# Appendix — Anthony Grandison v. Maryland

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 479 U.S. 873

## Text

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE
WILL BE ISSUED.

so. 85-7165

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

ANTHONY GRANDISON, SR.
Petitioner
Vv.
STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

APPENDIX

Ow” 4¥
RECEIVED AM 1986 \ ,)

POLICE DEPARTMENT 8/9118 11) 12) 1,2, 4 He
14/2)§
JU 6
am ae 1986 Nancy L. Cook
A

78,9) 10) 11) 12)1)2 34 i Appellate Advocacy Clinic
S Ui, 3 Washington College of Law
Vall wel NWLP The American University

4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
(262) 885-1500

Counsel for Petitioner

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial j
of the State and district wherein the crime shall ha
been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by iaw, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

uUry
Vv

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United States Constitution, Amendment VIII:

essive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
A

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:

‘ (N)or shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
nor deny to any perscr within the jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, Sec. 412:

§ 412. Punishment for murder.

(a) Designation of degree for court or jury
-- If a person is found guilty of murder, the court of
ury that determined the person's guilt shall state in

he verdict whether the person is guilty of murder in
he first degree or murder in the second degree.

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(b) Penalty for
found guilty of murder

first degree murder.
in the first deg: >

A person
shall be

sentenced either

to death or

to imprisonment for life.

The sentence shall be

imprisonment for

life unless (1)

the State notified the person
days prior to trial that it
of death, and advised the per

in writing at least 30

intended to seek a sentence

son of each aggravating

circumstance upon which it intended to rely, and (2) a
sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413.
(c) Penalty for second degree murder. -- A
person found guilty of murder in the second degree sal}
be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years.
Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, Sec. 413>

§ 413. Sentencing procedure upon finding of guilty of |
firsc degree murder.

. o e Ain au a oo
Separate sentencing proceeding required

If a person is found guilty of murder in the first
degree, and if the State had given the notice required
under Sec. 412(b), a separate sentencing proceeding
shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the
trial has been completed to determine whether he shall
be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life.

(b) Before whom proceeding conducted. -- This
proceeding shall be conducted:

(1) Before the jury that determined the
defendant's guilt; or

2 Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the
proceeding if

(i) The defendant was convicted upon a plea of
guiity;

(ii) The defendant was convicted after a trial
before the court sitting without a jury;

(1) The following type of evidence
in this proceeding:

is admissible

;

(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating
circumstance listed in subsection \g) of this section;

(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating
circumstance listed in subsection (d) of this section
which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to
Section 412(b);

(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions,
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of
such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent
admissible in other sentencing procedures;

i Any presentence investigation report.
However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in
the report is not admissible; and

(v Any other evidence that the court deems of
probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the
defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any
Statements.

(2 The State and the defendant or his counsel ma
present argument for or against the sentence of death

(3) After presentation of the evidence in a
proceeding before a jury, in addition to any other
appropriate instructions permitted by law, the court
shall instruct the jury as to the findings it must make
in order to determine whether the sentence shall be
death or imprisonment for life and the burden of proof
applicable to these findings in accordance with
subsection (f) or subsection (h) of this section.

(a) Consideration of aggravating circumstances
-- In determining the sentence, the court or jury, as
the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating
circumstances exist:

(1 The victim was a law enforcement officer whc
was murdered while in the performance of his duties

(2) The defendant committed the murder at a time
when he was confined in any correctional institution

(3) The defendant committed the murder in
furtherance of an escape or an attempt to escape from
evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or 5
an officer or guard of a correctional institution or »
a law enforcement officer

‘

(4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken
in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt
to kidnap or abduct.

(5) The victim was a child abducted in violation
of § 2 of this article.

(6) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to
an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise
of remuneration to commit the murder.

person to commit the murder and
pursuant to an agreement or cont:
the promise of remuneration.

(7) he defendant engaged or emp]
hh

(8) At the time of the murder
under sentence of death or imprisonment f:

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(9) The defend
of murder in th
incident.

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(e) Definition. -- su
following terms have the meanin
contrary meaning is clearly int
which the term appears:

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(2) The term “correctional institut

any institution for the detention or confinement
persons charged with or convicted of a

Patuxent Institution, any institution f
Or confinement of juveniles charged wit!
as being delinquent, and any hospital in
person was confined pursuant to an order of ac
exercising criminal jurisdiction.

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(3) The term "law enforcement officer” has the
meaning given in § 727 of Article 27. However, as used
the term also includes (i) an officer
lonary status, (ii) a parole and
d (iii) a law enforcement officer
tside of Maryland.

-4-

exist. -- If the court or jury does not find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating
circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in
writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for
life.

(g) Consideration of mitigating circumstances.
-- If the court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that one or more of these aggravating
circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether,
based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the
following mitigating circumstances exist:

1) The defendant has not previously (i) found
ty of a crime of violence, (ii) entered a plea of
ty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of
ence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay
ntry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of
ce. As used in this paragraph, “crime of
" means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping,
manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem,
murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first
or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these
offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony or another crime of violence.

2) The victim was a participant in the
| ndant's conduct or consented to the act which caused
the victim's death.

(3) The defendant acted under substantial dur
domination or provocation of another person, Dut no
substantial as to constitute a complete defense to
pr

(4) The murder was committed while the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance, or
intoxication.

(5S) The youthful age of the defendant at the time
of the crime.

(6 The act of the defendant was not the sole
prox 0 cause of the victim's death.

It is unlikel t

7) ] at the defendant wi
ther criminal act
U )

h l
ity that would constitute a
>

in fur ivi
continuing threat to society.
(8) Any other facts which the jury or the court

specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as

Mitigating circumst@nces in the case.

(h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating
Circumstances. -- (1) If the court or jury finds
one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist
shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the

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4

evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the

aggravating circumstances.

(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumst
do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the
sentence shall be death.

(3) If it finds that the mit
outweigh the aggravating circumstan
shall be imprisonment for life.

ances

(i) Determination to be written and unanimou
The determination of the court or jury shall be in
writing, and, if a jury, shall be unanimous and sh

Signed by the foreman.

(3) t qui in determination. -
determination of the court or Jury shall state,
specifically:

(1) Which, if any, aggravating circumstances
finds to exist;

(2) Which, if any, mitigating circumstances
finds to exist;

3 Whether any mitigating circumstances fou
under subsection (g) Outweigh the aggravating
circumstances found under subsection (4d);

(4) Whether the aggravating circumstances fo
under subsection (d) are not Outweighed by mitigat
circumstances found under subsection (9g); and

(5) The sentence, determined in accordance w

subsection (f) or (h).

(k) Imposition of sentence. -- (l The

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Shall impose the sentence determined by the jury u

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he

Subsection (f£) or (h)

(2) If the jury, within a reasonable time is
able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dism
the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for

(3) If the sentencing proceeding is conducte
before a court without a jury, the court shall imp
the ntence determined under subsection (f) or (h

-6-

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(1) Rules of procedure. -- The Court of Appeals
may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a
sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this
section, including any forms to be used by the court or
jury in making its written findings and determinations
of sentence.

(m) Alternate jurors. -- (1) A judge shall
appoint at least 2 alternate jurors when impaneling a
jury for any proceeding:

r

i) In which the defendant is being tri
crime for which the death penalty may be impo

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(ii) Which is held under the provisions of this

(2) The alternate jurors shall be retained during
the length of the proceedings under such restrictions
and regulations as the judge may impose.

(3) (1) If any juror dies, becomes incapacitated,

or disqualified, or is discharged for any other reason
before the jury begins its deliberations on sentencing,
an alternate juror becomes a juror in the order in which
selected, and serves in all respects as those selected
on the regular trial panel.

(ii) An alternate juror may not replace a juro. whe
is discharged during the actual deliberations of the
; ilt mnocence of the defendant, or on
>

ury on the guilt
he issue of sente

Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 414:

§ 414. Automatic review of death sentences.

(a) Review by Court of Appeals required. --
Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and the judgment
becomes final, the court of Appeals shall review the
sentence on the record.

(b) Transmission of papers to Court of Appeals. --
The clerk of the trial court shall transmit to the Clerk

of the Court of Appeals the entire record and transcript
of the sentencing proceeding within ten days after
receipt of the transcript by the trial court. The clerk
also shall transmit the written findings and

determination of the court or jury and a report prepared
by the trial court. The report shall be in the form of
a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the

Court of Appeals of Maryland and shall include a
recommendation by the trial court as to whether or not

imposition of the sentence of death is justified in the
case.

(c.) Briefs and oral argument. Siakedied t t he murder and he murder = maker +
7 renan? ‘ an sreement , eontract for remiunera?> r
wd 4a . a aQ ec « = | °
> r ra ho ~ cé¢ . remunerati -

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8. At the time of the murder, the defendant wa
under the sentence of death or imprisonment for lif

vos =
y y
- The defendant committed more t} ne ffense
of murder mn the first degree arising t of the same
neiden
incid Be
Yes y

Ge The defendant committed the murder while

~ 7s ttine attempt na t ale tasks. - a bbery, ars ™ ra ‘

in the first degree or sexual offense in the first
degree.

(If one or more of the above are marked “yes,” complete
section II If all of the above are marked "no," do not
complete Sections II and III.)

Based upon the evidence, we unanimously find that
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each of the following mitigating circumstances that
marked “yes” has been proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE
a> Gan ry - a6 as ‘ x
F THE EVIDENCE. Each mitigating circumstance that
not been so proved is marked "no." -

: e ney

l. As used in this paragraph, “crime f vy lence
means abcuctions, arson, escape, kidnapping, mayhem,
murder, robbery, rape in the first or second decree,
sexual offense in the first or second decree,

ca } \- 2 ; un?) ry r a’ r
mansiaughter other than involuntary mansla ter, a
attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use :
nandgun in the commission of a felony or another rime
of violence.

The defendant previously (i) has not been four
guilty of a crime of violence; and (ii has not entere
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of
crime of violence; and (iii has not been granted
nr ha + nm On - ryt nreru af _ Aan n+ - a ; n+ >
probatio Stay fe y of judgme . vant ¢t
sharge f Crime f vy lence.

Yes N

5 Th ,ir ac nar ;einar in he

oe rne victim was a participant in the
Je fendant' condu > . C nsented t the act wh =" Ca
the y —“ftimte dea

Yes y
3. The defendant acted under substantial duress,

ry provocation of another person, but not s
>

constitute a complete defense to the
- eior
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Vec \)
é The mu rde wa mmitted while the capac ‘
> _ ~ + > }

conduct or to conform his c nduct to the requirements of
law was substantitally impaired as a result of mental
incapacity, mental disorder, or emotional disturbance.

Yes Nc

c sae . ? +h eC ’ b
5 The defendant was of a youthful age at the
time of the crime.
’ N
6. The act of the defendant was not the sole«
proximate cause of the victim's death
Voc . "|
uP It is unlikel that the defendant will engags
n further crimina activit that wou constitute a
ntinuing threat t societ
Voc ——_
y
8 Other facts specificall et fort elow
~ tute loa t Jat - circum tar ec
Ye N
‘ ‘ :| necessary
+ 3° ve ~" Secr c TT have hoon marke
. oo > 7,7 T a 3 4 ~ & +he ahr e - Cor +
all fF the at i ‘
= e - > =~ me ere ‘oh an tels TY T
C pi te Section III

Section III

evidence, we un at it has
PREPONDERANCE t the

mstances marked I utweigh
sumstances marked I

DETERMINATION OF SENTENCE

",
‘ Jetermination of sentence either €¢
= me -* r "Death" acc rding t the f wir

were

rr

l If all
"Life Impri
2. If Sect
"Life Impri
3 If Sect
marked “no”
4. If Sect
"Death."
usly determ

of the a
sonment.”

ion III
sonment
ion I

reman

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i a
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r = r
. =

nswers

was completed
”

as comp
er "Dea

was com

Advice of the Judge.

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e shall
time al
shall a

th tha

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ally by

advise
lowed f
lso adv
(1) the

the Co

stayed pending

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ais

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y

and

f Judge

chal]
auwinha a
w i“ s
REPORT
. De fen

any app

prepare

orm:

-APTION

leted and all of the answers
he
pleted and was marked "no"
e t be
: ae oo
Turor 9
oe At +he time ~ = mr -
the defendant of the rig
or the exercise of this
ise a defendant who receive
sentence only will be
urt of Appeals, and (2) t?
a review of the sentence ¢
eal which the defendant ma
After sentence is imposec,
and send to the partie 3

and was marked

I are marked

a

yes

. Sex

o ~mmoow
>
ie?
»
a |
D
n
)

. Reputation in Community
ly Situation and Background
1. Situation at time of offense (describe
n a

defendant's living situation including marital
status and number and age of children
2 Family history (describe family history
including pertinent data about parents and
siblings
H Education
I Work Record
J Prior Criminal Record and Institutional Hist
( st any privsr convictions, Jisy t n, an period f
ncarcerati
k Military Histor
L. Pertinent Physical or Mental Characteristics t
4 st r :
M. Other Significant Data At t Defendant
I! Data Concerning Offense
ry Briefly describe facts of offense (include time,
place, and manner of death; weapon, if any; ther
participants anc nature of participation
B. Was there any evidence that the defendant wa inde:
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of t
f fense If so, describe.
, Did the defendant know the victim pr _ the
€ffoence”
ye N
If so, describe relationshiy
2 Did the pr r relations! W pre tat
the offense? If so, explair
c Did the victim's behavi r na - pr ke ¢t
ffense If so, explain.
E Data Concerning Victim
l. Name
2. Date of Birtt
3 Sex
4. Race
5S. Lenath of time in communit
6. Reputation in communit
F Any Other Significant Data About Of f« é
Ezz. & Plea Entered By Defendant
Not guilty ; guilty ; not g t t ea :
insanity ;
m Mode of Trial
~ yy * 7 ¥
U u!
If there was a jury trial, did defendant eng
the ur select n or my t Tf ,» e©xX
“on

At

'

=

7 2ee
o® ®
~

0
3

Ww
@
2

Name
Address

Appointed or retained (If more than
attorney represented defendant,

and include stage of proceeding at

representation was furnished.)

Pre-Trial Publicity -- Did defendant reques

mistrial or a change of venue on the basis

publicity? If so, explain. Attach copies

motion made and exhibits filed.

Was defendant charged with other offenses
|

of the same incident? If sc

ate whether they were tried at same pr

give disposition.

erning Sentencing Proceeding
aggravating circumstance(s upon w
ed in the pretrial notice.
the proceeding conducted before sam
] before same jury
sentencing proceeding was conducted ¢t
han the trial jury, did the defendant
ection or composition of the jury I
ounsel -- If counsel at sentencing was
trial counsel, give information re
C above
h aggravating and mitigating circum
ed by the evidence?
hich aggravating and mitigating cir
the jur instructed?
tence mposé Lite img nm t
. De **

ation of intention to seek penalt f
ilt/innocence) -- began and ended
rial Motions Disposed Of
cing Proceeding -- began and ended

imposed

endation of Trial Court as to Whether
tence of Death is Justified

py of the Findings and Sentencing C
is case 1 attached t an made a

provide

CERTIFI

7 ce ,€ > ne +h a ‘ | 7 -
I certify that the day of » a9 I sent
at at ae Ttt.t } rc _ ¥ om @ e oe cr en oo nn
copies of this report to counsel for the parties for comment a
have attached any mment made by them to this report.
a “ | eisaaszeaaaaaaaaaaa
JUDGE
Within five days after receipt f the report, the parti¢
may submit to the judge written comment concerning the factual!
accuracy of the report. The udge promptly shall file with tne
lerk f the trial court, and in the cas¢ f a life sentence wit
tho C6 .Y € +b o + ‘ rr » 7 he rer r+ — fina? farm
‘ € € ” I € IT Appeai t l ] al I I P
noting ar changes made, together wit ar somments f the

580 Md $06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

in county where murder Bas comr .
Anthony GRANDISON , though alleged acy of const Ts sob
place in other count)

v=

,
STATE of Maryland 2. Criminal Law © 14 |

Nos. 65 & 108, Sept. Term. 1984 Defendant, who wa argec *
Court of Appeals of Maryland

jection & venur of murder count Dy fa
‘ "

Aon } ) Qe 7 at tris

3. Conapiracs &4

Defendant was convitec f firsid
Conspirator »
gree murder, conspiracy & mr murocr P .
¢ ‘ ar nature 4
and use of handgun in commission of cmme 2 . P .
le ‘ -
f violence by We Ur Court. Somer:
ie - , a
Lounty J L vad Simpkin and he a
a? yh P ever r 7 r "
peaiec The Court f Appea A r
are cone pursua be
held that. (1) conspiracy charge Was pr
purpose ra
erly venued in county where murders were
ommitted (2 murder and hancgur 4. Criminal Las & 59
~harges were propery yrenuec r “ a
where murders were comr ugh ce as rl
‘ _. . >
fendant was guilty urde sole f~ t . " n
virtue of having entered inl conspira act. a
ther county. (3) dema! of defendants re nals

juest for further removal, Dasec On exter

a
sive publicity surrounding case. was ©
. i‘irimina | * «
abuse of discret mn where case ha pre ’ ns
Mur “
yusly been removed fron u wher :
or r ¢ “
murders were mmittec 4) refusal wu , .
defendar reque ndividua . ve .
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a
= 6 Cnr 4 a» ‘
ara
t “
eice
severa f
Ua 1
he re Py
a: xing
eff«
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w a
2: (onspirac’ > 46
ar er a
e WwW sé ; - ar
au na prux .
®& Criminal Law ¢
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r as

3ERIES

here murder was committed
zed acta of conspiracy Urn
r count)

Lae @145

nt

t who was charged with cor
urder and murder, waived ob
we of murder count by fail

iv
ra
y &i!
lor iS responsiblt for logica
ronsequences of acts comn
conspirators even tor hor
4 outside of b presence @
er contemplatec wher @
irsuance of common desig .
mspiracy
Las 595
er ura’ 4 .
ralor m con
y ulpable with perpetra
Dability exle
and Wwica e
ae 110
r agains def -
5 mn o where -
sgh Getendgar “a a
f
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pr
ae 6? j
exer
r Gefenda
_ grat Z y >
>| ‘ nag ’
Jelenda aga
‘ ar eff
io
t consp rawr ‘ r
re eariyv relevant af al
r >

VDetenca “ : ec
2 rn mor ¢ acre ' { ,
\a ; ul hereatter re ¢
‘ nr i “a y e@xar J + a a
ne - be preser “a ¥ ive

relu c A suodrr w exar a
hat ne r ater ooje hat ne wa
r give sul t opportur d€
rau go au neevde for
erur pit Vid Rules *
1s Criminal Las o5-+.10"
\" ‘ ,

581

tris! within 180 days after earlher of afr
pearance of defense counsel or first ap

pearance of defendant, only addre ascd

ation where case was set and ultima

tned in single circuit court and did

apply when case wa removed or def

ant's request other county

16. Criminal Las © 577.9

al case. © a mot re
4, 4 4 requ shar
7 - oO for tr with ™ |
me a s receive r ‘
Va f ~ 4 Cod Py art
iT Criminal Law @&> »
r 3 a “i as t* r
wa re uu her
, with wi) ac { ‘
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wa}
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, ’ requimng th3 2 "|
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in Criminal Law &!--
é r a ase allege x le
7 y mur pr
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6 Crmina La‘ ee
- , he gt nal t
aiece Priv et r curr
edce NPOSe was f al
- wher jefenda had r —
r relU e af wher corm rece
a aamor r agai’ ext ire
Vd R € $ e 4
ode ouru and Judicia Procet
» ]
0. Criminal Law & eo
4 { defenda re é r

er r sut Lanta mpair perf rma ‘ f
their dutie
’
24. Jury & lf .

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Fet a - r r

b } -

) ry ~ , iene
cau a U r ave lu if
and as fendarnt sed ir ner
anc 0 Getenda S alege nv eme \

drug trafficking. was not abuse of discre
tion, thoug?t bewng

cuted for murder and not drug traffickir

defendant was prose
R
where jurors indicated that they »

make Gecisior. based on evidence and law

25. Homicide €°334(1
In murder prosecution. allowing v

ums wife to tecufy about her relavionshir

with husband war at harmle error
gover. overwheiming e ence defer
. gvilt
4 gv

26. Criminal Law ©4381), 1153) 1
Adr ™ 7 oP . .

806 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

court, whose determination wil! not be d
turbed unless plainly arbitrary

77. Criminal Law € 4385) 4
In murder prosecution. tna! court

cision w admit photographs of victirr *u

not abuse of discretion. where phowyra)

were mere graphic representations of ur

+ vid

disputed fa \ alread evicer

2%. Criminal Law C10123

for ubyect party objecting will be b
those grour 2 - rdinar
dons eae, te yr

fied

29. Criminal Law ©1043

Defendar failed preserve ¢
Ww reicvancy | erla ri T -
r ‘ raise 4 r ¥u
hearta nature f ll
30. Conspiracy 4

In prosecution for pit
Ger. @stuumony of weun wile tha 7
spiralor acted in manner suppor
fendar wo fr ghte nerse 2
from testifying at pnor pr
fenda va re evar “
31. Criminal Law 404: 2

k “wat adr ~~ “
re £ _ { na a . -
ga nice
ahere Weal- exter
“a * * * .
where BW LNe suf nal sr na

32. Criminal Law 43

Display of enlarged letter u —
not have prejudicial effect of overer
ing single piece of evidence. where enlar;

ment was exact copy of omgina!l. and w!

eniargement Was emmy ec Ww Gemor r

33. Cominal Law 1

_RIES GRANDISON +. STATE Md 583
Cite as 506 ADd SOD (Md 1986)

determination will not be dis of coconspirator are admissible as excep 40. Criminal Law €=666'/;

}
plainly arbitrary ion Ww hearsay rule, as long as conspiracy Tral court's decision, refusing w allow
Law @4305) is established at some time during tna! defendant's request for direct. pretna! ex

amination of coconspirator. was not abu
of discretion, where both defendant ar
coconspirator were in custody and cor

calls with conspirators provided ample indé sidered extremely dangerous, where dé
pendent evidence of existence of conspir

prosecution. tna! court's ds 34. Criminal Laws @ 4727/5)

photographs of victuums wa

Defendant's letter, visit. and phone
mscretion. where pholoyray)!

aphic representations of ur

fendant had ample opportunity, pnor to b
already m eviden | Pr 5

4 that in proseculor for conspira request, & ascertain tenor of coconsp:r
ae C1019 ind murder. declaratior f defendant , tor lestimor and wher tma! cour
fw grounds are delines rator were adn t as except io while not allowing defendant to participa
ePly Objectling w ta Pe euros rule mn mlerview. did allow interview Ww be c
and w ordinariis ducted through defendar wand
4 , 45. Homicide 166: 4
t Waived gr ! r . ‘
Ev ide het defends had bes
} 1. Cnminal « 1036.2
hary: with other cnmes was adr : 4 n al La 1
- ~~ = P . ; » . " .
A 104313 mn ppenetunion tee Gane of titnemnes wt Defendant failed Ww preserve e*
f a } ‘ ’ ne tk .
tae \&) preserve - i have testified at poor enmina! pr Oo tna ourt s ru Nn 4 ra
7 ,
rt ‘ er fae a , te
Corts “ “ ‘ R how th Jefendant had nr were called as w e é jet ‘
raised at ur * — 4 sla “ 1 te a “Me t r #3
, ‘
le r . hirr r 4ifurd plea. where defe
e 16 Criminal Law i192 made no proffer of wha f rs
c&j5 ,
for r r l mur r pr A e “ r e
' , a a r
f ‘ fficer that vicun would hare ide
etim 's , ; 3 —
wieu wile tha - $2. Criminal Law 539: 1
: tified defendant as party t nrelated of
mar Fr sun ‘ 34 Da | 4
anne Upportive T be adn ble a ster roceeding
: . P " ’ nadmuissible hearsa wher
gn herself ano \ - former te mor mu Nave ¢ give
’ ex.(\fa >| aleme wer
a: prior prose “ ¢ inger oath. al proces £ ‘
" " ‘ boi emmatt? >
P nt n 7 ‘ ‘ ‘ u F ; ma
‘se Ww Snow OS la a ne sSarme 4 a J
how th Jefe ant } _——
ase @ 4042 . proceeding tnere mu na as res
= .
dey " ; a
3 t a ¥ alm r =
hat alleged } (Criminal! Law 116¢.2'] :
> defe , . -
ar le Te “ " .
“eam | r i ; as - .
f . 7 = a a .
£ Tie tha she ha fend “wacr reversible error
give similar weap 43. Criminal Law @=544. 54
. . eu}
38 Criminal Law ©666'A. 1153/1 - P ,
na r ré “ t adr + r
C cpeumctar nder which defenda: ; ‘ :
a 133 4 =i € ) 4 4 sa gra’ um te rr . 2
r Ju pretr nuernie. I pr = roinct tat not fa ret
arged letter u urors d 7 , = . , aga Olav Wa I abuse Gis e
“ e witne are matters Dest ieIt Wl Wia . — . . 4 7 ear
al effect of overempha . as lest y wa Hlained dumng 4
r ; retior nd t —
J Giscretio ano Una: court § deci 7 . =~ f ie@atineg he
f evidence. where er arge ¢ exploratory phase oF invesuga “
> A } f P thar
“ be reversed only for abuse of tha ¢ ate not ¢f nared
“Op of ongina and where federa’ attorneys were prepared
3 re r 4 '
*| t . . - “onst tor ; -
emploved to demonstrat« i cross| n apt 4

584 Md 606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

not serve ax basis for admission of tran
script of declarant’s federal grand jury te:
tuumon)

45. Criminal! Law @°594(3)

Tria! court's decision, not & allow cor

tunuance so thai defendant could attempt lo

secure presence of rebuttal witness, was
net abuse of discrevior where witness
presence coulic nol be guaranteed Dy Ge
fendant. and where 2s was Otherw
ready for tna
46. Criminal Law @700

In murder prosecution, defendant wa
not entitled, pmor wu being sentler
death. to stauistics as & frequer “
which state sought death penalty for de
fendants charged with murder
47. Homicide 354

Fact that defendant ha red
individual to commit Murder Was agrress
ing circumstance wi r mn murder pr
uor just fied im positior if deat pena
Code 1957, Art. 27. § 4
48. Homicide 354

Death pena!t which was imposec a!
ter defendant was convicted of ntracting
for murder of state witne
vestif aga r é r
croceed:ng. 7 ‘
Du 4 .
nour? defe 4 4 re
conviction for rime f ence. @
thoug? he Was Tf 1s ' pr ximale cause
killing
49. Criminal Law 641.415

Sentencing was not separate proceed

ing from crimina] tnal. such thal defend

ant. who had knowingly and wmteligent
waived right w counse! at tna yu
thereafter insist that attorney handle fh
sentencing US.C.A. ConstAmenc ¢

56. Criminal Lae 641.711

Md Rule 723. which mandates that tna

court readvise defendant of mgt
sel at every separate proceecing a r
reouire reacvisement “here jete na

affirmauvely waived nght wo counse

5}. Constitutional Law 295
Homicide 351
Amendment to Code 1957, Am 4
§ 124, allownng court to consider evider
of impact of murder on victim's family and
not just on vicum as part of sentencing

decision. did not change quantum of pur
ishment attaching to crime of murdcr

that it did not constitute ea post facto law
LSC A Cor An Lh
uon of Rights. Am 14

52. Homicide 354

r rr -
nvicle ra . 5
“ou have to fu r '
n a hough r ece r a
r Tr gating r nm a s
Art Zz & 4 ra

F 4 s* defe 3 ”
£ p ner ar a
r Ging e e e the lance “
found mow! fF a ated &
fendar Cc r fia
anc Geta ¢ reiau r
suct a “ be near ‘ dé
pena 4 ahere n harge aga
ele wes ase » ‘ “
“A a a r ‘
4 »
54. Conspiracy 2s
(166: 4
4 jefenda Na bee
F her ar

e Wa substance “ue
room associated with de
co ule nflammator
ence .of unrelated cnme
Oe aan . r deat

ased on k ng fw ‘
4 nave { als ,
( ae
r ré r
urce ar 4
J é
f ahether é
r r pa r
79
a ra A

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 585
Cie as 988 4.34 908 (hd = 1OR8)

when hired killer mistakingly killed wrong
pan

57. Criminal Law ©1035)

Defendant. who never requested that
juror be removed for miaconduct, could nf
argue on appeal that tna! judge should
have removed juror sua sponte

58. Criminal Law 10359)

Defendant, who at no time objected &
trial court's statement, as part of evidentia
ry ruling, that there was evidence to su;
port conspiracy could not raise coun
comment as ground for reversa! of con
uon where tna! judge had already advise
jury Uvat his lega) ruisr shouic fr

taken W indcicay

59. Criminal Law 113711

Defendar wh acquiesce n tna
uri Ge f wa “ fur D rele
hmer rece r
r r urge de n as a grou
reversa

69. Homicide 354

ra Wie defendar nad murdere
re War € party cor ule ig yra\a
rcum a | ‘ re é r r
‘a4 u ore aah
rator def. bir .
a (
mr murder. as well a ale
f other witnesses showing that defendar
hac talked with conspirators on var
ycasions Code 1957, Art 27, § 413id®"

62. Criminal Law 795

No mstrucuion on effect of deadio
was required where jury. in prosecutor
murder which extended over many da
reached verdict Ww one anc one quar

b

63. Homicide © 17

Defendant. who contractec »

party for murder of state witne
wraile ¢ mur
reialec prosecu was FV
cur f Ta ferre ‘

64. Homicide 354

Imposition of death penalty was aul!
nzed, though defendant was guilty of mur
der only ax accessory and not as pmncipa
in first degree, where defendant had en
ploved another person to commit murder

Code 1957. Art 27. § 4)3idW7), tex

Ne L Cook. A gne Py Ly
er Washing [ for appella
leterah K Chasanow A 4
ul e mh Sach A r
Balu re. fur appe''t

rgued before MURPH ,
MITH ELDRIDGE = =}

H and McA rre

( CH, Judge

T apjt ie 4 r
was cl.arged in Baltimore ( -
spirac. tw murcer > a ner r
r { .~
now 3 “usan -& ‘ a
handzun in the comr acr

, rand ha F > ,

£ ar he sut 7 é
- 4 -

4 a

gr | ‘re r 4 a
r P gr ° -
error we shal) affurn

With respect to the under g fa §

“@s w We narge aga Uranc
we recently recited ther in Eren pecia Appes Bo
n wt he as “
c ha he came & ans e
an ° nm having i 4 PY,
¢ a defencar we ai
2 & sugee
. e oat? e

“nr —-

588 Md

State, 6 Md.App. 623, 262 A.2d 290 (1969)
applied the holding of Laevers. In Boddu
the appellants were @ the State of Mary
land when the overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy to rob occurred. However
the illega! agreement mm that case seeming
ty took place outside of the territona! Lmits
of the state. Nonetheless, the court held if
the evidence could sustain a finding that a
conspiracy existed, the conspirators could
be punished in Maryland Boddie. 6 Md
App at 529. 252 A2d at 293. The rule uw
m sceord with. and indeed follows from
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
In Hyde v. United States, 25 US Mi. 32
SC. 793, 56 LEd 1114 (1912), the Coun
was considering whether venue wm a cor
spiracy case under § 5440 Rev Stat (190)
properly hes in the state or distrnct where

Uhe conspiracy was entered inw or ar

State or district where an overt act in fur
therance of the conspiracy was performed
In its analysis, the Court stated “thal a
conspiracy iS not necessanly the concepuor
and purpose of the moment, but may h&
conunuing Id. at 363, 32 S.Ct at 800, &
LEd at 1124
conspirators act there they “renes. or per
haps. to speak more properly, Wey conor
ue, they agreement. and Us agreement u

Moreover. wherever Ue

'

renewed or continued as to al) whenever
any one of them does an act wm furtherar

of they common desig ld at & .
SCr. at 801, 56 LEd@ at 1125 tquoung
Rotinson v. United States, 172 Fed. 10
(8th Cir.1909)); accord United States 1
Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 3) S.Cu 124, 126
54 L.Ed. 1168 (U.S.N.Y. 1910); see United
States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084. 1080 (Vu

2 ht is clear from the wanuript of February 2°
1984 that Grandison soughi only to dismins
Count Il] (conspiracy) of the wdiciment o0 Ue
basis Uval venue was umprope:

5. Marviand Rule 885 prowdes
“Rule 685 Scope 6f Rewew—Limiiad 0 Ques
mons Decdaed by Circ! Court
Thus Court wil) aot ordinarily decide any
pon! or question wtuch does oo! plainly ap

pear by ue record to have been wed and

decided by the carcuit coum but when a pou
or question of law had been presenied Une

606 ATLANTIC REPORTER, t¢ SERIES

Cir.1983), see generally 1 F Wharton
Criminal Lew § 14 (14th ed. 1978)

We note that, though the Count m Hyd
was analyzing @ statute which required a!
legation and proof of an overt act. it st!
accepted the charactenzation of a conspir
acy as “continuing” and “ongoing” See
Mayo, 721 F.2d at 1090. Such s character
wabon convinces us that the rule expressed
in Lievers and applied in Boddic & sound

Accordingly, appellant's argument m
fail. Since the murders occurred in Ba
more County and were a contemplated re
sult of an ongoing, continuing scheme
which appellant was coauthor, venue for
the conspiracy count was proper in Ba

more County

(B
Grandson next attempts Ww specifica
challenge venue for the murder and har
gun counts as being improperly set ir. Ba
more County He argues that since he wa

indicted and prosecuted outside the count

in which the acts he committed occurred
Balumors t the indictment charming
him as an accessory before the fact

murder a f a handgun volation should

have been dismissed

12) The short answer & apre!ar
venuor | hat venue for e W.lrde’ &
handgur counts Was never Ccha.«nge
the tna! court.*? Thus. wt argument 4a

waived Md Rule 885.? McBurney
State, 20 Md. 21, 32-33. 371 A.2d 129
135-36 (1977)

However, considering the nature of —«
proceedings before us, we entertain app

court and a decision of thal poi! or quest

of law by thus Court is necessary oF Gewradic
for the guidance of the ciurcwi court. oF
avord the expense and delay of anouner appes
to this Court, the point or quesion of law ma
be decnded by this Court even though it was
not decided by the circwt court Wher
dicvion cannot be conferred on Uys Court b
waiver or consent of the parties 4 question a
to the pumadiction of the circun cour may
raned and decided in us Cour ehethe

not ransed and decided in the cir oun

¢ generally 1 F. Wharton,

w § 14 (4th ed. 1978)

at, though the Court in Mydr

+ @ statute which required a)
proof of an overt act, it stl!
charactenzation of a conspir
nuing” and “ongoing.” See
‘d at 1090. Such a character
ces us that the rule expressed
i applied in Boddic w sound

appellant's argument mu*'
e murders occurred in Balt
and were a contemplated re
going, conUnuing scheme of
was coauthor venue fur

count was proper in Balt

(B)

ext attempu: w specifica
ye for the murder and har
being improperly set in Ba!
He argues that since he ¥a
rosecuted outside the count
acts he’ committed occurred
y. the indictment charpne
cessory before the fact u
a handgun violation shou'c
nissed

wl answer Wo appellant sc
venue for the murder ar
us was never challengec
Thus. this argumer.
Rule 885.2 McBurney

21. 32-33. 37) A.2ad

eG i«

nsidering the nature of Ux
fore us, we entertain appt

jecision of thal point or ques!

s Court is necessary or desrabic
ance of the circuit court, or \
ense and delay of another appes
the point or question of law may
y this Court even though it was
w the carcwit coun When jurs
t be conferred on this Cour >
vem of the partes. @ question a)
cuen of the crrcuit court may be
ecided on this Court. whether or
i decided in the circull coun

GRANDIBON +. STATE Md 589
Cire we 808 Ad 8 (ea ee

lant's argument but are compelled to sum
marily dismiss & as being without ment

{3) It wa generally recognized principle
that where the exittence of a conspiracy &+
established, the law imposes upon & con
spirator full responsibility for the logical!
and natural consequences of acta commit
ted by bis fellow conspirators if such acts
are done in pursuance of the common de
cign or purpose of the conspiracy See
is Wenzel. 31) F 2d 164 (4th Cir 1962)

l ‘rerio State 272 Md 607, 63) 32°
A 2d Kin, RY2 (1474) tembezziement) Ac
cord Comm nucalth Thomas, 410 Pa
160. #4 Add 255 258. cert denied. 31

c ate ag Ct 12%. 1) L.Ed.2d 83 (1960
Such responsi! - yttaches even thoug!

the conspirator Was not physically present
when the acts were committed by his fel
ow conspiralrs and would extend even U
» homicide whic a contingency of a
natufe! execution of the conspiracy, ever
though such homicide 15 not specifically
contemplated by the parties See Ureolo
7712 Md

Thomas, 189 A.2d at 258. See ge nerally, }
F. Wharton, supra: 2) AmJur.2d §§ 386
gy (196°

at 633, 325 A.2d at R92 accord

(4) This rule rests on Un underlying

principie that one who encourages. aids
abet, or assists Ure active perpetrator ir
he comin of wv fer is a FV I
r " a ? eve f the law
jus 2 “ ut re wl dm ,
3 Ss. ec. Ureiolo, 272 Md 60°. Je

4 24 878%. accord Bloomer | State, 48 Md
59) (1878: see Ex Parte Williams, 383
So 2d 564. 565 (Ala). cert denied. 449 US
99s, 10] S Ct. 334. 66 LEd.2d 293 (1980)
And this enminal accountability extends to
the proximate. natura! and logical! conse
quences of the conspiracy Williams, 383
So.2d at 565. It follows that the law looks
upon such a conspirator as an actual partuc
ipant im the contemplated offense In
short. the act of the co-conspirators in the
case at bar was the act of Grandison

{5] The determination of venue in the
instant case must rely Upon this theory of

viearoes cnmina! respoosibilty which
arises out of the exstence of the conspir
acy The conspiracy which Grandisor
took part had as its gos! and sole objective
the homeides of two vicume As & co-con
apirator, Grandison became criminally re
sponsible for the acl of his fellow conepir
ators, acta which were committed in Balt
more County. Since the record reveal:
that in this conspiracy Grandison played #
principal role he is subject to venue at u

situs of the enmmeé According!

view had the issue been proper’) al

would be without meri

Hl
Seperate Trals as & Count

Grandson also asserts that the charg
of conspuracy and handgun violatwn wert
improperly uned in Somerset Counts i
yuncucr with the murder charge

Appellant was charged in a four coun’
indicument with the murders of Scott Px
chowicz and Susan Kenned). conspire
murder Seott and Chery! Prechowicz. af
use of a handgun in the commussior of a
enme of violence. He sought remove
the case for una! without reference
count: Subsequently, he moved to seps
rate the tral of the conspiracy count fror

the tra! of all other count Appelar
argued that he intendec & tare the witre
stanc ©. his Owe defer s¢ WH Pes}«

the corspirac’ charge Ov wuhed U fete
silent with respect & the murocr charge

After the proceedings were ren vec
Somerset County, the movor for separa
trials was denied. We perceive no error u
the denial of appellant s mowvor

{6} It is uncontroverted that the de
sion as to whether to grant @ severance is
within the sound discrevon of the tna
cour. Stevenson v State 43 Md. Apr
120. 190, 403 A.2d 812, 81 (1979), affad
ORT Md 304, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980). State:
Jones. BA Md 232. Be 395 A.2d l)t-
1185 (1979). The tna! court, # exercising
its discrebon, & required balance Ue
likely preyudice to the accused against Ue

590 Me

possible effects on economy and efficiency
in judicial) administreuon. McKnight &
State, 230 Md. 604, 609-10, 375 A2d 55)
555 (1977)

{7} Moreover, we note that in considdr
ing a charge of conspiracy. the overt acts
of the conspirators in the commission of
the crime are clearly relevant and matena
to the proof of the conspiracy. See Jones
vr. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 379-80, 259 A.20
807. 813 (1969), Aall + State. 23) Md 45%
461. 190 A 2d 795, 79 }964 It follows
that in the case at bar. evidence of Une
homicides and surrounding circumstances
is relevant and matena! Ww the conspiracy)
which in the first instance contemplated
and directed their commission The hor

cides at wsue here are Clear!
‘

reiatec Ww Un
conspiracy

(8) Additionally, abser

contrary. it would bh

t authority Ww the
foolhardy and pur

ul

poseless to require as of nght two tnals

one for a crime committed and one for
commit the

conspiracy w same crime

Green v. State. 25 Md. App. 679, 686, 337
A.24 729. 733 (1975) At tnal. appellant

offered no authority or compelling jusuf
cation for a finding that a severance was
warranted. Only the following wok piace
at the February 27, 19M heanng. in pert

nent part
“THE COURT Thre Mouon for
Separate Trials under Count 1. 2 and 4
] guess what vou re Saying. you re as)
ing that Counts 2 ard 4 be tned and

that Count 3 be tned separate

Counts 1 and 2 are murder, first de
gree murder, and 4 is a handgun viola
tion, and 3 is conspiracy. What you're
saying is that the charges be severed and
that we have two separate trails

AJl right. I'm ready w hear from you
on that. You want w be heard on that
sir’

MR. GRANDISON: Yes, sir. Yes
Your Honor

Appellant does not argue that the conspiracy

under which he ws charged is unrelated to the
homicides committed in furtherance of the con

@27-

$06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

THE COURT. Al! nght. sr

MR. GRANDISON The position or
this motion w Uthat count should be ses
ered because | inund W take the stand
as to Count 3. but not as Count | and
2. which the Stale w seeking Ure deat!

penalty. My position » that if cases are
uned jointly, if | take the stand. then |
would be subject Ww being cross «xamined ’
as © any prnor convicuior that | ma
have 1 fee! that U might be ver
prejudicial to Me as Us those tw
which the Stal b b we
alty

THE COURT Are you saying tha
reason (thuse count r aa Hafele
becuuse—did | understand you & sa
Counts 1] and J vou @ i wa Ww Lake

the stand. but on Count 4 you a
MR GRANI ISON (

spiracy offense J] mtend wu ane

‘ ffor

stand and

THE COURT I see
MR GRANDISON Euta
and 2,1 dor wis! vestif
THE COURT. All ngt And becau

of tha you thin? re ast

Lest

separated that tr
aratec is that r re
VR GR ANI l

oniy reasor } Pie a a fea

MR. GRANDISON. The conspire
fense in this case a distinct offer
from the substantse offense wt
first degree murder charges. | dor
believe it to be true thal evidence hat
would be admissible in the conspira
count would be adrmussibie as wel) in the
first degree murder case

spiracy. Ci. McKmghi +. State, 280 Ma 604. 5
Ald 551 (1977

ERIES

URT. All right, sir

ANDISON The position on

& Unat counts should be sey
« I intend to take the stand
$, but not as to Counts | and
¢ Stale w seeking the death
y position wm that if cases are
if 1 take the stand, then |
byect lo being cross-examined
pror conviction that I may
e! that this might be ver
m™ as W those two count

ate is seeking the death per

RT. Are vou Saving that th:
counts should be separat

1 | understand vou wo sav ir
a 2 you don't want to tak
it on Count 4 vou d
SDISON Count 3» th
nse l intend wo Wake the
stuify, offer testimony

RT 1 see

*DISON: But as w Count
Ol wish Ww testify

tT: All nght. And becaus«
thinh he Case Shouid be
it the counts should be sep
at the only reasor
NDISON That's nv tt

i heave additiona! rea

DHISON Dn -” ‘
nO a0ditiona! reason other

lated

DOISON The conspiracy of
case i a distunct offense
Stantive offense which is
murder charges. 1 don't
« true that evidence that
ussible in the conspiracy

admissible as wel) ir the
urder case

might + State 280 Vd 604 37°

GRANDIBSON +. STATE

Mé 591

(Cave ow Me ADs SaD (had 1088)

| have oo authority righUy before me
t© support that position I think the
w—the law i clear on Uhat as wel! as Unc

rules, that evidence may be admissible in“

& conspiracy. but not be admissible to
substanuve offense

I think that I am entitled to a separate
tral on these two counts. especially in
light of the fact that | have presented to
the Court that | wish to take the stand as
to the conspiracy and not ax wo the firs:
degree murder counts

This is not no ordinary runof-them
case. The State « seeking the deatt
penalty on first count of the indictment
the first two counts of the indictment ]
think the situation would be different
from any other case and | think chat I'm
entitied © &@ Separate tma! on thes«
counts, and | subn

MR GRANDISON Your Honor. of
fer one additional thing To force me
mto a tna! of Count 3 along with the
first two counts in the indictment would
be a—pul me in Une position where |
would have to offer defense for my a
leged codefendant as well, where |
wouldnt be in that position if 1 wa
being tmed separate for both count
But being as the conspiracy count. the
State would allege different things as a
or allegedly commitied by thres
fendants which would force me in &
von to have & deferd the act allegedis

committed by them which | think would

be very prejudicial and no way could |
receive a fair tria! being tried in al! these
counts together

We are unable to find any authonty for
the proposition that a tna! court is required
to grant @ motion for separate trals as a
matter of nght to a criminal defendant
upon an allegation by that defendant that
he wishes to testify on less than al! counts
charged against him. In this case, Grand
son has done little more than express a
generalized desire to testify as to some

S. See supre noice | and accompanying tev

counts but not others He has not md)
cated what he would or would not have
tesufied & and whether such testumon,
would have been of any particular impor
tance We are thus unable w concluds
that appellant has demonstrated compelling
prejudice resulting from denial of the mu
uon for separate tnais when we have leer
given no wdication that tesumonys & &
offered or withheld by ajpeliant had «
value See McAnight, 2h) Md at 60
ho Ald Sol

Therefore. we conclude that Grand
bare allegation proffered in support
motor wit? nothing more under
record before us is no basis for manda’: ;
a severance of tria Sec. e¢. United
States + Corbin. 734 F.2d 643. 644%
Lith Cor 19m4) It follows. then. that there
war no abuse of discretion on the par
the tna! court in denying appeliants rr

von for separate trals

{9} Considering the allegatior that
conspiracy) and handgun counts were ir
properly removed along with the murcer
counts from Baltuumore County in the
mstance, we conclude this argument to

without ment

As Age Simok r “Orrect.\ nol °
ucge . ,
tna You remove the whole cass
part of More particu'ar’s former M
Rule 744° speaks in tern f wransferre
Ne Ca r r f
Fur! n Steven : ‘
App 152. 263 A.2d 36 119TH. the Cour

Special Appeals held that “[Ejven thoug!
[an] indoctment contains other counts wt
charge offenses which are not punisha!
by death. those offenses are carned alors
with the removal of the offense that is or
may be punishable by death. and are a
removed for tna! /d at 162 263 A2c a:
4)

Finally. we note that appellant's ini
movon did not express the intent lo ren
only the murder counts from Balur
County. Indeed. appellant's “Motor. ar
Affidavit for Removal! of Tma!” f t>

ec v

a

> —

692 Md

case Gemanded « removal of appellant's
trai As we have stated herew. 4 was
proper for appellant's enure (rel encom
passing a!) coun which were enumerated
in the Balumore County Grand Jury Indict
ment t© be removed pursuant tw former
Md Rule 744

Therefore, in light of the plain langvage
enunciated in former Md Rule 744 and Si¢
venson, 9 Md App 152 263 A2d 36. we
hold Unat the tna! court did not er
transferring Ube enure pro ceding to Son
erset County

We turn now w the sue of whether th
tia! court erred in refusing u grant app
mants request to file a plea of insar

The request was made on Apmi 25, 1964
the day before tra! was scheduled tu begir
The procedures governing the assert
of the insanity defense at the time of the
Grandison tna! were dictated by sector
12-108 of the 1982 Health—Genera! Aruck
of the Maryland Code and former Maryland
Rule 731.6 The rule and the statute n
be read in conjuncuor Their combined

provisions require the defense of insar

© De interposed uv wrung at the ume the
Ua! Picea mac a pies J »

mad withir sae 424 after ; earlier

of the appearance ‘ eounse r the for

appearance f the defendar before the

court pursuant to former Md Rule 723
This period is automatically extended if a
motion, demand for particulars. or other

aper requiring @ ruling by the court or
' t

6 The provisions § 12-106 of the 196)
Health—General Arucie of the Marviand Code
can mow Ge found wm § |)-iOhax and (2
that article § Marviand Code (1982 1985 Cum
Supp ). Health—Genera’ Ariicle § 12-109 we

1984 Md Laws & The provisions of forme
Mid Rule 73! « are now onuined in Marland
Rule 4 242ia) while forme: Rule 7 b&b ) uw now
Rule 4-242(bK}

The docke: refle > n the fiheen 4

~ Cea
perved trom Ap vue Ar . wae he
UJ “ing \u c were ma t

AD ‘

$06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 4 SERIES

compliance by # party before enternng «
plea w filed Former Md Rule 73) b 2
Such « filing delays the deadline for enter
ing 8 ples anti! fifteen days after the cour
has ruled on the motion /d

Both the statute and the rule provide {
an excepuon t© Ubese Ume constrainu
The court may sccept an insanity plea a
any ume before commencement

fthe wu

upon a showing of “good caus

Appellant posits two theomes ur
which he contends the tna! court si
have accepted hit insanity plea Fir:
asserts Uial i plea War Litre under f

mer Rule 73] b 2 and the court was ther:
fore without discretion u reject it inv
alternative. appellant argues that he mad
an adequate showing of “good cause” a

required by § 10® and former Ruk

Db, hence he was entit'-4 to plead insar
prnor w the commencement of una

110) Appellant's first areument fa
since f motion, Gemand for part ar
or olher paper requinng ruling dy U
court or compliance by a pa ., before er
tering &@ plea Was ruled upon by the cour
in the fifteen day penod preceding his a
tempted entry of the insanity plea* Cons

quentiy. the automatic extension of forn

Rule 731 b 2 does r coms

* ? the aL fe Sar fv Te r fir k
appeara wlor vr r J
19% the fifte Gu\ per junnc «
he had a net © file v : 4
expired long before Apn) 25. 19&4

{11} Thus, Grandison was entitled w e
ler a late plea of insanit yr upon a

showing of “good cause Marviand Co
Re-removal dened Apri! 13. 1984—Defendar
Motion to Withdraw Voluntar w to Othe
wise Disqualify Judge demed Apr! 16 1964
Order to usue subpoens duces tecum Apr é

1984—Order to transier inmate issued Apr ’
1984 Order t© msue subpoena duces tecur
Apr 19 1984—Defendani s M f Cor
ance Gemed Apri 25 1964—rdecr f menia
examination of defendant msued Apr! 24 |) 984
Defendants Renews! of Motion for Cor
ance dened Apr 2¢ 1984—Delendar vi
' ndividusa! \ Dire granie Pe

UES

e party before entering «

ormer Md
uve Ue deadline for enter

fifvween days after Une cour
ld
ie and Ue rule provide for

Uvese

movor

Rule 73)

d2

Ure cons\BiInu

accept an Mmeaennty pies &
commencement of Ue ins
f good caus
tw Uneor v
is the tna! court s
nsanity plea 7.
piea war Uri under |
2 ene the rea re
reuon reje
lant argues Wat he mac
wing of “good cause a
108 and former Rule 7
entitled lo plea ’
mencemer f ww
s fwst argumer :
demand for par P
requiring @ ruling ¢
nee by a party before «
as ruled upon t ne
¥Y pernwd preceding r 2
Ure insanity piea .
matic extension of forn
loew* r come
int made - fr k ‘
re the a
Ga perv jur rr ©€
file the insar . "
re Apr é 19a4
andison was enttied Ww e
of insanity only upon sa
} Cause Maryland Cod
Apr 3. 1984—Defendar
raw Voluntanis or to Uthe
sage Gemeed. April 16. 1984
»poena duces tecum. Apr .
ansier mmmate iasved Apri! 19

“ue subpoena duces tecurr
efendant's Motion for Con
1984—Order for menia

ssued Apri! 26

of Motion for Con

>
fendant
wwe

26. 1984
a) % Dire

Defendar

granied

n

}9R-s
“M

pe

GRANDIBON +. STATE Me 65593

(1982). Health—General Arucle. § 12-108

former Md Rule 73152 Aldinoug? sot &

the content of the maanity plea. we heave
previously hele Ut 6 Statulory require
mer ' good couse ves Wer Uw’ cov
with ewe Guwcrevor Ser Slate Prerer
298 Md 422. 470 A.2d 1269 (194) (ducus
ing “good cause m conler of postpone
ment of tra! date) State r Jones. 770 Me
ne 2 A2d 2) (1973) (analyse of “go
a ; req remer w per ar ’
whores fens sec r ra ta
er We now holt Wie > c-_ a
re remer fs ‘ ar forme r
keer ences r 4 r .
_ a - 7? Tv, a | 5
sete rm™mins - oF : he wutl
- ar «=? we en "ee ,
here wat & ear ar . at ca re
‘v) LX mor wry ;¥v 4
‘ 4 ‘ A? 4 > 4
Beca we fee! tha 6 mph
- “a > re at
re ~ re 7
e - e proflere re de fe ‘
r hearnng de err wm hethe
ea good ca arr g the acce
ance fs iav - a ea s
a . u anuave . ‘ee Na
> eer mfr - * -- 4 2
«> * * . .
atin
r pr de f avr era P
“? » wonca hac ber r ate pur
A aope ar Apr : see TOG
‘ nr arrs proy- f nia 7
ar at 4 ne Apr pw ear
ice Sompkins gave 3 fue: hand a
he even precipitatec Ural
request for a menta’ eva-ve r
; war filed t he defendar
ny r be fore our “a slam Ir
Oer W bare me af ‘ Ty *
w ge hom the etarm ne m UWrat fe
quested in We pies ar give ‘Tr
hear ‘ tra Ne re . . a

contacted «4 peycheve' who w employec
by the Department of Health and Menu
Hygiene. and asted him if he woul’ s
range for s peychwUrx exam

ear kind enoug? & arreng® ha’ @te

na n afer he g ‘ work le nig
He went to the Wicom« Ou
> t io me
wnuon Uenur af be . .
with Mr Grandson He met oh *¥
a a i rar »| _
a —
a ane y ,
Ma “a ” - +
>. ’ “e
4 as } ha re ecte
fuse a o the a e ha
2 a o stance
. hecause ? . ’
te 5 4 7 : .
. . “a _ e*
s ‘\e _ *
s se * . =
ot . ‘ rv
" ge
Ss - have 4
. *a
ta . apre a
‘
exar }
‘ Z " . “
4 ‘ re
* ave Wise ts r ’
es , .
“a ? re :
r omMrTav * r . “
i nave y ‘ rese 2
era a Gever ‘ :
States + Byrrs 740 F2
he ;
a ’ ‘ ‘
45. 4> cer! deni ‘
4 45 wi kA oO 5
‘ 4 6
. Bone 44 F2 :
) , s ‘ f 4)4
"“~ 7 r )969 eer 4
: . w & P t

(1970; United States « Albright, 888 F 2d
719, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1968)

113,14) A defendant s, however, env
ted to the assistance of counse! in deter
mining whether to submit to 8 peychiatric
examination. Fatelle » Smith, 451 US
454, 471, 101 S.Cu 1866, 1877, 68 L.Ed 2d
359, 374 (1981). Since Grandson was act
ing as his own counsel, the only possible
complaint he might have @ that he was
demed assistance of standby counsel! in de
termuning whether to undergo mental eva!
uation. However, the April 25, 198
“Plea” itaelf reflects that thu was not 50
It requests that the court “arrange proper
psychistree examination of Defendant” and
is signed by both the defendant and his
standby counsel. Also, at the April 26u
hearing, standby counsel, acting at the re
quest of the defendant, stated that pror to
the filing of this plea “Mr. Grandison and I
had s considerable discussion about the
fine distinction between competency
stand trial and insanity at the time the
crime was commitied” Thus, it is clear
that the decision to undergo psychiatric
evaluation was made after consultavon
with standby counse! Therefore, there
was po excuse for appellant's subsequent
refusal to proceed with the examunavon
He cannot now complain that he was not
given an opportunity to demonstrate “good
cause” or that the trial court's refusa! of
the insanity plea was m error. The defense
did not demonstrate “good cause” for entry
of the late plea Thus, the trial judge

& Now Md Rule 4271, wtuch provides
Rule 4271. Trial dau
(s) Trial Dare @ Ciraus Court —The date
for wrial ww the carcwt court shall be set withuo
30 days afver the carber of the appearance of
counse! or the first appearance of the defend

Art 27. § 39) prowdes
§ 59). Semng dau fo mal postpon
pen:

(a) Within two weeks after the arrmgoamen!
of @ person accused of » crumnal offense or

$44 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 34 SERIES

property exercued hs decreton @ re
fusing to accept the maanity plea

v

Violation of Former Md Rule 746

Grandson claims that the charges
against him should have been dismussed
because he was not tried within 180 days of
his arraignment and there was no post
ponement for good cause by an adminstra

tive judge pursuant © Maryland Code
(1957, 1982 Rep! Vol, 1985 Cum.Sup;
Art 2, § 591 and former Md Rule 746 *

The record reveals that Grandson was furs!
arraigned in the Circuit Court for Balt

more County on July 19, 1983, thus the 15
days requirement of Rule 746 started &
rup malang January 15, 1984 the expiratior
date before which the case was W be tried
in the Circuit Court for Balumore County
Tria! was initially set for November 1)
1983. but was subsequently postponed unt
January 3. 1984. The case was removed
from the Circuit Court for Baltumore Cour
ty to the Circuit Court for Somerset Cour

ty on December 16, 1985, on Grandson 's
motion. The record is silent as to what, if
anything occurred on January 3 1984. It
is clear, however, that on January 20, 1984
the Circuit Court for Somerset County set
the tria! date for Apri) 26. 19™
moved w dismiss based on two ground

first, he argued to the tra! judge that once
the 180 days had elapsed January 15, 1954

Grandsor

within two weeks afier the filing of an appear
ance of counse! or the appowunen! of counse
for ap accused in any crumuna! matter, whuch
ever shall ccow firm, 2 judge or other desig
ested official of the carew! court in whuch tbe
matic: ws pending shal) set 2 date for the tna
of the case, which date shal) be not later ar
180 davs from the date of the erraigament of
the person accused of Uw ay
appowunes! of count for the accused
whichever cocurs fra The date established
for the wal of the matic: chal! oot be pos
pooed except for good caus shown by the
moving party and only wnb the permussoo of
the admunimrative padge of the court where
the mater w peoding

arance of the

wmer Md Rule 746

s that the charges
have been dismissed
tuned within 180 days of
d there was no post
‘ause by an sdmunisus
tt to Maryland Code
Jol. 1985 Cum.Supp)
former Md Rule 746°
nat Grandison was first
yweuit Court for Balu
19, 1983; thus the 15
{ Rule 746 started u
15, 1984 the expiratior
ve case was wo be ted
for Baltumore County
vet for November 1)
juently postponed unt
he case was removed
rt for Baltimore Cour
rt for Somerset Cour
1983, on Grandison s
is silent as to what, if
n January 3, 198
st on January 20, 19™
Somerset County 5
i} 26, 1984 Grands
ued on two grounc
e tria) judge that once
sed (January 15, 198)

er the filing of an appear
x appointment of counse
y cruminal matter which
1, a judge or other desig
arcu court which une
sall set a date for the wna
sie shall be oot later than
ate of the arraignment of

od cause shown by the
jy with the permussion of
sdge of the court where
|

GRANDISON *. STATE

Md. 595

Cone as 908 A2d 500 (Bd 1988)

the trial court 00 longer had any jurisdic
tion. Secondly, he claimed that the admin
intrative judge did not grant the postpone
ment as required by the rule

Both Art 27. § 59! and former Rule 746
provide that tra! shall be set within 180
days after the earlier of the appearance of
counse! or the first appearance of the de
fendant before the circurt court The stat
ute and rule als: provide that for good
cause shown the County Admuinistratiy'
Judge may grant 4 change of a circuit
court tna! dau

{15} In our we the rule & SIM ly mal
plicable here where a! Grandison § reque
the case was removed ww the Circuit Court
for Somerset County '€s* than a month
before the Januar) 2 1984 tna) date set if
the Circuit Cour for Baltimore Count
This is reac) understandable since the
statute anc rue only address the situatior
where a case & Se" and ultimately tned in 4
single circul court. and not where @ We
date has been set im one circuit court but
the case has been rem wed to a different
circuit court for tna Indeed, to conclude
that Art. 2. § 54) and former Rule 74¢
similarly cover remove situauons would be
to render useless and uneffecuve the pn
pa! requirement contemplated by the stat
ute and rule Judge Eldndee speaking for
the Court in State Franer. 2 Ma 4--
453, 470 A.2d 126% 19n4), stated

“The major safeguard contemplatec D)
the statute and rule for assuming that
criminal tals are not needlessly post
poned beyond the \goday period, is the
requirement that the administrative
judge or hus designee. rather than an)

judge, order the postponement This is a

logical safeguarc. * it us the adminisus

tive judge who has ap overall view of the
court's business. Who & responsible ‘for
the admuustravon of the court,” who as
signs tna! judges, who supervises the
assignment of acuons for tral, who su
pervises the court personne! involved In
the assignment of cases and who re

@ The record joes 1" reflec: tha: Grandiser

ceives reports from such personnel”
(footnotes omitted)

* Clearly then former Rule 746 was not
designed to cover the removal situation
In such a situation the administravve
judge of the cirevit court from which the
case Was removed would be unable to fu!
fill those functions contemplated by the
statute and rule /d Similarly, to expec’
and require that the receiving court adhere
to the tna schedule set forth in the former
circuit court wuld be to bestow upon the

administrative judge of the receiving cour

an unreasonatie burden whict oftentime
could result m ar ympossibie task Under
standably. this was recognized by the tna
judge Somerset County who. iM deny'ng

Grandison s motion to dismiss. statec If

part
Obwousiy. when you ask for remova
like that. you automatica!!) extend tn
trial date. There is no 8) in this cour
ty we could have tried it on the 3rd
January. No. 1, we only had 12 days
because of the Christmas holiday and
weekends and New Year's holiday and
we have the problem of cancelling ov
four or five months of cases that hac
already been scheduled to be uied We

onix have one judge anc one courtroon
in U ynty. so it becarme necessary
ntinue the trial Gate & the reques:

the defendant »

116} We hold therefore that when 4
emmina! case & removed on 4 defendan:
request. the una! date assigned in the for
warding circuit court pursuant to An 2
§ 591 and present Rule 4-27] is sitnou'
effect. We further hold that under suc!
condivions the 180-day penod begins © rur
anew in the receiving circuit court from the
time the case & received therein A de
fendant also remains protected by his
speedy wna! rights under the federa! 3m
state consutuvons

{17} We also point out that this holding
is equal!) applicable where the State ob

tains the remo¥ al. but with some jymitauor

ever asacc for a continuance

596 Med

If it appears tat such removal was for the
purpose of or had the necessary effect of
circumvenung the requiremens of the sta!
ute and the ruk the ongina! tna! date will
hold. See Curiey * State, 299 Md. 449
474 A.24 2 94 icharges refiled follow

ing nolle prosequ Sto vt Glenn we
Md 464.474 46 cus () 984), and compare
State Ph ; ooo Ma 40 vw
512 (19
according!> * ment wo Great
s Z
orn
¢ a Des sa
nod © “
uw Mary 4 aac Marys
( on ir ‘ a
a aye ™
Granc I *- if
the Cir Balur
era ume [ matwn o e .
u as anpearm We >
“a federe . New k a
up —" he hearing 7
anc ther mater eas re urnesc New
York ¢t ra @ r A r
‘ o 4 ary
n m eng w
i . . . er
* “A ‘ “ eve “a nece
cars w have Grands attendance 3
court f r mat? nnectec U this case +
wnt of habeas corpus ad prosequendu”
was obtained 3! -erved Thereupor fed
era marst.a escorvec Grancson ri
and stayec * th him until the court DU
ness was com) eted. Grandson was Wen
10. Thai t 2 ri Si

ac juror €apose Une
selves Tmedia publicity further, there

in the record that suggests th:
ima! cou™ hac knowledge that an) member
¢

or mer.ter the jur hac violate

See also Adimi i nite

States. 3° F.2d 654 (Sth Cir.1965

Turnir¢ w the instant appeal. it must be

borne uw. und thal the recorc suggests tne
trai jucce *as extreme sensiuve W ar
concer? o he polenua probien
raise media publicity and was quit
av are 7 necessity of pecifica \ c

certain the existence of
on the jurors’ delibera
and wo take whatever
to diminish or eradicate

Silverthorne, 400

ficant fact existing in
edge on the part of the
violations by members
a! court s admonitions
the case at bar. Fur
ar. there is no evidence
publicity surrounding
only allegations of the

surrounding the re

vans (ma

United States Court of
unct of Columbw Cir
nvicuon of a cmmuina
sis that the trai court
the possible effect of
nembers of the jury
i! court was found wo
iry to twice separate
dmonishing the jurors
sspaper arucles about
urther, the tna! court
the potentia! prejudice
jurors the tna! court
paper accounts of the
was heic to constituls
the tria! court. In the
una: court specifically
r> not to eapuse ther
icity; further, there is
cord that suggests the
edge that any member
jury had violated its
so Adjmi v. United
‘Sth Cir.1965)

cant appeal, it must be
ve record suggests the
emely sensitive to and

potential problems
cbucity and was quite
ty of specifically call
f the jurors the impor

—s proposed bs the par
Emphasis added

GRANDISON v. STATE Md §99
Cre we Se 2d SOD (hd 19S)

tance of avoiding it. On the evening of
May 2. 1984. the tna! judge warned the
newly selected jurors
“Now, the admonishment | am going
lo give you now will be lve Urroughout
these proceedings Please don't discuss
this matter with anyone at all Don't
discuss it amongst yourselves and dont
discuss it with your fmends or your
neighbors or your wives or husbands. a
the case May be. or vour chileren. oF
with the pres>
As 1 said a couple times befor | know
when you are playing ar important part
in a proceeding Nxt vr wows difficult
sometimes avoid reading a newspaper
account of it or watching 2 Uelevisior
account of it or something the that |
know it is hard not to de tha’ But | ar

going to ask you. you are going w have

w refrain from doing 1 in ihe Case {
vou are going to be fair Ww both parve
You are under oath to fair w bot
parties Don't watch any television a
f

count or listen W an) radi account 0
these proceedings until this case Is tert
nated Dont read anything if the news
paper about i, please, UNt wn cast

terminatec

The next morning the tna! judge rev

erated the admor wor H. age” rem raoec
rie vrors during ; ur the tra
44 the mor ‘wy 2

f, "err . } r

+} morning «efter co“ ; Eva
“a convicied VUorcester ( our’ yor

request of the appellant-Grandisor the tr
a! judge posed the following quesuon
the jury en masse
Have any of you hearc anything
about the outcome of a case that war
concluded in Worcester County ‘ast
night” If you have please stand
There was no response by any member of
the jury
{22} Based on our review of the record
we are not persuaded that the tna! judge
erred in questioning the jury em masse as

12. Each case musi resi on its “snecia!l facts
Marshall v insted States YF LS 310. 79 SCt

to the alleged publicity aurrounding th
Evans tral"? Appellate court should t»
alow wo impute Jurmes 8 disregard of their
duties and w tral courts a want of 4
igence OF perspicacity appraising the
jury's conduct Fairmount Glass Worth
» Cub Fork Coal Co. BLS 474. 58
S.Ct. 252, 77 L.Ed 439 (1934 It ws mere

speculation unsupp rudd by the record. t
conclud: tat there wer jurors #7 i»
carn ,ermm PoIming niivences C |
ty surrounding a different tris! s ver d
not Choose w acknowledge these feeling
be f 77 they f¢ “ uror Ma ‘*
Granc hu r rate +}
ha "rt afford 3 r ‘
and impartia ur
Ll nd ; circumstal r nts )
the insta 4 we af r
he Ur sare err R °
quested r dire concermire put
roundiny (ry Eva! e w
1\
;
Erc usion for (au Jury Por
Vember ve Evryre f ‘
Otrections to the Death Pe u
{23} Grand r nex e t?
the (we ‘ pr - al ©) “a!
jes - HN .
for ¢ ial r
} - mor . - -
because their Oe etfs were f SU 2

prevent them from rendering an Imps

verdict The State. on the ol vand
tends there was no error ©) he tra: juce
We have areful , revrewec * re rs ar

agree with the States pos

The Court has recentl; beer confrontec
with two death penalty cases if which tne
same basic argument “a> made as is “
presented by Grandison. im both cases ¥°
rejected tha! argumen! and dv so ner
See Foster vr. State. 304 Md 439. 499 Ac

1171. 3 LEd 2d 1280 199

600 Md

1236 (1985) and Evans v State. 34 Md
4®7, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985) The only vana
tion in Grandwson's argument stems from,
Vainwnght r Wilt, 469 US 10°
S.Ct S44, 53 L.Ed.2d 84) (1985), whereir
the Supreme Court modified the standard
for determining when a prospective juror
may be excluded for cause because of his

or her views on capital punishment.” The
Court stated, “That standard © whether
Un ‘urors views would prevent or sul
stantially umpair the performance of hi
dutw's a # juror m accordance with he
matructions and his oath Id. — Us
a — 10 s at 52. 63 LEd2d a
81-52 iquot ™ Teras, 446 |S

3m. 100 65 LEd.2d +1
After reviewing the rece

that

(190

L &ti

rd we are Satisfied

where the trial puodge excused a pro
spective juror for cause he followed the
Standard set out in Witt In reaching this
conclusior we recognize that deference
must be giver to the tral judges decis
w eaclude Ir, Witt. in pertinent parr. Une
Supreme Cour stated
We note that. in addition w dispensing
with Witherspoon's reference to ‘auto

Matic decisionmaking, is Standard like
wise Goes not require that a jurors bia

.

m proved with ‘unmistakable clants
Tr i because determination f juror
bis an be recucec Ques nar
aMsWer se whic ‘2 ,
! Marner a calec? MW c

mor sense should have realzec

exper
ence has proved’ many veniremen simp)s
be asked enough questions &
reach the point where their bias has beer
made ‘unmistakably clear. these venire
men ma) know how they will react
when faced with imposing the death sen
tence, or may be unable two arucuilate. or
may wish w hide thew true feelings
Despite this lack of clarity in the printed
record, however, there will be situavions
where the tna! judge is lefi with the
definite impression that a prospecuve ju
ror would be unable to

cannot

not

faithfully and

imparually apply the law For reasons
13. See also Darden » Warnungt: “67> F 2d 7S>
bith Cir 1985). cert granted — LS ——. 10

06 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 24 SERIES

that will be developed more fully infra
this « why deference mus: be paid to thy
tna! judge

ror — |

who sees and hears the

S. at —. 0. 8 Ct at»

In our view. Judge Simpkir
taking!\

War parr

thoroush w

the Questior

prospective jurors, parti ’ tp

va *
obwrously had problems with t+ de
ality m genera Furthermer tt r
yedge afforded Grandson. hy» stand ‘
Lorne and the State s atlorre. an
poriunity to question the pr ‘
rors In short. we are satucfu .
entire procedure was carefu ere ‘
an effort wo obtain a fair and impartial jr
both a- uw the defendant a a. @
Xx
F y ; Cini
WA Indicated P b
to be impart
124] Grandison also argues that the tr
al judge erred in refusing uw stiri
cause Sic prospective juror: «wr * at
WH be impartia: wa craw no ser
quesuor because of ther a-er
iru: ana drug trefficki.,
1 def . ‘
far @ Tpuriia ur ’ a
OV ETI IAS nowueve
O: the prospective jurors fie Claim s!
have been struck were rehabilitate
through additional! quesuoning For exa

pie whe
heard the case was a drug-reiatec case a
Stated severa! times she thougr: she cou
base her decision on the evidence she hear
in the courtroom and the lias
Mrs. Dorsey disliked drugs. she
the following quesuon 0b
standby counsel!
‘MR. CRAWFORD. Couic ! ash yi
one more quesuon’ | am sorry Ge
ung back to this drug Dus:re f sore

acminmec she Ne

Mrs. Creasy

involve
War asne

Urendior

SC: 2) 8° LEd 2d 699 (1985) argue:

s

loped more fully wnfre
nce must be paid to th
sees and hears the ju
—, 105 $.Ct at 852
&52-53 (footnote omit

re Simpkins was pains
in the questonng of
particulars thos: wt

Tis - *? Pye te u ’
Purthermeaore the tri
ndison his standby at

le & allorne, an

, he pr -
are satisfied thai
s carefu exe ed
fair and imparta! jur
Want anc r “ta
\

fae Cour J
Pr fen i? ; y

m partic
Iso argues thal the tr

refusin

ng w strike for

e jurors whose at

draw. into senou
of thew aver mn wu
fick n,
' e of e
sr Whe ots

? fs tne 3

irors nie Clair shou
were rehabilitatec
yestioning. For exar
ho admitted she had
drug related case ais
she thougnt she could
the evidence she heard
nd the law involved
drugs. she Was askec
won by Grandison’s

RD. Could | ask you
" J am sorry. Get
rug business, if some

(198°. argued Januar

GRANDISON +. STATE Md 601

Cows os 908 ADd SED (id Pe

thing came out m tna! to indicate that
there were drugs involved. and sithouzh
this man ie not on trial for any drug
involvement, if it should develop dunmng
the course of the tna! that there ma)
have been some drug involvement, a!
though he is not on tna! for that, would
that have anv—make any difference U
you as how you arnved at a verdict
regarding what he is on tna for”

MRS DORSEY No. if it wasnt pert
nent to the case Like J said, J just dor t
like drugs | had an expenence in Grup
with my son. and he we thank Ue
] just don | hae Grug

Thus it is clear that Mrs Dorsey was stat
ing. in effect, that the Crug factor wou

make no difference in how she armvec ato
verdict if the case did not inveive dru
charge Mr Hankins @ Slated that

she would tr her very best Ww mane @

decision based on the evidence ana the law
Vrs Somers stated she WOUIC NOL Mare «@

decision on the fact of drugs alone anc
her decision would be based on the ¢

dence and the law Fina'iy. both Mr Bnr
er and Mr Serman testifiec that ®

drugs might influence then they would

follow the court instrucwuior w base their
Gecision n.the evidence @ 3
T while unremarns al. extre Py
aver us 3 ale “
make a decisior. based oF the es

une a Ir our vie™¥ rel 3 z “

tieo W no more

Death Qualified Jury
Grandison next contend> that he “as er
titled to be tmed by a jury from whiect
opponents to the death penalty were fn
excluded We recently had occasion W ac
dress this contention in Foster t Stote. W4
Md 439, 499 A2d 1236 11985) For the

reasons set forth in Par: IB of the Foster

opinion, 304 Md. at 453. 499 A 2¢ at 124

we again reject this contentio:

14. Genera tha: het re.ationsmip with ©
er. Susan “as ore ne “is “a
guod studen!. sporscrenics ane engagec

xi

Endence

Here certain evidence is argued to have
been erroneously admitted at tna That
evidence consists of, namely: (a) tesumon)
of Chery! Prechowicz concerning her hus
hand ar@ sister. (b) photographs of th

wieurns taken before the incident occurre

ic) phow graphs taken at the auto
each vic dG) testimons of Chery
cerT ng ner conversation with Janet M wore
ea™ 1] pists and if} an eniarg
e rand r Marc? 4
Moor
a
pra he trial. ( her Piechow ‘
fed 4 rai { ers far at»
sister & husband '' Otjection w U ‘
ur the ground f releva ,«
erru We perceive f en
par e tna! juare ruling
In - ’ S 92 Md 4 4
43 a.a 42 ¢ Qe?) holding th
ir cic rT , ry ne
mor at Une m ne 3 er
» ar we Stalec
“ ary ’
‘ “ °
, .
- t
str . ‘ hart
error The standard for Getermininy
hartr..¢ error. as thoughtfully laic
t Js*ae O Donne for th Court
Dorse. ». State 776 Md. 638. 65¥
A JG ° 67s «(1976 « whether a re
viewlr ¢ court. upon its owr independer

review of the record. is able u deciare a

belief, bevond a reasonabdie doubt. tha:
the error in no way influenced the ver
Gic* Upor such a review of the tmra
recor: . this case we Nave nm a:ffieu

n des amng bevond a reas ynable dou

that verdicts were nol &

-38-

a

the testimony concerning the daughter's

health. The record @ glutted with over: +

whelming evidence in support of the

jury's guilt determinatvons A rever

sal on this basis is thus not warranted.”
We find these principles applicable here
and dispositive of thw contenton

(b) & tc)

{26} During Chery!’s tesumony, two
color photographs were introduced. one, a
high school portrait of Susan Kennedy
(State's Exhibit #1), the other, the Pie
chowiezes at the beach (State's Exhibit
= 2)."° Whether a photograph ws of prac
tical value in a case and admussible at tna!
is 2 matter best left to the sound discrevion
of the trial judge. Johnson r. State, 303
Md. 487, 502. 495 A.2d 1, 8, cert denied
—US , 106 S.Ct 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907
(1985). Ordinarily a court's determination
as to the admissibility at tia) of photo
graphs will not be disturbed unless plainly
arbitrary. See Bowers v. State, 28 Md
115, 135-36, 468 A.2d 101, 111-12 (1983)

Considering first the photographs env
fied s State's Exhibits | and 2, we per
ceive no arbitrariness on the part of the
trial court in ruling those exhibits admiss)
ble The photograph of Kennedy was rele
vant to illustrate the similarity the netm
bore to her sister. Chery! Piechowiez, As
to the family photograph of the Preesow
iczes, we fail to see any prejudicial error in
admitting it, particularly in lght of the

overwhelming evidence against the ac
cused

{27} Two black and white photographs
one of each vicuin, marked Sw'e's Exhibits
23 and 24, are also contested as erroneous

18. The family photograph pictured the daughter
of Scom and Chery! as well Her image was
blackened out by the court prior to ts release tc
the jury

16. See also. Maryland Code (1982). HealthGen
eral Article. § S31 1(¢), whirh mates

"§ S311. Records
(d) Evidence —:
examiner for the F.B.1. Though unciear
from the record. appellant seemed to objec:
to the display of the enlargement since
was shown to the jury pror Ww its adm
sion into evidence. Whether the dispis
overemphasized that piece of evidence ¥a
not questioned by appellant a: tral Sr
Thomas. 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6

Nevertheless. we find no error on U«
part of the tra! court in allowing Sale
Exhibit 45 to be admitted. nor du we fe
the appellant was prejuaicec D> Ue Gis pis

- * . ae

Ce oe
:

‘ Le ew * a .
; REPORTER, G4 SERIES

Cae

of that exhibit pride te fie formal sdmiasion able, there must be a prime for showing

twto evidence First, the origina) eter wes
already i evidence, its admissibility was
not challenged ce appeal Second, testimo
ny revealed thet the enlargement wee ap
exact, although enlarged, copy of the orig?
mal Finely, the enlargement wes em
ployed to demonstrate to ihe jury the bass
for witness Senter’s conclusion that the
origina! letter was indeed authored, draft
ed, and signed by Grandison.

In analyzing such evidence, t & the
statement itself which has substantive le
ga! significance. The means by which the
statement is recreated as evidence before
the jury is of secondary import, provided
that its authenticity is reasonably assured
Colbert ». State, 37 Md App. 383, 387, 377
A.24 585, 588 (1977). Accordingly, we bold
there was po error in the display or the
admission of State's Exhibit 45

XIII

Admission of Hearsay Evidence Under
The Coconspirator Exception

Grandison next argues that the trial
judge erred in allowing the admission of
hearsay evidence ander the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. Ths is so
he argues, because the State had pot prov
en the existence of a conspiracy by inde
pendent proof showing hus participation
therein. Furthermore, be argues that sev
eral of the statements related to matters
pot within the scope of the conspiracy and
several statements were made by someone
not alleged to be part of « conspiracy
After reviewing the record we perceive po
merit to Grandison's contentions

Grandison concedes that oot of court dec
larations of one conspirator made during
the course of and im furtherance of the
conspiracy are admissible against 4 cocon
spirator as an exception to the bearsay
rule. See Greenwald + State, 22) Md
245, 157 A2d 119, appeal dismissed, 363
US. 721, 80 S.Cx 1599, 4 LEd2¢ 1521
(1960). What Grandison seems to argue is
that before this hearsay exception is avail

of the existence of «& conspiracy and hs
participation therein

{83} ‘To the contrary, it is not necessary
that « conspiracy be conclusively estab
lished before the declarations are admiss:
ble. Flexibility mm the order of proof
allowed. Greenwald, 22) Md. at 257, 157
A.2d at 126; see Hill o State, 23) Md. 458
461, 190 A.2d 795, 796, cert denied, 375
US. 861, 84 S.Ct 127, 11 L.Ed.2d 87 (1963)
Mason, Taylor and Taylor v. State, 18
Md App. 130, 187, 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973)

{34} Ip the instant case, we have re
viewed the record and are persuaded that
there was ample evidence presented, inde
pendent of the challenged hearsay state
ments, of the existence of a conspiracy to
justify the trial court's application of this
hearsay exception. For example, Grand)
son's letter of March 14 to Janet Moore
telling ber to take “Short” (Evans) to see
Rodney (Kelly) to take care of something to
do with his upcoming trial; the evidence of
Evans’ and Moore's visit thereafter with
Grandison im the City Jail; and Theresa
Purdie’s testimony that Evans, Moore, and
Kelly al) spoke to Grandison over her
phone about protective glass at a motel
In addition, Calvin Harper testified that
Kelly took a gun to show tw Evans and the
next day Kelly left with the gun and re
turned without it. There was also testmo
ny to the effect that Kelly got $500.00 from
a Michae! Queen, which apparently was
used to obtain the gun

It is settled that not much im the way of
independent evidence s needed w show the
existence of a conspiracy and ac scrused’s
involvement therein See Brown v. State
281 Md 241, 378 A2d 1104 (1977). In our
view the independent evidence m thm case
was sufficent

Finally, Grandison contends that there
was one instance of double hearsay which
did not fal) within the co-conspirator excep
tion and that another statement could no!
be said to be in furtherance of the conspir
acy. Furthermore, he complains that one

eee

rt be & prime facie showing
2 of « couspirecy and bis
erew.

contrary, it is pot necessary
acy be conclusively estab
ve declarations are sdmissi
+ > the order of proof is
nwald, 221 Md. at 257, 167
¢ Hill o. State, 23) Md. 458,
7195, 796, cert denied, 375
% 127, 11 LEd.2d 87 (1963);

and Taylor v. State, 18
¥7, 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973)

instant case, we have re
ord and are persuaded that
le evidence presented, inde
challenged hearsay state
nistence of a conspiracy
court's application of thi
oo. For example, Grand)
March 14 to Janet Moore
ake “Short” (Evans) to see
» take care of something to
ying trial, the evidence of
ore’s visit thereafter with
ve City Jail; and Theresa
my that Evans, Moore, and
e to Grandison over her
otective glass at a motel
lin Harper testified that
» to show to Evans and the
left with the gun and re
t There was also testmo
that Kelly got $500.00 from
m, which apparently was
he gun
vat pot much mm the way of
lence is needed to show the
onspiracy and ap accused's
rem. See Brown v. State,
3 A2d 1104 (1977). In our
odent evidence m this case

dison contends that there
e of double hearsay which
w the co-conspirator excep
other statement could not
furtherance of the conspr
we, he complains that one

Reference to Federal Case

{35} Appellant also objected to the in
troduction of evidence relating to 8 feders!
charge against hum pending at the ume of
commission of the homicides in the case
sub fudice. The admissibility of this evr
dence forms the basis for Grandison s next
argument

The State maintains that evidence of ap
pellant’s pending federal charge was rele
vant to show bis motive for arranging the
murders and thus admussible We agree

The record reveals that at no Gme during
the proceeding? belo did the State revea!
or attempt to reveal the nature of the pend
ing federal charge against the appellant, its
result, or details related to 1 The refer
ences made to the federa! charge only stat
ed that there existed a federal charge
against Grandson for which the prosecu
tion had to prove be occupied » parbcular
room at the Warren House Motor Rote) in
November of 19&2

It is elementary that evidence of a de
fendant’s prior criminal acts may not be
introduced to prove that he is guilty of the
offense for which he is on tna! Straughn
¢. State, 2977 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166
1169 (1983). We applied this rule, common
ty referred to as the “other crimes rule,” ip
Ross v. State, 16 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d
680, 684 (1976), where we said

“[E\vidence which i any manner shows

or tends to show that the accused has

committed another crime wholly indepen
dent of that for which be is on trial, even

though it be a crime of the same type e

17. Evidenrr of othe cme & independently
relevant and thus edmussible WU mrroduced ©
prove or establish

“(1) mouve, (2) wient (3) absence of mis
whe. (4) 8 common sxbem or plan embrac
ing the commusmoo of two oF more crunes #6

qg77." See C. McCormick, Bvidence
§ 190 (8d ed.1984) The admissibiity of
the challenged evidence must be deter
mined through recogniuon of thu rule and
more parucularly, apphcavon of ts excep
Dons

We conclude that the acintilla of evidence
admitted relating to appellants federa
charge was relevant to establish appe!
lant’s motive for arranging the murders
Thus. the evidence does not fall prey the
rule of exclusion enunciated above. As our
cases make clear, that rule will act as a bar
to other crimes evidence unless the evr
dence is “substantially relevant for some
other purpose than to show a probability
that [the accused) committed the cmme on
trial because be is # man of criminal char
acter.” Ross, 716 Md at 669, 350 A2d at
684 (quoting McCormick, supra) (emphasis
supped)

Thus. the trial court did not err See
Straughn, 297 Md at 333-34 465 A.2d a:
1169 (trial court has broad diserebon wu
admitting other cnmes evidence) McCor
mich, supra Evidence of the exstence of
appellant's pending federa! charge was re!
evant to Mustrate his movve for arranging
the murders, it demonstrated s logics! con
nection between the crucial defense w'
pesses, the Piechowiczes and the sabse
quent homindes Further, the fact that
the State proffered no evidence other than
the existence of the pending federa) charge
renders any potential prejudice to Grand
son minima! in light of its probatve value
297 Md at 333-34, 465 A2d at 1169

related to cach other thet proof of one tends
to emablish the other and (5) the idenurty of
the person charged with the comumussion of 4
crume o0 tal.”

Ros. 176 Md at 666-70 380 Ald a 684 (cre
pons omuned)

, Hho nvm
7 th
;.

Erroneous Admission ef Hearsay
Evidence Rervulting tn Prejudwe
(96) During the State's case-in-chief,
one James Savage, the prosecutor ip the
feders) drug tria! against Grandison, wes
permitted to testify that Scott Piechowie:
had provided the federal suthorives certain
evidence against Grandson The tenor of
this evidence was to show that despite the
fact that Piechowicz could not make & posr
tive identification of Grandison, he could
help establish that Grandison had occupied
s room at the Warren Mote! at & ume
critical to the federal prosecution Pie
chowicz had related to Savage that he had
seen & ticket on an individual's belt indicat
ing that the individual had been to the
Sugar Ray Leonard benefit Apparently
this ticket was found in the room occupied

by Grandison

We find no error in the trial courts re
fusal to preclude Savage testifying as 8
State witness. from relating this evidence
Grandison complained at the instant tria!
that his right of confrontavon was violated
and the evidence was hearsay This argu
ment is meritiess. Hearsay was not
volved as these extrajudicial statements
were not being offered for they wut
Lunsford v. Bd. of Education of Prince
George's County. 250 Md. 665, 374 A2c
1162 (1977); McCall's Ferry Co. ' Price
108 Md. 96, 69 A. 832 (1908), Sun Cab Ce
y. Walston, 15 Md.App. 113, 289 A 2d 804
(1972), aff'd on other grounds, 267 Md
559 298 A.2d 391 (1973). Through Savage
the State sought to establish a mouve for
the murder of Scott Piechowicz Thus, the
veracity of Piechowicz's statements to Sav
age was of no import The mere fact that
they were made supplied s motive for the
Piechowiez killing. At the instant trial
Savage was under oath and available for
crossexamination as to whether Piechos
iez actually made the statements Hence
his testimony was admussible

A second ground for complaint arose

when the State, in cross examining Detec
tive Duckworth, elicited certam alleged

the Suute

On cross-examination the State sought &
establish the nature of the dispute precip
jtating the second summons Without ob
jection. Detective Duckworth testified Unst
his investigation of the summons had re
vealed that Piechowiez and one Erx Aller
had disagreed over the amount of money
Allen owed for a room at the Warrer
House This line of quesvoning proceeded
unt) Duckworth was asked if he had inter
viewed Mr. Allen. At this point, Grandisor
objected stating, “Al! the « hearsay.

This objection was properly overruled be
cause quite simply the quesvon to whict
the bearsay objecbon was directed was po!
one wvolving hearsay Duckworth kne«
of his own knowledge whether be had @
terviewed Mr. Allen. Thus, the quesvor
was cearly proper. Further, ths
inquiry had been initiated by Grandisor
and we State was certainly privileged &
develo; the sue on cross-examunavoo!
See Culler v. Standard On! Co., 127 Md
405. 9€ A. 558 (1916), see also Walters
State. 156 Md. 240, 144 A 252 (1929), Koo
gle r. Cline, 110 Md. 587, 73 A. 672 (1909

line

(37) The final testimonia! complaint oc
curred when appellant recalled James Say
age wo testify that « person named Anthony
Garrison had registered for the hotel room
at issue in the federal trial and that Garn
son and Grandison were different people
On cross-examination the State pursued
this tne of questioning over objecbon and
elicted certain testimony which Grandisor
now contends was sufficiently preyudicia

to warrant reversal of his convicvon Spe

r Scott Piechowiez. Grandi
8 testimony from Duckworth
\ination without objectvon by

mination the State sought to
vature of the dispute prenip
ond summons. Without ob
ive Duckworth testified that
on of the summons had re
schowiez and one Eric Allen
over the amount of money
or @ room at the Warren
une of questioning proceeded
jd was asked if he had inter
en. At this point, Grandison
g. “All this is bearsay.”

bp was properly overruled be
mply the question to which
jection was directed was not
hearsay. Duckworth knew
ywledge whether he had »
Allen. Thus, the quesvor
oper. Further, this line of
xen initiated by Grandison
was certainly privileged &
ssue OM cross-examinavor
Standard Oil Co., 127 Md
(1916); see also Walters +
240, 144 A. 252 (1929); Koo
0 Md. 587, 73 A. 672 (1909)

ia) testimonia) complaint oc
ypellant recalled James Sav
vat & person named Anthony
»gustered for the hotel room
federa) tria) and that Garn
ison were different people
ination the State pursued
‘stoning over objection and
testimony which Grandison
was sufficently prejudicua!
rsa) of his conviction. Spe

—

plained that a showing that Grandison was
connected with s particular room at the
Warren House Hote! was crucial to convict
Grandison on federa) drug charges

The admission of tus tesumony does pot
warrant reversal. A review of the record
shows that each of these facts with the
exception of the fact that Garrisor recerved
remuneration for registering for the room,
was independently established through
unodjected to tesumony For instance
Chery! Prechowiet testified that she had
been summoned to appear as 8 witness
the federal drug tria! of Anthony Grand
sop to make an identificabon of Grandson
as an occupant of s room at the Warren
House. In addition, Savage when called as
a State's witness stated that the tesumony
of Scott and Chery! Piechownez inking
Grandison to s certain room in the Warren
House was critical to the federal! drug case
Also. in the very colloquy of which Grand
son now complains, Savage was permitted
to testify, “Mr Garnson requested the
room. Mr. Grandison occupied the room’
without objection or a movon to strike by
the defense. Finally, oo redirect examina
tion by Mr. Grandison, Savage tesufied
that Grandison had s key to the hotel room
in his possessior when he was arrested on
the federal drug charge

Thus, the only fact established over ob
jection by the complained of testimony was
that Garrison was paid by Grandison for
regustenng for the hotel! room at issue @
the federal drug trial. In light of the col
lateral nature of this evidence, we fail to
see how its admission prejudiced Grandr
son. Consequently, we find no reversible
error

1& North Carolina v Alford, 0 US 25.91 SC

ear"? . u oe

. % Kvl

* Denial of Request to Interner

Potential Witness

Grandison also challenges the proprety
of the trial court's refusal to allow hin to

interview & potential defense

witness, Rodney Kelly

Like Grandison, Kelly was considered a
substanua! security mek He had already
entered an Alford” plea to the crime of
conspiracy © murder Scott Prechowiez and
Susan Kennedy. As ® result of his plea
Kelly had received s state sentence of fifty
years He also had received 8 federa! hfe
sentence for the same acts At the ume of
the Grandison trial, Kelly was incarcerated
in federal prison in Lewisburg Pennsylva
nia While in confinement he had alleged!)
committed another murder and thos
charges were pending

At the onset it must be noted that We
court did pot unequivocal!) deny the de
fense access to the potentia! witness The
trial judge offered to make Kelly available
if the defense wanted to intervie® hirr
through standby counsel Grandison, how
ever, declined to avail himself of this oppor
tunity

The propriety of the tra courts ruling
denying Grandson persona contact witt
the prospecuve defense siiness raise> @
quesuon not heretofore disposiuvely ac
dres 2d by this Court However, dicta u
Kardy v. Shook 237 Md 524, S41, 20°
A.2d 83, 92 (1965), ndcates that a defend
ant and his counsel are at perfect liberty &
interview and interrogate prospecuve wt
pesses, subject to the witnesses 8cqu
escence ip such interrogavons

The Court of Special Appeals has twice
discussed this ssue. In Barnetit State *
Md App. 35, 42, 257 A.2a 466, 470 (1969
the intermediate appellate court noted that
there are po property rights mn witnesses
each party may wlerview the other's wit
nesses to ascertain facts within that #7
pess' knowledge. Subsequent!) that cour
suggested that under certain curcumstances

160. 27 LEd2d 162 (1970

Zz
au
the denial of « defense request to interview
a prospective witness would sot entitle tbe
defendant to s mistrial Johnson # State,

18 Md.App. ST1, 676, 908 Add 426,
ty and substantive use of depositons
Since the rule was clearly inapplicable it
could not serve as the basis for the sdmis

alleges that Mr. Levitz, the State '
during Farmer's before the
Feders! Grand Jury oo September 19 1983, be

Grand Jury sestimony.

(45) Finally, the trial court did not er
in refusing to grant s continuance to appeh
lant so a2 to allow appellant the opportum
ty to secure Farmer's presence for tra!
The matter was within the trial court's
discretion and wil! not be disturbed absent
a showing of abuse prejudicia! to the de
fendant Jackson v. State, 288 Md. 19)
194, 416 A.2d 278, 281 (1980) In light of
the fact that Farmer's presence could not
be guaranteed by the appellant and since
the case was otherwise ready for the jury
there was no pressing reason for the tu
court to further delay submission of the
case to the jury

XIX

Failure to Disclose Exculpatory
Information

This issue concerns a contenvon by Grar
dison that since be had made ® pret
request of the State for Brady™ matera
in its possession, the trial judge erred ©
denying his movon to compe! the State &
turn over to him an FB! report made by a»
agent who was testifying. It appears tha"
one Janet Bannister had given 8 statement
to federal agents; Bannister was not caliec
trial. Grandison, troug’

ment
statement contained exculpatory masters’
ip that she referred therein to seeing one
Helen Kondilidis in the parking jot at the

eneans. unless the absence was procured
the party offering bis depomuon”

2 Brady v. Maryland. 373 US. 83, 83 SC 11%
10 LEd.2d 215 (1963)

aEs

script of Farmer's Federal
imoey.

the trial court did not err
‘ant a continuance to appel

puse prejudicial to the de
on v. State, 238 Md. 191
78, 281 (1980). In light of
umer’s presence could not
yy the appellant and since
verwise ready for the jury
essing reason for the tra!
- delay submission of the

XIX

Disclose Exculpatory
nformation

serns a contention by Gran
» be had made a pretna!
‘tate for Brady = matena!
», the trial judge erred
jon to compel the State to
an FBI report made by an
estifying. It appears that
ster had given a statement
:; Bannister was not called
trial) Grandison, through
‘dings in his federa! tra!
edited copy of this state
claimed that Bannister s
ined exculpatory maternal!
rred therein to seeing one
in the parking lot at the

auve Evidence.

ng or trial » part or all of »
© far as otherwise admissibic
les of evidence, may be used as

ess is absent from the bearing
hat the party offering his depo
sep unable tw procure his a!
summons or other reasonabic
3 the absence was procured by
ening his deposv0n.~

land 373 US. 83, 83 S.Cu 11
1963)

There is po question but that Grandson
was entitled to any exculpatory matena! 1
the hands of the State or under its contro!
See former Rule 741. However, as the
trial judge stated, he could not order the
State to turn over something tt did not
have. In so holding, we observe that Gran-
dison had obtained ap edited copy of Ban-
nister’s statement through his federa! tna!
and thereby had more evidence than the
State

xx

The Request for Data Relevant for
Proportionality Renew

[46] lp May of 1984, Grandison's stand
by counsel filed on his behalf # motson to
compe! the State to provide Grandison with
certain information concerning ’
statistics.” The specific imformation was
as follows

“(}) The names of all defendants indicted

for murder after July 1. 1978, m
which aggravating circumstances,
as defined m Article 27, Secton 413
existed

(2) As to each defendant so listed, ind>

cate those cases im which the State
elected to seek the death penalty

(3) The disposition of each defendant's

case, indicating if disposivons were
the result of plea or trial

(4) The ful plea negotiations in those

cases im which the State accepted a
ples.”

As the motion indicates, this mformavon
was being sought to support Grandison’s
motion to dismiss the State's electon to
seek the death penalty on the basis that
such elecbon was anconstitutionally rar

argument made to that effect when ths
present motion was heard, Grandison ar
ques to us that he needed the informsbon
in order to prepare an argument on propor:
tionality renew In our view be has aban
doned the arbitrary elecvon argument and
we need not address it

As a practca! matter, at the time of the
request (after he had been found guilty but
prior to hus sentencing proceeding) the >
formation sought for proportionality re
view purposes was Dot needed by Grand
son. Indeed, that nformaton would never
be needed unti) the sentencing proceeding
resulted in the imposition of 8 death sep
tence. See Tichnell v. State, 297 Md 432,
468 A.24 1 (1983) for a thorough discussi0D
of the statutory proportionality review pro
cedure required of this Court

xX)

Motion to Dismiss for Violation of
Federc! Dua! Prosecution Policy

Ip an apparent response to the concern
expressed by the Supreme Court Petite
c United States, 361 US 529, 80 S.CL
450, 4 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1960), over the fairness
of multiple prosecubons, the Department
of Justice established s policy precluding
the initiaton or continuavon of a federa!
prosecution following 8 prwr federal or
state prosecution based on the same trans:
action unless there = & compelling mterest
supporting the subsequent prosecubon
See also Rinaldi ». United States, 44 US
22. 98 S.Cu 81, 54 LEA2d 207 (1977). Be
lieving that the present state prosecuBon &
based on the same transaction for which be
was prosecuted w the federa) courts, Grap-
dison attempts to invoke the federal De
partment of Jusuee poly and contends his

~~,

i ee

due process rights beve been violated
Whhout jodging the merits of the pobcy we
do not believe Kk has any relevancy > the
state prosecution and thus find no merit o
this contention.

xXx

Use of the Act Constituting the Offense
as an Aggravating Factor

[47] Grandison argues, for the first
time, that the finding that he entered into
an agreement with Evans to have the Pie
chowiczs murdered for remuneration ®
could not, standing alone, properly be re
bed upon to impose the death penalty. He
argues that “the act of contracting was the
crime itself, hence it could not also be an
aggravating factor.”

While this issue was not raised in the
tria) court and we need not address it (see
Md. Rule 885), we shall do so in recognivon
of the seriousness of the case. In Stebding
». Stote, 299 Md 331, 358-361, 473 A.2d
903, cert. denied, — US. —, 105 S.Cr
276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), we bad occasion
to discuss # similar contention made in the
context of using an underlying felony as an
aggravating factor ns felony murder case
in the capital sentencing phase Judge Ro
dowsky stated for the Court

“Maryland's capital punishment stat
ute, Art. 27, §§ 412-414 makes plain the
legislative intent that the commission of
certain felonies, underlying s felony mur
der conviction, is to be considered an
aggravating circumstance iD the capita!
sentencing proceeding. At least 30 days
prior to trial, the State must notify the
accused of its intent to seek a sentence
of death and must advise the accused ‘of
each aggravating circumstance’ upon
which it intends to rely. § 412(d) Sec-
tion 413(c1) provides that the ‘following
type of evidence is admissible in [a sen
tencing) proceeding:

(ij) Evidence relating to any aggravat
ing circumstance listed in subsection (d

zB Art 27, § 41MGK7)

REPORTER YM SERIES

of which the State had notified the de

fendant pursuant to § 412(b).’”
Jd. at 359-60, 478 A2d at 917.
Section 413(d) lists the aggravating circum
stances, of which the seventh is that “the
defendant engaged or employed another
person to commit the murder and the mur
der was committed pursuant to an agree
ment or contract for remuneravon or the
promise of remuneration ”" Ip our view the
same rationale used in Stebbing is applica
ble. the intent of the legislature is as clear
in the instant case as it was in Stebing
We reject Grandison’s argument

XXIII
Proportionality Renew

(48) Grandison next assails his sentence
of death on the basis that such sentence
has not been given in any other case where
the defendant had been convicted of cor
tract murder (hiring someone else © com
mit the killing). Ip the only case of this
nature where the State sought the death
penalty, Myers t State, 58 Md.App. 211
472 A24 1071, cert. denied, 300 Md 454
479 A.2d 373 (1984), Myers was givens life
sentence. In Myers, several milgeune
factors were found to exist, Myers had not
previously been found guilty of a cmme of
violence nor entered a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere thereto, he acted under
substantial duress, dominatbon or provoca
tion of another person; his capacity © ap

te the criminality of his conduct was
substantially impaired, his act was not the
sole prommate cause of the victim's death
it was found unlikely he would engage
further criminal activity; one co-defendant
was given 2 life sentence and the other a
grant of immunity. I the iustant case
only two mitigating factors were found
Grandison had no prior record of a convic
tion for a crime of violence, and he was po!
the sole proximate cause of the killings

Other cases cited by Grandison are &
sketchy that we do not find them helpfu! w
trying to make @ proportionality rene*

-49-

he State had notified the de
reuant to § 412%(b)."”
, 473 A2é at 917.
) liste the aggravaung circum
hich the seventh is that “the
gaged or employed another
umit the murder and the mur-
mitted pursuant to an agree
ract for remuneration or the
muneration.” Ip our view the
e used in Stebbing is applica
t of the legislature is as clear
case as it was in Stebbing
indison's argument

XXIII
vortionality Reviex

lison next assails his sentence
he basis that such sentence
riven in any other case where
had been convicted of con
(hiring someone else to com
z). In the only case of this
the State sought the death
3 v. State, 58 Md.App. 211,
, cert. denied, 300 Md 484
1984), Myers was given a life
Myers, severa) mitigating
ound to exist; Myers had not
n found guilty of a crime of
entered a plea of guilty or
ere thereto: he acted under
ress, domimabon or provoca
r person; his capacity to ap
iminality of his conduct was
mpaired, his act was not the
cause of the victim's death
anlikely he would engage in
a! activity; one co-defendant
fe sentence and the other a
unity. Ip the imstant case
gating factors were found
no prior record of @ convic
e of violence, and he was not
mate cause of the killings

cited by Grandison are so
e do not find them helpful in
e a proportionality review

a

What we said in Brena cupra, bears re
peating tee a, 7
“The murders giving rise to this prose
cation were as beinous as those m any
case to come before us under the present
capita) punishment statute. No killings
could have been more premeditated and
deliberate than those bere.”
304 Md. at 539, 499 A.2d at 1288
While we acknowledge that Grandison
was pot the “triggerman,” but for him
these murders would not have occurred
In our view Grandison is as culpable as
Evans and it is clear the legislature intend
ed that he be so found

XXIV

Denial of Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Sentencing

{49} On February 3, 1984, some two
and one half months before trial, while the
court was preparing to hear a motion filed
by Grandison, the court observed that
Grandison intended to represent himself
Accordingly, the court proceeded to con:
duct a hearing to satisfy itself that Grand
sop knew he had a right to counsel! and was
knowingly and voluntarily waiving that
right See former Md. Rule 723 ¢, now
4-215b).™ During the course of the collo
quy with Grandson, the tna! judge pointed
out the advantages of having a lawyer to
assist at trial and sentencing. Grandison
advised the judge be understood, but that
he had never waived his right to counsel,
he stated he wanted standby counsel who
the judge told him would be furnished
Being satisfied that Grandison understood
his right to counsel and chose to represent
himself, the court made a finding that
Grandison had made an intelligent and i-
tentiona! waiver of his right to ap attorney
There the matter rested until after the
guilt or innocence phase of the trial had
passed On May 28, 1984, the parves ap
peared in court for s hearing on Grand

24. Judge Simpkins, the trial judge also noted
that Judge Fader. of the Circwt Court for Balu:
more County, had apparently previously gone
over the same matier with Grandisoo

+. S7aTe ..-
Ox = i i me te ee

Md 613

ou's motion for a new trial and sentenc
ing. It was brought to the trial judge's
attention that Grandison and his standby
counse! had agreed, after the guilty ver-
dict, that standby counse! would handle the
sentencing Grandison maintained that he
was entitled to change his mind about rep
resentation because the case actually was
two separate trials. The trial judge disa
greed with this contention Nevertheless
because neither Grandison nor standby
counse] was prepared to proceed to sen
tencing. the court allowed an eight day
postponement, which was satisfactory to
Grandison. Thereafter, 8 sentencing pro
ceeding was had in front of a jury wherein
Grandison himself produced witnesses and
allocuted. the jury imposed the death pen
alty

Grandison argues here that as the sen-
tencing proceeding was 8 matter separate
from the guilt or innocence proceeding, he
was entitied to counsel. He recognizes
that be had previously effectively waived
counsel bot contends that waiver did not
prevent him from having counsel for sen
tencing ander the ravonale of Faretta v
California, 422 US. 806, 95 S Ct 2525, 45
LEd2d 562 (1975). We find nothing »
Faretta which supports Grandison’s argu
ment. That case stands for the principle
that the State may not force an attorney on
an accused who has knowingly and intelli
genuy made a voluntary election to repre
sent himself, which be has a right to do

{50} Grandison also maintains that any
prior waiver cannot be held to operate to
deny him the right to counse! at s subse
quent separate proceeding He relies on
former Md. Rule 723,% which he argues
mandates readvisement (of mght to coun-
se!) at every separate proceeding: his re
liance is misplaced. Section d 2 of Rule 7123
provides

25. Now Rule 4215. effective after this tna!

arr

—e
‘oO

614 ua - a ier :

. 7e

7 to Dag

ie e@ileuae

“Ll the defendant apghat ie eoutt with
out counsel, at any after bs
appearance parsuast to section 0 of this
Rule, the court may not proceed before
determining whether the defendant st
that time desires to waive counsel, or
hos woived counsel, either affirmative
ly or by neglecting or refusing to ob
tain counsel” (emphasis added).
This language is clear and unambiguous; *
states no prohibition to proceeding when
there has been an affirmatve waiver of
counse! as here

XXV

Admissibility of Victim
Impact Statement

[51] We are bere asked to reconsider
our analysis in Lodowekn v State, 302 Md
691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds, — US. —, 106 S.C 1452, 88
LEd.24 —— (1986), of the admissibility of
victim impact statements in death penalty
cases, we decline to do so except in the
context of the prohibition against er pos!
focto laws. See ')S Constitution, art |,
§ 9; Md. Decl. of sts., art 17. Grandison
argues that prior 0 July |, 1983 the thrust
of the law relating to victim impact state
ments was to compensate the victim for
financial losses; that effective July 1, 1983,
the permissible scope of nico mmpact evr
dence was vastly broadened to include evr
dence of the effect of the crime on the
victim’s family and made this type of evr
dence admissible in capita) sentencing pro
ceedings. Consequently, he argues the
pew statute rendered the act of which be
was found guilty punishable in s manner Ip
which it was not punishable when & was
committed.

In our view Grandison has misread the
law in existence prior to July 1, 1963 Art
cle 41, § 124 of the Maryland Code was not
limited to compensation to 8 rxtm for fr
nancial losses. By its terms the act provid
ed;

“(cX2Ki) The presentence investgatvon

shal) include a victim impact state
ment, if

“t, The defendant, tp committing 8
felony, caused physical, psychology
eal, or economic injury to the vicurm
or

(8) A victim impact statement shal!

()) Identify the victim of the of
fense,

(ii) Itemize any economic loss suf
fered by the vicum as 8 result of the
offense;

(ii) Identify any physical myer)
suffered by the victim as 8 result of
the offense along with Ms serous
ness and permanence,

(iv) Describe any change in the
victim's persona! welfare or familia
relationships as a result of the of
fense;

(v) Identify any request for psy
chological services iniuated by the
victim or the victim's family as 8
result of the offense, and

(vi) Contain any other informator
related to the impact of the offense
wpon the victim that the court re
quires.”

It is clear, then, that considerations other
than financia) losses were allowed The
law as changed in 1983 specifically provid
ed for use of the statement in death pena

ty cases and inserted “or the vicum's fam:
ly” im subparagraph (vi) of paragraph (3)
subsection (c) and added s new paragraph
(4) which is not pertinent here We beleve
the prior law was broad enough to have
allowed the information now specifically
set out im the current law Consequenuy

amendment to Article 41,
procedural and ameborauve The change
simply set forth an additional source from
which victim impact information could be
obtained, namely, the victim's family The
pew statute does not change the quantum
of punishment attached to the crime
hence, the current law is DO more onerous
to Grandison than it was prior to its amenc

ed physical, psychologt
anic injury to the victim;

impact statement shall:
+ the victim of the of.

» any economic loss suf
victim as resv)t of the

fy any physica) injury
the victim as a result of
along with its senous
™manence,

be any change in the
ona! welfare or familia)
as a result of the of

y any request for psy
vices initiated by the
e victim's family as @
offense; and

n apy other information
e impact of the offense
‘tim that the court re

at considerations other
es were allowed The
1983 specifically provid
atement in death penal
d “or the victim's fam
: (vi) of paragraph (3) in
added a new paragraph
inent bere. We believe
broad enough to have
vation now specifically
nt law. Consequently,
to Grandison's ex post
Furthermore, the 1983
cle 41, § 124 was only
eliorative. The change
additional] source from
t information could be
ve victim's family. The
ot change the quantum
tached to the cnme,
aw is DO more onerous
was prior to its amend

_«
ment. Bee Tchad Wnet, 451 Md O86.
134-87, 416 ASd G90, 860-42 (1980) (Tict-
nell 1). Accordingly, we think ht clear that ,
the prohibitions against «x post fecto laws
were not violated in this case.

xxvl

Right of Jury to Extend Mercy
at Sentencing
{52} Grandison complains that the jr
im a death penalty sentencne proceeding
has the right to show mercy ...d compas
sion in its sentence determination and the
trial judge erred m not so allowing

Building on former Md. Rule 759 1
which was in force at the time of his sen
tencing, Grandison argues that nothing ™
the death penalty statute prohibits the ex
ercise of compassion or mercy pursuant
the rule. Section f of the rule staws

“{, Recommendation of Mercy

A jury may attach to its verdict a
recommendation to the court to show
mercy to a defendant The recommenda
tion is not binding upon the court”

The issue arose because of two circum
stances that occurred during the proceed
ings. First, during voir dire of prospecuve
jurors each was asked individually whether
after listening to all the evidence and to
what the judge said the law was, and hav
ing become convinced that based thereon
the lew required the death penalty, they
would be able to give the death penalty
Second, Grandison requested the tru!
judge give the following struction

“The State alleges that the following
aggravating circumstance applies in this
case

The Defendant engaged or employed
another person to commit the mur.
der and the murder was committed
pursuant to an agreement or con
tract for remuneration or the prom
ise of remunerabon

Unless you find beyond s reasonable

doubt that this particular aggraveung

circumstance exists, you must mark ‘No’

2% Now Rule +327\(c)

axln* GRAKDEBON v. STATE
nent ak Oak rem

fm the space opposite thet agyreveting
circumstance in Section | of the sentanc
ing form, and you may pot consider that
factor im determining the appropriate
sentence

Should you believe that the State has
established beyond a reasonable doubt
that ths aggravating factor exes and =
sufficient im your minds to call for the
penalty of death, then it m= proper for you
to exercise your own moral, factua! and
lega! judgment mm determining whether
that circumstance is sufficrent m your
minds to call for the punishment of
death.”

He also requested that the jury be instruct
ed
“You need not find a mitugatng cv
cumstance m order to unpose a sentence
of life unpnsonment Nothing the las
forbids you from extending mercy out of
compassion or belief that life impnsor
ment is sufficient punishment under al!
the circumstances.”

The trial judge overruled Grandison's ob
jection on the voir dire issue and dened the
two requested mstrucbons listed above
Keeping m mind that § 41 %gX8) of Art 27
specifically allows the jury to # forth w
writing any other facts which i finds as a
mitigating circumstance, mt strikes us tha!
indeed there is ample provision for the ur)
to show compassion or mercy, albert based
on articulated facts. Ip our view this com
ports with the mandates cf Furman ¢
Georgia, 408 US mm 22 SCA 27, B
L.Ed 24 346 (1972) and Gregg v. Geora.
428 US. 153, 96 S.Ca 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859
(1976). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US
586, 98 S.Cu 2954, 57 LEd 2d 973 (1978)
In Gregg. the Court stated ip part
“Furman mandates that where discre
tion is afforded a sentencing body on s
matter so grave as the determinavon of
whether a buman life should be taken or
spared, that discreton must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the

‘

a oe — "ATX

ria of wholly erb@rary and capriciow
ection.” “rr.
e28 US ot 189, 068.00 at B952, 49 LEA 2d
at 63
Not only docs the Maryland death pena)
ty statute pass constitoGona! master, T\ch
nell v. State, 287 Md. 605, 416 A2d 830, &
is flexible enough to allow « jury to show
compassion and mercy should the facts and
circumstances of the case so warrant As
stated im Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 475,
499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985)
“If the sentencing authority perceives
anything relating to the defendant or the
crime which causes it to believe that
death may not be appropmate, it may
treat such factor as & mibgetng

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0286%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.