# Amicus Curiae Brief — Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 473 U.S. 134

## Text

FILED
NOV 24 1964

No. 84-9

ALEXANDE? L. STEVAS

In the CLE =
Supreme Court of the United-Statez
OCTOBER TERM, 1984

MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY and CECILIA STEVENSON,

Petitioners,

v.
DORIS RUSSELL,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
MOTION PICTURE HEALTH & WELFARE FUND
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

WILLIAM L. COLE »
(Counsel of Record)

HENRY E. FARBER
MITCHELL, SILBERBERG & KNUPP
11377 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90064
Telephone: (213) 312-2000

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Motion Picture Health & Welfare Fund

Westside Law Publishers Los Angeles, California (213) 477-0491 Sj

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act permits an employee benefit plan participant or
beneficiary to recover punitive damages or extra-contractual
compensatory relief from a plan fiduciary for improper or
untimely processing of benefit claims?

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Interest Of The Amicus Curiae. | l
Opinions Below... - 4
Summary of Argument... SS

Argument

A. The Plain Language And Detailed Scheme Of
ERISA Demonstrate That Extra-Contractual
Damages Cannot Be Awarded To A Rarticipant
Or Beneficiary In The Benefit Claim Context. 7

B. ‘the Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Not Supported
By The Legislative History of ERISA... ....... 12

C. Public Policy Militates Against Allowing Bene-
ficiaries And Participants To Obtain Extra-
Contractual Damages From Fiduciaries. 15

D. Sections 409 And 502(aX2) Of ERISA Do Not
Provide For The Recovery Of Punitive Damages
By A Participant Or Beneficiary From A
es coacaensatsesecvaccncossces 19

PT sn . ccaccuccccocccccsccccceccecevcencecceccscces 20

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Page
Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Industries, 728 F.2d 820
4° 3. . eepeeeibernposage rst ry) 0 ie eae 8
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)... Y

Davidson v. Cook, 567 F.Supp. 225 (E.D. Va.
1983) aff'd, 734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Accardi v. Davidson, 53 U.S."‘..W.

PE hcp anc cn acne Civ tbon sea Dien ona 11
Eaton v. D’Amato, 581 F.Supp. 743 (D.D.C.
RAS ROR Serre RNR tena ene ee 13

Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 500

F.Supp. 1162 (C.D.Cal. 1980)... 17
Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines,
Wwe gk Bee Fs! 4 See 11
Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F.Supp. 1255 (D.N.J.
RSS a ey ena Sel Re 11
International Union, United Automobile Workers v.
Federal Forge, Inc., 583 F.Supp. 1350 (W.D.
I oo eee ea ata 12-13

Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303(1961).... 10
Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F.Supp. 341 (W.D. Okla.

RTS ESP. crits Seep ® a reins Rene pe oe rn 1}
McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co., 565 F.Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983)... 17
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S.
RSE Pea Acres Sart tier ta ny Dee 7
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
nn i i oe ad's « 7
Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542 F.2d 1150
ERR Kaen py Seppe Ie oes Ve OPE )

Richerson v. Jones, 55! F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977) a

Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Company, 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983)... passim
Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No.

43, 431 F.Supp. 745 (C.D. Mich. 1977).......... )
CLS oe Bem ESe eee Cees... cs ollbas... de 11
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (1 1th Cir.

ER reat 7 RES SiN Teepe ee 9
Wilson v. Motion Picture Health and Welfare Fund,

et al., Case No. CV 83-8516 RMT(Kx).......... 4
Zink v. Heiser, 109 Misc.2d 354, 438 N.Y.S.2d 209

ee ge ene Waa nienpyenkae pga hoe 11

Statutes
29 U.S.C.

I sos sock ian cate sosvndaneog legit cade hap teens 2

io ns nda cas wap atenddns sae enaeev raphael 18

nn ical ont na bie bh dieteiiallllde 18

en i sa aes siaakenenediiveiad 2, 16

ae cx cusksuguadians cavsons Ou passim

io scl ica scvanscneeavenent-

>

7 «a

However, Congress did not leave participants and bene-
ficiaries without redress in the event of wrongdoing on the
part of a plan or its fiduciaries. Section 502(a) (3) specifically
permits a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary to bring an
action for equitable relief:

(A) To enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan... .

29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (3) (emphasis added). As the court
noted in Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No.
43,‘‘|s]ubsection (a) (3) clearly and specifically creates a
civil action for equitable relief.” 431 F.Supp. 745, 747
(C.D. Mich. 1977) (einphasis added).

In sum, Congress specifically deait with the question of
the remedies available to a participant or beneficiary
claiming a wrongful denial of benefits or a violation of the
provisions of ERISA or of the plan, and limited them to the
recovery of benefits due and other equitable relief. It is well
established, of course, that equitable relief does not include
compensatory damages for pain and suffering or other
traditional legal relief. D. Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of
Remedies, §1.1 at 1-3 (1973).

Unlike sections 502(a) (1) (B) and (a) (3), the other
subsections of Section 502 are general enforcement

4As Petitioners make clear in their brief, punitive damages are
also a legal rather than an equitable remedy and therefore are not
available to a participant or beneficiary in a benefit claim action. See
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Walker v. Ford Motor
Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364(11th Cir. 1982); Richerson v. Jones, 551
F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1977): Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542
F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976).

10

provisions designed to protect the plan itself. In particular,
Section 502(a) (2) permits the Secretary of Labor, a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring an action “for
appropriate relief under Section 1109 [Section 409] of
this title... .””- 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (2). The inclusion of
the Secretary of Labor in the class of persons entitled to
bring such actions demonstrates Congress’ intent that
actions for breach of fiduciary duty be brought in a
representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.

The language of Section 409 eliminates any doubi that
any remedies awarded should inure ‘to the plan itself, not
to individual fiduciaries. Section 409 provides:

(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed
upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore fo such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.

29 U.S.C. §1109 (emphasis added).

It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that words
are “known by the company [they] keep.” Jarecki v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). By
considering and quoting the phrase “other equitable and
remedial relief” out of context, the Ninth Circuit greatly
expanded its meaning. See Russell, 722 F.2d at 488, 490.
Read in context, the phrase “other equitable or remedial
relief’ plainly refers to other forms of relief available to
the plan. The phrase appears within the same sentence as

1]

and directly after a listing of two types of relief available to
the plan. The word “other” was obviously intended to
present an alternative to the types of relief available; it
cannot be construed as creating an entirely new class of
persons to whom the relief may be awarded.* Zink y.
Heiser, 109 Misc.2d 354, 438 N.Y.S.2d 209, 215 (1981)
(recovery against fiduciary under Section 409 available
only to the plan and not to participants or beneficiaries).

This result is supported by the well-established doctrine
of statutory construction ejusdem generis. Under this
doctrine, where general words follow specific words, *‘the
general words are construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.’ C. Sands, 2A Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4717, at 103 (4th
ed. 1973). See also Federal Maritime Commission v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973); U.S. v.
Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 19 (1889) (“It is one of these general
expressions which must be restrained by the more special
and definite indications of intention furnished by the
context.””) In Section 409, the relief described in the
general phrase “other equitable and remedial relief must
be construed to be of the same nature as the relief

‘Thus, a court may grant other forms of relief normally
available in the enforcement of trusts, such as imposing constructive
trusts, requiring an accounting, enjoining specific activity, or ordering
specific performance. See G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees
§861, at 2-27 (2d ed. rev. 1982). For exampies of cases in which the
courts have granted “other equitable or remedial relief’ under Section
409, see Davidson v. Cook, 567 F.Supp. 225, 240 (E.D. Va.1983),
aff'd, 734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Accardi v.
Davidson, 53 U.S.L.W. 3270(1984) (fiduciaries personally liable to
plan for diminished value of investment); Gilliam v. Edwards, 492
F.Supp.1255 (D.N.J. 1980) (fiduciary obligated to rescind self-
dealing employment agreement and to repay fund for compensation
paid pursuant to agreement); Marshail v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341,
354 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (court orders rescission of unlawful trans-
actions and appoints interim trustees).

12

previously specified in the section — relief to the plan.
Indeed, the example given, removal of a fiduciary, is
precisely the type of remedy sought for the benefit of the
plan as a whole.

In short, when Section 409 is read as a whole and is
considered in the context of the entire scheme of remedial
relief established by ERISA, it is clear that it was not
iitended to provide a remedy to a disappointed participant
or beneficiary of a plan in a case involving a claim for
benefits. To the contrary, Section 409 was designed to
protect the plan itself from breaches of duty by its
fiduciaries and Section 502(a) (2) merely permits partic-
ipants and beneficiaries to initiate actions for relief under
Section 409 on behalf of the plan.

B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF ERISA.

The Ninth Circuit’s selective reading of the statute is
rivaled only by its cavalier use of inapplicable portions of
ERISA’s legislative history to support its erroneous con-
clusion. To justify its assertion that Section 409 contem-
plates awards of extra-contractual and punitive damages,
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon language in early
Senate and House Committee reports that Congress
intended ERISA to provide “the full range of legal and
equitable remedies available in both state and federal
courts.”” Russell, 722 F.2d at 490, 491, quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 17 and S.R. Rep.
No. 93-127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 35, reprinted in
Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (Comm. Print 1976) (hereinafter
“Legis. Hist.”’)621, 2364. See also International Union,
United Automobile Workers v. Federal Forge, Inc., 583

13

F.Supp. 1350, 1356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1984); Eaton vy.
D'Amato, 581 F.Supp. 743, 747, (D.D.C. 1980).

This quote, however, does not reflect Congress’ intentions
with regard to the interpretation of Section 409. Indeed, it
does not even relate to Section 409. In both the Senate and
House reports, the quoted language is found in a section
describing the enforcement provisions of the bills. Legis.
Hist. at 621, 2364. In the bills under consideration by the
Senate and House at that time, it was the predecessors of
Section 502 that were contained in the enforcement
sections of the bills. Legis. Hist. at 577, 579, 2331,
2334. In contrast, the predecessors of Section 409 were
contained in sections of the bills entitled “Disclosure
and Fiduciary Standards”’ and “Fiduciary Responsibility
and Disclosure,” respectively. Legis. Hist. at 540, 2259.
Thus, the language relied upon by the Ninth Circuit below
refers to the breadth of remedies provided by Section 502
of ERISA, not to the limited remedy contained in Section
409.>

More importantly, the language quoted by the Ninth
Circuit sheds no light on ERISA as finally enacted. The
quoted language appeared in early Senate and House
reports, which were published before debates, before the
bills went be ore a Senate- House Conference Committee,
and before the remedy provisions of the Act were
finalized. Indeed, the sections providing remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty in the Senate version of the bill at
the time of the report called for considerably greater relief
than is presently provided in ERISA. The Senate version of

‘The many types of relief encompassed in Section 502 include
statutory penalties, §502(a) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (1) (A),
suits for benefits due, §502(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (1) (B),
declaratory relief, §502(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (1) (B),
equitable relief, §502(a)(3) and(4), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3),(4), as
well as civil penalties, §502(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) (5).

14

Section 502 specified that beneficiaries and participants
could bring “‘[c]ivil actions for appropriate relief, /ega/ or
equitable, to redress or restrain a breach of any responsi-
bility, obligation, or duty of a fiduciary, including but not
limited to, the removal of a fiduciary. . . .”- H.R. 4200,
Legis. Hist. at 2099 (emphasis added). The elimination of
this reference to legal relief in the final bill indicates that
Congress did not intend to permit the recovery of com-
pensatory or punitive damages.

Moreover, nothing in the quoted phrase indicates an
intent that any relief available under Section 409 should
be awarded to participants or beneficiaries rather than the
plan. To the contrary, the legislative history is consistent
with the language of the statute and confirms Congress’
intent that the remedies available under Section 409 inure
to the plan, not to individuals. S. Rep. No. 93-127, 93d
Cong, Ist Sess. 33, Legis. Hist. at 619 (‘‘a fiduciary is
made personally liable for his breach of any responsibility,
duty, or obligation owed to the fund, and must reimburse
the fund for any loss resulting from such a breach’’);
“Private Pension Reform Legislation, 93d Congress,
March, 1974 — Comparison of Senate-passed and House—
passed versions of H.R. 2,”” prepared by Congressional
Research Service of Library of Congress, Legis. Hist. at
4265 (both House and Senate versions provide that a
fiduciary is personally liable to the fund for any losses
resulting from a breach of fiduciary obligations). Accord-
ingly, even if the legislative history cited by the Ninth
Circuit were applicable to Section 409, it would not
detract from the inevitable conclusion that Section 409
provides relief only to the plan.

C. PUBLIC POLICY MILITATES AGAINST
ALLOWING BENEFICIARIES AND PARTI-
CIPANTS TO OBTAIN EXTRA-CONTRAC-
TUAL DAMAGES FROM FIDUCIARIES.

While the plain language of the statute and its legislative
history amply demonstrate that the decision below should
be reversed, this conclusion is buttressed by important
public policy reasons relating to the administration of
employee benefit plans. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision
were permitted to stand, it would inevitably lead to
increased litigation in the federal courts, a reluctance by
responsible individuals to serve as plan fiduciaries, and
an inequitable shifting of the costs of operating benefit
plans from the plan and its sponsors to the shoulders of
individual fiduciaries.

As previously noted, the touchstone of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is its holding that the authority to award
compensatory and punitive damages emanates from the
language of Section 409. Section 409, however, only
provides a remedy against individual fiduciaries and is
inapplicable to actions against the plan itself. Russell, 722
F.2d at 490 n. 8. Accordingly, under the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, a participant or beneficiary seeking an award 01
compensatory damages for pain and suffering must sue the
individual fiduciaries responsible for the benefit decision,
rather than the plan. In light of the nebulous proof
requirements and high recoveries associated with claims
for pain and suffering, it is inevitable that any individual
filing a claim against a plan alleging wrongful denial of
benefits will also assert a claim against the plan’s fidu-
ciaries for compensatory damages.® Indeed, it would be

©This would also lead to the anomalous result that all benefit claim
actions would be brought in federal court despite the fact that
Congress specifically provided for concurrent state court jurisdiction
over actions brought under Section 502(a) (1) (B). 29 USC.

16

tantamount to malpractice for an attorney to fail to advise
his client to bring such a double-barrelled action.

In short, since extra-contractual damages would be
available only against fiduciaries and not the plan,
adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ERISA
would imply that Congress intended to shift a major
portion of the risk of operating benefit plans to fiduciaries.
The impact of such risk shifting would be particularly
troublesome in light of the court’s further holding that a
breach of fiduciary duty, and thus a right to compensatory
damages, can be established by a showing of mere
negligence — the failure to exercise “reasonable care.”
722 F.2d at 489 & n. 7. In the benefit claims context
where the issue is often a close question of whether
benefits should be awarded under a specific set of facts,
fiduciaries could find themselves facing potential personal
liability whenever they make a good faith but erroneous
decision to deny benefits.

Significantly, it is primarily uncompensated individuals
who would be affected by the opinion below. In the
majority of self-insured employee benefit plans, the plan
sponsors appoint their own full-time employees to serve as
fiduciaries. Such individuals are prohibited from receiving
compensation for the performance of fiduciary duties. 29
U.S.C. §1108(c)(2). On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision would have no effect on insurance
companies acting as fiduciaries under insured welfare
benefit plans, since several courts have held that such
carriers remain subject to state law actions for com-
pensatory and punitive damages because ERISA does not

§1132(e) (1). The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
actions alleging a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a) (2)
and, therefore, provide the only appropriate forum when the two
claims are joined in a single action.

17

preempt state laws regulating insurance. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A); see, e.g., Eversole v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 500 F.Supp. 1162, 1170 (C.D. Cal.
1980); McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co., 565 F.Supp. 434, 443-44 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

Moreover, a plan cannot effectively insure such un-
compensated fiduciaries against losses arising out of a
breach of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. §1110. The Ninth
Circuit points out in Russell that while liability under
Section 409 is against the individual fiduciary p ._ sonally,
29 U.S.C. §1110 allows for “certain for.us of fiduciary
indemnification.” 722 F.2d at 490 n. 8. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision fails to consider, however, that while 29
U.S.C. § 1110 permits a plan to purchase insurance for its
fiduciaries to cover liability or losses occurring by reason
of the act or omissions of the fiduciary, the insurance
policy must permit recourse by the insurer against the
fiduciary in the case of a breach of fiduciary obligations.
29 U.S.C. §1110. Since compensatory damages under
Section 409 would be predicated upon a finding of breach
of fiduciary duty, the exception would necessarily swal-
low the rule in this situation.’

In these circumstances, holding individual fiduciaries
liable under ERISA for extra-contractual and punitive
damages in the benefit claims context can only have the
undesirable result of deterring qualified individuals from
volunteering to serve as fiduciaries. Few people would
agree to be placed in a position in which they were
regularly required to make decisions as to the propriety of
benefit claims if they risked personal liability for each

™While the fiduciaries or their employers may purchase insurance
without such a recourse provision, they must bear the costs of the
insurance and, thus, the costs of operating the plan are still shifted
away from the plan itself. Moreover, as discussed in Petitioners’ brief,
in many states no insurance is available for punitive damages.

18

erroneous decision. For the same reasons, it can be
expected that those individuals who do choose to serve as
fiduciaries will be extremely timid in the administration of
claims and will opt to award benefits whenever there is any
question as to a claim’s validity. It is respectfully submitted
that Congress never intended such a result.*

The Court below suggesis that if compensatory and
punitive damages could not be recovered against fidu-
ciaries, fiduciaries would have no incentive to abide by the
terms of the plan or of ERISA. Russell, 722 F.2d at 490.
The simple answer to this contention is that Congress did
not provide for such relief and it is not for the courts to
engraft additional remedies onto the detailed statutory
scheme. In any event, Congress did provide ample
procedures to correct any fiduciary misconduct. Partici-
pants and beneficiaries may always maintain actions to
recover benefits wrongfully denied, 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)
(1)(B), and may recover attorneys’ fees in appropriate
cases, 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1). Participants and benefi-
ciaries may also seek equitable relief to enjoin violations
of the plan’s terms, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and may seek
removal of the fiduciary for improper conduct, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109. In sum, Congress has provided sufficient means
of relief to ensure that participants and beneficiaries have
a method of controlling the fiduciary’s conduct.

®It could be argued, of course, that a plan can avoid these problems
by simply reverting to purchasing insurance and delegating the
fiduciary duty of deciding benefit claims to an insurance company. As
amicus curiae’s experience shows, however, it can be substantially
more expensive to provide benefits through an insured plan than to
self-insure, and such a result may therefore needlessly increase the
cost of administering welfare benefit plans. See pp. 2-3, supra. In
addition, Congress clearly intended employee welfare benefit plans to
have the choice between self-insuring and purchasing insurance. See
eg., 29 U.S.C. §1023(e); 29 U.S.C. §1101(b) (2), 29 U.S.C.
§1112(a) (2) (B); 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b) (2) (B).

19

Moreover, the decision below primarily affects those
fiduciaries who do not act in that role for personal profit
and who, therefore, have nothing to gain by wrongfully
withholding benefits. As previously noted, profit-oriented
fiduciaries are already subject to the precise sanctions
that the Ninth Circuit’s holding would add to ERISA. See
pp. 16-17, supra. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
would only add a deterrent where none is necessary.

In conclusion, it is apparent that adopting the inter-
pretation of the Court below would only hamper the
efficient operation of employee benefit plans without any
concomitant benefit to the participants and beneficiaries.

D. SECTIONS 409 AND 502(a)(2) OF ERISA DO
NOT PROVIDE FOR THE RECOVERY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY A PARTICIPANT
OR BENEFICIARY FROM A FIDUCIARY.

For each of the reasons set forth above, it is clear that
Congress did not intend fiduciaries to be held personally
liable for punitive damages under Section 409. Moreover,
the possibility of incurring punitive damage liability will
further discourage competent persons from serving as
fiduciaries.

Amicus curiae adopts the arguments encompassed in
Petitioners’ brief and joins Petitioners in urging that the
portion of the decision below permitting the imposition of
punitive damages be reversed as well.

20

CONCLUSION

For the reasons and on the authorities set forth above,
and for the reasons expressed in Petitioners’ Brief on the
merits, amicus curiae respectfully requests that the
decision below on the issue of extra-contractual and
punitive damages be reversed.

Dated: November 14, 1984

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM L. COLE
(Counsel of Record)

HENRY E. FARBER
MITCHELL, SILBERBERG & KNUPP
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Motion Picture Health & Welfare Fund

PROOF OF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
State of California

SS.
County of Los Angeles

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein
mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of
the County of Los Angeles, over the age of eighteen (18)
years and not a party to the within action or proceeding;
that my business address is 11333 Iowa Avenue, Los
Angeles, California 90025; that on November 13, 1984,
I served the within Brief of Amicus Curiae in said action
or proceeding by depositing true copies thereof, enclosed in a
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the
United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed
as follows:

Clerk, United States Brad N. Baker
Supreme Court Baker and Burton, P.C.
One First Street, N.W. 515 Pier Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20543 Hermosa Beach, California 90254
(Original and 40 copies) (Three copies)
John Nolan

Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr.

Antonia B. lanniello

Steptoe & Johnson

1250 Connecticut Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
(Three copies)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct. Executed on November 1 3, 1984, at Los
Angeles, California.

Joy Rivelli Miller
(Original signed)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0403%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.