# Opposition Brief — LAURO LINES s.r.l. v. Chasser

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1989
- **Citation:** 490 U.S. 495

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

LAURO LINES s.r.1.,

Petitioner,
v.

SOPHIE CHASSER, ANNA SCHNEIDER, ILSA KLINGHOFFER
and LISA KLINGHOFFER, as Co-Executrixes of the Estate of ®
LEON and MARILYN KLINGHOFFER, VIOLA MESKIN, SEY-
MOUR MESKIN, SYLVIA SHERMAN, PAUL WELTMAN,
EVELYN WELTMAN, DONALD E. SAIRE and ANNA G. SAIRE,
CHANDRIS CRUISE LINES, ABC TOURS TRAVEL CLUB,
CHANDRIS (ITALY) INC., PORT OF GENOA, ITALY, CLUB
ABC Tours, INC., and CROWN TRAVEL SERVICE, INC.,
d/b/a RONA TRAVEL and /or CLUB ABC Tours, and CLUB
ABC Tours, INC., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit

RESPONDENTS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

PIsSCHER, & KAGAN.
Wall Street Plaza
88 Pine Street
25th Floor
New York, New York 10005
Counsel for Respondents
Ilsa Klinghoffer
Lisa Klinghoffer
On the Bret
Jay D. Fischer
Jeffrey D. Marks

er an |

‘
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

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REASONS WHY THE Writ SHOULD BE DENIED... —i*«w” 3
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APPENDIX:
(A) Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circus

GERSEES AGUS ©, GED ccccsccceseccesssucessnal la
(B) Opumion of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

New York entered October 23. 1987... isis I3a

ef

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Alabama Labor Council v. State of Alabama, 453
Sonn ns ccccccecccccs

Bray v. U.S., 370 F. 2d 44 (Sth Cir. 1966) .......... 7
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407 U.S. |

Brewen v. U.S., 375 F. 2d 285 (Sth Cir. 1967).......
Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
EE, Ms vc ccccccccccccccecss 5.6
Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F . 2d 50 (2nd Cir.
ee Ceca cecccoccccccccecs 3,10
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman, 709 F. 2d 190 (3d.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) ...... 4
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949) cert. granted, 336 U.S. 917 (1949)... ... “3.9
Control Data Corp v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 421 F. 2d 323 (8th Cir. 1970).............. x
Davenport v. Adolph, 314 N.W. 2d 432 (lowa 1982),
Ne. ccc cccceccce 6
Dukane Fabrics International, Inc. v. M.V. Hreljin,
600 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ............... 7
Farmland Industries v. Frazier—Parrot Commodities,
806 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir. 1986) .................... 4
Fennell v. U.S., 339 F. 2d 920 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 86S. Ct. 100, 382 U.S. 852, 15 L. Ed. 2d 90. 7
Galaxy Export Corp. v. M/V ‘Hektor’, 1983 A.M.C.
EE 7
In Re Heddendorf, 263 F. 2d 887 (ist Cir. 1959).....
Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm'rs 364 F. 2d
EEE SSIS SEE LIED x
L.F.C. Lessors Inc. v. Pearson, 585 F. Supp. 1362 (D.
ee ee ck ccc cccccccecocces 6

iV

Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F. 2d 928 (Sth
See Ge ov cdusuiduedekssassstebeneelsaaas

TEED cocesdicccecesensensonsedesesadedeseseun

Louisiana Ice Cream Distributors v. Carvel Corp..,
Se We Ae Gee Ce Gh GED Nee dé kcccscesavccse

McQuillan v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di
Navigazione, 386 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff d 516 F. 2d 896 (2nd Cir. 1975)...............

Patterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United
Arrows §.A., 493 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)...

Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985)

Rohren, Hibler & Replogie, Inc. v. Perkins, 728 F. 2d
860 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984).

Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d
Gh CEE + Sh UES ewescennsennduteniesasnesaen

S. Stern & Co. v. U.S., 331 F. 2d 310 (C.C.P.A. 1963)
CR Es rs Gs es cbbdseccenedadsadauas

Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors In Action, 107
Se Gb Gee Gntcccscnadddasdsdekiasacee

ep as ED 565066 0ckcncsesdanetaeusisenn
Death on the High Seas Act, 28 U.S.C. § 761, et segq..

=
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No, 88-23 __

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

LAURO LINES s.r.l.,
Petitioner.

Vv.

2 PHIE CHASSER, ANNA SCHNEIDER, ILSA KLINGHOFFER
and LISA KLINGHOFFER, as Co-Executrixes of the Estate of
LEON and MARILYN KLINGHOFFER, VIOLA MESKIN, SEY-
MOUR MESKIN, SYLVIA SHERMAN, PAUL WELTMAN,
EVELYN WELTMAN, DONALD E. SAIRE and ANNA G. SAIRE, |
CHANDRIS CRUISE LINES, ABC TOURS TRAVEL CLUB,
CHANDRIS (ITALY) INC., PORT OF GENOA, ITALY, CLUB
ABC Tours, INC., and CROWN TRAVEL SERVICE, INC.,
d/b/a RONA TRAVEL and /or CLUB ABC Tours, and CLUB
ABC Tours, INC.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit

RESPONDENTS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents Ilsa Klinghoffer and Lisa Klinghoffer respectfully request
that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorarn, seeking review of the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case. That
opinion is reported at 844 F.2d 50.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court Appeals for the
Second Circuit officially reported at 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988)
is printed in the Appendix at la-i2a. the decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dictated in open Court on October 21, 1987, not offi-
cially reported, is printed in the Appendix at 13a-17a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Lauro Lines s.r.!. (“Lauro Lines’’) is the suc-
cessor by merger to Achille Lauro de Altri-Gestione m/n
‘Achille Lauro” s.n.c. (*ALA"’) and Societa de Fatto Achille
Lauro ed Altri-Gestione Armatoriali Nava Noleggiate
(“EAL”), partnerships whose offices were located at Via C.
Columbo 45, Naples, Italy. ALA owned the Italian-flag
ACHILLE LAURO. Since February, 1982 both partnerships
were in Italian reorganization proceedings. On July 28, 1986
all members of the Lauro group, including these partnerships,
were merged into one company, i.e., Lauro Lines s.r.|. The
merger was deemed retroactive to February, 1982.

On Septmber 14, 1984 ALA time chartered the ACHILLE
LAURO to a joint venture composed of FAL and Chandris
S.A. (Piraeus). The Joint Venture operated the Vessel as a
cruise ship. Tickets were sold to passengers worldwide.
Chandris S.A. (Piraeus) was reponsible for the United States
market. It retained Chandris, Inc. in New York to promote
bookings and distribute tickets to interested travel agents, and
others.

In October, 1985 the ACHILLE LAURO was hijacked by
terrorists while on a cruise in the Mediterranean. The cruise
commenced at Genoa, Italy, and it was scheduled to termi-
nate at that port. The ticket held by each passenger contained
32 provisions. Among them was the following:

2

Art. 3I—VENUE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS—
All controversies that may arise directly or indirectly in
connection with or in relation to this passage contract,
must be instituted before the judicial authority in Na-
ples, ee eee ee Samay OG oe
pressly renounced and waived .

Beginning in November, 1985 certain American passengers
(and the representative of a deceased passenger) brought a
series of suits in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York against Lauro Lines, Chandris.
and Crown Travel Service, Inc. (“‘Crown’’). Jurisdiction was
based upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1332, and.
the actions are also within the District Court's admiralty ju-
risdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333.*

On November 17, 1986 Lauro Lines filed a motion for an
order dismissing all actions against it on the grounds of lack
of New York in personam jurisdiction, the ticket forum se-
lection clause, and forum non conveniens. Defendants
Chandris and Crown joined the motion to dismiss on the ba-
sis of the forum clause. Plaintiffs in all actions opposed the
motion.

On October 21, 1987 following oral argument. the District
Court denied Lauro Line's motion. With respect to the forum
selection clause, the District Court stated, in part:

I find that the ticket does not give fair warning to the
American citizen passenger that he or she is renouncing
and waiving his or her opportunity to sue in a domestic
forum over a contract made and delivered in the United
States.

App. 6a.

*The Chasser action (85 Civ. 9708) (diversity of citizenship): the
Klinghoffer action (85 Civ. 9303) (diversity of citizenship and the Death
on the High Seas Act, 28 U.S.C. 761 ef seq.); the Saire action (86 Civ.
6332) diversity of citizenship); the Meskin action (86 Civ. 4657) (no ju-
rsdiction allegation in the Complaint).

3

On October 23. 1987 the Order denying enforcement of the
forum clause wa’ entered by the District Court.

On November 20, 1987 Lauro Lines filed its Notice of Ap-
peal from that portion of the Order denying enforcement of
invoked under the collateral final order doctrine of Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) cert.
granted, 336 U.S. 917 (1949). Chandris and Crown filed sim-
ilar Notices of Appeal. All cases were consolidated for pur-
poses of the appeal.

On January 29, 1988 plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.

On April 7, 1988 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit granted the motion for an order dismissing
the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Second Cir-
cuit concluded that:

The order at issue here is not appealable under the col-
lateral order doctrine, Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines,
844 F.2d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1988).

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED
THE INSTANT CASE IS NOT THE PROPER CASE TO
DECIDE THE QUESTION PRESENTED
Petitioner relies on Rule 17: 1(a) of the Supreme Court Rules
stating that one of the character reasons considered by the
Court in determining whether to exercise it discretion to re-

view by writ of certiorari ts:
When a Federal Court of Appeals has rendered a deci-
sion in conflict with the decision of another federal court
of appeal on the same matter... .
The key words are ‘same matter’. In the instant case, the
contract is one of adhesion, not normally reviewable by the
consumer. This matter does in fact differ from the decisions

4

in the other Circuits and as such is not in conflict. The Courts
recognize that the various sophistication levels of the con-
tracting parties and the likelihood to review a forum selection

Four Courts of Appeals, exclusive of the Court below. have
considered the question whether an order denying enforce-
ment of a forum selection clause is appealable as a collater-
ally final order. A common thread running through the facts
of each case has been that the contract examined was of a
type which is ordinarily subject to extensive review .'

The current facts indicate that the plaintiffs were not ade-
quately directed to the terms inside the ticket by defendant.
Whether a notice on the face of a ticket is sufficient to “draw
the passengers attention to the conditions’ within, and
thereby incorporate those conditions into the ticket/contract.
depends upon the particular circumstance of each case and
the ticket involved. It is not uncommon for a Court in the
process of scrutinizing a ticket (in order to determine a defen-
dant carner’s motion to dismiss) to engage in consideration
of such minutia as the shape of the ticket. how it is bound.
the number of pages. the placement of each phrase. the size
of the type utilized, the number of columns of print. the lan-
guages used and the color of paper and ink employed.
McQuillan v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 386
F. Supp. 462 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd. 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1975).

' Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman.. 709 F.2d 190 (3rd Cir, 1989). cert
demed, 44 US. 938 (1983) involving a commercial building contract
Farmiand Industries v. Frazier-Parrot Commodities, #06 F 2d 84% (th
Cur 1986) involving a commercial commodities contract. Lowisiana | «
Cream Distributors v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031 (Sth Cir 1987) involv.
ing sales distribution. retail and license agreements. Rohrer Hibler &
Replogie. Inc v Perkins, 728 F.2d 860 (7th Cir, 1984). cert. denied 469
LS 890 (19%4) involving an employment contract

5

The Achille ticket has but one reference on the outside of
the ticket directing passengers to read the terms, including
Art. 31, within. It is far from certain that the Achille Lauro
ticket ‘reasonably communicates the importance’*? of a term
in conditions of passage. a term which would require a pas-
senger to return to Europe to have their day in Court.

Public policy argues against contracts of adhesion which
lay venue outside the United States. In Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Company 407 U.S. 1 (1972) the Court stated that
forum selection clauses are ‘prima facie valid and should be
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party
to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”’ /d. at 10.

The Zapata holding that forum selection clauses are prima
facie valid can be distingushed on the facts in the same man-
ner the four decisions of the other Courts of Appeals can be
distinguished from that of the Court below. Critical to the
Court's holding in Zapata is that:

The choice of (the London) forum was made in an arms-
length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated
businessmen, and absent some compelling and counter-
vailing reason it should be honored by the parties and
enforced by the courts.’ Jd. at 12.

Under the facts of Central Contracting Co. v. Marviand
Casualty Co., 467 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966) cited by the
Zapata Court to define reasonableness, “mere inconvenience

McQuillan. at 466.

' Zapaia wmvolved a contract between an ocean-towing tug service based
in Europe and an American offshore drilling concern The Bremen was
to tow a large. barge mounted. drilling ng from the Gulf of Mexico to the
North Sea In route the ng was damaged and the Bremen put into port at
Flonda The contracts to tow placed venue for any litigation in London
Zapata attempted to litigate in the U.S Evertually the Supreme Court
gave the forum selection clause effect.

6

or additional expenses’’ were found insufficient to constitute
a test of unreasonableness in a forum selection clause. This is
logical in the context of a commercial contract ‘since it may
be assumed that the plaintiff (i.e., the party resisting the fo-
rum provision) received under the contract, consideration”
for any such expense or inconvenience. /d. at 344-45. There
is room to argue that an unsophisticated tourist should not be
held to the same standard of reasonableness. Cf. L.F.C. Les-
sors Inc. v. Pearson, 585 F. Supp. 1362 1364 (D.Mass. 1984).*

The Achille plaintiffs were not dealing with the defendants
at arms length and surely, if confronted directly with the fo-
rum selection clause at Art. 31, would have hesitated to ac-
cept the contract.

The court in Davenport v. Adolph, 314 N.W. 2d 432, (lowa
1982), 31 A.L.R. 4th 395, 403, surveyed the attitude of differ-
ent jurisdiction's choice-of-forum provisions and reported
that such provisions ‘‘are less likely to be sustained if they
appear in adhesion contracts prepared in advance by one of
the parties and will generally be disregarded if genuine incon-
vemience or inadequacy of remedy would ensue from them‘

* In L.F.C. the defendant opposed a forum selection provision. The court
upheld the provision after finding that the defendant was not an “unso-
phisticated consumer but a businessmen

* Cruise tickets are without question adhesion contracts. “‘The ticket is
what has been called a contract of ‘adhesion or a ‘take or leave it’ con-
tract. In such a standardized or mass production agreement with one
sided control of its terms, when the one party has no real bargaiming
power, the usual contract rule, based on the idea of ‘freedom of contract
cannot be applied rationally For such a contract is ‘sold not bought’
The one party dictates its provisions, the other has no more choice in
fixing those terms than he has about the weather “Seigelman v
Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955)

;

In contrast is New York Southern District's clear position
that ‘Courts in this District have consistently found that it is
not unreasonable to enforce a choice of forum provision em-
bodied within a standard printed form.’’ Dukane Fabrics In-
ternational, Inc.v. M.V. Hreljin, 00 F. Supp. 202, 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). The District Court cites two cases in sup-
port of this proposition.® All three cases are commercial in
nature-contracts, which involve sophisticated parties and
which would ordinarily be subject to extensive review. None
involve passenger contracts for a cruise ship.

The question posed by Petitioner is very broad. Whether a
given forum selection clause is appealable must rest on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Should this Court feel
that the Circuits which have decided the issue, none of which
have addressed adhesion contracts and unsophisticated par-
ties thereto, are in conflict, then a case similar to those de-
cided by the conflicting Circuits should be used to finally
decide the issue. This case is not suitable for the question.

THE APPELLATE PROCESS IS PROCEDURAL IN
NATURE THUS ENABLING EACH CIRCUIT TO
ESTABLISH ITS PROCEDURAL PRACTICE.

An appeal from the judgment of a Federal District Court ts
a matter of right.’ However, the Court of Appeals must grant

© Galaxy Export Cor. v. M’V “Hektor”, 1983 A.M_C 2637 (S.D.N.Y 1983),
Patierson. Zochonis (U.K) Lid. v. Compania United Arrows $.A., 493

F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
’ Bray v. U.S. 370 F.2d 44, 46 (Sth Cir, 1966) See. also, Brewen v. U.S.,

375 F.2d 285, 286 (Sth Cir. 1967); Fennell ». U.S., 399 F.2d 920, 922
(10th Cir, 1965), cert. denied % S. Ct. 100, a2 U.S. 852, 1S L.Bd.2d 9

permission for a litigant to appeal to that Court. The granting
of permission may at times occur in an informal fashion but
ordinarily is accomplished by explicit order. If no application
is made to it within the time specified by statute, no appeal
can be taken.” The statutory criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 “In-
terlocutory Decisions’ do not literally apply to the Court of

. In Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., $42 F.2d 928, 929 note 2. (Sth Cir
1976) the plaintiffs sought relief from the judgment under Civil Rule
“4 b) while an appeal was pending After demal of rehef. the plaintiffs

* Failure to file an application with the Court of Appeals within the

'' S.Rep. 2434, 85th Cong.. 2d Sess., 1958, in 1998 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News S255, $257.

es “Although it is not incumbent updn this court to express our reasons for
granting or denying an application for permission to take an interlocu-
tory appeal, we do so in the present case.’ Kraus v. Board of County
Road Comm'rs, ¥64 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966).

Appeals.'* The implication of the appellate process is cer-
tainly that it ts one of procedure.

Although Petitioner bases his appeal on the collateral final
order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp..,
337 U.S. 541 (1949) rather than on the strict interpretation of
28 U.S.C. § 1292, the appellate process as explained remains
the same.

The Court of Appeals for each Circuit may establish its
own appellate procedure. The United States Code provides
in part that:

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent
with the Acts of Congress and rules of practice and pro-
ry aaa See SA.
$2071.

stantial rights of litigants be not unduly circumscribed. S.
Stern & Co. v. U.S., 331 F. 2d 310, (C.C.P.A. 1963), cert.
denied, 84 §. Ct. 1169.

The question becomes whether the substantial nghts of lit-
igants in the instant case have been unduly circumscribed.
The order below points to | sre being no reason why denial
of a motion to dismiss on the basis of a contractual forum

'* “Although the statute does not expressly lay down standards to guide
the Court of Appeals in its exercise of judicial ‘discretion’. & would
seem that the appellate court should at least concur with the distnct

selection clause should be any less subject to correction upon
appeal from a final judgment then are demals of motions for
dismissal on grounds of improper venue or of forum-non-
conveniens. Chasser, 844 F.2d at 54. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the mere fact that ultimately it might ap-
pear that an interim reversal would have been more efficient.
or that the party against whom the order 1s entered may have
difficulty in persuading the Appellate Court to reverse after a
final judgment, is not reason to grant immediate review.
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors In Action, 07 S. Ct.
1177 (1987). The Court succinctly stated in Richardson—
Merrell inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 4356 (1985):

“The possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may
umpose additional litigation expense 1s not sufficient to
As ts evident from these decisions, the consequences which
would accompany the demal of enforcement of a forum se-
lection clause are not considered as unduly circumscribing
the nghts of litigants thereby prohibiting the courts from pre-
scrnbing thei individual appellate rules on the matter.
Without restating the cases on which Petitioner relies to
undicate conflict between the Circuits, should this Court in
fact determine that there is such a conflict. this conflict is
permissible pursuant to the rule making power afforded the
various Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C.A. $2071.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted

Jay D. Fischer

Fischer & Kagan

Wall Street Plaza

88 Pine Street

25th Floor

New York, New York 10005
Counsel for Respondents

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 1987

(Argued: February 16, 1988 Decided: April 7. 1988)
Docket Nos. 87-9081, -9083, -9085, -9087, -9089, -9091

SOPHIE CHASSER, ANNA SCHNEIDER, ILSA KLINGHOFFER
and LISA KLINGHOFFER, as Co-Executrixes of the Estate
of LEON and MARILYN KLINGHOFFER, VIOLA MESKIN,
SEYMOUR MESKIN, SYLVIA SHERMAN, PAUL WELTMAN,
EVELYN WELTMAN, DONALD E. SAIRE and ANNA G.
SAIRE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

ACHILLE LAURO LINES, THE LAURO LINES s.r.1., FLOTTO
ACHILLE, CHANDRIS CRUISE LINES, ABC TOURS
TRAVEL CLUB, S.N.C. ACHILLE LAURO ED ALTRI-
GESTIONE MOTONAVE ACHILLE LAURO IN AMMINISTRA-
ZIONE STRAORDINARIA, COMMISSARIO OF THE FLOTA
ACHILLE LAURO IN AMMINISTRAZION® STRAORDINA-
RIA, CHANDRIS (ITALY) INC., PORT OF GENOA, ITALY,
CLUB ABC Tours, INC., and CROWN TRAVEL SERVICE,
INC., d/b/a RONA TRAVEL and /or CLUB ABC TOuRS,

Defendants.

2a

LAURO LINES s.r.1., CHANDRIS CRUISE LINES. CLUB ABC
TOURS, INC., CROWN TRAVEL SERVICE, INC.. d/b/a/
RONA TRAVEL and/or CLUB ABC Tours. and CLUB
ABC Tours, INC..

Defendants-Appellants.

Before:

KEARSE and MAHONEY, Circwit Judges,
and GLASSER, District Judge*

Motion to dismiss appeals from an interlocutory order of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Louis L. Stanton, Judge. denying motion of de-
fendant Lauro Lines s.r.|. to dismiss actions on ground that
contract provision required suit to be brought in Italy.

Motion granted.

—

MORRIS J. EISEN, P.C.. New York. New
York (Arthur M. Luxemberg, New
York, New York), for Plaintiffs-
Appellees Sophie Chasser, Anna Sch-
neider, Viola Meskin, Sevmour Meskin.
Sylvia Sherman, Paul Weltman. and
Evelyn Weltman.

WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR & SOLIS-COHEN.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (Fischer.
Kagan, Ascione & Zaretsky, New York.
New York), for the Klinghoffer
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

WILLIAM P. LARSEN, JR... New York. New
York, (Newman, Schiau, Fitch & Burns.
P.C.. New York, New York), for the

* Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. sitting by designation

3a

Saire Plaintiffs-Appellees.
RAYMOND A. CONNELL, New York, New
York, (Healy & Baillie, New York, New

York), for Defendant-Appellant Lauro
Lines s.rJ.

KIRLIN, CAMPBELL & KEATING, New
York, New York (Daniel J. Dougherty,
New York, New York), for Defendant-
Appellant Chandris Cruise Lines.

RUBIN, Hay & GOULD, P.C., Framingham,
Massachusetts (Rodney E. Gould, Fra-
mingham, Massachusetts, A. George
Koevary, Parker & Duryee, New York,
New York), for Defendant-Appellant
Crown Travel Service, Inc., d/b/a Rona
Travel and/or Club ABC Tours.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Lauro Lines s.r.l. (“Lauro”), et ail., appeal
from an interlocutory order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Louis L.
Stanton, Judge, denying Lauro’s motion to dismiss the
present actions on the basis of forum-selection clauses in the
ticket agreements between Lauro, owner of the cruise ship
ACHILLE LAURO. and plaintiffs, who were or represent pas-
sengers on the ACHILLE LAURO. The clauses provided that
any suit by passengers against Lauro was to be brought in
Naples, Italy. Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the appeals
for lack of appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons below, we
grant the motion.

BACKGRO''ND

4a

Mediterranean cruise in October 1985 when it was hijacked
by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(‘*PLO”’). The passengers were held captive and terrorized
by the PLO, and they have brought the present actions, in-
formally consolidated below, to recover damages for physical
and psychological injuries and for the wrongful death of Leon
Klinghoffer.

Lauro moved to dismiss the actions on several grounds,
including the ground that a forum-selection clause in each
passenger ticket required plaintiffs to bring these suits in Na-
ples. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. With
respect to the forum-selection clause, the court stated that
the touchstone for enforceability was ‘‘whether the ticket
reasonably communicates the importance of its contract pro-
vision.’’ Transcript dated October 21, 1987 (**Tr.**), at 3. The
court described the “cover reference’’ to the forum clause as
‘“‘unobtrusive’’ and noted that the clause itself appeared in
“tiny type."’ /d. at 4. Further, the court noted that though
the ticket provided that the passenger ** ‘specifically
approves’ ©’ certain clauses, the forum-selection clause was
not among them. /d. at 5. In addition, though there was a
place for the passenger's signature at the bottom of the con-
tract, apparently none of the tickets was signed. In sum, while
the district court termed the question of adequacy of notice a
close one as to which reasonable persons might differ, id. at
4, it concluded that *‘as a whole . . . the ticket does not give
fair warning to the American citizen passenger that he or she
is renouncing and waiving his or her opportunity to sue in a
domestic forum over a contract made and delivered in the
United States,”’ id. at 5. Accordingly, the court denied the
motion to dismiss.

Lauro and two other defendants have appealed the court's
refusal to dismiss on the basis of the forum-selection clause.
Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the appeals on the ground
that the denial of the motion for dismissal is an interlocutory
order that is not appealable under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 (1982).
Lauro, which made no effort to have the court’s denial on

Sa

forum-selection grounds certified for immediate appeal pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982), argues that that denial is
a final order insofar as it determines where the litigation will
be conducted and that it is immediately appealable under
§ 1291 pursuant to the Cohen doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). We conclude that
the order is not appealable and we therefore dismiss the ap-

peals.

DISCUSSION

Section 1291 gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to re-
view ‘“‘final decisions’’ of the district courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. The district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss,
which leaves the controversy pending, is not, technically, a
final decision within the meaning of this section. See, e.g.
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 236 (1945). The Cohen
doctrine, on which Lauro here relies, is a judicially created
exception that allows an immediate appeal from certain or-
ders that are collateral to the merits of the litigation and that
cannot be reviewed adequately after final judgment. As the
Supreme Court has described it,

[t]he collateral order doctrine is a ‘‘narrow excep-
tion,’’ . . . whose reach is limited to trial court orders
affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the ab-
sence of an immediate appeal. See Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500, 506-508 (1979); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 660-662 (1977). To fall within the excep-
tion, an order must at a minimum satisfy three condi-
tions: It must “conclusively determine the disputed
question,’ ‘resolve an important issue completely sep-
arate from the merits of the action,”’ and “‘be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”

Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1985) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).

The narrowness of the collateral order doctrine reflects ju-

dicial deference to Congress's preference against piecemeal
appeals, as well as the recognition that judicial efficiency may

-

6a

be promoted by the denial of interim review because some
interlocutory orders will have become moot by the time a
final judgment is entered, either because the order is modified
prior to final judgment, or because the party disadvantaged
by the interlocutory order prevails in the action, or for some
other reason. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors
In Action, 107 §. Ct. 1177, 1184 (1987) (‘‘Stringfellow’’);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 544 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court has made
it clear that when an interlocutory order will be reviewable
on appeal from a final judgment, the mere fact that ultimately
it might appear that an interim reversal would have been more
efficient, or that the party against whom the order is entered
may have difficulty in persuading the appellate court to re-
verse after a final judgment, is not a reason to grant immedi-
ate review. In Stringfellow, for example, a party that had
been allowed to intervene in an action on condition, inter
alia, that it not assert new claims sought to appeal immedi-
ately from the imposition of conditions on its intervention.
Though it conceded that it would have the right to a review
of the conditions upon appeal from the final judgment, it ar-
gued that the practicalities of complex and protracted litiga-
tion would make an appellate court reluctant to vacate the
judgment on the basis of an erroneous intervention order.
The Court was unpersuaded that this consideration should
lead to disregard of the Cohen requirement of effective
unreviewability on appeal from final judgment. As the Court
succinctly stated in Richardson-Merrell Inc. y. Koller, *‘the
possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may impose
additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the
finality requirement imposed by Congress."’ 472 U.S. at 436.

This Court too has generally been reluctant to apply the
Cohen doctrine in an expansive fashion, *‘lest this exception
swallow the salutory ‘final judgment’ rule."’ Weight Watchers
v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.
1972); see, e.g. Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. v.
Lau, 825 F. 2d 647, 651 (2d Cir. 1987): C arlenstolpe v. Merck
& Co., 819 F 2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1987): United States Tour

———

7a

Operators Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 556 F. 2d 126, 128
(2d Cir. 1977). For example, our decisions indicate that this
doctrine does not permit immediate appeals pursuant to
§ 1291 from orders denying motions to dismiss on grounds of
improper venue, see A. Olinick & Sons vy. Dempster Bros.,
Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 442-44 (2d Cir. 1966), or forum non
conveniens, see Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d at
35-36.

We have not previously considered the applicability of the
Cohen doctrine to the denial of a motion to dismiss on the
basis of a contractual forum-selection clause. Some of our
sister circuits have concluded that such a denial is immedi-
ately appealable, see Farmland Industries v. Frazier-Parrott
Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1986): Coastal
Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190,
193-97 (3d. Cir.) (‘‘Coastal Steel’’), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
938 (1983), while others have concluded that is not. see Lou-
isiana Ice Cream Distributors v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031.
1032-34 (Sth Cir. 1987); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v.
Perkins, 728 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
890 (1984). We are persuaded that the latter view is correct
because we believe the refusal to dismiss on forum-selection
grounds is not ‘effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.”’

The Third Circuit in Coastal Steel came to the conclusion
that the district court’s refusal to enforce a contractual
forum-selection clause was unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment because 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1982) provides that
*[t]here shall be no reversal in the Supreme Court or a court
of appeals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement which
do not involve jurisdiction." We do not agree that § 2105
makes a refusal to enforce a forum-selection clause unreview-
able after final judgment or, if it did have that effect, that it
would allow such a refusal to be reviewed at an earlier state.

If § 2105 were to be taken literally and did preclude review
of such denials after final judgment, we would be at a loss to
understand how there could properly be interim review any

8a

more than review after final judgment, for ‘‘no reversal’’ has
a rather categorical flavor. Coastal Steel's rationale was that
§ 2105 could not have been intended to preclude interim re-
view pursuant to the collateral order doctrine because that
doctrine had not been devised in 1789 when the first progen-
itor of § 2105 was adopted. See 709 F.2d at 196. We find this
rationale unpersuasive for two reasons. F irst, if Congress has
indeed made a certain type of order immune from review. the
courts simply are not free to ignore the congressional limita-
tion. See, e.g., Thermtron Products, Inc. y. Hermansdorfer,
423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976) (order remanding removed action to
State court on grounds provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)( 1982)
is made unreviewable by id. § 1447(d), and thus may not be
reviewed). Second, the Cohen doctrine. which interprets fi-
nality within the meaning of § 1291, is concerned with the
timing of review; it assumes reviewability in principle and
focuses on the practical difficulties entailed by postponement
of review. The doctrine has not. to our knowledge, been used
to review at any time an order of a type that Congress has
made unreviewable in principle.

Further, assuming that § 2105 applies to forum-selection
motions, if the section were taken literally, it would forbid
review of even the granting of a motion to dismiss on forum-
selection-clause grounds, for that section does not forbid re-
versals just of denials of motions in abatement; it forbids
reversals of any nonjurisdictional ““ruling’’ upon a matter in
abatement. We have seen no authority supporting the propo-
sition that such a dismissal, which would, of course, be a
final decision in the litigation, is unreviewable.

It appears to us, however, that § 2105 is not to be taken
literally. Commentators have called it ‘‘one of the most com-
monly ignored provisions of the Judicial Code,”’ noting that
its *‘most important feature . . . is certainly its disuse."’ 15 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 3903, at 412, 413 (1976). This seems an accurate ob-
servation, for assuming, as did Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at
196, that ‘matters in abatement’’ means any (nonjurisdic-

9a

tional) ground for dismissal that would leave the parties free
to pursue the suit in another forum, that category would ap-
pear to encompass matters such as motions to dismiss on
grounds of improper venue or forum non conveniens; yet both
grants and denials of those motions are commonly thought to
be reviewable on appeal from final judgment. See, e.g., Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (review of
grant of forum non conveniens motion); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (same); In re Air Crash Di-
saster, 821 F.2d 1147, 1166-68 (Sth Cir. 1987) (en banc) (re-
viewing denial of motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 6, 1987) (No.
87-750); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 819 F.2d at 35-36:
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967) (review of denial
of motion to dismiss for improper venue); Gill v. United
States, 184 F.2d 49, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1950) (same); Corke v.
Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978)
(reviewing denial of motion to transfer venue); Central Val-
ley Typographical Union, No. 46 v. McClatchy Newspapers,
762 F.2d 741, 744-46 (9th Cir. 1985) (reviewing both grant by
first district court of a motion to transfer venue and denial by
transferee district court of a motion to transfer to a third dis-
trict).

We see no reason why denial of a motion to dismiss on the
basis of a contractual forum-selection clause should be any
less subject to correction upon appeal from a final judgment
than are denials of motions for dismissal on grounds of im-
proper venue or of forum non conveniens. The Supreme
Court has held that a forum-selection clause in a commercial
agreement “‘should control absent a strong showing that it
should be set aside.’’ The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 519 (1974). Such a clause thus grants an important
right that should be recognized unless the party resisting en-
forcement shows the clause to be unreasonable. We would
think, therefore, that if the district court has erroneously

10a

failed to enforce such a clause. its order may be reversed
when the judgment is finally appealed.

Perhaps the most pertinent case decided by our Court is
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. vy. Garage Employees Union.
Local 272, 791 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1986), an appeal from a final
judgment enforcing an arbitration award. The ground of the
appeal was that the district court had refused to enforce a
contract provision that required arbitrators to be selected ina
certain way from among a certain group. Noting that ‘‘anal-
ogous contractual forum section clauses are ordinarily bind-
ing and enforceable unless the party resisting them. . . shows
them to be unreasonable,”’ id. at 26, and ruling that no show-
ing of prejudice was required by the party seeking enforce-
ment of the clause, we reversed the judgment enforcing the
award entered by the ‘“‘wrong”’ arbitrator. and we remanded
for entry of an order directing the parties to place their dis-
pute before an arbitrator called for by the contract. Plainly,
therefore, in the context of arbitration clauses, which are a
type of forum-selection clause, this Court has viewed the re-
fusal to enforce as a matter that is fully reviewable on appeal
from the final judgment.

We reject Lauro’s suggestion that the right granted in a
forum-selection clause, if enforceable, must be vindicated
immediately or it is lost. It is a right to have the binding
adjudication of claims occur in a certain forum; it is not a
nght of the same magnitude as a constitutional right to be
free from double jeopardy, see Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. at 660-62, or the right to be free of any trial whatever,
see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530 (qualified govern-
mental immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. at 506-08
(Speech and Debate immunity). The rights to escape any trial
or any further trial are rights that would be lost unless vindi-
cated at a pretrial state. In contrast. the right to secure adju-
dication in a particular forum is not lost simply becuse
enforcement is postponed. And, as noted above, the fact that
postponing review may entail additional litigation expense has

lla

been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for
immediate appeal. 5

Since we conclude that the district court's denial of Lauro’s
motion to dismiss on the basis of the forum-selection clause
in the passenger tickets will be effectively reviewable on ap-
peal from final judgment, we need not decide whether the
first two Cohen requirements are met. We conclude that the
order at issue here is not appealable under the collateral or-
der doctrine.

Our recent decision in Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York
Convention Center Development Corp., Nos. 87-7306, et al..
slip op. 1431, 1434-36 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 1988), does not suggest
a contrary result. In Karl Koch, we held, relying on Pelleport
Industries v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 278 (9th
Cir. 1984), that a district court's enforcement of a contractual
forum-selection clause, by remanding a removed action to
State court, was appealable under the Cohen doctrine. Unlike
a refusal to enforce, with which we are presented here, the
Karl Koch enforcement finally decided the forum-selection
issue in a way that made the decision unreviewable on appeal
from the final judgment simply because the litigation was no
longer proceeding in federal court.

Finally, we reject Lauro’s fall-back suggestion that we have
jurisdiction of these appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1982). That section allows appeals of interlocutory orders
that grant or deny (or otherwise deal with) injunctions. We
do not regard the denial of a motion to dismiss on forum-
selection grounds as the equivalent of the denial of a motion
for an injunction within the meaning of § 1292(a)(1). Further.
even if such a denial were tantamount to the denial of injunc-
tive relief, we would grant the present motion to dismiss, for
the Supreme Court ‘has made it clear that not all denials of
injunctive relief are immediately appealable; a partly seeking
review also must show that the order will have a ‘* ‘serious, —
perhaps irreparable, consequence,’’ and that the order can be
“effectually challenged’’ only by immediate appeal.’
Stringfellow, 107 S. Ct. at 1184 (quoting Carson v. American

12a

Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (quoting Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955))) (em-
phasis ours). See also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 56 U.S.L.W. 4243 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988).
Since, for the reasons discussed above, we have concluded
that meaningful appellate review of the present order will be
available after final judgment, assuming that judgment is ad-
verse to Lauro, § 1292(a)(1) provides no basis for immediate
appeal of the present order.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Lauro’s arguments in support of
immediate appealability and have found them to be without
merit. The appeals are dismissed.

l3a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
85 Civ. 9303
October 21, 1987
12:55 p.m.

LEON KLINGHOFFER, ET AL..

Plaintiffs,
v.

ACHILLE LAURO, ET AL..,
Defendants.

Before:

HON. LOUIS L. STANTON,
District Judge

DECISION

Appearances

JAY D. FISCHER,
MORRIS EISEN,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
LAWRENCE W. SCHILLING,
RAYMOND A. CONNELL,

DANIEL J. DOUGHERTY,
RODNEY GOULD,

Attorneys for Defendants

l4a

[2] (In open court)

THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. And thank you all for
excellent briefs on the points involved in this motion.

They have been expressed in writing and orally with clarity
and vigor and style, and admirably cover the great variety of
aspects involved.

In ruling on the motion in a somewhat laconic fashion, I do
not wish to be taken as disregarding any of the areas pre-
sented in the papers or orally, but do so because I feel no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by expanding my
explanation beyond the points which I regard as decisive.

As to jurisdiction over Lauro, this question arises under
New York*‘s Long Arm Statute, which requires a showing of
a continuous and systematic course of doing business here
such as to warrant a finding of Defendant Lauro’s presence in
this jurisdiction.

Mere solicitation of business through an agent is not
enough, although if solicitation is present, in any substantial
degree, very little more is necessary to the conclusion that
business is being done.

The argument presented on this motion, since it is common
ground that solicitation of business was being done, lies in
the fact that Lauro’s agent for-sales [3] and marketing here
was Chandris, Inc., which had authority to confirm some
cabins on the Achille Lauro, and which had been at least
instrumental in part in obtaining for Crown Travel its author-
ity to confirm other space.

In addition, Chandris, Inc., has been responsible for effect-
ing changes in the Achille Lauro’s itinerary, and in some de-
gree to the accommodations of the vessel itself. Chandris,
Inc., issued tickets for confirmed space, for money which
was received and deposited in an account it maintained for
Lauro’s name, and Chandris, Inc., also handled at least on
various occasions the adjustment of passenger complaints.

lSa

There are other activities alluded to, including the volume
of passengers which was booked and the amount of money
involved, but taken as a whole, those of Chandris, Inc.'s,
activities are in themselves sufficient to bring Lauro within
the jurisdiction of this court, and that ground of the motion is
rejected.

I turn now to the ticket condition, as it has been referred
to, which is directed to Clause 31, and which raises a ques-
tion over which the courts have enjoyed 90 years of litigation
since The Majestic.

Under the cases, the touchstone is whether the ticket rea-
sonably communicates the importance of its contract provi-
sion.

[4] In this case, that is a close question. It is one upon
which reasonabie jurists, lawyers, and laymen might differ.

On the one hand, arguing for giving effect to Clause 31,
there are the facts that the reference on the cover is clear and
noticeable, and preceded by the word in solid capital letters,
‘*IMPORTANT.””

The sheet containing what is stated to be the terms and
conditions of contract of passage falls out of the ticket in a
manner that attracts the passenger's attention to it, and, fur-
thermore, as mentioned in at least one of the cases, there is
the sensible understanding, that the passenger must be taken
to understand, that these intricate provisions in Italian and
English were not printed simply for the fun of it, but had
legal meaning which affected the contract of passage.

On the other hand, the cover reference is unobtrusive
rather than eye-catching. It merely draws attention to the ship
owner's terms and conditions, and does not explicitly state
that the ticket represents a contract affecting the passenger's
substantial rights.

If its tiny type is read, Clause 31 carries an importance
beyond the importance of clauses dealing with short statutes
of limitation.

16a

While a statute of limitations clause can be [5] examined
after the accident when the importance of the contract as a
whole is apparent to all, the effect of Clause 31 is immedi-
ately and irrevocably to divest the passenger's right to sue
anywhere except before the judicial authority in Naples.

Yet, the contract is at least indirectly ambiguous on that
point. For unlike the time limitation Clause 27, Clause 31 is
not included in the list of clauses of which the passenger
‘specifically approves.”’ ,

Finally, there is a place for the passenger’s signature at the
bottom of the contract, a provision which as far as appears
has been entirely disregarded by both parties to the contract.

On the question, then, as a whole, I find that the ticket
does not give fair warning to the American citizen passenger
that he or she is renouncing and waiving his or her opportu-
nity to sue in a domestic forum over a contract made and
delivered in the United States.

That brings me to the final ground for the motion, the fo-
rum non conveniens argument, which is raised in a case in
which there are in this forum Chandris, Inc., every plaintiff,
of whom all are United States citizens, and Crown Travel,
and all the initial parties to the suit. The contract was made
here and delivered here.

As against that arguing for transfer there are [6] three seri-
ous considerations offered. The first is the location of Lauro’s
crew witnesses. These matters always involve balancing. On
balancing their travel here it would not appear to me to im-
pose such a burden as to upset the plaintiff's choice of forum.

The other body of witnesses located in Italy, who have
been referred to as the terrorists, do not appear to me to be
sO important to the issues in this case as to justify its transfer
to Naples.

Finally, there is the question of the application of Italian
law, and as to the ultimate application of Italian law in this
action, I make no ruling at this time.

17a

What issues Italian law might govern is a point as yet some-
what unclear, nor does there appear at this point any partic-
ular difficulty in ascertaining or applying Italian law to the
extent it may properly be required, and, therefore, I do not
find that that factor either separately or in concert with the
others justifies transfer under forum non conveniens.

Accordingly, the motion is denied, and will be so endorsed
for the reasons stated. Thank you very much.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0224%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.