# Amicus Curiae Brief — Maleng v. Cook

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0251%3A09

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 490 U.S. 488

## Text

inayat 1999
No. 88-357 JA 3
a er 0b, JR.
CLE SK
IN THE bees

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM. I988

NORM MALENG. King County Prosecuting Attorney; AMOS
E. REED. Secretary of the Washington State Department of
Social & Health Services; KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY, Attorney
General.

Petitioners,

MARK EDWIN COOK.
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

ALAN RAPHAEL

Counsel of Record

Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law

| East Pearson Street
Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 670-2935

National Legal Aid and
Defender Association

1625 K Street N.W.

8th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20006

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .... ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE * . >. . >. * . . i
STATEMENT. «. © © © © © © © »@ 3
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
OF ARGUMENT. . .. ++ «© « « 4

ARGUMENT

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY
REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE MR.
COOK WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN HE
FILED HIS PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ...+«++-+e++ee 8

II. THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO
LIMIT THE COLLATERAL USE OF
INVALID PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO
ENHANCE PUNISHMENT FOR A
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE. .. . 11

III.THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE
HOLDINGS OF THE VAST MAJORITY
OF CIRCUITS WHICH ALLOW HABEAS
CORPUS JURISDICTION TO
CHALLENGE A PRIOR FULLY SERVED
SENTENCE USED TO ENHANCE A
LATER CONVICTION. ... . 15

CONCLUS ION >. 7 >. > . >. * . > * 25

Cases

Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96
(2nd cir. 1984) > * > * > > Ll -15,

Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d 184
(llth Cir. 1987) ..... :

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
Di i ate o- 6 « ¢ «6 © 0 Ve
12, 13

, 406 F.2d

Cappetta v. Wainwright
1238 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 846 (1969). ....

Carafas v. LaValee, 391 U.S.
234 (1968) . 2. 2 ee ee eee

, 847 F.2d 616

Cook v. Maleng
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 363 (1988). ......

Cotton v. Mabry, 674 F.2d 701
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1015 (1982) .......

, 458 F.2d 1131
(Sth Cir. 1972). ...+++6+-s

Easterling v. Wilkins 303 F.2d
883 (2nd Cir. 1962)......

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
DTM « 6 6 @ ¢ ¢ © ¢ e «

ii

PAGE
17, 18
15
8, ll,
17
7, 21

17

18

11

PAGE

Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d
404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 907 (1979). ... 23
Harris v. Ingram, 683 F.2d 97
EM: « « © « ¢ © ¢ 22, 23
Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d
115 (7th Cir. 1979). .... . 15, 18, 19
Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d
840 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
426 U.S. 911 (1976). .... "21

Vv j .
411 U.S. 345 (1973)... .. .6, 7, 9, 22
Jackson v. Louisiana , 452 F.2d
451 (5th Cir. 1971)...... 17
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
Ds «62 os 6 6 « 6 « « ..
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
De « < @ 6 © ¢ © ¢ e ¢ 12

, 435 F.2d 1214
(34 Cir. 1970) . ..-. .... 15, 19, 20

Noll _v. Nebraska, 537 F.2d 967

Sem Gab. BOVGde 2 © ce co 23
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968) . >. . >. . . . . . . >. . 10

Preisery. Rodrigues, 411 U.S.
475 (1973)... : — 6, 11

iii

PAGE

Thacker v. Garrison, 527 F.2d 1006
(4th Cir. 1975) o a — — . > _ . 24

Thacker v. Peyton, 419 F.2d 1377
(4th Cir. 1969) . . . . . . . . 15, 23

Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948) >. >. e o _ >. > . > — _ 7 12
Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115
(4th Cir. 1966). . . 2. ss - 24

United States ex rel. Durocher v.
LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S.

998 (1964) . . > . >. >. > . 18
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502 (1954) o > . >. . >. . > . . 4, 14

United States ex rel. Di Rienzo_
, 423 F.2d 224

v. New Jersey
(3d Cir. 1970) . > >. > .* >. > >. 20
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.

443 (1972) . . . . . . . > o 4, 7, 8, 12

Ward v. Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1193 (1985)... . ‘ 24
Williams v. Coiner, 392 F.2d 210
(4th Cir. 1968) ....... 23

, 821 F.2d 1133

Young v. Lynaugh
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 108
= Y errr 15, 16

iv

Statutes

28 U.S.C.

28 U.S.C.

§ 2241)c).

§ 2254

PAGE

19

No. 88-357

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1988

NORM MALENG, King County Prosecuting
Attorney; AMOS E. REED, Secretary of the
Washington State Department of Social &
Health Services; KENNETH 0. EIKENBERRY,
Attorney General,

Petitioner,

MARK EDWIN COOK,

Respondent.

ON WRIT CF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF _
AMICUS CURIAE

The National Legal_Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) is a private, non-

profit organization located in

Washington, D.C., whose purpose is to
ensure the availability of quality legal
services in civil and criminal cases to
all persons unable to retain counsel.
NLADA has a membership of 2,300 legal aid
and defender offices employing
approximately 25,000 professionals and,
in addition, over 1,000 individual
members. The membership of NLADA includes
most public defender offices and legal
service agencies in the nation, as well
as assigned counsel plans and individual
practitioners.

Accordingly, NLADA is vitally
interested in ensuring that indigent
habeas corpus petitioners will continue
to have access to the federal courts to
challenge unconstitutionally obtained
convictions, including convictions used

to enhance later sentences. Counsel for

each of the parties to this case has
consented in writing to the filing of an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
NLADA.

STATEMENT

Petitioner, Mark Edwin Cook, was
convicted of armed robbery in 1958. In
1976, Mr. Cook was convicted of
Washington state crimes. In imposing
sentence in 1978, the Washington trial
court lengthened Mr. Cook's minimum
sentence by two and one-half years
because of his prior convictions.

In his petition for habeas corpus, Mr.
Cook alleged that his 1985 conviction was
invalid because he never received a
competency hearing which had been ordered
by the trial court. He claims that a
determination that his 1958 conviction

was unconstitutional would result in a

reduction of his 1978 sentence.

The district court found no
jurisdiction to consider the challenge to
the 1958 conviction. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. This Court granted certiorari
to address whether a district court has
subject matter jurisdiction over a § 2254
challenge to a prior fully-served
conviction used to enhance a subsequent

unrelated state sentence.

This Court has consistently held that
federal district courts have habeas
corpus jurisdiction to review a
prisoner's constitutional challenge to a
fully served conviction which lengthened

the sentence currently being served. See

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
448 (1972); United States v. Morgan, 346

U.S. 502, 512 (1954). Mr. Cook's
petition presents a compelling case for
habeas corpus relief because the minimum
duration of his 1978 Washington sentence
was increased by several years as a
result of his 1958 conviction. Cook v.
Maleng, 847 F.2d 616, 617 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
The increase in the minimum term on the
1978 sentence requires that the federal
court review his challenge to the 1958
conviction.

The instant petition falls squarely
within the traditional scope of habeas
corpus jurisdiction. The federal habeas
corpus statute requires that the
applicant must be "in custody" when the
application for habeas corpus is filed.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The custody requirement of the statute is

designed to preserve the writ of habeas
corpus as a remedy for severe restraints
on individual liberty. Hensley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 352
(1973). In the present case, the
additional time Mr. Cook will spend in
prison as a result of the 1958 conviction
is a severe restraint on his individual
liberty.

Both the language of the statute and
the common law history of the writ reveal
that the essence of habeas corpus is an
attack by a person in custody upon the
legality of that custody, and that the
traditional function of the writ is to
secure release from illegal custody.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485
(1973).

In the present case, this Court need
not expand the limits of the "in custody"

requirement. See Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (custody found

for petitioners released on bail);
Carafas v. LaValee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)
(custody found for petitioners released
during habeas review); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (custody
found for petitioners serving a term of
parole). Mr. Cook's petition presents a
clear-cut case of custody resulting from
an earlier sentence which, if invalid,
prolongs illegally his stay in prison.
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 448 (1972). See also Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).

Because the use of a prior,
unconstitutional sentence to enhance a
subsequent sentence revives the earlier
violation of the accused's constitutional

rights, the federal courts should retain

habeas corpus jurisdiction to review such
enhanced sentences.

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL FOR LACK
OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE
PETITIONER WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN HE
FILED HIS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
The minimum duration of Mr. Cook's
1978 Washington sentence was increased by
several years because of his 1958
conviction. As a result, the federal
district court has jurisdiction over his
challenge to the constitutionality of his
1958 conviction. If the prior conviction
was obtained unconstitutionally, then the
sentence imposed for the 1978 conviction
was improperly long, an error clearly
appropriate for habeas corpus relief.
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.

443, 448 (1972); see also Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). As the

United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recognized in this case,
habeas corpus jurisdiction extends to
only a limited class of fully served
prior convictions:

{wje do not hold that jurisdiction
afforded by section 2254(a) extends to
all constitutional challenges to prior
convictions upon a showing of some
unfavorable collateral consequence
flowing from the challenged
conviction. The question presented
for our decision is a narrow one,
namely, whether the custody
requirement for habeas corpus relief
is satisfied where a prisoner's prior
conviction, although expired, is used
to enhance the sentence on a current
or future term. We conclude the
custody requirement is satisfied in
such a case. Where the state uses a
prior conviction to enhance a present
or future sentence, fairness requires
that such restraints on individual
liberty be justified.

Cook v. Maleng, 847 F.2d 616, 619 (9th

Cir. 1988), citing Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350-351 (1973).

Amicus curiae asserts that habeas corpus

petitioners are entitled to relief when a

fully-served sentence resulting from an
unconstitutionally obtained conviction
causes a separate conviction or sentence
to be enhanced. Recognizing this right
serves the core purpose of habeas corpus:
preventing illegal detention of an
individual.

In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968),
this Court held that a prisoner may
attack on habeas corpus the second of two
consecutive sentences while still serving
the first. The Peyton Court indicated
that the federal habeas corpus statute
"does not deny the federal courts power
to fashion appropriate relief other than
immediate release." Id. 391 U.S. at 66.
Such relief is required not only when a
prisoner seeks immediate discharge from
confinement but also when he seeks to

diminish the length of that sentence.

10

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
483 (1973) (habeas corpus and not § 1983
is the sole federal remedy to challenge
duration of imprisonment when relief
sought is speedier release).

II. THIS COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO LIMIT
THE COLLATERAL USE OF INVALID PRIOR
CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE PUNISHMENT FOR
A SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE.

This Court has held consistently that
an invalid prior conviction may not be
used to enhance a subsequent conviction.
There is no persuasive reason to abandon
this rule. In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109 (1967), this Court held that a prior
felony conviction, invalid because of a
violation of the right to counsel as
enunciated in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), could not be used to
support guilt under an enhancement

statute. The Burgett Court concluded

that the use of an unconstitutional prior

11

conviction “either to support guilt or
enhance punishment" revives the violation
of the accused's constitutional rights.
Burgett, 369 U.S. at 115. See also Lewis
v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).

In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972), this Court held that

uncounseled prior convictions could not
be used as factors in sentencing for a
subsequent offense. In Tucker, the
habeas corpus petitioner was sentenced in
federal court on the basis of two fully
served convictions regarding which he had
been denied the right to counsel. This
Court stated that a sentence must not be
based on "misinformation of a
constitutional magnitude." Tucker, 404
U.S. at 448. Accord Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). See also

Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)

12

(prisoner was sentenced on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal
record which were materially untrue).
Like the sentence in Tucker, Mr. Cook's
current sentence was in fact enhanced by
a prior, fully-served conviction.

The requirement of both Burgett and
Tucker is that a habeas corpus
petitioner, in custody as a result of an
enhanced sentence, must not have his or
her sentences determined on the basis of
prior unconstitutionally obtained ‘
conviction. Because the use of a prior
unconstitutional sentence to enhance a
subsequent sentence revives the earlier
violation of the accused's constitutional
rights, the federal courts should retain
habeas corpus jurisdiction to review such
enhanced sentences. See Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).

13

In a case nearly identical to the case

at bar, this Court granted a writ of rit. THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE
HOLDINGS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF
error coram nobis to a petitioner CIRCUITS WHICH ALLOW HABEAS
CORPUS JURISDICTION TO CHALLENGE
sentenced as a recidivist on the basis of A PRIOR FULLY SERVED SENTENCE
USED TO ENHANCE A LATER
a fifteen-year-old fully served CONVICTION.
conviction. United States v. Morgan, 346 The vast majority of appellate courts
U.S. 502 (1954). The Court stated: which have considered the enhancement
Although the term has been served, issue have held that there is habeas
the results of the conviction may
persist. Subsequent convictions may corpus jurisdiction for prisoners to
carry heavier penalties, civil rights ;
may be effected. As the power to attack a prior fully-served conviction
remedy an invalid sentence exists, we
think, respondent is entitled to an used to increase the severity of charges
opportunity to attempt to show that
this conviction was invalid. or sentences. Aziz v. Leferve, 830 F.2d
Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-13. 184 (11th Cir. 1987); Young v. Lynaugh,
In Morgan, the district court had 821 F.2d 1133 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
jurisdiction because the prior sentence 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987); Anderson v. Smith,
enhanced the later conviction. Id. at 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1984); Thacker v.
503-04. The case at bar presents a Peyton, 419 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1969).
similar case for jurisdiction. See also Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d

115 (7th Cir. 1979); Lyons v. Brierly,
435 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1970).

14 15

In a decision involving the same issue
as the instant case, the Fifth Circuit
held that a petitioner is "in custody" to
attack a prior fully-served offense used
to enhance a later sentence. In Young v.
Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1987),
the petitioner challenged a 1963
conviction allegedly involving an
improper and uncounseled guilty plea
which resulted in his receiving a life
sentence in 1978 as a habitual offender.
The Court of Appeals stated that "in
custody" for jurisdiction does not
necessarily mean “in custody for the
offense being attacked." Young, 821 F.2d
at 1137. The Young court held that a
federal district court has jurisdiction
when there is "a positive and
demonstrable nexus between a petitioner's

current custody and the allegedly

16

~— =

unconstitutional conviction." Id. See
Craig v. Beto, 458 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th
Cir. 1972) (petitioner in custody if
serving enhanced sentence at time of
filing petition); Jackson v. Louisiana,
452 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1971) (same);
Cappetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1238,

1239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
846 (1969) (petitioner in custody if

prior conviction delayed start of a later
conviction).

In Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals found
jurisdiction for a challenge to a fully-
served sentence for possession of
weapons, alleged to have been based on a
Fifth Amendment violation, which could
have lengthened a contemporaneous felony
murder sentence. The habeas corpus

petition was filed more than four years

17

after the completion of the sentence for

illegal possession of weapons. Anderson,
751 F.2d at 190. See also United States

ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964) (petitioner
confined as recidivist, whose sentence
might be reduced if successful in
attacking fully-served convictions is in
custody); Easterling v. Wilkins, 303 F.2d
883, 884 (2nd Cir. 1962) (same).

In Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d 115
(7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit held
that a prisoner confined pursuant to one
conviction may attack the validity of a
separate, prior conviction if it prolongs
the period of his confinement. In
Harrison, an invalid 1966 conviction
postponed the beginning of petitioner's
1971 sentence. 597 F.2d at 116. Tae

18

Harrison court stated that the invalid
sentence would unlawfully prolong the
restraint on petitioner's liberty, so
that he was effectively "in custody” on
the earlier conviction. Id. at 116-17.
Thus, Harrison was found to be "in
custody” for purposes of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Id. at 117.
Accord Lyons v. Brierly, 435 F.2d 1214,
1215-16 (3d Cir. 1970) (petitioner in
custody to challenge validity of fully-
served sentence which petitioner had been
required to complete and which thereby
postponed commencement of a later
sentence).

In the present case, Mr. Cook does not
seek any expansion of the meaning of the
"in custody” jurisdictional requirement
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas corpus
relief. As the Third Circuit indicated

19

in finding jurisdiction in a similar

case:
we do not deal with the outer limits
which the "in custody” requirement
places on jurisdiction to entertain
writs of habeas corpus. Here the
earlier sentence which is under attack
directly and indubitably affects the
duration of petitioner's confinement
under the second sentences. This is a
clear cut case of custody resulting
from an earlier sentence which if

invalid prolongs illegally
petitioner's stay in prison.

Lyons, 435 F.2d at 1215-16. Accord

United States ex rel. Di Rienzo v. New
Jersey, 423 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1970).

The cases cited by the State of
Washington in support of a contrary rule
are not persuasive. The court in Cotton
v. Mabry, 674 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982), ruled
that a petitioner was not in custody to
challenge a prior conviction even if that
conviction prolonged two present

sentences. The Cotton court erroneously

20

relied on Harvey v. South Dakota, 526
F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976), for the
proposition that "[t)he collateral
consequences of conviction only kept the
case from becoming moot; they did not
suffice to give the federal courts
jurisdiction." Cotton, 674 F.2d at 703.
In fact, the petitioner in Harvey merely
challenged a fully served sentence, not
one used to enhance a later sentence.
526 F.2d at 841. Thus the Harvey
petitioner was not in custody and this
Court's decision in Carafas v. LaValee,
391 U.S. 234 (1968), was fully
dispositive of the issue. Carafas held
that a prisoner is in custody if the
petition was filed before his or her
release from prison or parole. 391 U.S.

at 237-38. Because the petitioner in

21

Harvey Was no longer in custody when he
filed his habeas corpus petition, the
district court lacked jurisdiction over
the petition.

Unlike the situation in Harvey, the
restraints on liberty in a case involving
enhancement are both severe and immediate
because the duration of present custody
continues to be determined by the prior

conviction. See Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 352 (1973).

The state cites Harris v. Ingram, 683
F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1982), as support for
its proposition that custody is not
reestablished by the use of a fully-
served conviction to enhance a later
sentence. Harris, however, is concerned
with venue ar? not jurisdiction. The
Harris court held that a federal district

court in one state may not consider a

habeas petition challenging a prior
fully-served state conviction in that
state when the petitioner is imprisoned
in another state on an unrelated charge.
683 F.2d at 98. Both the decisions on
which Harris relied concerned the proper
venue to challenge a fully-served out-of-

state conviction used to enhance another

state's sentence. See Hanson v. Circuit
Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Noll v.
Nebraska, 537 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1976).
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has held
consistently that a prisoner is in
custody for purposes of habeas corpus
jurisdiction to attack a fully served
sentence used to enhance a subsequent

conviction. See Thacker v. Peyton, 419
F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1969); Williams v.
Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968);

23

Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115 (4th Cir.

1966). See also Thacker v. Garrison, 527
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1975).

Finally, the State relies on Ward v.
Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985), which
is not an enhancement case at all but
concerns collateral consequences in the

parole setting.

24

The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
holding that the custody requirement for
habeas corpus jurisdiction was satisfied
when a petitioner's prior conviction,
although expired, was used to enhance his
current sentence, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN RAPHAEL

Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law

1 East Pearson Street
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 670-2935
COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR AMICUS

CURIAE, National Legal Aid and
Defender Association

Dated: January 31, i989

25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0251%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.