# Amicus Curiae Brief — Colorado v. Spring > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0096%3A10 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1987 - **Citation:** 479 U.S. 564 ## Text hl i lille il i, Ce i Tl, No. 85-1517 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Petitioner, Vv. JOHN LEROY SPRING, Respondent. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO BRIEF OF THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE COMMONWEALTHS AND STATES OF GUAM, ILLINOIS, IOWA, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NORTH CAROLINA, OKLAHOMA, VERMONT, AND WYOMING LINLEY E.. PEARSON Attorney General of Indiana WiLLIAM E. DAILY Deputy Attorney General LISA M. PAUNICKA Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney Genera! 219 State House Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 Telephone: (317) 232-6351 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities Interest of the Amici ¢ Statement of the Case Argument Conclusion TABLE OF AUTHORITIES f {j ) Berken V/ ( j S 104 te | »* (1984) ( Carter Gar m. 656 F.2d 68. (4th Cir. 1981) (ner l? mM) i | Ss. YOZ LO? S.( 145% LOX? (> ( Bri 4, 492 F.2d >, (3d Cir. 1974 denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 1401 (1974) Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) . Michiga Pucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357 (1974) 2 Miranda Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 woo 7 (1966) oe .. 1,2.3.5,.6.7.8.9 Moran Burb bie No 34 | 1X5 (L) S March LQ. LY) . 6 (Jrego) ; my STOC [] SS 105 S ( t LPRD5 { LYS) 6 United States v. Burger, 728 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1984) 6 No. 85-1517 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term. 1985 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO } Potof f JOHN LEROY SPRING Re ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO BRIEF OF THE STATE OF INDIANA AND THE COMMONWEALTHS AND STATES OF GUAM, ILLINOIS, IOWA, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NORTH CAROLINA, OKLAHOMA, VERMONT, AND WYOMING INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Twenty years ago in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that the fruits of custodial interrogation had to be suppressed at , ? I trial unless a defendant had beer irned of his rights to silence and to counsel! prior 1 | gation. Throughout the years, the “prophylact f Miranda have worked well. Indeed, the 1! rofessionalism of police that has resulted fro: n has benefited both the police and prosecuto! n preparing cases Moreover, since Miranda, there are ft alms of coerced confession in trials where the “coercion” involves police practices more abusive than violations of the Miranda rule itself. Due to the rigid, nontechnical guidelines set forth in Miranda, the range of police behavior has narrowed. Miranda has aided in the continuing pursuit of a lawful and just society. Despite the clarity of Miranda, the Supreme Court of Colorado appends to the decision an additional requirement: an individual must be informed of the charges about which he is to be questioned prior to waiving his rights. The SupremeCourt of Colorado has also imposed a duty of inquiry” on interrogating officers when a suspect, who has waived his rights and agreed to interrogation, refuses to answer a specific question. The amici curiae assert that the rulings of the Supreme Court of Colorado unnecessarily lessen the desired clarity of Miranda and serve to exclude reliable evidence in cases where a suspect's procedural or substantive rights have not been violated. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Respondent, John Leroy Spring, was charged with the first degree murder of Donald Walker. At trial, evidence established that Walker was shot to death during an elk hunt, in dhe 1979, while in the company of the Respondent and Donald Wagner. At the site of the hunt Walker was asked to walk ahead and to search a ravine for elk. Wagner iske 1d the Respondent to shine a flashlight in the direction of Walker. Subsequently, Wagner not only fired a rifle shot that hit Walker in the head. but als: approached him and fired a second shot which resulted Walker’s death. The Respondent later informed George Dennison, at informant working with agents of the Federal Bureau of Al tm Tobacco, and Firearms (hereinafter, ATF) irder. Dennison related details of the murder, as well as nformation regarding illegal firearm transactions to ATF agents. On March 30, 1979, the Respondent was arrested due to federal firearm charges. The Respondent, twic advised of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver of righ form. The Respondent was not informed of the subjec matter of the impending interrogation. At the conclusion of the interrogation concerning “pias violations, the Respondent was questioned about the murder. The ek td Respondent denied presence in Colorado and invoiveme: +L, , _— . in the murder. Soon after, the Respondent was charged with murder and entered a plea of guilty to a federal firearms violation. On July 13, 1979, ATF agents er “8 Respondent, ncarcerated in a Kansas City jail. After being advised of is Miranda rights and told that he | gi 0 at any time, the Respondent acknowledged that he | ag omg his rights, but refused to sign a waiver of rights form without first consulting an attorney. As the lad ta right Lo cease soa prepared to leave, the Respondent decided to talk with them. Thereafter, a discussion commenced regarding firearms and explosives, the Respondent’s activities in Colorado, the Colorado murder, and other crimes of which the Respondent was a suspect. The Respondent was agai advised of the option to cease questions. When Respondent declined to talk about the Walker murder, th agents changed the subject matter of the questions. The Respondent, however, told the agents that a.22 caliber gun that he possessed at the time of his arrest had been removed from Walker at his death. The Respondent was later } convicted of first degree murder, sentenced to _ life } / Imprisonment, and later appealed nis conviction + The Court of Appeals of Colorado reversed the Respondent's conviction on the basis that the March 30, 1979 and July 13, 1979 statements were taken in violation of the Respoendent’s constitutional rights and that the State had failed to establish that a statement given on May 26, 1979 was not the fruit of the March 30 statement. Because the Respondent was not informed, prior to the March 30 and July 13 interviews of the subject matter of the interrogations, his waivers were not knowingly and intelligently given. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the agents, on July 13, improperly continued to question the Respondent about the murder after he informed them that he did not want to talk about the subject. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals by ruling that the State failed to prove that the Respondent made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights since he was not informed of the subject matter of the interrogations prior to the interviews. The Supreme Court also ruled the July 13 statement inadmissible because “[o Jnce the defendant has indicated in any way that he does not want to answer a question or questions, the interrogating officers have an affirmative and emphatic duty to determine whether the suspect is in fact exercising his privilege against self-incrimination in all respects, or is merely reluctant to answer particular questions.” ARGUMENT A In Miranda Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 160 (1966), the Supreme Court set forth a “bright line” test admissibility which focused on the application of the F Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 1 custod\ interrogation: “| jhe prosecution may not statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effectiv secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” /d. at 444 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Supreme Court directed police t provide “procedural safeguards” when the suspect was custody and prior to interrogation. The procedu required that “(prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that an statement he does make may be used as evidence against nim, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorne) either retained or appointed.” Jd. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 The Court determined that a confession obtained during custodial interrogation and in the absence of Miranda warnings conclusively would be presumed the result police coercion. Because such a confession was presumed involuntary, it was inadmissible. In order to provide “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,’ the case-by-case examination of police interrogation methods ’ was replaced by a concise requirement that the prescribed warnings be given. As the Miranda Court stated “tajssessments of the know ledge the defendant possessed, - based on information as to his age, education, intelligenc: ? tna 7 or prior contact with authorities, can never be more he Court also stated that “[t]k e defendant may waive effectuat Lnese rights provided the waiver is n ade vo intariiv. Knowing intelligently.” /d id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611 6 speculation; a warning isaclear-cut fact.” /d. at 468-469, 56 S.Ct. at 1624-1625 It is clear that Miranda does not explicitly require that a person in custody be informed of the charges which the police are investigating. The language in Miranda is painstakingly specific regarding the basic constitutional rights which the police must advise a suspect prior to questioning. /d. at 467-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-1630, Carter Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1981)(per curiam) cert denied, 455 U.S. 952, 102 S.Ct. 1458 (1982), United States Burger, 728 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1984). Indeed, there is no indication in Miranda that there must be a warning given to a suspect concerning the nature of the crime which led to the interrogation conference, the possible penalty, the elements of the offense, and other sim lar matters. Miranda re q' lires that an accuse d be advised of hisr igh ts so that he may make a rational decision; not nece ssarils the best decision or one that would be reached only after long and arduous deliberation. Moreover. in Moran v. Burbine, No. 84-1485(U.S. March 10, 1986), a suspect was not informed that an attorn retained by his relatives, was available to him. The Court ruled that Miranda did not mandate the authorities to so inform the suspect No doubt, the additional information would have been useful to the respondent; perhaps even it might have affected his decision to confess. But we have never read the Constitution to require that the pelice suppl) a suspect with a flow of information to help him ee eee erest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights Acco (If. (Jregon _ Els fad [).S. . . LOD S Ct 1285, 1297 (1985). Further, the Court in Berkemer McCarty, U.S. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), indicated that the police need not inform a suspect, prior to suestioning, what the precise nature of the charges may be The Court refused to accord the Miranda procedural safeguards based upon a felony misdemeanor distinction since police are often unaware at the time of the arrest whether the arrestee committed a misdemeanor or a felony. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to require police to determine the nature of the offense as a condition precedent to proper police procedure. /d., 104S.Ct. at 3146. Also, as noted in Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 1401 (1974), the waiver of Miranda rights does not compe! a suspect to answer questions. When questioning progresses to an area of illegal conduct, the person being interrogated may + retuse to answer Finally, the amici curiae submit that the rule imposed by the Supreme Court of Colorado would severely impair the efforts of law enforcement officers who often do not know what laws have been violated until an investigation is complete. As written, Miranda strikes the proper balance between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the protection of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. 2 I> The waiver of Miranda rights by a person being interrogated is not irrevocable. Miranda and its progeny allow an interrogee to withdraw his waiver and fully assert nis Fifth Amendment rights in the midst of the interrogation process. In Miranda, the Supreme Court stated: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in an manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege: any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-1628. It is also settled that a suspect may selectively waive his Fifth Amendment rights by indicating that he will respond to some questions, but not to others. Under Miranda, once a person in custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this literal interpretation of Miranda by ruling that the exercise of the right to remain silent does not preciude all further questioning. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975). In Mosley, the Supreme Court refined its Miranda holding as follows: A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to adopt “fully effective means. . .to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored...” 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person's “right to cut off questioning.” /d. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person's exercise of that option counteracts the coerciv pressures of the custodial setting. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326. In the instant cass the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that interrogat officers have an affirmative duty to determine if a susp is exercising his privilege against self-incrimination or merely reluctant to answer particular questions wher suspect indicates that he does not wish to answer a quest or questions. The amici curiae submit that this dut clarification net only unduly restricts police, b creates uncertainty. he additional requirement which the Colorado Supreme Court has imposed on its state police officers is isive, procedurally ineffective, and generates intolerable incertainty. Under the Colorado requirement, police must carefully assess each word spoken by an interrogee in case that a later review of a record of proceedings may reveal words, arguably ambiguous, which possibly show a desire to remain silent. This requirement also necessitates a case by-case review which involves a balancing of variables including the behavior of the police and the subjective attributes of the suspect Further, the Colorado rule unnecessarily blurs the Viranda requirements. Indeed, an interrogee’s | > . Ps om | Villingness to answer certain questions and refusal to speak when he does not so desire evidences an inderstanding of his rights and his ability to discern those areas in which he chooses to preserve his silence. The imposition of the Colorado requirement would risk the > ns represented by Miranda v. Arizona CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the peti . ~ . ' j — . ] rtiorar! Siiouia be granted LINLEY E. PEARSON Attorne i Creneral of | WILLIAM E. DAILY Deputu Attorney Genera --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0096%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.