# Appellees Brief — Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellees Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 468 U.S. 1213

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United 2

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor,

Appellant

We

SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
and AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
Appell en

Joe G. GARCIA,

„. Appe Nant
SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
and AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION.

A ppe llees

On Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSIT ASSOCIATION

WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR
Counsel of Record

Ropert W BATCHELDER DONALD T. BLIiss
Chief Counse! To E. Bump
American Public Transit O'MELVENY & MYERS
Association 1800 M Street, NM.
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Suite 500 South
Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-5325

WILSON - Eres Painting Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, 0 C. 20001

—— —

> ee es

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), held that the minimum wage and overtime
compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act interfere with an essential attribute of state sov-
ereignty and therefore constitutionally cannot be applied
to integral activities in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions. Are publicly owned local mass transit
services integral activities in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions, thus precluding the application of
these federal statutory provisions to them?

2. Did National League of Cities find unconstitu-
tional so much of Congress’ intended coverage of state and
local governmental functions by the minimum wage and
overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act that it is unwarranted to apply these re-
quirements to publicly owned local mass transit systems
without new congressional enactment?

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..............................--..-.....--..

TABLE OF CONTENT CS —ͤ

I. National League Of Cities Determined That The

Fair Labor Standards Act Minimum Wage And
Overtime Compensation Provisions May Not Be
Applied To Integral Activities In Areas Of Tra-
ditional State And Local Governmental Func-
, è¾ TT tieianeareunens

A. Publicly Owned Local Mass Transit Is An
Integral Activity In An Area Of Traditional
State And Local Governmental Functions

B. The Provision Of Publicly Owned Local Mass
Transit Services Is Not A New Concept In
State And Local Government Responsibility.

. Other Federal Laws Applicable To Local Mass
Transit Raised By Appellants Are Irrelevant To
The Constitutional Principle At Issue And Do
Not Distinguish This Activity Of State And
Local Government From Other Activities Pro-
tected By National League of Cities ae

A. Traditional Federal Statutory Regulation
Would Not Be Eroded If The Fair Labor
Standards Act Is Not Applicable To State
And Local Public Transit Agencies

(iii)

12

12

15

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
B. By Accepting Federal Financial Assistance,
The States Should Not Be Held To Have
Tacitly Unleashed Boundless Federal Com-
merce Clause Authority ...... ................----------- 35

III. Alternatively, Application Of The Fair Labor
Standards Act To Publicly Owr ed Local Mass
Transit After National League of Cities Is Im-
permissible In The Absence Of A Subsequent
Amendment To That Act ........... ...--------------------- 46

cod cLUSs OWM —————— 47

*

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page

Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, 699 F.2d 1060
(Iith Cir. 1983), petitions for cert. filed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3884 (U.S. June 3, 1983) (No. 82-
1974), 52 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1983)

SES Sa eae 5
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033
r ..... 18
California v. Taylor, 383 U.S. 553 (1957) 27
County of Niagara v. Levitt, 97 Misc. 2d 421, 411
N. V. S. 2d 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19789) 26
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982) 6
Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transporta-
tion Authority, 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983) 5
EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) 7, 14, 17, 22,
34, 37-38, 42

Employees of Department of Public Health and
Welfare v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) ie

FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982 7,

First National City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983)

Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)

Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975)

Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (193997

Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commis-
ston, 106 &. Ct. SBB1 (1968) ..................................

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)

Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938)

Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934)

Henderson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority, 236 Ga. 849, 225 S.E.2d 424 (Ga.
RIE «Ä A 26

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 7, 12, 13, 32

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
I SIT cciccntsrnsrssnaccnsensinnemnccastansscsanion 46, 47

S888 YSIS $s

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Trans-
portation Administration, 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.
Ga. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Save Our Sycamore v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,
576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 197))) 26
Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285,
Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 US. 15
7 11, 19, 25, 35, 41, 42, 43
Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority,
677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103

Og ———— 5
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
1— ———— 19

Local Division 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618 (ist Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (198) 30, 41
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) 4, 31, 32, 46
Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County
Revenue Authority, 267 Md. 687, 298 A.2d 413

| een 26
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444

| ——— 27
Molina-Estrada t v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,

680 F.2d 841 (Ist Cir. 1982) ........................... 5, 8, 16, 23
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983 20
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

ne passim
Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Nemitz, 404

| OF) | 42

Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. 8. 184 (1964) 27
Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.

ee 34
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,

£0 Olly 11, 39, 41, 43, 46
Pennsylvania v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Author-

ity, 444 Pa. 345, 281 A.2d 882 (Pa. 19717 26
Scholz v. City of LaCrosse, No. 82-2890 (7th Cir.

L 5

Sloan v. Lemon, 418 U.S. 825 (1973) 11, 46

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

Subway-Surface Supervisors Association v. New
York City Transit Authority, 44 N.Y.2d 101, 375
N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. 1978) 17
Teamsters Local Union No. 676 v. Port Authority
Transit Corp., 108 N. J. Super. 502, 261 A.2d 718
(N. J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) 26
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) 27
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road Co., 455 U.S. 678 (19855 passim
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (198 18

CONSTITUTION, FEDERAL STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS:

Constitution of the United States:
art. I. § 8, cl. 1 (Spending Clause) 11, 41, 43, 44
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) passim
11 eR ae passim
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
$§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 19817 34. 42
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (repealed 19700) 38

Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142

r 38
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. V

EA TET SS dee. 34
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 88 201-219

(1976 & Supp. V 19817 * i, 2

29 U.S.C. 5 207 (a) (1976) 21

29 U.S.C. 5 216 (e) (1976 & Supp. v 1981) 6

29 U.S.C. 5 219 (197) 46
Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060

c — — 3

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, f 21 (b), 88 Stat. 555 4,31
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151 et seq. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
33 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) 45
33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) 45
33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1291 (1976 & Supp. V
ccc 45
33 U.S.C. 8 1284 (a) (4)- (b) (1) (1976 & Supp.
4? ——8 20
National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k et seg. (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)
42 U.S.C. § 300m-4 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat.

85

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) ͤ— 10, 34

29 U.S.C. § 1620 (16) 35

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§151 et seg.
——— 7 27, 34, 41

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
88 6942-6949 (1976) 45

Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 88 1601
1618 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) te 10
49 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) 37
49 U.S.C. § 1609 (e) (197) 44„ 41
EEA 6
CS — 21
29 C.F.R. § T76.3(b) (1968) -.................................... 5

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

29 C. F. R. 5 775.4 (b) (1983) — —
e

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES:

Cal. Const. art. 19,§1.
Cal. Pub. Util. Code

r
§ 216 (West 1975 & Supp. 198
§ 451 (West 1975 & Supp. 198
§ 7810 (West 1965)

Cal. Veh. Code

§ 12804 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)
88 21000 et seq. (West aner 1983)
§ 26711 (West 1977) —
§ 35106 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)

§ 35250 (West 1971 & Supp. 198
§ 35400 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983) —
$§ 35550-35551.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)

1, § 1-107 (Smith-Hurd 19717)
14, § 1-146 (Smith-Hurd 1971)
14, § 6-104 (Smith-Hurd 1971 & Supp.
)

95 14, 88 11-100 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1971
& Supp. 1983)
ch. 95 %, § 15-102 (Smith-Hurd 1971 & Supp.
1983) |
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 161A, 8 5(e 16) -5le %)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1983)
N.Y. Transp. Law § 141 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1983) |
N. v. Veh. & Traf. Law
§ 104 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983)
§ 375 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983)
§ 385 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1983)
§ 509a-509h (McKinney Supp. 1983

17

—
*

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

oe © ay ae 2 ow
1983) . ,

Tex. Rev. Civ. ‘Stat. om at 11131
§6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) . — 2
§8 (Vernon Supp. 1982) 17

Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 46.04.3820 (1970) = 30
§ 46.20.440 (1970 & Supp. 1983) . po oe 30
§§ 46.37.005-46.37.500 (1970 & Supp. 1983) 30
§§ 46.61.0056 et seq. (1970 & Supp. 1983) 30
OS, 30
§ 81.64.080 (1962) —ü— — 1 30

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments, 1965: Hear-

ings on H.R. 8259 Before the General Subcomm.

on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and

Labor, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) * 20, 32
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963: Hearings

on H.R. 3881 Before the House Comm. on Bank-

ing and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963) 37
Urban Mass Transportation—1963: Hearings on

S. 6 and S. 917 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate

Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist

Sess. (1963) . 37-38
H.R. Rey. No. 204, 88th Cong, Ist Bess, reprinted

in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2569 37, 39
H.R. Rep. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1966) 29
H.R. Rep. No. 2271, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3830 38
H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6323 25

xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in

1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425
110 Cong. Rec. 14,906 (19660) 3
110 Cong. Rec. 14,907 (198660

American Public Works Association, History of
Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976
(1976) .

D. Barnum, From Private to Public: Labor Rela-
tions in Urban Transit, 25 Indus. and Labor Rel.
1 fF

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
Co., 465 U.S. 678 (1982)... 1 2 — ——

k. Chomita and C. Lave, Forecasting the Financial
Effects of Work Rule Changes, 37 Transp. Q.
r

Education Commtaston of tho Staten, 1 50. State

Computer Education (1988) eS ——
Education Commission of the States, Working
Paper No. 2, Survey of States’ Teacher Policies
(Oct. 1983) ..
W. Grant & L. Eiden, Digest of Education Statistics

Page

C. Thompson, Public Ownership (1025) 2 1 29

— 19

— — 2—— 40
U.S. Department of Commerce, Public Employment
1 —::. . . 8

U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States (published annually) 25, 36, 40, 46
U.S. Department of Labor, Union Wages and Bene-
fits: Local Transit Operating Employees (1981) 3
U.S. Department of Labor, Summary of Public
Sector Labor Relations Policies (19861) 34
U.S. Department of Transportation, A Directory of
Regularly Scheduled, Fired Route, Local Public
Transportation Service in Urbanized Areas Over
50,000 Population (1981) .. 24
US. Department of Transportation, A ‘Directory
of Regularly Scheduled, Fixed Route, Local Rural

Public Transportation Service (19861) 24
U.S. 1 4 of the awe Federal Aid to
States (published annually) - ite 40

—

In THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBEerR TERM, 1983

No. 82-1961

RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor,
2 Appellant

SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
and AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,

Appellees

No. 82-1913

Joe G. GARCIA,
. Appellant

SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
and AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,

Appellees

On Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas

BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSIT ASSOCIATION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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(“DOL”) formally amended its FLSA regulations—with-
out any public notice or comment—to assert that local
publicly owned mass transit agencies do not perform
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions and therefore are subject to the FLSA. 44

Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979); 29 C.F.R. § 775.3(b) (1983).°

Letter from the Deputy Administrator of the United States

Department of Labor to the Amalgamated Transit Union (Sep-
tember 17, 1979), R. 163-66.

* While this is the only case involving this issue in which a de-
claratory judgment against the federal government was sought, the
issue has been raised in other federal appellate courts. Compare,
e. g., Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841
(1st Cir. 1982) (concluding that the FLSA may not be applied to a
state highway and transit authority) with Alewine v. City Council
of Augusta, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983), petitions for cert. filed,
51 U.S.L.W. 3884 (U.S. June 3, 1983) (No. 82-1974), 52 U.S.L.W.
3141 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1988) (No. 83-257), and Kramer v. New Castle
Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 786 (1983) (concluding that the FLSA may be applied to
local publicly owned mass transit systems). See ulso Dove v. Chat-
tanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983)
(reversing grant of summary judgment for transit agency and
remandin; for further proceedings); Scholz v. City of LaCrosse,
No. 82-2890 (7th Cir. April 11, 1983) (order granting stay of
proceedings pending this Court’s ruling in these consolidated cases) .

* DOL listed along with publicly owned local mass transit the
following state owned functions to which it believes the FLSA
applies: off-track betting corporations, generation and distribution
of electric power, provision of residentia! and commercial telephone
and telegraphic communication, production and sale of organic
fertilizer as a by-product of sewage processing, production, culti-
vation, growing or harvesting of agricultural commodities for sale
to consumers, and repair and maintenance of boats and marine

the general public. 29 C.F.R. § 778.3 (b) (1983). The
regulations also state that the FLSA should not be applied to
public libraries and museums. 29 C. F. R. § 775.4(b) (1983).

The American Public Transit Association (“APTA”), the
members of which include most publicly owned local
mass transit systems, intervened. Federal appellant also
counterclaimed on behalf of SAMTA’s employees for back
pay and injunctive relief. An employee, Joe G. Garcia,
intervened. 6

The district court granted SAMTA’s and APTA’s mo-
tions for summary judgment on November 17, 1981,
ruling that local public mass transit systems (including
SAMTA) are “integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions under the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).” Appendix to Jurisdictional
Statement for Federal Appellant U.S. J. S.“) 23a. Ap-
pellants here appealed directly to this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976). The Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case “for further consideration
in ‘ght of [the later-decided] Transportation Union v.
Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) [(“LIRR”)}.”
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
457 U.S. 1102 (1982).

5. After further briefing and oral argument, the dis-
trict court found that its previous conclusion that “op-
eration of a public transit system is a governmental func-
tion entitled to Tenth Amendment immunity,” was fully
consistent with this Court’s decision in LIRR and re-
entered judgment for SAMTA and APTA. U.S. J. S. 2a.“

6. Appellants again appealed to this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).

% The FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to seek back pay
for employees and liquidated damages in an equal amount for up
to three years if an employer did not compensate employees in the
manner established by the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §216(c) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).

11 The court’s order of February 14, 1988 was withdrawn and
reentered effective on that date on February 18, 1983 to correct
typographical errors.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

National League of Cities held that the FLSA minimum
wage and overtime compensation provisions—the specific
provisions at issue here—may not be applied consistently
with the Tenth Amendment to integral portion [s] of
those governmental services which the States and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their
citizens,” 426 U.S. at 855. This Court found that these
wage and hour determinations are “ ‘functions essential
to [the States’] separate and independent existence
so that Congress may not abrogate the States’ otherwise
plenary authority to make them.” Id. at 845-46. See also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 n.11 (1983
(reconfirming holding of National League of Cities that
lol ne undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the
States’ power to determine [wages, hours and overtime
compensation for employees carrying] out governmental
functions“)

In subsequent decisions, this Court has addressed Tenth
Amendment challenges to Congress’ exercise of Commerce
Clause power in statutory contexts other than the FLSA.
In each case it distinguished the federal statutory provi-
sions at issue in National League of Cities, consistently
reaffirming that the FLSA wage and overtime provisions
cannot constitutionally be applied to integral operations
in areas of traditional functions of state and local gov-
ernment. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. at 1060; FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982); LIRR, 455 U.S. at
685; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).

I. The only remaining issue in this case not expressly
resolved by National League of Cities is whether local
publicly owned mass transit services are “integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions.”
426 U.S. at 852.

Among these “important governmental! activities,” id.
at 847, specifically identified in National League of Cities,
are fire and police protection, sanitation, parks and recre-

A. From the inception of the Republic, one of the basic
purposes for which communities have organized them-

as urban areas have become more congested (thereby ne-
cessitating that people join together to share transporta-
tion), the means by which state and local governments
have met this transportation responsibility also has
changed. In addition to the management of streets and
highways, states and their political subdivisions have be-
come the predominant providers of local mass transit
services. About 90 percent of local transit revenues, total
transit miles, and passenger trips are attributable to
publicly owned local mass transit systems. Affidavit of
Stanley G. Feinsod, Executive Director, Policy and Pro-
grams, American Public Transit Association (“Feinsod
Affidavit”) 14, R. 177. Local public transit systems
serve the transportation needs of the entire community,
including low-income residents, who constitute 80 percent
of mass transit riders.“ Such riders depend on public
transit for access to jobs and to public health, education
and other vital governmental services. Even community

This figure represents riders with an income of $15,000 or
less. Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Moving People, An Introduction to Public Trans-
portation 35 (1981).

:

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THE

bus routes—is an integral part of the local planning proc-

ess and the management of streets and highways, which

the States overwhelmingly “have regarded as integral

parts of their governmental activities.” Jd. at 854 n.18.

“traditional governmental function.” See U.S. Br. 11,

16-20, 24-25, Brief for Appellant Garcia (“G. Br.”) 15-

17. This Court, however, has rejected such a “static his-

torical view of state functions generally immune from

regulation.” LIRR, 455 U.S. at 686. Local mass transit,

moreover, began to evolve into a public function of state

and local governments early in the century when several

major cities adopted this means of supplementing their

infrastructure shortly after transit tech-
nology was developed and the problems of urbanization

began to emerge. Later in the century, fueled by an

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that Congress did not intend through UMTA “to create a

body of federal law applicable to labor relations between

local governmental entities and transit workers.” Jackson

Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated

Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27 (1982). And similar pro-

grams of “cooperative federalism” emp ane pie

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implying
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— —
451 U.S. 1 (1981)

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—
7

12

ARGUMENT

I. National League Of Cities Determined That The Fair
Labor Standards Act Minimum Wage And Overtime
Compensation Provisions May Not Be Applied To In-
tegral Activities In Areas Of Traditional State And
Local Governmental Functions.

As its subsequent decisions have made increasingly
clear, this Court in National League of Cities has conclu-
sively determined all but possibly one of the requirements
for invalidating application of the FLSA to local pub-
licly owned mass transit.“ See LIRR, 455 U.S. at 684
n.9; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88. In Hodel, this Court ar-
ticulated the criteria that must be applied:

[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional com-
merce power legislation is invalid under the reason-
ing of National League of Cities must satisfy each of

three requirements. First, there must be a showing
that the challenged statute regulates the “States as
States.” Second, the federal regulation must address
matters that are indisputably “attribute[s] of state
sovereignty.” And third, it must be apparent that
the States’ compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability “to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.”

452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted; emphasis in orig-
inal). The Court also noted:

13 National League of Cities was founded on an analysis of the
limitiations imposed by the Tenth Amendment and our system of
federalism on the otherwise legitimate exercise of congressional
Commerce Clause powers; therefore, federal appellant cannot side-
step the constitutional issue here merely by declaring that the
UMTA and the FLSA reflect the congressional belief that local
mass transit has an “interstate impact” and that [because of
the direct impact of transit service on interstate commerce the
FLSA may constitutionally be applied to public transit employees.”
U.S. Br. 46-47.

13

Demonstrating that these three requirements are met
does not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amend-
ment challenge to congressional commerce power ac-
tion will succeed. There are situations in which the
nature of the federal interest advanced may be such
that it justifies state submission.

Id. at 288 n.29.

National League of Cities has already decided, first,
that application of the FLSA to the States and their po-
litical subdivisions regulates the “States as States,” 426
U.S. at 845. Second, it decided that the FLSA’s regulation
of minimum wage and overtime compensation for state
and local employees addresses a matter that is an “un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty.” Jd. Further-
more, as this Court recently confirmed in LIRR, Na-
tional League of Cities has decided the fourth point,
the balance between the federal and state interests, see
426 U.S. at 852-53; see also id. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), and has determined that the nature of the
federal interest advanced in the FLSA was not “so great
as to justif [y] State submission.“ LIRR, 455 U.S. at
684 n.9 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29).

Finally, the first aspect of the third requirement—
whether the States’ compliance with the federal law
would “directly impair their ability ‘to structure integra!

tions in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions.“ Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (citation omitted; em-
phasis added)—is also resolved for this case by Na-
tional League of Cities. There, this Court held that ap-
plying the very same FLSA provisions to integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions would
“impermissibly interfere” with an essential attribute of
state sovereignty, leaving little of the “States’ ‘separate
and independent existence, 426 U.S. at 851 (citation
omitted; emphasis added). National League of Cities

14 Contrary to federal appellant's suggestion, U.S. Br. 43-45,
when this Court in National League of Cities asked whether imposi-

14

has already established that federal displacement of the
States’ prerogative to establish wages and overtime com-
pensation for employees engaged in areas of traditional
functions would impair the States’ “ ‘ability to function
effectively in a federal system,’” id. at 852 (citation
omitted)

As this Court reaffirmed in EEOC, “National League of
Cities held that ‘there are attributes of sovereignty at-
taching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress’ and that ‘[o]ne undoubted at-
tribute of state sovereignty is the States’ power to de-
termine the wages which shall be paid to those whom
they employ in order to carry out their governmental
functions, what hours those persons will work and what
compensation will be provided where these employees may
be called upon to work overtime.’ 426 U.S. at 845.” 103
S. Ct. at 1061 n.11. Thus, National League of Cities
has decided part of the final test, leaving unresolved
only whether local publicly owned mass transit is an
integral part of a traditional function of state and local
government.“ The court below correctly answered in the
affirmative.

tion of a federal regulation would endanger the' States’ “separate
and independent existence” it called for an evaluation of the effect
on state sovereignty of the FLSA’s displacement of state policy
choices regarding wages and hours. It did not call for consideration
of whether the States’ provision of certain services, e.g., transit,
parks, or hospitals, is essential to the States’ “separate and inde-
pendent existence,” id. As the Court reaffirmed in EEOC, “applica-
tion of the federal wage and hour statute to the States threatened
a virtual chain reaction of substantial and almost certainly unin-
tended consequential effects on state decisionmaking.” 103 S. Ct. at
1062 (citation omitted). It is this encroachment that threatens
state sovereignty; National League of Cities does not require a
showing that state sovereignty is threatened if a state does not
provide, for example, public hospitals, parks, museums, libraries or
transit.

15 This issue, in keeping with the explicit suggestion of the fed-
eral government in that case, was not addressed by the Court in
LIRR. See infra note 38.

15

A. Publicly Owned Local Mass Transit Is An Integral
Activity In An Area Of Traditional State And Local
Governmental Functions.

As the district court concluded, the provision of pub-
licly owned local mass transit services is as integral to
the public responsibility of state and local government
as are “fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, pub-
lic health, and parks and recreation,” National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 851, and schools and hospitals, id. at
855, which, while “obviously not an exhaustive catalogue,”
id. at 851 n.16, this Court has held are “typical” ex-
amples of the “numerous line and support activities
which are well within the area of traditional operations
of state and local governments,” id.“

A city’s transportation infrastructure contains trans-
portation routes which, like the veins and arteries of the
human cardiovasculs: system, provide the paths for the
lifeblood of its object, facilitating circulation and nourish-
ing those areas the lines reach. If any are blocked, the
area they serve—or sometimes even the entire object—

16 While distinctions can be drawn between publicly owned local
transit and the activities enumerated in National League of Cities,
and “[{wJhile there are obvious differences between the schools and
hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments
affected [in National League of Cities], each provides an integral
portion of those governmental services which the States and their
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.”
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855 (footnote omitted).
Lacking any constitutionally significant basis for distinguishing
local publicly owned transit services from other essential public
services expressly protected by National League of Cities, Appellant
Garcia urges this Court to limit the reach of immunity from FLSA
coverage to law enforcement officers, G. Br. 23, which presumably
would eliminate Tenth Amendment immunity for most employees
of schools, hospitals, parks, recreation and so forth. But this Court
more thoughtfully has sought to isolate for exemption from the
FLSA those areas of governmental services that are “typical of
those performed by state and local governments in discharging their
dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing
public services.” 426 U.S. at 851.

16

deteriorates and dies. A local transportation network is
thus essential to the life of any community, and the man-
agement of such a network is one of the sovereign pur-
poses for which state and local governments exist.

These governments have regarded the use of publicly
owned local mass transit as an integral and often es-
sential means of performing this traditional governmental
function.“ Buses and subways are necessary to trans-
port middle and lower income people to work—people who
cannot afford an automobile or city-center parking fees.
Buses or subways are necessary to transport children to
integrated schools across town or the single high school in
a rural school district. Buses or subways are necessary
to enable senior citizens at a reduced fare occasionally
to go to a department store or downtown cafeteria.
Buses or subways are necessary to bring people to work
or shop in a redeveloped neighborhood so that businesses
are willing to locate there and residents willing to buy
and renovate homes. Even for persons who are not regu-
lar riders, public transit is necessary to relieve traffic
congestion and foster safe streets and a more livable en-
vironment. The life of communities is, and always has
been, entirely dependent on publicly provided means of
movement between home, work and shops and, in urban
areas in particular, this dependency has long meant pro-
viding local mass transit services as well as providing
streets and roads. Public mass transit therefore is an
integral part of a traditional—indeed critical—function
of state and local government, which is at least as im-
portant to the health and survival of a community as are

17 Indeed, federal appellant acknowledges as much, U.S. Br. 29-30,
by quoting the director of the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning
Commission as stating that local government officials believe that
in addition to highway programs their communities must have “a
completely balanced transportation system” which includes public
mass transit. Cf. Molina-Estrada, 680 F.2d at 845.

17

the functions expressly protected in National League of
Cities.

For this reason, public transit agencies are organiza-
tionally integrated or closely coordinated with other es-
sential local governmental services such as street and
traffic management, public works, land use planning and
zoning—often under the umbrella of a common city de-
partment or regional authority. Feinsod Affidavit { 11,
R. 183-86. Decisions about where, how and when to con-
demn land to build a subway line or urban expressway,
or where to place a bus stop, traffic light, pedestrian
overpass or bus route, are the kinds of “core state func-
tions” that local governments were created to perform.
EEOC, 103 S. Ct. at 1060. Similarly, the budgeting of
local transit agencies is an important part of a local gov-
ernment budget. See, e.g., Subway-Surface Supervisors
Association v. New York City Transit Authority, 44
N.Y.2d 101, 111, 375 N.E.2d 384, 389, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323,
329 (N.Y. 1978) (transit system is performing a govern-
mental function because of the “intertwinement” be-
tween its finances and the city’s). To serve people in a
local community dependent on inexpensive transporta-
tion, general and special state and local tax revenues pro-
vide much of the financial support for local public mass
transit. Feinsod Affidavit J 8, R. 178-80. Reduced fares

18 Federal appellant would dismiss the finding of the court
below that publicly owned mass transit is a traditional govern-
mental function by contending that some of the same reasoning
could be applied to the Long Island Rail Road, a state-owned pas-
senger railroad. U.S. Br. 20-21. For the reasons stated infra p. 27-
30, such an approach would ignore the completely local nature of
public mass transit, as distinguished from the Long Island Rail
Road, which this Court found was an integral part of the interstate
rail network and thus had been subject to comprehensive, uniform
‘national regulation for nearly 100 years. LIRR, 455 U.S. at 687-90.

19 Indeed, some states simultaneously combat transit costs and
air pollution through funding transit with motor vehicle fuel
taxes. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 19, §1; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 1118x § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1982).

a

18

are provided for students and the elderly, id. 1 9B, R.
181-82, and fares are kept low in the face of rising
costs, making transportation accessible to the poor and
the low and middle income workers, id. N 9A, R. 180.

As the court below found, referring to Amersbach v.
City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) :

Public transit benefits the community as a whole,
. .. is provided at a heavily subsidized price[,] . . .
[and] cannot be provided at a profit[, and therefore
is provided] for public service, not for pecuniary
gain. [Thus] government is particularly well suited
.. . land, in fact,] is the only component of society
that can provide the service.

Finally, government today is the primary provider
of transit services.

U.S. J. S. 16a.

Appellants’ attempt to characterize local publicly owned
transit as a “business enterprise,” which is the express
premise for all the arguments made by Appellant Garcia,
see, e.g., G. Br. 6, is absolutely erroneous. State and
local governments do not provide transit services in order
to compete with the private sector in a profit-making ac-
tivity." Instead they have responded to the community-

20 See also, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 161A, § 5(e42)-5(e%)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1983).

21 Federal appellant argues that states provide transit services
as “market participants” rather than “as a traditional and essential
element of state sovereignty.” U.S. Br. 22-24 & note 23. This dichot-
omy is falsely applied for two primary reasons. First, National
League of Cities does not require that the state service, e. g., transit
or sanitation, be an essential element of state sovereignty, but rather
that the state decision to be preempted, e. g., setting wages and
hours, be such. See supra p. 18. Second, while White v. Mass.
Council of Constr. Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983), found that
limitation on state activity imposed by the Commerce Cleuse—that
states may not unduly burden interstate commerce—is not applica-

19

wide need for this service regardless of its commercial
viability. In Jackson Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 17,
quoted in U.S. Br. 26-27, this Court acknowledged the
congressional finding that communities should “continue
to receive the benefits of mass transportation despite the
collapse of the private operations,” thereby recognizing
that public transit services are not revenue-raising ven-
tures but are provided for public benefit. APTA is un-
aware of any publicly owned local transit system that
does not have to draw on its local tax base to meet its
costs. Feinsod Affidavit H 6-8, R. 178-79.

Fares which provide only about 40 percent of transit
operating revenues do not offer much prospect for the
survival of public transit in the competitive environment
federal appellant desires. See U.S. Br. 13-14, 47-48. Nor
do such user fees distinguish local public transit from
other functions of government expressly protected in Na-
tional League of Cities.“ User fees often recover some of
the operating costs of sanitation systems, public hospitals,

ble when states act as market participants, this should not affect the
States’ Tenth Amendment immunity. Indeed, state and local gov-
ernments did not enter into provision of transit services as market
participants; they are not competing for profitable business with
the private sector, but instead have assumed an important public
function the private marketplace cannot provide.

22 Transit Fact Book 45. The remaining operating revenues are
derived principally from state and local assistance, which constitutes
40 percent of such revenues, as contrasted with federal operating
assistance which constitutes only 17.3 percent. Id. It is beyond
doubt that states do not provide transit services to engage] in
business activities which have as their aim the production of reve-
nues in excess of costs.” See Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 418 n.1 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

23 See also Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Financing Transit: Alternatives
for Local Government 228 (1979).

20

parks and recreational facilities and even public schools.“
Sometimes such charges finance a greater share of the
costs of such traditional public services than do public
transit fares.”

That the provision of public transit services is ‘an in-
tegral governmental function is further demonstrated by
the extensive disruption to community life that would
result if state and local government were unable to
structure routes and schedules as they believe best.
Pl artieularized assessments of actual impact” of fed-
eral regulations, of course, are not necessary since it is
the State’s policy choices that are constitutionally pro-
tected. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851. “The
determinative factor . . [is] the nature of the federal
action, not the ultimate economic impact on the States.”
FERC, 456 U.S. at 770 n.33 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at
292 n.33). The FLSA overtime requirements, however, do
have a direct impact on the ability of state and local
governments to choose how to structure routes, employee
work hours, service schedules, record keeping and com-
pensation.**

For example, the FLSA requires overtime payment of
time-and-one-half the “regular rate” for hours worked
over forty hours per week, which is computed’ in accord-

2% See Mueller v. Allen, 108 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (some public
schools also charge tuition or user fees).

25 For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. 8 1284 (a) (4)-(b) (1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), requires
states receiving sewage treatment plant and areawide waste treat-
ment management grants to recover from industrial users the full
cost of the federal grants attributable to treatment of their waste
and from other users the full cost of maintenance and operation
of treatment facilities.

26 See, e. g., Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments, 1965: Hearings
on H.R. 8259 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 303 (1965)
(testimony of C. Cochran).

21

ance with a federal statutory formula. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)
(1976); 29 C.F.R. § 548 (1983). Unlike the private sec-
tor, state and local governments cannot decide on strictly
economic terms whether to minimize costs under this re-
quirement by hiring more employees,” or by designing
routes and work schedules to reduce the amount of over-
time needed. Public transit systems must set scheduling
and make arrangements for work hours that enable them
to provide essential community services. Special payment
provisions have evolved through the years to compensate
public transit operators for unique working requirements,
such as the scheduling of bus drivers in two split shifts
at peak commuter hours. See, e.g., K. Chomitz and C.
Lave, Forecasting the Financial Effects of Work Rule
Changes, 37 Transp. Q. 453 (1983). If the FLSA provi-
sions are superimposed on the pay structures the States
have designed to respond to these special scheduling and
other operational needs, substantial additional costs will
be incurred.“ A city with a restricted budget, as most
are, may have to curtail service to points at the end of
routes to avoid excessive overtime costs. If service at those
hours is curtailed, the low and middle income people
dependent on public transportation may be limited in the
locations they can accept employment or may be forced to
spend much more time commuting. Street traffic con-
gestion will likely increase, perhaps necessitating use of
additional police to direct traffic. Additional traffic would
result in increased air pollution, see Transit Fact Book

27 Indeed, Congress assumed that such cost minimization would
be a natural result of the FLSA overtime provisions. See, ¢.g.,
S. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3002, 3024 (“the committee believes that
new jobs will become available as the excessive hours worked by
present employees are reduced.”).

28 Labor costs in the form of salaries and fringe benefits are of
critical significance to the management of transit systems. In
1980, for example, they comprised more than 70 percent of all
operating expenses. Transit Fact Book 49.

22

38, perhaps causing additional expenditures to reduce
other sources of pollution. This Court was critical in
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847, of [this
type of forced relinquishment of important governmental
activities.”

Application of FLSA requirements thus would leave the
States with “less money for other vital State programs,”
and would limit their ability to pursue their “social and
economic policies beyond their immediate managerial
goals.” See EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2“ 1063. Of course, to
minimize the cost impact of the federal requirements the
States could change their scheduling practices, but this
would “have the effect of coercing the States to structure
work periods in some employment areas... in a manner
substantially different from practices which have long
been commonly accepted among local governments of this
Nation.” National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 850.
“Nothing in the Constitution permits Congress to force
the states into a Procrustean national mold that takes no
account of local needs and conditions. That is the anti-
thesis of what the authors of the Constitution contem-
plated for our federal system.” EEOC, 103 S. Ct. at 1075
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).

B. The Provision Of Publicly Owned Local Mass
Transit Services Is Not A New Concept In State
And Local Government Responsibility.

Appellants contend that, because local mass transit has
become a pervasively state and local governmental func-
tion in recent decades, it cannot be protected under Na-
tional League of Cities. Federal appellant, for example,
urges this Court to give “primacy . . . to historical evi-
dence,” U.S. Br. 25, and to base its decision on whether
the States have regarded transit services as an integral
part of their governmental activities “since the inception
of the industry.” Id. at 24. Any such “static historical
view” was expressly rejected by this Court in LIRR, 455
U.S. at 686, when it clarified that it would “not merely

23

. . look I] only to the past to determine what is tradi-
tional.’” id. It stated:

This Court’s emphasis on traditional governmental
functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty
was not meant to impose a static historical view of
state functions generally immune from federal regu-
lation.

Id. at 686-87. Cf. First National City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior, 103 S. Ct. 2591, 2603 n.27
(1983).

The provision of a local transportation infrastructure
has been an integral function of state and local govern-
ments since the earliest days of our Republic.” See
Molina-Estrada, 680 F.2d at 845. With the industrial age
and the growth of the nation’s urban areas, local streets
and roads became inadequate to meet this governmental
obligation. Indeed, “[i]n 1905 congested traffic at rush
hours was deseribed as the number one problem of large
cities in the United States.” W. Owen, The Metropolitan
Transportation Problem 6 (rev. ed. 1966). As the prob-
lems of urbanization (such as unemployment, traffic con-
gestion and safety, air pollution and mobility for students
and the elderly) increased, state and local governments
turned to developing public transit technology to meet
community-wide needs.

Several major cities entered into the provision of pub-
licly owned transit services financed through state and
local bond issues or taxes early in this century.” In fact,

2 Even before the ratification of the federal Constitution, in
Massachusetts “townships [were] obliged by law to keep their
roads in good repair.” A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
77 n.29 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969) (citing Laws of Massachusetts,
Law of March 5, 1787, Vol. I, p. 305).

30 See, e.g., C. Thompson, Public Ownership 225-26, 240-41 (1925).
As early as 1925, this author commented: “So we now have in
America not only numerous smaller cities cwning and successfully

24

before the enactment of UMTA providing federal finan-
cial assistance, more than half of the nation’s 21 largest
cities provided publicly owned transit services. See infra
p. 36.

By 1978, about 90 percent of transit revenues, total
transit miles, total transit vehicles owned and leased, and
linked passenger trips were attributable to publicly owned
mass transit systems. Feinsod Affidavit 4, R. 176-77;
Transit Fact Book 43. Today almost all ot the metro-
politan areas in the country with a population over 200,-
000 are served by transit systems owned by state or local
government agencies.“

Moreover, local governments in rural areas also have
responded to the need for public mass transit. By 1981,
248 out of 339, or 73 percent, of transit systems in non-
urbanized areas were publicly owned.“ The pervasiveness
of state and local ownership of public transit is compar-

operating municipal street car lines, but three of our larger cities
[are also doing so].” Id. at 222. San Francisco had started providing
local public mass transit service in 1912, Seattle in 1919, Detroit in
1922 and New York City in 1932. Cleveland acquired its public
transit system in 1942, and public transit systems serving Boston
and Chicago were acquired in 1947. American Public Works Asso-
ciation, History of Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976 177
(1976). Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Sacramento were served by
publicly owned systems by 1959, J. Moody, Moody s Transportation
Manual a70 (1960), Oakland by 1960, Memphis by 1961, J. Moody,
Moody's Transportation Manual a72 (1961), and Miami in 1962.
J. Moody, Moody's Transportation Manual a78 (19€2). Public
transit systems serving Long Beach and St. Louis were acquired in
1968, followed by those serving Dallas and Pittsburgh in early
1964, J. Moody, Moody's Transportation Manual 260-a61 (1964).

31 U.S. Department of Transportation, A Directory of Regularly
Scheduled, Fixed Route, Local Public Transportation Service in
Urbanized Areas Over 50,000 Population 1-12 (1981).

82 U.S. Department of Transportation, A Directory of Regularly
Scheduled, Fized Route, Local Rural Public Transportation Service
13 (1981).

25

able to other traditional governmental functions expressly
listed in National League of Cities.“

Large numbers of state and local governments thus
assumed the responsibility for providing mass transit
services and funding them from tax revenues after it
became clear that essential community-wide transit serv-
ices could not be operated in a manner that would meet
public needs and demands unless operated by a state or
local government.“ States have undertaken this function
because they regard the maintenance of urban transporta-
tion infrastructures accessible to all residents as integral
parts of their governmental activities,” National League
of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18, and as “governmental
services which their citizens require,” id. at 847. These
services, moreover, are for the benefit of the local com-
munity, rather than as part of an integrated network
that serves all parts of the country. Thus, local publicly
owned mass transit is the type of public service that the
States have determined over many years is necessary to
meet their fundamental public welfare obligations in the
fulfillment of their “role in the Union.” LIRR, 455 U.S.
at 687."

The fact that private institutions also provide some local
transit services (i.e., carrying about 6 percent of the passengers,
Transit Fact Book 27, 43) cannot be a determinative factor under
National League of Cities, since private institutions provide services
in other areas protected by that decision. In 1979, for example, pri-
vate schools accounted for 20 percent of elementary schools, 19.3 per-
cent of secondary schools, and 56.5 percent of post-secondary schools.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, Table 214 at 132 (1981) (published annually) (“SAUS:
19xx”). Moreover, in 1974, private firms collected 50 percent of all
residential waste and 90 percent of all commercial waste. H.R. Rep.
No. 1461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 6323, 6325.

34 Transit Fact Book 27; D. Barnum, From Private to Public:
Labor Relations in Urban Transit, 25 Indus. and Labor Rel. Rev.
95, 99 (1971). See alse Jackson Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 17.

un The essential and sovereign character of public transit services
has been expressly recognized by some state constitutions, see, e. g.,

26

II. Other Federal Laws Applicable To Local Mass Transit
Raised By Appellants Are Irrelevant To The Consti-
tutional Principle At Issue And Do Not Distinguish
This Activity Of State And Local Government From
Other Activities Protected By National League of
Cities.

Appellants interject into their analysis of this case
a number of federal laws other than the FLSA which are
irrelevant to the constitutional principle involved here.
This attempt to complicate the picture and obscure the
controlling effect of National League of Cities fails to
provide any constitutionally significant basis for dis-
tinguishing publicly owned local mass transit from those
activities of state and local government this Court ex-
pressly exempted from the FLSA requirements. Nor do
appellants’ contentions establish any federal interest
sufficient to override the States’ judgment that their pro-
vision of local transit services is as integral to the func-
tions of state and local government as are the enumer-
ated activities.”

Ga. Const. art. 9, §§ 4(2), 502); Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 7, and legis-
latures, see, e. g., Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp.
Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99, 104 (N. p. Ga. 1975), af d sub nom. Save
Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978) ; Henderson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 236 Ga. 849, 853, 225 S.E.2d 424, 427 (Ga. 1976);
Mass Transit Admin. v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267 Md.
687, 690, 298 A.2d 413, 415 (Md. 1973); Teamsters Local Union
No. 676 v. Port Auth. Transit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 502, 507, 261
A.2d 713, 716 (N. J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970); County of Niagara
v. Levitt, 97 Misc.2d 421, 422, 411 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) ; Pennsylvania v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Auth., 444 Pa.
345, 350, 281 A.2d 882, 885 (Pa. 1971).

0 Federal appellant also attempts to distinguish publicly owned
mass transit from the other protected activities by reliance on an
early tax case, Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934), which held
that the Trustees of the Boston Elevated Railway Company were
not immune from federal income taxation. The activity addressed
in that case, however, was the tem orary quasi-public operation of

27

A. Traditional Federal Statutory Regulation Would
Not Be Eroded If The Fair Labor Standards Act
Is Not Applicable To State And Local Public
Transit Agencies.

Appellants strain to bring this case within the limita-
tion on Tenth Amendment immunity addressed in LIRR.
In upholding the application of the Railway Labor Act
to the employees of the state-owned Long Island Rail
Road, this Court followed and expressly affirmed its de-
cision in National League of Cities. Following a line of
prior Supreme Court decisions involving statutes other
than the FLSA—Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.
184 (1964) ; California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957);
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) —this
Court stated in National League of Cities that “the oper-
ation of a railroad engaged in ‘common carriage by rail
in interstate commerce . . .,’” 426 U.S. at 854 n.18 (cita-
tion omitted), is not “in an area that the States have

a privately owned transit system. Cf. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 (1975). As Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in Fry, id.
at 555 n.1: “The Court in [the later decided] Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938), was careful to distinguish between the
imposition of a federal income tax on the New York Port Author-
ity, a question which it reserved, and such a tax upon an employee
of the Authority, a question which it decided in favor of taxability.”
Moreover, reference to this 1934 case does not answer whether pub-
lic transit has become a traditional function of government as the
result of the widespread establishment of public transit services by
state and local governments since then. As Justice Black noted
in his concurring opinion in Gerhardt,

[mlany governmental functions of today have at some time in
the past been non-governmental. The genius of our govern-
ment provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action,
the people—acting not through the courts but through their
elected legislative representatives—have the power to deter-
mine as conditions demand, what services and functions the
public welfare requires.

304 U.S. at 427; see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
444, 458-59 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ; Graves v. New York,
306 U.S. 466 (1939).

28

regarded as integral parts of their governmental ac-
tivities,” id.“ :
This Court further determined in LIRR that a state
would “erode federal authority in areas traditionally sub-
ject to federal statutory regulation,” 455 U.S. at 687,
if it could exempt its employees from federal Railway
Labor Act protection by acquiring a small but integral
part of the national railroad system that has long been
subject to federal Commerce Clause legislation specifically
directed at that integrated system. This statement was
made, however, in the context of what was perhaps a
unique function for a state to acquire, i.c., railroads,
which even when publicly owned still serve as part of the
national railroad system“ and qua railroads, public or
private:

have been subject to comprehensive federal regula-
tion for nearly a century. The Interstate Commerce
Act—the first comprehensive federal regulation of
the industry—was passed in 1887. A year earlier we
had held that only the Federal Government, not the
states, could regulate the interstate rates of rail-
roads. The first federal statute dealing with
railroad labor relations was the Arbitration Act of
1888. The Railway Labor Act thus has provided
the framework for collective bargaining between all
interstate railroads and their employees for the past
56 years. There is no comparable history of long-

37 The Court noted in LIRR that only two of the seventeen com-
muter railroads were publicly owned. 455 U.S. at 686 n.12.

38 Indeed, federal appellant represented to this Court in LIRR
that “the LIRR, despite the evolving characier of its operations,
remains a railroad—an integral part of the interstate railroad in-
dustry and plainly distinguishable from conventional intraurban
transit systems.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 12,
LIRR, 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (emphasis added). “As is reflected in
the definitions and statutory provisions cited . . one important
attridute of commuter railroads is their genesis as a part of the
railroad industry, rather than as a form of intraurban transit.” Id.
at 26 n.19 (emphasis added) ; see also id. at 25-27, nn.19-20.

29

standing state regulation of railroad collective bar-
gaining or of other aspects of the railroad industry.

455 U.S. at 687-88 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
“Moreover, the Federal Government has determined that
a uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the opera-
tion of the national rail system.” Id.“ The Long Island
Rail Road acceded to this federal regulatory authority for
the first 13 years of its ownership by the state, id. at 690;

0 In LIRR, the Court stressed that “Congress [had] long ago
concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor relations is nec-
essary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the
national economy.” 455 U.S. at 688. Under these circumstances,
tjo allow individual states, by acquiring railroads, to circumvent
the federal system of railroad bargaining, or any other of the
elements of federal regulation of railroads, would destroy the uni-
formity thought essential by Congress and would endanger the
efficient operation of the interstate rail system.” Id. at 689.

Extrapolating from this Court’s concern in LIRR for preserving
the perhaps unique, comprehensive, uniform federal regulation of
railroads, federal appellant suggests that “substantial deference” is
due the congressional] determination that there should be uniformity
in the FLSA between public and private transit agencies in order
to avoid “unfair competition.” U.S. Br. 18-14, 46-48. But this con-
gressional desire for uniformity is of a wholly different nature from
that in LIRR and was as much a reason why Congress in 1974
sought to bring within the FLSA many other public activities,
including activities expressly protected in National League of Cities.
H.R. Rep. No. 1866, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1966); S. Rep.
No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1966 U.. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3002, 3009-10. It is highly misleading for
federal appellant to imply that Congress amended the FLSA be-
cause of a unique concern with eliminating some perceived “unfair
competition” between public and private transit; in fact, the con-
gressional reports cited for this proposition, id., address the amend-
ment of the FLSA definition of “enterprises” which affected cover-
age of public schools, hospitals, institutions and transit systems.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ 102 (e), 80 Stat. 880, 831. Furthermore, contrary to federal
appellant’s statement, U.S. Br. 36 n.29, sewage treatment has
been privately provided in some cities, C. Thompson, Public Owner-
ship 290 (1925) ; ef. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions, Intergovernmental Responsibilities for Water Supply and
Sewage Disposal in Metropolitan Areas 15-16 (1962), and thus the
same concern for competition could have arisen in that field.

30

it was only in the midst of the cooling- off period during
a strike that the state attempted a conversion of the Long
Island Rail Road's corporate status, apparently believ-
ing that the change would eliminate Railway Labor Act
coverage,” id. at 681.

Local mass transit, in contrast, has always been a
local responsibility. There simply is not, and never has
been, any comprehensive federal system of law regulat-
ing local mass transit, private or publicly owned. See
Local Division 589, Amalgamated Transi: Union v. Mas-
sachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 633 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982). State or local laws have
dictated, for example, the rates charged users of local
transit,“ equipment standards for transit vehicles,“ the
licensing of drivers of those vehicles,“ and traffic safety
rules.“

It simply cannot be said that when state and local gov-
ernments entered this area they “knew of and accepted”
the application of the FLSA. Cf. LIRR, 455 U.S. at 690.
The statutory history of the FLSA is instructive. First,

40 See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 210, 216, 451 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1983); N.Y. Transp. Law § 141 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1983) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 81.64.010, 81.64.080 (1962).

*! See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 7810 (West 1965); Cal. Veh.
Code §§ 26711, 35106, 35250, 35400, 35550-35551.5 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1983) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 ½ §§ 1-107, 15-102 (Smith-Hurd
1971 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 104, 375, 885 (Me-
Kinney 1970 & Supp. 1983); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 46.04.3820,
46.37.005-46.37.500 (1970 & Supp. 1983).

42 See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 12804 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983) ;
III. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 ½ §§ 1-146, 6-104 (Smith-Hurd 1971 & Supp.
1988); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §6509a-509h (McKinney Supp.
1983) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.20.440 (1970 & Supp. 1983).

#8 See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 21000 et seg. (West 1971 & Supp.
1983) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 ½ §§ 11-100 et seg. (Smith-Hurd 1971
& Supp. 1983); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 1100 et seg. (McKinney
1970 & Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 46.61.005 et seq.
(1970 & Supp. 1983).

31

it is a general statute applicable to virtually every private
business engaged in interstate commerce; it is not a
statute setting up a regulatory system with respect to a
specific industry. Second, although applicable to many
other private employers since first enacted in 1938, Con-
gress did not even attempt to apply the FLSA to regulate
the wages and hours of even private transit employees
until 1961.“ Its first limited attempt to extend these
requirements to public transit employees (along with em-
ployees of public hospitals and schools) was in 1966, and
even then Congress specifically excluded most private and
public transit employees (e.g., bus drivers and other op-
erators) from the overtime requirements. Even after
Wirtz, when Congress attempted to extend the FLSA re-
quirements to most public agencies, overtime coverage of
public and private transit operating employees was to be
phased in; it was not until 1976, only seven years ago,
that Congress intended to extend the full reach of federal
wage and hour regulation to most local public transit
employees,“ and only four years ago (just two months
before this action was filed) that the Executive Branch
sought to implement this congressional directive.“ State
and local governments began to provide transit services
prior to the enactment of the FLSA and well before
Congress’ attempt to extend it to private or public transit.
About the time Congress attempted to apply the provi-
sions of the FLSA to any transit system—public or pri-
vate—the majority of major urban areas was served by
publicly owned transit systems,“ and the majority of

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30,
$§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 66, 72.

4 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
259, f 21(b), 88 Stat. 55, 68.

46 See supra text accompanying note 7.
47 See infra p. 36.

transit employees worked for publicly owned systems.“
Furthermore, when Congress or the Department of Labor
did act, those actions were immediately challenged in the
courts.

Federal appellant concedes that “the specific federal
legislation at issue here is of comparatively recent vin-
tage,” and “Congress did not fully exercise its [alleged]
powers to legislate respecting terms of employment in
the transit industry until relatively recently.” U.S. Br.
41-42. Thus federal appellant demonstrates that the
States’ provision of local transit services did not “erode
federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal
statutory regulations,” LIRR, 455 U.S. at 687. Rather,
the federal government here seeks to extend its power
into an activity the States were already conducting and
into an area of historic regulation by the “States as em-
ployers.” See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286 (quoting National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841)“ “[T]he Federal

By late 1964, 56 percent of transit employees worked for public
authorities. Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments, 1965: Hearings on
H.R. 8259 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 297 (1965)
(testimony of C. Cochran).

Federal appellant would have this Court ignore the fact that the
Court’s view of the Tenth Amendment has changed since 1966 when
Wirtz was decided. See U.S. Br. 49-50 and n.38. It is not clear what
federal appellant means by warning against a “doctrine of creeping
unconstitutionality,” id. at 50. No sinister scenario is suggested by
the answer to federal appellants’ question: [oln what date did the
public transit provisions of the FLSA, assuredly valid when enacted,
become unconstitutional?” Jd. That date was June 24, 1976 when
National League of Cities overruled Wirtz.

5° The court below recognized that:
the FLSA is not a current manifestation of a traditional fed-
eral concern for labor relations in the mass transit field.

Transit was specifically exempted from coverage from the time
of the Act’s original passage in 1938 until 1961 amendments
subjected private transit operators to minimum wage provi-
sions (but not the overtime pay provisions) . Pub. L. No. 75-78,
§ 18(a) (8), 52 Stat. 1067 (1988); Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§ 2(c),

Government cannot usurp traditional state functions
[just as] there is no justification for a rule which would
allow the states. . to erode federal authority in areas
traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation.”
LIRR, 455 U.S. at 687.

The fact that some activities protected by National
League of Cities were at one time conducted more sig-
nificantly in the private sector than in the public sector
was not relevant to that decision. Perhaps this was be-
cause, unlike the acquisition of an interstate railroad,
there was no reason to believe that a tradition of federal
statutory regulation would be eroded by state acquisition
of such activities. For, like local mass transit, and unlike
railroads where there is “no comparable history of long-
standing state regulation,” LIRR, 455 U.S. at 688, the
protected activities in National League of Cities were
subject to extensive state regulation.“ These are func-
tions within the traditional sphere of state responsibility,
and nothing in LIRR suggests that state acquisition of
a private hospital, university or local mass transit sys-
tem would so erode federal regulatory authority as to
deny the States the immunity established by National
League of Cities. Indeed, publicly owned hospitals, rec-
reational facilities, schools and universities, museums

9, 75 Stat. 65, 66, 72 (1961). Public employers remained en-
tirely exempt until 1966. Diminution of federal authority re-
sulting from private to public conversions during this period
would have been attributable to the statutory exemption and
consistent with congressional intent.

U.S. J. S. Ta-9a (emphasis added).

51 Hospital regulation includes state licensing of hospitals and
medical personnel. See American Hospital Association, AHA Guide
C18-C19 (1983). Similarly, education, police and fire protection
are heavily stat - regulated. See, e.g., Education Commission of the
States, Working Paper No. 2, Survey of States’ Teacher Policies,
Tables I-IV (Oct. 1983) (teacher certification); Education Com-
mission of the States, A 50-State Survey of Initiatives in Science,
Mathematics and Computer Education 29-41 (1983) (curriculum
guidelines and graduation requirements).

34

and sanitation services that have been acquired from the
private sector are no longer subject to FLSA require-
ments.

In an attempt to fabricate an unconstitutional erosion
of comprehensive federal regulation, appellants cite other
general federal labor laws which apply to private local
transit. U.S. Br. 39-40; G. Br. 19-20. But the statutes
cited do not establish a comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation unique to transit labor relations, as, for ex-
ample, the Railway Labor Act does for railroads. Instead,
the cited statutes regulate particular e.nployment condi-
tions for virtually all private employers in interstate com-
merce, including the private counterparts of the activi-
ties expressly protected in National League of Cities. In
contrast, public employers, including publicly owned
transit systems, are generally exempt from such federal
labor laws and instead are subject to state collective bar-
gaining laws that govern wages and hours for their em-
ployees. U.S. Department of Labor, Summary of Public
Sector Labor Relations Policies (1981) .*

Thus, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), regulates the private
conduct of all the activities listed in National League of
Cities, e.g., private hospitals and schools, as weil as pri-

52 Federal appellant also cites some federal statutes that apply
to traditional governmental functions, such as the Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which was upheld against
Tenth Amendment challenge in Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1979). Like ZEOC, in which the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was
upheld against Tenth Amendment challenge by a state park game
warden, Pearce involved an employment category, public hospital
employees, which with respect to the FLSA was expressly immunized
by National League of Cities. Thus, the fact that some federal labor
laws may even apply to traditional governmental functions does not
make the particular governmental functions any less traditional
for the purposes of the FLSA wage and overtime compensation re-
quirements—which National League of Cities held cannot be im-
posed on the States.

35

vate transit, but it specifically exempts state and local
government employees, including public transit employ-
ees. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1976). See also Jackson Transit
Authority, 457 U.S. at 23. For this reason the district
court concluded, “any diminution of federal authority
under the NLRA that results from a private to public
conversion is attributable to this statutory exemption,
not to the Tenth Amendment, and is consistent with..
congressional intent.” U.S.J.S. 7a-9a. Furthermore, the
statutes cited, except perhaps the NLRA, were enacted
after the state and local governments of many of the
nation’s major metropolitan areas were providing local
public transit services. See supra note 30. Unlike the
railroad regulation in question in LIRR and the na-
tional emergency wage freeze legislation at issue in Fry,
regulation of the labor relations of local mass transit,
publicly or privately owned, has not presented a problem
that Congress believed “only collective action by the Na-
tional Government might forestall.” National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 853.

B. By Accepting Federal Financial Assistance, The
States Should Not Be Held To Have Tacitly
Unleashed Boundless Federal Commerce Clause
Authority.

Unless this Court adopts a “static historic view,” “ ap-
pellants have not presented any convincing reasons why
publicly owned local transit services are constitutionally
distinguishable from activities expressly protected in Na-
tional League of Cities. Appellants thus search for an-
other constitutionally significant basis upon which to jus-
tify federal usurpation of the States’ authority to fix the
hours and wages of their public transit employees. They
seize upon the federal funding to the States under UMTA
to shore up their weak argument that the FLSA may

58 This view, of course, was rejected in LIRR, 455 U.S. at 686.

36

be applied to publicly owned local transit. The signifi-
cance of UMTA funding is elusive, however.

1. This Court was well aware that the activities pro-
tected in National League of Cities received substantial
federal financial support, see 426 U.S. at 878 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ; yet the Court nevertheless held that the
FLSA could not be applied to them. UMTA funding is
no more significant than the federal funding of other
traditional activities simply because, if appellants’ al-
legations are correct, it provided an incentive for public
ownership.

Contrary to appellants’ contention, U.S. Br. 12, 17, 26,
28; G. Br. 20-21, the trend toward public ownership of lo-
cal mass transit was well established before the enactment
of UMTA. Prior to the availability of UMTA funds, the
majority of the largest urban centers had publicly owned
transit systems. Of the nation’s twenty-one largest citiés
(i. e., with populations in excess of 500,000), twelve were
served by publicly owned transit systems by 1964. Com-
pare supra note 30 with SAUS: 1965, Table 14 at 19-20.
There is no doubt that federal aid helped many cities,
particularly smaller cities, to fulfill their responsibility
to provide transit services when private systems were un-
able to satisfy the public welfare obligations that urban
transit had assumed.“ But state and local governments
have obligated substantial portions of their limited re-
sources to perform this service because it is an integral
part of their traditional function of facilitating intra-
urban transportation.“ It is simply historical revi-

54 “Today nine-tenths of the mounting expenses of city govern-
ments are for services that did not exist at the turn of the cen-
tury—traffic engineering, airports, parking facilities, health clinics,
and a long list of others.” W. Owen, The Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Problem 4-5 (rev. ed. 1966).

55 As noted supra note 22, state and local operating assistance
contributes a substantially greater share of public transit revenues
than does federal operating assistance. Transit Fact Book 45. State

—

37

sionism to imply that state and local governments pro-
vide transit services because federal aid enticed them
into doing so. Indeed, Congress made clear that UMTA
was not intended to encourage the acquisition of private
transit systems by public agencies. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.
§ 1602(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); S. Rep. No. 82, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1963); H.R. Rep. No. 204, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. 12, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2569, 2581; 110 Cong. Rec. 14,905 (1964)
(statement of floor leader Rains). Rather, Congress re-
sponded to pleas from state and local government officials
for financial assistance that would help the States pre-
serve a function they believed critical to the local public
welfare,“ and therefore a “core state function.” EEOC,

and local governments have also provided substantial capital funds.
See id. at 29. Federal appellant’s argument regarding federal fund-
ing of transit is grossly misleading. See, e.g., U.S. Br. 34-36. He
states that the federal government.. . has supplied a larger share of
[transit] operating subsidies than state government in many recent
years,” id. at 34, but this ignores the facts stated in appellant’s own
source that during those years local governments have provided a
substantially greater share of operating assistance than has the fed-
eral government and that state and local government assistance com-
bined has been in the range of 70-80 percent of all government oper-
ating assistance. Transit Fact Book 28-29. Another incomplete quo-
tation in federal appellant’s brief, U.S. Br. 31, implies that APTA
has conceded the importance of federal funds to widespread state
and local government takeover of transit services. He fails to
include the first part of the sentence, which states: “The rela-
tively small amount of funding during the 1960s was used by
many cities to buy the vehicles and facilities owned by private
transit systems that were on the verge of bankruptcy.” Transit
Fact Book 29 (emphasis added).

56 See U.S. Br. 12; see also Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1968: Hearings on H.R. $881 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 88 (1963) (statement of J.F.
Collins, Mayor of Boston) ; id. at 91 (statement of E. Peabody, Gov-
ernor of Massachusetts) ; id. at 312 (statement of P.H. Sachs, Chair-
man of Maryland Metropolitan Transit Authority) ; id. at 414-15
(statement of W.D. McClelland, Chairman of the Board of County
Commissioners of Allegheny County); Urban Mass Transporta-

38

103 S. Ct. at 1060. Federal grant aid to cities in sup-
port of transit services—like federal aid to education,
hospitals and law enforcement—simply demonstrates that
Congress thought it important that states be able to
meet their local public welfare responsibilities in these
areas.“

No doubt changing circumstances such as the inereased
use of automobiles and’ the migration to the suburbs,
which were due in large part to substantial federal high-
way funding,“ contributed greatly to the collapse of pri-

tion—1963: Hearings on S. 6 and S. 917 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 188-
89 (1963) (statement of G.S. Clinton, Mayor of Seattle).

57 Federal funding has not made state provision of sanitation,
health or educational services any less a traditional governmental
function. Many such state and local programs would not have
existed without federal funding. For example, federal funding of
advanced waste treatment facilities began in 1956. The Senate
Report on the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
753, 80 Stat. 1246 (repealed 1970), refers to “the long period of
disregard and neglect that preceded Federal legislation in this
field.” S. Rep. No. 1367, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3969, 3975. Similarly, comprehensive,
statewide health planning was “spotty and fragmented” prior to
federal funding of such planning, see H.R. Rep. No. 2271, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3830, 3833. See also National Health Planning and Resources De-
velopment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, §§ 1512, 1513, 88 Stat.
2225, 2232-39 (specifies structure and functions of local health
systems agencies, which may themselves be local governmental
units) ; Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-142, § 3 (a), 89 Stat. 773, 774 (“State and local educa-
tional agencies have a responsibility to provide education for all
handicapped children, but present financial resources are inade-
quate to meet the special educational needs of handicapped chil-
dren ;” the federal role is to be “a catalyst to local and State pro-
gram growth,” S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in
1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1425, 1429).

58 See S. Rep. No. 82, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1963).

vate urban transit systems.“ UMTA represents in part
a congressional attempt to redress the imbalance between
federal highway funding and support for mass transit so
that the States could fashion the “completely balanced
transportation system,” see U.S. Br. 29, that they believe
would best meet the needs of local residents and the com-
munity at large.”

2. Appellants’ argument must therefore rest on the
onerous notion that by accepting federal funds to assume
a function necessary to the life of the community, state
and local governments—without express notice in the stat-
ute or in a condition of the grant—unleashed boundless
federal Commerce Clause authority over an integral ac-
tivity otherwise entitled to Tenth Amendment protection.

This argument is so wholly inconsistent with his
Court’s precedents that it must be scrutinized closely.
See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980); Employees of Department of Pub-
lic Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).

Like the program of aid for the developmentally dis-
abled at issue in Pennhurst, UMTA “is a federal-state
grant program whereby the Federal Government provides
financial assistance to participating States” for the provi-
sion of public mass transit services. 451 U.S. at 11. It is
not any different fundamentally from federal grant pro-
grams that assist schools, hospitals, police and fire depart-
ments and sanitation.“ “Like other federal- state coopera-

5° H.R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 4. reprinted in 1964
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2569, 2571-72.

9 S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1963); H.R. Rep. No.
204, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2569, 2571-72; 110 Cong. Rec. 14,907 (1964) (statement of
floor leader Rains).

61 Federal funding of other traditional governmental functions
has far exceeded that of local public mass transit. The federal ap-

40

tive programs, the Act is voluntary and the States are
given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth
in the Act or foregoing the benefits of federal funding.”

pellant states that “[b]y 1978 more than 813 billion in federal] aid
[to transit] had been awarded under the UMT Act and other fed-
eral programs. Federal capital grants exceeded $2 billion
annually in fiscal 1978 and 1979.” U.S. Br. 27-28. In comparison,
however, between 1965 and 1978 (excluding 1967, for which data
are not available), more than $57.8 billion in federal aid was given
to public elementary and secondary schools. (For years 1966, 1970,
and 1975-78, see SAUS: 1981, Table 218 at 135; for years 1965, 1968
and 1969, see SAUS: 1970, Table 149 at 105; for years 1971 and
1972, see SAUS: 1972, Table 157 at 106; for 1973, see SAUS: 1976,
Table 186 at 117; and for 1974, see SAUS: 1980, Table 222 at 141.)
For the two-year period, 1977-78, the federal government provided
$7.7 billion in aid to public elementary and secondary schools.
W. Grant & L. Eiden, Digest of Education Statistics, Table 66 at
75 (1982).

Similarly, a comparison of federal funding of sanitation and public
transit shows that during the ten-year period, 1971-81, the federal
government had awarded states $27.11 billion in sewage treatment
construction grants. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Aid

to States (published annually) (FAS: 1922"). FAS: 1971 at 4;

FAS: 1972 at 4; FAS: 1973 at 6; FAS: 1974 at 5; FAS: 1975 at 6;
FAS: 1976 at 8, 27; FAS: 1977 at 6; FAS: 1978 at 6; FAS: 1979
at 7; FAS: 1980 at 10; and FAS: 1981 at 9.) In 1979 alone, the
federal government provided $3.7 billion in subsidies for sewage and
sanitation services, FAS: 1979 at 7, which accounted for 31.4 per-
cent of total local expenditures of $11.77 billion on such services.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Environmental Quality Control,
Governmental Finance: Fiscal Year 1978-1979, Table C at 4 (1981).
This compares with only $2.96 billion in 1979 for local public mass
transit operating subsidies and capital grants, or 36.6 percent of
available revenues, Transit Fact Book, Table 5 at 46 and Table 19
at 67.

With such substantial federa! financial assistance now necessary
to support the capability of state and loca) governments to perform
essential public services such as education, sanitation, and public
local mass transit, it would indeed be an odd constitutional doctrine
that drew the line at some arbitrary percentage of federal assistance
and rested a fundamental principle of constitutional law on the
shifting sands of the federal budget process.

41

Id. The question in this case is not whether Congress has
the power pursuant to the Spending Clause * to condition
federal assistance to publie transit systems on compliance
with the FLSA, because Congress did not impose this con-
dition. In accepting federal assistance to acquire, operate
or expand this necessary public service, the States were ac-
cepting only the federal authority expressed in the stat-
ute or the grant, Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 16-17. UMTA
does not condition grants on consent to other federal
labor regulations, including the FLSA. Moreover, unlike
the Railway Labor Act directly at issue in LIRR, UMTA
was not enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and
does not purport to be part of a comprehensive system of
federal regulation of local transit, Local Division 589,
666 F.2d at 633-34. Nor does any such system exist.
Congress did address labor relations in UMTA, but in-
stead of imposing specific federal conditions such as the
FLSA requirements, it deliberately chose a less intrusive
approach, providing in section 13(c) that state and local
governments should make “arrangements” to preserve
existing collective bargaining rights as a condition of
federal funding. 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (e) (1976). In Jack-
son Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 27, this Court unani-
mously held that Congress “did not intend [UMTA] to
create a body of federal law applicable to labor relations
between local governmental entities and transit workers.”
Congress respected the States’ need for flexibility to
manage their labor relations with local transit employ-
ees consistently with their public service obligations.”

The relationship between the Spending Clause and the Tenth
Amendment was expressly not addressed in National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17. See also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n. 13.

In Jackson Transit Authority, 457 U.S. at 27, this Court held
that section 13(c), which addresses state and local transit employ-
ees’ collective bargaining rights in, for example, wages and hours,

42

UMTA’s section 13(c) allows the States to select among
alternative means to preserve rights of employees of
private transit systems. The FLSA, in contrast with
section 13 (e), is so specific in its wage and hour provi-
sions that it would be impossible for the States to pre-
serve necessary options and at the same time fulfill
federal requirements.“

does not establish any federal rights for employees of transit sys-
tems receiving UMTA funds in addition to those rights established
by state law. This Court stated:

Section 13 (e) would not supersede state law, it would leave
intact the exclusion of local government employers from the
National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would retain
jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to
local government transit labor relations.

Id. at 27 (footnote omitted)

Jackson Transit Authority sharply distinguished the effect of
section 18(c) of UMTA on the federal rights of transit workers
from the effects of a federal labor statute on the federal rights of
railroad employees. Jd. at 27 n.9. The Court thus found that the
law applicable to local public transit workers was not similar to its
decision in Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37
(1971), that “a railroad’s employees stated federal claims when they
alleged a breach of an agreement entered into by the railroad under
6502) (fh) of the Interstate Commerce Act,” Jackson Transit Au-
thority, 457 U.S. at 27 n.9; with respect to transit, the Court deter-
mined that section 18(c) of UMTA “addresses ‘municipal and State
problems, and not Federal problems.“ Id. at 28 n.11.

„Thus, as this Court concluded in EEOC, the FLSA and the
ADEA at issue in that case have a very different effect on the
States’ policy choices. Unlike the FLSA, the ADEA

does not require the State to abandon [its] goals, or to abandon
the public policy decisions ur-derlying them.

Perhaps more important. . in distinct contrast to the situa-
tion in National League of Cities, even the State’s discretion to
achieve its goals in the way it thinks best is not being overrid-
den entirely, but is merely being tested against a reasonable
federal standard.

108 S. Ct. at 1062 (citations omitted).

43

This Court has made clear that:

[Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Con-
gress’ power to legislate under the spending power
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and know-
ingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract’... . There
can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State
is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascer-
tain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress
intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, it must do so unambiguously. ... By insist-
ing that Congress speak with a clear voice, we en-
able the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). Pennhurst
and Jackson Transit Authority, together, establish that
in enacting UMTA Congress has not attempted to require
state compliance with the FLSA through the exercise of
its Spending Clause power.

It would indeed be a strange conclusion, therefore,
that Congress, by providing UMTA funds through the
exercise of its Spending Power, has implicitly elimi-
nated the Tenth Amendment limitation on its Commerce
Clause powers. Again, as this Court stated in Pennhurst,
451 U.S. at 16-17: “Because such legislation imposes con-
gressional policy on a State involuntarily, and because it
often intrudes on traditional state authority, we should
not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act
under [some other constitutional] authority [in addition
to the Spending Clause when Congress has not] expressly
articulate d] its intent to legislate. ... The case for
inferring intent is at its weakest where, as here, the
rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the
States to fund certain services, since we may assume that
Congress will not implicitly attempt to impose massive
financial obligations on the States.” Nevertheless, appel-

44

lants in effect urge this Court to decide that in the enact-
ment of UMTA Congress intended to legislate pursuant
to the Commerce Clause, as well as the Spending Power,
and to imply a condition on the receipt of federal funds
which, as an exercise of Commerce Clause power unre-
strained by the Tenth Amendment, would alter perma-
nently the balance of federal-state relations even though
the States did not realize the existence of such an implied
condition at the time they accepted the federal funds.“

3. Appellants also contend that UMTA funding has
established a federal interest that outweighs the interests
of the States. But, as already noted, supra pp. 36-39, the
federal funding here, like most federal funding of other
traditional functions, is simply helping the States perform
a function that they may have chosen to provide. Since
the revenue raising ability of states is much more limited
than that of the federal government, it is not surprising
that states have sought federal financial assistance for
public transit as they have done in virtually every other
area of traditional state governmental functions.

Federal appellant argues, furthermore, that local pub-
lie mass transit systems are not “integral to the function-
ing of state and local governments [because] the very
shape of transit systems as they exist today reflects the
imprint of federal policy” encouraging “comprehensive
area wide plan[ning].” U.S. Br. 32-33. If local govern-
ments of cities and their suburbs “were induced [by the
federal government! . to band together and to create

tan transit systems spanning the entire urban
area,” id. at 32, this type of federal incentive is indis-
tinguishable from similar federal planning incentives

* Appellants’ argument is particularly threatening because it
constitutes a realignment that the States cannot cure since the ra-
tionale is based on initial, not continuing, acceptance of federal
money. Cf. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 108 8. Ct. 3221,
8229 (1983) (States may prefer to terminate receipt of federal
money rather than comply with a condition if they disagree with its
interpretation).

45

that have induced regional coordination among local gov-
ernmental units in providing many of the public services
expressly protected in National League of Cities.”

State and local governments must have a strong inter-
est in providing a service before they will assume the
function, regardless of whether federal funds are avail-
able. It drains their limited resources in ways not com-
pensated for by federal funds, as they must match a
share of federal funds and generate revenue through the
local tax base. It would be a confusion of the respective
functions of the different levels of government to conclude
that simply because the federal government raises reve-
nues and concurs in the States’ judgment that grants
should be given to provide a basic community service,
that the federal government can impose the full force of
federal private sector regulations on state agencies.
Through uniform national taxation, the federal govern-
ment has resources the States cannot approach. If federal
revenue is shared with the States to enable them to pro-
vide a service they deem integral to community life, the
result should not be that at some undetermined time in
the future the States, without warning, will find they
have surrendered substantial portions of their sover-

eignty.

* See, e.g., National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 800m-4 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (grants for planning
by state haalth systems agencies and state health planning develop-
ment agencies) ; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
88 6942-6949 (1976) (federal grants and guidelines for comprehen-
sive planning for solid waste disposal); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1256, 1281-1291 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (grants to state agencies for comprehensive water quality
control plans and encouragement of areawide waste treatment
plans).

Before National League of Cities overruled Wirtz,
Congress extended FLSA requirements to all state and

stitutional most of the intended coverage.

Despite the presence of a standard severability clause
in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1976), it is not probable
that Congress would have intended to enact a law only
directed at a small class of public employees if it could
no longer carry out its intent to cover all state and local
employees.” See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 834. This
statutory scheme is quite unlike that considered in /m-

S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (1983). Several categories of public
employees covered by the FLSA were brought within its
ambit in 1966; at that time most public transit employees
were excluded from the overtime compensation provisions.
When the law was broadened in 1974, and the coverage of
the large number of transit employees was phased in,
Congress was acting on the strength of Wirtz and its be-
lief that it could comprehensively regulate wages and
hours for all state public employees. The presumption
articulated in Chadha should not be applied to federal
regulation of state activity because congressional regula-
tion of the States has always required express statement
of congressional intent. Cf. Pennhurst, 451 US. 1
(1981).

Moreover, what remains after severance is not “fully
operative” and “workable administrative machinery.”

* National League of Cities expressly eviscerated coverage for
what is currently 73 percent of state and local government employ-
ees. SAUS: 1983, Table 501 at 303.

47

Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775. Such federal intervention in
wage and hour decisions for a small number of state em-
ployees and not for others is divisive and may undermine
the States’ leverage in labor negotiations with its em-
ployees not subject to federal law.

Therefore, the minimum wage and overtime compensa-
tion provisions of the FLSA should not be applied to pub-
licly owned local mass transit, even if public transit were
not an integral operation in an area of traditional gov-
ernmental function, because these requirements are not
severable from the unconstitutional provisions of the
statute. This Court may rely on this alternative argu-
ment to affirm even though it was not the ground relied
on by the lower court. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 US.
379, 387 n.13 (1975).

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that, like pro-
tected activities expressly mentioned in National League
of Cities, publicly owned local transit services are im-
portant governmental activities,” 426 U.S. at 847, which
are “typical of those performed by state and local gov-
ernments in discharging their dual functions of admin-
istering the public law and furnishing public services,”
id. at 851 (footnote omitted). Indeed, these are precisely
the kinds of public welfare services that “States have
traditionally afforded their citizens.” Id.

Since this Court has held, and repeatedly confirmed,
that the precise federal regulation at issue here im-
permissibly interferes with an essential attribute of state
sovereignty—the power to fix wages and overtime com-
pensation—and that when applied to integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions it en-
dangers [the States’] ‘separate and independent’ exist-
ence,” LIRR, 455 U.S. at 690 (quoting National League
of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851), it follows that publicly

48

owned local mass transit, as an integral and traditional
governmental function, may not be subject to the FLSA.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the court below.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.
Counsel of Record

DONALD T. BLIss

ZoE E. BAIRD
O’MELVENY & MYERS
1800 M Street, N. W.,
Suite 500 South
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-5325

ROBERT W. BATCHELDER
Chief Counsel
American Public Transit
Association
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dated: February 3, 1984

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0015%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.
