# Respondents Brief — Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 678

## Text

No. 8-920 ~ ur :

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

In the Supreme Court of the United Stafee™

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

WILLIAM E. BROcK, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

RICHARD K. WILLARD
Assistant Attorney General

Louis R. COHEN
Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES M. SPEARS
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General

LAWRENCE §S. ROBBINS
Assistant to the Solicitor General

DOUGLAS LETTER
Attorney

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the legislative veto provision in subsection
(f) (8) of Section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f)(3), is severable
from the remainder of Section 43, which imposes on
air carriers a duty to hire airline employees who have
been displaced from their jobs following deregulation.

(I)

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ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
a seenmusomnenes 1
Jurisdiction ........ EE 1
Statement:
A. The Airline Deregulation Act —.........0000000000..... 2
B. The employee protection program ........................ 4
C. The proceedings below ..................-.........--.-..00.-..--+- 7
ET 12
Argu
(i) The court of appeals correctly decided that the
legislative veto provision of Section 43(f) should
be severed from the duty-to-hire provisions of
ES 16
A. The court of appeals applied the proper rule
EEE TR 16
B. The structure, language, and legislative his-
tory of the statute show plainly that Con-
gress would not wish to abandon the remain-
Tee ee eremsencs 21
1. The structure and language of the statute.. 21
2. The legislative history of the statute........ 27
a. Initiation of the bill in the Senate........ 28
b. The Senate debate on the bill ............. 32
Cee ecsenecenenes 34
d. The House debates ................................ 85
e. The bill reported by the conference... 36
Ne ssumstecousnesovewerenmees 42

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Aaron V. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 ........------------e---eeee---ee000+ 21
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 178... 11
Bowsher v. Synar, No. 85-1377 (July 7, 1986) ........ 26
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 -....------------------0-00000+ 12, 16, 18
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 ............-..--.-- 19
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of

Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 .........---------------+- 9, 12, 16, 17, 18

Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,
aff’'d sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group V.

Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 ............ 32, 42
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n. v. GTE Syl- '
vania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 .......--------.----ee-eecee-eeseeeeees 21 :
EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 1232........ 15 :
El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87........ 17, 19
Greyhound Corp. Vv. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. |
— Cena 21
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, cert. denied,
No. 84-20 (Oct. 1, 1984) .......-..-.-.-..2------cceereesecceeees 10
Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 ..............-...-------- 15
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9199 ............-----------ee-eeeee2++" passim
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187 ......... 12,18
People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. V.
Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 129 N.E. 202 .................------- 43
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 ................ 12, 17, 19, 23
Tilton Vv. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 .............----------- 10, 13, 18
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570........ 12, 18, 19, 23
Statutes and regulation:

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
504, 92 Stat. 1705 ef seq. ...............-----0----ccee-eeeeeeees
GUT. Baie, TITEL GE) -nncsncnnnnnecvencce cco evescesseseenss
rok Se |! eee
4D ULC. Asp. TETL GE) C7) _ ..-~~-22-~--220nnccccerer ses
GD UG, Bam, TUT aneencnccce nc ccrnccctenesenccsvsncenncnscne
49 U.S.C. App. 1482(d) ......... Bet aera) eee rere
Ge BI TI. siitvicotevcctrerceccinnnvsevcseescncewnenen
49 U.S.C. App. 1551(a) (1) (A) .......-----------------
4 U.S.C. Amp. TEB1 CG) (B) .-....---2-<200-cncce2cee2-
49 U.S.C. App. 1551 (a) (8) -........--...--<cc-cc---+-220

orwr wr RWW WH

Vv

Statutes and regulation—Continued: Page

49 U.S.C. App. 1552 (§ 43) 00. passim

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c) (§ 43(a)-(c))...... 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(a) (1) (§ 48(a) (1))........ 5

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b) (1) (§ 43(b) (1))......5, 21, 22

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) ($ 43(d)) 0. 5, 18, 22

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (1) (§ 43(d) (1))..5, 6, 22, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (2) (§ 43(d) (2))_...... 6, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d) (3) (§ 43(d) (3))....... 6, 23

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(e) (§ 43(e)) 0. 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (§ 43(f)) 00... 24

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (1) (§ 48(f) (1))........ 6

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (2) (§ 43(f) (2))......6, 14, 24,

25

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3) (§ 43(f) (3))........ 6, 7, 25

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(g) (§$ 43(g)) 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (§ 48(h)) —.............. 5, 21

49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (1) (§ 43(h) (1))........ 5, 22

4 SRR ee A oo ee PRS ON 9,15

SESE eee San” ee eee 15
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et

Gunn: “meibiessadasinanicbbiinminineadbadsimecicdaenamia sitet ati 2

Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 565 ( Se 39
Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 et seq... 39

Ie res I ci ke 11,12

Miscellaneous:
124 Cong. Rec. (1978)

SEES SE Sb anes OMA RNR a ae 32

RS RESET RSS avn LCR ie SOO ee aD 32

EER DCRR ye RI teed 33

I 33

Ba i A 33

pp. 10677-10678 _.... hapiguaanscialiiiaienmbaieniaiiainiaa Mais 33

See hs J ee 33

“5 es RECN Se ea 33

gk Saha Ie ee OC 83

ge RET ER SIN Seo epee aL an 34

SPRUE FOES Ene are aE 34

GES TERE ESC pe as oe NO 38

VI
Miscellaneous—Continued : Page
DP. 2OGZE ..........---..------2nceecenoreceeneensecnrsneenasonsenseenee 35
PP. 29529-29530 ..........-.-------c-nc-ncenseneeesnenenssnensenses 35-36
DP. BOGT71 ............-.-..-.-0-c-ecece-ssaneessnecessereeesenensensenseses 36
DB. BOTOG .........-...-2--2----ncer-nernrenenecnsnesnacnecescsorscssneess 36
De BT41G ......----..00-00-0--0-nc-ncencenernnscnenesncsseccscornessnscees 36
Wp, TIN nanan enna nn no nnecncnscrnnscnsnecsscnsnscnecencoonecnonss 36
Bo, BODE ....2n.ncnnnnnonna-nannnncenssnsecreresnssnsscecnscsscosenscses 36
OE —_—-—« DTN ENNE NE Oe 87, 41, 42
Oe, I acesicsccnscccoserseonscanaccssosoonenesenonscnesensesiniad 27, 36, 41
BD, SOBRE nccecencnncensco-na-acencecsenscceecesnsevenssesenscnonsoeseee 37
- DP. 38524-B8525 ...............----c-c--cceeeeceeeeceenensense 27, 36, 41
130 Cong. Rec. :
p. H2520 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984) ....................-. 38
p. H10516 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) ....................... a8
Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemak-
ing: Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and a8
Related Bills, Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
I © ininccesatinniensiocctsensconntecssscmncnmnasesueinneeies 38
44 Fed. Reg. 19146 (1979) .......-.......-.------- -1---eeeeeeeee 7
47 Fed. Reg. 41804 (1982) ~..............--------------eeeeeeeee 7
48 Fed. Reg. (1983) :
ARIE ncoanerchinsecesenncesniosueniibisocnnsmvesnosten s¢ecnconamtens 7
i, TI secreenecsscvnncoennnsevacocsonsennvenvncnannsnecsenensnbons 11
H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
| eee 3
H.R. Rep. 95- 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ....4, 34, 35
House Comm. on Public Works, 96th Cong., Ist :
Sess., Legislative History of the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978 (Comm. Print 96-5, 1979) ......passim
Legislative Veto Proposals: Hearings on S. 890
and S. 864, Before the Subcomm. on Agency Ad- :
ministration of the Senate Comm. on the Judici- ;
ary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) .. saa . 87-38
Levitas & Brand, The Post Legislative “Veto Re-
sponse: A Call to Congressional Arms, 12 Hof- ;
* oS f §. FREE 38

S. Rep. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) -........... passim

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 85-920
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

WILLIAM E. BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-
29a) is reported at 766 F.2d 1550, and the opinion of
the district court (Pet. App. 30a-37a) is reported at
594 F. Supp. 92.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on July 16, 1985, and a petition for rehearing was
denied on September 11, 1985. The petition for a

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writ of certiorari was filed on November 27, 1985;
the Court granted the petition on March 3, 1986.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

A. The Airline Deregulation Act

Beginning in 1938 and for the next forty years,
the federal government, acting through the Civil
Aeronautics Board (“CAB”), extensively regulated
the commercial airline industry. Pursuant to the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its successor, the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301 et
seq.), the CAB “provided for comprehensive regula-
tion of prices and entry in domestic air transporta-
tion” (S. Rep. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as S. Rep. 95-631]; Leg. Hist.
168).1 Over time, however, Congress came to believe
that price and entry regulation was producing unde-
sirable results. “Broad regulation of fares and rates
ha[d] discouraged price competition at every turn
[and] [n]Jew entrants ha[d] been singularly unsuc-
cessful in gaining new route authority” (S. Rep. 95-
631, at 2; Leg. Hist. 168). “In short,” the Congress
concluded, “a careful analysis of the regulatory sys-
tem indicated that it was imposing costs upon the
industry and raising prices to consumers without
producing any offsetting benefits” (Leg. Hist. v-vi)
(Introduction by Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson, Chair-

1 Much of the legislative background of the Deregulation
Act has been compiled in a single volume entitled House
Comm. on Public Works, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative
History of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Comm.
Print 96-5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.j.

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man, Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion).

In 1978, Congress decided that “[t]he time ha[d]
come for a major change and fundamental redirec-
tion as to the manner of regulation of interstate and
overseas air transportation so as to place primary
emphasis on competition” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 52;
Leg. Hist. 218). Enacting the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (the Deregulation Act), Pub. L. No.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 et seg., Congress took “historic”
measures “to return the air transportation industry
to [the] free enterprise economy” (S. Rep. 95-631, at
4; Leg. Hist. 170). It jettisoned the industry-wide
fare structure previously enforced by the CAB and
substantially altered the procedures by which airlines
could enter new markets (49 U.S.C. App. 1371(c)
and (d) and 1482(d)). It also abolished the licensing
power of the CAB as of 1981, and, effective in 1984,
eliminated the CAB altogether (49 U.S.C. App.
1551(a) (1) (A) and (a) (3)).

In making what it termed “a major change and
fundamental redirection * * * [in the] regulation of
* * * air transportation” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 52;
Leg. Hist. 218), Congress felt “strongly that the
movement to a more competitive airline system should
be made without major disruptions to the industry
or the traveling public” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 5; Leg.
Hist. 171). For that reason, Congress made clear
that the Deregulation Act was intended to effec-
tuate a “gradual and phased transition to a deregu-
lated system” (H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 56 (1978); Leg. Hist. 898). During the
first three years under the new act, for example, each
previously certificated air carrier could enter only one
new market without prior CAB approval (49 U.S.C.

4

App. 1371(d)(7)). And not until 1982 could car-
riers enter new markets and withdraw from unprof-
itable old ones, free from government regulation (49
U.S.C. App. 1551). Similarly, while Congress re-
duced the authority of the CAB over airline rates
during the first three years of deregulation, it did not
terminate that authority entirely until 1983 (49
U.S.C. App. 1373, 1551(a) (2)).

B. The Employee Protection Program

Just as it sought to minimize disruption to the in-
dustry and the traveling public, Congress in 1978
expressed its determination to “insure that the bene-
fits to the public which result fro:a its decision to
alter substantially the regulation of air transporta-
tion * * * not [be] paid for by a minority—the air-
line employees and their families who have relied on
the present system” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 114; Leg.
Hist. 280). The Senate Committee recognized that
airline employees had relied upon the system of regu-
lation both in “their decision to enter the industry”
and in their decision to remain (ibid.). Over time,
the Senate reported, the regulatory structure had
prevented the operation of “the normal free market”
in employment; as a result, “[i]n order for Congress
responsibly to change its policy now and require the
industry to move toward a much more competitive
market oriented environment, Congress should at-
tempt to minimize the [employee] disclocations caused
by the change” (ibid.). The House Committee ex-
pressed the same concern (see H.R. Rep. 95-1211,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978); Leg. Hist. 530).

Congress therefore provided a statutory Employee
Protection Program (“EPP”), enacted as Section 43

5

of the Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C. App. 1552), to
assist dislocated employees. The EPP as enacted had
two parts. The first provided for monthly payments
and relocation assistance to persons who had been
employed by airlines for at least four years (“pro-
tected employees”) and who lost their jobs or much
of their income because of deregulation (Section
43(a)-(c), (e), and (h) of the Deregulation Act, 49
U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c), (e), and (h)). The Sec-
retary of Labor was directed to promulgate “guide-
lines to be used by him in determining the amount
of each monthly assistance payment to be made” (49
U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). The financial assistance
part of the EPP, however, was expressly made “sub-
ject to such amounts as are provided in appropriation
Acts” (49 U.S.C. App. 1552(2)(1)); Congress never
appropriated any funds, and the financia) assistance
program has not become operative and cannot become
operative without future legislation. It is not in-
volved in this case except as it bears on the intent of
Congress in providing a legislative veto.

The second part of the EPP imposes on airlines
certificated under the prior regulatory system a “duty
to hire protected employees.” Section 43(d), 49
U.S.C. App. 1552(d), provides that “fe]ach such air
carrier hiring additional employees shall have a duty
to hire [protected employees] before they hire any
other person * * *” (§48(d)(1)). Protected em-
ployees are those who had been employed by a certif-
icated carrier for at least four years as of the date
that the Deregulation Act went into effect (49 U.S.C.
App. 1552(d) and (h)(1). If any such employee is
“furloughed or otherwise terminated” other than for
cause within the ten years after October 24, 1978, a
carrier covered by the section is obligated to hire him,

6

“in his occupational specialty,” before it may hire any
other job applicant to fill the position (except that the
hiring carrier may first rehire any of its own pre-
viously furloughed employees) (49 U.S.C. App.
1552(d)(1)).

The duty to hire is imposed directly on the affected
carriers by Section 43(d)(1). A separate provision
directs the Secretary of Labor to “establish, maintain,
and periodically publish a comprehensive list of jobs
available with air carriers” and to “make every ef-
fort to assist an eligible protected employee in finding
other employment” (§ 43(d)(2)). Section 43(d) (2)
further provides that “[i]n order to carry out his
responsibilities under this subsection, the Secretary
may require each such air carrier to file with the Sec-
retary the reports, data, and other information nec-
essary to fulfill his duties under this subsection”’.’

A separate subsection of Section 43 provides that
the Secretary of Labor “may issue, amend, and repeal
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the administration” of the EPP (49 U.S.C. App.
1552(f)(1)). It states that the “rule containing the
guidelines which is required to be promulgated pur-
suant to subsection (b) of this section [relating to
- monthly assistance payments] and any other rules or
regulations which the Secretary deems necessary to
earry out this section shall be promulgated within six
months after October 24, 1978” (49 U.S.C. App.
1552(f)(2)). It also states that the Secretary may
not issue any final rule until 30 legislative days after
it has been submitted to the two transportation com-
mittees of Congress (49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3)).

* The Secretary is also directed to encourage negotiations
between air carriers and eligible protected employees “with
respect to rehiring practices and seniority” (49 U.S.C. App.
1552 (d) (3)).

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Finally, it contains a legislative veto provision, de-
claring that any such final rule shall be submitted
to Congress and shall become effective after 60 legis-
lative days, unless during that 60-day period either
House of Congress adopts a resolution disapproving
the rule. Ibid.*

The Deregulation Act took effect on October 24,
1978. In March 1979, the Secretary published pro-
posed regulations covering both the financial assist-
ance and duty-to-hire portions of the EPP (44 Fed.
Reg. 19146). Thereafter, in September 1982, the
Secretary issued revised proposed regulations relating
only to the duty to hire (47 Fed. Reg. 41304). Fol-
lowing receipt of public comments, the Secretary pro-
mulgated final regulations in November 1983 (48
Fed. Reg. 52854), and simultaneously submitted them
to Congress. But for this litigation the regulations
would have become effective on May 17, 1984.

C. The Proceedings Below

Petitioners are 14 airlines subject to the duty-
to-hire provisions of the Deregulation Act. They
brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia against the re-
spondent Secretary; thereafter, several airline em-
ployee unions intervened as defendants. Among a
variety of constitutional and statutory claims, peti-
tioners contended that the legislative veto provision
in Section 43 is unconstitutional under this Court’s
decision in INS vy. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ; that
the veto provision is not severable from the balance

* If both Houses adopted an approval resolution during the
60-day period, the rule would become effective immediately
(49 U.S.C. App. 1552(f) (3)).

8

of Section 43; and that the entire EPP must there-
fore be invalidated.

The Secretary agreed that under Chadha the legis-
lative veto provision is unconstitutional. The Secre-
tary argued, however, that the veto clause is severable
from the remainder of Section 43, and that the Secre-
tary’s regulations relating to the duty-to-hire provi-
sions of the EPP should therefore be sustained. The
Secretary also defended his regulations against the
other legal challenges raised by petitioners.

In May 1984, just before the Secretary’s regulations
were to have become effective, the district court
granted summary judgment to petitioners (Pet. App.
30a-37a). The court struck down the entire EPP,
holding that the legislative veto clause could not be
severed from the remainder of Section 43 (Pet. App.
34a-37a). The court did not reach any of the other
issues raised by the petitioners.

The district court first considered the test for sev-
erability of unconstitutional provisions. The court
stated that “[t]he question is not * * * whether Con-
gress would have enacted some type of employee pro-
tection plan in the absence of a legislative veto provi-
sion; rather, the issue is whether Congress would
have enacted the same statute. If not, the Court can-
not enforce the remainder of the statute merely be-
cause it might be an approximation of what Congress
would have enacted” (Pet. App. 33a n.8 (emphasis in
original) ). Examining the text and history of the
Deregulation Act, the court concluded that “Congress
considered the legislative veto provision to be integral
to the EPP and that Congress would not have enacted
§ 43 in its present form without such a provision”
(id. at 34a). The court found “most significant” the
fact that Section 43 was the only portion of the De-

weeny

9

regulation Act to contain a legislative veto (Pet. App.
34a). The court also found in the legislative history
of Section 43 evidence that Congress wanted to “sub-
ject to a legislative veto” what the district judge felt
was a “grant of * * * broad authority to the Secre-
tary” (Pet. App. 35a). The court discounted the fact
that there was “relatively little discussion of the veto
provision in the legislative history of the Act” (ibid.).
Applying its view of the governing legal standard, the
district court was unable to find that Congress “would
* * * have enacted the remainder of § 43 in its pres-
ent form without [the legislative veto]” (id. at 36a).
It therefore invalidated the entire EPP (id. at 37a).

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, holding that the legislative veto pro-
vision was severable from the rest of Section 43.‘
The court of appeals first reviewed the severability
principles articulated by this Court in Chadha and
other cases. Following Chadha and earlier cases dat-
ing back to Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), the court
held that the legislative veto provision must be sev-
ered “‘[uJjnless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not’ ”
(Pet. App. 16a (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-

* Before reaching the merits of petitioners’ claims, the court
first held that appellate jurisdiction properly lay in the court
of appeals, notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1252
(Pet. App. 6a-92). The court then determined that the sever-
ability issue was ripe, despite the fact that Congress had never
exercised the legislative veto contained in Section 43 (Pet.
App. 9a-10a). The court also concluded that the district
court had correctly decided that this Court’s decision in
Chadha applies retroactively to earlier enacted veto provi-
sions (id. at 1la-l5a).

10

932)). The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ con-
struction of that language, according to which the
entire statute must be invalidated whenever “Con-
gress would have passed some alternative version of
the statute if it knew that it could not lawfully have
included the offending provision” (id. at 18a). That
approach, the court of appeals determined, would vio-
late “ ‘[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construc-
tion [which] is to save and not to destroy’” (id. at
18a n.9 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
684 (1971)). Limiting its consideration to the two
available choices, the court of appeals held that “ ‘the
question is * * * whether Congress would have pre-
ferred th[is] statute[], after severance of the legis-
lative veto provision[], to no statute[] at all’” (Pet.
App. 18a, quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d
797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, No.
84-20 (Oct. 1, 1984)).° In making that determination
in this ease, the court of appeals further noted, peti-
tioners must overcome a presumption of severability
because the duty-to-hire provision “is fully operative
as a law” without the legislative veto provision (Pet.
App. 16a-17a (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934)).

The D.C. Circuit reviewed the text and legislative
history of the Deregulation Act in light of these
standards (Pet. App. 20a-24a, 27a-28a). In the leg-
islative history the court found that Congress had
expressed “a strong, humanitarian desire to provide
for airline employee protection” and, by contrast, had
evinced “relatively little concern about the veto pro-

5 The court of appeals did not state, as petitioners imply
(Br. 7), that the test is whether Congress would have pre-
ferred any protection statute to none at all. It simply com-
pared the statute it had with the only available alternative—
striking it down.

ll

vision” (id. at 19a). The court rejected petitioners’
argument that the structure of the oversight provi-
sions “evidenc[ed] a Congressional intent of insever-
ability” (id. at 24a-27a). After examining the rec-
ord in considerable detail the court concluded that
“fajmple evidence persuades us that the employee
protection program, whatever its merit, was deemed
by Congress to be an important aspect of the Act. In
contrast, there is not a shred of evidence that the
veto provision was deemed to be a vital feature of
the protection plan.” Jd. at 28a.° The court of ap-
peals therefore upheld the balance of Section 43 and
remanded the case to the district court to consider
petitioners’ remaining challenges (Pet. App. 28a).’

* Judge Ginsburg concurred in the judgment. Like the
majority, she concluded that “[d]eletion of the veto preserves
Section 43 and thereby gives effect to the dominant intent of
Congress,” while a declaration of inseverability ‘“‘would be
far more destructive of the legislature’s will” (Pet. App. 29a).

™On remand, the district court sustained all but one of the
Secretary’s regulations against petitioners’ contention that
they were inconsistent with the Deregulation Act (Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 178 (D.D.C. 1986) ). The
sole exception was Section 220.21(a) (1) (29 C.F.R.) of the
regulations (Pet. App. 52a; 48 Fed. Reg. 52863 (1983) ), which
deals with the initial hiring age of designated employees. The
district court remanded to the Secretary that part of the rule
that affected flight officers and pilots. After the district court
and court of appeals declined to stay the effective date of the
remainder of the regulations, the Chief Justice, by order dated
January 27, 1986, denied petitioners’ application for a stay
pending the Court’s disposition of petitioners’ certiorari peti-
tion. No. A-571. The Secretary’s regulations accordingly
went into effect on January 27, 1986. After this Court granted
certiorari approximately one month later, the D.C. Circuit
recalled its mandate, as it automatically does in such instances.
On May 9, 1986, pursuant to the Secretary’s motion, the court
of appeals reissued its mandate, thereby allowing the Secre-

pb

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The court of appeals faithfully applied the rule
prescribed by this Court for determining whether an
‘ unconstitutional provision is severable: the uncon-
stitutional provision should be severed and the bal-
ance of the statute sustained “‘[u]nless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have enacted those pro-
visions which are within its power, independently of
that which is not’” (Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-932,
quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976),
and Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n
of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). Applied
to this case, as the court of appeals held (Pet. App.
18a-19a), this rule dictates sustaining the duty-to-
hire provisions “unless it is evident” that the enact-
ing Congress would have preferred to abandon the
duty-to-hire provisions if it had known that it could
not have the legislative veto provision.

The phrase “unless it is evident” reflects a strong
presumption in favor of severability. The Court has
held that a further presumption arises when what
remains is “ ‘fully operative as a law’ ” (Chadha, 462
U.S. at 934, quoting Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234; see
also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 585-591 (1968) ). Courts have no authority
to invalidate federal statutes except the command of
the Constitution, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176-180 (1803), or the expressed or
“evident” intent of Congress that an otherwise valid

tary’s program to go back into effect. On May 20, 1986, the
Chief Justice denied petitioners’ request that the mandate be
recalled and stayed. The regulations are now in operation,
with the exception of Section 220.21(a) (1), insofar as it re
lates to flight officers and pilots.

ee

13

provision is to fall with an unconstitutional provision.
Absent such instructions, the duty of the court is “ ‘to
save and not to destroy’” (Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 684 (1971) ), permitting Congress, and not
the courts, to reconsider otherwise valid provisions
after a portion of the statute has been found uncon-
stitutional.

Petitioners’ contention that the court of appeals
“formulated * * * a completely new standard” that
“violates the * * * separation of powers” (Br. 9-10),
is groundless. The court of appeals, expressly follow-
ing this Court’s instructions, made a meticulous ex-
amination of the only issue a court does have the
power to decide: whether it is evident (from the text,
structure, or legislative history) that Congress would
not have wanted the courts to enforce the constitu-
tional remainder of a statute, after the unconstitu-
tional part was stricken. It is petitioners, who insist
that courts speculate about whether Congress would
have preferred some third possibility—perhaps a stat-
ute “with different form, content or language” (Br.
15)—who would have the courts intrude on the leg-
islative domain and strike down otherwise valid leg-
islation without instructions from Congress to do so.

II. As the court of appeals concluded, the struc-
ture and language of the EPP show plainly that Con-
gress would have wanted the duty-to-hire provisions
in Section 43(d) to survive. The statute itself im-
poses the duty to hire directly on the air carriers;
the Secretary is given only the routine functions of
gathering and providing information and otherwise
assisting. The statutory requirements imposed on
the air carriers do not depend on any regulatory ac-
tion by the Secretary and would not have been sub-
ject to any veto. There is not the slightest reason to
suppose, as petitioners do, that Congress would prefer

14

to abandon the detailed structure that it created sim-
ply because it lost the power to veto regulations of
the Secretary that, in respect of this part of the EPP,
were entirely routine.

The legislative history also confirms the court of
appeals’ conclusion “that the employee protection pro-
gram, whatever its merit, was deemed by Congress to
be an important aspect of the Act. In contrast, there
is not a shred of evidence that the veto provision was
deemed to be a vital feature of the protection plan”
(Pet. App. 28a). The EPP was described, again and
again in the legislative debates, as an important “in-
surance” feature of deregulation; the veto provision,
on the other hand, appears to have been a reflexive
addition to the bill, added almost without comment.

In particular, there is not the slightest suggestion
that any member of Congress anticipated the possi-
bility of vetoing any regulation relating to the duty-
to-hire provisions. The only mention of the legislative
veto in the committee reports relates it to the finan-
cial assistance program (which is now inoperative),
not the duty-to-hire provisions that are before the
Court. (The statute itself, in fact, suggests in Sub-
section (f) (2) that the desire for congressional over-
sight related principally to the financial assistance
program.) Moreover, the only comment on the veto
clause in the debates in either House came from one
House member, long a champion of the legislative
veto, who noted his routine approval of the inclusion
of such a clause in the Conference Bill—without sug-
gesting any particular concern about duty-to-hire reg-
ulations or any others; in fact, the House Bill, which
he had actively supported, did not contain a veto
clause. A fair reading of the legislative record thus
richly confirms what the court of appeals concluded:
there is no reason to believe that, if Congress had

ee .

ee ee eee

ern ee

15

anticipated the demise of the legislative veto, it would
have wanted the courts to invalidate the duty-to-hire
provisions of the EPP.*

® Petitioners contend, as they did below, that the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s decision
held “an Act of Congress unconstitutional” and therefore, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. 1252, could only be appealed directly to this
Court. As the court of appeals concluded in rejecting this
argument (Pet. App. 6a-9a), this Court’s jurisdictional ruling
in EEOC vy. Allstate Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 1232 (1984),
resolves this question against petitioners. There, the EEOC
took a protective appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1252 from a district court decision holding the legislative veto
provision in the Reorganization Act of 1977 inseverable from
the remainder of the enactment. At the same time, however,
the EEOC contended that the severability holding of the dis-
trict court presented simply a question of legislative intent—
not one of the constitutionality of the remaining provisions.
As such, the EEOC maintained, an appeal was properly
brought to a court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984). This Court
dismissed the appeal] in Allstate, making it clear that an appeal
under these circumstances must be taken to the court of
appeals.

Petitioners’ effort to distinguish Allstate (Br. 13 n.13) is
unavailing. They contend that in Allstate the appellants chal-
lenged only the remedy ordered by the district judge, after he
had found the veto provision unconstitutional. By contrest,
petitioners maintain, here the United States has challenged
the district court’s finding of inseverability. But this is just a
semantic quibble: the “remedy” challenged in Allstate was the
same as that which the Secretary appealed from here—the
declaration that a legislative veto provision is, by virtue of
legislative intent, inseverable from the balance of the statute.
Under this Court’s unanimous holding in Heckler v. Edwards,
465 U.S. at 885, an appeal only from that judgment—which
does not challenge the underlying decision that the veto is
unconstitutional—does not vest jurisdiction in this Court
under 28 U.S.C. 1252.

16
ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISION OF
SECTION 43(f) SHOULD BE SEVERED FROM THE
DUTY-TO-HIRE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 43(d)

A. The Court of Appeals Applied The Proper Rule Of
Severability

Both courts below, and all parties in this Court,
have agreed that this cas2 is governed by the sever-
ability rule repeatedly stated by this Court (Chadha,
462 U.S. at 931-932, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
108, and Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234) :

[T]he valid portions of a statute are to be
severed “ ‘unless it is evident that the Legisla-
ture would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that
which is not.’ ”

Petitioners have misinterpreted this Champlin rule in
two respects.

First, petitioners make the remarkable assertion
that under the Champlin rule an entire statute must
be invalidated whenever it appears that Congress—
had it known that one portion would be declared in-
valid—would have modified the remainder in any
respect (Br. 15, 18).° To make that formulation
seem more plausible, petitioners repeatedly (and in-
correctly) attribute to the Secretary, and to the court
of appeals, a formulation that would sustain the re-

® Even if petitioners’ formulation were correct, it would not
change the result in this case: as we show below, there is no
evidence that Congress would have modified the duty-to-hire
provisions in any respect if it had known that it could not
have a legislative veto.

17

mainder of a statute whenever it appears that Con-
gress would have enacted any statute with the same
general purpose (7.e., Br. 9-10).

Both of petitioners’ formulations—the one that
they endorse and the one that they erroneously ascribe
to the court of appeals—are wrong. A court’s proper
task, when deciding severability, is to choose between
the two available alternatives, saving the balance of
what Congress in fact enacted, unless it is evident
that Congress would not have wanted the remainder
enforced in the absence of the unconstitutional provi-
sion. That is the plain meaning of the Champlin rule,
and that is the only formulation that avoids intru-
sion upon Congress’ prerogatives. Both of petition-
ers’ formulations would lead to inappropriate, and
inevitably fruitless, speculation about legislation nei-
ther adopted nor actually considered by Congress.
And both would rest the fate of provisions Congress
actually enacted on the hypothetical fate of imaginary
alternative legislation.

Second, petitioners ignore the strong presump-
tion, reflected in the Champlin rule, in favor of sev-
erance. The words “unless it is evident * * *” ob-
viously imply such a presumpton. Explaining the
reason for the presumption, the plurality in Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984). said, “A rul-
ing of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of
the elected representatives of the people. Therefore, a
court should refrain from invalidating more of the
statute than is necessary” (id. at 652; accord id. at
661, 677 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring) ;
cf. El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87,
96 (1909)). The Court has alse repeatedly stated
that where the valid remainder of a statute “ ‘is fully
operative as a law,’” the invalid provision “is fur-

18

ther presumed severable” (Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934,
quoting Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234). These pre-
sumptions reflect the fact that courts have no author-
ity to invalidate federal statutes except the command
of the Constitution, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 176-180 (1803), or the expressed or
“evident” intent of Congress. The duty of the courts
is to sustain constitutionally valid parts of a statute
unless either there is a clear indication in the statute
or its legislative history that Congress would have
wanted them to fall, in the absence of the unconstitu-
tional part, or the valid parts cannot operate without
the unconstitutional part.

The decision of the court of appeals in this case
was entirely faithful to the severability rule articu-
lated by this Court. Following Chadha, the court of
appeals held that the veto provisions should be sev-
ered “‘fu]nless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not’ ”
(Pet. App. 16a, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108).
Noting, further, the presumption in favor of sever-
ability where, as here, the valid portion “ ‘is fully
operative as a law’” (Pet. App. 16a, quoting Chadha,
462 U.S. at 934), the court of appeals held, con-
sistent with this Court’s decisions, that “[o]nly if
we conclude that Congress would not have included
[the balance of Section 43] absent the constitution-
ally flawed portion [are those] provision[s] to fall”
(Pet. App. 18a). The court reviewed the language

10 In Chadha, the Court also found a presumption based on
the existence of a severability clause. It is clear that, while
the presence of a severability clause certainly strengthens the
case for severance, the absence of such a clause does not raise
a presumption against severability. See Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. at 684; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n.27.

19

and structure of Section 43, together with its legisla-
tive history, and concluded that had Congress known
that the veto would be found unconstitutional, it
would not have preferred “no employee protection
program over the program passed by Congress shorn
of its veto provision” (Pet. App. 28a).

The court of appeals asked precisely the right ques-
tion. The district court had only two choices when it
found the legislative veto portion of the EPP invalid:
save the duty-to-hire provisions or strike the duty-to-
hire provisions. Since that choice depended on legis-
lative intent (Regan, 468 U.S. at 653; Jackson, 390
~ 3. at 585-591; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
2.38, 313 (1936), the relevant question, in this case,
is just as the colrt of appeals put it: would Congress
have preferred “no employee protection program
over the program passed by Congress shorn of its
veto provision” (Pet. App. 28a).

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals’ ap-
proach “rais[es] serious separation-of-powers con-
cerns” (Br. 19) and “improperly allows the judiciary
to reformulate statutes to create laws which are not
at all what Congress contemplated” (Br. 17). But
this is simply not a case in which a court has changed
the meaning of a statute in order to save its consti-
tutionality. The court of appeals here sought “‘to save
as much of the statute as [it] can” (Pet. App. 18a;
see Regan, 468 U.S. at 652; El Paso & N.E. Ry.,
215 U.S. at 96), by sustaining otherwise valid provi-
sions that operate independently and that Congress
clearly considered important. It did so without in
any way “reformulating” the duty-to-hire provisions
or departing in any way from what Congress con-
templated. And it left to Congress the task of revis-
ing the EPP, should it choose to, in light of the demise
of the legislative veto.

20

Under petitioners’ theory, on the other hand, if a
court finds anything in the otherwise valid balance
of a statute that it guesses Congress might have writ-
ten differently were it not for the invalid provision,
the court must strike the whole enactment—even if
it is clear that Congress would have preferred to keep
the balance of the statute rather than lose it. It could
not be plainer that the court of appeals honored (as
far as possible) what Congress wrote and intended,
while petitioners’ approach would force the courts
into speculation about legislation Congress did not
enact.

Finally, this case illustrates perfectly still another
problem with petitioners’ approach to severability:
there is no stopping place. Petitioners apparently
believe—and the district court, accepting petitioners’
legal premise, expressly held (Pet. App. 37a n.5)—
that the EPP was severable from the balance of the
Deregulation Act. Thus, the district court concluded,
the invalidation of the EPP did not require the entire
deregulation statute to be struck down. The court so
held because, in its view, “[n]othing in the statute or
legislative history even remotely suggests that Con-
gress would not have passed the Act without the EPP
or that in the absence of an EPP it would have taken
a different approach to deregulation” (ibid.). In fact,
there is a good deal of evidence that at least some
members of Congress would have taken a much dim-
mer view of the rest of the Deregulation Act had the
draftsmen not included the EPP. See, e.g., S. Rep.
95-631, at 221; Leg. Hist. 387 (Sen. Inouye) ; id. at
216; Leg. Hist. 382 (Sen. Danforth). Indeed, the evi-
dence unmistakably shows that the EPP was more
essential to the passage of the entire Deregulation
Act than the legislative veto was to the passage of
the EPP. See pages 28-39, infra. Under petitioners’

<----—

21

proposed standard it is hard to see why the balance of
the Deregulation Act should not be invalidated along
with the EPP. Certainly, petitioners do not say.

B. The Structure, Language, And Legislative History Of
The Statute Show Plainly That Congress Would Not
Wish To Abandon The Remainder Of Section 43

1. The Structure And Language Of The Statute

“(T]he starting point for interpreting a statute,”
this Court has noted, “is the language of the statute
itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative inten-
tion to the contrary, that language must ordinarily
be regarded as conclusive” (Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)). Accord Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695
(1980) ; Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.,
437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978). Here, the language and
structure of Section 43 leave no doubt that Congress
would have wanted the duty to hire it imposed on
petitioners to be sustained, notwithstanding the in-
validity of the legislative veto.

Section 43 established two different kinds of pro-
tection for employees displaced from their jobs as a
result of airline deregulation. The first program, em-
bodied in Section 43(a)-(c), (e), (g), and (h), 49
U.S.C. App. 1552(a)-(c), (e), (g), and (h), was in-
tended to provide “monthly assistance” and other fi-
nancial support to eligible employees. Under this pro-
gram, eligible employees were entitled to receive,
“subject to such amounts as are provided in appropri-
ation Acts,” a “monthly assistance payment * * * in
an amount computed by the Secretary” (§ 43(b) (1),
49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). In discharging his:
considerable discretion under this provision, the Sec-
retary of Labor, “after consultation with the Secre-
tary of Transportation,” was to “promulgate guide-

22

lines to be used by him in determining the amount
of each monthly assistance payment to be made”
(§$ 43(b) (1), 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(b)(1)). This
program, however, was never funded by Congress
and, thus, never went into effect.

The other program provided by Section 43, em-
bodied in Section 48(d), 49 U.S.C. App. 1552(d),
imposed on air carriers a “duty to hire protected
employees” who were “furloughed or otherwise ter-
minated” by an air carrier during the 10-year period
beginning with the effective date of the Deregulation
Act. In contrast to the assistance provisions, Con-
gress imposed this obligation, unconditionally, in the
statute itself and spelled out the “duty to hire” in
some detail. Paragraph 438{d)(1) gives “[e]Jach
person who is a protected employee of an air car-
rier’—defined by Congress in Section 43(h) (1),
49 U.S.C. App. 1552(h) (1)—“‘who is furloughed or
otherwise terminated by * * * an air carrier (other
than for cause)” a “first right of hire” for a specific
period of time. This right of hire, Congress stated,
extends only to the employee’s “occupational spe-
cialty” but may be enjoyed “regardless of age.’’ Each
affected air carrier—defined by Congress in Subsec-
tion (d) (1)—*“shall have a duty to hire” protected
employees “before they [sic] hire any other person,
except that such air carrier may recall any of its own
furloughed eraployees before hiring such a person.”
Further, each employee rehired pursuant to this sub-
section “shall retain his rights of seniority and right
of recall with the air carrier that furloughed or ter-
minated him.”

Whereas the now inoperative assistance program
could not have functioned without a substantial exer-
cise of discretion by the Secretary (who was to fix
the guidelines for benefits), the statute does not make

WY ES PS ee

23

the airlines’ duty to hire dependent on regulation at
all. The Secretary’s role is an auxiliary one, and
the scope of his assigned duties is routine; there is
no reason whatever to think Congress might have
wanted to veto his exercise of those functions. The
Secretary is mentioned only in an entirely separate
provision (§ 43(d)(2)), which directs him to “pub-
lish a comprehensive list of jobs available with air
carriers’, which list “shall include * * * information
and detail * * * such as job descriptions and required
skills.” The same provision directs him to “make
every effort to assist an eligible protected employee
in finding other employment.” To carry out these
functions “the Secretary may require each * * * air
carrier to file with the Secretary * * * reports, data,
and other information.” »

Congress did not make the airlines’ duty to hire,
which is set forth in Section 43(d) (1), conditional in
any way on regulations and did not subject it to any
legislative veto. That fact provides the clearest pos-
sible evidence that Congress would not have wanted
the duty to hire invalidated merely because the legis-
lative veto was invalidated. And the responsibilities
that Congress did give the Secretary with respect to
the duty to hire (in contrast to his responsibilities

11 The Court need not decide in this case whether, if the
assistance provisions had not been rendered inoperative by
Congress’ failure to fund them, they would have been invali-
dated as inseverable from the legislative veto. The fate of the
duty-to-hire provisions does not depend in any way on that
question. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 653; Jackson, 390 U.S. at
585-591.

12 A separate provision provides that, in addition to these
duties, “the Secretary shall encourage negotiations between
air carriers and representatives of eligible protected employees
with respect to rehiring practices and seniority” (§ 43(d) (3)).

24

under the assistance program) were auxiliary activ-
ities in connection with a program whose basic obli-
gations were defined and imposed on the carriers by
Congress itself. There is no reason to believe that
Congress contemplated the possibility of vetoing any
of the Secretary’s actions in connection with the duty-
to-hire program.”

The language of Section 43(f), which contains the
legislative veto, also confirms that to the extent that
Congress wanted to oversee anything, it was the
anticipated assistance regulations, not the Secretary’s
activities in connection with the duty to hire. Sec-
tion 43(f)(2) provides that within six months the
Secretary shall promulgate “[t]he rule containing the
guidelines which is required to be promulgated pur-
suant to subsection (b) [establishing the “monthly
assistance” program] and any other rules or regula-
tions which the Secretary deems necessary to carry
out this section.” Congress’ principal concern—the
only set of regulations that it identified specifically
in Subsection (f)—was the regulations under the

48 Petitioners’ assertion that “Section 43 required the De-
partment of Labor * * * to establish a novel, untested type of
labor protection” (Br. 3) (emphasis added) is incorrect. It
was Congress, not the Secretary, which imposed the duty to
hire from which petitioners now seek to escape, and it is to
Congress that they should address their objections. Petitioners’
suggestion that because of purported “uncertainty about the
need for labor protection * * * Congress did not fully develop
the EPP” (Br. 4) is similarly mistaken. The EPP was, as peti-
tioners acknowledge (Br. 3), an “insurance” program, and it
was of course hoped that few employees would need to call on
it; but Congress exhibited no uncertainty whatever about
whether the duty-to-hire part of the insurance should go into
effect. To the contrary, Congress unambiguously declared its
intent to impose on air carriers a duty to hire displaced
workers.

25

“monthly assistance” program. And it is not hard to
see why: with respect to the financial assistance pro-
gram, Congress delegated the hard, and expensive,
choices to the Secretary, subject to appropriation by
Congress.**

The case for severability of the legislative veto is
strengthened by the fact that Subsection 43(f) (3)
also provides for a so-called “report and wait” rule,
under which the Secretary may not “issue any rule
or regulation as a final rule or regulation * * * until
30 legislative days after it has been submitted” to
the congressional transportation committees. As a
result of this provision, the demise of the veto did
not deprive Congress of all power to review the Sec-
retary’s regulations. Congress retains the authority
to review proposed regulations and, if it wishes, to
disapprove them through constitutionally permissible
legislation.”

14 Petitioners find fault with the court of appeals’ determi-
nation that the legislative veto was primarily directed at the
payment regulations—not the duty to hire (Br. 40 n.49). They
argue that Congress intended both parts of the EPP to “oper-
ate in tandem” (ibid.). Whatever that may mean (and, of
course, it has not proven to be the case in practice), it does
not contradict the considerable evidence that the only source
of controversy in the EPP was the assistance provisions.
Those provisions were, potentially, the costliest and, under the
statutory framework, involved the greatest measure of dele-
gated authority to the Secretary. Not surprisingly, the only
part of the EPP to which the oversight provisions make spe-
cific reference is the portion giving the Secretary authority
to promulgate guidelines for monthly payments (49 U.S.C.
App. 1552(f) (2)).

15 The Court made a similar point in Chadha, finding the
legislative veto severable in part because a “report and wait”
type of oversight remained available to Congress. The Court
noted that, without the legislative veto, ‘Congress’ oversight

26

Petitioners contend that Congress viewed the EPP
as an “unprecedented” proposal, which was “funda-
mentally inconsistent with the overall deregulatory
purpose manifest throughout the Act” (Br. 29, 33-
34). They imply (id. at 32-33) that Congress in-
serted a veto provision “directly into subsection 43(f),
the same provision granting the DOL delegation”
(id. at 30), and combined the veto power with a “‘re-
port and wait” requirement (id. at 32 & n.39), be-
cause Congress wanted a second look before the duty
to hire was implemented. But, first, petitioners mis-
characterize the record. Congress assuredly did not
regard the duty to hire as a “novel, untested type of
labor protection” (Br. 3); in fact, the Senate Report
described the EPP as a program similar to ones that
had been approved “in certain cases in the past” (S.
Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg. Hist. 279).*° Moreover,

of the exercise of * * * delegated authority is preserved since
all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it” (462
U.S. at 935). “‘Without the one-House veto,” the Court ob-
served, the remaining statute “resembles the ‘report and wait’
provision approved by the Court” in prior case law (id. at
935 n.9). See also Bowsher v. Synar, No. 85-1377 (July 7,
1986), slip op. 19 (inclusion of fallback provision indicative of
legislative intent with respect to consequences of invalidation
of statutory provision).

16 Only Senator Zorinsky described the EPP as “without
precedent”, but he limited his characterization to the monthiy
payment program (S. Rep. 95-631, at 208; Leg. Hist. 374)
(additional views of Sen. Zorinsky). That program, we have
noted, was never funded and never became operational. The
Senator did, however, find ample precedent for the duty-to-
hire program, which he thought “mesh[ed] perfectly with this
expanding competitive environment” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 206;
Leg. Hist. 372). The Senator, in fact, proposed amending the
EPP in a way which would have retained the duty-to-hire
provisions in their present form. Jd. at 208-209; Leg. Hist.
374-375.

27

Congress did not regard the EPP as “fundamentally
inconsistent” with the deregulation bill. As petition-
ers are constrained to admit (Br. 43 n.53), some
members of the House even favored a protection pro-
gram stronger than the final bill. See 124 Cong. Rec.
38523 (1978); Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.
Harsha) ; 124 Cong. Rec. 38524-38525 (1978); Leg.
Hist. 986 (statement of Rep. Mineta). All of the
evidence affirms Congress’ belief that the EPP was
entirely consistent with the desire that “movement
to a more competitive airline system * * * be made
without major disruptions” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 5;
Leg. Hist. 171), and without causing the benefits of
the deregulation to be “paid for by a minority—
the airline employees and their families” (id. at
114; Leg. Hist. 280). While Congress clearly re-
tained the right to decline to fund the assistance
program, there is not the slightest evidence to support
petitioners’ suggestion that Congress wanted the duty
to hire to be less than an unconditional statutory
obligation.”

2. The Legislative History Of The Statute

The court of appeals “emerge[d] from [its] trek
through the legislative history of the Airline Deregu-

17 Petitioners point to the fact that out of the entire Dereg-
ulation Act only Section 43 contained a legislative veto (Br.
28-29) as demonstrating that Congress would not have wanted
the duty-to-hire provisions to be sustained in the absence of
the legislative veto. But the uncommented-on absence of a
veto clause in other provisions of the Act says nothing what-
ever about (i) whether Congress considered the veto clause
in Section 43 more important, or less important, than other
veto clauses it has adopted or (ii) whether Congress would not
have enacted the duty-to-hire provisions of Section 43 with-
out it.

28

lation Act” persuaded “that the employee protection
program, whatever its merit, was deemed by Congress
to be an important aspect of the Act” (Pet. App.
28a). “[W]hat evidence there is,” the court declared,
“indicates that Congress had a strong, humanitarian
desire to provide for airline employee protection”
during the deregulation process (id. at 19a, 22a).
“In contrast,” the court noted, “there is not a shred
of evidence that the veto provision was deemed to be
a vital feature of the protection plan” (id. at 28a).
In short, the court concluded, given the only two
choices that a court has when it strikes a portion of
a statute (id. at 19a)

the evidence * * * positively indicates that Con-
gress would have preferred the employee protec-
tion plan with the veto provision severed out to
a deregulatory statute stripped of any employee
protection plan.

As we show below, the court of appeals read the
legislative history correctly. There is strong support
for employee protection, but, in the entire history of
Section 43, the legislative veto is mentioned only
twice—once in a sentence in the Senate Report, which
ties it to the assistance provisions and not the duty-
to-hire provisions, and once in a routine comment by
one Representative.

a. Initiation Of The Bill In The Senate

The airline regulatory system established in 1938
“subjected airlines to extensive economic regulation
by the Civil Aeronautics Board” (Leg. Hist. v) (In-
troduction by Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson, Chairman,
Committee on Public Works and Transportation).

If an airline wished to change the cities it served
or the prices it charged, it was required to seek

ee we a a amenen al

29

permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Board could refuse to allow the airline to
take actions which would benefit consumers and
which the airline believed to be in its best inter-
est. Even if the Board ultimately granted an
airline’s request, there could be years of delay
before the airline could implement its proposal
[ (Leg. Hist. v) (same) }.

After forty years of an airline regulatory struc-
ture that had “outlived its usefulness” (Leg. Hist.
v) (same), Congress enacted the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978, a “landmark” and “historic” reform
which “free[d] the airline industry from excessive
economic regulation” (Leg. Hist. v-vi) (same).” Be-
cause of the dramatic changes contemplated by this
legislation, however, Congress determined that the
“movement to a more competitive airline system
should be made without major disruptions to the in-
dustry or the traveling public” (S. Rep. 95-631, at
5; Leg. Hist. 171). Accordingly, among other provi-
sions, the Senate Bill contained an employee protection
plan substantially identical to the version that was
eventually enacted as Section 43 (S. Rep. 95-631, at
46-48; Leg. Hist. 212-214).

In the report that accompanied the bill when it
reached the Senate floor, the legislators made clear
that employee protection was a central concern. Some
airlines, the Senate Report noted, may well “en-
counter such difficulties in adjusting that they will
lose enough traffic to cause a major reduction in
their total labor force” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg.

18 The Senate Report described the new legislation as “a
major change and fundamental redirection as to the manner
of regulation of interstate and overseas air transportation”
(S. Rep. 95-631, at 52; Leg. Hist. 218).

30

Hist. 279). This prospect, the Senate observed, while
uncertain, “should not be ignored” (ibid.). Over the
years, the Report continued, “[r]egulation has * * *
had the effect of reducing the potential for major
employment reductions in individual airlines” (ibid.) ;
as a result, once the burdens of regulation are lifted
“a major reduction might occur in the labor force of
one or more airlines” (ibid.). The Senate felt
strongly that “[a]irline employees have relied on the
present regulatory system” both in “their decision to
enter the industry” and in their decision to continue
in the field “within the context of the regulatory sys-
tem” (id. at 114; Leg. Hist. 280). The Senate put
its concerns squarely (ibid.) :

Because it is the public who will benefit from
the regulatory reform provided for in this bill,
the public should be willing to assume reasonably
close to the full cost of such reform, including
the cost of transition for any dislocated employ-
ees. The Committee believes that the Congress,
on behalf of the American people, must insure
that the benefits to the public which result from
its decision to alter substantially the regulation
of air transportation are not paid for by a minor-
ity—the airline employees and their families who
have relied on the present system.

The Senate therefore proposed “a statutory em-
ployee protection program, as has been done in cer-
tain cases in the past” (S. Rep. 95-631, at 113; Leg.
Hist. 279). Its report sheds considerable light on the
intent of the legislators. First, if, as petitioners urge
at length, the Senate evinced any “uncertainty” about
the EPP (Br. 10), that uncertainty concerned solely

31

the financial assistance program, not the airlines’
duty to hire dislocated employees. Thus, while the
report reflected some passing concern about “the po-
tential expenditure of Government funds” (S. Rep.
95-631, at 115; Leg. Hist. 281), it expressed no com-
parable concern over the duty-to-hire provisions. In-
deed, the only reference in the Senate Report to con-
gressional oversight of the Secretary’s regulations
stated that the “amount of [each monthly] payment
would be * * * determined by regulations promulgated
by the Department of Labor. These regulations will
be subject to congressional review” (id. at 116; Leg.
Hist. 282). The report gave no indication of any de-
sire to oversee the Secretary’s regulations relating to
the duty to hire.

The Senate Report, then, corroborates the court
of appeals’ conclusion: Congress expressed substan-
tial concern for employee welfare; and it paid little
attention to legislative oversight. Moreover, what
little interest the Senate expressed in exercising a
reviewing power related solely to the assistance pro-
gram, which has never become effective. The Senate
said nothing indicating an interest in overseeing, let

alone vetoing, regulations relating to the duty to
hire.”

19 The strong support for the duty to hire, and the lack of
concern to oversee related regulations, are both illustrated by
the views of the Senators who refused to vote for the Senate
Bill in committee. Senator Zorinsky objected to the bill be-
cause its employee protection program was not limited to a
duty to hire. His alternative proposal would have retained
virtually the identical duty-to-hire plan (S. Rep. 95-631, at
208-209; Leg. Hist. 374-375) (additional views of Sen.
Zorinsky), for which, the Senator acknowledged, there was
“precedent” (id. at 206; Leg. Hist. 372) (same). Senator
Zorinsky would simply have excised the funding program,

b. The Senate Debate On The Bill

Senator Cannon sponsored the Deregulation Act on
the Senate floor on April 19, 1978 (124 Cong. Rec.
10647 (1978); Leg. Hist. 396). While he discussed
the employee protection program (id. at 10649; Leg.
Hist. 399), he said nothing about a legislative veto
power—or, for that matter, congressional oversight
generally. Indeed, when Senator Cannon caused a
summary of the EPP to be printed in the Record, the
summary did not even indicate that the legisiation
contained a legislative veto (ibid.). See Consumer En-
ergy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group
v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).

Thereafter, during the debates on the bill, various
Senators reaffirmed their support for the EPP, and
no Senator ever said anything at all about the legisla-
tive veto. For example, Senator Zorinsky, consistent
with the views he had expressed when the bill emerged

which he believed might cost as much as $1 billion (id. at 207;
Leg. Hist. 373) (same). From the opposite perspective, Sena-
tor Inouye objected to the bill because it did no go far enough
in protecting employees from “the risks” of “large-scale em-
ployee cutbacks and other disruptions” (id. at 221; Leg. Hist.
387) (minority views of Sen. Inouye). The other two dissent-
ing committee members were Senators Melcher and Goldwater.
See id. at 222-224; Leg. Hist. 388-390 (minority views of Sen.
Melcher) (expressing concern over “assuredly * * * wide
spread unemployment and dislocation among the labor forces
of the carriers”) ; id. at 225-228; Leg. Hist. 391-394 (minority
views of Sen. Goldwater). Finally, one Senator who voted for
the bill did so in part because the final bill, unlike the original
version, included a “program to assist employees who might
be dislocated” (id. at 216; Leg. Hist. 382) (additional views of
Sen. Danforth).

me te 5 et ee

33

from committee (see page 31 n.19, supra), proposed
deleting the assistance program altogether, leaving
only a duty to hire (124 Cong. Rec. 10674-10676
(1978); Leg. Hist. 443-446). Significantly, however,
while Senator Zorinsky’s proposal would have elimi-
nated the assistance plan, it would, quite deliberately,
have “liberal[ized]” the duty to hire, by expanding
the definitions of “protected employee” and “qualify-
ing dislocation” (id. at 10674-10675; Leg. Hist. 443-
444). Senator Cannon, the floor manager of the bill,
endorsed the duty-to-hire aspect of the amendment as
a “good” “concept * * * [which] wouid insure
that people have the opportunity to work, even though
it is with another carrier” (id. at 10677; Leg. Hist.
448). After vigorous debate, in which one chief sup-
porter of the Committee Bill opposed Senator Zorin-
sky’s modification (see id. at 10677-10678; Leg. Hist.
448-450) (remarks of Sen. Danforth), the Senate re-
jected Senator Zorinsky’s effort to scale down the
EPP (id. at 10683; Leg. Hist. 458). It bears repeat-
ing that nowhere in this debate about whether to
strengthen the duty to hire is there any mention of
a role for regulations or the legislative veto.

The Senate lopsidedly rejected an amendment pro-
posed by Senator Hatch that would have entirely
eliminated the EPP (124 Cong. Rec. 10679, 10682
(1978); Leg. Hist. 451, 457).% After a strong de-
fense of the EPP by two of its proponents (id. at
10682; Leg. Hist. 456-457) (remarks of Sens. Ken-
nedy and Cannon), the Hatch amendment was de-

22 Although the Hatch amendment would have eliminated
even the duty-to-hire provision, here, too, the only objection
to the EPP expressed by Senator Hatch was to the costliness
of the financial assistance provision (id. at 10679, 10682; Leg.
Hist. 451, 457).

34

feated 85-7. Following renewed expressions of sup-
port for the deregulation bill—including, in particu-
lar, support for the EPP (see id. at 10695; Leg. Hist.
479 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) )—the Senate over-
whelmingly passed 8.2493, providing for airline de-
regulation (id. at 10698; Leg. Hist. 485-486). In all
of the debate, no one—neither a supporter, nor an
opponent of the bill—said one word about the legisla-
tive veto.

c. The House Bill

The history of the Deregulation Act in the House
confirms the same conclusions: Congress was very
concerned about employee protection, and was not
concerned about a legislative veto. The employee pro-
tection sections of the House Bill differed substan-
tially from the Senate Bill, which eventually became
law. The House Bill provided that the “authority
granted [to airlines] by the [deregulation] bill may
not be exercised until the Secretary of Labor certifies
that employees affected by new authority are pro-
tected by arrangements no less favorable than those
in * * * [certain sections of] the Interstate Commerce
Act and * * * the Rail Passenger Service Act.” These
arrangements included benefits to be paid by employ-
ers, but “reimbursed from a separate account in the
U.S. Treasury” (H.R. Rep. 95-1211, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1978) ; Leg. Hist. 530). The House Bill had
no legislative veto or other oversight provision.

The House Bill would have delegated substantia]
authority to the Secretary of Labor, who had to “cer-
tify” that employees were “protected” by arrange-
ments “no less favorable” than those under two other
transportation statutes before any of the authority
granted by the deregulation bill could be exercised.

te tt Don 4

35

Yet, as noted, it provided no legislative oversight of
the Secretary’s determinations. The willingness of
the House Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation to pass favorably on a bill with these fea-
tures demonstrates both strong House support for
employee protection and, even more significantly, a
willingness to delegate substantial decision-making
authority to the Secretary without legislative over-
sight.”
d. The House Debates

Employee protection provoked no controversy at
all when the House debated the Deregulation Act.
Congressman Anderson, who managed the bill on the
floor, stated that one feature of the legislation “in-
sure[d] that the costs of the transition to a more
competitive system will not weigh too heavily * * * on
airline employees” (124 Cong. Rec. 29526 (1978);
Leg. Hist. 731) (statement of Rep. Anderson). Con-
gressman Anderson made clear the House’s concern
that “regulatory reform * * * not have an undue
impact on airline employees” (ibid.; Leg. Hist. 732)
(same). Otherwise, the provision emerged from the
House debates without comment; and, despite its
broad delegation of power to the Secretary, it was
adopted without any mention of legislative oversight.”

21 Congressman Levitas, the one Member of Congress who
eventually commented on the legislative veto, supported the
House Bill; and although he noted some disagreement with
what he thought was the “precipitous[ness]” of the House
Bill, he said nothing at this point about any need to insert a
legislative veto (H.R. Rep. 95-1211, at 73; Leg. Hist. 581)
(additional views of Rep. Levitas).

22 Again, Congressman Levitas, as he had when the bill
emerged from committee, spoke enthusiastically about the
bill. Again, he did not mention the veto power (124 Cong.

36

The bill passed the House by a vote of 363 to 8 (124
Cong. Rec. 30708 (1978); Leg. Hist. 824-825).

e. The Bill Reported By The Conference

The final version of the EPP, as it emerged from
conference, was “basically the same as the Senate
bill” (H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
105 (1978); Leg. Hist. 947) (listing the differences).
The Conference Report gives no indication that there
was any consideration in conference of eliminating
the EPP; and, except in the text and summary of the
bill itself, the report makes no mention of a legisla-
tive veto. Thereafter, when the two chambers con-
sidered the final bill, the legislators again stressed
their support for the EPP. See 124 Cong. Rec. 37416
(1978); Leg. Hist. 968 (statement of Sen. Cannon)
(characterizing the EPP as an “important protec-
tion[]” in the bill); id. at 37421; Leg. Hist. 975
(statement of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 38522; Leg.
Hist. 981 (statement of Rep. Snyder); id. at 38523;
Leg. Hist. 984 (statement of Rep. Johnson). Indeed,
two members of the House expressed their regrets
that the EPP had not been made even stronger. See
id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.
Harsha) ; id. at 38524-38525; Leg. Hist. 986 (state-
ment of Rep. Mineta). But Congressman Anderson,
who had managed the Conference Bill on the floor
(id. at 38521; Leg. Hist. 980), assured the other

Rec. 29529-29530, 30671 (1978); Leg. Hist. 737-738, 760)
(statement of Rep. Levitas). Indeed, the Congressman ex-
pressed his view that the House Bill—which did not contain a
veto clause—was ‘“‘far superior to the bill of the other body
in every respect” (id. at 30671; Leg. Hist. 760) (statement of
Rep. Levitas). The Senate Bill, of course, did contain a leg-
islative veto provision.

87

members of the House that the “conference provi-
sions represent substantial progress for the airline
employees” (id. at 38522; Leg. Hist. 981).

During this debate on the Conference Bili—indeed,
during Congress’ entire deliberation on the EPP—
only one comment, by Congressman Levitas, was made
about the legislative veto provision (id. at 38524;
Leg. Hist. 985-986).** Plainly, however, even in Con-
gressman Levitas’ own consideration of the legisla-
tion, the veto provision played an insubstantial role.
As noted above, he was a supporter of the House
Bill, which would have delegated substantial author-
ity to the Secretary and would have required that
authority to be exercised before deregulation could
even become operational, but he made no attempt to
add a legislative veto provision, or any other oversight
provision (see page 35 nn.21, 22, supra). The Con-
gressman’s remarks in the post-conference debate, as
their tone reflects, are best understood as support for
legislative vetoes in general—not as a belief that the
veto had some specia! significance in the EPP.™

28 Representative Levitas stated: “Finally, Mr. Speaker, I
cannot let this moment go by without making this observation.
While there have been several! bills sent to the President this
year and signed by him which contained a provision for a
congressional veto, I am happy to say that this piece of legis-
lation cor*ains a one-House veto over the regulations which
may be issued by the Secretary of Labor on the labor protec-
tion provisions, so that the Congress and not an unelected
bureaucrat will have the final word on the regulations that
will have the effect of law.”

*4 Representative Levitas has been an ardent partisan of
the legislative veto device and has supported its inclusion in a
wide variety of statutes to cover all agency regulations. See,
e.g., Legislative Veto Proposals: Hearings on S. 890 and
S. 684, Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administration of

38

if sum, the legislative history amply supports the
urt of appeals’ conelusion. Committees and leaders

f Congress repeatedly expressed strong support for
the E P P, insisting that displaced employees not bear
an unfair portion of the costs of deregulation. By
contrast, there is only one committee report reference
to the legislative veto (and it relates the veto to the
assistance program), and one Congressman on one
occasion mentioned the legislative veto (and his com-
ment was routine praise for a device he vigorously
supported). On that record, there is simply no basis
to conclude that Congress—had it known that the
veto would one day be invalidated—would have

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 97
(1981) ; Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking:
Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and Related Bills, Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Re-
lations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 142 (1975). Indeed, Congressman Levitas’ unusual de-
votion to the legislative veto was recognized by his colleagues
in the House. In 1978, during the same period of time that the
Deregulation Act was being considered in Congress, one Con-
gressman paid tribute to Congressman Levitas’ “leadership
in the fight to establish a congressional veto over executive
agency rules and regulations” (124 Cong. Rec. 19 7 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Alexander)). Congressman Alexander
described his colleague as “[u!lndaunted by an administration
that opposes the concept of a legislative veto” and noted that
Congressman Levitas had “time and again brought our atten-
tion to the need for such a veto through introduction of
amendments to authorizing legislation for the various Fed-
eral agencies” (ibid.). Representative Levitas has continved
his support of the legislative veto device, strongly expressing
his view that this Court was mistaken in ruling as it did in
Chadha. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. H2520 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
1984); id. at H10516 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984): Levitas &
Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to Con-
gressional Arms, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 593, 613 (1984).

39

wished this Court to invalidate the balance of the
EPP as well.

Petitioners’ picture of “uncertainty” and “doubts”
in Congress that labor protection was even necessary
(Br. 34-37), their suggestion of congressional “con-
cern” that the Department of Labor might not be
“knowledgeable or even sympathetic to the objectives
of the Deregulation Act” (Br. 38), and their asser-
tion that “Congress left open many fundamental is-
sues for subsequent resolution through administra-
tive action subject to congressional review” (Br. 37)
are all belied or totally unsupported by the legislative
history. What petitioners describe as “uncertainty”
about the need for labor protection was, as the court
of appeals noted (Pet. App. 21la-22a), simply “the
sincerely held belief in various legislative quarters
that loss of employment in a deregulated industry was
unlikely,” not opposition to insurance in case it oc-
curred. No one in Congress, not even those most
optimistic about the future of deregulation, denied at
least the possibility of employee dislocation; and no
one spoke in opposition to establishing a duty-to-hire
provision as insurance. See, e.g., S. Rep. 95-631, at
206-211; Leg. Hist. 372-377 (additional views of Sen.
Zorinsky). Nor is there a whisper in the legislative
record that Congress doubted either the ability or
willingness of DOL to administer the program; cer-
tainly petitioners point to no evidence of this.” Fi-
nally, at least in the duty-to-hire provisions, Con-

25 Indeed, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion (Br. 38), the
Department of Labor had had significant regulatory responsi-
bilities for other employee protection programs. See, e.g.,
Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 565(b) ; Redwood Na-
tional Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92
Stat. 163 et seq.

40

gress did not leave open “many fundamental issues’’
(Pet. Br. 37) for regulatory resolution.

Petitioners’ suggestion that the legislative veto was
part of a compromise at conference is also without
foundation. Petitioners note that in conference the
Congress deleted a “qualifying dislocation” require-
ment applicable to the duty-to-hire provisions, with
the effect, they say, of “provid[ing] less guidance to
DOL regarding the duty-to-hire authority” (Br. 41).
At the same time, petitioners contend, Congress
strengthened the oversight requirements of the EPP
—by adding the six-month rule and the report-
and-wait provision—while simultaneously deleting a
veto provision elsewhere in the bill (Br. 41-42). “By
strengthening the Section 43 veto in conference, and
at the same time removing a veto provision from a
section that was at least as controversial as Section
43, Congress unmistakably demonstrated its serious
reservations about the regulatory authority delegated
to DOL” (Br. 44).

Petitioners’ claims were correctly rejected by the
court of appeals (Pet. App. 26a-28a). The removal
of the “qualifying dislocation” requirement did poten-
tially expand the class of protected employees (and
thus is further evidence of congressional enthusiasm
for the duty to hire), but it had no stated, or logical,
relationship either to the Secretary’s regulations or
to the power to veto them. If Congress believed that
by removing this requirement it was investing DOL
with some new and less fettered authority, or if it
perceived any tie between this step and the matter
of legislative oversight, it never said so. The decision
to remove the veto provision in a wholly unrelated
part of the Act says nothing at all about the failure
to delete a legislative veto in the EPP; again, Con-

II fic cana rein ee

41

gress gave no expression to the motivations petition-
ers ascribe to it. Finally, the addition in conference
of the six-month deadline and the report-and-wait
rule are, at best, equivocal evidence: the former sug-
gests a desire to proceed promptly with implementa-
tion, while the latter, as the Court recognized in
Chadha (see page 25 n.15, supra), reduced the im-
portance of the veto provision; in any event, no one in
Congress suggested that these steps were part of any
compromise. Indeed, apart from the lone reference
to the legislative veto by Congressman Levitas,” the
only discussion of the EPP after conference, in either
House, consisted of either wholesale approval (see,
e.g., id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.
(statement of Sen. Cannon) ; id. at 38522; Leg. Hist.
981 (statement of Rep. Snyder) ), or regrets that the
protections had not been made even stronger (see,
e.g., id. at 38523; Leg. Hist. 983 (statement of Rep.
Harsha) ; id. at 38524-38525; Leg. Hist. 986 (state-
ment of Rep. Mineta). In fact, the only real evidence

26 Petitioners maintain that Congressman Levitas tried to
“persuade” a “skeptical House” to “‘acquiesce” in the Senate’s
approach to the EPP, by “emphasizing the importance of the
legislative veto” (Br. 43). As our previous discussion indi-
cates, Congressman Levitas was not trying to “persuade”
anyone, nor were his colleagues “skeptical” about the bill. The
Congressman was simply extolling the presence of a legisla-
tive veto in this bill—a theme, we have noted, he returned to
on numerous occasions in a variety of contexts. Moreover,
as the court of appeals correctly observed (Pet. App. 27a-28a),
those few members of the House who were, indeed, “skeptical”
felt that the employee protections did not go far enough. As
the court of appeals put it, “{i]t seems * * * unlikely that a
program offering less protection would have occasioned a call
for even greater legislative control over the bureaucracy”
(Pet. App. 28a).

42

of what Congress thought had been done to the EPP
in conference was expressed by the House floor man-
ager, Congressman Anderson; he assured his col-
leagues that the Conference Bill on employee protec-
tions had been made “considerably stronger than the
Senate bill” (id. at 38522; Leg. Hist. 981).

Thus, the debate’ on the EPP ended in conference
just as it had begun in the Senate: Congress main-
tained its support for a strong EPP, and paid virtu-
ally no attention—let alone “emphatic” attention (Br.
45 )—to the presence of a legislative veto.”

CONCLUSION

Congress spoke plainly when it enacted the EPP.
It sought deliberately to protect airline employees in
order that “the benefits to the public which result
from its decision to alter substantially the regulation
of air transportation * * * not [be] paid for by a
minority—the airline employees and their families

*7 Based on this legislative record, the case for severability
is far stronger here than it was in Chadha. In Chadha the
Court found in the history of related immigration legislation
that “Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over
cancellation of deportations” (462 U.S. at 932), and thus that,
at least to some extent, “Congress[] desire[d] to retain a
veto in this area” (id. at 934). Similarly, in Consumer
Energy Council, 673 F.2d 425, which this Court affirmed
without opinion, 463 U.S. 1216, the court of appeals, while
finding severable a legislative veto attached to a portion of
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, conceded that there were
“contradictory comments about the importance of [the legis-
lative veto]” (673 F.2d at 442), including statements on the
floor that a key portion of the legislation “could be rejected by
legislative veto” (id. at 442-443). By contrast, there is no
evidence on this record that anyone in Congress was concerned
about the power to veto regulations connected with the duty
to hire.

—*

Ln te

43

who have relied on the present system” (S. Rep. 95-
631, at 114; Leg. Hist. 280). The duty-to-hire pro-
visions of Section 43—the only provisions ever to be-
come operational—impose a direct obligation on air
carriers, an obligation that was not made dependent
on regulations or subject to veto. The EPP was over-
whelmingly approved by both Houses of Congress;
and not once in either House—not in committee, not
on the floor, and not in conference—did anyone in
Congress suggest, even obliquely, that legislative
oversight of the EPP regulations was important. The
veto was simply of no visible concern to anyone.

Given the only two choices that were available to
the court of appeals once the legislative veto was in-
validated, that court made the right selection. Peti-
tioner’s alternative approach—requiring courts to
search the record for any evidence that Congress
might have passed a different statute if it had known
that there would be no veto provision—is truly a rule
of judicial nullification. But statutes, as Judge (later
Mr. Justice) Cardozo once said, “are not to be sacri-
ficed by courts on the assumption that legislation is
the play of whim and fancy * * * Our right to de-
stroy is bounded by the limits of necessity. Our duty
is to save unless in saving we pervert” (People ex
vel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y.
48, 62-63, 129 N.E. 202, 207-208 (1920). The court
of appeals saved the balance of Section 43 and left to
Congress the choice of how, if at all, to amend it, in
light of the veto’s demise. That was exactly what
the law requires.

44

For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of
the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

RICHARD K. WILLARD
Assistant Attorney General

LouIs R. COHEN
Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES M. SPEARS
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General

LAWRENCE §S. ROBBINS
Assistant to the Solicitor General

DOUGLAS LETTER
Attorney

JULY 1986

W ©. 5S. GOVERNMENT Palatine Orrice, 1986 491507 20273

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0428%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
