# Amicus Curiae Brief — Board of School Commissioners v. Jaffree

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0031%3A13

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 924

## Text

U.S.
. ‘ S reme Court.

juL 5 1984

RK ——
IN THE ——

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

No. 83-812
GEORGE C. WALLACE, Governor, et al.,
Appellants,
V.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 83-929
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, et al..
Appellants,
Vv.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE, et al.,
Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE FREEDOM COUNCIL,
AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE APPELLANTS

JOHN W. WHITEHEAD JAMES J. KNICELY
P. O. Box 409 GRABER & KNICELY
Manassas, VA 22110 1001-A Richmond Road
(703) 491-5411 Williamsburg, VA 23185

(804) 253-0026

Participating Attorneys for
The Rutherford Institute

P. O. Box 510

Manassas, VA 22110
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Freedom Council

P. O. Box 64323

Virginia Beach, VA 23464

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Interest of Amicus Curiae ......... 6.00 e cece eee e ee eeeee 1
Summary of Argument ....... 26-666 cee eee eee renee 3

Argument

I. Alabama’s Statutory Provision Which Permits Public
School Teachers To Begin The School Day With Medi-
tation Or Silent Prayer Does Not Conflict With The In-
tentions Of The Framers Of The First Amendment As
Revealed In Their Words, Deeds, And History ........ 4

A.
B.

If. Ala

The Views Of Thomas Jefferson And James Madison 5

Executive And Congressional Actions In Support Of
Our Religious Heritage ......... 6-6 -- esses eee 11

bama’s Statutory Provision Which Permits Public

School Teachers To Begin The School Day With Medita-
tion Or Silent Prayer Merely Permits An Exercise Of The
Liberty Of Conscience In Its Purest Form .........-- 16

Ill. Alabama’s Statutory Provision Allowing Meditation or

Sile

nt Prayer is an Example of Affirmatively Mandated

Accommodation ... 6... ccc cc eee eee e eee eennes 21

IV. Alabama’s Statutory Provision Allowing Meditation or
Silent Prayer does not Violate the Lemon Tripartite Test 23

A.

Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 Serves Secular Educa-

tional Purposes .........-- 60sec e eee eee eens 23
Any Advancement of Religion By a Period of Silence

is Merely De Minimus and Incidental ..........-- 26
There is No Entanglement Issue Presented Here .... 27

TABLE OF CASES

Cases
Page
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1970) ............ 19
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) ..........--5265. 21
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ............+55. 19
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) .......... 5, 16, 17
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) ............6-0445- 25
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ............... 6, 7, 12, 15
Everson V. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) .......... 5, 6
Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337 (D.Mass. 1976) ...... 25, 26
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ............ 19, 20
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) ... 2.2... cc wee ewes 24
Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554
F.Supp. 1104 (S.D.Ala. 1983) ..... 2.2... 6. eee e ee eens 27
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 595 (1942) ... 2... 2.6622 c eee 16, 19
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ......... 20
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) ......... 20
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) ... 2.2... cece ene 24
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ............. 4, 23,24
Lynch v. Donnelly, ——— U.S. ——., 104 S.Ct. 1355
GEE . cctuccsecdhantacs 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27
Marsh v. Chambers, US. ——, 103 S.Ct. 3330
CERES cccccccontbacccesecésueuheeenane 5, 10, 11, 21, 24
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) ... 0... 0... ee ene. 20

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ....9, 16

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960) .............. 10
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) .........0e ee euee 16
Meyers Vv. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ............... 15
Mueller v. Allen, U.S. ——, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983) .... 24
NAACP Vv. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ..........6.5005: 19
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) ........ 5
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ........... 19
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) ........... 16, 20
Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. 48 (W.D.Mich. 1965) ..... 25
School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 US.
EE 16, 17, 26, 27, 28
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ............000005- 20
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) .............0055. 21
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 449 (1969) ............. 16, 19, 20
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944) ..........00055. 16, 19
Tinker Vv. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503
EPEC ECU cE eiweseccsssececcccccecccccs 20
Torcaso V. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ............54.. 27, 29
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) ........ 5,21, 22
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
eee e ey we eenecccccccccecccceces 16
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) ...........050005. 27
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ............055. 20
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) ..........2005. 16, 19
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) .......... 16, 21, 22, 23

Statutes
Pr eR: FBR. | Revere ore TeTTTITT LTT ei 23
ALA. CONST. Preamble, ALA. CODE, Vol. 1 ............ 29
A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskas-
kia Tribe of Indians, 7 Stat. 78-79 (Peters ed. 1846) ....... 9

A Treaty Between the United States and the Oneida, Tuscorora,
and Stockbridge Indians, dwelling in the Country of the
Oneidas, 7 Stat. 47-48 (Peters ed. 1846) ..........20005. 13

An Act granting further time for locating military land warrants,
and for other purposes, Ch. 26, 2 Stat. 271-272 (Peters ed.

SEED. cctuadsdnnees66s0s 665 ReCedens cueedebeeteseas 8
An Act in addition to an act, intituled etc., Ch. 30, 2 Stat. 155-
CS GUE GE, TG 0 6.0 cee es cdtdcccccesevticssonces 8

An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest
of the river Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51

CURE BUD 8 occ ccecccasecsecstessescveseceese 13
An Act to revive and continue in force, etc., and for other pur-
poses, Ch. 30, 2 Stat. 236-237 (Peters ed. 1845) .......... 8
Articles of a (Kickapoo Indian) Treaty, 7 Stat. 391-392 (Peters
GE, TD. duc ctndncwessddbcnncdscecatevnseenssecouss 14
Articles of a (Osage Indian) Treaty, 7 Stat. 242-243 (Peters ed.
CE bck cb cddvudusiondiedndeiece beddeedesicns tenes 14
Articles of a (Wyandot Indian) Treaty, 7 Stat. 160, 166 (Peters
Oe TE 64.6 64.6660666500d00h0eRenesonennesaeereues 13

H. R. Rep. No. 124, 33rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1789), reprinted in
2 Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives 4
CED noo wen cnccecedscavescenveusteesneseuacesss 10

Joint Resolution, etc., Pub. L. No.. 94-344 § 1(19), 90 Stat. 810,
813 (1978), codified, as amended, at 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1978) 15

iv

Page

Joint Resolution to establish a National Motto of the United
States, Ch. 795, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (1957) ... 15

Journal of the House of Representatives 123 ................ 11
i, une dae ebekeueeneanene 11

Ord. of 1787, July 13, 1787, Art. 3, reprinted in Documents Illus-
trative of the Formation of the Union of American States 52

ED | a space bake Kid 4k Kd Ones akaked deeeeeneaus 13
Other Sources
2 American State Papers (J. Gales ed. 1834) ............... 14
1 Annals of Congress (J. Gales ed. 1834) ................ 10, 17
C. Antieau, A. Downey and E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal
ee ee du neat nanses canes 6
H. Black, Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1927) ............... 8
Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu-
tional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1963) ............ 25
Comment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59
Pe aie SG Ee UE gba 0 e666 nnb5000 00606600608 26
Comment, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Hu-
manism, 8 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 329 (1981) .............. 28
T. Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (1893) ......... 8
R. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and
eg ed cen eeansees es 8, 10, 11
H. Cox, The Secular City 18 (1965) ............ccceeeees 29
Forkosch, Religion, Education, and the Constitution—A Middle
Way, 23 Loyola L. Rev. 617 (1977) ............2e200ee 28
P. Freund, Religion and the Public Schools (1965) .......... 26

Page

Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal
Development—Part I, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 (1967) ....17, 18

Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal
Development—Part II, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1968) ....22, 28

M. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness (1965) ........... 6
P. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution (1962) ....... 29
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich.
Se OD +. b6 Gu eb dave we eesecwensescees 21, 26
Note, Religion in the Public Schools, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1078
CRD. Cksb cd vec nncedccsnsbeceesscvecveteeseteess 26, 27
2 J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
the Presidents, 1789-1897 (1901) ......... 0. ccc ee eeeee 14
P. Stokes and L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States
CED ce Cake 60d 6bbW640040%9065 00000806686 0508 7, 12,13
2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
Ge Ge IE 96060 ces cet cnedbecenseccoesseses 7, 8,18
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) ............. 24
1 U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, 1824-1831 (1976) ........000005 14

1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1922) 15
J. Wilson, Public Schools of Washington, 1 Records of the

Columbia Historical Society 4 (1897) ...........0000eee 9
8 Works of Thomas Jefferson (Washington ed. 1861) ........ 7
15 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed. 1904) ....... 8
19 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed. 1904) ....... 9

vi

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1983
No. 83-812
GEORGE C. WALLACE, Governor, et al.,
Appellants,
V.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 83-929
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, et al.,
Appellants,
V.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE, et al.,
Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE FREEDOM COUNCIL,
AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE APPELLANTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

This case presents important issues concerning the power
of the state to recognize and accommodate America’s re-
ligious pluralism and diversity in the operation of the public

2 Counsel of record to the parties in the cases described above
have consented to the filing of this brief and letters of consent have
been filed with the Clerk pursuant to Rule 36.

2

schools without infringing upon the freedom of conscience
of individual students or teachers. The Freedom Council is
greatly concerned about the implications for religious free-
dom and tolerance raised by the Court of Appeals’ decision
in this case. The Freedom Council believes that the Court
of Appeals ruling swept too broadly when it invalidated the
Alabama meditation or silent prayer statute. The statute
does not advance religion. It merely provides for a period of
silence that recognizes in neutral fashion the freedom of
conscience of each teacher and student. Teachers are free
to decide whether or not to observe a period of silence and
students are free to utilize the period of silence in the
manner they — choose. Such activity merely ad-
vances the spirit of pluralism and toleration intended by the
First Amendment and does not constitute an unlawful estab-
lishment of religion.

The Freedom Council is a non-profit religious corpora-
tion organized to defend, restore, and preserve religious
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. With chapters
in each of the 50 states, the Freedom Council is also affili-
ated with student groups on over 70 college campuses
and with the Christian Broadcasting Network, currently
the largest cable television network in the United States
reaching over 20 million homes. The Freedom Council
assists its chapters and associated organizations in address-
ing issues on the local, state and national levels that have
a significant impact on First Amendment religious freedoms.

Amicus Curiae is represented by participating attorneys
from The Rutherford Institute, a non-profit religious cor-
poration named for Samuel Rutherford, a 17th-century
Scottish minister and Rector at St. Andrew’s University.
Through the efforts of its staff and affiliated local chapters,
attorneys and lay persons, the Institute undertakes to assist

3

litigants and to participate in significant cases relating to
First Amendment religious freedoms. Counsel for Amicus
Curiae have specialized in constitutional litigation, including
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, and have par-
ticipated as counsel for amici curiae in previous cases
before this Court. Counsel John W. Whitehead has
argued and served as special cons.:tutional consultant in
numerous First Amendment cases and has authored several
books and law review articles that focus on interpretation
and application of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
The Freedom Council believes the expertise of its counsel
will be of assistance to the Court in this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In prior cases, this Court has relied upon the intent of
the Framers of the Bill of Rights for understanding the
meaning and reach of the Establishment Clause. The histori-
cal record shows that the climate of the revoiutionary
period was fundamentally religious and favored government
accommodation of religious practices, some of far more sig-
nificance than the Alabama law in question. Both Jefferson
and Madison, often cited for their disestablishmentarian
views, in fact tolerated and approved numerous religious
practices in the public schools and in public life. Jefferson,
for example, was President of the School Board of the Dis-
trict of Columbia where the Bible and the Watts Hymnals
were used as primary texts. Moreover, our national history
is replete with examples of government, in a spirit of tolera-
tion and accommodation, recognizing, as the State of Ala-
bama has in this case, America’s religious tradition and
culture, but without infringing on the rights of conscience
of those who do not subscribe to particular tenets of that
tradition or culture.

4

The Alabama law in question is permissive. It provides
an opportuni:y to observe a period of silence in which
each may meditate or voluntarily pray. It respects the in-
violability of conscience that is at the heart of the Free
Exercise Clause. It is not a constitutionally proscribed
establishment of religion. It merely advances in neutral
fashion the freedom to believe (or not to believe) and con-
stitutes the type of affirmative, yet neutral, accommodation
mandated by the First Amendment.

The Alabama law also satisfies the “tri-partite test” of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 405 U.S. 602 (1971). Secular means
and ends are furthered by the period of silence, including
the interests of calling the classroom to order, instructing
the students in self-discipline, teaching the students re-
spect for the authority of the teacher, permitting students
to contemplate serious thoughts and values, engendering
an appreciation for this nation’s cultural and religious heri-
tage and promoting religious liberty and tolerance through
voluntarism. Any nominal aid to religion is incidental to the
purposes of the statute and de minimus when compared to
statutory enactments this Court has approved in the past.

ARGUMENT
1.

Alabama’s Statutory Provision Which Permits Public School
Teachers To Begin The School Day With Meditation Or
Silent Prayer Does Not Conflict With The Intentions Of
The Framers Of The First Amendment As Revealed Ja

Their Words, Deeds, And History.
History provides varied and ample evidence that among
the founders of this Republic and its early presidents and

congresses, the universal sentiment towards religion was one
of accommodation, not merely toleration. It is unequivo-

5

cably clear from the language, intent, and history surround-
ing the adoption of the First Amendment that the separation
of church and state intended by the Bill of Rights was of
limited effect and that amicability, not hostility to the free
exercise of religion, was the shibboleth of that era.

In Religion Clause adjudication, no less than any other
area of law, Justice Holmes’ statement is most fitting: “A
page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). The de-
termination of “the ultimate constitutional objective” as
expressed by the Framers and “as il/uminated by history” is
of particular relevance here. Lynch v. Donnelly, US.
; , 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984); Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970). In this regard,
this Court has said:

In applying the First Amendment to the states through
the 14th Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), it would be incongruous to interpret
that clause as imposing more stringent First Amend-
ment limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed
upon the Federal Government.

Marsh v. Chambers, __. US. . , 103 S.Ct. 3330,
3335 (1983). Because of this basic constitutional presup-
position, concrete, specific historical evidence of the Fra-
mers’ views on religion and religious practices in public life
must be placed at a premium to understand the reach and
meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.

A. THe Views Or THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
JAMES MADISON.
The views of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison have
been previously recognized by this Court as most instructive.
verson V. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Al-

6

though Thomas Jefferson can in no sense be regarded as
a Framer of the First Amendment, this Court, in its early
Religion Clause cases, has adopted the view that “the
framers spoke in a wholly Jeffersonian dialect and those
who ratified it fully undevstood that style of speech.” M.
Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 10 (1965). At
the time of the drafting and adoption of the First Amend-
ment, Jefferson was in France. However, through his cor-
respondence with James Madison, his influence was at least
partially felt.

In many ways, the views of Madison and Jefferson were
not representative of those of the Framers of the Constitut-
ion. Both Madison and Jefferson were from Virginia and
were central figures in the fight in that state for the disestab-
lishment of the Church of England. See Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. at 11-13 and 33-42 and Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428-429 (1962)’

Not all states, however, shared Madison’s and Jefferson’s
fervor for disestablishment. As this Court has previously
noted, at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, “there

2 Antieau, Downey and Roberts note, however, that: “[T])he First
Amendment was hardly the exclusive product of any one person.
Subsequent interpretations of the Amendment should not be con-
trolled by the singular statements of Madison [or] Jefferson. ... An
examination of the early activities of the Federal Government in-
dicates that the people approved and welcomed its aid to church
related activities. .. . There was undoubtedly the faith that subse-
quent generations of Americans would be able to utilize the power
of the Federal Government to promote the concurrent interests of
government and religion under First Amendment norms that were
reasonable, and just.” C. Antieau, A. and
E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 207-209 (1964).

2 Both Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, written in 1785 in opposition to legislation which would
use Virginia’s public funds to pay teachers of the Christian religion,
and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia,

in 1779 and enacted in 1786, were central documents to
these disestablishmentarian forces.

7

were established churches in at least eight of the thirteen
former colonies and established religions in at least four of
the other five.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 428. The dis-
establishment of state churches was by no means complete
by the time of the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
Indeed, the Congregational Church was not disestablished
in Connecticut until 1818 and in New Hampshire until
1819. The last of the colonies, Massachusetts, was not
disestablished until 1833. P. Stokes and L. Pfeffer, Church
and State in the United States 77-78 (1964).

This history of state church establishment illustrates that
the term “establishment” had a fixed meaning in the minds
of the drafters. On the Federal level, “[t]he real object of the
[first] amendment was. . .to prevent any national ecclesias-
tical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government.” Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1361, citing 2 J. Story, Commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United States 593-595 (2d
ed., 1851). This restriction was institutional in nature. As
Jefferson’s often quoted expression stated, the Religion
Clauses were to build “a wall of separation between Church
and State.” 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 113 (Washington
ed. 1861) (emphasis supplied). No wall of separation was
intended, however, even by Jefferson, to seal religion
hermetically from governmental activities. The institution
of the church was to be isolated from the institution of the
state. As Jefferson stated in 1817:

If by religion, we are to understand sectarian dogmas,
in which no two of them agree, then your exclamation
on that hypothesis is just, “that this would be the best
of all possible worlds, if there were no religion in it.”
But if the moral precepts, innate in man, and made a
part of his —— constitution, as necessary for a
social being . . . in which all agree, constitute true re-

ligion, then, without it, this would be, as you again say,
“something not fit to be named even, indeed, a Hell.”

15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 109 (Memorial ed.
1904). Indeed, it must be noted: “Probably, at the time of
the adoption of the constitution, and of the amendment to it
now under consideration, the general if not the universal
seiitiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible
with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of re-
ligious worship.” J. Story, supra; see also H. Black, Consti-
tutional Law 515 (4th ed., 1927) and T. Cooley, Principles
of Constitutional Law 224 (1893).

That this sort of accommodation of religious freedom was
compatible with the alleged “separationist” views of Thomas
Jefferson was particularly evident in Jefferson’s actions in
the field of education. Jefferson as President repeatedly de-
parted from the fastidious separationism which revisionist
historians have attributed to him. For example, on three
separate occasions, Jefferson signed into law extensions of
a land grant given by the Federal government specifically to
promote proselytizing amongst the Indians. R. Cord, Sep-
aration of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current
Fiction 41-46 (1982).° Further, in 1803, President Jeffer-
son proposed to the United States Senate a treaty with the
Kaskaskia Indians in which the Federal government would
agree to “give annually for seven years one hundred dollars

*An act regulating the grants of land appropriated for military
services, and for the society of the United Brethren for propagating
the gospel among the heathen, and for other purposes, as extended by:
An Act in addition to an act, intituled etc., Ch. 30, 2 Stat. 155-156
(Peters ed. 1845); An Act to revive and continue in force, etc., and
for other purposes, Ch. 30, 2 Stat. 236-237 (Peters ed. 1845); and
An Act granting further time for locating military land warrants,
and for other purposes, Ch. 26, 2 Stat. 271-272 (Peters ed. 1845).

9

towards the support of a priest” and “further give the sum
of three dollars to assist the said tribe in the erection
of a church.” A Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians, 7 Stat. 78-79 (Pe-
ters ed. 1846). The treaty was ratified on December 23,
1803, and included a specific appropriation for a Catholic
mission, at President Jefferson's request.

Jefferson’s involvement in th: accommodation of the
religious nature of the Americar people was not limited to
Federal grants for the proselytizing of Indians. It extended
as well to general public education. Jefferson was the first
president of the school board in the District of Columbia in
which the Bible and the Watts Hymnal were used as the pri-
mary texts. J. Wilson, Public Schools of Washington, 1
Records of the Columbia Historical Society 4 (1897). Mr.
Jefferson also advocated religious instruction at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, of which he was a founder. Although
the University was wholly governed, managed and con-
trolled by the Commonwealth of Virginia, Jefferson believed
that religious instruction on the school’s premises was “most
interesting and important to every human being. ..The
want of instruction in the various creeds of religious faith
existing among our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in
the general institution of the useful sciences.” McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 245-246 (1948) (Reed,
J., dissenting), citing 19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
414-417 (Memorial ed., 1904). Clearly, Jeffersonian state
disestablishment did not require the eradication of religion
from public schools, even though Virginia’s Bill for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom may have had much more stringent
provisions than those constraining the Federal government.

James Madison, although often cited as antagonistic
toward religion, participated in the creation of several

10

government sponsored religious practices.‘ Madison is
repeatedly noted for leading the disestablishment forces
against Patrick Henry’s A Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion, which would have pro-
vided a subsidy to religion. It is apparent, however, that
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments was specifically pointed at discriminatory aid
along sectarian lines. In fact, Madison seemed especially
opposed to inequal treatment caused by discrimination along
denominational lines. R. Cord, supra, at 20-21.

Later acts by Madison further clarify that he was not
opposed to governmental benevolence towards religion gen-
erally. A primary example of Madison accommodating the
religious needs of the American people occurred three days
before final agreement upon the wording of the Bill of
Rights. Madison, a participant in the first House of Repre-
sentatives, was a member of the congressional committee
that recommended the chaplain system. H. R. Rep. No. 124,
33rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1789), reprinted in 2 Reports of
Committees of the House of Representatives 4 (1854).
Madison himself voted for the bill authorizing payment of
chaplains for their services. 1 Annals of Cong. 891 (J. Gales
ed. 1834) and Marsh v. Chambers, 103 St. Ct. at 3333.
Reverend William Linn was elected as chaplain to the
House of Representatives and five hundred dollars was ap-

propriated from the Federal treasury to pay his salary.
On September 25, 1789, the same day that final agree-
ment was reached upon the wording of the Bill of Rights,

*It is interesting to note that in the same year that Madison and
Jefferson's collaborative efforts resulted in the passage of A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, Madison presented to the Virginia
legislature A Bill jor Punishing . . . Sabbath Breakers, which i
a fine of “ten shillings for such offence.” McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 438-439 (1960).

11

the House resolved to request that President Washington
proclaim a Day of Thanksgiving to acknowledge “the many
signal favors of Almighty God.” Journal of the House
of Representatives 123; Journal of the Senate 88; Marsh
v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct., at 3334. James Madison endorsed
this and other proclamations calling for Thanksgiving, fast-
ing and prayer. R. Cord, supra, at 28-29. Indeed, later, as
President, Madison issued at least four “Thanksgiving Day”
executive proclamations. Those occurred on July 9, 1812,
July 23, 1813, November 16, 1814 and March 4, 1815.
Id. at 31.

These actions of Madison and Jefferson are of particular
interest because they are contemporaneous with, and proxi-
mate to, the drafting of the First Amendment. As this Court
has held, “historical evidence sheds light not only on what
the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean,
but also on how they thought that Clause applied...
their actions reveal their intent.” Marsh v. Chambers, 103
S.Ct. at 3344.

If James Madison and Thomas Jefferson are an anomaly,
it is because of their fervor for disestablishment. Yet, the
evidence is clear that both Virginians advocated, partici-
pated and authorized Federal government funding and
sponsorship of patently religious activities which generally
exceeded that degree of accommodation fostered by the
Alabama law involved in the present case.

B. EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS IN
Support Or Our RELIGIOUS HERITAGE.

Other manifestations of governmental benevolence
towards religion of a greater magnitude than the Alabama
law are manifest. Universally, the oath of office for Presi-
dents has been administered upon the Bible. By resolution

12

adopted by both houses of Congress it was decided that
“divine services” should be heid in St. Paul’s Chapel in the
District of Columbia to be “performed by the Chaplain of
Congress” following the administration of the oath of
office to George Washington in 1789. P. Stokes and L.
Pfeffer, supra, at 87. On April 30, 1789, Washington upon
assuming office stated, “. . .it would be peculiarly improper
to omit in this first official act my fervent supplications to
that Almighty Being who rules over the universe. . .” Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

Each of our Presidents, from George Washington to the
present Chief Executive has, upon assuming his office, asked
the protection and help of God. An impressive grouping
of such invocations appears in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at
446-449. As previously mentioned Presidents Washington,
Adams, and Madison issued, at the request of Congress,
Presidential Thanksgiving proclamations. Such executive
expressions can not be cavalierly relegated to the archaic
past, but must be recognized as part of our rich inheritance
of “countless. . . illustrations of the Government’s acknow-
ledgement of our religious heritage and governmental spon-
sorship of graphic manifestations of that heritage.” Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1361.

Of course, such accommodations to the spiritual needs
of the American people are not limited to the Executive
Branch. Congress, besides being integrally involved in the
adoption of legislative prayer and paid Congressional Chap-
lains, initiated the proclamations already discussed. Perhaps
more important the Continental Congress enacted the North-
west Ordinance on July 13, 1787. That ordinance, in part,
provided:

Religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to
good government and the happiness of mankind,

13

schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.”

Ord. of 1787, July 13, 1787, Art. 3, reprinted in Documents
Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of American.
States 52 (1927). On August 7, 1789 (after the agreement
to the final wording of the Bill of Rights), the Congress of
the newly formed Federal government reenacted the North-
west Ordinance. An Act to provide for the Government of
the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio (Northwest Ordi-
nance), Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51 (Peters ed. 1845).

This Federal grant of land for the promotion of “religion,
morality, and knowledge” was not a unique occurrence
among the early settlers. For example, in 1795, President
Washington concluded a treaty with the Oneida, Tuscorora
and Stockbridge Indians in which the United States paid
“one thousand dollars, to be applied in building a convenient
church at Oneida,” to replace the one which the British
burned in the Revolutionary War. A Treaty Between the
United States and the Oneida, Tuscorora, and Stockbridge
Indians, dwelling in the Country of the Oneidas, 7 Stat. 47-
48 (Peters ed. 1846). Later in 1819 in a treaty with the
Wyandot Indians, Article I of the treaty granted six hundred
and forty acres to the rector of the Catholic Church of St.
Anne in Detroit. Articles of a (Wyandot Indian) Treaty,
7 Stat. 160, 166 (Peters ed. 1846). In 1825, President John
Quincy Adams provided in a treaty with the Osage Indians
for a “Missionary establishment” to teach, civilize and im-

°A. Stokes and L. Pfeffer comment on one manifestation of
such encouragement: “Also worthy of mention in this listing of the
official acts and utterances of the founders before the Constitution
are the resolution of Congress in 1777 instructing the Committee on
Commerce to import twenty thousand copies of the Bible and its
resolution of 1782 approving ‘the pious and laudable undertaking’
of a printer named Robert Aitken in publishing an American edition
of the Holy Scriptures.” A. Stokes and L. Pfeffer, supra, at 85.

14

prove the indians. Articles of a (Osage Indian) Treaty, 7
Stat. 242-43 (Peters ed. 1846). As late at 1833, we find the
Federal government obligated to pay “thirty seven hundred
dollars, for the erection of a mill and church” as terms of a
treaty with the Kickapoo Indians. Articles of a (Kickapoo
Indian) Treaty, 7 Stat. 391-392 (Peters ed. 1846).

Besides these treaties with the individual Indian tribes,
Federal money was expended to support religious schools
and training a policy of “civilizing the Indians.”
This policy was implemented almost exclusively by religious
societies, fulfilling the Federal government’s “duty to use...
[its] influence in converting to Christianity and bringing
within the pale of civilization” the Indian tribes. 2 J. Rich-
ardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1897 415-416 (1901) (Address by Presi-
dent John Quincy Adams in his Fourth Annual Message to
Congress on December 2, 1828). The list of tribes and
Missionary societies supported from Federal funds is quite
extensive. 2 American State Papers 275-277 (J. Gales ed.
1834). Direct subsidies were given from the Federal
treasury to the following religious societies: the United
Brethren, the American Board of Commissioners for For-
eign Missions, the Baptist General Convention, the Prot-
estant Episcopal Church of New York, the Hamilton Baptist
Missionary Society, the Methodist Society, the Synod of
South Carolina and Georgia, the Society of Jesuits, the
Cumberland Missionary Board, and the Society for Pro-
pagating the Gospel. 1 U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Annual
Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1824-1831
(1976) (Report of November 24, 1827).

These treaties and grants are of particular relevance since,
as this Court has noted “the interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clauses by Congress in 1789 fakes on special signifi-

15

cance in light of the Court’s emphasis that the First Con-
gress ‘was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have
always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the
greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental
instrument.’ ” Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-
175 (1926); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1359.

Congressional actions seeking to embody the religious
nature of the American people are not limited to the early
years of our Republic. One such recognition is the relatively
recent adoption of “In God We Trust” as our national motto.
Joint Resolution to establish a National Motto of the United
States, Ch. 795, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (1957).
The phrase is <videnced upon all coins and currency, is in
our National Anthem, and is inscribed over the entrance
to the Senate Chamber. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 440,
449. Since 1954, the Pledge of Allegiance has contained
the words “One nation, under God, with liberty ard justice
for all.” Joint Resolution, etc., Pub. L. No. 94-344, § 1(19),
90 Stat. 810, 813 (1978), codified, as amended, at 36
U.S.C. § 172 (1978).

All of the institutions of our government are permeated
with such practices, including this Court. The very decorum
of this Court, as well as the ornamentation of the courtroom
communicates this rich heritage. Since the days of John
Marshall, this Court’s crier has said, “God save the United
States and this Honorable Court.” See 1 C. Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History 496 (1922). In-
deed, “[t]he very chamber in which oral arguments on this
case were heard is decorated with a notable. ..symbol of
religion: Moses with the Ten Commandments.” Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1361.

It is blinking at reality to say that the practices and
actions described above do not provide concrete, specific

16

historical evidence upon which to evaluate the constitu-
tional validity of the Alabama statute. In light of this rich
heritage of governmental benevolence towards religion, the
result is inevitable. As Justice William O. Douglas instructs:
“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952). The invalidation of this statute would severely con-
tradict our history, and bring this Court into “war with our
national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.” McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. at 211-212; Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1359.

Il.

Alabama’s Statutory Provision Which Permits Public School
Teachers To Begin The School Day With Meditation Or
Silent Prayer Merely Permits An Exercise Of The
Liberty Of Conscience In Its Purest Form.

Liberty of conscience, or the freedom to believe accord-
ing to the dictates of one’s own conscience, is a primary
philosophical tenet of both First, Amendment Religion
Clauses. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-715
(1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969);
School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 US.
516, 530-531 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US.
158, 164-165 (1944); West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942); Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 595 (1942) (Opinion of Reed, J.); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922). Concern for this
liberty is central throughout all of the protections embodied
in the Bill of Rights, particularly those identified by this

17

Court as constituting the right to privacy. It would do viol-
ence to both the letter and spirit of our Constitution to sever
religious beliefs from the other freedoms of conscience that
are now clearly protected in the public school environment.

In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, the first in-
stance wherein the Religion Clauses were made applicable
against the states, this Court held that the First Amendment
“embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.’ /d. at 383-384. The absolute restriction
on governmental regulation of belief springs from the senti-
ment that “the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of
peculiar delicacy, and will bear the gentlest touch of gov-
ernmental hand.” I Annals of Cong. 730 (J. Gales ed.
1834) (Statement of Rep. Daniel Carroll of Maryland dur-
ing debate on August 15, 1789). See also School District of
Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231
(Brennan, J., concurring).

The illimitable liberty of conscience embodied in the
First Amendment, was, and still is, a point of scholarly
unanimity. As Professor Giannella has written:

The original constitutional consensus concerning re-
ligious liberty was an outgrowth of Protestant dissent
and humanistic rationalism, the viewpoints that domi-
nated the thinking of the authors of the Constitution.
These two perspectives conjoined to place the indi-
vidual conscience beyond the coercive power of the
secular state. For the Protestant dissenter there was a
Higher Power claiming his u!timate allegiance. For the
rational humanist the individual was anterior to the
state; in the social contract with the state he had prop-
erly reserved the right to his opinions and beliefs on
matters on ultimate concern. This respect for the in-
violability of conscience lies at the heart of the free
exercise clause of the first amendment.

18

Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doc-
trinal Development—Pari 1, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1386
(1967).

Freedom to believe is not limited solely to the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. It is clear from the Annals of Congress that
the Establishment Clause was sought primarily to protect the
individual citizen fron: the predatory tendencies of a na-
tional ecclesiastical establishment in violation of his or her
liberty of conscience. As this Court recently recognized in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1361, quoting from Justice
Joseph Story:

The real object of the First Amendment was . . . to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which
should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government.

J. Story, supra, at 593-595. Justice Story went on to state
that:

[The First Amendment] thus cut off the means of re-
ligious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages),
and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in
matters of religion.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The principle of liberty of con-
science also pervades Madison’s Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments and Jefferson’s Bill
Establishing Religious Freedom, and, indeed, was a central
motivating factor in disestablishment, as well as religious
liberty.

This freedom, the right to believe, also provides the foun-
dation for numerous constitutional immunities. Such pre-
ferred freedoms as the free exercise of religion, speech,
press, assembly, petition, security against search and seizures,
and immunity from self-incrimination are all causally linked

19

with the liberty of conscience. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
at 530-531). Cf. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1,
6 (1970); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. at 595; Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1941). These freedoms
all have their point of origin and their justification in free-
dom of thought. Wocley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714. It
is in this respect that the Alabama statute recognizes and
advances free thought. This fact has been recognized by this
Court:

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are
to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); ef.
NAACP vy. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564 (emphasis supplied ).

It is primarily the religious nature of the thoughts, reflec-
tions, mediations or prayers, that are objectionable to the
appellees. An eradication of religious sentiment certainly
does not promote true constitutional objectives. The Es-
tablishment Clause does not mandate a regime of absolute
separation between religious aspirations and secular
thought. Not only would this be impracticable, it would
be impossible. As this Court has noted, thought and religion
both “have unity in the character's prime place because they
have unity in their human sources and functionings. Heart

20

and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned
judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But
in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these
variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression
in a thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in
law more than life.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at
164-165. It would be inapropos to so fervently protect the
liberties of speech, press, assembly, and petition in the
school forum, while curtailing that freedom of conscience
which is their root and origin. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968).

Content-based censorship of thoughts, solely because the
meditation may be of religious significance does “violate
both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.” Jd. at 512.
“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men’s minds.”
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S., at 565. Unquestionably, “the
classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Na-
tion’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection.’ ” Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District, 393 U.S. at 512; Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). This liberty is closely
linked to the right to receive information, which is pro-
tected under the First Amendment. Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301, 307-308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557. Religious belief and
speech should receive no less protection.

21

Il.
Alabama’s Statutory Provision Allowing Meditation Or
Silent Prayer Is An Example Ot Affirmatively
Mandated Accommodation.

First Amendment neutrality mandates that the public
school present no affront to the spiritual needs and con-
cerns of its students. Voiding the Alabama statute would
have two “chilling effects” on the First Amendment rights
of students. First, it would prefer those who believe in no
religion over those who believe. Second, it would subjugate
the Free Exercise Clause to Establishment Clause interests,°
thus, contradicting the original intention of the Framers of
the First Amendment.

It is obvious that “[w]e are a religious people whose in-
stitutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. at 313, and that those actions which are “simply
a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country,” are not per se an establishment
of religion. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. at 3336. It is
equally clear that the “limits of permissible state accom-
modation are by no means co-extensive with the noninter-
ference mandate by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate
the two would be to deny a national heritage with roots in
the Revolution itself. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
423 (1963) (Harlan, J. dissenting); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).” Walz v. Tax Commission,

*As Paul Kauper has written: “If the protection afforded in the
name of religious freedom against a state-prescribed, non-theistic
orthodoxy is that a person cannot be compelled to participate,
whereas the protection afforded in the name of the establishment
clause is that a person may demand that any exercise promoting
theistic belief be com y eliminated, the result is that the freedom

by the establi t clause is regarded as having a higher
value than the freedom protected by the free exercise clause.”

Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61
Mich.L.Rev. 1030, 1063 (1962).

22

397 U.S. at 673. “There is room for play in the joints pro-
ductive of benevolent neutrality” towards religion. /d. at
669. This benevolence is mandated in the present case.

Governmental intrusion into the area of religion in con-
temporary society involves comparative religion, philoso-
phy, ethics, and values clarification courses. As Giannella
notes:

Unlike . . . other areas, formal public education does
not involve a pattern of — in which the place
of religion can be derived from secular catagories . . .
education directly touches upon religious concerns,
such as the meaning of existence and the sources and
nature of human values.

Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doc-
trinal Development—Part Il, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 513, 561
(1968).

Because of this entrance into the precinct of religion, it
is constitutionally impermissible for government fanatically
to seal religion from the classroom. Such a seculariza-
tion would prefer nonbelief over belief. Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. at 314. Moreover, the Constitution does not
require “complete separation of church and state; it affirma-
tively mandates accommodation, not merely toleration, of
all religions, and forbids hostility towards any.” Lynch vy.
Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1359 (emphasis supplied).

The requirement of affirmatively mandated accommoda-
tion is particularly relevant in education due to the impres-
sionable nature of the youths involved. Just as religious
indoctrination may convey—indeed inculcate—doctrines
contrary to the views of the children’s parents, here the
placing of the governmental hand upon the shoulder of a
young religious adherent for holding and expressing those
views would be equally inappropriate. In the past, this

23

Court has sought to “sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group and
that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows in the best of our traditions. ... The government
must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.
It may not thrust any sect on any person. . . . But it can
close its doors or suspend its operations as to these who
wish to repair to their sanctuary for worship and instruction.
No more than that is undertaken here.” Zorach v. Clauson,
343 US. at 313-314.

The school room is undoubtedly a “market place of
ideas.” This is the goal of the pluralism we profess. Ala-
bama’s solution, the accommodation of all creeds, while
espousing none, cannot help but to further the true spirit
of voluntarism, pluralism, and religious liberty. In this Re-
public, where large degrees of personal autonomy from
governmental restraints are normative and limitations upon
preferred freedoms are the exception, it is inappropriate “to
impose a crabbed reading of the [religion] clauses on the
country.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at 1366.

IV.

Alabama’s Statutory Provision Allowing Meditation Or
Silent Prayer Does Not Violate The Lemon Tripartite Test.

A. ALABAMA Cope § 16-1-20.1 Serves
SECULAR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES.

In the past, this Court has found it useful to inquire 1)
whether a challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose,
2) whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or
inhibit religion, and 3) whether it creates an excessive en-

24

tanglement of government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. at 612-613. However, as this Court has re-
cently noted, even where applicable, this “tripartite test”
provides “no more than a helpful ‘signpost’ in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 104
S.Ct. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mueller v. Allen,
463 US. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).’

The first of those criterion, that the legislation or con-
duct have a secular purpose, is easily met. Undoubtedly
“the definition of ‘secular’ here must be a generous one. .
[otherwise]... virtually nothing that government does

would be forbidden because they overlapped the fifth com-
mandment of the Mosaic Decalogue.” L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 835 (1978).

Prayer is a patently religious activity. Meditation may
or may not be. _Used in its ordinary sense, “meditation”

and Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. at 3330, this Court did not

25

contemplate anything that he desires. Thus, the words...
[meditation or silent prayer]. . .are capable of a reasonable
construction by which the constitutional difficulties raised
by the plaintiffs may be avoided. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 192, n.6 (1974).” Gaines v. Anderson, 421
F.Supp. 337, 342 (D. Mass. 1976).

Plainly, those who do not wish to pray are free to con-
template anything they want. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237
F.Supp. 48, 56 (W. D. Mich. 1965). Because of this, there
is no element of peer-pressure:

If a student’s beliefs preclude prayer in the setting of a
minute of silence in a schoolroom, he may turn his
mind silently toward a secular topic, or simply remain
silent, without violating the statute . . . or facing the
scorn or reproof of his classmates.

Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp at 345. Accord, Choper,
Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard, 47 Minn.L.Rev. 329, 371 (1963). Thus, the
content of the “meditation or prayer” may be wholly secu-
lar, or wholly religious, depending on the individual’s exer-
cise of conscience.

An important secular interest furthered by this legisla-
tion is that of recognizing religious liberty. It is inconsistent
to insist that the concept behind the Free Exercise Clause
has a necessarily religious purpose. If it does, then the
Lemon test is fatally flawed. It is obvious that the estab-
lishment of the freedom to believe or not to believe is not
an establishment of religion. If this were not so, the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause would be
incompatible. Such self-invalidation is a constitutional ab-
horrence. A moment of silence for meditation or silent
prayer is a reasonable accommodation of the spiritual or
non-spiritual needs of students which avoids such anom-

26

alies. See, e.g., Note, Religion and the Public Schools, 20
Vand.L.Rev. 1078, 1092-93 (1967); P. Freund, Religion
and the Public Schools, 23 (1965); Kauper, supra; Com-
ment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59
Neb.L.Rev. 425, 450-462 (1980).

Several other secular educational functions are more ob-
vious. As this Court noted over two decades ago: “A quiet
moment at the beginning of the day would tend to ‘still the
tumult of the playground and start a day of study.’ ” School
District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 281 and n. 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Fur-
thermore, the legislature could reasonably believe that stu-
dents tend to learn greater self-discipline and respect for
the authority of a teacher from a required moment of si-
lence. Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp. at 342. Surely, it
is consistent with the public schools secular educational
goals to encourage students to turn silently towards serious
thoughts and values. /d. at 343.

Another secular purpose also exists. It is that purpose
which is analogous to “those governmental acknowledge-
ments of religion [which] serve, in the only ways reasonably
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purpose of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. at
1369 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Accord, School District
of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
Such a recognition of our religious-cultural heritage is
clearly a legitimate educational goal.

B. ANY ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION BY A MOMENT OF
SILENCE Is MERELY De Minimus AND INCIDENTAL.

A moment of silence provides no opportunity for in-
culcation or indoctrination. The entire exercise is content

27

neutral and uniquely voluntary. It does not have the primary
effect of advancing a state religion, or religion in general.
It is neutral as between belief and non-belief. It coerces no
one. Providing a forum for an exchange of ideas or silence
“does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on re-
ligious sects or practices.”* Widmar vy. Vincent, 454 US.
263, 274 (1981). It fosters religious freedom. As Justice
Brennan has noted: “It has not been shown that. ..the
observance of a moment of silence at the opening of class,
may not adequately serve...solely secular purposes...
without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any
members of the community or the proper degree of separa-
tion between the spheres of religion and government.”
School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. at 281. Any reverent attitude which would prevail
during the silent period would be merely incidental to the
secular purpose of the quieting of the students. Note,
Supra, 20 Vand. L.Rev. 1078 (1967).

C. THERE Is No ENTANGLEMENT ISSUE PRESENTED HERE.

The entanglement prong of the Lemon “test” is inappro-
priate here. The entanglement “test” was uniquely adopted
in the instances where administrative entanglements or
political divisiveness arise. Lynch v. Donnelly, vJD S.Ct. at
1364-1365. Because there are no such entanglements in this
case, it is inappropriate to use it in this analysis. In addi-

*The imprimatur of state approval or disapproval is particularly
relevant in this case because of certain findings of fact made at the
trial court level. In the companion case, Jaffree v. Board of School
Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.
1983), specific findings of fact were made that a state religion was
being established in Alabama schools. The trial court found that a
“religion of secularism”—secular humanism—was being promoted
through the organs of the state. See Id. at 1129-1130, n. 41. Cf.
Torcaso Vv. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495, n. 11 (1961). Clearly such
indoctrination is improper.

28

tion, it should be noted that a unique barrier stands between
the state and religion in this instance—-silence. In a very real
way, the individual religious adherent is insulated by silence
from intrusion. Entanglements are impossible because of the
nature of this exercise.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, “[t]he purpose of the establishment clause was
not to extirpate religion from public life.” Comment, Secu-
larism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8
Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 329 (1981). The mind frame of those
who directed the constitutional era and the drive toward
separation of church and state “was, in some respects, anti-
clerical, as a result of Papism, Cromwellism, etc., but never
antireligious, so that some interrelating and intermeshing of
state and religion have always been with us.” Forkosch,
Religion, Education, and the Constitution—A Middle Way,
23 Loyola L.Rev. 617 632 (1977).

The Framers sought to avoid the kind of hostility found
in this case by accommodating the religious interests of
the people. There was no intention on the part of the
Framers to censor or eradicate religion from education. And
such has never occurred. The rule of separation that the
Framers had in mind when they drafted the First Amend-
ment was to be implemented in a climate of accommodation
and benevolence, not of hostility toward religion.

Appellees reasoning runs contrary to this central his-
torical and political truth. Such reasoning amounts to a
de facto establishment of what this Court has previously
identified as a “religion of secularism,” School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225, which
seeks fervently to eradicate all mention of religion from
public life. See also Giannella, supra, 81 Harv.L.Rev. at

29

586-587 and Torcaso v. Watkins, 376 U.S. at 495, n. 11.
As Harvard professor Harvey Cox has noted, secularism
is an “ideology, a new closed world view which functions
very much like a new religion. ...It is a closed ism.” H.
Cox, The Secular City 18 (1965). “It is a menace to free-
dom because it seeks to impose its ideology through the
organs of the State.” /d.

Here, the State of Alabama did nothing more than ac-
commodate in neutral fashion the cultural-historical-reli-
gious elements of America’s past and present. As Kauper
has noted, by way of such accommodation governments are
“cuntributing to religious freedom and making it more
meaningful.” P. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitu-
tion 10 (1962).

When the people of Alabama ratified their Constitution,
they echoed the religious beliefs of the Framers of the
Federal Constitution. In their preamble they proclaimed:

We, the people of the State of Alabama, in order to
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and se-
cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our poster-
ity, invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God,
do ordain and establish the following Constitution and
form of government for the State of Alabama.

Ala. Const. of 1901, Preamble, Ala. Code, Vol. 1. In
ratifying the Bill of Rights, their descendants never
imagined that one day the United States Constitution
could be argued in such a manner as to limit the display of
the faith they proclaimed, much less prohibit a moment of
silence in their public schools.

30

It is, therefore, €. ‘ential that the conflict be resolved in
favor of the appellants.

; TEHE
JAMES J. KNICELY

Participating Attorneys for
The Rutherford Institute
P.O. Box 510

Manassas, Virginia 22110

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Freedom Council
P.O. Box 64323
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0031%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.
