# Opposition Brief — Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. William J. Sheffield, Governor of Alaska

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 471 U.S. 1140

## Text

-

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

>.
— ew

. CHEVRON U.S.A., Inc., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

JAY S. HAMMOND, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF ALASKA, et al.,

Respondents.

’."
—

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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“~)"

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

aa.
w

NORMAN C. GORSUCH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Doveitas K. Mertz
Assistant Attorney General
State of Alaska
Department of Law

Pouch K, State Capitol
Juneau, Alaska 99811

(907) 465-3600

~ Counsel for State of
Alaska Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333

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i
QUESTION PRESENTED

May the State of Alaska, consistent with the Su-
premacy Clause, prohibit oil tankers from discharging oil-
contaminated ballast water into state waters, when the
U.S. Coast Guard’s regulations do not grant a right to
such a discharge and the Clean Water Act affirmatively
allows states to impose stricter discharge requirements
than those of the federal government?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

QUESTION PRESENTED WW... iaiiaealisiaiaaamaaae —
TABLE OF CONTENTS, 2c shel ~ -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ili
STATEMENT OF THE CASE pe
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ....... iat 4
Summary of Argument — 4

I. THE IMPACT OF THIS CASE IS ‘MINOR
AND NEITHER NATIONAL IN SCOPE NOR

A. Only one vessel is affected 1 by this “ne

B. There are no broader ramifications of the rul-

IEE ene ania 6

C. Alaska’s law will not hinder Coast Guard
meth-pelbutiets C6CCOR, naccinccinnci 7

D. Alaska’s law will not hinder international ef-
Sorte mapnienst WONG, ccncnccsnicciens ee

Il. THE CONTROVERSY WILL SOON BECOME
BOTT « aLninnscrsseicsrsnstiaesstataeniisssaaiaiasimaaae 9

A. The industry is moving toward elimination of
the type of vessel at issue here. 000. 9

B. Congress is considering legislation which
would moot the ruling here. 2000000 10

Ill. THERE ARE NO CONFLICTING DECISIONS,
AND RESOLUTION CAN WAIT UNTIL CON-
og Pky ee 11

IV. REVIEW OF THE RULING BELOW WOULD
REQUIRE A DETAILED FACTUAL IN-
rT) RBA. SMH. aa: 12

CIC EI eeitinicstininiiitereentienieamntiaiee Soe.2: 14

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Pages

Appendix A: Relevant Statutory Provisions:
AS 46.03.750 (eff. until 7/1/80) .......... App. 1
AS 46.03.750 (eff. after 7/1/80) ........... App. 2
ee App. 2
a App. 3

Appendix B: U.S. Supreme Court Order of June 18,
1984, denying leave to file untimely
petition ae App. 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Askew v. American ~siad —* Inc.,
411 U.S. 325 (1973) . ms
Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) . eee ae

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 1 (1978) 4, 6, 12
Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) = 5

Statutes and Regulations
Ns OF

1980 Session Laws of Alaska, ch. 116 2000 am 2
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0) (2), 33 U.S.C.

a RR 4,11, 12
Ports and Waterways Safety Act ( PW — P.L.
, 92-840, EE |
CS

No. 84-634

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

sy
Vv

CHEVRON U:S.A., Inc., et al.,

Petitioners,
vs.

JAY S. HAMMOND, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF ALASKA, et al.,

Respondents.

ray
eas

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

“sy
Vv

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1976 the Alaska Legislature passed a statutory pro-
hibition on the discharge of ballast water from cargo tanks
of oil tankers into state waters. This legislation was
prompted by evidence that ballast water discharged from
eargo tanks, i.e., tanks which contain oil for a portion of
a voyage, always contain residual oil, and that even min-

2

ute amounts of oil harm larval crustaceans important to
Alaska’s fishing economy.’ (CR 141)?

In 1977 petitioner Chevron U.S.A. filed suit on the
issue in the instant case and others. The U.S. District
Court issued final rulings on a variety of issues in the
ease in 1979 and 1981; in 1981, the present respondents
appealed the District Court’s adverse ruling on the instant
issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninath Circuit.
On February 3, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed, rul-
ing for the State of Alaska defendants. After receiving
an extension of time until June 2, 1984, Chevron U.S.A.
lodged a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court
on June 4, 1984; the Petition was rejected as untimely.
On June 18, 1984, this Court denied Chevron’s motion
for leave to file an untimely petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. (Appendix B). Simultaneously, however, Chev-
ron had returned to the Court of Appeals with a motion to
allow a late petition for rehearing; it conceded in its
moving papers that its motivation was to secure a new
mandate from the Court of Appeals, thus, it believed, start-
ing over its time for petitioning for certiorari in the Su-
preme Courts The Court of Appeals allowed the untimely
motion for rehearing to be filed, then denied the petition

i The statute, Alaska Statute 46.03.750, was amended in
1980, following the District Court decision, to give the tanker
industry more discretion in deciding appropriate methods of
complying with the no-discharge requirement. See chapter
116, 1980 Session Laws of Alaska.

2 Record citations are to the District Court’s Clerk’s Record
prepared for the Court of Appeals.

$ Supreme Court Rule 20.4 states that a “timely filed” peti-
tion for rehearing starts the time limit for petitioning for cer-

(Continued on next page)

on August 9, 1984. The renewed Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari was then filed and served on respondents on Octo-
ber 22, 1984.4

Chevron’s basic claim below was that the Alaska sta-
tute was preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act (PWSA), P.L. 92-340, 46 U.S.C. §391la, because the
state standard for discharge of contaminated ballast water
is stricter than that in Coast Guard regulations promul-
gated under the PWSA.°

The Court of Appeals’ decision noted that neither the
PWSA nor the Coast Guard regulations contain an explicit

(Continued from previous page)

tiorari anew. It is unclear whether the time period is also en-
larged when, as here, the petition for rehearing was not timely
but was nonetheless allowed to be filed by the Court of Ap-
peals.

: The renewed Petition for Certiorari is not limited to a re-
quest for review of the new issues raised in the Motion for Re-
hearing to the Court of Appeals; it_requests review of all the
issues argued in the first Petition which this court refused to
receive.

5 The Coast Guard regulations, at 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.29, 157.37,
allow tankers to discharge “‘oily’’ ballast beyond fifty miles from
land, but prohibit discharging all except so-called ‘clean bal-
last’ (ballast containing low levels of oil) within fifty miles. The
Alaska statute effectively prohibits discharge of any ballast con-
taining oil within the 3-mile state waters.

Chevron repeatedly uses the phrase ‘clean ballast’ in its
petition as if it refers to oil-free ballast; this is misleading. In
fact, ‘‘clean ballast’ is a term used in the Coast Guard regula-
tion to indicate ballast which merely contains less contaminant
than so-called “dirty ballast.” All parties agree that ballast wa-
ter from cargo tanks—whether “clean” or ‘‘dirty’-—always con-
tains oil. Chevron also states, as if it were fact, that the Coast
Guard regulations expressly permit discharge of contaminated
ballast ir state waters; this is one of the main legal issues, and
the court of appeals resolved it against Chevron.

reference to an intent to preempt (as Chevron conceded
below). It also noted that it is possible for every tanker
to comply with the requirement without physical altera-
tion and without being subjected to conflicting standards
in other jurisdictions.® Finally, it also noted that the Clean
Water Act, passed in the same Congress as the PWSA,
affirmatively grants states the right to impose stricter dis-
charge requirements than the federal government in state
waters.’

fy
Vv

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Summary of Argument

A writ of certiorari should be denied in this case be-
cause it presents no issues important enough to warrant
the Court’s review. Petitioners concede that it will affect
only one small and aging vessel, operating in the waters
of one state. No other cases in other jurisdictions have
complained of similar laws, and there are no conflicting
lower court decisions. No disruption of the tanker industry
has occurred and petitioners can show no likelihood of any.
Most importantly, the tanker industry itself is moving
voluntarily to the cleaner and more efficient operation of

6 Chevron had argued that Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151 (1978), contains a finding that Congress intended the
PWSA to preempt the field of tanker deballasting. But the
Court of Appeals ruled that in Ray this Court affirmed the right
of states to impose non-discriminatory environmental opera-
tional requirements on tankers so long as they were not design
and construction requirements. 435 U.S. at 164.

y There are two “‘non-preemption” provisions in the Clean
Water Act, at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2) and 33 U.S.C. § 1370.

5

vessels required by the statute at issue, so the controversy
is disappearing and hardly merits review at this level.

I. The Impact Of This Case Is Minor And Neither
National In Scope Nor Recurring.

Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules states that cer-
tiorari will be granted only when the question is “impor-
tant” or “of substance”, Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349
U.S. 70, 74 (1955) or is of a recurring nature, Baggett v.
Bullit, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964). This ease has little im-
portance for anyone other than the litigants and even then
will have little long-term impact for petitioners. It deals
with a problem which is diminishing, not recurring.

A. Only one vessel is affected by his ruling.

Alaska law prohibits discharge of oil-contaminated
tanker ballast water into state waters. Tanker owners
have a variety of means available for compliance, includ-
ing use of segregated ballast tanks, use of shore-based de-
ballasting facilities, use of oil barges instead of tankers,
and use of stationary barges for receiving tanker oily
ballast for later transfer to an onshore deballasting fa-
cility. Since passage of the statute, every tanker used in
Alaskan waters except one has come into compliance
through one of the above methods. The single exception
is Chevron’s Alaska Standard, a small aging vessel which
transports a portion of the oil used in various coastal com-
munities. In fact, the Alaska Standard discharges polluted
ballast in only some of the ports it visits; it is able to
comply fully in other ports by using onshore reception fa-
cilities. (CR 141) Thus, the practical effect of the ruling
below is minimal, i.e., requiring Chevron to modify its
operation of one small vessel in a few ports so as to join

6

the rest of the industry, including its competitors, in no
longer discharging oil into state waters.

“ B. There are no broader ramifications of the rul-
ing below.

Chevron contends that the ruling below “threatens to
disrupt the tanker industry”; they offer no indication of
how it could do so, and the record contains no such evi-
dence. Two points are clear: The tanker industry trend
toward segregated ballast tanks and on-shore deballast-
ing facilities is world-wide and will not be accelerated by
requiring the Alaska Standard to comply with Alaska’s
laws. And secondly, the fear that the ruling below will
disrupt the industry by causing a proliferation of varying
state discharge standards is illusory: under the Clean
Water Act every state has its own standards for discharge
of scores of pollutants, from sewage to garbage to oil,
from vessels into state waters. These varying standards
have been upheld numerous times (e.g., Askew v. Ameri-
can Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)) and
the tanker industry has never been disrupted by having
to comply with them.°

In any case in the eight years since Alaska passed its
law, no other state has duplicated it, and not a single other
lawsuit regarding preemptive effect of the PWSA has

* Of course if varying state standards required design chang-
es or were so conflicting that compliance were physically im-
possible, preemption would result, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). But Alaska’s law requires no physical
alteration of vessels and is compatible with federal law, so un-
der Ray, no preemption problem exists. That there have been
no conflicting requirements or disruptions of the industry is
— by the industry’s overwhelming compliance with Alas-
a’s law.

been filed in federal courts. This is clearly not a matter
of national imoprtance, and given the lack of similar sta-
tutes or cases, it can hardly be said to be a recurring
problem.

C. Alaska’s law will not hinder Coast Guard anti-

pollution efforts.

Chevron contends that this case should be reviewed
because Alaska’s statute somehow frustrates the Coast
Guard’s regulation of tanker pollution. In fact as the
Court of Appeals found Alaska’s statute does not con-
flict with or frustrate federal requirements. Chevron’s
theory depends on the assumption that the Coast Guard
grants an affirmative right to pollute, where Alaska pro-
hibits it; and that failure to allow tankers to pollute state
waters somehow upsets and frustrates a grand Coast
Guard scheme to reduce pollution. Neither is true.

The Coast Guard regulations set out two different
sets of restrictions on discharge of contaminated ballast
within fifty miles of land the regulations prohibit all dis-
charges of oil-contaminated ballast except that with oil
levels too low to create a visible sheen, sludge, or emul-
sion; beyond fifty miles tankers may discharge even more
contaminated ballast. Chevron reads this as according
tankers the positive right to discharge low-level con-
taminated hallast within the fifty-mile zone, which would
conflict with the state’s prohibition on discharges within
the 3-mile zone of state waters. To make this argument,
Chevron must posit that the PWSA, whose purpose they
concede is to protect the marine environment, has its pur-
pose frustrated by a state statute which provides an even
greater measure of protection to the environment. In fact,

- 8

this is a simple case of a set of federal restrictions vis-a-vis
a set of state regulations which go beyond the federal
regulations in the same direction; the state regulations
do not frustrate the purpose of the federal regulations,
they advance it. It is not jogical, in view of the PWSA’s
purpose, to theorize that it intended to accord a positive
right to pollute, nor is there any support in the Act for
that theory.

Likewise there is no support for the theory that Alas-
ka’s law will somehow frustrate a grand Coast Guard com-
prehensive plan to reduce pollution. The Coast Guard
may have arrived at a different judgment than Alaska’s
on how stringent the restrictions on pollution ought to be,
but there is no evidence that the Coast Guard affirma-
tively desires tankers to discharge oil in state waters. And
there is no evidence that the Coast Guard’s overall plan
to reduce tanker pollution will be frustrated if tankers are
banned from polluting state waters.°

D. Alaska’s law will not hinder international ef-
forts against pollution.
Chevron theorizes that Alaska’s law, which operates
only within the 3-mile zone, will somehow hinder efforts
to reach international agreements on pollution control.

9 Chevron asserts in its Petition (p. 22) that Alaska’s pro-
hibition on contaminated ballast discharge “renders purpose-
less’’ equipment required by the Coast Guard. This is simply
untrue. Alaska’s law applies only in the 3-mile state waters;
beyond three miles, to the 50-mile limit set by the Coast Guard,
the federal requirements for onboard equipment remain just
as necessary and purposeful as their authors intended. More-
over, some of the required equipment, i.e., the above-water
piping, is utilized every time a vessel uses onshore deballasting
acilities.

—_—.. _—_s

9

In fact, this legislation is irrelevant to international agree-
ments and will have no effect on international relations.
The international treaty-making efforts cited by Chevron
relate solely to pollutant discharges on the high seas; as
the court below found, none of the treaties to which the
U.S. is a signatory or is considering joining affects opera-
tions in territorial waters (see, e.g., the 1978 MARPOL
Protocol). Indeed, the U.S. has consistently insisted, in
negotiating international agreements on pollution, on the
right to apply different standards in territorial waters;
the Ports. and Waterways Safety Act, at 46 U.S.C.
§ 391a(6), explicitly authorizes regulations exceeding in-
ternational standards.

In point of fact, Congress, in the PWSA and else-
where, even when accepting international standards on
the high seas, has always insisted on the right to apply
its own domestic standards to pollution of coastal waters.
By using the Clean Water Act as the primary device for
setting pollutant discharge standards in coastal waters,
Congress has made clear that allowing states to set their
own reasonable standards is not an impermissible inter-
ference with international treaty-making. Chevron has of-
fered no credible evidence that any such interference actu-
ally occurs, and there is no support for the proposition in
the record.

II. The Controversy Will Soon Become Moot.

A. The industry is moving toward elimination
of the type of vessel at issue here.
Both federal legislation and international agreements
have resulted in a clear tanker industry trend in the last
decade. Most new tankers are built with segregated bal-

10

last tanks, eliminating the need for putting ballast in cargo
tanks and thus contaminating it; more on-shore deballast-
ing and oil/water separating facilities are being built;
small tankers are being replaced by barges on coastal
hauls, such as that of the Alaska Standard.'° With increas-
ing environmental regulation and improving technology,
new cleaner vessels are fast replacing those which dis-
charge oil-contaminated ballast. The Alaska market is a
ease in point: Since initial passage of the statute at issue
here, in 1976, the entire fleet serving Alaska has switched
to onshore deballasting or been converted to segregated
tanks. When the aging Alaska Standard retires (it was
built in 1959), the entire fleet will have come into com-
plianee with Alaska’s pollution standards by the ordin-
ary process of modernization over time. Thus there is
no cause for Supreme Court intervention, since the mere
passage of time will moot the controversy.

B. Congress is considering legislation which

would moot the ruling here.

Recently Congress has been considering legislation
which would revamp the national approach to oil spills,
including preemption of some or all state oil spill legisla-
tion. During the current session the House Merchant
Marine Committee passed out a version of the Compre-
hensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act
which would preempt state oil spill liability laws, most

10 Fuel barges supply much of the oil product delivered in
the area served by the Alaska Standard and other vessels. Con-
trary to Chevron’s assertion, the District Court record shows
evidence exists that barges are in fact environmentally safer
than tankers, since barges spill less oil per accident than tank-
ers. Chevron itself uses barges as well as tankers.

11

likely including the one at issue here.'! Although Congress
will likely take no further action this year, the proposal
for a national preemptive oil spill law will doubtless be
considered again early in the new Congress. The Adminis-
tration supported the preemption provisions of the pro-
posed Act this year, so the possibility of mootness through
new legislation must be considered very real.

III. There Are No Conflicting Decisions, And Resolu-
tion Can Wait Until Conflict Arises.

Chevron states that this Court should review the rul-
ing below because it threatens to disrupt the tanker in-
dustry. As we note above, such “disruption” is almost
totally illusory, since only one aging vessel would be ef-
fected. Chevron also asserts the “possibility” of similar
laws in other states, with attendant dire consequences.
In the years since Alaska’s law was passed in 1976, no
such laws. have passed and no such disruption has oc-
curred.” In fact, the consequences of such restrictions on
the industry are so minor that there are no other cases
on this or related controversies, and no other court of ap-
peals decisions, much less conflicting ones. It is apparent

ue That bill, HR 3278, was eventually merged into HR 5640,
the so-called oil spill “Superfund” bill; HR 5640 has a narrower
preemption provision which would not affect the Alaska statute
at issue here. It is likely that both provisions will be reintro-
duced in the next Congress.

ag In fact every state already has its own standards for dis-
charge of pollutants into state waters, promulgated under the
Clean Water Act; no disruption of the industry has resulted.
We also note that in 1980, following the District Court decision,
the Alaska statute at issue here was liberalized to give the in-
dustry free scope to decide on alternatives to discharge of con-
taminated ballast; the earlier version required that it be trans-
ferred to an on-shore deballasting facility.

12

that this is not a controversy which is growing or which
needs immediate resolution at the highest federal level:
if in fact other states ever follow suit, and if in fact the
tanker industry became discommoded by such laws, legal
challenges would arise. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the national interest cannot wait for other
cases to arise, to be either resolved at the court of appeals
level, or by this Court if a conflict arises, But for now,
there are no other cases and, therefore, no conflict among
circuits, and there is nothing to indicate a need for the
Supreme Court to resolve the questions. At the same time
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), has not
engendered new questions on the application of the
PWSA; the court of appeals clearly followed Ray fully,
considering each element of that decision as it applied
here. Given the lack of other cases on the same statute,
Ray hardly needs to be reexamined after this short period.

IV. Review Of The Ruling Below Would Require A
Detailed Factual Inquiry.

The ruling below required a detailed study of the
legislative history and language of both the PWSA and
the Clean Water Act, as well as a particularized inquiry in-
to a number of detailed factual questions which are unique
to this case. Chevron’s position rests in part on the theory
that Alaska’s statute will require widespread changes in
the tanker industry, including physical alterations of ves-
sels; it also theorizes that Alaska’s prohibition upsets
carefully balanced regulations taking into account vessel
design, available facilities, and the economies of the oil
transportation business. To review the merits of these as-
sertions, the lower courts had to consider factual questions
such as the following: Are tank vessels used in the Alaska

13

trade already constructed in such a way that compliance
with the Alaska law is physically possible without rede-
signing and retrofitting? What shore-based facilities are
available in what locations, and are they adequate as an
alternative to retrofitting vessels? Will the economies of
the world-wide tanker industry react to laws like Alaska’s
by causing mass avoidance of local markets? By a change
in present tanker design and construction? By a shift to
barges or other transportation modes? Will enforcement
of Alaska’s law result in non-availability of onshore de-
ballasting facilities for heavily contaminated ballast, as
asserted by Chevron? Will the industry react by internal
changes which frustrate the Coast Guard’s overall anti-

pollution strategy?

The Court of Appeals has already digested the volum-
inous and complex facts on these points. This Court can
adopt the Court of Appeals’ factual conclusion, which was
that Alaska’s statute will not require widespread changes
in the tankard Industry. However, in order to find Chev-
ron’s assertions proper cause for reversal, this Court would
need to make its own examination an analysis of these
complex issues. Following that review, reversal would be
appropriate only if this Court reached a conclusion con-
trary to that reached by the lower court. Moreover, those
facts are unique to the situation of the Alaska tanker trade,
making a decision in this case of little relevance to other

similar cases, if others should ever arise.

—)
|

14

CONCLUSION

This case does not merit review by the Supreme
Court: It has no far-reaching impacts, will likely become
moot over time, and presents no great questions of law
for resolution. We respectively request this Court to
deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

NORMAN C. GORSUCH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Dove.ias K. Mertz
Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for State of Alaska Respondents
November, 1984.

App. 1
APPENDIX A

Alaske. Statutes
AS 46.03.750
Effective until July 1, 1980

Sec. 46.03.750. Ballast water discharge. (a) No per-
son may pollute or add to the pollution of waters of the
state by discharging from any vessel ballast water, tank-
cleaning waste water or other waste containing petroleum
in excess of the maximum permitted by the water quality
standards established under §4 70 and 80 of this chapter
and in no event may a vessel discharge ballast water, tank-
cleaning waste water or other waste containing petroleum
in excess of 50 parts per million of oil residue.

(b) Exeept as provided in (ec) of this section, no
vessel may take on petroleum or any petroleum product or
by-preduct as cargo unless it arrives in ports in the state
without having discharged ballast at sea during the period
of time from departure of the vesse! enroute to the state
from a port outside the state to arrival at a port in the
state or while in transit between ports in the state, and
the master of the vessel certifies the fact on forms pro-
vided by the department.

(ec) Vessels equipped with tanks used exclusively
for ballast or capable of producing ballast with an oil
content less than that provided for in (a) of this section
may discharge that ballast at sea, including the waters of
the state, if it meets the standards of (a) of this section
and the master of the vessel certifies that fact on forms
provided by the department.

(d) Repealed by $19 ch 220 SLA 1976.

(e) Cargo in tank vessels, as defined in AS
30.20.060(9), engaged in the marine transportation of

App. 2

crude oil, refined petroleum products or their by-products
may not be placed in segregated ballast tanks, nor may
ballast be placed in cargo tanks of those tank vessels
having segregated ballast systems. However, the depart-
ment may by regulation permit the placing of ballast in
the cargo tanks of those vessels in emergency situations.
All ballast placed in cargo tanks shall be processed by or
in an onshore ballast water treatment facility and may not
be discharged into the waters of the state. (§ 3 ch 120 SLA
1971; am § 19 ch 220 SLA 1976; am §3 ch 266 SLA 1976)

AS 46.03.750(a) (b)
Effective after July 1, 1980

Sec. 46.03.750. Ballast water discharge. (a) Except as
provided in (b) of this section, a person may not cause or
permit the discharge of ballast water from a cargo tank
of a tank vessel into the waters of the state. A tank vessel
may not take on petroleum or a petroleum product or by-
product as cargo unless it arrives in ports in the state
without having discharged ballast from cargo tanks into
the waters of the state and the master of the vessel certi-
fies that fact on forms provided by the department.

(b) The master of a tank vessel may discharge hal-
last water from a cargo tank of his tank vessel if it is neces-
sary for the safety of the tank vessel and no alternative
action is feasible to assure the safety of the tank vessel.
($3 ch 120 SLA 1971; am § 19 ch 220 SLA 1976; am $3 ch
266 SLA 1976; am § 3 ch 116 SLA 1980)

United States Code
33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)

(0) Obligation for damages unaffected; local author-
ity not preempted; existing Federal authority not modified

App. 3

or affected. (1) Nothing in this section shall affect or
modify in any way the obligations of any owner or opera-
tor of any vessel, or of any owner or operator of any on-
shore facility or offshore facility to any person or agency
under any provision of law for damages to any publicly
owned or privately owned property resulting from a dis-
charge of any oil or hazardous substance or from the re-
moval of any such oil or hazardous substance.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
preempting any State or political subdivision thereof from
imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the
discharge of oil or hazardous substance into any waters
within such State.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
affecting or modifying any other existing authority of any
Federal department, agency, or instrumentality, relative to
onshore or offshore facilities under this Act or arty other
provision of law, or to affect any State or local law not in
conflict with this section.

33 U.S.C. Section 1370
§ 1370. State authority.

Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in
this Act shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State
or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to
adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respect-
ing discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement re-
specting control or abatement of pollution; exeept that if
an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent stan-
dard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
performance is in effect under this Act, such State or

App. 4

political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt
or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, ef-
fluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance which is less stringent than the
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-
formance under this Act; or (2) be construed as impair-
ing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction
of the States with respect to the waters (including boun-
dary waters) of such States.

(June 30, 1948, ch. 758, Title V, § 510, as added, Oct. 18,
1972, P. L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 893.)

App. 5

APPENDIX B

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

June 18, 1984

Richard E. Sherwood, Esq.
Charles P. Diamond, Esq.

400 South Hope Street

Los Angeles, California 90071

RE: Chevron U.S.A., Inc., et al. v. Jay S. Hammond
No. —

Gentlemen:

The Court today entered the following order in the
above-entitled case:

“The motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition
for writ of certiorari, out-of-time, is denied.”

Your check in the amount of $200.00 is returned.
Copies of your petition for certiorari are being returned
under separate cover.

Very truly yours,

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS, Clerk
By
Francis J. Lorson
Chief Deputy Clerk
Ene.

ec: Counsel of record
Honorable Rex E. Lee,
Solicitor General

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0346%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
