governments.
Children who lack adequate health insur-
ance or Medicaid coverage often rely on
public hospitals, which are supported by
states and local governments. Even pri-
vate hospital charges, when left unpaid

by a child's family, may ultimately te-

(footnote continued)

related programs bear undue burdens in
serving children who are erroneously
excluded from SSI and related Medicaid
eligibility.

260

vert to state-subsidized uncompensated
care pools. Ses, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 118F, §§ 15, 17 (Supp. 1988).
Through such mechanisms, state funds 01
timately fill some of the gap that is
created when SSA policy causes chroni-
cally ill and disabled children to be
excluded from the program that Congress

intended to fund their care. +2/

107 State-subsidized insurance or
guasi-insurance programs may also assist
in paying the costs of health care for
these children. For example, the Massa-
chusetts “CommonHealth" program, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. LI8E, § 6B (Supp. 1988),
provides health benefits to disabled
children who are not eligible for SSI.
This program is designed for families
who are financially ineligible for SSI;
the Massachusetts statute incorporates
the SSI disability standards. Disabil-
ity determinations for the program, how-
ever, are made separately from SSI de-
terminations. Thus, it is possible that
some disabled children who are improper-
ly rejected from SSI may participate in
this state-funded program.

99.

These state-funded programs, numer-
ous and costly as they are, do not en-
sure a disabled child's access to neces-
sary services. Without SSI benefits and
associated Medicaid coverage, some chil-
dren will not receive preventive and re-
habilitative services that would promote
their development II“ ultimately, for
some of these children, such deprivation
will result in greater life-long depend-
ency on publicly-funded services, in-
cluding institutional care, than would

otherwise have been necessary. For the

III <A Wew York official has estimated
that as many as 25% of the disabled
children who may be eligible for SSI in
that State are not recipients of any
public assistance program at present.
These children are unlikely to be te-
ceiving timely and adequate medical care
and other associated services, which
might ameliorate or improve their condi-
tions.

-28-

states, that result means vastly in-
creased costs, particularly for mental
health and mental retardation services.
Similarly, @ chronically-ill child’‘s
lack of access to preventive health care
may lead to increased hospitalization,
at least some of the costs of which may

fall to a state.

D. Additional Long-Term Costs.

Unduly restrictive SSI policies im-
pose additional, less direct costs on
the states. The stress placed on an en-
tire family by a child's chronic illness
or disability is obvious and well docu-
menrted. See generally N. Hobbs, et al.,
Chronically 11] Children and Their
Families. pp. 62-101 (1985). Financial
strain due to unreimbursed expenses for

medical care or related services adds

29

substantially to that stress. Id. at
89. The consequences of such stress are
high in both human and financial costs.
Such consequences include increased fam-
ily disintegration, mental and physical
illness among all family members, home-
iessness, child abuse, substance abuse,
and a variety of other manifestations of
family dysfunction. See generally id.
Each of these consequences, in turn, may
increase demand for various state-funded
benefits and services. For an undeter-
minable number of families, SSI could
ease the strain sufficiently to prevent
such consequences, and thus to obviate
the need for additional state-funded
services.

Because Congress intended to place
the burden of caring for low-income dis-

30

abled children on the federal govern-
ment, the cost of services provided to
them and their families through these
various types of programs is an unwar-
ranted drain on state budgets. Thus, by
adopting an eligibility determination
policy that excludes large numbers of
severely disabled children, SSA has un-
dermined the legislative purpose and
circumvented the will of Congress.

II. THE COURT NEED NOT DEFER TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE
GOVERNING STATUTE.

The Court of Appeals correctly con-
cluded that the regulations at issue are
invalid because they are inconsistent

with the clear intent of Congress.
Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 73-74, 76

.

(3d Cir. 1988). Accord Marcus vy. Bowen,
696 F. Supp. 364, 382-64 (N. o. Ill.
1988), appeal pending, No. 89-2717 (7th
Cir.). Under the circumstances, the
Court of Appeals also properly declined
to defer to the SSA's contrary interpre-
tation of that statute. 6855 F.2d at
72-73. Accord Marcus v. Bowen, 696 F.
Supp. at 384.

Whether an agency's regulations ex-
ceed statutory authority is a pure ques-
tion of statutory construction for the
court to decide. NLRB v. United Food
and Commercial Workers Union 484 U.S.
112, 105 S. Ct. 413, 421 (1987), relying
on INS vy. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
446-49 (1987), and Chevron U.S.A... Inc.

vy. Natural Resources Defense Council.
Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 and un.

.

(1984). In answering that question, the
court first tries to determine congres-
sional intent using “traditional tools
of statutory construction,” namely, the
plain language, structure, and history
of the statute. NLRB, 4864 U.S. 8
108 S. Ct. at 421 and cases cited: see
INS, 480 U.S. at 449. It a clear con-
gressional intent can be discerned in
this manner, then the agency's regula-
tions must be “fully consistent” with
Congress's intent. NLRB. 484 U. S.
a t „ 108 S. Ct. at 421. It is only

where these tools fail to reveal Con-
gress‘s intent that any deference to the
agency's interpretation of the governing
statute is appropriate. Ea. Regents
of University of California v. Public

Employment Relations Board, 485 U.S.
589, 108 S. Ct. 1404, 1412 (1988)

-33-

("Because we have been able to ascertain
Congress's clear intent based on our
analysis of the statutes and their leg-
islative history, we need not address
the issue of deference to the agency”);
Board of Governors. FRS v. Dimension
Financial Corp., 474 US. 361, 368
(1986), quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43 ("If the statute is clear and un-
ambiguous ‘that is the end of the mat-
ter, for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Con-
gress

The Court of Appeals properly recog-
nized that the starting point for ascer-
taining Congress's intent is the plain
language of the statute itself. 855
F. zd at 73. EL.. American Tobacco Co.

v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
1 **

Since courts must assume that the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used by Con-
gress expresses Cou,ress's intent, that
plain language is conclusive unless
there is a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary. Id. «at 68,
72 n.6, 75 and cases cited. iIn-
deed, this Court often decides cases
solely on the basis of the plain lan-
guage without resort to legislative his-
tory. Ea, Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v.
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, „ 108 8. Ct.

1255, 1258 (1988); Burlington Northern

12/ See also Rodriguez v. U.S., 480
U.S. 522, 525 (1987); Burlington North-

ern R,. Co. vv. Oklahoma Tax Commission
481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Escondido Mut.

Water Co, v. LaJolla Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984);

Banner Institute. Inc.,
460 U.S. 103, 110, 118 (1983); Griffin

v. Oceanic Contractors. Inc. 458 U.S.
564, 570-571 (1982).

=~ =

U.S. 454, 461 (1987). See also American
Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 75 ("Going be-
hind the plain language of a statute in
search of a possibly contrary congres-
sional intent is a ‘step to be taken
cautiously,’ even under the best of
circumstances.").

After comparing the plain language
of 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982) to
the Secretary's regulations, the Court

of Appeals properly concluded that,

in the statutory directive that
‘any’ impairment may be disabling if
severe enough, Congress has clearly
expressed an intention that children
be given the opportunity for indi-
vidual evaluations comparable to the
residual functional capacity assess-
ment for adults. This intent is
contrary to that of the agency,
which is to restrict children to
listed impairments.

855 F.2d at 76.47 There is nothing

13 The Court of Appeals conclusion is
bolstered by the use of the words

(footnote continued)
~~

in the legislative history which clearly
expresses a contrary legislative in-
tent. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals
discussed, the legislative history sup-
ports the plain meaning of the statute.
855 F. 2d at 74-75. Accord Marcus v.
Bowen, 696 F. Supp. at 370-71. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeal's decision
that the Secretary's regulations are

invalid should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

this Court should affirm the decision of

(footnote continued)

“comparable severity” in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).

12

the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES M. SHANNON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

uza E. Durrell

Counsel of Record
Judith Fabricant

Assistant Attorneys General
One Ashburton Place, Rm. 2019
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 727-2200

Don Siegelman, Attorney General
State of Alabama

Douglas B. Bailey, Attorney General
State of Alaska

Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General
State of Arizona

John Steven Clark, Attorney General
State of Arkansas

Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting
Attorney General, State of
Connecticut

(appearances continued on next page)

38

Charles M. Oberly, III, Actorney
General, State of Delaware

Herbert O. Reid, Sr., Acting
Corporation Counsel; Charles L.
Reischel, Deputy Corporation
Counsel, Appellate Division,
District of Columbia

Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General
State of Illinois

Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General
State of Indiana,

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General
State of Iowa

Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General
State of Kansas

William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney
General, State of Louisiana

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney
General, State of Maryland

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney
General, State of Minnesota

William L. Webster, Attorney General
State of Missouri

Marc Racicot, Attorney General
State of Montana

Robert M. Spire, Attorney General
State of Nebraska

-39-

John P. Arnold, Attorney General,
State of New Hampshire

Robert Abrams, Attorney General
State of New York

Ernest d. Preate, Jr. Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

James E. O'Neil, Attorney General
State of Rhode Island

Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney
General, State of South Dakota

Charles W. Burson, Attorney General
& Reporter, State of Tennessee

Jim Mattox, Attorney General
State of Texas

R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General
State of Utah

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General
State of Vermont

Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General
State of Wyoming

September, 1989

-40-

Hubert H. Humphrey, III. Amorney General
State of Minnesota

William L Webster. Attorney General
State of Missoun

State of Montana

Robert M Spire, Attorney General
State of Nebraska

John P Arnold. Attorney General
State of New Hampshire

Rober Abrams. Attorney Generu.
State of New York

Ernest D Preate, Jr, Attorney General
Commonwealth of Pennsy!y ama

James E O'Neil, Attorney General
State of Rhode Island

Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General
State of South Dakota

Charles W Burson, Attorney General & Reporter
State of Tennessee

Jum Mattox. Attorney General
State of Texas

KR Paul Van Dam Attorney General
State of Utah

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General
State of Vermont

Joseph B Meyer, Attorney General
State of W yormng

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0469%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
