# Respondents Brief — Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 678

## Text

No. 85-920

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

WILLIAM E. Brock, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al.,

Respondents.

Ca Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

GARY GREEN

EUGENE B. GKANOF*

Arr LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

*(Counsel of Record)
Of Counsel

GEORGE B. DRIES=EN

1000 Potomac Street, N.W.
(Suite 204)

Washington, D.C. 20007

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

-— oval at the carrier which furloughed or ter-

SI iaiteat ak Leh coun instereted to-gnepere
and publish a list of jobs available with certificated
carriers, and to “make every effort to assist an eli-
gible protected employee in finding other employ-

10

ment.’ The Secretary was also authorized to require
carriers to submit relevant reports, data, and other
information. (§ 22(d\2))

In addition to the mandatory duties imposed on the
Secretary of Labor—primarily determining monetary com-
pensation levels and establishing a job list—Section 22 pro-
vided that “(t]he Secretary may issue, amend, and repeal
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
administration of this section.’’ (§ 22(f1)) Subsection
22(f(2) then provided that the rules and regulations pro-
posed by the Secretary had to be submitted to Congress
60 legislative days before they were to take effect, during
which period they could be disapproved by a resolution of
either House.

On the Senate floor, there were several attempts to
amend Section 22. The Hatch and Zorinsky amendments
which dealt with the basic concept and form of labor pro-
tection have previously been described. Supra, pp. 6-7. The
Zorinsky amendment, aside from its primary objective of
seeking to delete the financial assistance component of
Section 22, sought as well to change some of the partic-
ulars of first right of hire so as to make it more favorable
to employees. Thus, the amendment would have defined
a “protected” employee as a person with only one year
of airline employment, instead of four years, and would
have defined ‘‘a qualifying dislocation” as any reduction
in a carrier’s workforce instead of a minimum 15% re-.
duction. Senator Zorinsky’s stated purpose was to further
strengthen the hiring preference as a better alternative to
“affording the relief of compensation from the pockets of
the Nation’s taxpayers.” 124 Cong. Rec. 10,674-75 (1978).
Senator Danforth, on the other hand, offered an amend-
ment that would have enhanced the financial assistance
component by extending the three year limit on monthly
payments to up to five years and by eliminating the “15%
trigger’ for both monetary compensation and first right

11

of hire. As with the Zorinsky amendment, the Danforth
amendment did not pass; the vote was 54-37 against. 124
Cong Rec. 10,680-81 (1978).

Senator Cannon, one of the primary sponsors of S. 2493,
offered an amendment which did pass: deleting language
which would have required the Secretary of Labor ‘to
insure that the protected employee will not, during the
period in which he is entitled to protection, be placed in
a substantially worse financial position with respect to
wages and fringe benefits.” 124 Cong. Rec. 10,683 (1978).
The stated purpose of this amendment was to make certain
that the Secretary would not be legally bound to guarantee
the full salary and benefits of very highly paid employees,
but rather would have “discretion concerning the level of
payments” in view of his “expertise and experience in
providing adjustment assistance to workers.” [bid.

There was no discussion on the floor of the Senate con-
cerning the legislative veto, nor was it even mentioned.
The Committee report refers to the veto once, as follows:

Eligible employees who lost their jobs would
be entitled to monthly payments for a maximum
of 3 years or until they were reemployed, which-
ever occurred first. The amount of such payment
would be equal to a percentage of former wages,
as determined by regulations promulgated by the
Department of Labor. These regulations will be
subject to congressional review. The committee
considered setting statutory percentage figures
and maximum dollar amounts, but concluded that
the Secretary of Labor, after consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation, will be in a bet-
ter position to determine the appropriate
amounts. The committee intends that the per-
centages chosen will result in compensation pay-
ments that are less than the employees’ after-tax

12

income in order to preserve maximum incentives
for employees to secure comparable work.

[Senate Report, pp. 116-117 (emphasis added)]
II. The House Bill
A. The House’s Deregulation Provisions

The House bill, H.R. 12611, was reported out by the
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation on
May 19, 1978. The Committee pointed out that there was
considerable dissatisfaction with the existing airline reg-
ulatory system, which had been established in 1938 and
had not been substantially changed since. House Report,
p. ‘1. The sources of that dissatisfaction, in the Commit-
tee’s view, were largely the same as those identified in
the report of its Senate counterpart (supra, p. 3): the CAB,
particularly prior to 1975, tended to discourage competi-
tion in the industry “by denying or dismissing most ap-
plications for new routes, by refusing to allow new carriers
to enter the trunkline industry,... by discouraging ex-
periments with reduced fares ... [,]’’ and by utilizing hear-
ing procedures which “‘led to extensive inaction, delay, and
red tape.”” House Report, p. 2.

The legislation recommended by the House Committee
was conceptuaily similar to that passed by the Senate in
that it, too, opted for targeted reform in specific ways—
a “release of some regulatory fetters’”—as opposed to giv-
ing the CAB discretionary authority to implement “‘total
deregulation.”” House Report, p. 4. As the Committee re-
port described the proposed legislation, “H.R. 12611 is a
moderate reform bill which introduces more competition
and less regulation of the airline industry on a gradual,
controlled basis.”” Ibid. Like the Senate bill, the House bill

... includes a revised policy statement requiring
the Board to stress competition and to encourage
low fare service and new entry into the industry.
The bill also includes a fare flexibility provision

13

permitting airlines to raise and lower fares by
specified percentages without CAB approval. The
bill also imposes procedural deadlines for CAB
decisions and allows CAB to develop simplified
procedures for less controversial cases.

[House Report, p. 5]

Also like the Senate bill, the House bill contained provi-
sions allowing easy access by other carriers into markets
in which carriers certified to provide services were not
doing so (“dormant authority”) aud establishing an “‘ex-
perimental automatic entry program under which all CAB
certificated carriers will be permitted automatic entry into
one market of their choice in the first calendar year after
enactment.” Thereafter, the CAB would report on the pro-
gram, and Congress would decide whether to continue it
on a more permanent basis. House Report, p. 5.

B. The House’s Labor Protective Provision

Section 32 of H.R. 12611 protected airline employees
from the potential effects of deregulation in a way which
was far more encompassing than the more specific pro-
tection afforded by the Senate bill. For, under the House
bill, no new carrier authority could be exercised at all if
affected employees were thereby placed in a substantially
worse position. The Secretary of Labor was charged in
this regard with adhering to a minimum protection stand-
ard, but no statutory maximum was set. Thus, Section 32
provided that:

No authority granted by this Act, or by any
amendment made by this Act, shall be exercised
by any carrier unless prior to each such exercise,
the Secretary of Labor has certified to the Civil
Aeronautics Board that the interests of the em-
ployees who may be affected thereby have been
adequately protected by fair and equitable ar-
rangements providing levels of protection no less
beneficial to and protective of such interests than

14

those established pursuant to section 5(2\f) of the
Interstate Commerce Act and section 405 of the
Rail Passenger Act, as such sections are in ex-
istence on the date of enactment of this section
or are hereafter amended, except that the car-
rier-employer of the affected employees shall be
responsible for the application of the protective
arrangements to such employees and sha! be
reimbursed by the Secretary of the Treasury for
the cost of such application. There is hereby es-
tablished in the Treasury of the United States a
separate account to be known as the “Airlines.
Employees’ Protective Account’”’ ... to make
reimbursements pursuant to this section.

[124 Cong. Rec. 30,703, 30,718 (1978); House Re-
port, p. 22]

Section 5(2Xf) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was
then codified as 49 U.S.C. § 5(2\f) and subsequently re-
codified as 49 U.S.C. § 11347, provided inter alia that
affected employees of the carriers involved will not be in
a worse position with respect to their employment for at
least four years, and that the protective arrangements be
at least as favorable to the employees as were ordinarily
required prior to February 5, 1976.* Section 405 of the
Rail Passenger Act, 45 U.S.C. § 565, mandated “fair and
equitable arrangements to protect the interests of em-
ployees,”’ which

... Shall include, without being limited to, such

provisions as may be necessary for (1) the pre-

servation of rights, privileges, and benefits (in-

* February 5, 1976 was the date of enactment of the Railroad Re-
vitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-210, 90
Stat. 31. Section 402 of that Act, 90 Stat. 62, amended Section 5(2\f)
of the Interstate Commerce Act to require the ICC to impose arrange-
ments no less protective of the interests of employees “than those
heretofore imposed pursuant to this subdivision. . .”’

15

cluding continuation of pension rights and
benefits) to such employees under existing col-
lective-bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2)
the continuation. of collective-bargaining rights;
(3) the protection of such individual employees
against a worsening of their positions with re-
spect to their employment; (4) assurances of
priority of reemployment of employees termi-
nated or laid off; and (5) paid training or re-
training programs.

The House Committee report briefly summarized the
gist of the House bill’s employee protection provision, but
otherwise did not discuss it. House Report, p. 22. The
report did, however, list the employee protection program
as among the “important provisions of H.R. 12611.” Jd.
at p. 5.

H.R. 12611 was considered and passed by the full House
on September 21, 1978. 124 Cong. Rec. 30,661-718 (1978).
The labor protective provision, as reported out by the Com-
mittee, was acopted without apparent controversy or dis-
cussion. /2. at 30,703. The provision contained no
legislative veto language, and none was proposed or even
mentioned on the House floor.

III. The Conference Committee And Subsequent Enact-
ment

As stated in the Conference Report, the employee pro-
tection provision that emerged from the House-Senate
Conference Committee and was ultimately enacted as § 43
of the ADA “‘ijs basically the same as the Senate bill.”
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1978)
(hereinafter ‘‘Conf. Rep.””). However, under pressure from
the House conferees, the protection provision was liber-
alized in several respects. Perhaps most important, the
“qualifying dislocation” requirement was dropped for first
right of hire, though it remained as a condition for finan-
cial assistance. Conf. Rep., pp. 48-51, 105-106. Thus, in

16

order to obtain the hiring preference granted by § 43, a
“‘protected”” employee would not have to meet the heavy
burden of showing that his termination or furlough was
the result of a “bankruptcy or major contraction ... the
major cause of which is the change in regulatory structure
provided by the Airline Deregulation Act ... as deter-
mined by the Civil Aeronautics Board.”’ § 43(hX2) (defini-
tion of “qualifying dislocation”). On the other hand,
language was added making clear that employees fur-
loughed or terminated ‘‘for cause” were ineligible for the
hiring preference. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(d1). The re-
quirement that employees entitled to the preference be
hired in order of seniority was deleted, but the “regardless
of age” language was retained. Jbid.

Financial assistance was made somewhat easier to ob-
tain because a “‘major contraction’’—one of the elements
of a “qualifying dislocation” —was redefined as a work
force reduction of at least 7'/, percent, rather than 15
percent. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(hX4). Also, the limit on
the number of monthly assistance payments was increased
from 36 to 72. Conf. Rep., p. 105; § 43(eX1). However, the
words “subject to such amounts as are provided in ap-
propriation Acts’’ were insertec in subsections (bX1) and
(c) of § 43, thus removing any possible doubt that all mon-
etary compensation authorized by the provision was con-
tingent on future a»propriations.

With regard to both the guidelines for financial assist-
ance which the Secretary of Labor was directed to issue
and such other rules and regulations “as may be neces-
sary’ for the program, the Secretary was placed under a
time constraint: they were to “be promulgated within six
months after the date of enactment of this section.”’
§ 43(f(2); Conf. Rep., p. 105. Moreover, a. ‘report and
wait’”’ requirement was added to the one-house legislative
veto provision: %.¢., thirty days prior to issuance, the Sec-
retary was obligated to submit any final rule or regulation
to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Com-

17

mittee and to the House Public Works and Transportation
Committee. § 43(f(3); Conf. Rep., p. 106.

The Conference Report on the ADA was agreed to by
the Senate by a vote of 82 to 4 without any significant
debate on the employee protection provision. 124 Cong.
Rec. 37,416-21 (1978). Senator Cannon described the pro-
vision as “important” (Jd. at 37,416), and Senator Pearson
called it “‘an acceptable compromise ‘hat all sides can live
with” (Id. at 37,417-18).

The House, by a vote of 356 to.6, likewise agreed to
the Conference Report. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,526-27 (1978).
Congressmen Andersen, Snyder, Johnson, Harsha, and
Minetta all commented on the importance of the employee
protection provision. Jd. at 38,521-25. Representative An-
derson, who presented the Conference Report, specifically
pointed out that the ‘House provisions on employee pro-
tection ... were stronger than those in the conference
bill,” but that the House conferees had succeeded in mak-
ing the Conference bill “considerably stronger’ than the
Senate bill. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,522 (1978). Representative
Harsha, a member of the conference committee, com-
plained that he was not. “totally satisfied’ with the con-
ference agreement because

... benefits are not to be paid an employee who
loses his job . . . until there is at least 7'/, percent
employee reduction in the airline. It makes no
sense ... to defer these benefits until this per-
centage trigger is reached, causing employees
who have not found a job to suffer needlessly.
However, in the spirit of compromise we man-
aged to reduce by one-half the percentage trigger
in the Senate bill.

{124 Cong. Rec. 38,523 (1978)]
Congressman Minetta, who had been deeply involved in
drafting the House’s labor protection provisions, elaborated
further:

18

The Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation struggled with the problem of employee
protection for quite some time before it came
around to support almost unanimously the em-
ployee protection provision I offered. . .

The labor protective provisions in the House-
passed bill were reasonable, responsible legisla-
tion. These provisions were to be based on levels
of protection established pursuant to section
5(2\f) of the Interstate Commerce Act and sec-
tion 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act. The
levels of protection would have assured that an
affected employee would not be in a worse po-
sition with respect to his employment as a result
of passage of the act. An employee who suffered
reduction in salary or who was deprived of em-
ployment would have been eligible for 100 per-
cent of his average monthly salary for up to 6
years, with moving expenses if necessary and a
12-month lump sum separation payment op-
tion. . .

By comparison with the House-passed provi-
sion, the conference agreement—which was based
on the Senate language—is not much protection
at all.

[124 Cong. Rec. 38,524-25 (1978)]
Concerning the legislative veto provision, Congressman
Levitas, in the course of commenting on several other
provisions of the bill, stated:

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I cannot let this moment
go by without making this observation. While
there have been several bills sent to the Presi-
dent this year and signed by him which contained
a provision for a congressional veto, I am happy
to say that this piece of legislation contains a

19

one-House veto over the regulations which may
be issued by the Secretary of Labor on the !abor
protection provisions, so that the Congress and
not an unelected bureaucrat will have the final
word on the regulations that will have the effect

of law.
[124 Cong. Rec. 38,524 (1978)]

Representative Levitas’ “observation”’ is the sole reference
to the veto in either the House or Senate debate on the
ADA.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals concluded that the veto provision
is severable from the remainder of § 43 because the leg-
islative history provides overwhelming evidence that Con-
gress considered the protections afforded emovloyees by
that section to be important, but there is no evidence that
Congress regarded the veto as significant. As the court
pointed out, the legislative history. is barren ‘‘of any direct
statement evidencing a Congressional intent of insevera-
bility;’”’ hence, the case against severability is entirely cir-
cumstantial. 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a-25a). The record
fully supports the court’s determination that the circum-
stances fall ‘‘far short” of establishing the requisite intent;
if anything, they “‘positively” buttress the holding in favor
of severability. 766 F.2d at 1561, 1565 (Pet. 19a,. 28a).

First, there were only a handful of votes in the Senate
opposed to § 43; the House wanted an even stronger em-
. ployee protection provision; and the committee reports and
comments made in debate confirm that labor protection
was deemed to be a vital part of the ADA. Notwithstand-
ing uncertainty over the economic consequences of dere-
gulation on airline employees generally, Congress was not
uncertain about the need to assist individual employees
who had made a career commitment to the industry when
it was regulated and relatively stable and who might be

20

furloughed or terminated through no fault of their own in
the new competitive environment.

Second, the authority delegated in § 43 which is subject
to the legislative veto is not the sort of authority which
Congress has historically been reluctant to part with out
of fear that an unchecked delegation would undermine tra-
ditional legislative prerogatives. There was no concern that
§ 43 might permit an unwarranted expansion of executive
branch power at the expense of the legislative branch.

Third, the veto provision was not the result of any com-
promise between the House and the Senate. The provision
was in the Senate bill from the outset, and it played no
role in the House’s eventual acceptance of the Senate’s
labor protection concept. In fact, the House was willing
to delegate far greater authority to the Secretary of Labor
to formulate protective arrangements for airline employees
without subjecting that authority to a legislative veto.

Fourth, there is no support in the record for Petitioners’
argument that Congress was afraid that the Secretary of
Labor’s administration of § 43 would defeat the objectives
of airline deregulation, and, accordingly, inserted the veto
provision to allow Congress to check the Secretary’s au-
thority. No concern of that nature appears in the com-
mittee reports or in floor debate. Moreover, neither of the
two components of § 43 present any potential for inter-
fering with deregulation. Financial assistance payments
from federal revenues to terminated or furloughed em-
ployees would obviously have no bearing on airline oper-
ations. Nor would first right of hire impair a carrier’s
competitive position. The carrier’s ability to enter new
markets and to price its services remains unaffected be-
cause first right of hire does not increase a carrier’s labor
costs, but merely requires a carrier who is otherwise hiring
to give a preference to eligible individuals who meet that
carrier’s~ qualifications and are willing to work for the
wages and under the working conditions established by

21

the carrier. If anything, by hiring individuals with consid-
erable experience in the industry, a carrier is likely to
improve its ability to compete.

Fifth, especially with regard to first right of hire, § 43
sets forth the nature of the benefits provided in consid-
erable detail. The authority delegated to the Secretary of
Labor is circumscribed and quite routine. There is nothing
in such a delegation which suggests that the Senate, in
enacting a labor protective provision with a veto, and the
House, in acquiescing in the Senate’s version, regarded
the legislative veto as an indispensable rein on the Sec-
retary’s authority.

Sixth, had the House’s labor protection provision been
enacted, the Secretary would have been given extremely
broad authority to impose labor protective provisions. The
Secretary's decision-making could significantly affect the
nature and pace of deregulation under the House bill be-
cause “{njo authority granted by ... [the Airline Dere-
gulation] Act” could be exercised without a certification
from the Secretary that the employees had been ade-
quately protected (supra, p. 13). That. the House was will-
ing to give the Secretary this authority without attaching
a legislative veto to it, and only reluctantly acceded to the
Senate’s far more modest labor protective provision, com-
pellingly demonstrates that the veto was irrelevant to
House action.

Seventh, the legislative history of § 43 indicates that the
most likely explanation for the veto provision is that the
Senate wanted to retain a check on the financial assistance
payment levels established by the Secretary. Since the pay-
ments were to be based on wages, these levels could prove
to be politically sensitive in view of the high earnings of
many airline employees. Nonetheless, although the veto
was useful and desirable, it was not essential: financial
assistance payments depended on future appropriations,
and thus the appropriations process gave Congress the

22

requisite means to keep a rein on the Secretary if for any
reason the veto could not be utilized.

Eighth, in any event, all that is at issue in this case is
first right of hire, and there is nothing in the legislative
history which ties the veto to that component of § 43. First
right of hire can and should be implemented without re-
gard to whether the financial assistance component of § 43
is also implemented. Congress preferred that displaced air-
line employees obtain jobs, and only if they could not was
financial assistance to be made available.

Ninth, the addition of a “report and wait” requirement
to the veto provision does not show that the veto was
crucial to the enactment of § 43. If anything, “report and
wait” diminishes the importance of the veto because it
ensures that Congress will receive sufficient advance no-
tification of proposed regulations to overrule them through
the normal legislative process should it be dissatisfied. The
significance of the veto provision in § 43 further recedes
in light of the far more elaborate veto provisions Congress
inserted in other statutes. The comparison shows that Con-
gress attached a much higher priority to legislative review
in those situations than it did here.

Finally, the court of appeals’ severability analysis is not
invalid because the court considered whether Congress
would have preferred § 43 without the veto to an ADA
without a labor protective provision. The court’s opinion
reflects a thorough canvass of the legislative history in an
effort to ascertain legislative intent. The court, in fact,
found ‘“‘not a shred of evidence that the veto provision
was deemed to bea vital feature of the protection plan.”
(766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 28a)). Moreover, there is “not a
shred of evidence” either that, but for the legislative veto
in § 43, Congress would have enacted a different labor
protective provision than it did. Accordingly, it is clearly
not “evident” that Congress chose § 43 over other alter-
natives because of the veto provision, and that, absent the

23

veto, § 43 would have failed of passage. In this context,
and in light of the practical realities, it was entirely ap-
propriate for the court to search for the dominant legis-
lative intent as between preserving § 43 without a veto
and tearing down the section in its entirety.

ARGUMENT

I. There Is No Persuasive Basis For Concluding That
The Legislative Veto Provision Was Crucial In Any
Material Respect To The Enactment Of § 43

A. The Evidence To Support A Determination of Insev-
erability Is Completely Lacking Here

In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 931-932 (1983), this Court, reaffirming and quot-
ing from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) and
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n., 286 U.S.
210, 234, (1932), stated “that the invalid portions of a
statute are to be severed ‘[ujnless it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which
are within its power, independently of that which is not.’ ”’
Petitioners assert no disagreement with this standard. (Pet.
Br., p. 14) They argue, however, that it means that “a
statutory section containing an invalid provision must fall
in its entirety if it appears that absent the invalid part,
Congress would have enacted either no provision at all or
one with different form, content or language.” (Pet. Br.,
pp. 14-15) But even with the gloss that Petitioners place
on the Chadha/Buckley/Champlin Refining standard, the
fundamental inquiry is the same: it still must be ‘‘evident”’
that the invalid portion was crucial to passage of the sta-
tutory section in question; and, with respect to an uncon-
stitutional legislative veto provision, it still must appear
that Congress would have been unwilling to delegate the
authority it did unless it could retain a check on that
authority by way of the veto. American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 307 (D.C. Cir.

24

1982); Consumer Energy Counsel of America v. FERC, 673
F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Cunsumer Energy Council of
America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). That showing simply has
not been, and cannot be, made here. For, as the court of
appeals found, the evidence is “{ajmple... that the em-
ployee protection program... was deemed by Congress to
be an important aspect of the [Airline Deregulation] Act,”’
whereas, “‘{iJn contrast, there is not a shred of evidence
that the veto. provision was deemed to be a vital feature
of the protection plan.” 766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a).) If,
as we now demonstrate, the court was correct in con-
cluding that the veto provision was not ‘deemed to be a
vital feature” of § 43 by Congress, it follows that affirm-
ance would be appropriate even under Petitioners’ for-
mulation. In other words, as the legislative record confirms,
it is far from evident that Congress would have chosen
to enact no program at all, or a substantially modified
§ 43, rather than enact the section as it now stands with-
out the veto.‘

Although Petitioners do not directly attack the court of
appeals’ finding that Congress regarded the employee pro-
tection program as important, they do so inferentially by
referring to what they term the ‘“‘congressional uncertainty
about the need for labor protection” in the ADA. (Pet.
Br., pp. 4, 37) Presumably, Congress would be more in-
clined to insist on retaining a legislative veto over regu-
lations implementing a program the necessity of which was

‘In Regan v. Time, Inc., ___ U.S. —__, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 3269, (1984),
Justice White’s plurality opinion stated: ““Whether an unconstitutional
provision is severable from the remainder of the statute in which it
appears is largely a question of legislative intent, but the presumption
is in favor of severability.” Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, was
of the view that “severability is exclusively a question of legislative
intent.” 104 S.Ct. at 3275. Under either view, the finding of the court
of appeals that the veto provision was not considered by Congress to
be ‘vital’ to § 43—if that finding is borne out by the record—should
be dispositive of the severability issue.

25

in doubt than a program it definitely wanted. However,
as Petitioners concede (Pet. Br., pp. 9-10), § 43 was viewed
by Congress as a form of insurance. The impact of the
deregulatory provisions of the ADA on employees in the
airline industry could not be accurately predicted. On the
one hand, the proponents of deregulation anticipated that
air travel would increase, which, in turn, would bring in-
creased employment opportunities. On the other hand, it
was fully recognized that individual employees might well
be adversely affected by deregulation as some airlines con-
tracted or went out of business while other airlines pros-
pered and expanded. Supra, pp. 4-5; 766 F.2d at 1562
(Pet. 22a). Section 43 was no different than most common
forms of insurance: there was uncertainty. over the extent
to which the contingencies on which the benefits were
predicated would materalize; but there was no serious
doubt as to the need for protection if they did. In the
Senate, an amendment to eliminate § 43 in its entirety
was overwhelmingly defeated 85-7. Supra, p. 7. And in
the House, a labor protective provision which was per-
ceived as far more expansive was passed without contro-

versy. Supra, p. 15.

There is no persuasive evidence that Congress would
have failed to enact §43 were it not for the legislative
veto. To begin with, § 43 does not delegate authority which
has traditionally been jealously guarded by Congress. For
instance, there is nothing in § 43 remotely comparable to
the authority to restructure the Executive Branch con-
tained in the Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
17, 91 Stat. 29, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seg., which
was at issue in EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d
1188 (5th Cir. 1984) (legislative veto provision found sev-
erable), in EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984)
(severability rejected), and in Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC,
743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (severability question not ripe
for decision in absence of actual use of veto by Congress).
We do not have here delegated authority analogous to the

26

authority to establish pay schedules for federal employees
contained in the salary adjustment statutes at issue in
McCorkle v. U.S., 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). (veto proviso held insevera-
ble). No danger exists that the delegation in § 43 might
work an unintended shift of govenmental powers as be-
tween the separate branches. See Consumer Energy Coun-
cil v. FERC, supra, 673 F.2d at 445, n. 70. Section 43
does not constitute ‘definitive legislation’’ which was care-
fully “‘designed ... to mark the limits of Congressional
and Presidential power” over appropriated funds. City of
New Haven v. United States, __. F.Supp. ___,____ (No. 86-
0455) (D.C. D.C. May 16, 1986), slip. op., p. 7 (legislative
veto in Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2
U.S.C. § 681 et seg., held inseverable).

Moreover, the circumstances with respect to § 43 are
not at all like those in American Federation of Government
Employees v. Pierce, supra, in which one house of Con-
gress acceded to the other house’s legislation in lieu of its
own, but only reluctantly and after insisting on the in-
sertion of a veto restriction as the price of its acquies-
cence. True, the House was reluctant to agree to the
Senate’s labor protective provision. But that was only be-
cause the Senate bill was viewed as insufficiently protec-
tive of employee interests. Supra, pp. 17-18. Furthermore,
the veto provision was in the Senate bill from the outset;
the record is devoid of any indication that it was inserted
in either the initial or the final version of § 43 as the price
of House agreement. Of far greater significance is that
the House first passed a deregulation bill; H.R. 12611,
which gave the Secretary of Labor broad latitude—indeed,
far broader than that in the Senate bill—to fashion labor
protection arrangements for airline employees, and yet the
House attached no legislative veto leash to the Secretary’s
authority. Supra, pp. 13-15. If the House was willing to
enact the expansive and non-specific labor protective pro-
vision of H.R. 12611 without any veto language, it is log-

27

ical to assume that it likewise would have been willing to
enact § 43 without the veto restriction. As the court of
appeals put it, “(ijt seems ... unlikely that a program
offering less protection would have occasioned a call for
even greater legislative control over the bureaucracy.’’ 766
F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a).

B. Petitioners Are Mistaken In Asserting That The Veto
Provision Resulted From Congressional Concern That
Administration Of § 43 Might Conflict With Airline De-

regulation Objectives

Petitioners argue, however, that a legislative veto was
“critical’’ to enactment of Section 43, but not to the labor
protective provision of H.R. 12611, because § 43 “created
a program fundamentally inconsistent with the overall de-
regulatory purpose manifest throughout the Act” (Pet. Br.,
p. 29). They particularly assert that Congress was espe-
cially fearful of first right of hire “regulations that would
displace marketplace hiring decisions and ... thwart the
Deregulation Act’s overall purpose by overburdening cov-
ered carriers” (Jd. at 30). Petitioners are demonstrably
wrong in their contentions.

As shown supra, pp. 2-4, 12-13 the type of deregulation
that Congress sought to accomplish through the ADA was
to substantially increase the ability of new carriers to enter
the industry and of existing carriers to expand into new
markets, as well as to ensure greater non-predatory fare
competition among carriers. First right of hire does not
contravene those stated objectives. It clearly does not pre-
vent new entrants from coming into the industry or limit
the ability of existing carriers to expand into new markets.
And it does not undercut the competitive position of any
carrier because it does not require a carrier to do any
hiring that it does not plan to do, and does not preclude
the carrier from recalling its own furloughed employees
before hiring others. Nor does § 43 compel a carrier to
pay any higher wages or grant any more favorable work-

28

ing conditions to an individual entitled to the preference
than it would if it hired someone not so entitled. Except
for age, a carrier need only hire those who meet its own
qualifications, notwithstanding that those qualifications are
more stringent than the minimum Federal Aviation Admin-
istration qualifications or the qualifications of other air-
lines. To the extent that compliance with the preferential
hiring requirement presents any administrative burden to
a carrier, that burden is so slight and its cost so small as
to be inconsequential with respect to the carrier’s ability
to compete. Surely, if there had been any concern in Con-
gress about the impact of first right of hire on the ability
of existing carriers to compete in a deregulated environ-
ment, that concern would have surfaced in the various
committee reports or in floor debate. However, there is
nothing in the legislative history which so much as sug-
gests that Congress thought this to be a potential problem
or otherwise saw any burden to carriers in first right of
hire. For all that appears, it is more likely that Congress
accepted the commonsense notion that carriers would ben-
efit by hiring experienced individuals.*

There is another equally persuasive reason why Con-
gress manifested no misgivings regarding the authority it
delegated to the Secretary of Labor to issue such regu-
lations as ‘“‘may” be necessary to administer first right of
hire: the statutory language defining those entitled to the
hiring preference—‘‘protected’’ employees—was suffi-
ciently elaborate as to leave little in the way of substantive
discretion to the Secretary. Thus, the statute was fairly

* Department of Labor regulations implementing first right of hire,
which are currently in effect, confirm that carriers are entitled to
impose their own qualifications. 29 C.F.R. § 220.21, 50 Fed. Reg. 53103
(Dec. 27, 1985).

*Nor is there any suggestion in the legislative history that the fi-
nancial assistance component of § 43 could frustrate the deregulation
objectives of the ADA. Payments which would come from federal rev-
enues could only help disadvantaged employees, not harm the airlines.

29

detailed in spelling out eligibility requirements and man-
dating the class of carriers who are obliged to grant the
preference; in specifying the manner in which age, sen-
iority, and discharge for cause could or could not be taken
into account; in limiting the preference to an individual’s
occupational specialty; and in permitting a carrier to hire
its own furloughed employees before being required to hire
others entitled to the preference. Supra, pp. 7-10, * , 15-
16. As the court stated in McDonald v. Piedmon' Aviation,
625 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), a private action
brought by an individual pilot claiming the defendant car-
rier wrongfully denied him first right of hire under § 43,
“the statute delineates unambiguously the rights and du-
ties of the parties and identifies specifically to whom they
should apply,’”’ so much so that “the adoption of regula-
tions is hardly necessary to the enforcement of Section 43
of the Act.”

And, indeed, the Labor Department’s implementing reg-
ulations tend to confirm that appraisal. Except insofar as
they reiterate the statutory requirements or reflect what
§ 43 clearly seems to require (¢.g., that a ‘qualifying dis-
location” is not a prerequisite for first right of hire, 50
Fed. Reg. at 53094-95), their focus is on the sort of me-
chanical details—notices to be sent, information to be sub-
mitted and published, and procedures to be followed—which
could scarcely be considered of much interest to Congress.
29 C.F.R. Part 220, 50 Fed. Reg. 53094-53105 (Dec. 27,
1985). Arguably, the Secretary made “policy” decisions in
requiring carriers to wait 30 days after notifying the Labor
Department of a vacancy before hiring an applicant not
entitled to first right of hire (50 Fed. Reg. at 53095), and
in allowing a carrier having a specific equal employment
opportunity requirement to place that requirement ahead
of its first right of hire obligation (50 Fed. Reg. 53096).
But these are ordinary pragmatic administrative deter-
minations which merely serve to highlight the routine na-
ture of the authority delegated to the Secretary.

30

By contrast, the authority that would have been dele-
gated to the Secretary of Labor in the House bill is of a
different level entirely. Had the House bill become law,
the Secretary was not merely authorized, but virtually in-
structed, to play a major role in regulating the pace of
deregulation because no authority granted by the ADA
could be exercised until the Secretary certified that af-
fected employees were protected. Supra, p. 13. And the
Secretary was not only directed to ensure that the affected
employees were not put in a worse position, but also given
extremely broad powers to achieve that result. Supra, pp.
13-14. The guidelines set by reference to Section 5(2\f) of
the Interstate Commerce Act and Section 405 of the Rail
Passenger Act are general ones, and, by the very terms
of those provisions, are only a floor, not a ceiling. Supra,
pp. 13-15.

To be sure, as Petitioners point out (Pet. Br. p. 33),
the arrangements imposed by the Secretary would likely
deal ‘‘with specific companies, workers, route terminations
and employment dislocations that were a direct result of ~
some private transaction or government approval.’”’ But
that would provide small comfort to any carrier seeking
to utilize the new authority contained in the ADA. No
such carrier could do so without contemplating the eco-
nomic consequences that would flow from the labor pro-
tective arrangements likely to be imposed by the Secretary.

‘ The cost of those arrangements would inevitably be cal-

culated by airlines in deciding whether, under the aegis
of the ADA, to consolidate or terminate routes, to expand
into new markets, to merge with another carrier, or to
establish a lower fare structure. Obviously, the Secretary’s
authority to require such arrangements would become a
significant factor in this kind of airline decision-making.
Nonetheless, the House was willing to give the Secretary
this authority without proposing or even discussing any
restraint on the Secretary by way of a legislative veto
limitation.

31

In short, analysis of the legislative history reveals that
it was not the impact of Section 43 on deregulation that
evoked Congressional concern, but rather the potential im-
pact of deregulation on airline employees that caused a
concerned Congress to ameliorate the effects of that im-

pact without changing the deregulation process itself.

Moreover, unlike the speculative and implausible expla-
nation advanced by Petitioners in an effort to demonstrate
that § 43 would not have been enacted without a legislative
veto, there is a perfectly straightforward explanation which
fits logically with the legislative history as to why the
Senate inserted a non-essential veto provision in § 43 and
the House went along with it. Thus, the aspect of § 43
that provoked significant controversy in the Senate was
the financial assistance component. Senator Zorinsky’s ef-
fort to defeat it in Committee lost by a narrow margin
as did his renewed attempt on the Senate floor. Supra,
pp. 6-7. Both the Committee Report and floor debate re-
flected Congressional anxiety about the overall cost to the
Treasury and the political sensitivity of salary protection
for individuals with high earnings. Supra, pp. 6-7, 10-12.
In fact, § 43 was successfully amended by Senator Cannon
on the Senate floor ‘o ensure that the Secretary of Labor
was authorized to establish payment levels which were
below that of full salary and benefits. Supra, p. 11. By
contrast, there was no specific controversy over first right
of hire. Senator Hatch, who opposed any employee pro-
tection provision on principle, garnered only seven votes
in support of his amendment to eliminate § 43 in its en-
tirety (supra, p. 7), and other Senators commented on the
importance of the provision. Supra, pp. 7, 17. Senator
Zorinsky, notwithstanding his opposition to financial as-
sistance, had no difficulty in accepting first right of hire
and even introduced an amendment to strengthen the hir-
ing preference. Supra, pp. 6, 10. Significantly, the only
mention of the veto provision in the Senate was not made
in connection with first right of hire, but rather was in

32

regard to financial assistance: the Senate Report explained
that, although the Committee had considered setting wage
percentage figures and maximum dollar amounts, it had
decided to let the Secretary of Labor do that by regulation,
and that such “regulations will be subject to congressional
review.” Supra, p. 11. The Senate Report thus unmistak-
ably ties the veto provision to the Congressional interest
in reviewing the Secretary’s performance of his assigned
task of determining payment levels. All of these circum-
stances persuasively support an inference that the moti-
vating factor for the veto provision in the Senate, where
it originated, was a desire to retain a Congressional check
on the substantive details of the financial assistance pro-

The House, which acceded to the Senate version of § 43
after changes favorable to employees were made in Con-
ference, had no reason not to accept the legislative veto
restriction contained therein. For all that appears—with
one exception—the veto restriction made no difference one
way or another in the House. The exception is the lone
comment of Congressman Levitas (supra, pp. 18-19) ex-
pressing approval of the presence of a legislative veto in
§ 43. However, as the court of appeals pointed out, ‘‘[bly
his own description, Rep. Levitas was ‘making [an] obser-
vation,’ ... not setting forth what he was maintaining to
be an indispensable legislative ingredient of an acceptable
bill.”” 766 F.2d at 1563, n.12 (Pet. 23a). Moreover, ‘Rep.
Levitas was a vigorous advocate generally for the prop-
osition, eviscerated by Chadha, that Congress must retain
control over administrative agencies via the legislative veto
device.” 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a), citing Levitas &
Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to
Congressional Arms, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 598, 611-12 (1984).
However, “there is not a shred of evidence that Rep.
Levitas’ statement represented the view of Congress as a
whole (or even his full Committee) fhe was a member of
both the House and Conference committees which consid-

33

ered the ADAj, nor is there any indication that Congress-
man Levitas himself attached especial significance to this
particular veto provision, as opposed to his keen interest
generally in seeing the incorporation of such devices in
legislation enacted by the Congress.” 766 F.2d at 1563
(Pet. 25a). In short, the evidence is lacking that Repre-
sentative Levitas himself, much less any other represent-
ative, would have voted against the conference substitute
had the legislative veto not been a part of § 43. See, Con-
sumer Energy v. FERC, supra, 673 F.2d at 443-444
(“‘Nothing in these dozens of remarks remotely indicates
that these proconsumer arguments would have changed
into opposing arguments had Phase II not been made sub-
ject to legislative review.’’).

Even though the Senate may have preferred that Con-
gress retain a veto over the Secretary of Labor’s admin-
istration of financial assistance authorized by § 43, it is by
no means apparent that the Senate would have been un-
willing to enact the same authorization absent a veto once
the Conference Committee inserted qualifying language
making certain that all monetary compensation authorized
was contingent on subsequent appropriations. Supra, p.
16. The appropriations would then provide an absolute
Congressional check on the financial assistance program.’
Furthermore, there is absent from the legislative history
here the type of strong, positive indications which courts
have relied on in other cases to find that the substantive
provisions of a bill would not have been enacted in the
absence of a veto provision.*®

’ 1 Mezines, Stein and Gruff, Administrative Law § 3.02 at 3-61 and
authorities cited therein at n. 1 (“The denial or reduction of appro-
priations because of administrative or executive action of which Con-
gress disapproves” is “one of the most commonplace methods of
Congressional control. . .’’).

*In McCorkle v. U.S., supra, 559 F.2d at 1262, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that, when some members of Congress protested during

34

In any event, it is academic whether the financial as-
sistance portion of § 43 would have been enacted without
the veto reservation. Because Congress has never appro-
priated any funds to provide such assistance and may never
do so, it is immaterial whether or not the veto provision
was crucial to passage of that portion of § 43. All that is
presently operative is first right of hire, and there is every
reason to go forward with that part of the program even
if a legitimate question could be raised concerning the
other part. Although, as Petitioners assert (Pet. Br., p.
3), first right of hire and financial assistance are ‘“‘closely
linked components,”’ the linkage is one in which the hiring
preference is the remedy of choice for cushioning the im-
pact of deregulation on airline employees, and monetary
compensation is a secondary or fallback remedy. To the

vigorous debate that a federal pay bill would delegate excessive au-
thority to the President, the bill’s defenders repeatedly responded ‘‘that
Congress could veto the President’s suggestions.”” In EEOC v. CBS,
supra, 743 F.2d at 972-973, the Second Circuit emphasized that the
Reorganization Act was viewed as a compromise in which the veto
provision played such a central role that Congress, warned of possible
constitutional problems, nevertheless decided ‘‘the risk [was] worth tak-
ing’ and, accordingly, rejected efforts to delete the provision or add
a severability clause. In American Federation of Government Employees
v. Pierce, supra, 697 F.2d at 306-307, the District of Columbia Circuit
emphasized that the legislative veto language was the result of a com-
promise, and that severance would produce a result—a complete ban
on reorganizing the Department of Housing and Urban Development—
which Congress plainly did not intend. And in City of New Haven v.
United States, supra, slip op., pp. 7, 9, the district court emphasized
that “Congress was intent upon recovering its primacy in matters of
money and spending for all time,” and the ‘‘one-House veto was spe- .
cifically extolled as an integral component of the control machinery
being considered."’ Compare, EEOC v. Hernando Bank, supra, 724 F.2d
at 1192 (“‘Mere uncertainty about the legislature’s intent is insufficient
to satisfy the test announced in Buckley v. Valeo.’’); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 173 (1984) (fragility of a compromise is insufficient to establish
non-severability in the absence of “‘a clear indication” that the statutes
would not have been passed without legislative veto provisions).

35

extent employees entitled to first right of hire are suc-
cessful in obtaining new jobs, their need for and entitle-
ment to financial assistance will be reduced or eliminated.
Even if Congress had appropriated funds to implement the
financial assistance component of § 43, the objectives of
the statute would be fully satisfied if not a penny had to
be spent because all eligible employees obtained new jobs
as a result of first right of hire. Accordingly, whatever
the status of the financial assistance component of § 43—
that is, whether it is dormant because of a lack of ap-
propriations or rendered inoperative because of its rela-
tionship to the invalid legislative veto—Congress obviously
intended first right of hire to continue.’

C. Petitioners Do Not Otherwise Show That The Veto Pro-
vision Was Crucial To Enactment Of First Right Of
Hire

In this Court, as in the court of appeals, Petitioners,
{flailing to find any direct statement evidencing a
Congressional intent of inseverability, ... advance various
items of circumstantial evidence of what they perceive to
be such an intent.” 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 24a-25a).

Thus, Petitioners argue that “{[bly strengthening the
Section 43 veto in Conference and at the same time re-
moving a veto provision from a section that was at least
as controversial as Section 43, Congress unmistakably
demonstrated its serious reservations about the regulatory
authority delegated to DOL” (Pet. Br., p. 44). The
“strengthening” to which Petitioners refer is the addition
of a “report and wait” requirement that, thirty days prior
to issuing rules and regulations implementing § 43, the
Secretary of Labor must submit them to the House and
Senate committees primarily responsible for the ADA. As

*The Senate Report anticipated that, as a result of first right of
hire, “few ... employees would be without work for a long period of
time” and that cash payments under the financial assistance program
would thereby be decreased. Senate Report, p. 116.

36

the court of appeals recognized, ‘[t}his mechanism may
reasonably be viewed as the assertion of interest by com-
mittees not normally charged with the review of the labor
regulations. ..” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a). However,
there is nothing in the record which indicates precisely
why the committees had such an interest. Yet, given the
controversy over the financial assistance program, the un-
certainty about its cost, and especially the political sen-
sitivity of the payment levels, almost surely the monetary
compensation component of § 43 was the source of that
interest, rather than the hiring preference which is at issue
in this litigation. In any event, whatever the basis of the
committees’ interest as manifested by the addition of the
“report and wait” provision, interest alone “does not in-
dicate that the veto is inseverable, particularly since the
‘report and wait’ clause remains inviolate notwithstanding
Chadha.”’ 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a)."° Moreover, as to
both the financial assistance and first right of hire com-
ponents of § 43, the addition of the “report and wait’
requirement makes it more likely, not less, that Congress
would have enacted § 43 as it now stands—that is, without
an operative veto provision. For, although “report and
wait” does not give Congress as much control as the veto,
it does give the relevant committees advance notice of
proposed regulations, and, hence, the opportunity to make
their views known before the regulations are actually is-
sued and during a period when they could easily be mod-
ified. If the Secretary of Labor was nevertheless
determined to issue the regulations in disregard of the
committees’ views, Congress could make use of the con-
stitutional legislative process to achieve a different result.
Accordingly, “report and wait” is a workable procedure

‘© This Court made clear in Chadha that its ruling declaring legislative
veto provisions unconstitutional was not meant to express disapproval
of “report and wait” provisions, the validity of which has previously
been upheld. Chadha, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2776, n. 9, citing Sibbach v.
Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

37

=

which preserves a measure of legislative review and
thereby diminishes the importance of the veto; in other
words, a veto is less necessary with “report and wait’
than without it. Cf Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, supra, 734
F.2d at 804, n. 26.

As for the removal of legislative veto language from a
section other than § 43, the Senate bill provided that either
house could disapprove CAB rules issued on an emergency
basis modifying the automatic entry program established
as part of the deregulation effort. 124 Cong. Rec. 10,701
(1978) (§ 5, S. 2498, amending § 401 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act by, inter alia, adding new subsection k(11) (B));
Senate Report, p. 16. This legislative veto provision was
dropped in Conference, although the Conference report is
silent as to why. Conf. Report, pp: 66-67. However, the
automatic entry program extended only through 1981, and
emergency modification of the program during the three
years it was in effect was an unlikely contingency. Fur-
thermore, the conditions for exercise of the emergency
authority were rather precisely spelled out, and use of the
authority would be subject to judicial review. See § 12,
ADA, 92 Stat. 1718, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) inter
alia adding subpar. 7(D). In these circumstances, the Con-
ference Committee could well have deemed a legislative
veto superfluous in the automatic entry section, but still
have preferred to retain the veto in § 43 in light of the
authority given to the Secretary of Labor with respect to
monetary compensation. In any event, absent any legis-
lative history showing a connection between the two, it is
at best a tenuous inference that because Congress deleted
the veto from the automatic entry section, it would not
have enacted -the entirely unrelated § 43 unless a veto
provision was included.

It is equally tenuous to argue, as Petitioners do (Pet.
Br., pp. 28-29), that the veto provision was crucial to pas-
sage of § 43 because “‘only DOL’s delegation to implement
the EPP was made subject to a legislative veto.’’ As the

38

court of appeals aptly responded, it is “‘hardly surprising”’
that §43 was “the most likely candidate for inclusion, of
a legislative veto device” in what otherwise is a deregu-
latory statute. 766 F.2d at 1563 (Pet. 25a-25a). Thus, the
basic thrust of the ADA is to limit rather than to expand
the CAB’s regulatory authority. Supra, pp. 3-4, 12-13.
Congress could have decided to “indicate its preference
for increased competition in a general way, leaving the
particular details of reform to the Board...” Senate Re-
port, p. 4. Instead, it chose to “deprive the Board of some
of its discretion so that anticompetitive policies cannot
reemérge in the future. . .” Ibid. Inasmuch as a legislative
yeto normally operates as a check on the manner in which
an agency affirmatively uses its delegated authority, it
would have made little sense to insert legislative veto pro-
visions in the numerous sections of the ADA which operate
to reduce agency discretion—that is, which require the
CAB to regulate less and to allow market conditions
greater play in determining routes and fares. By contrast,
§ 43 established a new program, and Congress could ra-
tionally desire a veto provision as a check on the newly
delegated authority it conferred on the Secretary of Labor
to administer that program, and especially to set payment
levels. But that says nothing about whether Congress con-
sidered the veto so essential that it would not have granted
the Secretary the authority it did without retaining a veto."

Petitioners assert that the ADA contains “‘at least 25 distinct del-
egations of regulatory authority” (Pet. Br., p. 28). To the extent that
various sections of the ADA (other than § 43) do provide for issuance
of rules and regulations which could have been subjected to a veto
restriction, the nature either of the authority granted or of the subject
matter tends to be self-explanatory as to why there is no such restric-
tion. Petitioners specifically mention only four such “distinct delega-
tions” (Pet. Br., p. 29, n. 35). As just discussed, one of these, the
exceedingly narrow authority to modify by rule “on an emergency
basis” the automatic entry program, is readily differentiated from the
§ 43 type of authority. Another, the FAA’s duty to establish safety
standards (§5, 92 Stat. 1709, and §33, 92 Stat. 1738), concerns a

39

Petitioners also contend that the requirement that final
regulations of the Secretary of Labor implementing § 43
be promulgated within six months (supra, p. 16) enhanced
the importance of the veto provision because it ‘“‘guaran-
teed that the regulations would be reviewed by essentially
the same members of Congress who, through their posi-
Png on the aviation committees, shaped the Deregulation

” (Pet. Br., pp. 32-33). Here again, Petitioners’ con-
omer is nothing more than speculation, unsupported by
legislative history. Moreover, as the court of appeals
pointed out, there is an opposing inference which is at
least as persuasive: the six months requirement “‘could just
as readily be seen as an indication of the high importance
Congress attached to the employee protection plan, which
Congress mandated be implemented as quickly as possi-
ble.” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 26a). The latter inference
surely is more consistent with the committee reports and
comments made in floor debate. Supra, pp. 4-6, 7, 15, 17-
18. Furthermore, contrary to Petitioners (Pet. Br., pp. 32-
33), the six months requirement could not assure that
“essentially the same members of Congress’”’ would review
the Secretary’s regulations, inasmuch as the 1978 Congres-
sional elections would have intervened between the Oc-
tober 23, 1978 date of enactment of the ADA and issuance
of the Secretary’s regulations. There obviously could be

technical subject in which the regulatory details are more suitable for
evaluation by experts than particularized oversight by Congress. The
third—the CAB’s duty to establish, by rule, objective criteria for des-
ignating “eligible points” for purposes of providing essential air service
to small communities, and also to promulgate guidelines for ‘“‘computing
the fair and reasonable amount of compensation required to insure the
continuation of service to any eligible point” (§ 33, 92 Stat. 1732, 1736,
1739)—merely requires elaboration of factors which the statute already
sets forth in detail; hence, Congress had scant reason to fear that the
criteria and guidelines would not reflect ‘its wishes. The fourth—the
CAB’s obligation, under revised procedures, to consider applications for
route certifications (§ 7, 92 Stat. 1711, and § 8, 92 Stat. 1712)—leaves
no room for a legislative veto of anything other than the Board’s
processing and determination of ind’-idual cases.

40

no “guarantee” that the members of the Congress who
were the primary sponsors of the ADA in general, and of
§ 43 in particular, would be reelected, or, if reelected,
would have the same committee assignments.

Finally, Petitioners urge that the “unique combination
of features’’-+the six months requirement coupled with the
“review and wait’’ and legislztive veto provisions— “create
a review procedure that ensured intimate congressional
involvement in the development of the EPP”’ (Pet. Br.,
pp. 31-32). For a number of reasons, this argument is
. farfetched. First, aside from the monetary compensation
levels, Congress was sufficiently specific in § 43 as to leave
little room for administrative development (especially when
compared to the labor protective program proposed by the
House). Supra, pp. 28-31. Second,:the six months require-
ment can readily be explained as evincing Congressional
interest in getting the labor protection program moving
quickly rather than in legislative review of that program.
* Third, if continued intimate involvement in the labor pro-
tection program was a Congressional objective, it is odd,
indeed, that such a seemingly significant purpose is no-
where mentioned in the committee reports or in floor de-
bate. Instead, the Senate Report refers only to the far
more modest goal of ensuring Congressional review of the
“statutory percentage figures [of former wages] and max-
imum dollar amounts” to be set by the Secretary in con-
nection with the financial assistance aspect of the program.
Fourth, as Petitioners acknowledge (Pet. Br., p. 31), there
is nothing unique about statutory deadlines for issuing reg-
ulations or “report and wait’ and legislative veto provi-
sions. Each has separately been incorporated in numerous
statutes. However, as the court of appeals concluded, their
combination here does not point to “anything of decisional
import.” 766 F.2d at 1564 (Pet. 25a). Of greater signifi-
cance, we suggest, is that Section 43’s veto provision is
by no means the strongest rein on delegated authority that
Congress could devise. In matters which Congress attached

41

a high priority to preserving legislative review, such as
reorganization of the Executive Branch, the veto provision
is considerably more elaborate and more compelling.’ That
Congress chose a weaker veto provision in § 43, when
there was precedent for a stronger one, further undercuts
Petitioners’ argument that inclusion of the legislative veto
was crucial to the section’s passage.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED A PROPER
TEST FOR DETERMINING SEVERABILITY

Petitioners concede (Pet. Br., pp. 14, 15), as they must,
that the court of appeals correctly began its severability
analysis with the question of whether it is ‘“‘evident’”’ that
Congress would have failed to enact § 43 in the absence
of a legislative veto provision. 766 F.2d 1559-60 (Pet. 16a-
18a), citing Regan v. Time, supra; Chadha v. INS, supra;
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n., supra; Buckley
v. Valeo, supra. However, Petitioners fault the court (Pet.
Br., pp. 14-26) for asking the additional question of whether
Congress would have preferred § 43, after severance of
the veto provision, to “no statute at all.’’ 766 F.2d at 1560
(Pet. 19a), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797,
804 (T.E.C.A.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 173 (1974).

Had the court of appeals not posed the second question
and analysed the severability issue in light of the first

The Reorganization Act provides that the President is required to
submit each proposed reorganization plan to Congress; immediately after
such submission, resolutions of disapproval are automatically introduced
in both the Senate and the House and referred to designated commit-
tees; after 45 days, the resolutions are automatically placed on the
appropriate calendars in the Senate and the House even if they were
not reported out of committee; any member of Congress could at this
point move for consideration of the disapproval resolution; and a ma-
jority “‘yes’’ vote in either the House or the Senate would veto the
plan. 5 U.S.C. §§ 909-912. Other statutes contain veto provisions along
the same lines: ¢.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3417; 29 U.S.C. § 1306; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2159; 42 U.S.C. §§ 8724, 8725; 43 U.S.C. § 1337(aX4); and 50 App.
U.S.C. § 2097.

42

question only, the result would have been exactly the same
and, indeed, so would the court’s analysis. For, although
Petitioners contend otherwise, there is no ‘“‘strong evidence
that Congress would have preferred to enact something
different” than the current § 43 if the legislative veto pro-
vision could not be included. (Pet. Br., p.26). Instead, as
we have shown (supra, pp. 23-27), what is striking about
this case is the complete lack of any such evidence in the
pertinent legislative history, especially the committee re-
ports and floor debate. As the court held, there is ‘ample
evidence ... that the employee protection program ...
was deemec by Congress to be an important aspect of the
[Airline Deregulation] Act,” but “not a shred of evidence
that the veto provision was deemed to be a vital feature
of the protection plan” (766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a)). This
conclusion, the product of a careful search of legislative
records, is dispositive of the severability issue under any
plausible test.*

Petitioners criticize the court of appeals for failing to
take into account that there are alternatives besides, on
the one hand, the current version of § 43 stripped of the
veto, and, on the other, no labor protective provision what-
ever. They argue. that, had Congress known the veto pro-
vision would be struck down as unconstitutional, it might
have enacted an altogether different type of protection
program for airline employees or a substantially modified
§ 43. (Pet. Br., p. 18). If it were evident here that, but
for the inclusion of the legislative veto in § 43, Congress
would have chosen a different option—for instance, the

‘8 Petitioners imply that the court of appeals arrived at its conclusion
by mechanical application of an erroneous standard as opposed to “a

painstaking inquiry into legislative intent.’’ (Pet. Br., p. 20). The im-

plication does not withstand scrutiny. A substantial portion of the court’s

opinion was devoted to just that “painstaking inquiry into legislative
intent’’—as well as a thorough discussion of Petitioners’ arguments—
which Petitioners now accuse the court of avoiding. 766 F.2d at 1560-
65 (Pet. 19a-28a).

43

House provision in lieu of § 43—there would be some force
to the argument that the court of appeals ignored a rel-
evant consideration. But this is not a case where a showing
of that nature has been, or can be, made. There was
accordingly no reason for the court of appeals to accept
the unfounded speculations advanced by Petitioners as to
what Congress might have done had it been prescient
enough to anticipate Chadha.

Nor was.it in any way impermissible for the court to
add by way of elaboration that the ‘evidence . ~ positively
indicates that Congress would have preferred the employee
protection plan with the veto provision severed out to a
deregulatory statute stripped. of any employee protection
plan.” 766 F.2d at 1561 (Pet. 19a). Surely, a key consid-
eration in any severability analysis is whether the end
result will be an outcome Congress plainly never intended.
For instance, as the court of appeals pointed out (766 F.2d
at 1564-65 (Pet. 27a-28a)), in American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees v. Pierce, supra, severance of a leg-
islative veto provision would have left in place a complete
ban on reorganizing the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, a consequence which “it was abundantly
clear” would have been unacceptable to Congress. Ac-
cordingly, the court in Pierce decided against severance.
So, in the instant case, the court quite properly focused
on which result—‘“‘excision of the veto provision” or “‘dem-
olition of the airline employee protective prescriptions’’
(766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 29a) (concurring opinion of Gins-
burg, J.)—Congress would have found least acceptable. The
court had little difficulty in making that choice: as con-
curring Judge Ginsburg succinctly put it, whereas
{deletion of the veto preserves section 43 and thereby
gives effect to the dominant intent of Congress,” by con-
trast “{a] declaration of inseverability, tearing down the
section in its entirety, would be far more destructive of
the legislature’s will. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, -108-
09...” Ibid.

44

The court could not very well ignore the foregoing and
still be faithful to the “cardinal principle of statutory con-
struction” which “is to save and not to destroy.’”’ Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937)). Petitioners respond that “[t]o save statutes in
a form inconsistent with congressional intent threatens,
not preserves, the role of the legislative branch.’’ (Pet.
Br., p. 22, n. 23). Here, however, the court explicitly ac-
knowledged that its “charge ... to save as much of the
statute as we can’ must be carried out “consistent of
course with the underlying legislative intent.” 766 F.2d at
1560 (Pet. 18a). The search for probative legislative intent ~
is precisely the point of the court’s inquiry as to whether
Congress “would have preferred no employee protection
program over the program passed by Congress shorn of
its veto provision.” 766 F.2d at 1565 (Pet. 28a). Such an
inquiry appropriately recognizes and takes into account the
practical reality that a determination of inseverability
would, indeed, leave the ADA with no employee protection
program. And that is a result which the legislative history
clearly shows to be at odds with the importance Congress
attached to the program (supra, pp. 4-6, 7, 15, 17-18),
whereas there is nothing in the committee reports or floor
debate which indicates that Congress would have failed to
enact § 43 in the absence of the veto provision.

Petitioners urge that “the responsibility for remedial
action should be left ... with the legislature.” (Pet. Br.,
p. 18). But even Petitioners concede that as a necessary
predicate it must “appear ... that congressional prefer-
ence would have been for a law other than that which
would remain after severance...’ Ibid. Here, the predi-
cate has not even come close to being established.

In this context, then, the court of appeals was right to
ask whether Congress would have wanted an ADA entirely
without a labor protective provision or an ADA with the
labor protective provision that had been enacted minus the

45

legislative veto. In responding that Congress clearly would
have preferred the latter, the court adequately addressed
and rejected any contention that, but for the veto provi-
sion, Congress would have withheld the delegation of au-
thority to the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations
implementing § 43. In short, it was simply not “evident”
to the court that loss of the veto provision would have
doomed § 43. We submit that Petitioners have failed to
demonstrate either that the court did not make the ap-
praisal required by the Chadha—Buckley—Champlin Refin-
ing standard, of that, in making that appraisal, the court’s
assessment of legislative intent was incorrect.

ay

For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent Air Line
Pilots Association urges that the decision of the court of
appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

GARY GREEN
EUGENE B. GRANOF* :
AiR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-4119
Counsel for Air Line Pilots Ass’n.,
Int’l.
Counsel of Record

Of Counsel

GEORGE B. DRIESEN

1000 Potomac Street, N.W.
Suite 204

Washington, D.C. 20007

July 18, 1986

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0428%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
