# Amicus Curiae Brief — California v. Ciraolo

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0314%3A15

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 476 U.S. 207

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED

CT 4& 1989

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
84-1513 | CLERK

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,

Vv.

DANTE CARLO CIRAOLO,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
California Court of Appeals
for the First District

BRIEF OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES
MONITORING PROJECT AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDF.:.7

AMITAI SCHWARTZ *
RICHARD JAY MOLLER
RONALD M. SINOWAY
MELVIN B. PEARLSTON

AMITAI SCHWARTZ
Suite 800
155 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 398-0922

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Civil Liberties
Monitoring Project

*Counsel of Record

earn) scucwige

-
*

te a:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the state's
intentional visual surveillance into an
American's curtilage is a search intruding
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy

in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

2. If the state's intentional
aerial surveillance into the curtilage is
not a full-fledged search, whether the
brief aerial surveillance of a curtilage
is a Fourth Amendment intrusion as
significant as a stop of the person,

requiring particularized suspicion.

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TAB F NT

Page
Questions presented... ceeeeeeeececceces i
Tee OE MMEMOPLELOB sc ccc cc ccc ccccccccs iii
Interests of Amicus Curiae.........200. 2
Summary Of Argument......eceeeceeecceees 3
ATQUMENE.. ccc cee cece eeseeeeesesesesecees 6

I

THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL VISUAL
SURVEILLANCE INTO A CURTILAGE
IS A SEARCH INTRUDING UPON A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN VIOLATION OF THE
DTM E . 6c cc bceececccescccccces 6

II

IF THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE, FOR A BRIEF TIME, INTO

A CURTILAGE IS NOT A FULL-FLEDGED

SEARCH, IT IS AT LEAST AS SIGNIFICANT

AN INTRUSION AS A BRIEF STOP, THUS
REQUIRING PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION..... 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page
Cases
Brown v. Texas
BES Uebe SF CAP eh cccbsocoeccvcosaevesess 20
idge v. New Ham i
403 U.S. 443,469-470 (1971)........20.8. 9
749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984)
cert. ‘ U.S.
Pawn tes 8.ce, 2900... ...0s sees 23
K . U
DOS Gels BOF TEOET Pedasocscoisbovsaecesres 8
Mincey v. Ar
437 U.S. 385, 393-395 (1978) ..ccccccces 27
New York v. Belton
453 U.S. 454,458-459 (1981).....;,..04. 22

National Organization for the Reform

608 F.Supp. 945
(D.C.Cal. 1985). .cccccccccccccces 2,40,87

Oliver v. United States
466 U.S. » Oe be BEe 26 2146, cccces passim

People v. Arno
90 Cal.App.3d 505,509-512 (1979)...... 24.

iv

7

State v. Rogers
3

Terry v. Ohio

SPE Wome Be bO. CAPER Riso cccccsccevacs

United States v. Allen
675 F.2d 1373,1381
(9th Cir. 1980) cert.

denied
. we Pe ae! Pee anes

United States v. Cortez

449 U.S. 411,417-418 (1981).........

United States v. DeBacker
~493 F.Supp. 1078,1081

CWB RGM RIGO) ccc cveccccccccserccse

United States v. Kim

415 F.Supp. 1252 (D.Haw. 1976)......

United States v. Lace

669 F.2d 46,57 (2d Cir. 1982).......

United States vy.
732 F.2d 390,398-399

(Jer: Gaee Seth oS 6 45S b dK 040 coe ae

Other Authorities

George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four

C1DRD cece cc cccccseesdsovbbdesceeces

P.2d 142,144 (N.M.App. 1983)....

Pe 2 ee

te

No. 84-1513

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,
V.
DANTE CARLO CIRAOLO,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CALIFORNIA
COURT OF APPEAL FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

BRIEF OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES MONITORING
PROJECT AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Civil Liberties Monitoring
Project ("Project") is a nonprofit
California corporation. The principal
focus of the Project is on the continued
preservation and enhancement of individual
rights and liberties. The Project engages
in discussions and other forms of
education concerning civil liberties and
civil rights. General aerial surveillance
threatens the privacy and welfare of the
Organization's members, particularly
because many of its members live in
isolated areas in rural counties subject
to this new law enforcement technique.
Amicus is presently engaged in litigation
with the Federal Government and the State
of California in a case challenging

governmental aerial surveillance. The

National Organization for the Reform of

ae —————

a

Marijuana Laws v.- Mullen, 608 F.Supp. 945
(D.C.Cal. 1985).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The state, and amici in support
ot the state, write as if this case
concerns Only a marijuana garden.! In
fact, at stake in this case is the privacy
of Americans in their own homes and
curtilages.

The state's argument--that the
aerial search conducted in this case is
not really a search and in any event not
unreasonable--logically would permit

searches by cther technological means,

1. For the sake of simplicity,
amicus will refer to the arguments of the
state as including those arguments
advanced by the amici curiae in support of
the state.

at best degrading an expectation of
privacy as we know it, and permitting
substantial, difficult to control, abuses.

The state's argument is at war
with Fourth Amendment law and any
reasonable policy attempting to
accommodate both the state's interests and
the important policies underlying the
Fourth Amendment. For this Court to
establish a narrow principle of law
upholding only this type of plane search
would further complicate Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; but to establish one of the
Droad principles of law advocated by the
state and amici wouid inadvertently Lay
the groundwork for an Orwellian-type
government able to keep its subjects under
24-hour surveillance.

Amicus asks this Court to

declare that Americans' subjective

~-e* _

expectation of privacy from unfettered
governmental spying into their homes and
curtilages is an expectation this Court,
and society in general, is prepared to
recognize as reasonable, and thus
constitutionally protected. At a minimun,
this Court should hold that a brief aerial
search of a curtilage is a privacy
intrusion as serious as a stop of the
person, and thus requires founded

suspicion.

ARGUMENT

I
THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL VISUAL
SURVEILLANCE INTO A HOME OR
CURTILAGE IS A SEARCH INTRUDING
UPON A REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

The state's primary argument is
the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
physical intrusions into the privacy of
on2's home and curtilage; visual searches
into one's home and curtilage are not
really searches. (Brief for Petitioner at
16-17, 32-34). Amicus agrees with the
state there is no meaningful distinction
between the constitutional protection
Americans enjoy in their homes, as opposed

to their curtilages (Brief for Petitioner

at 34 & n.10). The curtilage of a home is
the area to which extends "the intimate
activity associated with the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."

Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. . .

80 L.Ed.2d 214,225; 104 S.Ct. 1735,1742
(1984). Because the principle of law is
the same, Amicus will often refer to the
house and the curtilage simply as the
home.

The problem with the state's
distinction between a visual and physical
search is that from the viewpoint of most
Americans a visual search is just as
intrusive as a physical search. In George
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Big
Brother did not physically intrude upon
the subjugated populace's homes and
curtilages. Instead, the omnipresent

video screens and helicopters adequately

kept people under constant surveillance.
The state's theory is
inconsistent with the law. Whether the
police are physically in a place where
they have a legal right to be is not
determinative of the legality of a search
that is conducted from that place. For
example, the telephone wiretap the police
placed in the public telephone booth in
Katz was also in a place it had a legal
right to be. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). Thus, because the right
of privacy focuses on a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy, the
issue in this case is whether Americans
reasonably expect some protection from
general systematic aerial surveillance of
the curtilage. Whether the state has
physically intruded onto property is

simply not a determining factor in

assessing a Fourth Amendment privacy

violation. Oliver v. United States,

supra, 466 U.S.wws, 80 L.Ed.2d 214,227.

A critical factor is whether the
state's visual intrusion was intentional
or accidental. Certainly, Americans do
not object to the casual, inadvertent view
of a neighbor or police officer into their
homes or backyards. Moreover, such an
inadvertent plain view is legally

permissible. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 469-470 (1971). But
virtually all Americans object to Peeping
Toms peering into their windows late at
night or spying upon them in their
backyard <¢o catch a glimpse of some
private matter. Americans engage in
private matters in the privacy of their
backyards and homes without feeling the

reed to build opaque domes and to shutter

10

Windows because the risk of Peeping Toms

is so minimal that Americans generally do
not live in paranoid fear of such
intrusions. There is a big difference,
however, between Peeping Toms and the
government. See e.g. United States v.
Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252,1256-1257 (D.Haw.
1976).

Recently, the government has
launched a war called the Campaign Against
Marijuana Planting (CAMP) against
thousands of innocent Americans in an

effort to curtail marijuana cultivation.

In National Organization for Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.Supp. 945

(D.C.Cal. 1985), the court recounted

numerous incidents where federal and state
personnel used helicopters to look into
persons' homes and curtilages, and to

chase innocent people into the woods or

| en Yoel

e

——%

11

frighten them. Id. at 950-951,955-56.
Marilyn Beckworth, for example, was
"continually buzzed" by a helicopter while
taking her outdoor shower. Id. at 955.
Allison Osborne testified that occupants
of a law enforcement helicopter flew about
fifty feet above the ground right outside
her home and made obscene gestures at her
seven year old daughter. Id. She said it
felt like Vietnam as the "leaves from the
trees are blowing down on your head and
the children are kind of hanging on to you
because it feels like you'll be gusted
away."" Id. at 956. A CAMP helicopter
blew the toilet paper from Charles Keyes
reach as he was using his outhouse. Mr.
Keyes and his five year old son Arthur
left their property in fear of their
safety. Id. at 955.

The court summariz2d the

/

12

unbelievable conduct of the government as
follows:

"Rather, the
uncontradicted evidence shows
regular intrusions into the
areas immediately surrounding
the home. These helicopters
are no longer just surveying
open fields, but are
deliberately looking into and
invading peoples' homes and
curtilage. Moreover, this
prying is not limited to an
occasional, casual peek during
an overflight to a raid site,
but is accomplished through
sustained and repeated
buzzings, hoverings, and dive
bombings that at best disturb,
and at worst terrorize, the
hapless residents below.

It is not just the
highly disruptive character of
low helicopter flights that
distinguishes them from the
common airplane overflights
that we are all accustomed to,
but also the degree of their
intrusiveness into "the
privacies" of life; an airplane
can see far less than a
helicopter that is hovering
outside a bedroom window or
over an open outhouse or
shower. This case demonstrates
how the unique versatility of
helicopters renders them at

13

once an effective law
enforcement tool and an

unprecedented threat to civil
liberties."
Id. at 957.
Under the state's theory,
however, an aerial search is a
"non-search"; it is only a search if the
police land the helicopter on one's home
or in one's backyard. This doublespeak
harkens back to Orwell. When a search is
no longer really a search; when a
helicopter hovering at one's bedroom
window is not a violation of one's
privacy; when intentional aerial
surveillance of one's home and curtilage
is no longer an intrusion, then words
become meaningless and Americans' lack of
respect for law and justice sinks deeper.
If Americans’ sub jective

expectation of privacy in their homes and

14

curtilages is unreasonable as applied to

visual spying, Americans will not be able
to engage in any private, intimate matter
in any place in the world except behind
closed doors and shuttered windows.
Americans do not reasonably expect privacy
in their backyards because they are all
growing marijuana. There are hundreds of
activities people enjoy doing in their
backyard, in part because they believe
they have privacy. Such activities
include playing with one's children,
having a talk with one's son, showing 3
affection to one's spouse, or having
friends over for a barbeque.

Simply imagine a police agent's
head hanging over a backyard fence, or
perched in a tree in an open field, or
sticking out of a hovering helicopter or a

circling plane watching a teenage

15

daughter's birthday pool party. Would it
be reasonable if her father believed the
police officer was invading his family's
privacy even though the agent had not
physically entered his backyard and began
swimming and dancing with his daughter and
her friends? Would it be reasonable for
her mother to tell the police officer to
leave them alone--that her daughter and
her friends felt inhibited so long as the
police officer watched. Yet, the officer
would have as much reason to watch this
birthday party for possible crime as to
survey every American's backyard garden
for marijuana. Young people have been
known unlawfully to drink alcohol, use
drugs or engage in sex at parties at least
as frequently as the average American
grows marijuana in his backyard.

The state, however, does not

16

discuss teenage birthday parties. Instead,
the state argues the crime of growing
marijuana in one's backyard is so terrible
that all Americans ought to be willing to
give up their right to privacy anywhere
the sun can shine. The real issue is
whether it is reasonabie for Americans to
expect privacy at their childrens'
backyard birthday parties or weddings, or
in their bedrooms. In short, a visual
invasion into the privacy of one's home or
curtilage is not different enough from a
physical intrusion to justify less than
full Fourth Amendment protection:

probable cause and a search warrant.

The state's concern the police
will have difficulty not looking into
Americans' curtilages or homes, while
freely looking into open fields, is

misdirected. This Court recognized the

—— 5

17

courts and the police are capable of
distinguishing between open fields and

curtilages. Oliver v. United States,

supra, 466 U.S. at__, 80 L.Ed.2d at 226
n.12. There is no showing--nor could
there be--that police patrols in planes
have a difficult time distinguishing
between a home and its curtilage and an
open field. Any person with eyesight good
enough to qualify to fly a plane, can
distinguish between a home and an open
field. In California, the CAMP operation
is presently under court order to keep
helicopters and planes at least 500 feet

away from all homes. National

Organization for the Reform of Marijuana

Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.Supp. 945,965-66
(D.C.Cal. 1985). Only intentional

intrusions are enjoined. Id. at 965 n.17.

It is imperative to distinguish

18

between an intentional visual intrusion
into a home, and an inadvertent view. The
state's intentional invasion into
Americans' last bastion of privacy is
necessarily different from a casual glance
of a passerby or the casual sightings of
plane passengers. Intentional police
surveillance has the potential of cowering
the populace and suppressing the vitality

and joy of life of a nation.

II

IF THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE, FOR A BRIEF TIME, INTO
THE CURTILAGE IS NOT A FULL-FLEDGED
SEARCH, IT IS AT LEAST AS SIGNIFICANT
AN INTRUSION AS A BRIEF STOP, THUS
REQUIRING PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION

Amicus agrees with the state

that it is significant the police took to

19

the air in this case "following a report
of suspicious activity." (Brief of
Petitioner at 19). Random, general aerial
searches of everyone's home without a
warrant are far more objectionable than
the aerial surveillance of a particular
person's home for which the police have
founded suspicion of a crime. If this
Court does not believe this particular
plane search to be a full-fledged search
requiring probable cause, it is at least
as intrusive as a brief stop on the
street--requiring particularized

suspicion. See, e.g., United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,16 (1968). Many

of the aerial searches upheld by lower
courts involve some amount of
particularized suspicion rather than

general, systematic surveillance of

20

everyone. See, e.g-., United States vy.

Marbury, 732 F.2d 390,398-399 (5th Cir.,
1984); United States v. Allen, 6/75 F.2d

1373,1381 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied
454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v.

DeBacker, 493 F.Supp. 1078,1081 (W.D.

Mich. 1980); State v. Rogers, 673 P.2d

142,144 (N.M.App. 1983).

A generalized suspicion that
some persons in a certain county are
growing marijuana, however, does not
justify the wholesale invasion of
everyone's privacy who lives within the

county. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47

(1979) (being present in a high crime area
with a great deal of drug traffic is not a
sufficiently suspicious circumstance to
justify the momentary stop of a particular
individual and to request identification

from him.) Moreover, unless this Court

21

requires at least a standard of founded
suspicion, "by only modest logical
extension, legitimacy [will be] conferred
on 'random' enhanced viewing of a whole
neighborhood of unfenced yards from a
government satellite in geosynchronous
orbit." (Brief of Petitioner at 43 n.16).

A minimal standard of founded
suspicion is essential to prevent the
state from enjoying an unfettered right to
spy upon Americans twenty-four hours a day
for weeks at a time so long as the police
hide in the open fields or woods, or use
high-flying planes, rather than openly
enter backyards where they would be

visible. See United States v. Lace, 669

F.2d 46,57 (2d Cir. 1982). (Court upheld
three weeks of warrantless 24-hour
surveillance by camouflaged police

officers peering through telescopes from

22

the wooded fields).

If Americans have no reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance into their homes and
curtilages, then it would be lawful for
the state to photograph bedrooms through
skylight windows in the roof, or use
X-rays to penetrate a curtained window or
a solid roof. It would simply be
unreasonable, however, to force
law-abiding Americans interested in
preserving their privacy to line the
walls, windows and roofs of their homes
with a substance impenetrable to X-rays or
to build an opaque dome over their
curtilages.

In establishing a clear,
bright-line rule in this difficult Fourth

Amendment area, see New York v. Belton,

453 U.S. 454, 458-459 (1981), the

23

well-understood standard of founded
suspicion is preferable to many of the
standards proposed by the state.

For instance, this Court should
not give constitutional significance to
the type of visual surveillance the state
used in conducting the search. (See Brief
of Petitioner at 13, 20-21). It would
only add further confusion to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to give lower
courts the Herculian task of
distinguishing among the myriad kinds of
ground searches, helicopter searches, the
plane search in this case, plane searches
at 2000 feet with binoculars; U-2 spy
plane searches at 10,000 feet with
sophisticated photographic equipment, cf.
Dow Chemical Company v. United States, 749

F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
td Bicininniy Anti Dba 805: 6.48.3700% ond

24

spy satellites using computers to keep
Americans under 24-hour surveillance. The
impact on Americans' right to privacy is
Similar, no matter where the vantage point
of the state agent, or what the
technological equipment.

This Court should also not
burden lower courts with the need to
decide whether a particular technological
device allowed the state to view an object
that otherwise could only have been seen
by physically intruding into the
curtilage. One can imagine the absurd
lengths the defense and prosecution could
go in trying to prove that an object seen
by the police could not have been seen
from a legal vantage point without the use
of the technological device. (See e.g.

People v. Arno, 90 Cal.App.3d 505,509-512
(1979).

25

The result in this case should
not depend on the location of Ciraolo's
home. The fact Ciraolo's home happened to
be located in a suburban area in close
proximity to a major airport should be
deemed irrelevant. It would make a mess
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to force
lower courts to hold hearings about the
proximity of airports to an American's
home, the absence or presence of air
traffic over a person's land, or whether
the visual search of a home occurred in an
urban in contrast to a remote rural area
of the country. It would also be unfair
to distinguish among Americans in this
arbitrary fashion with respect to the
highly-valued blessings of freedom and
privacy.

It should also be immaterial

that Ciraolo's home and backyard had a

26

fence, but nevertheless, might have been
in view of neighbors, utility workers,
roofers, or children climbing trees. Many
Americans live in homes and spend private
moments in backyards which are more or
less protected from view than Jae
Ciraolo's home. This Court should avoid
establishing a rule of law which would
encourage Americans to build high walls,
moats, opaque domes, or castles. To
distinguish among Ciraolo's suburban home
and a suburban home without a fence; or
one with a high wall and many trees around
it and one without trees; or a rural home
in a remote location protected by dogs and
fences and a rural home hidden in the
woods would only deepen the quagmire of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The issue
is not whether private citizens can spy

upon neighbors, or whether the police can

27

accidentally look into a home; the issue
is the propriety of intentional visual
searches into a curtilage by the state's
police.

It would be unprincipled to
allow the legality of visual searches to
depend upon the type of object seen.
Under this theory, the legality of an
aerial search would depend upon whether an
American used his backyard for sunbathing
as well as for marijuana cultivation.
Fourth Amendment protection has never
depended upon whether the police were
looking only for marijuana and saw only
marijuana. Just as there is no murder
scene exception to the Fourth Amendment,

Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 393-395

(1978), there is no marijuana scene
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Thus,

Ciraolo's fenced suburban backyard should

28

not lose its status as a curtilage because
alot of marijuana was grown in it. It
would cause unimaginable confusion to have
courts define a curtilage on the basis of
the size or number of marijuana plants
grown within it. |

Amicus feels compelled to add a
final word in response to the state's
arguments about the probable impact of
this Court's decision on marijuana
cultivation and use. The state has made
no showing that allowing unfettered aerial
surveillance will have any effect on the
total supply or demand for marijuana.
After Oliver, the state has an unlimited
right to engage in general systomatic
aerial surveillance of 95% of the land
mass of the United States.

Even assuming a few marijuana

plants may escape detection in the

ee

29

curtilages of homes (rather than escape
detection in enclosed greenhouses, or
closets, or foreign countries), the issue
is whether Americans are willing to pay
this minimal price to ensure the state
will not have the unfettered discretion to
watch a pool party, a wedding, a show of
affection or a playful romp with one's
children occurring in one's backyard or
bedroom with the sunshine streaming in

through the window.

CONCLUSION
The Civil Liberties Monitoring
Project respectfully requests this Court
to decide this intentional aerial
intrusion into the sanctity of Ciraolo's
curtilage is a Fourth Amendment search
requiring probable cause and a search

warrant. At a minimun, Amicus believes a

30

standard of founded suspicion for this

kind of search is imperative.

Dated: September 29, 1985

Respectfully submitted,

AMITAI SCHWARTZ *
RICHARD JAY MOLLER
RONALD M. SINOWAY
MELVIN B. PEARLSTON

AMITAI SCHWARTZ
155 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 398-0922
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Civil Liberties Monitoring Project

* Counsel of Record

$<

CERTIFICATE CF SERVICE BY MAIL
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

V.
DANTE CARLO CIRAOLO, No. 84-1513

Respondent.

State of California
City and County of San Francisco me
Amitai Schwartz, a member of the Bar of
the Supreme Court of the United States,
being duly sworn, deposes and states:
That his business address is 155
Montgomery Street, Suite 800 in the City
and County of San Francisco, State of
California; that on October 4,1985 true
copies of the attached Brief for Amicus
Curiae in the above-entitled matter were
served on counsel of record by placing

same in envelopes addressed as follows:

Clerk, United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543

Marshall W. Krause

Krause, Baskin, Shell, Grant, & Bellenttne
Wood Island, Suite 207

60 E. Sir Francis Drake Blvd.

Larkspur, CA 94939

Pamela H. Duncan
Attorney at Law

Post Office Box 98
Santa Cruz, CA 95063

John Van de Kamp

Attorney General of California
Laurence K. Sullivan

Deputy Attorney General

6000 State Building

San Francisco, CA 94102

Clerk of the Court
California Court of Appeal
First Appellate District
350 McAllister Street

San Francisco, CA 94102

Leo Himmelsbach

District Attorney

70 W. Hedding Street, 5th Fl.
San Jose, CA 95110

Clerk, Santa Clara Superior Court
191 N. First Street
San Jose, CA 95110

Said envelopes were then sealed
and deposited in the United States mail at
San Francisco, California with first class

postage thereon fully prepaid.

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 4th day of October, 1985

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0314%3A15. Public record. Not legal advice.