# Amicus Curiae Brief — Springfield Township School Dist. v. Knoll

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0011%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 471 U.S. 288

## Text

FlLLED

32-1889 | wm 21 98

ALEXANDER L STEVAG,
No. CLERK

b oY UY 4 Office Supreme Court, us]

in the Supreme Court of the
Bnjted States

October Term, 1982

SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Political

Subdivision of the Commonwealth of lvania; RO-
MAN, LOUIS A., Su tendent, Wh es a
School District; LA , JOHN J., W, MARIE M.,

eld Township District,
Petitioners
vs.
KNOLL, MADELIN H..,
Respondent

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

; Capitol

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reasons for Granting the Writ:
1. The decision below conflicts with the deci-
sion of other courts of appeals as to the suit-

ability of applying to federal civil rights ac-
tions six-month statutes of limitations .......... 3

2. Heed gihguser Ss bane twee tga pede
federal law regarding
statutes of tanitations to federal civil rights
actions and conflicts with the decisions of
SR Aa So a

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES:
Board of Regents of the University of the State of

New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) ....4, 6,
7,9, 10
Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (ist Cir. 1980) ........ 5
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) ........... 7
Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187
cc ecemmmseene 5
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304
ER SATA SR AS mart a UP 7
Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1
(os aE cen 5
i

Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (1978) .....c..c0000 5

Holden v. Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination, 671 F.2d 30 (ist Cir.), cert. de-

nied 103 S.Ct. 97 (1982) ........cccccccccoscccsscesccsees 5
Hussey v. Sullivan, 651 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1981) ...... 5
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.

GIO CUBTED ccnesicciccscscidisecinitlidelibiabadiebediriees cli 4,7
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) ........ 9,10

Swyka v. Johnson, 649 F.2d 675 (1983), petition
for cert. filed, No. 82-1928 (May 19, 1983) .... 8

Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, cert.
denied 423 U.S. 855 (1975) ......ccccccccccceseeeeeeeee 5

STATUTES:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 41.1481 ..........ccccecccceee

Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 24-34504 ooo... cccccccccccceceeeeeeeees

Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 601 A. 15(12) ....cccccccccccceeeeeees

Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 44-1004 and 1005 .0........0..0.0....
Ky. Rev Stat. Sec. 344.200 .....ccccccccccoscssscccesseseccesessees

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B Sec. 5 ............ccccceee 2,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 Sec. 4611 ..............ccccseeeee
Mich. Stat. Ann. Sec. 3.548 (601) II (b) ................

—
=)
A.
z
:
dl
yr
~
NN V NN NNN NN &§-& &— = =

ii

Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec, 363.06 ........esecssessesssensseeneenees 2
Mo. Ann. Stat. Sec. 213.120 ......cc.cccccessescesceseecereenees 2,6
Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 49-2-501 .........ccccescesesseseeneneees 2
Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 20-119 ........ccccccccsssesesseseeseescenees 2,6
Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 613.430 .........cccccescssessessesceneenees 2
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 354-A:09 .........ccccesceceeeees 2
N.J. Rev. Stat. Sec. 10: 5-18 ........ccccccccsseeseeseeseeceesenees 2
N.M. Stat. Ann. Sec. 28-1-10 ........ccccscssessescssessecceeees 2
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 4112.05 ........ccccccceseeseseeee 2
Oka. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 Sec. 1501 .........ccccccccsseeseeseeees 2
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Sec. 5522 (b) .....ccccsescssesesceseecenees 4
R.1. Gen. Laws Sec. 28-6-10 .......ccccccccesccssesessesseneeees 2
S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 65-2D (1) .......ccccssesseseeseeseneeeesees 2
S.D. Codified Laws Sec. 20-13-31 .......cccccccsceseeeeeeeees 2
Tenn. Code Amn. 4-21-117 ........cccceccesesseseeseeceneeceneeees 2
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 ............cccccccsessessesessesseseseeees 10
GO PC cevicencccncngssdecsutntintassscctecscssyube 10
I cinevtetcneseceentsnecnctmastanpenesnnns 1,9, 10
GB RA I I icecrccketnctectnccnnniernnceniinii 10
42 US.C. Section 1988 ............cccsccccessescereeseereeees 1,4,7,8
42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5 (€) ........ccccccescesesseseeneeeeees 8,9
42 U.S.C. Section 3610 (b) ....c.c.cceccesescesceseeeeseeeeeeees 9
Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7 (15) ....c.ccccccsessescerenseneeseneenes 2
a I Be cakdithecntecttnctescccscnovesrebibtcencetnatnias 2
W.Va. Code Sec. 5-11-10 .........ccccccssscsscsrenserenceecensess 2
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 27-9-106 ......cccccesesseseseseeseseseeseneennens 2
iii

—=—<—$

Interest of the Amici Curiae I

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CU" [AE

This case presents the question whether a federal
court properly may reject application of a state statute of
limitations, which it is required to borrow for purposes of
a civil rights action, because the court determines that the
limitations period is too short. The decision of the court
of appeals in this case, refusing to apply Pennsylvania’s
six-month statute of limitations to an employment discrim-
ination claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, will
have a broad impact on the states joining in this brief.

The states, their officers and employes are, perhaps,
the most frequent defendants in federal civil rights actions.
Although the civil rights statutes represent a strong federal
policy to encourage vindication of civil rights, Congress
likewise has expressed the firm view that certain interstices
in the civil rights scheme, including the prescription of
limitations periods, are to be filled by application of state
law. See 42 U.S.C. §1988. The amici have a substantial
interest in the vindication of their responsibility and power
to choose generally applicable limitations for actions.

The Third Circuit’s decision here, if permitted to
stand, will have a considerable effect on amici. In addi-
tion to the Pennsylvania statute at issue here, there are
statutes of limitations from at least 32 States’ which are

1 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41.1481 (six-month limita-
tion ; employment diserimination) ; COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34504
(90-day limitation ; housing discrimination) ; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§46a-82 (six-month limitation; employment discrimination) ; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6 §4605 (six-month limitation; housing discrim-
ination); FLA. STAT. ANN. §23.167 (six-month limitation; em-

2 Interest of the Amici Curiae

less than one year and which could be applied to civil
rights actions. With respect to each of these statutes, the
State has made a carefully considered policy choice in

ployment discrimination) ; GA. CODE ANN. §89-1714 (six-month
limitation ; employment discrimination); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§378-4 (90-day limitation; discrimination action); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 68 §7-102 and 103 (180-day limitation ; civil rights vio-
lation) ; IND. CODE ANN. §34-4-16.5-7 (180-day limitation; po-
litical subdivision claim); IOWA CODE ANN. §601 A. 15(12)
(180-day limitation: employment discrimination); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §44-1004 and 1005 (six-month limitation; employment dis-
crimination) ; KY. REV. STAT. §344.200 (six-month limitation;
employment discrimination) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §4611
(six-month limitation ; employment discrimination) ; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §5 (six-month limitation ; employment dis-
crimination) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §3.548 (601) II(b) (90-day
limitation; employment discrimination); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§363.06 (six-month limitation; employment discrimination) ; MO.
ANN. STAT. §213.120 (180-day limitation, housing discrimina-
tion); MONT. CODE ANN. §49-2-501 (six-month limitation ; em-
ployment discrimination) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §20-119 (six-month
limitation ; housing discrimination) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §613.430
(six-month limitation; employment discrimination); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §354-A:09 (90-day limitation; discrimination ac-
tion) ; N.J. REV. STAT. §10:5-18 (six-month limitation; discrim-
ination) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §28-1-10 (90-day limitation ; diserim-
ination action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.05 (six-month
limitation; discrimination action); OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25
§1501 (six-month limitation; discrimination action); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §28-6-10 (four-month limitation; employment discrimina-
tion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §20-13-31 (180-day limitation;
discrimination action); TENN. CODE ANN. 421-117 (180-day
limitation; discrimination action); UTAH CODE ANN. 34-35-
7(15) (30-day limitation; discrimination action); VA. CODE
§36-94 (180-day limitation ; housing discrimination); W. VA.
CODE §5-11-10 (90-day limitation ; diserimination action) ; WYO.
STAT. §27-9-106 (90-day limitation ; employment discrimination ).

4 Reasons for Granting the Writ

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decision of

Other Courts of Appeals as to the Suitability of Applying

to Federal Civil Rights Actions Six-Month Statutes of
Limitations

Section 1988 of Title 42 provides, in pertinent part,
that federal courts adjudicating civil rigt-- claims shall
refer to state law “when federal law provides no rule of
decision.” Board of Regents of the University of the State
of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980)
(hereinafter “Tomanio”). Because the civil rights statutes
have no statutes of limitations, state law supplies the rule
of decision. Under Section 1988, state law may be disre-
garded only if it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States”, or if it is “inconsistent with the
federal policy underlying the cause of action under con-
sideration.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).

Pennsylvania law prescribes a six-month statute of

limitations for actions brought against state and local gov- .

ernment officials.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5522(b). In re-
liance upon what it perceived to be the “remedial spirit”

242 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5522(b) provides as follows:
Commencement of Action Required.—The following ac-
tions and proceedings must be commenced within six months:
(1) An action against an officer of any government unit
for anything done in the execution of his office, «xcept an ec-
tion subject to another limitation specified in this sub-chapter.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 5

of the civil rights statutes, the Third Circuit concluded
here that six months simply is too short a time period in
which to expect the average plaintiff to realize the import
of the action taken against him and to file a lawsuit. In
reaching its decision, the Third Circuit ignored decisions
of the First and Eighth Circuits upholding application of
six-month limitations periods to civil rights claims.

In Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99 (ist Cir. 1980),
the court of appeals applied Massachusetts’ six-month
limitation to a civil rights race discrimination claim. The
First Circuit found the six-month period to be reasonable.
“Although it may take more than six months to properly
prepare a civil rights case, a complaint meeting the require-
ment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) can surely be filed in that
time. And amendments to the complaint and supplemental
pleadings may be sought after suit is brought. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15.” Id., at 106. The court also emphasized the “im-
portant policy reasons” which support using the limitations
applicable to similar actions in state court; a longer limita-
tions period for federal actions would encourage initial re-
sort to federal court thereby further involving the federal
courts in local matters. Jbid. The First Circuit consis-
tently has followed Burns. See. e.g. Hussey v. Sullivan,
651 F.2d 74 (ist Cir. 1981); Holden v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30 (ist
Cir.) , cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 97 (1982); Carter v. Super-
markets General Corp., 684 F.2d 187 (ist Cir. 1982);
Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1 (ist
Cir. 1982) .

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Warren v. Norman
Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855
(1975) and Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (1978),

applied to federal civil rights claims challenging local

ka’s and Missouri's fair housing laws.’

The Third Circuit here chose not to acknowledge the
decisions cited above or to canvass the important state
policies reflected in Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.
Instead, the court substituted its own judgment for that of
the state legislature as to what limitations period is fair
and reasonable. Because this decision conflicts with deci-
sions of the First and Eighth Circuits, certiorari should
be granted to review the judgment below.

2. This Case Involves an Important Question of Federal

Law Regarding Application of State Statutes of Limita-

tions to Federal Civil Rights Actions and Conflicts With
the Decisions of This Court

As Judge Adams observed in his dissent from the
denial of rehearing: “There is no indication that the opin-
ion in the present case follows Tomanio’s direction to give
weight to the significant policies underlying the state stat-
ute of limitations” (Pet. App. 34a; 699 F.2d, at 147).
The Third Circuit’s failure properly to apply the Tomanio
test justifies this Court’s review.

The teaching of Tomanio is that, in civil rights ac-
tions, “state statute[s] of limitations . . . are more than a
technical obstacle to be circumvented if possible. In most
cases, they are binding rules of law.” 446 US. at 484.

* Althongh no other vourts of appeals have addressed this ques-
tion, as we noted earlier (see note 1, supra), at least 33 States have
statutes of limitations of less than one year which, arguably, could
be applied to a civil rights action.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 7

Only if the policies underlying the state limitations period
are inconsistent with the federal policies reflected in the
civil rights statute may the state statute be ignored. 446
US. at 487. In this case the Third Circuit erred in fail-
ing even to consider the policies on ' hich the state statute
is based.

Statutes of limitations are inherently arbitrary in that
they involve “a value judgment concerning the point at
which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting prosecution of
stale ones.” johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 US. 454, 463-464 (1975). See also Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 US. 304, 314 (1945). The bor-
rowing provision. of 42 U.S.C. §1988 reflect a congres-
sional judgment to “rely on the State’s wisdom in setting
a limit” on the time for bringing an analogous action. 421
U.S., at 464. Generally, a state statute of limitations
which does not discriminate against federal rights and
which gives the party a reasonable time to sue must be
applied. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 US. 610, 615-616
(1895).

Per nsylvania’s six-month limitation period for claims
against public officials fosters important state policies be-
yond those reflected in limitations statutes generally. State
and local governments are more likely to experience fre-
quent changes in personnel than are other entities. The
almost constant flux in which government finds itself ex-
acerbates the problems of assembling evidence to defend
claims. Even a short passage of time often will result in
the departure from government of persons with knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Frequently,
upon leaving government, former officials are less than

8 Reasons for Granting the Writ

cooperative in assisting the defense. Moreover, the large
volume of business and transactions handled by the gov-
ernment often creates serious problems in keeping track
of and assembling documents necessary to defend in litiga-
tion. These considerations provide additional justification
in the context of this case for respecting the state’s choice.‘

As petitioners have noted (Pet. 14-15), the policies
which support shorter limitations periods for actions
against public officials are particularly compelling when
the claim involves discrimination in public employment.
Every time a government agency fires, fails to promote or
refuses to hire a person, someone else fills the position.
The passage of time makes it increasingly difficult for the
agency to reverse its course if a court decides that the
agency violated the civil rights statutes by virtue of its
personnel decision. In fact, Congress itself explicitly
recognized this problem and prescribed a 180-day limita-
tions period for employment discrimination actions. See
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (e) .”

When balanced against the federal policies which
underlie the civil rights statutes, it is clear that the state
policies in no way conflict with the federal aims. The

* In light of the strong policies which support the state’s choice
of a six-month limitation, it is particularly ironic that the court
of appeals held that a six-year limitation period applies to civil
rights actions (Pet. App. 15a; 699 F.2d at 145). That holding
clearly flies in the face of the presumption, created by Section
1988, that the states may be relied upon to make these policy
choices.

* The Third Cireuit has not limited its holding to employment
discrimination actions or any other categories of cases. See Swyka
v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 675 (1983), petition for cert. filed, No. 82-
1928 (May 19, 1983).

+

“

Reasons for Granting the Writ 9

“principal policies embodied in §1983 [are] deterrence
and compensation.” Tomanio, 446 US., at 488. It is

The court of appeals’ conclusion (Pet. App. 10a; 669
F.2d at 142) that six months simply is too short a time
in which to file a

|
:

as a federal policy, implicit in §1983, to favor vindication
of individual rights (Pet. App. 11a; 699 F.2d, at 143).
Once again, the statute at issue here has no direct impact
on that policy. If the Third Circuit is concerned that
some rights will not be vindicated because the statute will
bar the claim, it is sufficient to note that “a state statute
cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely
because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litiga-
tion.” Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) .

‘The court of appeals also relied upon what it con-
sidered to be a congressional policy of uniformity (Pet.
App. 10a-11a; 699 F.2d, at 143-144). The court found

10 Reasons for Granting the Writ

this policy to be undermined by the possibility that one
limitations period would apply to public officials under 42
U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985, while a different limitations peri-
od applied to private defendants sued under 42 USC.
§§1981, 1982 and 1985. Once again, the court ignored
this Court’s teachings.

As the Court observed in Tomanio, the claim that
federal policy requires uniformity in application of limita-
tions statutes to civil rights claims consistently has been
rejected. “The need for uniformity, while paramount
under some federal statutory schemes, has not been held
to warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations
for civil rights actions.” 446 US., at 489. Congressional
reliance on state law obviously presupposes the lack of
nationwide uniformity. Robertson v. Wegmann, supra,
436 US., at 594, n.11. The same rationale applies here.
If Congress had no difficuty with the application of vary-
ing limitations for the very same cause of action brought
in different states, it is unreasonable to suggest that federal
policy is substantially affected by the application of dif-
ferent limitations to different causes of action brought in
the same forum.

In the final analysis, there is no substantial basis in
this case to reject out of hand the state’s considered judg-
ment that claims against public officials must be com-
menced promptly. The féteral policies of compensation
for civil rights violations and deterrence of future miscon-
duct are not affected in the sightest by application of Penn-
sylvania’s six-month statute of limitations.

Reasons for Granting the Writ 11
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue
to review the decision of the Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
LERoy S. ZIMMERMAN
Attorney General
By: ANDREW S. GORDON
Deputy Attorney General
ALLEN C. WARSHAW
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Special Litigation
Office of Attorney General
1545 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
(717) 783-1471

Date: June 6, 1983

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385012_0011%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.