# Amicus Curiae Brief — Martin v. Ohio

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0273%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 228

## Text

In Che Supreme Court Of Che United States

OCTOBER TERM, [985

EFARLINE MARIIN, Petit

STATE OF OHIO, Respo

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AM/CUS CURIA!
AND
BRIEF FOR OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

RANDALL M. DANA
Ohio Public Detender
GREGORY L. AYERS
Chief Counsel!
Ohio Public Defender Comn
I ght East Long Stree
Columbus, On
(614) 466-5

Counsel of Re rd

RICHARD L. AYNES
MARGERY B. KOOSED
| DEAN CARRO

App ite R w OTT

NSE] mel 1 Af

DEFENDER

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amicus curiae

Petitioner's brief.
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GREGORY L. YERS
Chief Counsel

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COUNSEL OF RECORD

RICHARD L. AYNES
MARGERY B. KOOSEI
J. DEAN CARRO

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE
OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dp As" T
wy

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..ccccseeenececes vill

"rv7ya ATO VW ae, r ~T?T marmn
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .cccccccceccvcccvee 2

ARGUMENT .ccccccccccccccseseseeceeces 4
rT. SINCE SELF-DEFENSE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
INNOCENT CONDUCT, AN ACCUSED
CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO BEAR
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THAT
ISSUB. ceoccccccesccceccccsccces 4

Il. PROOF OF SELF-DEF
NECESSARILY NEGAT

S SEVERAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE CRIME OF

>

AGGRAVATED MURDER. ..ccceccvcecs l

A. Mullaney and Patterson

. | 4
*7 ~
Analysis e*eeseeeee#ee#ee#ee#ee#e#ee#e#*#e##*#*##* # @ » @
— ' £ £ x ~ - -
B. Self-Defense Negate
r rr sein ln ~—_—
niawLlut ess Be ee eoe¢edceeees se 6 a
~ | S 7
~ F$unafance Ne FR
~ @ aS de & st —* L
oy . * _ + =
— (hr DD nro = >
Le 4 Lml 7. oe CLOnNaAUCT *eeee#ee#ee#ee# @ @
~ Zz: + hm UR ~
y ~~ - a & er we © / ; ~
we ole = IRE ~ E C
i he \A . i VV/ e#f8f @&@# @#@ #8# @# @# @ @ @ , a ,

Cherry v. Jago, 722 F.2d 1296
(6th Cir. 1983), Cert.

denied, U.S. __, 104
S.Ct. 3516 (1964) ccccccees 6

Coker v. Georgia, 43:3
584 (1977) é

*eeoeeee#ee#ee#e#e#e#ee#e#e#*##e## # @

Commonwealth v. Hilbert,

ee Ad ‘¢ “+
i. fie & NA a

Cooper v. North Carolina, 702

F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1983) ... 23
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.

TSA CAPES) cecccvesoseceeeee 33

Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St.

186 (1876) *e cesses f&tets#te#e#t+st*#+2# # #*® #* @ 30,38
Filmore v. Insurance Co.,

82 Ohio St. 208, 92 N.E.

26 (1910) tet 0ceez2«s' e+e+#+e#t # © © © © © @ @ 26
Francis v. Franklin, 471 S

__, 105 §.Ct. 1965, 85

bbcomtte 26 3486 (1965S) ccocceoes ' 36,550,551,

52,53,69

Gourke v. United States,

eo Gewe Bee Cheest sececnes 10
Graham v. State of Ohio, 98

Ohio St. 77, 120 N.E. 232

(1910) ereretetsetft &® © @ @ > * + *® * * «© *« 28
Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d

Sava. teen Cat. Bee? seeecee JeabGsaaced
Griswold v. Connecticut,

Sen Use GIP Capen wcoeccees ; 12

Hamilton v. Alvis, 109 Ohi
App. 298, 160 N.E.2d 372
(1959) eee#fr”*~j,.t+?# ¢* *¢ © « *« #® *# * *# #*# ®*® * # # 28

U

Holloway v. McElroy, 6
605, cert. denied, 4 :
BGSe CAPS? ov evees TrETTTTTT 6,2

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
CSPTOP awesesereseccoeseuss passl

771 7
Va & +

Isazc v. Engle, 646 F.2d
1129 (6th Cir. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Engle v. Isaac,
456 0.8. 100L (L962) ccccces 13,43

Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S.

253 (1968) see#sFf-eer'fe#re#eFfr#setse*t*s © © © © #*& @ ® 37
Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2

1332 (llth Cir. 1982),

cert. denied, 460 U.S

cy? Rk 5 | ee ee 2
Lambert v. California,

‘2 ~ Re. Beio. > Ss 4

395 U.S. 6 (1969)

Leland v. Oregon, 34:2

790 (1952)

“‘\ -

Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d

eA r.P
/ 2 wow & Ys

Lester v. State, 121 S 2
Marts v. State, 26 Onlo St

t+ MG! ys > Ee ee ae 28,3/,38
McElroy v. Holloway, 632 F.2d

605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 451 U.S. 1028

(1981) > fe © © esFeHet+ti#eg#efe#er°(o#* «* *# *# *#® # #* # @®
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,

UeS- ,» 294 U.S.L_W.
Sree SRO scuceecuebewiens 2

Lx

oe v. Wilbur, 42]
6% eee) Btaenakesees aeee
Ohio v. Brooks, 1 Ohio [
Reprint 407 (Cuy. Co.
Sommon Pleas 1851) .........

Patterson v. New York,

AQ ‘7 c 107 / 077

~ oe 4 “ewe a ff a Se is e#ee#e#e#e#8e#8e#e

People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y
2g 288, 347 N.E.2d 898
1976), affirmed sub non.,
Patterson v. New York,
A429 Tle 1907 077)

PoweLt v. Texas, 392

, 4 oe
14 IBR
—_ ~ a ~ -— - + + + *+ & & > e-eeeee © © @© @ @

Reed v. State, ll Tex. Ct.

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SQ ~ +

ADD. : \LOO Sseeeeeeeeb eee
Rivera v. Delaware, 429

877 (1976), appeal dismissed;

35 Dime DE 6466604886 6666068

Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St

hn _ a Y *enerteeeee#ee#ee#e#e#e##*#e##e*#e#*#e#*#e#e

Robinson v. California,

2 = hb f 4
w/ VV / * * . 7 A , /

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Sandstrom v.
442 U.S. 510 (1979)

Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St.
90 (1871), cited with appro-
val in State v. Humphries,
51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364

+ 4 is J -

dr P {
Ye lte &\A . oe : »w/Z#ttietiteée s#®ee#ee#eeeese®

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291

U.S. 97 (1934), quoted

with approval, Patterson

v. New York, 432 U.S. 19/7
(1977) E

eeeeeeeeeerse#feesee*ee#e#i#e#e*#e##e*##* #

Speiser v. Randall, 35/7
‘Sh Be: 3° ) a rrr rTrTirri rT R
State v. Carson, 2 Onl1o Dec.
Reprint 81 (Hardin Cty
State v. Champion, lI
St. 281, 142 N.E. 14!
State v. Clifton, 32
Ann 5A 924 9AN NX -
/ « a A 4U% 7 y J ‘ . A
aa (39095 4
-_ ~~ + e*eeeeeee#free#fe#fkeee#*#* *# * ®# 7
State v. Cotton, €
2g 8, 381 N.E.2 1 186
(1978 eeeese*eeneeeveee#eee#e#ee#e#e#ee####s @ 4a
State v. Farmer, 156 hic
14, 102 N.E.2d ll l ]
State v. Hankerson, 288 N
625 990 cc F_2a 8575 (1975
i a how F a oe / «© it o 4 4 7 _ « ~ J
rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233
PSU we 046464660646 6606686666606%
State v. Hardy, 60 Ohl1o Ag
A yi: 107 WOR - 7
Le WA J he 7 J Ye a
1978 a ee ee ee ee ,4

State v. Hogan, 6:
JZy 58 N.E -¥

State v. Humphries, 51 110
St.2d 5, 364 N.E.2d 1354
Sloss are a ee ee

State v. Jones, 47 Ohio 2P ,
2g 8, 351 N.E.2d 798

State v. Kinnemore, 34 Ohi
App.2d 39 (1972 ee ee ae 2

State v. Lafferty, 309 A.

Fo mt PM ys t ee eee

State v. Martin, 21 Ohlo t
J pe 488 Ne Be 2¢ ‘eke

Ce ~ = 1c - a 2 ie 7 os ~
eee & , / ~ ¥ a
- ——-
A ~
mw (FF sneee#ee#e#eeee#e#e#es#e#e#e#ee#ee#e#e#eeee#ee#e

Ms in. ) ¢

State v. Rivers, 50 Ohic
App. 2d 129, 361 N.EI y.
136 Rloes ) ee

State v. Robbins, 58

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STATUTORY PROV

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AUTHOR

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4

John A. Bingham, The Argument

of John A. Bingham, Special
Judge Advocate (Washington

BOGGS) LILLE ccccccccccccecces

I Bishop, A Treatise On
Criminal Law, § 865
subsection 2, vo. 61

OG. L9GZ) ceccccccccccccecces

II Bishop, A Treatise On
Criminal Law, § 17, 2, p.

471 (9th ed. 1982) .........

Black's Law Dictionary (Rev.

Fourth Ed. 1968) ....cceccees

Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England, 1//7-

L7E CLIGS) ccoccccccccccccces

l Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England, Ch. l,

D. 129 (1783) eecccecceseees

4 Blackstone Commentaries on
the Laws of England, Ch.

21, Dp. 289 (1783) cesseeeeee

Comment, "Shifting the Burden
of Proving Self-Defense--
With Analysis of Related
Ohio Law," ll Akron L. Rev.

TLE CLOTS) ccccccccccscceces

Declaration of Independence

st, Treatise of the Pleas
of the Crown 217 (1803)

XVil

t-
©

46

Lay

9,41

Fletcher, “Two Kinds of Legal
Rules: A Comparative Study
£ Burden of Persuasion

ces in Criminal Cases,"
ale L.J. 880 (1968) .... 61

Ss, Jr., The Common
© €Aen? eeeceeee cus

Uy
=
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©
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LaFave and Scott, Handbook on
Criminal Law, § 53, p. 391

(1 72) oe feeee#eeee#ee#eeeee#ee#eeee#eeeé 30

enal Code, Comment to
(Tent. Draft No. 4

=

Model Penal Code § 3.04, p.
GTe Chere? 6644 600666660e00% 47
Note, "The Constitutionality
of Affirmative Defenses
After Patterson v. New
York," 78 Col. L. Rev. 655
CAUTe? 656o654000450086040008 L3

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Qu
D
3

Note, "H.B. 1168: The Bu
of Proving An Affirmativ
2

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nse," 5 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 441 (1980) wccccccceccs

LJ
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27 Ohio Jur. 2d, Homicide,
§ 89, p. 629 (1957) ........ 8

I, Warren on Homicide, § 54,

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SINCE
TUT IONALLY
CONDUCT,

ARGUMENT

I.

SELF-DEFENSE

PROTECTED

Is

CONSTI-
INNOCENT

AN ACCUSED CANNOT BE

REQUIRED TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON THAT ISSUE.

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unusual punishment provision of the Eighth

rs

Amendment. 3 Equally as important, any attempt

to deprive the people of the "right" of self-

a

Jefense by making self-defense criminal would
deny them constitutional rights reserved and
protected by substantive due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment and the rights

With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim, the question

be ranked as’ fundamental." Snyder v.

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), quoted

3. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment--including punishment that is dispropor-
tionate to the "offense." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977). Punishment for any lawful act, including
self-defense, is both disproportionate and cruel and
unusual. See also Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605,
627, n. 35, and 636, n. 49, cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1028 (1981), noting a “plausible argument” could be
made that criminalizing self-defense would violate
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
provision and/or the due process clause.

with

7
ainaties a on
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approval,

Patterson Vv.

7
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New York,

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en

justifiable to resist certain attacks, even
by the death of the assailant, and the party

fwas] without blame." East, Treatise of the

leas of the Crown 217 (1803).

" 1. c ~ "3 a £ " . a x -_
right of sel:r-defense. This phrase 1s not
' .

. sn} te to F eal Fer .

r1cclidental, for tne roots of sel qaqerense run
+ a _ -~ r - £ 0G +

ieep within American common law, finding 1

r y
. Iie * _ al “Amr 7 © Dt

4 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 224, 479

f
. \
ed. 1972); I, Warren on Homicide § 54, at 162 (1914);
I, Warren, supra, at 163:

we

Criminal homicide is the unlawful killing
of a human being . . ." (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added). See also §§ 63, 64, 68.

[, Werren, supra, § 143 t 617; 27 Ohio Jur. 2d,

7
Homicide, § 89, at 629 (1957):

"It is universally recognized that one 1s
not punishable criminally for taking the
Life of another person when he has been put
under the necessity or apparent necessity
ȣ doing so, without any fault on his own

> ; a ior
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Fourteenth Amendment, treated self-defense

as “the acknowledged right o

This right was also recognized in early
Federal case law.

Where rime is committed with
ity . . . those unprotected
by other sanctions .. . [
compelled] . . . to rely upo
physical force for the vindication
of their natural rights. There is
no other remedy and no other
security." United States v.
Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785 (Cir. Ct.
Ky. 1866)

™ ail — am ten S tea 1 » £m
The right to defend one's self is a basic
fundamental right rooted in such basic

qaocuments as the Declaration of Independence,
o vre " 77 ART . +ho }
stating that all men are endowed by their

creator with certain inalienable rights...

6. John A. Bingham, The Argument of John A. Bingham,
Special Judge Advocate (Washington 1865) 13-14,
quoted in Allen, "A Rhetorical Analysis of the
Speaking of John A. Bingham with Emphasis on His Role
in the Trial of the Lincoln Conspirators" (Ph.D
Dissertation, Ohio State University 1963).

7. See also Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 446
(1896); Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563
(1895); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 283
(1894); Gourke v. United States, 153 U.S. 183 (1893);

und Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1894).

:
10

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2 — -~ANCil awa y / Y ¢' aw

society.'" Reed v. State, 11 Tex.
- App. 509, 517 L88z I

United tates v. Morris

reason of self-defense, rightful,
not wrongful, i.e., is lawful,
there is no crime." Griffin v.
Martin, 785 F.2d 1183 (Murnaghan,
J.) (pending following rehearing
en banc).

yo Ninth Amendment i roOornrtnigs
a ih WALL LL AIT LAUAINC liu alLSsoO LeTUVY LIA oC SO

sl @)
ry
O
+
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al infringement which

ngside those fundamental

ifically mentioned in

the first eight constitutional

amendments." Griswold Vv.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488
(1965) (per Justi

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personal security, Boyd v. United States

_

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lanaerina it.” Stoffer v. State, |

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eGo e Li&U Urs

nt), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom, Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.

‘

As stated by the Fourth Circuit:

". . .« it is elementary and
fundamental to our jurisprudence
that killing or wounding in self-
defense is simply no crime at all."
Sarah Thomas v. William D. Leeke,
725 F.2d 246, 250, n. 2 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. _,
105 S.Ct. 18, 83 L.E.2d 148 (1984).

Because self-defense is >A
constitutionally protected right, one

innocence in violation of the principles
enunciated in In re Winship.
Xi.
PROOF OF SELF-DEFENSE NECESSARILY
NEGATES SEVERAL INGREDIENTS OF THE
CRIME OF AGGRAVATED MURDER.
A. Mullaney and Patterson Analysis
Based upon Patterson and Mullaney, the

inalysis appropriate to this case 1s:

| ° - se -~ |
(1) identify the elements of the crime

ae b -~ AtTan
pe prove Il;

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 4. S-

Mu | laney :

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van AW >
- FP See also M
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 686, n. 3: "“whoev
nlawfully Kills ; numa be lina wit! Nall

Sale int, ae I Y

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Cooper v. North Carolina,

Vv. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279, 28 . j
See also Lamb v. Jernigan, | .
6 (lilt 1r. ind Holloway v. McElroy

‘ort . en le

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14 51); see also Robbins v. Stat

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Tre - er ~y ner

At SO LaALeLYy -'@ea NTT . “4 WL GALLON L LI

to. «€6caommit kidnapping, rape, aggravated

arson or arson, aggravated robbery or

robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary

or escape." Ohio Revised Code § 2903.
—

4 ~ r “- “¥ ry 1+ ‘ ‘ =|
Ms. Martin Wa largqged w Violating , or
_ | ‘ow. ny. sn

> JUS.UL(A).

L4. In Ohio yv. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 407 (Cuy.
Co. Common Pleas 1851), the court instructed the jury
as follows in a case of first-degree murder
"(First], murder in the first degree, which
in general is an unlawful killing purposely
and of premeditated malice." Id. at 40

\

(emphasis added).

nrT4, - jas rr maa — —T
ine aerendant in a nomiciae case can

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> ae OL1S! ned na eS A Ny ¥ si ssl w as -

inlawful killing .. ." “Taylor v. State,

Ay
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4 . . > = 4
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the state, of deliberate and premed
‘ m r »lternm / - | [se aeuet 2 \ ma
ited malice emonasis added State v.
James Turner, Wriacnt nio Supreme ly
tot a OF £88 eett : ‘Ve
ecisions) 20, 2 1831), questioned Fuller
y = - ] ; . A ] A “2 aee
v. State, LZ » S23Le BOX Lot :
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WV “

Hamiiton v. ALVIS, } ioD. 298 ;
Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162, syllal
> State v. Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 284, 14
N.E. 141, 142 (1924); see also Graham v. State of
Ohio, 98 Chio St. 77, 81-82, 120 N.E. 232, 233 (191

E. 23 (19]
rm) hot ight of self-defense"]: State v. Vancak,

orf -
LaWlLUsi F1IGnh I 5C Ll | }

st. 211, 214, 107 N.E. 511, 5 114); Stoffer

at. Hina S
N Ge Ll, Ls }

v. State, 15 Ohio St. a ] Le

6. See also R.C. § 2941.

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state, In} St , L187

he

approval in State v. Humphries, 51 h St

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_ = 7T e; + ay . > os —
1/83). Justifiabdl nomicide carried mm
— ~~" : :
a * - m4 . - + ~ —— a Cc ~ ers
enalties, while excusable homicides resulted in t!
4 —, £ ~ , '— | le Th — + ~~
siture of the slayer'’s lands. Ihe concept
er
£ » 444 ~ . a be om, ~ ~ . °.9 -_
rftelture, 2>1n foreliaqan to American law, wai
ar a Po eee
7 a & —— ~ + } . ~ on . Y
“arded and the distinction between jJustifrlabdile an
“IC aH i eQ cf | a lof sco However =light riginally
AWA i. CS ww adi oelense , rlOwe "A=s © — 1an = Or 4 Lnal Ys
. WA 7 A reroaatric rw 5 , 1 Taw
llsappeared. I Bisnop, A Treatise on Criminal Law,

865, 2, p. 614 (9th ed. 1982); II Bishop, supra, §
7, 2, p. 471; Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St.

5, % wie = — : = ? S ” -
der Ohlo law, all actions taken in self-defense are

_— - 7 -~. > ~ q hl ne ~ ; -
istifiable, lawful acts done without rimina]
~ Mf » o . TOA 100
tent. E.g., Erwin v. State, supra, at i94-19
See also LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, §

hs ‘ 4 4

re aon - . "rt y Stat:

vy. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 22 ~B.2c
rev'd om other or s sub nom. Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 43 - = 1977); Commonwealth v

Hilbert, 4/6 Pa. 285, , 32 A.2da /24,

See also

rvty

This common-law presumption O
unlawfulness is still a part of Ohio law.
This is evident from the Ohio Supreme Court's

decision in this case. The Court character-

which "seeks to relieve the defendant from
culpability rather than negate an element of
the offense charged." Martin, 21 Ohio St.2d
at 94. See also Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.2d 865,
877 (6th Cir. 1983).20

Thus, under Ohio law, unlawfulness
(i.e., a crime) is to be presumed from proof
of the elements of the offense, despite the
fact that the accused may have acted in self-
defense. In other words, a lawful act of

self-defense is presumed to be unlawful unless

20. "(Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05(C)(2)'s] use of
the terms ‘excuse' and ‘justification’ strongly
implies that a criminal offense has been
committed--i.e., that all elements of a crime have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the
perpetrator will be criminally liable unless an
‘excuse’ or 'justification' is presented." But see
fn. 17, supra.

i. 5A = + ,ah - . . AnAcCaNnsrsS c
Ce a sea es AD J 1e OLS Ln ° vee
A] —_=" Lo | |= ? 7 ‘a i’ « The Riwiernan , + Dratring Aw
iW©) I a Lie Oe A. + S$ L Ai ots © | \ L Ce WV AALS Fill
Affir itvea Nefaneso " « 1 Yavton IT Paw:
+ a -& ai X y / © LY —_ ’ a | - ¥ a.
44] 4S (1980
“? - # 8 4 UU] e
+ + } Y) -” F ry lc } } . Yr?
A tLe [same -ime, Onl1o’s nigqn Court
r Fine ~ . "Yynowl oac + | rs ~ 1f£O0A F Ao . o-
reLltuses -O acKnowledacde -nla Sselil =Lense 1S
TRHAARnRaGIia* ~ + ari eh + | + - + - on
LNCONSLScent Wl ne Lac a =| Crime

~
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tu
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a
a |

proof of a killina. See Model Penal Code
i - 7
Comment to Section 1.13 (Tent. Draft No. 4,

b--

ee en eae ; a
1955) ("No one can estimate the probabil

that “an intentional homicide ... was or

common-law presumption of unlawfulness to

shift the burden to the accused to prove her

act lawful violates due process.

aS Amicus submits that Ohio's presumption of
unlawfulness must satisfy the beyond a reasonable
doubt test as it is a mandatory presumption. See
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. __, 85 L.Ed.2d 344,
353 (1985) (mandatory presumption is one jury must
infer if state proves certain predicate facts);
accord, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Ohio‘s presumption of unlawfulness is mandatory
because it is established upon proof of the elements
of the offense even though the defendant may have
acted lawfully in self-defense.

C. Self-Defense Negates Criminal Conduct
It is axiomatic that the State can only
punish criminal conduct. E.g., Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). It has been held
Since the 1600s that killing another in self-

defense is conduct which is justified--no

crime has been committed. Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. at 692. This has always been the
law in Ohio. E.g., Marts v. State, 26 Ohio
St. 162 (1875) (Syllabus 2), cited with
approval, State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d
15, 21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1978).

The State of Ohio recognized this
requirement and made allegations of criminal
Or unlawful conduct against Petitioner
Martin. Like alibi, e.g., Stump v. Bennett,
398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1001 (1968); Johnson v. Bennett, 393
U.S. 253 (1968), and even more so than by

accident, e.g., State v. Rivers, 50 Ohio

App.2d 129, 134, 361 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (1977),

-if-defense ‘Stadlishe t it t ic/cu
. rm ' ~~ > > ¥ "4 r > ~ | 7 - - ~4 oo
nm } a one ‘rime a 3. Marts v. State,
: — idee
¢ — + al ( 4 }
- . i he i ; .
Le a ? 7 = lw«s 4 _ “
ALAA ] . ° . WY ic f )
a .'« * «4 “4 — > 7 i + -— a ~ oo -
Rrran maar + o errnynnaniie rnrear snmar ance
4 ‘ ALANA ‘ : . Aid Vw he 4 . AANA - Ad
~4 A } 2 et : - nec ln i . 14 } f
standar he ry ind: se -defense
LANA A y / Ad AM Y he &ALVAO > A 4 a’ -iivo@ ys,
™ 7 ’
> ,aYr . " . icf at=" > or a a Ica i i ake q ’
‘ ‘ ‘ A . A : , ‘ 4\A 4 - / . 7 . 7

Erwin v. State 29 Ohio St. at 199.

-
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‘ ¥ i" y " ; > )
i X v mal i 44 s [ ¢ 4s © =i ic o'wod A
|
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. ‘ i. ¥ A | i AA ‘ > i A*
=: £ } + } +
na ~ *.7 ha ate "1c D “Jac 717
) k Wild j j i A>‘ | Wa oa ¥ «

Mullaney should apply to the case at bar a

: , Pon ee a : wht aaoe
fortiori, where proof f self-defense wo i

D. Self-Defense Negates the Voluntary Act
Requirement

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an uplifted knife," Brown v. United States,

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E. Self-Defense Negates Both General
Intent and the Specific Intent of
Prior Calculation and Design.

General Intent. For crime

nsidered mala in se, it is general]

mens rea and actus reus. See generally Lambert

v. California, 355 U.S. 285 (1975

, and Powel!

v. Texas, 392 U.S 514 (1968

a 7 a '
~rimina labliilt LS
} > an . a oa

- - 4

factors, ‘an evil-meaning mind
[and] an evil-doing hand ....'"™
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 402 (1980), quoting Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251

Yr, in the words of Justice Holmes, criminal
liability is founded on "blameworthiness."

Holmes, The Common Law 50 (1881).24

The Legislature of the State of Ohio
required proof of general mens rea, for the
Legislative Committee Note to R.C. § 2901.22
states that for conviction there must be a
"blame-worthy" mental state--a "guilty state
of mind." Similarly, the Committee Comment
to Ohio Revised Code § 2901 states that an
essential part of any crime must be "a certain

guilty state of mind at the time of his act

24. "[(T]lo constitute a crime against human laws,
there must be first a vicious will, and second, an
unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will." 4
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Ch.
21, p. 289 (1783), quoted with approval, 27 Ohio Jur.
2d, Homicide, § 6, pp. 557-8 (1957). See also State
v. Carson, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 81, 82 (Hardin Cty.
C.P., 1859): "Guilty knowledge is generally, and
criminal intent always, necessary to constitute

- 41 «

Se

7)

A person who acts in lawful self-defen
cannot be said to have a state of mind which
is either "blame-worthy"” or "guilty." On the
contrary, proe@f of self-defense would dis-
prove the existence of such a state of mind.
For example, in State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio
App.2d at 286, 287; 290 N.E.2d at 923, the
Court concluded that: "Clearly, one who kills
in self-defense does so without the mens rea
that otherwise would render him culpable of
the homicide."

Judge Whiteside, of the Ohio Court of
Appeals, has found that:

", . . the existence or nonexistence

of self-defense bears a direct

relationship to the existence or

nonexistence of the required mental
elements of the crime [of aggra-
vated murder]. State v. Robinson,

48 Ohio App.2d 197, 206, 209; 356

N.E.2d 725, 721 (1975) (Whiteside,

concurring), affirmed on other

grounds, 47 Ohio St. 103, 351 N.E.2d
88 (1976).

[jury charge].

As Justice Sweeney noted in his dissent below:
"The affirmative defense of self-defense ;
goes to the mens rea of the crime charged,
whether the act committed was indeed a crim-
inal act." State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d at
96 (A. 43-44),

Applying similar reasoning, former Chief
Judge Edwards of the Sixth Circuit found:

"Criminal intent of aggravated

assault and self-defense are, in

my view, completely irrecon-

Cilable. To require a defendant

to carry the burden of proof on

self-defense is to require him to

disprove criminal intent"

(footnote omitted). Isaac v.

Engle, 646 F.2d at 1136.

Proof of self-defense negates the mental
element of the crime of aggravated murder.
Burdening Ms. Martin with proving self-
defense deprived her of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to require the state to prove
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Prior Calculation and Design.

Petitioner Martin was convicted of aggravated

murder, under R.C. § 2903.01. A critical

element of this offense is "prior calculation
and design.” Saddling the Defendant with the

burden of proving self-defense relieved th

State of its constitutionally mandated burden

v

of proving this element. The conflict between

(

the two is irreconcilable.

The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted

1

the elements of "prior calculation and design"
to require greater thought and control on the
part of the defendant than the previously

utilized elements of "premeditation and

deliberation."

“Instantaneous deliberation is not
sufficient to constitute prior
calculation and design."

"Where evidence adduced at trial
reveals the presence of sufficient
time and opportunity for the plan-
ning of an act of homicide to
constitute prior calculation, and
the circumstances surrounding the
homicide show a scheme designed to
implement the calculated decision
to kill, a finding by the trier of
fact of prior calculation and
design is justified." State v.
Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 49g 2 and

3 of the Syllabus; 381 N.E.2a 186
(1978) ,25

Thus, under Ohio law, if the Petitioner
acted solely upon the instantaneous decision
to preserve her own life, that fact would
negate the element of "prior calculation and
design." This dichotomy between self-defense
and prior calculation and design was aptly
demonstrated by the jury instructions below.

The trial court instructed the jury that
prior calculation and design cannot be found
when a defendant "acts on the Spur of the
moment or after momentary consideration of
- the purpose to kill" (fT. 690; A. 14), yet
self-defense demands "an honest belief .
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm" (T. 700; A. 19), a belief that the

defendant is about to be killed or to receive

25. See also Legislative Service Commission Note
to R.C. § 2903.01 (1973).

great bodily harm" (T. 701; A. 20).26 Only
acts to escape an imminent threat of death

Or serious bodily harm can be grounds for

acquittal. If the imminence of the threat
dissipates, and the defendant is "released
from the danger, .. . the right to use force
in self-defense [is] ended" (T. 702; A. 21).

Self-defense thus cannot co-exist with prior
calculation and design.

"Acting on the spur of the moment
Or after momentary consideration
of the purpose to kill is not
sufficient to constitute the kind
of prior calculation and design
requi-ed for aggravated murder."
(T. 690-691; A. 14)

A killing resulting from an instantaneous
eruption of events "is not one with prior

calculation." State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d

26. “Imminent danger" in this context is further
defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. Fourth Ed.
1968), as “immediate danger, such as mist be instantly

met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for
the assistance of others or the protection of the
law. Or, .. . such an appearance of threatened and
impending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent
man to his instant defense" (emphasis added).

74, 78 (1979) .27 Yet, an act in self-defense
necessarily occurs on the spur of the moment,
arising spontaneously in the face of an
imminent danger. Stoffer v. State, 14 Ohio
St. at 52-53. It is an instantaneous eruption
of events, presenting no opportunity to avoid
the danger. State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d
at 80. The force used by the defender is

"immediately necessary for the purpose of

protecting [her]self." Model Penal Code
§ 3.04, p. 478 (1974) (emphasis added).

To prove the element of prior calculation
and design, the prosecution necessarily must
Saimmaieinn that the defendant's act was not

on the spur of the moment (T. 690; A. 14).

27. The trial court further instructed the jury
that prior calculation and design requires "a
definite process of reasoning in advance of the
killing, which. . . must. have included a mental plan,
involving studied consideration of the method and the
means with which to kill another.” (T. 690; A. 14)
See also Legislative Service Commission Note to R.C.
§ 2903.01 (1983), requiring “studied care in planning
or analyzing the means of the crime, as well as a

scheme encompassing the death of the victim"
(emphasis added). Prior calculation and design is
wholly incompatible with self-defense.

By obliging the defendant to prove she acted

in the belief that she was in imminent
danger," about to be killed or to receive

great bodily harm (T. 701; A. 20), the Ohio
trial court demanded that Earline Martin prove
she acted on the spur of the moment. The
trial court's instruction thus required her
to disprove the essential element of prior
calculation and design, and her conviction
is violative of due process.

The Ohio Supreme Court stated that
Appellant did not dispute the existence of
these elements, including prior calculation
and design. This is inaccurate. In fact,

the Ohio Supreme Court did not independently

The Ohio Supreme Court instead attempted

rely on the characterization of self-

ct
O

lefense in State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18,

19, 294 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973), as a defense

which “admits the facts claimed by the prose-

ct

cution.” Such reliance is misplaced. Poole
involved the defense of accident, not self-
defense, to a charge of the first degree under
the previous murder statute, and simply
identified self-defense as such a defense in
passing. State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d at
19, n. 3. More importantly, all of the cases
which Poole cited in support of this
characterization, and Poole itself, were
decided before the element of prior
calculation and design was legislatively
identified and defined. Therefore, Poole
has no relevance in the determination of the
relationship between self-defense and prior
calculation and design.

Petitioner Martin is not asking this
Court to substitute its own reading of the
term 'prior calculation and design' for that
of the Ohio legisiature or the Ohio courts.

The meaning of the term is evident in both

the Legislative Service Committee notes and

i+ Taeriec? > } " . -~jc my; } 7,
Ohio decisions. The inconsistency between
> as

"prior calculation and design” and sel

defense i

oP

evident upon the face of the jury
instructions in the case at bar. Since prior
calculation and design and self-defense so
obviously negate one another, the principles
of Mullaney and Patterson require that the
judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court be
reversed.

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
__, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (i985),
also warrant a reversal of Defendant Martin's
conviction. "A jury's verdict cannot stand
if the instructions provided the jury do not
require it to find each element of the crime
under the proper standard of proof." Cabana
v. Bullock, U.S. __, 106 S.Ct. 696, 88
L.Ed.2d 704, 715 (1986) (citing Sandstrom).

While the jury received general

instructions as to the prosecutcr's burden

(T. 676, 686-7, 692-693; A. 6, 12, 15), and

the presumption of innocence (T. 676-677; A.
6-7), the jury was also specifically
instructed that the burden of proof is upon
the Defendant to prove the elements of self-
defense by a preponderance of the evidence
(T. 699-700, 703; A. 19-20, 21). Prior
calculation and design and self-defense are
Simply irreconcilable circumstances. Ms.
Martin's jury was thus faced with clearly
contradictory instructions respecting allo-
cation of the burden of persuasion ona crucial
element of the offense, prior calculation and
design. Such "contradictory instructions as
to [an element] create a reasonable likelihood
that a juror understood the instructions in
an unconstitutional manner," Francis v.

Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1976, shifting the

burden of proof from the prosecution to

Defendant Martin. 28

Informing the jury at several points

28. While Sandstrom and Francis both presented
instances of unconstitutional burden-shifting by
means of a presumption, the same due process test of
"the way in which a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction" Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. at 514, must apply to jury instructions
which, by other devices, are challenged as having the
effect of relieving the state of the burden of proof
enunciated in Winship. This test applies regardless
of the device used. "It has been settled law since
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), that
when there exists a reasonable possibility that the
jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of
the law in reaching a guilty verdict, that verdict
mast be set aside." Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct.
at 1976, n. 8. The Stromberg principle clearly
applies to other burden-shifting devices, although
the Court has not yet had an occasion to apply it in
a non-presumption context. The issue was presented
in Patterson. Although this Court concluded its
opinion with the statement that "nothing was presumed
or implied against Patterson," Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. at 216, this Court had granted review in the
absence of a presumptive device to consider whether
"burdening the defendant in a New York State murder
trial with proving the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance as defined by New York law"
offended the constitution. Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. at 198. The Court sustained Patterson's
conviction as no burden-shifting occurred as to an
element of the crime because the affirmative defense
bore no direct relationship to any element of murder.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 201.

The Court's recent opinion in Cabana v. Bullock,
__ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986),
demonstrates the Court's continued application of the
Stromberg test to all circumstances where jurors may

have been led to unconstitutional, or constitu

» $2 «

that the prosecutor must prove prior
calculation and design beyond a reasonable
doubt does not cure the due process violation.
These instructions at best contradicted the
allocation to the defendant of the burden of
proof on self-defense. See Francis v.
Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1975, 1976, and see
also Cabana v. Bullock at 714-715, n. 2. No
instructions were provided the jury that would
lead them to reconcile the conflicting
instructions in a constitutionally permis-

sible manner.

(cont. )

tionally inadequate, decision-making. In Bullock,
the Court used the Stromberg test in ascertaining
whether the capitally sentenced Bullock had been
found by the jury to have actually killed, attempted
to kill or possessed the intent to kill the victim
as required by the Eighth Amendment. See Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The Court found that
a “fair-minded juror . . . could have understood [the
jury instructions] to mean that the jury could find
Bullock guilty of capital murder without regard to
his intent.” Cabana v. Bullock, 88 L.Ed. 2d at 714.
Bullock involved no presumptions, nor burden-
shifting, yet the Court applied the Stramberg
analysis. That same analysis should apply here toa
non-presumptive, but burden-shifting, instruction.

- 53 -

The burden-shifting was repetitive and

e)

permeated the entire charge. The conflict

was inherent throughout the instructions.

innocence in favor of the Defendant (T. 681;
A. 8), they were at the same time specifically

told to convict if the evidence regarding

Re Bh) On these instructions, the jurors
were informed that the state had the burden
to prove prior calculation and design beyond
a reasonable doubt but what the jurors were
not explicitly told was that self-defense
could provide that reasonable doubt. Indeed,
a reasonable juror may well have believed

that Earline Martin had to prove the absence

of prior calculation and design by a

preponderance of the evidence to be
acquitted. 29

Finally, the instructions created
confusion by yet another conflicting duty.
The jurors were instructed: "Before you can
find the Defendant guilty of aggravated
murder, you must find beyond a reasonable
that on or about the 2lst day of July, 1983,
and in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the Defendant

unlawfully and purposely and with prior

29. The jurors received a writter copy of the
instructions (T. 686; A. 11), and therefore had the
Opportunity to review them. It is possible that same
jurors may have disagreed with the judge's instruc-
tions that the Defendant must prove her innocence,
i.e., that her act was in self-defense. However, it
is highly unlikely that such disagreement would have
influenced deliberations. The first instruction the
jury received was that it was their sworn duty to
apply the law as given, and that they "are not
permitted to change the law, not to apply your own
ideas of what you think the law ought to be” (T. 673;
A. 4). One of the last instructions the jury received
was that they "not invad[e] [the judge's] area, which
is relative to the law (T. 705; A. 22). The jury was
also repeatedly admonished not to be "swayed or
influenced by considerations such as sympathy” (T.
673; A. 4-5, and see 704; A. 22). Therefore, even
if some jurors were possibly unhappy with the law's
allocation of burden, they were not permitted the
opportunity to act on those concerns.

- 55 -

rn

calculation and design, caused the death o
another .. ." (emphasis added) (T. 686; A.
12). The jury was told there was a right of
self-defense (T. 702; A. 20-21) and that an

" . }

act performed in self-defense is “justified
(T. 699, 700; A. 19, 20).

Therefore, the jurors were directed that
the prosecution must prove that her act was
unlawful, and yet Ms. Martin had to prove her
act was justified, i.e., lawful. These
instructions are irreconcilable, and a
reasonable juror might well reconcile the two
by placing the burden of proof on the Defendant
to prove her act lawful. This interpretation
offends due process, and this Court cannot,

on this record, be assured this path was not

taken.

III.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE

STATE BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROVING

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE

ACCUSED'S ACTIONS WERE UNLAWFUL AND

NOT IN SELF-DEFENSE.

It is axiomatic that the State may not
convict and punish an accused for a crime
unless it has proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). This fundamental due process
Standard was not met in the instant case.
The State was not required to prove that Ms.
Martin's actions were unlawful and consti-
tuted a crime. On the contrary, Ms. Martin
was required to prove that she acted lawfully
in self-defense.

In Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-364, this
Court identified several vital interests pro-
tected by the reasonable doubt standard: the
liberty and good name of the accused; reducing

the risk of convictions based on factual

error; and commanding the respect and confi-

dence of the community in applications of the

criminal law. As in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. at 700, these interests are implicated
to a greater degree here. Ms. Martin faced
a life sentence and stigmatization as a
murderer if convicted. If acquitted, she
would be set free. Both the consequences to
Ms. Martin and the community's interest in
seeing only the guilty punished required that
the State prove that she acted unlawfully.
Moreover, requiring Ms. Martin to prove

the critical fact in dispute--whether or not

she acted in self-defense--increased the
likelihood of an erroneous conviction. Id.,
at 701. This Court held in Mullaney that:

"[sluch a result contravenes the
principle articulated in Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526
(1958):"

'{w]here one party has at stake
an interest of transcending
value--as a criminal defendant
his liberty--thl[e] margin of
error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the
[prosecution] the burden...
of persuading the factfinder
at the conclusion of the trial

. ." See also In re Winship,

397 U.S. at 370-372 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Id.

See also, Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215.39
Accordingly, due process requires the State
to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the issue of self-defense, a fact so critical
to culpability.

The practical effect of requiring an
accused to prove self-defense by a prepon-
derance of evidence is appalling. Under this
burden of proof, Ms. Martin could have
received a life sentence when it was as likely
as not that she was innocent. As this Court
recognized in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703, this
is an intolerable result in a society where
"it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." See
Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., con-

curring). It can only be remedied by requiring

30. "Such shifting of the burden of persuasion with
respect to a fact which the state deems so important
that it must be either proved or presumed is
impermissible under the Due Process Clause."

the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the accused did not act in self-defense.

(Tt
J
'
D

Otherwise, guilt may be found even where

is a reasonable doubt that the defendant'

7

actions were criminal.

Additionally, under Ohio law a jury must
decide guilt or innocence based on conflicting
and confusing instructions. On the one hand,
the jury is told the accused is presumed
innocent and the State must prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. On the other, the jury
is instructed that the defendant is required

to prove his claim of self-defense by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence. While lawyers

may reconcile those instructions, there is

substantial doubt that lay jurors can.?1 Due
process demands that the jury clearly
understand the proper standard of proof for
deciding guilt or innocence. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85
L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. ,106S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986).
Indeed, the overwhelming number of jurisdic-
tions in the United States have recognized
this fact and require the state to bear the
burden of proof upon the issue of self-

defense. See cases summarized in the Appendix

31. See Comment, "Shifting the Burden of Proving
Self-Defense--With Analysis of Related Ohio Law," 11
Akron L. Rev. 717, 744 (1978). Several courts have
held similar instructions placing the burden of proof
on the issue of self-defense on the defendant to be
conflicting and confusing. See Thomas v. Leeke, 725
F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. __,
105 S.Ct. 218 (1984); Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d
1172 (4th Cir. 1986), reh. en banc granted, _ F.2d
___; State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504 (Maine 1971), and
cases Cited therein; Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54
(Colorado 1962); Lester v. State, 121 So.2d 110
(Alabama 1960); see also Cherry v. Jago, 722 F.2d
1296 (6th Cir. 1983) (Jones, J., dissenting) cert.
denied, U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 3518 (1984).

to this brief at A-4. Placing the burden on
the State to prove the absence of self-defense
has the virtue of relative simplicity and
comports with Winship. See State v. Millet,
273 A.2d at 507.

If this Court is to remain true to the
principles of Winship, it cannot countenance
the conviction in this case under a lesser
standard of proof. The State cannot be per-
mitted to deprive the accused of her liberty
and good name without being required to prove
that her actions were unlawful. Actions taken
in self-defense are not a crime. Before the
State may punish an accused, she must be shown
to be morally blameworthy. See Fletcher,
"Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative
Study of Burden of Persuasion Practices in
Criminal Cases," 77 Yale L.J. 880, at 890,
911 (1968). This is fundamental to basic
notions of due process.

Further, to require the accused to prove

her innocence on the “critical fact in

dispute” compounds the Winship violation. It
not only conflicts with the overriding
presumption of innocence, but increases the
risk that an innocent person will be
convicted. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at
701. It is certainly not a standard of proof
“designed to exclude as nearly as possible
the likelihood of an erroneous judgment."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
As this court said in Winship, 397 U.S. at 364:

"It is critical that the moral force

of the criminal law not be diluted

by a standard of proof that leaves

people in doubt whether innocent

men are being condemned."
Such doubt pervades the instant case.

CONCLUSION

Because an act taken in self-defense is
innocent conduct which is protected by the
United States Constitution, the State cannot
require an accused to bear the burden of proof

on that issue because to do so would require

the accused to prove her innocence in vio-

lation cf the principle announced in In re

Winship. Equally as important, a functional

that proof of self-

W

analysis demonstrate

7)
w
se)
ry
i
| oe
|

OowQar-s

of onfusion between the
instructions upon the state's burden to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the
defendant's burden to prove self defense, it
is clear that the underlying problem was that
the Court found self-defense to be
inconsistent with cuilt.

veaaser V- Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994

1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

Ginia law: no infirmity in
—

eq defendant to establish self-defense
"to the extent of raising... a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not he acted in the
lawful exercise of such right"); Baker v.

Muncy, 619 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1980) [Virginia
law: following Prazier]. See discussion of
Frazier in Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1986) at 1187-1189 (J. Murnaghen)
(pending for rehearing en banc); cf. 1194 (J.
Sneeden, dissenting).

Fifth Circuit

Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1981) [Georgia law: self-defense negates
unlawfulness]; McElroy v. Holloway, 632 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1028 (1981) [Georgia law: self-defense
negates unlawfulness].

Sixth Circuit

Compare Carter v. Jago, 637 F.2d 449
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 J.S. 989
(1982); Thomas v. Arn, 704 F.24G 865 (6th Clr.
1983); Nieb v. Jago, Ah F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210; Jones v.

Jago, 701 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 914; Long v. McKeen, 722
F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1106 (1984); Melchior v. Jago, 723 F.2d
486 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
952 (1984) (Contie, J., concurring), White
v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1986), petition
for writ of certiorari pending, and Wilson
v. McMacken, 786 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1986)

rejecting arguments oe to those
presented in the instant case with Hooper v.
Perini, 641 F.2d 445, 446 ‘6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817; Thomas v. Arn,
704 F.2d 865, 876, on 13 (6th Cir. 1983)
[indicating that self-defense negated the
malice element under the pre-1974 Ohio murder
statute] and Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129,
1136 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Edwards, C.J.,
concurring), rev'd on other grounds sub non.

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1984). It
should also be noted that in Webster v. Engle,
721 F.2d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 1983), and Melchior
v. Jago, 723 F.2d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 1984)
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952, it was indicated
that the question O
stitutional to place the burden of ae

the issue of self-defense was one which

-

was "open" and still not resolved within the
Circult.

Eleventh Circuit

See Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332,
1336 (llth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1024 (1983) {Georgia law: self-defense
negates malice] (dicta).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0273%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.