# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 470 U.S. 116

## Text

g3-1013

No. 83- |

INTHE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1983

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY,
FMC CorporaTIOoN, and

Union CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
Vv.
NaTuRAL Resources Derense Councit, Inc., and
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

ee

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

———

Tueopore L. GARRETT
(Attorney of Record)
CorinNE A. GOLDSTEIN
CovincTon & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
P.O. Box 7565
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 662-6000
Attorneys for Petitioners Chemical
Manufacturers Association, et al.

December 1983
—————— OOOO

The decision below raises important concern-
ing EPA’s development of -based effluent
limitations guidelines and standards under

pretreatment
the Clean Water Act. Since the beginning of this program
under the 1972 Act, the Agency has established such
limitations and standards for industry categories in na-
tional regulations based on a consideration of typical
plants. EPA has deferred to subsequent “variance”

proceedings the consideration of atypical plants present-

contrary to thie Court's holding in

plants, as EPA has done by including a variance clause” in
its regulations.

2. Whether the court below was incorrect in ruling
that § 301(1) of the Clean Water Act precludes the grant-

ing of a variance for toxic pollutants to atypical plants that
can demonstrate a factor not considered by EPA in

establishing national technology-based regulations.
3. Whether the decision below, by removing EPA's

decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

PARTIES
The parties to this action are as follows:'
Chemical Manufacturers Association, American
Cyanamid Company, FMC Corporation, Union Carbide
Corporation;
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; and
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(“NRDC”) was the petitioner below. The U S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was the respondent.
The Chemical Manufacturers Association, et al., were
intervenor-respondents below.’

' In accordance with Rule 28.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
the parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates of each corporate
party to this petition are set forth in the Appendix at A-111.

* The above list includes all parties to the separately-briefed case
numbers 81-1977 and 81-1985 below. The decision below also ruled on
related petitions filed by other parties which do not involve the
questions presented here. The parties to these related cases below
are as follows:

National Association of Metal Finishers, Electroplaters of Yor,
Inc., Pioneer Metal Finishing, Inc., The Institute for Interconnect-
ing and Packaging Electronic Circuits, Ford Motor Company, Inc.,
United States Brewers Association, American Paper Institute, Na-
tional Forest Products Association, Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturers Association, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Her-
cules Incorporated, Shell Oil Company, Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies, Metal Finishing Association of Southern Cali-
fornia, Interlake, Inc., Republic Steel Corporation, United States
Steel Corporation, American Iron & Steel Institute, Rouge Steel
Co., Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, Illinois Manu-
facturers Association, and Mid-America Legal Foundation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EES i
ESSE LEE TLE DETR T EEE PEEP ii
EE EEE EO iii
ek 8s ceeecoeccee iv
Ten on. cecccececcce 2
a 2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ............... 2
ae ow oncecosescoeceoes 2
A. Legislative And Administrative Background 3
B. The Proceedings Below ................... 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................... 4

I. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict In The Cir-
ee ey 20S Siler Decision OF Site .

II. The Decision Below Presents Questions
Of Law Which Should Be By This Court . 12

III. The Decision Below Upsets EPA’s Reasonable Con-
EL 15
Tees ced ccccccsccceesoccoes 19

APPENDIX

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) ..... 13
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir.

SD Sanecesnesnsseesasédunnnunean 8, 9, 10, 12, 19
EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112

OPN Oe passim
EDF v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980) Lannea 4
EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64

EEE Gnoccecoedecancsesesseccdoenshasnens 11, 17, 18
FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976) ... 13
OT ee ae We
NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) ............... 14
NZRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) .... 14
NRDC vy. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976) ........ 11, 18
NRDC v. Train, 8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) ...... 4,13
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) .......... i, 14
Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th

Gh BED wnccococcesccnnesesasedesbecneuseses 13
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.

EY. co ceedcoceconcesecceenenenesensesensestes 11
STATUTES:
Se Gee ER coccccccncaccccccncccescss 2
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) .......... 2,7
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1 (A) (1976)... 2... ee eee eee 4
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ..... 4
SD Ge © IEE ccncdccescadcsecéccceseces 16
33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (Supp. V 1981) ................. 16
33 U.S.C. § 1311(1)) (Supp. V 1981) ............... passim
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ........ 2,4,7
33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ..... 2,4, 7, 11

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1976)... ccc eee eens 7, 15

Vv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS:
43 Fed. Reg. 27736-7783 (1978) ......... cece eee uees 7
46 Fed. Reg. 9404-60 (1981) .......... ccc cece eee 7
REGULATIONS:
fi er 6
ee dn. cccccccccesacess 2,6
40 C.F.R. § 408. 13(c)(2)iv) (1983) ... 2... eee 7
40 C.F.R. § 403.13(c)(3 ii) (1983) ...... 2.6... 7
40 C.F .R. § 408. 19(d) (1983)... 2... cece ccc eee eee 6
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
H.R. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ..... ll
S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ........ 18

A islative Hi of the Clean Water Act of 1977,
“7 eae ee Comm. Print No. 14, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ..........cccecsccee cece. 17

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY,
FMC CorporaTION, and
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Vv.
NATURAL Resources DEFENSE CoUNCIL, INc., and
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners Chemical Manufacturers Association, et
al., pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
opinion and judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.'

' The Solicitor General, on behalf of EPA, nas requested an exten-
sion of time until February 17, 1984, within which to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari in this case. See Appx. at A-128. The Court may
wish to defer acting on this petition until the government files a
petition for a writ of certiorari (or advises the Court that it has
decided not to file a petition) so that the Court will have before it all
relevant materials.

2

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals below is reported at
719 F.2d 624, and is reprinted in the Appendix to this
petition at A-1.

JURISDICTION

The order of the court of appeals was entered on Sep-
tember 20, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1254(1) (1976).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This case involves technology-based “pretreatment
standards” under Section 307(b) of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 301(b)
of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
describes various effluent limitations and standards that
are to be achieved. Section 301(1) of the Act provides that
the Administrator may not modify the requirements of
§ 301 for toxic pollutants. The factors to be considered in

ishing effluent limitations are set forth in § 304(b) of
the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Section; 301(b), 301(1), 304(b) and 307(b) of the Act are
set forth in the Appendix at A-116-21.

EPA’s regulations govering the establishment of
“fundamentally different factors” (“FDF”) variances
from pretreatment standards are codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13 (1983), and are set forth in the Appendix at
A-122.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Under the Clean Water Act, EPA is directed to prom-
and standards applicable to the various major segments
of American industry. Because of the complexity of devel-

3

oping these limitations and standards, EPA has focused
its rulemaking efforts on the more typical plants in an
industry, and has deferred to subsequent individual
“variance” proceedings the consideration of atypical
plants. This has resulted in significant cost and time
savings in the development of industry regulations.

This petition seeks review of a judgment of the Third
Circuit which struck down EPA’s deferred procedure for
allowing so-called “variances” for “fundamentally differ-
ent” dischargers of priority or toxic pollutants subject to

standing way in which EPA has developed and applied
technology-based regulations under the Clean Water
Act. The decision below creates a conflict in the circuits,
and is contrary to this Court’s decision in E.]. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (“du Pont”).

A. Legislative And Administrative Background

A brief discussion of the Act’s program of guidelines
and standards provides the background of the proceed-
ings below. Under the Clean Water Act, industrial direct
dischargers must meet a series of technology-based
effluent limitations and standards.* By July 1, 1977, in-
dustrial direct dischargers had to achieve effluent limita-
tions based on the application of the “best practicable
control technology currently available” (“BPT”) as de-

? Industrial and commercial plants use water for various purposes
in their operations and discharge wastewater. These discharges are
made either directly to waters of the United States (“direct dis-
charges”) or to municipal sewer systems (“indirect discharges”). In
the latter case, the discharges are collected and treated in a publicly
owned treatment works (“POTW”) before being discharged to wa-
ters of the United States.

4

fined by EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)1)A) (1976). Such
industrial direct dischargers must meet a second stage of
limitations based upon the “best available technology
economically achievable” (“BAT”) by July 1, 1984. 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b(2)A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Industrial
dischargers to publicly owned treatment works
(“POTWs”) are required to comply with pretreatment
standards established under the Act for pollutents that
are not susceptible to treatment by POTWs or would

interfere with the operation of POTWs. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(b).

EPA has implemented the BPT, BAT and pretreat-
ment provisions of the Act through a major rulemaking
program to establish technology-based effluent limita-
tions and standards for twenty-one major industries

covering sixty-five priority or “toxic” pollutants or

dischargers

Under the statute, EPA considers various technical
and economic factors in establishing the technology-
based regulations.‘ These include the age of equipment

* This strategy was the basis for settling suits by four environmen-
tal groups, and the resulting settlement agreement was approved in
1976. NRDC v. Train, 8 E.R... 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub
nom. NRDC v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1833 (D.D.C. 1979), modified sub
nom. NRDC v. Gorsuch (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1982). In the 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Wate. Act, Congress sanctioned the Agency's
approach to establishing effluent limitations and standards. See EDF
v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Act also author-
izes EPA to establish standards for new sources, which are not
involved here.

* Section 304(b) of the Clean Water Act specifies the factors for
BPT and BAT limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b). EPA has considered

includes the pollutants discharged by an industry, the
soormaont toshaclagien tied or ovalable for ene, the trestabiy of
pollutants, the processes used, and the economics of the industry.

* See du Pont, supra, 430 U.S. at 122.

6

clause is codified in EPA’: NPDES permit regulations at
40 C.F.R. § 125.31 (1983): for indirect dischargers, it is

contained in EPA’s general pretreatment regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 403.13 (1983).’

Under the FDF variance regulation, any interested
person may apply to EPA for an FDF variance with
respect to a plant that is believed to be “fundamentally
different.” The issuance of a variance may result in dis-
charge limits that are either more or less stringent than
the limits for the industry category." The plant that re-
ceives a variance from a BAT standard is not “exempt”
from BAT, but will be given an individual BAT limit
based on the statutory BAT factors.’ A discharger must
satisfy two key requirements to obtain an FDF variance.
First, the discharger must show that it is fundamentally
different from the other plants in the industry in ways
corresponding to the statutory factors discussed above.

"A copy of 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 appears in the Appendix at A-122.

* A member of the public may apply to EPA for a variance seeking
the application of different, more stringent limits to a fundamentally
different plant, or the plant may apply for a variance seeking differ-
my , less stringent limits. A variance request may also be initiated by

PA.

* See section II] below. The term “variance” is somewhat of a
misnomer since the revised plant limits are not an exception to the
Act’s requirements but rather an individualized application of those
requirements.

These factors are: the nature or quality of pollutants, the volume
of the discharger’s process wastewater, the nonwater quality en-
vironmental impact of control and treatment, the energy require-
ments of treatment technology, the age, size, land availability and
configuration as they relate to the discharger’s equipment or facili-

the application of the control
with required control technology. 40 C.F.R. § 403. 13(d). See notes 3
and 4 above.

7

Second, the discharger must demonstrate that com-
pliance with the industry standards would result in either
a pollutant removal cost wholly out of proportion to the
cost considered by EPA during development of the stan-
dards, or a non-water quality environmental impact
fundamentally more adverse than the impact considered
in developing the standards. ''

The FDF variance procedure has proven to be an
essential and limited “safety valve” in the effluent limita-
tions and standards program. It has been relied upon by
EPA in virtually every effluent limitation and standard
regulation under §§ 301(b), 304(b) and 307(b) of the Act.
The F DF procedure enables EPA to focus its attention in
these regulations on the typical facilities in an industry
and to defer consideration of atypical facilities.

B. The Proceedings Below
The general pretreatment regulations (including the
F DF variance clause) were first promulgated on June 26,
1978. (43 Fed. Reg. 27736-773). Following further
rulemaking on issues not involved here, EPA prom-
ulgated revised general pretreatment regulations on Jan-
uary 28, 1981. (46 Fed. Reg. 9404-60). A number of peti-
tions seeking review of these re culations were considered
together by the Third Circuit.

In its suit, NRDC argued that EPA's allowance of a
variance from pretreatment standards was unlawful on
two grounds. The first and broader ground was that FDF
variances from pretreatment standards are not specifical-

"40 C.F.R. §$§ 403.13(e)(2Miv) and (eX3)ii) (1983).

' The courts of appeals have direct and exclusive jurisdiction to
review pretreatment standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1976).

8

ly authorized by the Clean Water Act. Recognizing that
this Court in du Pont construed the Act to require a
variance procedure, NRDC argued that the Court’s deci-
sion addressed BPT regulations and did not apply to BAT
or pretreatment standards. NRDC’s second argument
was that variances for priority or toxic pollutants were
contrary to § 301(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311()), which
provides that the “Administrator may not modify any
requirement of this section as it applies to any specific
pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list.” Relying
upon this Court’s decision in du Pont and other cases,
EPA argued that variances are necessary to address
atypical plants presenting relevant factors not considered
by the Agency. As to the second point, EPA argued that
§ 301(1) of the Act does not bar the granting of FDF
variances for toxic pollutants, but refers to modifications
specifically authorized by statute."

The Third Circuit did not rule on NRDC’s broader
argument that FDF variances are unauthorized under
the Act. However, the court below struck down EPA's
FDF variance regulation, holding that § 301(1) of the Act
prohibits variances for toxic pollutants. The court re-
jected EPA's distinction between FDF variances and
modifications specifically authorized by the Act. In so
doing, the court recognized that its decision conflicts with
the decision of the Fourth Circuit in App. ‘achian Power
Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980). The court also
rejected EPA’s argument that the principle of this
Court’s decision in du Pont authorizes FDF variances
from pretreatment standards.“

"8 See section III below.
“The opinion below also decided a number of other issues in
related cases, which are not involved here.

It is difficult to overstate the impact of the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision. It has undercut a major feature of the
been accepted and relied upon for years by EPA, reg-
ulated industries and the courts. If allowed to stand, the
Third Circuit’s decision would require all concerned to
rethink the basis for past as well as future industry limita-
tions and standards, and would remove essential flexibil-
ity in establishing these regulations.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court should grant this petition for certiorari for
three reasons that the Court has traditionally found com-
pelling. First, the decision below creates a direct conflict
among the circuits and is contrary to a decision of this
Court. Second, the decision below raises an issue of na-
tionwide importance concerning a major EPA program.
Third, the decision below is at odds with the language and
structure of the Clean Water Act.

I. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict In The Circuits
And Is Contrary To A Prior Decision Of This Court.

The court below acknowledged that its decision direct-
ly conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,
620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980). In Appalachian Power, the
Fourth Circuit upheld an FDF variance regulation which
allowed variances for toxic pollutants from EPA's BPT
regulations for the steam electric industry. In upholding
EPA's FDF variance regulation, the Fourth Circuit ex-
plicitly rejected the same NRDC argument that was ac-
cepted by the court below, namely that § 301(1) of the Act
prohibits variances for toxic pollutants. The court stated

that EPA had interpreted § 301(1) as applying only to
those parts of § 301 that expressly authorize EPA to

10

modify applicable regulations,” and that the interpreta-
tion of the Agency is entitled to deference. (620 F.2d at
1048)."* The Third Circuit considered the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning and concluded that it “must disagree” with the
Fourth Circuit’s decision. (Appx. at A-43).

The decisions of the two courts of appeals cannot be
reconciled. Although the Fourth Circuit addressed FDF
variances from BPT regulations and the decision below
involved FDF variances from pretreatment standards, in
both cases the decision turns on the scope of § 301(1) of
the Clean Water Act and its applicability to non-statutory
FDF variances. The court below held that “FDF
variances for toxic pollutant discharges are forbidden” by
§ 301(1) of the Act (Appx. at A-43), while the Fourth
Circuit held that § 301(1) “does not apply so as to require
the exclusion of toxic substances” from the F DF variance
regulation. (620 F.2d at 1048)."

The decision below is also contrary to this Court’s
decision in E. J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112 (1977) (“du Pont”). In du Pont, this Court held
that EPA was authorized to set BPT limitations by
regulation “so long as some allowance is made for varia-
tions in individual plants, as EPA has done by including a
[F DF) variance clause in its 1977 limitations.” (430 U.S.
at 128). Subsequent decisions have interpreted this
Court’s opinion in du Pont as not merely authorizing EPA
to allow FDF variances, but as requiring such

'S See section III below.
* See du Pont, supra, at 135 n. 25.

In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1979), the court implicitly upheld FDF variances from BPT regula-

tions for toxic pollutants.

11

variances." While the du Pont decision dealt with BPT
regulations, the rationale of the Court in du Pont applies
equally to the pretreatment standards involved here."

In du Pont, the issue was whether EPA could set
effluent limitations by regulation for industry categories
in spite of the fact that the statute authorized BPT limits
for point sources, while authorizing BAT limits for classes
or categories of point sources. This Court stated that
nothing in the Act “suggests any radical difference in the
mechanism used to impose limitations for the 1977 (BPT]
and 1983 [BAT] deadlines.” (430 U.S. at 127). The Court
therefore held that BPT limitations, like BAT limits,
could be established “by regulation, so long as some al-
lowance is made for variations in individual plants, as
EPA has done by including a variance clause” in its
regulations. (Jd. at 128).

Section 307(b) of the Act is silent on how “pretreatment
standards for . . . pollutants” are to be established. The
legislative history of § 307(b), however, indicates that
pretreatment standards are to be comparable to BPT and
BAT limitations.” Nothing else in the Act suggests any

“EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980);
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1032-34(D.C. Cir. 1978).
Prior to this Court’s decision in du Pont, the Second Circuit also
—s the FDF variance clause. NRDC v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642 (2d

. 1976).

'’ The pretreatment standards for electroplating, which were be-
fore the court below, in fact were BPT-level standards. Appx. at
A-76.

”H.R. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 87 (1977). See text at
n.3 above. The Act contains a threshhold requirement that the pollu-
tants controlled inte: ‘ere with or pass through the POTW, and it also
contains a provision for removal credits applicable to pretreatment
standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b).

12

radical difference in the way in which pretreatment
standards and BPT/BAT limitations should be imposed.
Accordingly, EPA has been promulgating pretreatment
standards equal or comparable to BPT/BAT limitations
on an industry category basis. If EPA chooses to estab-
lish pretreatment standards by regulation on an industry
category basis, then it must allow for FDF variances from
such regulations for atypical plants not considered in the
national regulations, consistent with this Court’s decision
in du Pont.”

We therefore submit that the decision below is contra-
ry to this Court’s decision in du Pont and conflicts with
the sound decision of the Fourth Circuit in Appalachian
Power.

Il. The Decision Below Presents Important Questions Of
Law Which Should Be Settled By This Court.

The decision of the Third Circuit that FDF variances
are precluded for toxic pollutants undermines a central
feature of the effluent limitations and standards program.
This program is of singular importance to current efforts
under the Clean Water Act to reduce the discharge of
pollutants. EPA’s regulations affect thousands of in-
dustrial dischargers. The Third Circuit’s decision, issued
just as the last “BAT” phase of the program is being
implemented, is likely to cause confusion, further litiga-
tion, and delay in this program.

The Clean Water Act requires EPA to take into ac-
count relevant differences among plants in promulgating

21 The addition of § 301(1) to the Act after this Court’s decision in du
Pont was not intended to limit the applicability of FDF variances to
non-toxic pollutants, as discussed below in section III.

13

effluent limitations and standards. The Third Circuit’s
ruling thus leaves EPA and the public in a quandry. The
Agency has promulgated effluent guidelines and stand-
ards for many of the 21 major industries based upon a
consideration of typical plants, and relying on the FDF
variance clause to handle atypical plants. If the Third
Circuit’s decision is allowed to stand, then the basis for
the prior regulations is subject to question. If § 301(1) of
the Act were to preclude FDF variances for toxic or
priority pollutants, EPA would be subject to requests by
industry to reopen previously promulgated regulations to
address the atypical plants not previously considered. If
the Agency refused to do so, it would be subject to possi-
ble legal challenges in the courts.”

The Third Circuit’s decision also has an impact on
regulations currently being developed by the Agency.
EPA is under judicially imposed deadlines to issue the
technology-based regulations for the remaining industry
categories, which include the organic chemicals in-
dustry.” A change in procedures to address atypical or
unique plants will only complicate and delay EPA’s
efforts to complete the rulemaking process for those in-
dustries.

An important issue raised in this case is EPA’s discre-
tion to proceed by way of individual order rather than

2 EPA's effluent limitations and standards regulations have in the
past been held invalid for failure to consider relevant factors. Amer-
ican Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); FMC Corp. v. Train, 589 F.2d 973 (4th
Cir. 1976); Tanners’ Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th
Cir. 1976). Some regulations were upheld by the courts on the
grounds that the FDF variance procedure was available to address
atypical situations. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, supra n.17.

™ See NRDC v. Train, supra n.3.

14

rulemaking to address atypical situations. EPA could in
theory have chosen to address all plants, including atypic-
al plants, by establishing sufficient subcategories of
plants in the original technology-based standards
regulations.” This course proved impractical due to data,
resource and time constraints. As a result, EPA pro-
ceeded to address the typical plants in the national
regulations, leaving to a deferred procedure atypical
plants not previously considered. The decision of the
Third Circuit, which deprives EPA of its chosen method
of proceeding, is contrary to this Court’s important deci-
sion in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and its
progeny.”

In Chenery the issue was whether the SEC was re-
quired to issue a rule prohibiting certain actions or
whether it could bar those same actions in individual
cases. The Court emphasized that, as here, “problems
may arise in a case which the administrative agency could
not reasonably foresee,” or the problems may be “so
specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible to
capture within the boundaries of a general rule.” (332
U.S. at 202-203). The Court concluded that “the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individ-
ual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.” (/d. at
203). In barring EPA’s informed choice of the FDF proce-
dure to deal with atypical plants, the decision below is
contrary to the principles established by this Court in
Chenery.

* At oral argument below, counsel for NRDC agreed that EPA
“can implement the pretreatment standards flexibiy . . . through
subcategories.” (Transcript at 247.)

% See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-95
(1974); NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 668-69 (1976).

15

The decision of the Third Circuit is directly applicable
to the FDF variance clause for pretreatment standards
under the Act. The regulations in question were reviewed
directly in the court of appeals under § 509(b) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b). Under that provision,
challenges to rules must be commenced within 90 days of
promulgation. Thereafter, the rules are not subject to
judicial review, not even as a defense in civil or criminal
litigation. Thus, only this Court can address the issues
raised by the decision below.”

There is a likelihood of further litigation of the FDF
issue as applied to direct dischargers. Pending in the D.C.
Circuit are cases involving EPA’s NPDES permit
regulations.” NRDC has notified the D.C. Circuit that it
intends to challenge the FDF variance clause for direct
dischargers on the same grounds raised in the Third
Circuit for pretreatment.

In the statement of the case, we described the complex-
ity and scope of EPA’s national rulemaking program for
BPT, BAT and pretreatment limitations and standards.
Because the decision of the Third Circuit raises fun-
damental questions as to the basis of this important pro-
gram, review by this Court is warranted.

III. The Decision Below Upsets EPA's Reasonable Construc-
tion Of The Act.

The iong-established FDF variance procedure is not
specifically provided for in the Clean Water Act. How-

* We do not, however, rule out the possibility of subsequent chal-
lenges to pretreatment standards by atypical plants not considered
by EPA, through judicial actions or petitions to EPA seeking revised
regulations. See text at n.22 above.

“NRDC, et al. v. EPA, D.C. Cir. Nos. 80-1607, et al.

16

_
.

ever, the Act does expressly authorize certain statutory

modifications to the technology-based standards. For ex- ~

ample, § 301(c) of the Act authorizes a modification of
BAT limits based on the economic capabilty of the partic-
ular plant or owner. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976).* Section
301(1) of the Act, enacted in 1977, states that EPA may
not modify any of the requirements of that section for
toxic pollutants, which means that EPA cannot issue a
§ 301(c) modification for a toxic pollutant. However,
nothing in the language or history of § 301(1) of the Act
indicates that Congress intended to preclude FDF
variances for toxic pollutants.

When Congress adopted the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Water Act, this Court’s decision in du Pont had
already been rendered. Yet nothing in § 301(1) or its
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
end the EPA’s long-standing practice of providing for
FDF variances or to overrule the du Pont decision requir-
ing variances. In fact, as the court below admitted, the
legislative history of § 301(1) indicates that Congress was
“primarily concerned with prohibiting modifications
under § 301(c). . . .” (Appx. at A-42.)” The court below
nonetheless rejected the Agency’s distinction between

* Such individualized economic capability is not one of the statuto-
ry factors for the technology-based limitations. See notes 4 and 20
above. Section 301(g) of the Act authorizes a modification of BAT
limits where water quality would be protected, but by its terms does
not apply to toxie pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (Supp. V 1981).

2» Congressman Roberts, one of the leaders in the House of Repre-
sentatives for the 1977 amendments to the CWA, stated,

Due to the nature of toxic pollutants, Nmap atl rd
tion will not be subject to waivers from or modification

requirements under this se. Lion, , neither
section 301(c) waivers based on the economic ility of the

17

variances and § 301 modifications, stating that if Con-
gress was willing to prohibit § 301(c) modifications for
toxic pollutants, then it was difficult to imagine why
Congress would have permitted FDF variances for toxic
pollutants. (Appx. at A-43.) The Third Circuit’s decision
is based on a failure to understand the difference between
FDF variances and § 301(c) modifications as articulated
by this Court.

Section 301(c) allows a discharger to avoid compliance
with BAT requirements based on the discharger’s indi-
vidual economic capability. A discharger that satisfies the
requirements of § 301(c) qualifies for a variance “simply
because the (discharger] could not afford a compliance
cost that is not fundamentally different from those the
Administrator has already considered. ...” EPA v.
Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, supra, 449 U.S. at 78 (empha-
sis added). Congress quite reasonably could have con-
cluded that such a discharger should be required to meet
applicable technology-based requirements for toxic pollu-
tants, regardless of its individual economic capability. A
section 301(c) modification is based upon a criterion out-
side of the technology-based factors of the Act.”

An FDF variance is not an “exemption” from the Act’s
technology-based requirements for BPT, BAT or
pretreatment. It is a determination of the BPT, BAT or
pretreatment requirements for an individual discharger,
base1 on the statutory factors and circumstances con-

i ~y~ \genennee water
ey faye on quality considera-
A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Cong. Re-
~~ aaaataaieaaaae Print No. 14, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 328-29
( ).

* See notes 4, 20, and 28 above.

18

cerning the discharger that were not considered in the
development of standards for the industry. This distinc-
tion was explained by this Court as follows in discussing
the FDF variance:

In such situations, ~~ -tbi 4
ment that the uniform BPT limitation was set

out reference to the full range of current
which the Administrator was to refer. — ry

bn caenen, Uhan GA Gants FOP wate & b
creating a new subcategory for a plant, after notice and an
opportunity for a public hearing, and establishing stand-
ards for that subcategory based on the statutory factors.

Subcategorization of an industry is within the sound
discretion of the Agency unless the Agency acts arbitrari-
ly and capriciously. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,
supra n.17. The objective of subcategorization is to en-
sure that similar plants will be subject to similar
requirer ents.“ EPA cannot always collect or consider all
relevant data to establish the necessary subcategories,
however, particularly within the time frames con-
templated by the Act and imposed by the courts." EPA
has therefore provided the FDF variance mechanism as
the way in which EPA, a member of the public, or a
discharger may demonstrate, after public notice and an

“EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, supra, 449 U.S. at 77-78.
=S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1972).
™ See NRDC v. EPA, supra n.18.

EPA regulations provided for FDF variances well be-
fore this Court’s decision in du Pont. Congress
undoubtedly has been aware of EPA's interpretation of
the Act allowing such FDF variances, yet it has never

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
THEODORE L. GARRETT
(Attorney of Record)
CORINNE A. GOLDSTEIN
CovINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 662-6000
Attorneys for Petitioners Chemical
Manufacturers Association, et al.

APPENDIX

eS

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

Y aPPinaoher tay BPA, Now. 7-226,
Finishers, et al. v. EPA, Nos. 79-2256, et al. (3d

Onder aes the Opinion filed Sep-
tember 20, 503 te National Association of Metal
Finishers, et al. v. EPA, Nos. 79-2256, et al. (3d
ed i ok ica ocadcenceas A-29
Certified Amended

tional Association of M 4, 1 etal.v. EPA,
Nos. 79-2256, et al. (3d Cir., Nov. 1, 1983) ..... A-97
Second Amended J of the Court in National
Association of Metal Finishers, et al. v. EPA, Nos.
79-2256, et al. (3d Cir., Dec. 7, 1983) .......... A-104
Petitioners’ Parent

Clean Water il ata A-116
“Fundamentally Different Factors” Variance
Regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 408.13 ...........-.... A-122
The Government's Request for an Extension of Time
Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Cer-
EE A EE ere A-128

A-l

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 79-2256

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS,
ELECTROPLATERS OF YORK, INC. AND
PIONEER METAL FINISHING, INC.,

Petitioners

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent

No. 79-2443

THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING
AND PACKAGING ELECTRONIC CIRCUITS.
. _ Petitioner

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
| Respondent

Nos 80-1008, 81-1210, 81-1279

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, INC..,
| Petitioner

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY and DOUGLAS
M. COSTLE, Administrator, United States

Environmental Protection Agency, |
' Respondents
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC..,
Intervenor

A-2

No. 81-1351

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS
and INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING
AND PACKAGING ELECTRONIC CIRCUITS,

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent
No. 81-1712
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Petitioner

v

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY aud WALTER
BARBER, Acting Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondents
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC.,

Intervenor

No. 81-1977

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005,
Petitioner

v

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
401 M Screet, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460 and
DOUGLAS M. COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460,

Respondents

A-3

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
‘ _- FMC CORPORATION
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Intervenors

No. 81-1978
UNITED STATES BREWERS ASSOCIATION,
, - Petitioner
v

ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, and
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

) Respondents
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC..,
‘ a Intervenor
No. 81-1979

MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION, .
AMERICAN PAPER INSTITUTE,. NATIONAL
FOREST PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
PAINT AND COATINGS ASSOCIATION,
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, AIR
PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC.,
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, FMC
CORPORATION, HERCULES INCORPORATED,
SHELL OIL COMPANY, and UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Petitioners

U

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent

A-4

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC.,
Intervenor
No. 81-1981
ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN
SEWERAGE AGENCIES,
Petitioner

v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC.,
Intervenor
No. 81-1982

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS,

Petitioner ~

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

! Respondent
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC.,
Intervenor

A-5

No. 81-1983

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, FMC

CORPORATION, UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,

Petitioners
v

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC..
Intervenor
No. 81-1984

AMERICAN PAPER INSTITUTE and NATIONAL
FOREST PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners

Uv

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
. Respondent
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL. INC..
Intervenor

No. 81-1985

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC..
1725 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006,
Petitioner

v

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460,
Respondent

A-6

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
FMC CORPORATION
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Intervenors

No. 81-2119

METAL FINISHING ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
' Respondent

No. 81-2150

INTERLAKE, INC., REPUBLIC STEEL
CORPORATION and UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION,
Petitioners

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC.,
Intervenor

AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE
ROUGE STEEL Co..,
Intervenors

A-7

No. 81-215}

CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, ILLINOIS MANUFACTURERS’
ASSOCIATION, and MID-AMERICAN LEGAL
FOUNDATION,

Petitioners

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC.,

Intervenor

ON PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF ACTIONS
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Argued June 20, 1983
Before: GIBBONS, HUNTER and BECKER, Circuit Judges

Opinion filed September 20, 1983

Theodore Garrett (Argued)
Constance J. Chatwood
Corinne A. Goldstein
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, D.C. 20044
Attorneys for National Association
of Metal Finishers, The
Institute for Interconnecting and
Packaging Electronic Circuits, and
Chemical Manufacturers Association

A-8

. \ 7 285 4 |
F Ab: : AL | ae i 1
TRL ERT aia AE
lull ual ihe Mi

A-10

& Wolff
Suite 900, 1101 Vermont Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Attorneys for American Paper
Institute and The National Forest

A-ll

A-12

TABLE OF CONTENTS

lL BACKGROUND

A
B.

Cc.

D

The Statute

The Regulations

1. The General Pretreatment Regulations
2 The Categorical Electroplating Standards
The Consolidated Cases

The Standard of Review.

IL THE GENERAL PRETREATMENT

A

REGULATION

The Definitions of “Interference” and “Pass
Through”

l. Interference

2 Pass Through

Definition of “New Source”

The Fundamentally Different Factor Variance

1. Variances from Pretreatment Standards

2 Variances for Toxic Pollutants

The Removal Credits Provision

1. EPA Approval and Authorization

2 Unworkability

The Combined Wastestream Formula

1. Process Categories

2 Moving Target

3. Attainabiliry and Cost of Combined
Pretreatment

A-13

Ill THE CATEGORICAL ELECTROPLATING

A

B.

STANDARDS

Methodology of the Standards
1. The Regression Analysis
2 Lead and Cadmium

The Cost to Segregated Facilities
1. The NAMF Settlement Agreement
2 The Cost-Benefit Analysis

C. The Compliance Deadline for Integrated
. Facilities

IV. CONCLUSION

History

Metal in Infiluent
Metal Finishing Association of South-
ern California

Ls
2 43F

U.S.C. §1317(b), (c) (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
ed Reg 27,736 (1978), as amended, 46 Fed Reg 9404

(1981) (codified at 40 CFR. §§403.1.-16 (1982)).

3. 44 Fed Reg 52,590 (1979), as amended, 46 Fed Reg 9462
(1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§413.01.-64 (1982)).

A-15

standard of review, we find invalid certain provisions
both of the general pretreatment regulations and of the
categorical electroplating standards. Because it is not for
us to rewrite those provisions, we will remand them to
the Administrator. |

L BACKGROUND
A. The Statute

2 In 1972 Congress amended the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (“the Act” or “the Clean Water
Act”),® setting as a national goal the elimination, by

control technology currently available

id. §§ 1311061 XA), 1314(6X 1) (1976), and to

use by 1983-87 the best available technology economi-
cally achievable (“BAT”), id. §§1311(bX2) (1976 &
Supp. I 1977), 1314(6X2) (1976). For newly-constructed
direct dischargers the Administrator had until 1974 to
establish “new source” performance standards requiring
the best available demonstrated con-
BDT”). Id. §1316. The Administrator
set the BPT, BAT, and BDT limitations by consid-

ering the factors specified in sections 304(b) and 306(b)

6. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (codified as amended in
sections of 33 U.S.C. ch. 26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).

i

A-16

of the Act, id. §§1314(b), 1316(b). He was to apply those
limitations to individual direct dischargers through the
National Pollutant Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit issued to the discharger under sec-
tion 402 of the Act, id. §1342 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).

4. Second, the Act mandated that the Administrator
set effluent limitations for publicly owned treatment
works (“POTWs”) engaged in the treatment of munici-
pal sewage or industrial wastewater. See id. §1292(2)
(1976 & Supp. I 1977). Under the Act the Adminiscrator
had to establish effluent limitations, based on “second-
ary reatment,” which POTWs had to meet by 1977. Id.
§§131106X1XB), (C), 1314(d(1) (1976). The limita-
tions thus established were w be applied to each individ-
ual POTW through its NPDES permit Id. §1342 (1976
& Supp. I 1977).

5. Third, section 307 of the Act addressed the “indi-
rect dischargers,” point sources which discharged their
pollutants not directly into navigable waters but into
POTWs. Congress recognized tha. the pollutants which
some indirect dischargers release into POTWs could in-
terfere with the operation of the POTWs, or could pass
through the POTWs without adequate treatment To
prevent such discharges by existing sources, Congress
directed in section 307(b)1) of the Act:

not to be susceptible for treatment hy such treat-
ment works or which would interfere with the op-
eration of such treatment works. . . . Pretreatment
standards under this subsection. . . shall be estab-
lished to prevent the discharge of any pollutant
through [POTWs], which pollutant interferes with,
passes through or otherwise is incompatible with
such works.

A-17

33 U.S.C. §1317(bX1) (1976); see also id. §1314(g)
(Supp. I 1977). The Administrator had to designate the
categories of existing sources to which each such stand-
ard would apply, the standards by 1973, and
ern gaeemeye ately gn and indus-
trial processes changed. or newly-con-
structed indirect dischargers the Act directed that by
1974 the Administrator had to promulgate pretreatment
coemdaste Git cach canngary oe Piast of Reg Wright)
Finally. Ford noces the NRDC v. Trem consent decree

mandates that in setting standards “\«/be

scope of pom

by the

numbers

if
+]

A-59

3. Attatnability and Cost of Combined Pretreatment

68. Joint petitioners, Interlake and GM also con-

i Ht He if

HE il 8242 quis

il
a
a Fe

iy +
ul iil
ie 3 Hi

43. GM argues that because the formuls proposed in 1979 had

ar et ee ee
conc ete form in each standard’s rulemaking proceedings

A-60 A4l

only in reviewing the categorical standards applicabie to
(2) (1976). Sceten S08() of ho Act sequins Oe Ae

Id. $1316(a), (>). When the Administrator sets pretreat- 7. To determine whether a challenge to an admin-
ment standards using the BPT, BAT, or BDT levels of istrative regulation is ripe for review.
technology. he must consider those statutorily-relevant a two-fold inquiry must be made first to determine
factors for the wastestreams he regulates, whether they whether the issues tendered are appropriate for ju-
ase caguaguens 2 comianad, Eee qonnesy ee ot dicial resolution, and second to assess the hardship
sa ee eeten tho niieems eatecten emanaie Wy an cho pasties © potiatel sxliat te Contes at Coat ctnge
pretreatment of combined wastestreams. and the cost of Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162
attaining that reduction **

70. EPA admits that in the combined
wastestream “rmula the Administrator “did not consid-
er — in fact could not have taken into account — every
relevant factor for every ” Brief for Respondent
(No. 79-2256) at 78; see 46 Fed Reg 9422 (1982) (stat-
ing EPA urges instead that the

amplification

cost of an alternative discharge limit Hooker Chemical
Co. v. EPA, 642 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1961). It is only in
our review of such categorical standards that we can re-

46. Moreover, while the formula is itself “final.” & does nox
generae final, enforceabie alernacve discharge uruts und a cate
eS ea
a 147, 149-52

5
:
oe
ta,
U
3

bia

in }- isi Th
iu i 4 i
at eh
' ti Hii
Hi uf
IF ti rift

providing separate precrearrment
46 Fed Reg 9422 (1962) We

comoirung reguiaced
of segregaung and
and unregulated stearns

IIL THE CATEGORICAL ELECTROPLATING
STANDARDS

78. The categorical pretreatment regulations estab-

upon the discharge of certain pollutants by electroplat-
ing operations. 40 C.F.R. §§413.01-.84 (1982). Petition-

conmol technology

A-65

compliance date for integrated electropiaters is arbitrary
and capricious.

A. Methodology of the Standards
79. Ford contends chat the A-imimistrator has im-

ogy from section 301(bX 1A), 33 U.S.C. §131106X1XA)
(1976). The requirements for determining BPT limits
are set forth in section 304(b\ 1), which directs the Ad-
miunistrator to “identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-
ents and chemical, physical, and biological characteris-
tics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction
attainable through the application of the best

currently available for classes and
categories of point sources.” 33 U.S.C. §1314(bX1)
(1976). The stringency required by BPT is indicated in
the legislative history: :

subjects electropiaters to a moving target, it should not be applied to
ther. As we have considered and rejected those arguments in
denying the petitions for review of those two provisions. we decline
NAMF's invitation to set aside the electroplating -egulanons on

NAMF also argues that the definitions of “interference” and
“pass through” are invalid and undermine the stand-
ards. We agree that the definicons are invalid However, the defini-
uons play no part in either the setting or the administration of the
categorical pretreatment standards. We can therefore see no reason
why cheir invalidity should affect the validity of the electroplating
standards.

1972 Legis. Hist. 170 (staternent of Sen. Muskie); see S.
Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3716.°' Unless the

present practices of al] sources in the category are “uni- .

formly inadequate,” 1972 Legis. Hist. 169-70 (staternent
of Sen. Muskie), “the average of the best” is a measure
of BPT. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537
F.2d 620, 633 (2d Cir. 1976); American Meat Institute
v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1975); see Nat‘onal
Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 76 & n.15; AISI I, 526 F.2d
at 1057.

81. To set the BPT electroplating standards the Ad-

82. Ford challenges the data and methodology used
by the Administrator in his calculations. Under the arbi-

its expertise. In particular. *’.e choice of scientific data
and statistical to be used is best left to the
sound discretion of the Administrator. See BASF Wyan-
dotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 655 (Ist Cir. 1979):
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023.
1036 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 986 (4th Cir.
1976); American Meat Institute, 526 F.2d at 457.

1. The Regression Analysis

was able to base the long-term averages directly on em-
pirical data from the average of the best plants. For cop-
per, nickel,

(“Me”); the concentration in the influent of all Precipi-
table Metals (“PM”™); and the concentration in the efflu-
ent of the Total Suspended Solids (“TSS”). J. App. at
1346. The Administrator

believe, however, that both the assigned values are

strating the invalidity of that approach. Ford questions

using Xme. J. App. at 1364-65: 44 Fed. Reg. 52.609 (1979).

34. Ford questions the Administrator's decision to use TSS and
Xme data from only some of the plarus EPA visited, but fails to ad-
dress the criteria used by the Adminiscrator to
the adequacy of creatment at the visited plants. See J. Apn. at
1357-58.

A-59

median variability factor. We sec nothing in Ford's crit-
cismms that satisfies its burden. :

2 Lead and Cadmium
86. Finally, Ford claims that, in contrast to the

each poilutant’s long-term average. J. App. at 1347-49,
1359. For lead and cadrniurn, however, the Administra-

were available. Therefore, this equation is used to

derive average [cadmium] and [lead] limits as well

SS. We can find no indication that any comments during the
rulernaking called the Administrator's attention to the lack of data
behind the lead and cadmium limits. We note. however. that the
Administrator was nonetheless aware of the problem. Indeed. given
its centrality to his efforts to sex limits for those pollutants. the lack
of data could hardly have been overlooked. See A/S! |, 526 F.2d ac
1050. In amy case, EPA does not argue that Ford should be barred
from raising the problem because of any failure to raise it before the
Administrator.

A-70

J. App. at 1359, 1361 (reference and footmote omitted).

metals wil] predict wel] the treatability of lead and cad-
mium. We can reasonably discern, however, that the Ad-
ministrator found lead and cadmium to be equally as
treatable as the other metals. Ford has failed to rebut
that implicit assumption, for it has never dernonstrated,
either in the administrative record or before us, that lead
and cadmium are not equally creatable.

88. We note, moreover, that the Administrator but-

however. Therefore. it cannot serve as support for the
tor's decision. A/S/ 11, 568 F.2d at 296-97. EPA also cites daca im the
record fromm the facilicies of Ford and other automakers which

and argues tha" NAMF is barred from raising its conten-

water did not comsider che data from those facines to be usabic.
however. wnat data can be gven lice weight

EPA mext noces tha the Admurustr or requested data from the
electroplating industry and tha: the thre bead and three cadmium

SEE +5 78h mad Hf He il Heh
el aA a i a ut
i An iL a i
ot E rte l THLE fel uti Hill

. ayy 4 ny ay" aH Hy

Tot peti iad TEE

Wi tii li

pil ua
» Mae 333 a3 Uva i ETT:
3 Bi citys nll Ait ele

TH : sa Hail

3 hee ell ty as i: gt

rt Hi i dl HL Bt THE

ima

pu

‘ a3 ¢

ll HELL
X1) (1976 & Supp. I 1977). When the Adminis-
promulgated the standards in 1979.

A-36

uve date of March 13. 1961. 46 Fed. Reg 9464 (1961):
see id. at 9404. The Adminiscrator justified the extension
Uv stating chat the formula “would have to be

ed in final form before integrated facilides would under-
siand their compliance obligations under the electropiat-
ing standards. Id. at 9464.

112 After an inical of the formula's
effective date to March 30. 1961. the Administrator then
indefinitely postponed the formula’s effective date. See
47 Fed Reg 4516 (1962); 46 Fed. Reg 50.502-03
(1981): see also id. at 11.971 (1981). He explained thar
because he had received numerous comments cridciz-
ing the “highly controversial” formula’s effect on inte-
grated facilines. he believed the formula should be de-
ferred “while the Agency studies the implications of the
presemt formula further.” 47 Fed Reg 4519. 4520
(1982). The Administrator that the indefinite

postponernent of the formula also postponed the date by

which integrated facilives had to comply
standards. 46 Fed 43.973 (1981).

113. In NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982).

mula. effective March 30. 1981. Id. at 768-69. We
stated:

Id. at 768-69. Soon after our decision. on August 10.
1982. GM filed a petition for reconsideration asking the

i

|

pTine
5

115. We will grant the petitions for review in Nos.
81-1279, 81-1977. 81-1962, 81-1983, 81-1964. 81-1985.
81-2150, and 81-2151. We wil] deny all other
We will also deny EPA's motion regarding MF ASC.

116. We will remand to the Adminisrrator:

(c) 40 C.F.R. §403.3(n) (1982). establishing
the definition of “pass through:” and

(d) 40 C.F.R. §403.13 (1982). the
Sunteeanndine Giitaues hater weslenen pete

A-89

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For Tee Temp Crecurr

No. 79-2256

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS.
ELECTROPLATERS OF YORK. INC. AND
Petitioners

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
. Respondent

No. 79-2443

THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING
AND PACKAGING ELECTRONIC CIRCUITS.

Clerk of the United States Court uf Apprels |
for the Third Circuit Petitioner

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.

Respondent

as Nos. 80-1008, 81-1210, 81-1279

FORD MOTOR COMPANY. INC..
Petitioner

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY and DOUGLAS
M. COSTLE. Administrator. United States
Environmental Protection Agency.

Respondents
‘A. U. S Courts The Legal inelligencer. Phila. Pa) >

A-9%)

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL. INC..
Incervenor

No. 61-1351

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS
and INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING
AND PACKAGING ELECTRONIC CIRCUITS.
Petitioners

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.

Respondent
No. 61-1712
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
Petitioner

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC...
Intervenor
No. 81-1977

A-91

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
401 M Street. S.W.. W D..C. 20460 and
DOUGLAS M. COSTLE. ADMINISTRATOR.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
401 M Street. S.W.. Washington. D.C. 20460.
Respondents
CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
FMC CORPORATION
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION.
Intervenors

No. 61-1978
UNITED STATES BREWERS ASSOCIATION.

Respondents
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL. INC..
Intervenor
No. 81-1979

MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION.
AMERICAN PAPER INSTITUTE. NATIONAL
FOREST PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION. NATIONAL
PAINT AND COATINGS ASSOCIATION.
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION. AIR

No. 81-1981 Intervenor
ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN

SEWERAGE AGENCIES. He. 61-1908
Petitioner
vo
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY.
Responde
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL. INC..
intervenor
No. 81-1982 a
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS. eemnenes enitiieinin oeenee
ae COUNCIL, INC..
v 1725 Eye Street. N.W.. Washington. D.C. 20006.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. Petitioner

Ao A-%

- AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE

| ROUGE STEEL Co..

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
401 M Street. $.W., Washington. D.C. 20460.
Responden: No. 81-2151

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION “HICAGO ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE AND

Intervenors

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY INDUSTRY. ILLINOIS MANUFACTURERS
FMC CORPORATION
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION. FOUNDATION.
Intervenors Petitioners
v.
No. 81-2119 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
METAL FINISHING ASSOCIATION PROTECTION AGENCY.
|] SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. parece
- COUNCIL. INC..

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
Respondent ON PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF ACTIONS

No. 81-2150

INTERLAKE. INC.. REPUBLIC STEEL Argued June 20. 1983
CORPORATION and UNITED STATES Before: GIBBONS, HUNTER and BECKER. Circuit
STEEL CORPORATION. Judges
Opinion filed September 20. 1963
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ORDER AMENDING OPINION
PROTECTION AGENCY. | 1 The slip opinion filed in this case on September
Respondent 20. 1983 is hereby amended as follows:
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE a The last two sentences of paragraph | shall
COUNCIL. INC. be amended to read as follows:

A

Under that standard of review. we find in-

valid certain provisions of the general pre-
treatment regulations. Because it is not for
us to rewrite those provisons. we will re-
mand them to the Administrator.

b. The reference to the petition for review in
No. 61-1279 shall be deleted from paragraph 115.

By THE COURT.

/ James Hunter. 0!

Circutt Judge

Dated: October 5. 1963

A True Copy:
Teste:
Clert of tne Unued States Court of Appeais
Jor tha Thed Cvcutt
AO US Courts CMC Preeemg Pree Pe 315 660-4086)

Usrrep States Exvirowmewtat Protection AGENCY and
Doveias M. Costie, Administrator, United States

Natural Resoveces Derense Councit, Lwc., /atervenor

No. $1-1351

NaTIONAL AssoctaTion of Meta. Fintswers and
ey y+ —

ExvironMeNtal Prorection Acency, Respondent

A®

No. 81-1712
General Motors Conporation, Petitioner

Unsrrep States Ewvimowwew tat Prorection AGENCY and
Wacrer Barser, Acting Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency. Respondents

Natural Resoweces Derense Couwcn., Inc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1977

Natural Resovrces Derewse Counc, Inc.
917 15th Street, N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20005, Petitioner

U.S. Exvimowmewtat Protection AGENCY
#01 M Street, S.W.. Washington, D.C. 20460 and
Dove as M. CostLe, ADmmwterTraTor,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W..,

Washington. [ C 2460, Respondents

Americas Cranamip Company
FMC CoumrosatTiow
Ustow Cazsipe Comporation, /ntervenors

No. $1-197s

Usrrep States Beewers Association, Petitioner
a

Apmuwisteaton, Ex~vinowmewta: Protection AGENCY, and

Natural Resoveces Derense Cocwecn. Inc., /ntervenor

A-99

No. 81-1979

MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN Paper INSTITUTE,

NATIONAL Forest Products ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL PAINT AND COATINGS ASSOCIATION,
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
Arr Propucts aNnD CHEMICALS, INCc.,

AMERICAN CYANAMID Company, FMC Corporation,
HERCULES INCORPORATED, SHELL O1L Company,
and Union Carsipe CorporaTion, Petitioners

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondents

NaTuRAL Resources Derense Counci, Inc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1981

ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE AGENCIES, Peti-
tioner

v.
Unrrep States ENVIRONMENTAL PrRoTecTION AGENCY, Re-

spondent
NaTURAL Resources Derense Counci., INc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1982

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS, Petitioner
Vv

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent
NaTURAL Resources Derense Counc, INc., /ntervenor

A-100

No. 81-1983

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN CYANAMID Company, FMC Corporation,
Union CARBIDE Cor’ ORATION, Petitioners

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent

NATURAL Resources Derense Counci., Inc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1984

AMERICAN Paper INSTITUTE and
NATIONAL Forest Propucts ASsociaTION, Petitioners

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent

NaTURAL Resources Derense Councit, Inc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1985
NATURAL Resources Derense Counci., INc.,

1725 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, Petitioner .

v.

11S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460, Respondent

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
FMC CorPoRATION
Union CARBIDE CORPORATION, /ntervenors

A-101

No. 81-2119

METAL FINISHING ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN
CaLirornia, Petitioner

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent

No. 81-2150

INTERLAKE, INc., Repusiic STEEL CorPoRATION and
Unirep States STEEL Corporation, Petitioners
Vv.

UniTeD STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Re-

NATURAL Resources Derense Counci., INc., /ntervenor
AMERICAN [Ron & STEEL INSTITUTE
Rovuce Steer Co., /ntervenors

No. 81-2151

CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, ILLINOIS MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, and
MID-AMERICAN LEGAL FounbDaTion, Petitioners

Vv.
Unitrep States ENVIRONMENTAL Prorection AcEency, Re-

NATURAL Resources Derense Counci., Inc., /ntervenor

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ACTIONS OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Present: Gippons, HUNTER and Becker, Circuit Judges

A-102

AMENDED JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the record from the
Environmenta! Protection Agency, and were argued by coun-
sel June 20, 1983.

On consideration whereof, it is now ordered and adjudged by
this Court that:

1. The petitions for review of the regulations tg ty: teed
at 46 Fed.

1), docketed at C.A. Nos. 8 1977 orl 4%

1984, 81-2150 and 81-2151, wh owed 2

granted; and,

2. The said causes, at 1 supra, are hereby remanded to
the said for further proceedings consistent
with the of this Court.

It is further ordered and adjudged that the petitions for
review docketed at C. A. Nos. 79-2256, 79-2443, 80-1008, 81-
1210, 81-1279, 81-1351, 81-1712, 81-1978, 81-1979, 81-1981,
81-1982, 81-1985 and 81-2119, be, and the same are hereby
denied and the respective actions of the said Agency are
hereby affirmed in accordance with the opinion of the Court.

It is further ordered and adjudged that the following provi-
sions of the Code of Federal Regulations be, and the same are
hereby remanded to the Administrator for further proceedings
in accordance with the opinion of this Court:

(a) 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(i, (1982), establishing the defini-
tion of “interference, ”

(b) 40C.F.R. § 408.3(k) (1982), establishing the defini-
tion of “new source;”

(ec) 40 C.F.R. a establishing the defini-
tion of “pass through;” and

(d) 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1982), containing the
fundamentally different factor variance maw Ray

It is further ordered and adjudged that that portion of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s motion filed February 11,
1983, regarding whether the Metal Finishing Association of

A-103

Southern California is bound by the 1980 Environmental
Protection Agency—National Association of Metal Finishers
settlement, is hereby denied.

Costs taxed against respondents in C. A. 81-1977, 81-1983,
81-1984, 81-2150, and 81-2151. Costs taxed against petitioners
in C. A. Nos. 79-2256, 79-2443, 80-1008, 81-1210, 81-1279,
81-1351, 81-1712, 81-1978, 81-1979, 81-1981, 81-1982, 81-1985,
and 81-2119. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of
this Court.

ATTEST:

/s/ Sally Mrvos
SALLY Mrvos
Clerk

October 5, 1983

Certified as a true copy and issued in lieu
of a formal mandate on November 1, 1983.
ATTEST:

/s/ Sally Mrvos
SALLY Mrvos
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

A-104

UNITED STATES COURT “'F APPEALS
POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 79-2256

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS,
ELECTROPLATERS OF YorK, INC. AND PIONEER
Mera Finisuine, Inc., Petitioners

Vv

ENVIRONMENTAL Protection AcEency, Respondent

No. 79-2443

THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING AND
PACKAGING ELectronic Circurts, Petitioner

v

ENVIRONMENTAL Prorection Acency, Respondent

Nos. 80-1008, 81-1210, 81-1279
Forp Motor Company, Inc., Petitioner
Vv.

al Unrrep StTaTes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and
Dovuctas M. CostLe, Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Kespondents

NATURAL Resources Derense Counci., Inc., /ntervenor

No. 81-1351

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF METAL FINISHERS and
INSTITUTE FOR INTERCONNECTING AND PACKAGING
E.ectronic Circurts, Petitioners

v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEecTION AGENCY, Respondent

A-105

No. 81-1712

Vv

Untrep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and
WALTER Barser, Acting Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents

NaTURAL Resources Derense Counc, Inc., Intervenor

No. 81-1977

NaTuRAL Resources Derense Councit, inc.
917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, Petitioner

Vv

U.S. ENvironmen1. t Prorection AGENCY
401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460 and
Dovucias M. CostLe, ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20460, Respondents

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
FMC Corporation
Union Carsipe Corporation, Intervenors

NaTuRAL Resources Derense Counc, Inc., Intervenor

A-108
Neo. 51-1979

Americas Parte Leetrrure.
National Forest Prooucts Association,
RARE TURNS GD COMES AER,

Exvimoxnwenwval Protection AcENcY, Ax ondents
Natural Resoweces Derexse Couwcn.. bec. Jaterwenor

Neo. 51-1981

AssectaTios of Mereorourran Seweract Acewcies, Pet.
fomer

Usrrep States Exvirmoxwewta: Peorection Acency, Re-
spondes!

Natural Resoweces Derexse Couwcn.. Inc.. Jeternesor

Ne. $1-1982
Natiowal AssoctaTiow of Meta: Poewswers Petitioner

¥.

A-107

No. 51-1983

Cremical MaNUPaCTURERS Associa TION,
American Cyanamip Company, FMC Comroration,

Exvimowmentat Protection Acency, Respondent

No. 51-1984

Ampaican Parer Lestrrute and
National Forest Prooucts Association Petihoners

Exvimonmentat Protection Acency, Respondent

1725 Eye Street, N.W.. Washington. D.C. 20006, Petitioner

U.S. Ewvrmowmewta: Protection Acewcy,
#01 M Street, S.W.. Washington, D.C. 3660, Respondent

American CYaxasmp Company
FMC Comroaation
Ussow Caxerpe Compoaation, / afervenors

No. 51-2150

Unsrrep States Stree: Comroration, Petehoners

v

Unrrep States Exvimonwwewtat Protection Acency, Re

spomden!
Natural Resources Derense Counc, Lwc., /atervenor
Amenican Leow & Sree. Leetrrvute

No. $1-2151

Cwrcaco Association of Commence and

¥

Unsrrep States Ewvirowwewtat Prorectioow Acency, Re-
sponden!
Natura Resoweces Derense Councn, Iwc., /atervenor

ON PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF ACTIONS OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Present: Gassows, Hunter and Becker, Circus Judges

It us further ordered and adjudged that
review docketed at C. A. Nos. 79-2254, 79-2443, 80-1008, #1.
1230, 81-1279, 81-1351, 81-1712, 81-1978, 81-1979, 81-1981,
81-1982 and 81.2119, be, and the same are hereby demied and
the respective actions of the said Agency are hereby affirmed
mm accordance with the opumon of the Court.

|

It ws further ordered and adjudged that the following prov
mons of the Code of Federal Regulations be. and the same are
hereby remanded to the Admurustrator for further proceedings
im accordance with the opinion of this Court:

(a) @C_F_R. § 408.) (1982), establishing the defini-
“interference,”

ven of

) 40 C.P._R. § 403. 2k) (1982), establishing the defini-

(>)
tien of “new source,”

(>) @C.P.R. § 408. mn) ( establshin, he defim-
tion of “pass through:”

@ 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1982), containing the

fundamentally different factor vanance provimon
It ws further ordered and adjudged that the portion of the
Environmental Protection Agency's motion filed February | 1.
1983. regarding whether the Metal Firushing Association of

81-1279, 81-1351, 81-1712, 81-1978, 81-1979, 81-1981, 81-1982
and $1-2119. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of
this Court.

DECEMBER 7. 19%

A-lll

Lest of Corporate Petitioners Parents.
Suberdiaries. And Affiliates Pursuant to
Supreme (Court Rule 28 |

Thus list is submitted pursuant to Rule 28 | of the Supreme
Court Rules.

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY
Subesdianes and Affiliates

as A-113

FMC—Foret, Compania Colectiva
FMC Guatemala, S.A.

FMC (Ireland) Limited

FMC Machinery (Germany) GmbH
FMC de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

FMC Saudi Arabia Limited
FMC—Servicos e Empreendimentos S/C. Ltda.
FMC Spain S.A.

FMC Wellhead de Venezuela, S.A.
Foret, S.A.

Foret Arif Libanaise, S.A.R.L.
Huron Forge and Machine Company
IMRX Corpevation

Jamex, S.A.

UNION CA tBIDE CORPORATION

Subsidiaries and Affiliates

ACM Services
Administracion Y Servicios Carmex S. A. De C. V.

Chemos Industries Pty. Ltd.

Chrome Corporation (South Africa) (Pty.) Ltd.

er ae aS. : Cia Nr.ional de Caleareos e Derivados
Seciedad Anonyma Comercial, In- Dai Nippon Jushi Co. Ltd.

a Delvan Pty. Ltd.
Elektrode Maatskapy Van Suid Africa (Eiendoms) Be-
perk
Eletro Manganes Ltda.

Eletrometalurgica Suadade Ltda.
Empresa Brasileira De Reflorestamento e Argo-Pecuaria
Ltda.

A-1l4

Empress Brasileira De Cilendros Ltda.
Incarmex, S. A. De C. V.

Indugas N. V.

Joint Industries (Hycel) 1970 Ltd.
Karaj Road Property Co. Ltd.

P. T. Karmi Arafura Fisheries

La Littorale S. A.

Miami Welding Supply, Inc.

Montrose Exploration Co. S. A. (Pty.) Ltd.
Nepal Battery Co. Ltd.

Nippon Unicar Co.

Nita . pet, S. A.

Oxigenio Edy S. A.

Oxigeno Del Norte, S. A.

Oy Unifos A.B.

Servicos Administrativos Carmex S. A. De C. V.
Servicos DYC S. A. De C. V.

Societe Civile Des Produits Lifine
Sony-Eveready Inc.

Tubatse Ferrochrome (Pty.) Ltd.

Ucar Plastics Ghana Ltd.

Unifos Kemi A. B.

Union Carbide Argentina S. A. I. C. S.
Union Carbide Australia & New Zealand Ltd.
Union Carbide Australia Ltd.

Union Carbide Canada Ltd.

Union Carbide Ceylon Ltd.

Union Carbide Egypt S. A. E.

Union Carbide France, S. A.

Union Carbide Ghana Ltd.

Union Carbide India Ltd.

Union Carbide Kenya Ltd.

Union Carbide Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.
Union Carbide Mexicana, S. A.

Union Carbide New Zealand Ltd.
Union Cartide Nigeria Ltd.

Union Carbide Pakistan Ltd.

Union Carbide Sudan Ltd.

A-115

Union Carbide Yemen Ltd.
Union Gas Co. Ltd.

Union Polymers Sdn. Bhd.
Union Showa K. K.

United States Welding, Inc.
Sociedad Anomima White Martins
S. A. White Martins Nordeste

A-116

CLEAN WATER ACT PROVISIONS

. Section 301(b) of the Clean Water Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981):

(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives

In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there
shall be achieved—

(1MA) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations
ior pies, comsens, oper Chee eatiey cunes Gamnent
works, (i) which shall require the application of the best

control technology currently available as de-

the Administrator pursuant to section 1314 (b) of

this , or (ii) in the case of a discharge into a publicly

owned treatment works which meets the requirements of

subparagraph (B) of this , which shall require

compliance with any poets rere

See SEP SY eS See Gee Ee this
title;

(B) for Say aa eee w rks in existence

977, or approved to section 1283 of
A, A be A. E 4 (for which construction

ing the of all pollutants, as determined in
accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator

A-117

pursuant to section 1314(b\(2) of this title, which such
Sanat Retetege atl rovie the eamnatien of So
on

com-

PerearaphiA) of thie nr oe ona
not

after the date such are established;

(E) not later than July 1, 1984, effluent limitations for
and classes of point sources, other than icly

owned treatment works, which in the case of
identified pursuant to section '314(a)(4) of this title shal!
— of the best conventional pollutant con-
. 3 determined in accordance with regula-
tions issued

1314(b)4) of title; and
(F) for all ; (

arty ame
Apef the eremenk later than

not 3 after the date
such limitations are established, or not later than July 1,

—_ whichever is later, but in no cas later than July |,

A-118

2. Section 301(1) of the Clean Water Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 131401) (Supp. V 1981):

(1) Texie pollutants

The Administrator may not any requirement of
this section as it applies to pollutant which is
"= pee eeemenine section 1317(a)(1) of this

3. Section 304(b) of the Clean Water Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981):

if
fl
4.
:
i
t

st
r
:

1
Lt
H
|
i
Hy

id
|
;
i

sj
u

rf
;

environmental (ineluding energy requirements),
and such - ay ~ +
appropriate;

ip be-
tween the costs of yi tay — pe
the effluent reductiun derived, and the compari-

HE if?

Hie .

ti

He

Hl

Tk
rAnE

535
¥
5f73

it

§ LST7b) (1976 & Sapp. V 1981

é. Section 387\b) of the Clean Water Act. as amended. 13

a wii

4 i iis

a

isi

a

at
A

i ist thei Hit

i

aint

$403.13 Variances from categorical pretreatment stand-

ii Hse i i
ad i Hil
: Hu i 1: i
wba aa if i nah
‘tnt ij ; j
if |

fu

sity

HE

a iy oY

Lil |
li

ibebeat

aH

ae

uae
sideinraatas

11 nee
li i Hi i i
if it a! Ry
i Hutte ma ile

| i A Hine

lity

“344°

Ae

fiode,8

uel

+

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Hobe
gt

va T RTA TLE ES HE
etal Aa ti
ee | Fe i Hen

alt uli tr flict in| it
lihet Wil pattillat Hie
“lily 9) Wy : ree ee bl | i:
il sdnilelelsuileete eel anny

aq882 43

ik

::

i

Ms

ial

A-128

.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983

Unrrep Staves ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner
v.

NATURAL Resources Derense Council, INc.

APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN
WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

ALLL

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency, requests an extension of 60
days, to and including February 17, 1984, within which to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

The judgement of the court of appeals was entered on Sep- /

tember 20, 1983. A copy of the court’s opinion is attached. ' The
time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, unless ex-
tended, will expire on December 19, 1983. The jurisdiction of
this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

This case concerns the validity of an Environmental Protec-
tion Agency regulation (40 C.F.R. 403.13) permitting
ve~iances from national standards limiting the quantity of pol-

| The court’s decision (National Association of Metal Finishers v.
EPA, Nos. 79-2256, 80-1008, 81-1210, 81-1279, 81-1351, 81-1712,
81-1977, 81-1978, 81-1979, 81-1981, 81-1982, 81-1983, 81-1984, 81-
1985, 81-2119, 81-2150, 81-2151 (3d Cir., Sept. 20, 1983), concerned

1985).

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lutants that industrial dischargers may discharge into publicly
owned treatment works. An industrial discharger may qualify
for « variance from applicable national standards if it can
demunstrate that its situation involves factors “fundamentally
different” from those considered by the Agency when it estab-
lished the relevant national standards. Section 307(b) of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1317(b), requires the
Administrator of EPA to promulgate “pretreatment standards
for introduction of pollutants into [publicly owned treatment
works] for those pollutants which are determined not to be
to treatment by such treatment works or which
would interfere with the operation of such treatment works.”
The pretreatment standards are to apply to categories of in-
dustrial sources which introduce such pollutants to treatment
works. Because of the complexity in developing national
t standards for various categories of sources
under Section 307(b), occasionally the EPA may overlook data
showing that a particular plant within a certain category may
differ from the plants considered during the rulemaking in
ways that affect the plant’s ability to comply with the national
standards. Accordingly, EPA has promulgated a limited safe-
ty valve in its General Pretreatment Regulations, 40 C.F.R.
403.13, by which the Agency may establish more or less strin-
gent standards for an industrial discharger if the discharger
can demonstrate that its plant is “fundamentally different”
from the plants considered by EPA when it promulgated the
relevant national standards.
unlawful because Section 301(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(1), prohibits the Agency from modify-
ing any requirement applicable to toxic pollutants. The lower
court concluded that a variance based on fundamentally differ-
ent factors, as applied to a toxic pollutant, constitutes a “modi-
fication” of otherwise applicable national pretreatment stand-
ards and is therefore forbidden by Section 301(1).
The court of appeals’ conclusion seems incorrect. Section
301(1) was intended only to prohibit modifications under Sec-

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appeals

does indicate that Congress was primarily concerned with
modifications under Section 301(c) and (g)” (sl> op.

at 42). Furthermore, prior to the enactment of 301(1) in 1977,

part of numerous other national rulemakings, and this Court
had held in E. J. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,430 U.S.
112 (1977), that EPA was required to provide variances from
certain national effluent limitations and standards for direct
dischargers. There is no hint in the legislative history of the
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act that Congress
sought to end the Agency’s adrr‘nistrative practice or overrule
this Court’s decision in duPont.

The Third Circuit’s decision also appears to be at odds with
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, 620 F.2d 1040 (1980). There, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the Natural Resources Defense Council's claim that
Section 301(1) prohibits EPA from granting similar variances
to direct dischargers, i.e., industrial sources that discharge
wastes directly into navigable waters instead of into publicly
owned sewage treatment works. Thus, under the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision, EPA may grant variances based upon
fundamentally different factors for direct dischargers, but
under the Third Circuit’s decision, the Agency may not grant
such variances for indirect dischargers. This disparate treat-

Because of the importance of this issue to the Agency's
of national pretreatment standards for various

industrial categories and the apparent conflict between the
circuits, further review by this Court may be warranted. The

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additional time is requested in order to permit careful consid-
eration of whether a petition for a writ of certiorari should be
filed in this case. The additional time is also needed to confer
wih etesestengvemmnent eqns, exe detiten te Give
petition for a certiorari is reached, to and pri
the petiti prepare and print

Respectfully submitted,

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

DECEMBER 1983

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0039%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
