# Opposition Brief — Whorton v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 931

## Text

Bupreme Court, U.S.

L ‘ 5
/ tH F. SPANIOL, JR.
@LERK

No. 86-1045 , -

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

CARL WHORTON, KEN WHOoRTON, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC., YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC.,
Fort WortH Cas & BaGGaGE Co., INc., CITY OF
DALLAS, TEXAS, CITY OF FortT WortTH, TEXAS, CITY OF
IRVING, TEXAS, CITY OF GRAPEVINE, TEXAS,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PRIVATE TAXI COMPANIES IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT

STAN McMurry

RAIN HARRELL EMERY YOUNG & DOKE
4200 Republic Bank “Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 754-9484

Attorney for Respondents,
SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC.
YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC.,
and FortH WoRTH CAB AND
BaGGAGE Co., INC.

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

-
t

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE
PRIVATE TAXI COMPANY RESPONDENTS

I.

IS THERE A, CASE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO THE
PRIVATE TAXI COMPANY RESPONDENTS SINCE
THE LOWER COURT ALSO DISMISSED THE ACTION
AGAINST THEM ON AN INDEPENDENT AND AL-
TERNATIVE GROUND AS TO WHICH PETITIONERS
DO NOT SEEK REVIEW?

II.

WHEN THERE WAS EXTENSIVE STATE REGULA-
TION WHICH ESTABLISHED “A CLEARLY ARTIC-
ULATED AND AFFIRMATIVELY EXPRESSED STATE
POLICY” SHOWING “THE LEGISLATURE COMTEM-
PLATED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF” BEFORE ANY
AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTES IN QUESTION OC-
CURRED, DID THE LOWER COURT’S REFERENCE
TO A SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT, WHICH VALI-
DATED AND CONFIRMED THE CHALLENGED CON-
TRACTS AS “AN ADEQUATE INDICATION OF THE
STATES DESIRE TO ALLOW JOINT AIRPORT
BOARDS TO DISPENSE COMPETITION”, RAISE AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION RELATING TO RETROAC-
TIVITY?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PRIVATE TAXI
COMPANY RESPONDENTS .......ccccsseecceesssecceeeseeeeeeneess

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......cccccsccscscssccccccosccescescceces

STATUTES INVOLVED .....cccccccccccscccsscoccccssscscscccccoscsncs

JOMSBICTIONN cocniereccscccccccccscsersctseconscernanessacessstunssssass

STATEMENT OF THE CASE uaccccssscccscccssccssccccscceseceoess

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT .........cc+000

be

II.

There is no case or controversy as to the
private taxi company respondents under Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution. ...........ssseeseeeees

The petition does not present any issue of
importance, because the lower court’s judg-
ment does not depend upon a subsequent val-
idating provision in an amendment to
establish ‘‘a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed policy” showing ‘“‘the legis-
lature contemplated the acts complained of,”
and there is no conflict with another Court
of Appeal or with this Court on any federal
question of importance. .........scseseeereeeeeerees

CORMNCERTORIONG c5svcsceinncscaconesneatdbietotcentiashaanaaae

22

28
30

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 450, 89 L.Ed. 1725 65 S.Ct. 1384
SII) cdenssdhinsidiasubunisdninssechicmeetdanapeaditctiehniiskeees

Amalgated Association v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 416, 95 L.Ed. 389,
RE TE NED casonsccesnateccchiapipapiitertscionseee

Brownlowe v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216, 43 S.Ct. 263,
gk 5. RR 2a

DeFunis v. rat: 416 U.S. 312, 40 L.Ed. 2d
BI Be ie BAG CA GTE) oe cicsscntchdecscocerccoseces

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 20’ L.Ed. 2d 947, 88
SEEN ENE LE IND

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 37 L.Ed. 2d 407,
I

Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 108, 22 L.Ed. 2d 113,
ep I sso vs ciecivascndsacanectocsconecence

Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 24 L.Ed. 2d 214, 90
NN SIT MID Necantiniconseseasshasabibicladidccoussecees

Heitnuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 65 L.Ed. 990,
MM TT MUUEED. . sccedsvcndenensssniaceseeivaricsseccce ;

Honig v. Students of Cal. School for Blind, 471 U.S.

—, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. —__(1985)...

Independent Taxicy\, Drivers’ Employees v. Greater
Houston Transportation Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th
Cir.) cert. dented, __U.S. __(1985) 0.0.0.0...

Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 52 L.Ed. 2d 184,
OTE ceaneepatuniesigunonece

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 2d 154, 92.
ak ces chien

Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 71 L.Ed. 2d 508,
REID yo cacecceosnctnenacceseetecccocens

Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 35 L.Ed.
Ba UF Petes BU CADIS, covncsccccsccccectossee

25

25,26

30
27
27
26

26

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Local No. 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 4 L.Ed.

2 Fie. S Bi Bek Clee. eiiiieaicciwm, 26
Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 3 L.ED.

SOD = acisdees ata ick Mitantbekniaasenas 25
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 40 L.Ed. 293, 16 S.Ct.

BEE CREE sik cakacsiitasiarcictetsiicvnisseibiedbbindatnter dines 25,26
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 71 L.Ed. 2d 353,

102 S.Ct. 1181 PIII uccncatgeaenninmsanaeiaghiniaktapes 24

Natural Milk Producers Association of California
v. City and County of San Francisco, 317 U.S.

423, 63 S.Ct. 359, 87 L.Ed. 375 (1943) Blanes 26
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 30 L.Ed. 2d

435, SE: A Ge CIEE ebceiscttitrcnstes 27
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674,

6 Fh I Te. ehignietniteicnstitietteeneticinencces 25,27
Pease v. Rathbren-Jones Engineering Co., 243 U.S.

273, 61 L.Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283 (1917) _...... 25
Princeton University v. Schnid, 455 U.S. 100, 70

L.Ed. 855, 102 S.Ct. 867 (1982) .............0000 27
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 93

Ris ee EE tnta wi chistseceinpeniaminendsbiakatohonces 25
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct.

Ue Tee ey BAe SD atcinntcinecnscstonncnctanees 26
Sierra Club v. rig. 405 U.S. 727, 31 L.Ed. 2d

636, 92 S.C _ 1361 IEE. - kcciciinsedeieimbdbenanne 26

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Orga-
nization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L.Ed. 2d 450, 96

Ge TEE SE ncbandeb can tekiessdideaaeerdnsioneccices 24
Socialist Tabor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 32

L.Ed. 2d 317, 92 S.Ct. 1716 (1972) ................ 26
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United

States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S.Ct. 721, (1985)... 24

Tennessee v. Condors, 189 U.S. 64, 47 L.Ed. 709,
es I I | Gila cnigesdictneiiasipasetiasinns 25

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 714 104 S.Ct. 1818, 79
Rima TE FAN IIE ~ Bacesccencancesancenctnsssbunsnceses 30
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,
BE es es I iis dickip dis snasidetinsnnsinsenes 24

United States v. Alaska Steamship Company, 253
U.S. 118, 64 L.Ed. 808, 40 S.Ct. 448

PIED. cucceatiicicaiieiaichibaaiinanaaibtantbipitadneniabssesincia 27
United States v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567,

1 L.Ed. 2d 563, 77 S.Ct. 529 (1957) _............ 27
United States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 45 S.Ct.

MBG, GE LTE, GH CB) aincskcvcctccccccsscccccss: 30

Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S.
464, 70 L.Ed. 2d 700, 102 S.Ct. 752

CE nili asiisiniascdsaanhanthnieateniaadbiadindbeninevabausnscet 26
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 801 F.2d 159, —(5th

ACMI: | daiecsciedbiealiicdntbiapicnimas iaiiiaia nid caihiabniinala eee 27
STATUTES:
Article III of the Constitution ........00.......ccccsseeeeeee ii,1,22
ee SED ~ eeiitttteiiccscsieierrersintnecss 1
Sree ee pice ieen eiieicaie 1
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1175 (Vernon 1968) ........ 1,13
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 46d (Vernon 1969) ...... passim

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964) .... passim

Tex. R. R. Comm’n, 16 Tex. Admin. Code §5,
SUE. acdaninicbhecohdieca tices chdeneuniieacamansmaaadenaaaiahas 1,19,20

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1045

CARL WuortTon, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC., ef al.

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PRIVATE TAXI COMPANIES IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATUTES INVOLVED

The federal statutes involved are Article III of the
Constitution; the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 and 2;
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §35. The state stat-
utes involved are the Texas Home Rule Statute, Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1175 (Vernon 1963); the Texas
Municipal Airport Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 46d
(Vernon 1969); and the Texas Motor Business Act,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964).

JURISDICTION

The existance of an alternative defense as to the
private taxi company respondents precludes a case or
controversy under Article III of the Constitution.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport (‘Regional
Airport’’) is owned by the City of Dallas, Texas (‘‘Dal-
las”), and the City of Fort Worth, Texas (“Fort
Worth’’). The two cities built it between Dallas and
Fort Worth, in a cooperative effort, at the request
of the Federal Aviation Administration. The Dallas/
Fort Worth Regional Airport Board (‘Regional Air-
port Board’’) governs the Regional Airport, with rules
and regulations approved by Dallas and Fort Worth.
The system selected by Dallas, Fort Worth, and the
Regional Airport Board to regulate and authorize
taxicabs to serve the Regional Airport required con-
tractual authority. These rules and regulations re-
quired taxi drivers and companies who wished to
provide service to do so pursuant to a contract. Dal-
las, Fort Worth, and the Regional Airport Board con-
tracted with Surtran Taxicabs, Inc. for the period
from the end of 1974 to the start of 1985. The con-
tractual authorization system is no longer used, and
all drivers who wish to serve the Regional Airport
do so under a permit system (which petitioners do
not complain of) at the same cost they paid under
the contract system.

In 1970 the Regional Airport Board decided to se-
lect one operator to handle all ground transportation
needs, both bus and taxicab, from the Regional Air-
port to the ten-county area around the Regional Air-
port. Seven companies were invited to bid, but no
bids were submitted to provide both bus and taxicab
services. The decision of Dallas, Fort Worth, and the
Regional Airport Board to select one ground trans-
portation operator is at the heart of this controversy.
This decision was based on the recommendation of

3

an independent consultant who had been hired to
study transportation needs and to recommend means
of implementing service. Several consultants were
thereafter retained to provide technical assistance on
ground transportation matters. The consultants con-
tinued to recommend the single operator system, but
the system was later modified to allow all taxi drivers
who wished to provide service the opportunity to do
so.

When it became obvious that no single private
transportation company could meet the bid criteria,
Dallas and Fort Worth jointly formed the D/FW Sur-
tan System [‘‘Surtan System’’] to serve as the single
operator of all airport ground transportation services.
Surtan System in turn contracted with the Regional
Airport Board to provide all ground transportation
for hire from the Regional Airport. 7

Dallas, Fort Worth, and Surtran System deter-
mined that Surtan System would subcontract with the
private sector for taxicab services. Surtran System,
which was managed by the Dallas Transit Depart-
ment, provided bus service to or from the Regional
Airport. The final bid criteria, adopted by the Re-
gional Airport Board and approved by both Dallas
and Fort Worth, required the potential taxi subcon-
tractor to bid on outbound taxi service from the Re-
gional Airport to anywhere in the surrounding ten-
county area. The Dallas Transit Department, as man-
ager of Surtran System, solicited bids from local taxi
companies for taxi service.

Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc. and Fort Worth Cab &
Baggage Co., Inc. received approval from Surtran
System to form a corporation to bid for taxi services.
This company, Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., submitted the

only bid. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc. signed a contract
with Dallas, Fort Worth, and Surtran System. This
contract was renewed one time. Before the D/FW
Airport opened, Surtran Taxicab, Inc. applied for and
received, from the Railroad Commission of Texas
(‘Texas Railroad Commission’’) a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity to serve the D/FW Air-
port. During the second contract, Yellow Cab of Dal-
las, Inc., applied for and received such a certificate.
No other company had such a certificate or authority
during the term of either of the two contracts.

In the years before the 1983 amendments, referred
to by petitioner, the two principal legislative acts by
which the State of Texas provided for regulation of
taxicab service at the Regional Airport were the Texas
Municipal Airport Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
46d (Vernon 1969), and the Texas Motor Bus Act,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 9lla (Vernon 1964).
Under the Motor Bus Act, regulation was provided
by a state agency, the Texas Railroad Commission.
This regulation was mandatory and its terms were
detailed by the statute. Under the Texas Municipal
Airport Act, the regulation was provided by a joint
airport board. This regulation was of the type which
had traditionally been provided by cities within their
limits. Since the Texas Municipal Airport Act, allows
a joint airport board the same authority over taxicabs
at a regional airport as cities have over taxicabs
within their limits, one should also consider the au-
thority which the State of Texas gives cities such as
Dallas and Fort Worth to regulate taxicabs.

The following provisions of the Motor Bus Act, su-
pra, were applicable before the 1983 amendments re-
ferred to by petitioners:

eA ST arepony ea

stint ke

The term “Motor Bus Company” when
used in this Act means every corporation
*** owning, controlling, operating or man-
aging any motor propelled passenger vehicle
*** and engaged in the business of trans-
porting persons for compensation or hire over
the public highways within the State of
Texas, whether operating over fixed routes
or fixed schedules, or otherwise; * * * pro-
vided further, that the term ‘‘Motor Bus
Company” as used in this Act shall not in-
clude corporations or persons, * * * insofar
as they own, control, operate, or manage mo-
tor propelled passenger vehicles operated
wholly within the limits of any incorporated
town or city, and the suburbs thereof,
whether separately incorporated or other-
wise.

All motor-bus companies, as defined herein,
are hereby declared to be ‘‘common carriers”’
and subject to regulation by the State of
Texas, and shall not operate any motor pro-
pelled passenger vehicle for the regular
transportation of persons as passengers for
compensation or hire over any public high-
way in this State except in accordance with
the provision of this Act...

It is hereby declared that when existing
transportation facilities on any highway in
this State do not provide passenger service
which the Commission shall deem adequate
to provide for public convenience on such
highway, then such inadequacy of service
shall be corisidered as creating a condition

where the public convenience and necessity
require the designation of, and provision for,
additional service on such highway, and it
shall be the duty of the Commission to issue
certificate or certificates as herein provided,
if in the opinion of said Commission the is-
suance of such certificate will promote the
public welfare.

The Commission is hereby vested with
power and authority, and it is hereby made
its duty to supervise and regulate the public
service rendered by every motor bus com-
pany operating over the highways in this
State, to fix or approve the maximum, or
minimum, or maximum and minimum, fares,
rates or charges of, and to prescribe all rules
and regulations necessary for the govern-
ment of, each motor bus company; to pre-
scribe the routes, schedules, service, and
safety of operations of each such motor bus
company; to acquire the filing of such annual -
or other reports and of such other data by
such motor bus company as the Commission
may deem necessary.

** *

The Commission is further authorized and
empowered to supervise and regulate motor
bus companies in all other matters affecting
the relationship between such motor bus com-
panies and the traveling public that may be
necessary to the efficient operation of this
law.

It shall be unlawful for any motor bus com-
pany to sell any tickets for the transportation

See a eT ee

of passengers within this State over any mo-
tor bus line at any rates other than the rates,
authorized and approved by the Commission
under the terms of this law;

** *

No motor-bus company shall hereafter reg-
ularly operate for the transportation of per-
sons as passengers for compensation or hire
over the public highways of this State with-
out first having obtained from the Commis-
sion under the provisions of this Act a
certificate or permit declaring that the public
convenience and necessity require such’ op-
eration;

The Commission is hereby vested with
power and authority, and it is hereby made
its duty upon the filing of an application for
a certificate of public convenience and ne-
cessity, to ascertain and determine under
such rules and regulations as it may pro-
mulgate, after considering existing transpor-
tation facilities on such highway, the service
rendered and capable of being rendered
thereby, and the demand for, or need of ad-
ditional service, if there exists a public ne-
cessity for such service, and if public
convenience will be promoted by granting
said application and permitting the operating
of motor vehicles on the highways designated
in such application, as a common carrier for
hire.

* * *

Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of
any corporation and every other person who
violates or fails to comply with, or who pro-
cures, aids, or abets in the violation of any
provisions of this Act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by a fine not to exceed Five
Hundred ($500.00) Dollars, or by imprison-
ment in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment;
and the violations occurring on each day shall
each constitute a separate offense.

Any officer, agent, servant, or employee of
any motor bus company as heretofore de-
fined, and any motor bus company, as here-
tofore defined and/or the owner or operator,
officer, servant, agent or employee, or any
such owner or operator of any bus terminal
who violates or fails to obey, observe or com-
ply with any order, decision, rule or regu-
lation, direction, demand or requirement of
the Commission shall be subject to and shall
pay a penalty not exceeding Five Hundred
($500.00) Dollars, for each and every day of
such violation. Such penalty to be recovered
in any court of competent jurisdiction in
Travis County, Texas, or in the County in
which the violation occurs. Suit for such pen-
alty or penalties shall be instituted and con-
ducted by the Attorney General of the State
of Texas, or by the county or district attorney
of the county in which the violation occurs,
in the name of the State of Texas, and by

direction of the Railroad Commission of
Texas. :

The following provisions of the Code of Rules and
Regulations of the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Air-
port Board were applicable before the 1983 amend-
ment referred to by petitioners:

| The provisions of this Code shall constitute

a special enactment of effect only within the

boundaries of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional
Airport, and adopted in cooperation and con-
cert with other Cities in recognition of the
unique and special requirements of the plan-
ning, ... operation, regulation, and protec-
tion and policing of the Dallas-Fort Worth
Regional Airport.... To the extent of any
conflict between the existing or future gen-
eral ordinances of any city and this Code,
this Code shall prevail only within the bound-
aries of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Air-
port and not otherwise.

It shall be unlawful for any person to so-
licit ground transportation business on the
Airport, or to pick up passengers or baggage
for hire on the Airport without a ground
transportation permit from the Airport
Board, or without having an Airport Board
Concession, License or Franchise therefor,
and, to the extent of any operations outside
the Airport Boundaries, without a license,
permit or franchise from any City through
which said business is conducted if lawfully
regulated by the ordinances of any such city.

10

Duly certified copies of all rules, regula-
tions and orders of the Dallas-Fort Worth
Regional Airport Board pertaining to the
subjects mentioned in Section 3; and pre-
scribing penalties for violations, shall be for-
warded by the Executive Director to the chief
administrative officer of each city adopting
this Code, and if the City Council of such
City shall elect to enact such rules, regula-
tions and orders in the manner and form
prescribed for other penal ordinances of such
City, the municipal court or courts of such
City shall each have concurrent jurisdiction
with any other proper forum over offenses
arising thereunder and within the corporate
limits of such City; and the duly authorized
and commissioned security officers or other
enforcement officers of the Dallas-Fort Worth
Regional Airport shall thereafter be author-
ized to file cases arising thereunder in such
municipal courts, in addition to any other
convenient and proper forum.

The authorized and commissioned security
officers of the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional
Airport Board shall issue and use traffic ci-
tations and summons of the type now used
by the Texas Highway Patrol with such
changes as are necessitated to render same
applicable to the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport.

* * *

Airport Police. The primary responsibility
for police, fire and health security and for

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11

the enforcement of regulations, and for the
performance of inspections and services
within the boundaries of the Dallas-Fort
Worth Regional Airport shall be vested in
the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport
Board and in the Police force and such health
officers as may from time to time be duly
appointed and commissioned as such officers
by the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport
Board.

...the violation of any provision of The
Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas-
Fort Worth Regional Airport Board where
an act or a failure to act is made unlawful
or is otherwise prohibited, shall be punishable
by a fine not to exceed Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00), and each day a violation shall con-
tinue shall constitute a separate offense; pro-
vided, however, where the offense is one for
which a penalty is fixed by state law, the
latter penalty shall govern.

The Municipal Airport Act, contained the following
provisions before the 1983 amendments referred to
by petitioners:

[t]wo (2) or more municipalities are specif-
ically authorized to make ... agreements...
for the joint acquisition and operation of air-
ports.... Concurrent action by ordinance,
resolution or otherwise of the governing bod-
ies of the participating public agencies shall
constitute joint action.

The joint board shall have power to ...
operate, regulate, protect and police any air-

12

port ... to be jointly acquired, controlled and
operated, and such board may exercise on
behalf of its constituent public agencies all
the powers of each with respect to such air-
port,. .. subject to the limitations of Subsec-
tion (d) of this Section.

Police Regulations. Any resolutions, rules,
regulations or orders of the joint board deal-
ing with subjects authorized by Section 7 of
the Act shall become effective only upon ap-
proval of the governing bodies of the con-
stituent public agencies provided that upon
such approval, the resolutions, rules, regu-
lations or orders of the joint board shall have
the same force and effect in the territories
or jurisdictions involved as the ordinances,
resolutions, rules, regulations or orders of
each public agency would have in its own
territory or jurisdiction.

* * *
[t]he ... operation, regulation, protection
and policing of airports ... and the exercise

of any other powers herein granted to mu-
nicipalities and ... to be severally or jointly
exercised, are hereby declared to be public
and governmental functions, exercised for a
public purpose, and matters of public neces-
sity; ... and in the case of any municipality
other than a county, are declared to.be mu-
nicipal functions and purposes as well as pub-
lic and governmental.

The act provides two cities may jointly do what a
city may do individually, and the act provides a city
may:

13

.. regulate, protect and police airports .. .,
: either within or without the territorial limits
of such municipality ... including the ...
4 operation at such airports of... facilities ...
: for the comfort and accommodation of air
travelers. ...
* * *

| In operating an airport ..., such munici-
pality may, ... enter into contracts, ... and
; other arrangements for a term not exceeding
: forty (40) years with any persons:

(1) granting the privilege of using ... such
airport :.., or space therein for commercial
purposes;

(2) conferring the privilege of supplying

.., services ... at such airport....

(3) making available services to be fur-
nished by the municipality ... at such air-
port. ...

In each case the municipality may establish
the terms and conditions and fix the charges,

. or fees for the privileges or services,
which shall be reasonable and uniform for the
; same class of privilege or service and shall
be established with due regard to the prop-
: erty and improvements used and the ex-
penses of operation to the municipality.

The Texas Home Rule Statute included the follow-
ing provisions prior to the 1983 amendment referred
to by petitioners:
... (home rule cities) shall have full power
: of local self-government, and among the other

UAW howinten lids Gledhdtrci ese “ds Routan

14

powers that may be exercised by any such
city the following are hereby enumerated for
greater certainty:

To hold ... any character of property,. .. .

To prohibit the use of any street, ..., or
grounds of the city by any ... character of
public utility without first obtaining the con-
sent of the governing authorities expressed
by ordinance and upon paying such compen-
sation as may be prescribed and upon such
condition as may be provided by any such
ordinance. To determine, fix and regulate the
charges, fares or rates of any person, firm
or corporation enjoying or that may enjoy the
franchise or exercising any other public priv-
ilege in said city and to prescribe the kind
of service to be furnished by such person,
firm or corporation, and the manner in which
it shall be rendered. ...

** *

To license, operate and control the oper-
ation of all character of vehicles using the
public streets, including ..., automobiles... .

To regulate, license and fix the charges or
fares made by any person owning, operating
or controlling any vehicle of any character
used for the carrying of passengers for hire
. on the public streets and alleys of the

city.

15

To license any lawful business, occupation
or calling that is susceptible to the control
of the police power.

During the 1983 legislative year, the Texas legis-
lature passed House Bill 593. In the portion of House
Bill 593 which dealt with the Texas Railroad Com-
mission’s authcrity over motor bus companies, the
legislature provided that the Railroad Commission
would continue to exercise authority over taxicab
companies providing service from the Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Airport. That bill provides in part as
follows:

AN ACT

Relating to the administration, power, du-
ties, and continuation of the Railroad Com-
mission of Texas, including the regulation of
transportation. .. .

Section 14. Subsection (c), Section 1, Chap-
ter 270, Acts of the 40th Legislature, Reg-
ular Session, 1927 (Article 9lla, Vernon’s
Texas Civil Statutes), is amended to read as
follows:

(c) the term ‘Motor Bus Company’”’ when
used in this Act means every corporation, or
persons as herein defined, their lessees,
trustees, receivers or trustees appointed by
any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,
operating or managing any motor propelled
passenger vehicle not usually operated on or
over rails, and engaged in the business of

16

transporting persons for compensation or hire
over the public highways within the State of
Texas, whether operating over fixed routes
or fixed schedules, or otherwise. However,
the term “Motor Bus Company” as used in
this Act shall not include: ...

(3) corporations or persons, their lessees,
trustees, or receivers, or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, insofar as they own,
control, operate, or manage motor propelled
taxicabs designed for carrying no more than
five passengers; permits, licenses, or certif-
icates issued prior to June 1, 1983, would
not be affected by the provisions of this ex-
clusion. Such taxicabs are motor buses only
when they operate to or from an airport es-
tablished pursuant to Chapter 114, Acts of the
50th Legislature, 1947, as amended (Article
46d-1 et seq., Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes).
[Emphasis supplied.] ,

This amendment clearly affirmed the jurisdiction of
the Texas Railroad Commission over taxicab service
at the Regional Airport.

In the same 1983 legislative session, the legislature
also passed Senate Bill 960, which provides in per-
tinent part:

SECTION 2. Subsection (d) Section 14,
Municipal Airports Act (Article 46d-14, Ver-
non’s Texas Civil Statutes), is amended by
adding Subdivisions (6) and (7) to read as
follows: ‘(6) Taxicab Licensing. Notwith-
standing any contrary provisions in H.B. 593,
Acts of the 68th Legislature, Regular Ses-

17

sion, 1983, a joint airport board established
pursuant to Chapter 114, Acts of the 50th
Legislature, Regular Session, 1947, as
amended (Article 46d-14, Vernon’s Texas
Civil Statutes), shall have power to license
taxicabs picking up passengers at or deliv-
ering passengers to the airport.

(7) Regulations. Any resolutions, rules, reg-
ulations, or orders of the joint board dealing
with subjects authorized by Subdivision (6) of
this subsection become effective only upon
approval of the governing bodies of the con-
stituent public agencies. Upon the approval,
the resolutions, rules, regulations, or orders
of the joint board have the same force and
effect in the territories or jurisdictions in-
volved as the ordinances, resolutions, or or-
der of each public agency would have in its
| own territory or jurisdiction.

This language expressly authorized the use of a li-
cense system by a Regional Airport Board in addition
to the contractual system which continued to be au-
thorized.

Subsequent to the passage of House Bill 593 and
. Senate Bill 960, the 1983 legislature passed Senate
Bill 28. That act amended House Bill 593, and pro-
. vides in pertinent part as follows:

AN ACT

Relating to the regulation of taxicabs serv-
ing airports

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLA-
TURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:

18

SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section 1,
Chapter 270, Acts of the 40th Legislature,
Regular Session, 1927 (Article 9lla, Ver-
non’s Texas Civil Statutes), as amended by
H.B. 598, Acts of the 68th Legislature, Reg-
ular Session, 1983, is amended to read as
follows:

“(c) The term ‘Motor Bus Company’ when
used in this Act means every corporation or
persons as herein defined, their lessees,
trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by
any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,
operating or managing any motor propelled
passenger vehicle not usually operated on or
over rails, and engaged in the business of
transporting persons for compensation or hire
over the public highways within the State of
Texas, whether operating: over fixed routes
or fixed schedules, or otherwise. However,
the term ‘Motor Bus Company’ as used in
this Act shall not include: ...

(3) corporations or persons, their lessees,
trustees, or receivers, or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, insofar as they own,
control, operate, or manage motor propelled
taxicabs designed for carrying no more than
five passengers; permits, licenses, or certif-
icates issued prior to June 1, 1983, would
not be affected by the provisions of this ex-
clusion. Such taxicabs are motor buses only
when they operate to or from an airport es-
tablished pursuant to Section 14, Chapter 114,
Acts to the 50th Legislature, 1947, as amended

19

(Article 46d-14 Vernon’s Texas Civil Stat-
utes).”” [Emphasis supplied. ]

This legislation also made it clear that the Texas Rail-

road Commission retained its jurisdiction over motor

bus companies or taxicabs servicing a jointly-owned

municipal airport such as the Regional Airport in
question.

The Texas Railroad Commission then promulgated
a rule, 16 Texas Administrative Code § 5.248, which
had the effect of administratively deregulating the
Regional Airport from Texas Railroad Commission
regulation. This occurred during the final months of
Surtran Taxicab, Inc.’s second five-year contract.
When this rule was passed, Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.
and Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc. brought a declaratory
judgment against the Texas Railroad Commission,
Dallas, Fort Worth, and the Regional Airport Board.
A judgment was entered in the state district court
suit which considered and interpreted the statutes be-
fore the 1983 amendments, after the 1983 amend-
ments, and the rule which had been adopted by the
Texas Railroad Commission:

x * *

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that this is an appropriate action for a dec-
laratory judgment pursuant to Art. 6252-
13(a), V.T.C.A. and Art. 224-1 V.T.C.A., and
for injunction.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECHEED that the amended regula-
tions approved by the Dallas/Fort Worth Re-
gional Airport Board on or about December
16, 1988, and thereafter approved by the City

20

of Dallas and the City of Fort Worth, which
became effective January 1, 1984, are au-
thorized by the Municipal Airport Act Art.
46d-14, V.T.C.S. and said amended regula-
tions are lawful except for Sec. 8-5(b) and
are not inconsistent with the Motor Bus Act,
Art. 91la, V.T.C.S.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the recent Rule
adopted by the Railroad Commission of
Texas, 16 Texas Administrative Code Sec.
5.248(b\2\c\Xi), is inconsistent with the Motor
Bus Act Art. 91la, V.T.C.S. and the portion
of said aforementioned Rule which provides
that taxicab service within the licensing ju-
risdiction of the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport Board may be performed without a
certificate issued by the Railroad Commission
of Texas is invalid.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the Railroad Commis-
sion of Texas does not have authority to al-
low taxicabs to operate from the Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Airport to the ten county
area around said airport without a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity and
compliance with of ier provisions of the Mo-
tor Bus Act.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that no taxicab company
or taxicab driver may provide service from
the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport to

21

the ten county area around said airport un-
less they do so pursuant to both a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity from the
Railroad Commission of Texas and authority
from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport
Board, and all taxicab companies and taxicab
drivers must comply with the provisions of
the Motor Bus Act, 911 V.T.C.S. and Dallas/
Fort Worth Regional Airport Board’s
amended regulations which became effective
January 1, 1984, before they may transport
passengers by taxicab from the Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Airport to the ten county
area around the Airport.

The District concludes and it is AD-
JUDGED that the Railroad Commission of
Texas has the duty to regulate taxicab ser-
vice from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regidnal
Airport to the ten county area around the
Airport.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that Terminal Cab Com-
pany, Inc. is enjoined from providing taxi
service from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport without a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity from the Railroad
Commission of Texas.

*-*

This judgment confirmed concurrent jurisdiction at
the Regional Airport of both the Regional Airport
Board and the Texas Railroad Commission. The court
held that the Texas Railroad Commission was re-
quired by the Motor Bus Act, to regulate taxicab

22

service at the Regional Airport. This judgment was
appealed by the defendants and became moot while
on appeal in 1985 when the Texas legislature again
amended the Texas Motor Bus Act. This amendment
removed taxicabs from the definition of a motor bus
company. All taxicab companies now provide service
under a license system.

I. There Is No Case Or Controversy As. To The Private
Taxi Company Respondents Under Article III Of The
Constitution

Insofar as the private taxi company respondents are
concerned, the petition does not present a case or
controversy. Under Article III of the Constitution a
case or controversy is an indispensable prerequisite
to jurisdiction. As stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 20 L.Ed. 2d 947, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968):

The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined
and limited by Article III of the Constitution.
In terms relevant to the question for decision
in this case, the judicial power of federal
courts is constitutionally restricted to “‘cases”’
and “‘controversies.”’ As is so often the sit-
uation in constitutional adjudication, those
two words have an iceberg quality, contain-
ing beneath their surface simplicity sub-
merged complexities which go to the very
heart of our constitutional form of govern-
ment. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and
“controversies” are two complementary but
somewhat different limitations. In part those
words limit the business of federal courts to
questions presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable
of resolution through the judicial process.

23

The petitioners only ask the Court to grant
certiorari to review of one of two propositions, either
one of which the lower court found was sufficient to
preclude any relief as to the private taxi companies.
Regarding the private taxi companies, the lower court ~
noted that the issues were:

I. Should these consolidated actions be dis-
missed because the Defendants’ challenged
activities are immune from scrutiny under the
antitrust laws by virtue of the state action
exemption?

* * *

III. Should the Plaintiffs’ claims against
the private taxi company defendants be dis-
missed as barred under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine?

The lower court determined:

I. Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are DIS-
MISSED because the Defendants’ challenged
activities are immune from scrutiny under the
antitrust laws by virtue of the state action
exemption.

* * *

III. Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against the
private Defendants are DISMISSED as
barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The petition before this Court does not request
certiorari to review the lower court’s determination
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was applicable as
a defense for the private taxi companies. Even if the
Court should, and it should not because such holding

24

was correct, reverse the lower court’s holding that
the state action exemption applied, the unchallenged
holding that the Noerr-Pennington defense also ap-
plied would still result in a dismissal of the petitioner’s
claims as to the private taxi companies. It is also
significant that the test under the state action ex-
emption for a private person is different from the
test for a governmental body. Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 105 S.Ct. 17138, (1985)
and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S.Ct. 721, (1985).

Whether there is a case or controversy is deter-
mined at the time the issue is considered. Golden v.
Zuickler, 394 U.S. 108, 22 L.Ed. 2d 1138, 89 S.Ct.
956 (1969). As of the time this petition is presented,
there is no case or controversy as to the private taxi
companies. First, if a favorable resolution of the ques-
tion petitioners seek to present as to these
respondents will not give the petitioners relief, the
minimum standards of a case or controversy have not
been met. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L.Ed. 2d 450, 96 S.Ct.
1917 (1976); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 71 L.Ed.
2d 353, 102 S.Ct. 1181 (1982). Even if the petitioners’
question on the state action defense were answered
in their favor, the private taxi companies’ Noerr-Pen-
nington antitrust immunity remains intact, barring
petitioners’ claim.

As this Court has stated, when any one of several
propositions would support the judgment rendered,
and one of the propositions is found sufficient, it is
unnecessary to consider the others:

The information consists of several counts,
to all of which exceptions are taken. The

25

Court however is of the opinion that the
Fourth Count is ,ood and this renders it un-
necessary to decide the others.

Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 3 L.Ed. 364. In
short, a federal court will not act on a question when
there is no case or controversy, O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974);
and there is none here.

A cause of action may present a case or controversy
as to some and not to other parties. Dismissal of the
parties in the action as to which there is no case or
controversy is proper. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35
L.Ed. 2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). Therefore, the
private taxicab companies must be dismissed since no
case or controversy exists as to them.

A second reason for denying the petition is moot-
ness. An issue is moot if no order of the Court could
properly affect the petitioner’s rights with respect to
the issue the Court is asked to review. Honig v. Stu-
dents of California School for the Blind, 471 U.S. —
, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. __(1985). The inability
of a Court to grant any effectual relief renders the
matter moot. Brownlowe v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216,
43 S.Ct. 263, 67 L.Ed. 620 (1923); Hettnuller v.
Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 65 L.Ed. 990, 41 S.Ct. 522
(1921); Pease v. Rathbren-Jones Engineering Co., 243
U.S. 278, 61 L.Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283 (1917); Tennessee
v. Condors, 189 U.S. 64, 47 L.Ed. 709, 23 S.Ct. 579
(1903); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 40 L.Ed. 293,
16 S.Ct. 132 (1985).

Because the private taxicab companies are immune
from antitrust liability on other valid grounds, the
state action defense question is moot as to them. This

26

Court has consistently held that it is its duty “to
decide actual controversies by a judgment which can
be carried into effect and not to give opinions on
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to decide
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’’ Mills v. Green,
supra; Local No. 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 4
L.Ed. 2d 378, 8 S.Ct. 391 (1960).

There must be a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy in order to assure the adverseness of
the litigation. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
31 L.Ed. 2d 636, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972); Valley Forge
College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 70 L.Ed.
2d 700, 102 S.Ct. 752 (1982); Linda R. S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 35 L.Ed. 2d 536, 93 S.Ct. 1146
(1973), Socialist Tabor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S.
583, 32 L.Ed. 2d 317, 92 S.Ct. 1716 (1972). In fact,
“A federal court is without power to decide moot
questions or to give advisory opinions which cannot
affect the rights of the litigants ir the case before
it.”” St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct.
910 87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943) (emphasis added); DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 40 L.Ed. 2d 164, 94 S.Ct.
1704 (1974); Honig v. Students of Cal. School For
Blind, 471 U.S. __, 85 L.Ed. 2d 114, 105 S.Ct. _
(1985); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 24 L.Ed. 2d 214,
90 S.Ct. 200 (1969).

Here, the Courts’ opinion on whether the state ac-
tion exemption was properly applied to the private
respondents cannot affect the petitioners’ rights at
all. When a question becomes moot it is no longer
sufficient as a case or controversy. Lane v. Williams,
455 U.S. 624, 71 L.Ed. 2d 508, 102 S.Ct. 1322 (1982);
Natural Milk Producers Association of California v.

27

City and County of San Francisco, 317 U.!5. 423, 63
S.Ct. 359, 87 L.Ed. 375 (1943); Kremens v. Bartley,
431 U.S. 119, 52 L.Ed. 2d 184, 97 S.Ct. 1709 (1977);
Amalgated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board, 340 U.S. 416, 95 L.Ed. 389, 71 S.Ct.
373 (1951); United States v. Alaska Steamship Com-
pany, 253 U.S. 118, 64 L.Ed. 808, 40 S.Ct. 448 (1920).
A request for an advisory opinion or for an answer
to hypothetical question does not present a case or
controversy. Princeton University v. Schnid, 455 U.S.
100, 70 L.Ed. 855, 102 S.Ct. 867 (1982); Alabama
State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
89 L.Ed. 1725 65 S.Ct. 1384 (1945); Gilligan v. Mor-
gan, 418 U.S. 1, 37 L.Ed. 2d 407, 98 S.Ct. 2440
(1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 2d 154,
92 S.Ct. 2318 (1972); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 38 L.Ed. 2d 674, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974). Because
there was a basis for denying liability on the part of
the private taxi company defendants which is not at
issue, any decision on the state action defense by this
Court would be merely advisory.

This Court does not decide issues ‘‘unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.’ United States
v. International Union, 352 U.S. 567, 1 L.Ed. 2d 568,
77 S.Ct. 529 (1957). There is no such necessity here.
Because the Supreme Court “‘has frequently repeated
that federal courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them,”’ North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
244, 30 L.Ed. 2d 413, 92 S.Ct. 402 (1971), the petition
does not present a case or controversy.

28

II. Because State Regulation Which Established “‘A
Clearly Articulated And Affirmatively Expressed
State Policy’’ Showing ‘“‘The Legislature Contem-
plated The Acts Complained Of’’ Without The Sub-
sequent Amendment Which Validated And Confirmed
The Contracts Complained Of, The Petition Presents
Nothing Of Importance

There are not special and important reasons for
granting a writ of certiorari here. This case does not
present a situation where the decision of the Court
of Appeals is in conflict with another Court of Appeals
on the same matter, and a federal question has not
been decided by the Court of Appeals in a way that
is in conflict with applicable decisions of this court.
Sup. Ct. R. 17. For these reasons alone, the
Petitioners’ Writ should be denied.

The Petitioners’ argument that a writ of certiorari
should be issued is based on the lower Court’s ref-
erence to language in a 1983 amendment to the Texas
Municipal Airport Act. According to Petitioners, this
reference indicated that the lower court had applied
a retroactive rather than prospective test. The
Petitioners attempted to use the same amendment in
the trial court to argue that during the period before
the 1983 Amendment, a “‘regulatory void’’ had existed
in which no governmental entity had any authority
to regulate taxi service at the airport. The argument
was rejected on the basis that ‘‘[t]he opposite is true,”’
and the lower Court held that “[tJhis clarifying leg-
islation does not suggest that no power to regulate
existed before its enactment.” Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, 801 F.2d 159, —_(5th Cir. 1986).

There was direct regulation of taxicab service at
the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport, by the State

29

of Texas, both before and after the 1983 amendments
referred to by petitioners. A review of the applicable
acts set forth in the Statement Of The Case estab-
lishes that extensive state regulation existed through-
out the period in which the respondent taxicab
companies served the Regional Airport.

The Texas Municipal Airport Act gave cities which
jointly owned an airport outside their limits the same
authority to regulate taxicabs at such airport as they
had to regulate taxicabs in their city limits. The Re-
gional Airport Board therefore had extensive author-
ity to regulate taxicabs at the Regional Airport. The
provisions of the Texas Motor Bus Act gave the Texas
Railroad Commission extensive regulatory authority
over taxicabs or vehicles for hire which operated on
state highways from the Regional Airport. This reg-
ulation determined who could serve, the terms of this
service, and the rates charged. All these regulations
were enforced by a criminal penalty for a violation.

The conclusion by petitioners that a retroactive test
was utilized is based on a misconstruction of what
the lower court held and a disregard for what the
record reflects regarding applicable legislation. There
is no language in the opinion of the lower court which
states that a retroactive rather than prospective test
may be applied in any antitrust analysis. The refer-
ence to the subsequent amendment was viewed as
nothing more than confirmation that “the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of.’’ The
fact that the lower court expressly referred to the
amendment as “clarifying legislation’’ establishes that
this was not something new. In fact, the lower court
stated that the amendment relied upon by petitioner

30

“does not suggest that no power to regulate existed
before its enactment.”

At best the dispute turns on a factual analysis of
whether there was or was not sufficient statutory
regulation before the amendment referred to, and this
dispute is not sufficient for certiorari. United States
v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 45 S.Ct. 496, 69 L.Ed. 925
(1925); Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 714 104 S.Ct. 1318,
79 L.Ed. 2d 714 (1984). This case is identical to Jn-
dependent Taxicab Drivers’ Employees v. Greater
Houston Transportation Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, __ U.S. —_ (1985), in- all important re-
spects, and the denial of certiorari in that case in-
dicates certiorari should be denied in this case.

CONCLUSION

As to the private taxi company respondents, there
is no justifiable controversy. In the unlikely event that
all the points petitioners raised were resolved in
petitioners’ favor, petitioners would still not be en-
titled to relief as to the private taxi company
respondents. The lower court’s opinion is correct. It
follows the decisions of other circuit courts as well
as this Court’s decisions. The petition ignores appli-.
cable state statutes and misconstrues the lower court’s
decision in an attempt to interject some question of
importance in this matter when none exists. The
petition should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

STAN MCMuRRY

RAIN HARRELL EMERY YOUNG & DOKE
4200 RepublicBank Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 754-9484

Attorneys for Respondents

SURTRAN TAXICABS, INC.,

YELLOW CAB OF DALLAS, INC. AND
FORT WoRTH CAB & BAGGAGE Co., INC.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2558%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.