# Reply Brief — Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0184%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1986
- **Citation:** 476 U.S. 227

## Text

=— —>-- eee
i

Cuyer a (niyrt. |S.

riLB#s &

2 NOV 27 1985
No. 84-1259 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
IN THE Ree aus
Supreme Court of the United States
ae
October Term, 1985
el

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

BY AND THROUGH ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

a

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

——
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
(sae a

JANE M. GOOTEE, Esq.
Counsel of Record

JAMES H. HANES, Esq.
BERND W. SANDT, Esq.
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
1111 Washington Street
Midland, Michigan 48674
| (517) 636-2663

Counsel for Petitioner

Interstate Brief & Record Co., Suite 731, David Whitney Building, Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 962-8745

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

pe er ee
ARGUMENT:

I.

Il.

Ill.

IV.

EPA UNREASONABLY INTRUDED INTO THE
DETAILS OF DOW’S SECURED, DEVELOPED IN-
DUSTRIAL FACILITY — EPA DID NOT MERELY
OBSERVE OUTDOOR ACTIVITY. ........

EPA’S AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PROMOTES NO
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.

THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT
CORRESPOND TO THE FACTS. __........ . .. .

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FAR EXCEEDS THE
SCOPE OF EPA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

a ee re. ee ee

‘i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES:

Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (ISF@ . wc cece eeenn 8
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) ........ 13
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ....... 10

DuPont v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
rr 16

Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Company, 283
U.S. 663 (1963) 2. eee c oe end eeeeeee 17
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)...... 7,8
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .... 13, 14

Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 416
U.S. GOP ...ccccesss enn 16

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) 3, 7, 9, 17
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 80 L.Ed.2d 214

(199G) 0... cc cv evvevece cau ee 3, 4, 7
State v. Davis, 627 P.2d 492 (Or. App. 1981) .... 14
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) .......... 8
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)... 9, 10
United States v. Karo, _ U.S. —., 82 L.Ed.2d 530

0 Pee 8, 9, 13
United States v. Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Ha.

Perr rr 13, 14

ee 13, 14

ili

PAGE
United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
Eee a wobec ce ses bcc c eee 3
United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir.
DESC GG Sb ese csc esc ee cece 3
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir.
PE eases sc crc cece secs 13, 14
STATUTES:
es eg wc cee te ee ee ee 11
6 he ets ee ee 15
Ee 1, 10
ie ow... 8... 11, 16, 17
Ee 11, 16
SE og wo ce tee ee eee 16
eS ss bc oe cee tc ec ee 16
REGULATIONS:
St ee ec ct ct os 14
ein so tcc tees 17
EE eee 11
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
re 1, 3, 9, 17
MISCELLANEOUS:
Federal Prying From The Sky, NATION’S BUSINESS,
IE, go ccs ccc cc ee ence 13

MANUAL OF COLOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY,
American Society of Photogrammetry (1968) 15

iv

Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939) ........... 16

The EPA’s Eye In The Sky Has Companies Seeing
Red, BUSINESS WEEK, October 28, 1985,

No. 84-1259

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ss

October Term, 1985
aa

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BY AND THROUGH ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

a
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
—

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
ao

Dow believes that EPA’s surreptitious acquisition of
detailed aerial reconnaissance photographs of Dow’s
entire manufacturing facility for use as evidence in
enforcement litigation (A. 31-32) is both contrary to Sec-
tion 114 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7414) and an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. EPA completely bypassed the Judiciary and
engaged in its intrusive quest for evidence — despite
both Dow’s explicit refusal uf consent for a repetitive on-
site inspection with a camera (A. 29), and a Dow/EPA
discussion about the need for a search warrant (Pribila
Affidavit, Exh. A, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 120).

The government does not find fault with the holding
of the Court of Appeals that Dow has a reasonable

2

expectation of privacy from ground level intrusion (Pet.
App. A-8). The government does not argue that the
Dow facility is an open field from an aerial perspective.
The government does not assert that the Dow facility is
anything other than a secured, developed commercial
structure. The government admits “that aerial photo-
graphy allows more to be seen than mere observation
from the air by the unaided human eye” (Gov't. Brief,
p. 21). However, the government argues the case on
hypothetical facts — that is mere outdoor activity and
mere observation, and then erroneously concludes that
the principles applicable to mere observation of visible
property also control intrusive aerial photography (Gov't.
Brief, p. 7). Aerial observation with the naked eye is not
at issue.

When applied to the facts of this suit, the cases and
authorities cited by the government are either not appli-
cable or they support Dow.

ARGUMENT

EPA UNREASONABLY INTRUDED INTO THE DETAILS OF
DOW’S SECURED, DEVELOPED INDUSTRIAL FACILITY
— EPA DID NOT MERELY OBSERVE OUTDOOR ACTIVITY.

The government incorrectly and persistently mischar-
acterizes the case by utilizing such terms as “outdoor
activity” or “outdoor plant” (over 40 references) and
“observation” or “viewing” (over 90 times). Those terms
are surely intended to prompt the Court to think of the
Dow property as an open field rather than the secured,
developed industrial facility that it is. The characteriza-
tion of EPA’s sortie as a mere observation or viewing
ignores both the fact that the aerial photography cap-

3

tured vivid detail beyond the perception of the human
eye or mind (Pet. App. B-27; Gov't Brief, p. 21), and the
fact that no EPA personnel were even in the plane to
observe or view the Dow facility.

Oliver v. United States, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 224-225, and
n. 8, 10, 11 (1984)' confirms that secured commercial
structures such as the Dow property are enclaves that
should be free from arbitrary government interference
while open and undeveloped “open fields” are not so
protected.

Before discussing what arguments the government
made and what arguments are conspicuous by their
absence, the case should be put into perspective.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Dis-
trict Court that Dow has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from ground level intrusions (Pet. App. A-8). The
Court of Appeals then created an internal inconsistency
in its own opinion and reversed the District Court's
summary judgment ruling on the basis that from an
aerial perspective, the Dow facility is “like open fields”
(Pet. App. A-9). But for the open fields analogy, the
Court of Appeals would have found that EPA’s actions
constituted a search, that Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978) controls, and that Dow’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated (Pet. App. A-5). The Court of
Appeals is clearly in error in holding that Dow’s Mid-
land facility is an open field from the air.

' Contrary to the statement on page 4 of the government's brief,

the District Court made its ruling not only on the basis of the panel
decision in United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981), but
confirmed the correctness of its ruling (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 223), in
response to EPA’s Second Motion For Reconsideration (Dist. Ct. Dkt.
218), which was based on the en banc Oliver decision, 686 F.2d 356
(6th Cir. 1982), which reversed the panel decision.

4

As depicted in Photograph 3 of the Sealed Joint
Appendix”, Dow’s Midland manufacturing facility covers
4500 acres (about 2000 are inside the fence line) and
includes 710 buildings and open-air structures which are
connected by nearly 40 miles of roadways, where thou-
sands of employees in 80 production plants (all within
the fence line) manufacture about 500 products. It is
hard to imagine a more secured and developed man-
ufacturing complex (Pet. App. B-19-21). The degree of
development is reflected in the more than $10 million in
property taxes the Dow Midland manufacturing facility
pays each year. This is not the “unoccupied or unde-
veloped” open fields referenced in Oliver, supra at 225,
n. 10.

Photograph 1 in the Sealed Joint Appendix depicts
one of the dozens of open-air plants in the secured Dow
Midland facility. An “open-air” plant is a three-
dimensional commercial structure which encompasses
the production equipment and know-how and which
does not have a traditional roof. Plants are designed as
open-air production processes for reasons of worker
safety, economics and industry custom (A. 59-60, 64-65,
71-72 and 74). For instance, routine maintenance in the
plant shown on Photograph 1 requires cranes with 100-
foot booms to move equipment weighing up to 50 tons
(A. 75). A roof is not needed and would be totally
impractical from an engineering standpoint (A. 74). With
respect to the issues in this case, physical “protection”
from mere aerial observation is unnecessary since the

2 Contrary to the assertion in n.5 on p. 18 of the government's
brief, Photograph 3 is a Dow photograph and not a photo taken for
EPA. Photograph 3 is representative of what a person would “ob-
serve” unaided from the air. It, and a demonstrative enlargement
found at Dist. Ct. Dkt. 172, was used to easily distinguish between
“mere observation” and the intrusive, detailed EPA aerial Photo-
graphs 1 and 2.

5

complexity and the smallness of the detail is its own
protection from the unaided aerial human eye (cf. Photo-
graph 1 versus Photograph 3).

Private homes and outbuildings are clearly depicted
on Photograph 1 (one of many EPA photographs
showing non-Dow property). The homes are in the
lower right-hand corner of the photograph. Moving
“up” the photograph, one traverses the county road, the
Dow 8-foot fence, the berm (roughly 50 yards in from
the fence; part of the snow-covered berm is hard to dis-
tinguish since it parallels the afternoon sun rays and
does not create a shadow), and then enters the 30-acre
production plant (A. 74-76). Turning to Photograph 2,
which is a 60% overlap of Photograph 1°, the manufac-
turing plant is now in the lower part of the frame and
Dow’s West Side Power Plant (one of the targets of
EPA’s quest) is “above” the production plant.

Looking at the 30-acre manufacturing plant on either
Photograph 1 or 2, it is easy to see how interrelated the
two major buildings (the building with the tan roof in
the “upper” portion of the plant, and the building
housing the control room with the flat, snow-covered
roof near the center of the plant) are to the other con-
tiguous parts of the commercial structures which com-

* Contrary to n.i on p.3 of the government's brief, the two
frames selected as representative of what EPA did and what Dow
was trying to protect were frames 9505 and 9506 — not 8505 and
9506. The consecutive frames are important because it is the 60% for-
ward overlap (A. 43) that allows stereoscopic viewing which shows
depth (e.g., the height of tanks) (Lake Depo. I, pp. 82-83, Dist. Ct.
Dkt. 41). Such work is done with original contact prints, as Photo-
graphs 1 and 2, not with enlargements. Photointerpretive analysis
was requested by EPA on the photos of Dow (A. 44). EPA people
with experience in photographic analysis, enhancement or reconnais-
sance examined the photographs (A. 36). Both frames 9505 and 9506
were enlarged 10x and 20x for demonstrative purposes (See, Dist.
Ct. Dkt. 171, under seal).

6

prise the production process. In fact, Photograph 4
shows that process equipment abuts the control room
building, which is the snow-covered roofed structure in
the upper right corner of the photograph.*

Photograph 4 also shows that walking through the
plant is similar to walking on a city street lined by tall
buildings. Contrary to the government's statement on
p. 49 of its brief (substituting, of course, the phrase “de-
tailed aerial photography” for mere “observation”), the
authority expressly conferred on EPA to enter premises
at ground level for specific purposes is undoubtedly not
more intrusive than detailed aerial photography. Such
surreptitious photography amounted to a nonparticular-
ized, general, fence-to-fence search which captured
much more detail of the entire 2000-acre secured facility
than an on-site inspection ever could.

The minute details of the plant which are so important
to Dow, which are not visible by aerial naked-eye obser-
vation, and which establish the constitutionally-offensive
intrusion in this case, are contained on the original EPA
contact prints — Photographs 1 and 2 in the Sealed Joint
Appendix. The government, apparently forgetting that it
made enlargements of the very plant in question (Dist.
Ct. Dkt. 15, under seal)*, attempts to cloud the issue

* The Dow enlargements were made for demonstrative purposes
such as this. Photointerpreters use the original contact prints for
their work — not enlargements such as Photographs 4 or 5.

> EPA made three complete sets of contact prints along with 50
2 x enlargements (5 each of 10 frames) (A. 42). At page 3 of its brief
the government leaves the impression that only one significant
enlargement was made. A number of the enlargements of the power
house made by EPA depict the exact manufacturing facility shown in
Photographs 1 and 2 of the Sealed Joint Appendix (Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15).
The government erroneously states that Dow made the only enlarge-
ments of consequence and also that Dow does not assert the exis-
tence of private information in the pictures of the power plants (e.g.,
Gov't. Brief, pp. 28, 31 and 40 n. 27).

7

and persuade the Court that the offensive detail is only
on the Dow enlargements (Gov't. Brief, pp. 27-28).°
Using hand-held magnification and the orig wl EPA
contact prints, the Dow plant manager discerned items
and equipment as small as '2-inch in diameter (A. 53-54).
Of course, that is not surprising since a naked-eye study
of those original contact prints reveals both power lines
and their shadows.

NOWHERE IN ITS BRIEF DOES THE GOVERNMENT
ARGUE, OR CITE ANY AUTHORITY, THAT THE DOW
FACILITY IS AN OPEN "IELD. The government does dis-
cuss cases such as Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924) and Oliver, supra, but it never relates those cases
to the facts of this case. Rather, the government gives
“secured, open-air commercial structure” the extremely
loose translation of “outdoor activity or plant,” and
equates “intrusive, detailed aerial photography” with
“observation or viewing,” and hopes for the best.

Dow urges the Court to think “secured, developed
open-air commercial structure” and “detailed aerial pho-
tography” whenever the government uses the terms
“outdoor plant or activity” and “observation.”

The government does not argue that the Dow prop-
erty is anything other than a secured, developed indus-
trial facility. That fact alone takes the case out of the
Hester “open field” ambit and places it within the pur-
view of Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra. The fact that the
“windows” in the Dow structure open to the vertical,
rather than the horizontal, perspective is of no constitu-
tional significance. The significance is the exploitation of

© Whatever detail is depicted on the enlargements is also neces-
sarily found on the original contact prints. The government implies
(p. 29) that by “manipulating” and enlarging the photos Dow
somehow created new images not captured on the original EPA
photos.

8

technological advances to intrude into a secured, devel-
oped commercial structure to reveal details about the

__interior of the premises that could not have been
obtained by mere visual surveillance. United States v.
Karo, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, 536, 541-2 (1984) reh. den. 82
L.Ed.2d 942.

The government on page 21 of its brief admits that
“aerial photography allows more to be seen than mere
observation from the air by the unaided human eye.”
Conspicuous by its absence, the government does not go
on to argue that the photographic detail it captured of
the Dow facility — detail that far exceeded the capabili-
ties of the unaided human eye — was not intrusive
surveillance into a secured, developed commercial
structure.

Rather, the government ignores the facts of the case
and basically argues that “observation” ought to be
allowed.” Then, with no distinctions as to quality, pur-
pose or authority re aerial photography, the government
arrives at the sweeping but unsupportable conclusion
that “[t]he same principles [concerning government
aerial observation] apply when a photograph is taken
from an airplane flying overhead” (Gov't. Brief, p. 7).

Since this is neither a “plain view” nor an “open field”
nor a “mere observation” case, cases such as Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), Air Pollution Variance Board v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), Hester v. United
States, supra, and the many marijuana overflight/mere

” The government ignores both its admission that aerial photo-
graphy is more powerful/intrusive than mere observation and the
fact that the EPA did not even attempt to “observe” the Dow plant.
A contractor was hired to take about 100 color shots of the entire
Dow facility for the express purpose of capturing the details of the
operation for use as evidence and for photointerpretive work (A. 32,
39, 43, 44, 46).

9

observation cases cited in the government's brief do not
support the government’s argument. Here, the govern-
ment used technology to intrude into the non-visible
details of Dow’s secured facility. The technology of a
certified mapping camera did not merely enhance the
human visual sense, as a flashlight does; it goes far
beyond human capabilities and accomplishes a feat no
moving, airborne human eye could do. The camera per-
ceived and captured minute detail, the smallness of
which is protection from mere human aerial observation.
The surreptitious use of a technological aid to intrude
into a secured commercial structure, into details not dis-
cernible by visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Karo, supra at 541.

A search occurs when there is an unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion upon a reasonable expectation of
privacy; a seizure occurs when there is a meaningful
interference with a possessory interest in property.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94
(1984). The laws protecting trade secrets and Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), were cited by Dow in
its Brief on the Merits to buttress the already-strong
argument that Dow’s expectation of privacy in the non-
public details of its secured commercial structures was
an expectation that society deems reasonable. The gov-
ernment’s argument beginning on page 37 of its brief
concerning the capturing of trade secrets or. the photo-
graphs misses the point. It is the intrusive surveillance
of detail (trade secret or otherwise) beyond the purview
of the naked eye that constitutes the Fourth Amendment
violation. The Fourth Amendment violation exists inde-
pendently of the capturing of any Dow trade secrets.

Dow’s motive in this case is to protect its trade secrets
(assets) and commercial competitiveness. Dow’s interest
is to preserve its right to privacy and right to be free

10

from unreasonable government search in the form of
intrusive aerial photography.

Il.

EPA’S AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PROMOTES
NO LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.

“{T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on ...
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). There are no legitimate gov-
ernmental interests to balance against the severe intru-
sion upon Dow’s privacy in this case. In addition, aerial
photography is not a “law enforcement practice.” The
EPA’s action was entirely unchecked and without rea-
sonable safeguards.

As stated in its Brief on the Merits, Dow believes that
aerial photography as a site inspection technique is
totally outside of EPA’s statutory inspection authority. 42
U.S.C. § 7414.

EPA promoted no legitimate governmental interest in
this case. The photographs showed no smoke coming
from the powerhouses (A. 31), and thus they were
worthless as evidence in the enforcement action. The
aerial photography was a wholly ineffective technique
that lent no assistance to any legitimate governmental
function.

When the nature and quality of the intrusion on
Dow’s Fourth Amendment rights are balanced against
the government's actions in this case, EPA’s conduct is
clearly unreasonable. Cf., United States v. Jacobsen, supra
at 101. There are no governmental interests, much less
important ones, proffered to justify the intrusion. In

11

fact, long before the overflight the government had all
the evidence against Dow that it needed (A. 27-28).

The nature and quality of the intrusion clearly estab-
lish constitutionally offensive scrutiny. The magnitude of
the surreptitious, continuing intrusion is shocking. The
agency did not take one brief look at specific structures
in the Dow facility in which they arguably have an in-
terest. The agency conducted an exploratory search of
the entire 2000-acre Dow facility, permanently capturing
in vivid detail Dow personal property not otherwise
exposed to view.

EPA had a number of alternatives to aerial photo-
graphy. For instance, under section 114(a)(1) of the
Clean Air Act the Administrator may require any site
owner to maintain records, make reports and provide
such other information as required. 42 U.S.C. § 7414
(a)(1). As the record reflects, Dow had provided all the
schematics and diagrams of the powerhouses that EPA
requested prior to the time of the overflight (A. 25, 28).
EPA had requested no further information from Dow.

The giving of information to the EPA (as opposed to
surreptitious taking by EPA) allows the owner to claim
trade secret protection according to 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c)
and 40 C.F.R. 2.201, et seq. Otherwise, as in the case of
aerial photographs and photointerpretive reports, un-
marked documents are considered to be in the public
domain and available under the Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) to the extent the requestor is willing
to pay for reproduction (Trakowski Depo., pp. 26-30,
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 42).

In its nonchalant discussion of its possession of the
intimate details of Dow’s raison d’étre, the government
(Gov't. Brief, pp. 9, 40) attempts to lessen the actual
intrusion upon Dow’s rights and privacy. However, in

12

the two months after the flyover and before the film and
photos were placed under seal, the EPA shipped the
film and photos to and from their photographic labs in
Las Vegas via airline baggage/air freignt (A. 41; Beyer
Depo., p. 79, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30). Once the film and en-
largements were back in Chicago, the enlargements
were kept on heating ducts, on the floor and hung on
office walls, which offices had no doors (A. 52-53; Roth-
blatt Depo., pp. 36-37, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33). The pictures
were seen by other than “need to know” persons (Roth-
blatt Depo., pp. 54-55, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33; Beyer Depo.,
pp. 79-83, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30).

All of the film, prints and enlargements were to be
placed into the custody of the District Court and under
seal per a stipulated order entered April 7, 1978 (A. 3;
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15). Despite that order, EPA “found” an
“extra” roll of prints in its possession in July, 1978 (Lake
Depo., p. 100, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 41). Contrary to the gov-
ernment’s position (pp. 9, 40), EPA’s actions with
respect to Dow’s personal property do cause Dow great
concern.

Although the government asserts (p. 45) that aerial
photography “materially assists” EPA in “the exercise of
important governmental functions,” the government
never offers an explanation of how it materially assists
or what important government functions it references.
On the bottom line it boils down to the fact that the
government had no need (or authority) for its actions
and it has nothing but empty rhetoric in defense of its
unauthorized, intrusive conduct.

13

THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTS DO NOT
CORRESPOND TO THE FACTS.

In addition to confusing mere observation and detailed
aerial photography, the government attempts to put aerial
photography rather than its own conduct under scrutiny
(Gov't. Brief, p. 32). This is not a case against aerial
photography any more than a wiretap case is against the
equipment employed, or a murder case is against the
gun or other weapon, or other surveillance cases are
against telescopes or beepers. E.g., United States v. Karo,
82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United
States v. Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Ha. 1976); United
States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. den. 459
U.S. 854; United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir.
1980). It is the exploitation of technological advances
that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere
existence. United States v. Karo, supra, at 539-540.

In its argument the government refuses to acknow-
ledge that all aerial photographs are not alike. The vari-
ables are numerous, including perspective (vertical or
oblique), resolution, weather conditions, camera and
quality. In conjunction with its security measures against
unauthorized aerial photography (A. 13-22), Dow does
release photographs of the production facility after inter-
nal review (A. 20). Although Dow tries to get a credit
line (e.g., Photo Courtesy of The Dow Chemical Com-
pany) (A. 13), sometimes it appears (Federal Prying
From The Sky, NATION’S BUSINESS, October 1985, pp.
34, 36), and sometimes it does not (The EPA’s Eye In
The Sky Has Companies Seeing Red, BUSINESS WEEK,
October 28, 1985, p. 90). In any event, those photo-
graphs released by the company are taken at an oblique

14

angle and have passed internal muster. They are obvi-
ously and easily distinguishable from the EPA photo-
graphs (cf., Photographs 1 and 2, Sealed Joint Appendix).

In its brief the government places importance on the
fact that the detailed aerial photographs were taken from
public airspace. So what? The question is whether the
surveillance intruded into Dow’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. Katz v. United States, supra. It did. The photo-
graphs captured and depicted more detail and informa-
tion than the unaided aerial human eye and mind could
ever hope to do (Pet. App. B-27; Gov't. Brief, p. 21). It
is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far
into a developed commercial structure that it can detect
items and equipment as smail as /2-inch in diameter and
still not be considered to have engaged in an unreason-
able search. Cf., United States v. Kim, supra, at 1256;
United States v. Lace, supra; and United States v. Taborda,
supra.

The fact that the photos were taken from lawful
altitude is of no moment.® FAA regulations were de-
signed to promote air safety, not to define reasonable
expectations of privacy. See, State v. Davis, 627 P.2d 492,
494 (Or. App. 1981).

In its attempts to make aerial photography seem ordi-
nary and mundane, the government: fails to recognize
that all aerial photographs are not of like quality and

® The minimum altitude over a congested area is not 1000 feet,
as the government states at p. 19. Rather, it is 1000 feet above the
highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2000 feet of the aircraft.
14 C.F.R. § 91.79. Although there is no “nearby tall building or water
tower” with reference to the Dow facility as speculated in n.4 on
p. 17 of the government's brief, there are structures within the Dow
facility that are over 200 feet high.

15

resolution’; fails to admit that the EPA photographic
labs are set up for vertical aerial mapping cameras and
printers (A. 51), not the hypothetical hand-held camera;
fails to acknowledge that the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources photograph (referenced at Gov't.
Brief, p. 23 and at A. 54 and filed as a part of the record
by EPA — Dist. Ct. Dkt. 167) bears absolutely no
resemblance to the intrusive detail contained in the EPA
photographs of the Dow plant; and finally, fails to
acknowledge that the only photographs taken of Dow's Mid-
land facility at the request of EPA are the subject of this
lawsuit (A. 33), and that the agency’s own enforcement
personnel thought the photos were novel (Beyer Depo.,
p. 81, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30; Rothblatt Depo., pp. 54-55, Dist.
Ct. Dkt. 33).

The EPA aerial photographs of Dow’s facility are not
ordinary or mundane. To the best of Dow’s knowledge,
they are intrusively unique.

IV.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FAR EXCEEDS THE SCOPE
OF EPA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

The government's position on this issue is accurately
and succinctly stated in its Summary of Argument (p. 10):
the EPA assumed it could use the investigation technique
and then assumed the power.'® As noted on pages 42-49

® Although aerial photography may be “common” in the sense
that it can be acquired for a price, the government certainly slights
the capabilities of aerial photography and the training of aerial
photographers when it equates aerial photography and mere visual
observation in its brief, pp. 17-21. See generally, MANUAL OF COLOR
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, American Society of Photogrammetry (1968).

10 At one point EPA also “assumed” it could utilize the military
to aid in civilian law enforcement (about 50-60 times over 9 years) —
clearly in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
(Dybdahl Depo., pp. 62, 87-88, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 49).

16

of Dow’s Brief on the Merits, that assumption of power
is without statutory authority, is contrary to the plain
language of section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act (42
U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2)), and is inconsistent with both sec-
tion 114(c) of the Act and existing tort and criminal laws
protecting trade secrets. Neither the Court of Appeals’
decision nor the government cites any authority to the
contrary.

On page 10 of its brief the government blithely asserts
that “the agency is entitled to use any methods of inves-
tigation that could lawfully be employed by private
investigators.” The government then ignores the fact
that if private individuals procured aerial photographs
such as EPA’s Photographs 1 and 2 in the Sealed Joint
Appendix, Dow would press charges in both the crim-
inal and civil courts. Michigan Compiled Laws sections
752.772, 750.539a and d (Pet. App. E); Restatement of
Torts section 757 (1939) (Pet. App. C); Kewanee Oil Com-
pany v. Bicron Corporation, 416 U.S. 470, 475-476 (1974);
and DuPont vy. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. den. 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).

The government's citation (p. 46) to what federal law
enforcement agencies may do in support of what this
administrative agency can do is especially distressing.
That argument confuses the basic differences in purpose
and function among the agencies, ignores the explicit,
different terms of statutory authority granted to each
agency, and amounts to the repugnant bottom line that
“the government is the government and as long as any
agency has the power, all agencies have the power.”
Apparently some in the federal government forget that
it is a government of limited powers.

The government states (p. 48) that the Clean Air Act,
first enacted in 1970, somehow “expanded” the govern-
ment authority to investigate air pollution. The actual

17

statement made does not support the government's argu-
ment. The type of statement cited by the government,
remarks made during Senate Committee hearings, are
generally not used as statutory construction aids —
especially when there is plain meaning in the language
employed by Congress. Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 650 (1931).

Under the government's interpretation, section
114(a)(2) “devolves almost unbridled discretion upon
executive and administrative officers, particularly those
in the field, as to when to search and whom to search,”
the very situation in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 323 (1978) (OSHA inspection) which violated the
Fourth Amendment.

Unlike OSHA, which after public notice and comment
adopted regulations concerning site inspections (29
C.F.R. § 1903, et seq.), EPA has no regulations governing
inspections or its inspectors. EPA has assumed powers
not reasonably within the plain meaning of Congressional
language, and has gone about its self-perceived business
without public or judicial oversight. EPA has combined
unbridled discretion with an extremely intrusive inspec-
tion technique.

The government states (n. 32, p. 50), that EPA specifi-
cally addressed the issue of overflights in a May 1978
internal policy (no public notice and comment). Contrary
to the implication in the footnote, the notification of
companies after an overflight (not applicable to this case) :
was not an agency policy. It was merely a Region V pro-
gram (C.A. App. 160). As documented at pages 86-93 of
the Joint Appendix, Regions II and VII attempted prior
notification, which evoked the same corporate concern
for Fourth Amendment rights and trade secrets that
Dow asserts here.

18

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in
Dow’s Brief on the Merits, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ JANE M. GOOTEE, Esq.
Counsel of Record

JAMES H. HANES, Esq.
BERND W. SANDT, Esq.

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
1111 Washington Street
Midland, Michigan 48674

(517) 636-2663

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: November 25, 1985

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0184%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
