# Amicus Curiae Brief — Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0402%3A15 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1985 - **Citation:** 473 U.S. 172 ## Text - Supreme Lourl, ¥.0- _ FILED \p / No. 84-4 DEC 13 1984 In the Supreme Court ofthe: ss | CLERK United States | 7 WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, E? AL., Petitioners, v. HAMILTON BANK OF JOHNSON CITY, Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FC & THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. BRIEF OF CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIA- TION AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT GIDEON KANNER 1441 West Olympic Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90015 Teiephone: (213) 736-1058, (818) 848-6765 Attorney for Amicus Curiae California Building Industry Association Westside Law Publishers Los Angeles, California (213) 477-0491 TOPICAL INDEX Page Interest Of Amicus Curiae And Nature Of The Problem Addressed. tena l Summary Of Argument Ph ve 3 Argument l. Preliminary Statement: What Is The Issue Before The Court? 7 I. This Court’s History Of Explicit Recognition Of The “Just Compensation” Remedy For Takings, As Available And Preferred, Is Longstanding And Thoroughly Settled. a 9 Ill. The Acts Of Petitioner Were Within Its Powers, Even If The Manner Of Execution Exceeded Constitutional Limits. 12 IV. Preservation Of The Right To Just Compensation For Temporary Takings As Part O; A Flexible And Fair System Of Remedies Rests On Sound Policy, Settled Precedent, And Conservation Of Judicial Resources 15 V. M_ Justice Brennan’s Views In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. Have. Been Widely Acclaimed, And Form A Desirable Blueprint For Solution Of The Issue Before: The Court... coccccceee .. 20 Conclusion ...... de Re Rea eee oe aa | Om that is entitled to the same degree of judicial deference as the avowed pursuit of the err ‘nent domain power for a public purpose; see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff __. U.S. ___., 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984); Ruckelshaus, supra, 104 S. Ct. at 2879. Since the judiciai role in ‘*second-guessing the legislature” is held by these authorities to be extremely narrow, it follows that a regulaiory taking effected by an overreaching statutory application is in every constitutional sense a taking for public use, for which compensation is mandated by the Fifth Amend- ment (binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment — Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 15, 160 (1980)). Put another way, when regulators take the position that their regulation promotes the 'SAs opposed to wholly extralegal prospective acts as in Youngs- town Sheet and Tube Co., supra. 12 police power objectives, and as such is entitled to judicial deference for purposes of its validity, they cannot simultaneously assert when their regulation effects a temporary taking, then the regulation suddenly becomes so unimportant that the courts should disregard the teachings of Midkiff and Ruckelshaus, eschew all deference to the legislature, and as a matter of routine simply invalidate the regulation — as a first, not last, resort — merely to spare the regulators the need of obeying the weighty “just compensation” command of the Fifth Amendment. Such an argument is simply self-contradictory; it just won't wash. “. . . [P]ower, once granted does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used.” Bivens v. Six Unknown etc. Agents, supra, 403 U.S. at 392. In sum, in spite of expansive assertions, Petitioner and friends are unable to put their finger on any holding of this Court that where a taking has already occurred, the “remedy” shoula be the ineffective and acaden.ic exercise of telling the wrongdoer through a court decree that it shouldn’t have done what it already dia, leaving the victim uncompensated for serious economic losses already inflicted. Petitioner and friends are unable to do so because no such unjust cases are extant, as shown above, this Court has historically opted for effective compensatory remedies as part of its remedial arsenal, and has done so consistently in physical as well as non-physical - takings (see footnote 13, supra). No legitimate reason appears why that reasoned and mature doctrinal approach to the taking problem should be suddenly abandoned now. til THE ACTS OF PETITIONER WERE WITHIN ITS POWERS, EVEN IF THE MANNER OF EXECUTION EXCEEDED CONSTITUTIO- NAL LIMITS. Two points need tc be touched on briefly in connection with the law of remedies discussed above. First, Ruckelskaus, supra, speaks of takings of property “|. duly authorized by law. . .” Does that mean that there ee nee 13 must be express authorization of the taking qua taking?!® The short answer to this question was provided by this Court in Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292, 301 (1925): “The incantation pronounced at the time jof taking] is not of controlling importance; our primary concern is with the accomp- lishment.”!? Likewise, Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967): “ . .. The Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says, or what it intends, but by '6This issue bears comment in light of the ingenious assertion in the Brief of the United States, that when government action is “‘not authorized’’, no “‘taking’’ can result. The vintage case of Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910) relied on by the Solicitor Generai is simply not on point because there the Congress expressly refused to appropriate a $6,000 annual rent, whereupon the claimant rented the premises to the government for $4,500 ( which he accepted) and sued on the balance. What that has to do with the ad hoc factual analysis requized at bench (Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-175 (1979)) is obscure. With respect, the Solicitor General seems to confuse those cases where the action is wholly extralegal and hence the officials are without any power to act at all (e.g, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, 343 U.S. 579), and those cases where the power to act exists, but the illegality springs from failure to authorize payment of just compensation (Hurley v. Kincaid, supra, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra), thereby triggering a constitutional remedy (Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). '7Another answer is provided by the fact that the Tucker Act provides a procedure for recovering compensation from the govern- ment for claims arising under the Constitution. Jacobs v. United States, supra, 290 U.S. at 16. But if it were first necessary to show that the governmental act was “‘authorized”’ (in the sense of the taking being authorized rather than the governmental act that led to the taking) that would make self-stultifying nonsense out of the Tucker Act, for then a claim under the Constitution wouid be of no avaii, and the claimant would be limited to claims under statutes “ authori- zing’ the taking. Compare United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748-749 (1947). Put another way, if the taking itself first had to be authorized by legislation, there could never be an inverse condemnation case. Yet, this Court’s many precedents and the daily busir.ess of the U.S. Claims Court bear striking witness to the contrary. 14 what it does (Stewart, J. concurring, emphasis in the original.) See, San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 450 U.S. at 652- 653. Thus, in United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1905), the “authorized” governmental act was the construction of a dam, not appropriation of the plaintiffs’ land. And in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the “‘authcrized” act was the flight of aircraft through navigable airspace, not an appropriation of a flight easement. Yet both were deemed compensable takings because that was required by the Fifth Amendment. Or. as this Court put it in Hurley v. Kincaid, supra, 285 U.S. at 104: “For even if the defendants are acting illegally, under the Act, in threatening to proceed without first acquiring flowage rights over the complainant’s la..a, the illegality, on complainant’s own contention, is confined to the failure to compensate him for the taking, and affords no basis for an injunction if such compensation may be procured in an action at law” (footnote omitted). In sum, the illegality of governmental conduct at bench, as in Hurley, did not consist of any absence of authority to act!8, but rather of acting in pursuance of such authority in an excessive way that deprived Respondent of any economically viable use of its land for the duration of the illegal conduct. A second aspect of Ruckelshaus (and kindred cases) that warrants mention, is the Court’s familiar inquiry into the availability of the Tucker Act remedy, which finds no application in cases suci: as this, where the taking arises by conduct of state rather than federal entities. All the Tucker Act does is waive the United States’ defense of sovereign immunity, and designates a special court for monetary claims in excess of $10,000. The '8Quite the contrary. Petitioner vigorously asserts lawful posses- sion of the police power to regulate subdivisions, which is not disputed. The controversy is over the way in which Petitioner wielded its plainly and concededly present authority. In other words, Peti- tioner’s authority was not lacking; rather, it went “‘too far’ (Penn- sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 15 Tucke; Act in no way gives rise to a cause of action;!? itis“... only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right...” “*... itmerely confers jurisdiction upon [the Claims Court] whenever the substantive right exists . . .”, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-539 (1980). Accord, United States v. Testam, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). None of these concerns, however, have any applicability to lawsuits in federal courts against state and local! defendants, for there jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and the substantive right of recovery at law by the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, it has long been settled that federal courts do have jurisdiction to entertain on the merits claims of takings by local entities. Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916), Mosher v. Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29 (1932) IV PRESERVATION CF THE RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION FOR * EMPORARY TAK- INGS AS PART OF A FLEXIBLE AND FAIR SYSTEM OF REMEDIES RESTS ON SOUND POLICY, SETTLED PRECEDENT, AND CON- SERVATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES. Any argument on the issue of remedies must at least begin with this Court’s definitive analysis in Hurley v. Kincaid, supra, 285 U.S. 95, which is conceptually dispositive. When a taking is effected in pursuance of governmental powers --- as is the case at bench — the property owner’s grievance arises not 19Indeed, neither does it give rise per se to any particular remedy. What the Tucker Act does, is provide the jurisdictional and pro- cedural means of pursuing a constitutionally mandated monetary remedy for a pre-existing substantive, constitutional “cause of action”; i.e., a completed taking of a property interest. Jacobs v. United States, supra, 29 U.S. at 16. Where such monetary remedy at law is adequate, this 1vxecloses equitable relief (Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104; Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. at 2880 [8]). For further discussion of the Court’s analysis of the law of remedies, see Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 16 because of the taking,2° but because compensation has not been paid (285 U.S. at 104). It follows, therefore, that if compensation is provided by the courts (whether at the government s or the owner’s behest) the illegality is elimina. =d (Id.). Moreover, it is the courts that are have primacy in determining just compensation; see, e.g. United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923). Nor did Hurley stop there; it went on to admonish: “Even where the remedy at law is less clear and adequate, where large public interests are concerned and the issuance of an injunction may seriousiy embarrass the accomplishment of important govern- mental ends, a court of equity acts with caution and only upon a clear showing that its intervenuon is necessary to prevent an irreparable injury.” 285 U.S. at 104, fn. 3. That admonition, of course, puts its finger on the pertinent policy: it would be most improvident to structure a constitu- ti nal imperative striking down potentially vital regulations, as the sole remedy, merely because they impacted on a property owner so as to deprive him of a “stick” in his property rights “bundle”. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, provide an excellent example of the hazards inherent in Petitioner's theory. Had such a theory been applied there (as indeed it was by the trial court, only to be rejected by this Court) the upshot would have been an instant destruction by the stroke of a judicial pen of a comprehensive congressional scheme, that would have left the most densely populated regions of the country without an effective rail transportation system, with eight major railroads in the throes of fragmented, individual bankru;-tcy proceedings, without a coherent system whereby to 20This is so because the taking power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty (Koh/ v. United States, 1 Otto (U.S.) 367 (1876)); the Constitution only limits it, inter alia, by requiring that just compensa- tion be paid. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878). 17 consolidate and make optimally useful all of their combined resources, still needed to maintain a national rail transportation system. The same is true of Dames & Moore v. Regan, supra. Had Petitioner's no-compensation approach been applied there, the result wouid have been a drastic d'sruption of the executive power to conduct foreign relations, with severe consequences to the affected citizens. Instead, the Court's opting for availability of the compensation remedy preserved both the governmental policies, and the rights of the few adversely affected individuals. While the instant controversy does not present the Court with such far-reaching prospects as the above cases, it still should not serve as a vehicle for the formulation of a dogmatic constitutional imperative that in future applications would compel judicial destruction of regula- tory scheines that some day may be vital to national survival.?! As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall enduringly put it: “The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have bee~ the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as nox to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages tc come, and consequently, to be adapted to the varicus crises of human affairs.” McCulloch vy. 2!This is no hyperbole. Surely, it takes no vivid imagination to visualize governmenta! responses to the difficult problems of energy, deficit control, and inflation, for example, that may trench on constitutionally protected property rights of some individuals. Should that occur, which would be better public policy: to require the benefited public to pay only for those limited private rights destroyed in the process of thus bettering the public condition (see San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S. at 652), or to declare such programs completely invalid, with possibly calamitous consequences? (Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104, fn. 3). 18 Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819), emphasis added. Petitioner's thesis, that would have the courts invalidate legislative enactments on an ongoing basis, as the primary remedy, violates that principle, and ignores the gravity of judicial intervention in the workings of a tri-partite democratic government. When the judiciary invalidates a legislative enact- ment it is a measure of last — not first — resort. The judicial power to invalidate is historically rooted in “strict necessity” (Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947); Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)), and is to be invoked only when “‘unavoidable” (4/ma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136 (1946)). See Rescue 4rmy v. Municipal Court, supra, 331 U.S. at 571-572. Petitioner's theory seems preoccupied with short-range pro- vincial concerns of local governmental interests. It ignores the grave strain that judicial invalidation of legislation imposes on the fabric of a democratic society. It improvidently demands a rule that would have the judiciary tell the legislature what it may or may not enact, not in the historical context of major policy conflicts that have confronted the nation on occasion and thereby made legitimate claims on this Court’s extraordinary power to invoke the organic law’s grand scheme of checks and balances, but in ierms of routine, day-in, day-out, case by case, ad hoc adjudications of purely local (usually intensely political) decisions involving what in national policy terms are but insignificant patches of land. Petitioner's approach would make the judiciary an ongoing supervisor of the local legislative branch; it would make this Court te Supreme Board of Zoning Appeals. The foregoing is no hyperbole. Only a few state’s law provides so-called site specific non-monetary relief;?? i.e., judicial relief in the form of a decree that commands the regulating entity to allow a specified improvement on the 22See e.g. Sinclair Pipeline Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 167 N.E. 2d 406, 411 (1960, IIl.). 19 specific site. The vast majority of jurisdictions (in those cases where non-monetary relief is granted) merely remand the matter back to the regulatory entity for further action, thus inviting ongoing judicial involvement. Aside from the delay- lade... inefficiency of such a procedure, it also opens up vast opportunities for either regulatory foot-dr igging or outright bad faith, as acutely noted t_- Mr. Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, supra, 450 U.S. at 655, fn. 22.23 23]t must be noted with great emphasis that the problem is far more pervasive than one might surmise from the entirely accurate, if somewhat flippant, remarks of a California city attorney quoted there. No less an expert than Richard F. Babcock, the dean of the land use bar, noted the severity of the problem in his book, ““The Zoning Game” (Univ. Wisc. Press, 1966) at pp. 12-13, with devastating accuracy: “First, we have the multiplicity of jurisdictions, the innumerable decision-makers. In other significant areas of admiri- strative law — the regulation of utilities, control over the issuance of securities, and the arbitration of disputes between employe: and employee — there exist if not national at least statewide forums for the resolution of disputes. In the area of zoning there is no such centralized umpire to provide a sense of belonging to a common administrative practice, and, indeed, of sharing a common admini- stra:ive ethic. Among these scattered groups of lay decision-makers there is an almost total lack of communication despite the effort of innumerable planning groups, each offering earnest if generally diffused guidance. One of the most significant results of this fractured cecision-making process is that the injunctions of the judiciary have only nominal impact upon the decision-makers. 4f the Supreme Court of California makes a determination that the California Public Utilitites Commission has acted improperly, the impact of that judicial determination is direct and, in most instances, decisive. But if the Supreme Court of California were to say to the local legislature in Community X that its policy is improper that injunction, I suspect, would have little practical impact upon the identical administrative actions of Community Y or perhaps even on Community X itself. Other lawyers have shared the experience that follows a victory on behalf of a landowner in the state Supreme Court. You have obtained a decision that the single-family classification of your client’s property is unreasonable. Your client wants to use the property for commercial purposes. The community immediately rezones the property to a Duplex Zone and invites you to spend 20 Moreover, putting aside such potential for unwholesome governmental conduct, injunctive relief is often ineffective without judicial oversight. In practice, in order to have effective specific decree enforcement, one would have to emtroil the courts even deeper in the ongoing administration of complex local land use schemes, and impinge further on the courts’ limited resources. In contrast, in appropriate cases where a compensable economic loss has already been suffered, a court need only order recompense under the familiar rules of eminent domain valuation (San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S. at 658-659), thereby concluding the particular litigation, and freeing itself for other judicial business. Vv MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN’S VIEWS IN SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO. HAVE BEEN WIDELY ACCLAIMED, AND FORM A DE- SIRABLE BLUEPRINT FOR SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT There is littie that can be added to the above heading. The response of the Courts of Appeals speaks for itself. So far, the following Circuits have expressly opted to follow the views articulated in the Brennan opinion: 24 Hernandez v. City of another two years and thousands of dollars litigating thai classifica- tion. “This indifference to judicial decisions applies, by the way, even in jurisdictions such as Maryland, where, as in Baltimore County, there are relatively few independent municipalities and decisions with respect to land use are centralized in the county itself.’ Emphasis added. Of course, since the time Mr. Babcock wrote, things have changed a bit, and a second round of litigation these days can easily consume a multiple of the “two years” he alludes to, to say nothing of tens of thousands of dollars, and likely mere. 24Reasoning quite logically that since Mr. Justice Brennan spoke for four members of the Court, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist — although joining the majority on the jurisdictional point — was unmistakably clear in his endorsement of the substantive soundness of Mr. Justice 21 Lafayette, 643 F 2d 1188(1981, Sth Cir.), Devines v. Maier, 665 F. 2d 138, 1/:2,(1981, 7th Cir.), Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F. 2d 476, 482, fn. 5 (1982, 7th Cir.), In re Aircrash in Bali, 684 F. 2d 1301, 1311, fn. 7 (1982, 9th Cir.), Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F. 2d 1141, 1148 (1983, 9th Cir.), Fountain v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Dist., 678 F. 2d 1038, 1043 (1982, 11th Cir.) and of course, the Court below: Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County, etc., Comm’n., 729 F. 2d 402, 408 (1984, 6th Cir.). To the same effect, Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F. 2d 99 (1981, 5th Cir.), endorsing the 42 U.S.C. §1983 damages remedy for temporary denial of use of the subject property under a local confiscatory land use ordinance. Also see, Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F. 2d 386 (1978, 6th Cir.). Only the First Circuit adheres to the lonely and concededly problem-ridden position that non-monetary relief is the sole remedy: Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F. 2d 33 (1980, 1st Cir.)*° Similarly, in the short time since their articulation, the San Diego Gas & Electric Co. substantive views have commanded a following among state courts; see e.g., Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A. 2d 15, (1981, N.H.); Zinn v. State, 334 N.W. 2d 67, 72-73 (1983, Wis.); Rippley v. City of Linccln, 330 Brennan’s views (450 U.S. at 633), the Brennan views clearly intimated the substantive and remedial views of the Court’s majority, particularly since the majority opinion in San Diego merely address- od jurisdiction — it did not disagree with the dissent’s substantive views. on them a lesser remedial responsibility to their victims than 1s raced by other constitutionally transgressing entities and officials. (See Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condem- ration a..d the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, supra, 15 Rutgers L. Jour. at 99). No respectable reason has been advanced for such an unblushing demand that the Court create some sort of aristocracy, as it were, privileged to live above prevailing norms of constitutional accountability. Justice Brennan’s policeman, reacting instantly to deadly peril, ali alone in a dark alley, often with limited education and experience, still must know and obey the Constitution — and be accountable for his refusal to do so. No respectable reason appears why the municipal land use establishment, replete with planners, legal counsel and expert consultants, fully advised of its responsibilities, and acting at leisure (usually, as at bench, taking years to accomplish its purpose) should claim for itself & ‘esser standard of constitutional accountability. As the court noted in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926), in a changing world, the scope of constitu- tional guaiantees must “‘expand and contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of operations.” In the past half-century, their scope has contracted in the face of expanding (nay, exploding) land use regulations. But now the time is at hand to note that the sword and scales of justice have two sides. In the face of expansive 27 growth of land regulatory powers, it is time to reaffirm the line beyond which constitutional rights may not be impaired with impunity. “In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise” (Euclid, supra). A fortiori so, in a principled if changing world. Land use regulations have at long last reached such a level of intensity and complexity that they often become counter- productive. Instead of regulating housing, they frustrate it; instead of soiving problems, they exacerbate them. That is not in the public interest. It does not deserve the issuance of what amounts to a carte blanche. If permitted to go on unchecked and unrestrained by an obligation to make whole its victims, it is a process that is certain in the long run to erode property nghts and impair other liberties; see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at 415. For ultimately, there can be no real liberty for people whose property nghts can be snuffed out by an izresponsible govern- ment; liberty and property are in the final analysis inter- dependent a:id “neither could have meaning without the other” (Lynch v. Household Finance Corv., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)). Amicus respectfully urges that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, GIDEON KANNER Attorney for Amicus Curiae California Building Industries Assoc. PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL State of California SS. County of Los Angeles 1, the undersigned say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action or proceeding; that my business address is 11333 lowa Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90025; that on December 12, 1984, I served the within Brief of Amicus Curiae in said action or proceeding by derositing true copies thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope with post2ge thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows: U.S. Supreme Court Robert L. Estes, Esq. One First Street N.W. M. Milton Sweeney, Esq. Washington D.C. 20543 Stewart, Estes & Dornell (Orginal and 40 cupies) Third National Bank Building Nashville, Tennessee 37219 G.T. Nebel, Esq. Counsel for Petitioners Bass, Berry & Sims 2700 First American Center Nashville, Tennessee 37238 Counsel for Respondent I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 12, 1984, at Los Angeles, California. Robin J. McColgan (Original signed) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0402%3A15. Public record. Not legal advice.