# Appendix — Hobson v. Connecticut

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 480 U.S. 917

## Text

gue io
86 = 78. | +e:
IN THE | NOV 22 1986
SUPREME COURT OF THE unrrbo SER ES |

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

NO.

GLADYS HOBSON,
Petitioner

V.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

JOHN R. WILLIAMS,
SUE L. WISE

WILLIAMS AND WISE
265 Church Street
New Haven, CT 06510

Counsel for Petitioner

November 20, 1986

ee ee:

(i)
APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A (Connecticut Appellate
Court Decision)....... la-32a

APPENDIX B- (Judgment of Superior
[trial] Court) ...se2s. 1b—5Sb

APPENDIX C (Order Denying Petition
for Certification to
Appeal to the Connec-
ticut Supreme Court).. lc-2c

APPENDIX D (Defendant's Motion
to Suppress Physical
ES. 4 6 ss ae ka we es ld-3d

t ie seaers oe ee eo

la
APPENDIX A
ae ae ee A Oe eee ae ee

June Term, 1986

STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. GLADYS HOBSON
HULL, SPALLONE and BEILUCH, Js.

Argued February 14, 1986-decision released
June 24, 1986

Substitute information charging the
defendant with the crime of larceny in the
third degree, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New
Haven and tried to the jury before Quinn,
J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from
which the defendant appealed to this
court. No error.

John R. Williams, for the appellant
(defendant).

Paul M. Scimonelli, assistant state's

2a
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were
Arnold Markle, state's attorney, and Julia
DiCocco Dewey and Paul J. Devlin,
assistant state's attorneys, for the
appellee (state).

HULL, J. After a trial to a jury, the
defendant was convicted of larceny in the
third degree violation of General Statutes
§53a-119(8) and §53a-124./ In this appeal

from that judgment, she claims that the

ij

“General Statutes §53a-119(8) provides
in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of
larceny by receiving stolen property if he
receives, retains, or disposes of stolen
property knowing that it has probably been
stolen or believing that it has probably
been stolen, unless the property is
received, retained or disposed of with
purpose to restore it to the owner."

General Statutes §53a-124(a) provides
in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of
larceny in the third degree when he
commits larceny as defined in section
53a-119 and: (1) The value of the property
Or service exceeds one thousand dollars."

3a
trial court erred in three respects: (1)
in refusing to suppress the fruits of two
searches of her home; (2) in failing to
declare a mistrial because of alleged jury
misconduct; and (3) in denying her motion
for judgment of acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence. We find no
error.

When ruling on the defendant's motion
to suppress, the trial court could
reasonably have found the following vice.
In September of 1982, officer John Dattilo
of the New Haven police department
obtained a warrant authorizing a search of
the defendant's Hazel Street home for
drugs which Dattilo believed were being

sold by one of the defendant's adult sons

4a
who lived with her.* While executing that
warrant, Dattilo observed many articles of
clothing of differing sizes, some with
store tags still attached, various kinds
of consumer goods, including stereo
equipment, five television sets, cameras,
projectors and numerous pieces of jewelry.
Because of the quantity and diversity of
goods, Dattilo suspected that some of the
merchandise was stolen. He therefore
recorded the serial numbers of several of
the items and through a later computer
check determined that two of them, a Sony
television set and handgun, had been
reported stolen. Based on this
information, Dattilo obtained a second

warrant authorizing him to search the

*is a result of the search, narcotics
and paraphernalia were discovered.

5a
defendant's home and person and to seize
the television and the gun.

On October 7, 1982, accompanied by
other officers including Francis Cacioli,
the detective in the New Haven police
department who was in charge of the theft
recovery unit, Dattilo entered the
defendant's house to execute the warrant.
In addition to seizing the two items
listed in the search warrant, the officers
took approximately 148 other articles they
reasonably believed might be stolen. In
an attempt to determine whether any of the
additional items was in fact stolen, the
police put them on display at headquarters
and invited members of the public to view
them. Several individuals identified

items as their property, and the defendant

6a

was charged with larceny of those items
and of the television set and the gun. At
trial, the defendant moved to suppress the
television set, the gun and the other
objects, claiming that both searches were
invalid and that the items seized were,
therefore, the inadmissible fruits of an
illegal search. The trial court denied.
the motion.

The defendant's first claim on appeal
is that the police, by looking for the
serial numbers on the television set and
the gun, conducted a search of those

items.° She argues that this search was

. =

“The defendant does not challenge the
search of her home, nor could she since
the first warrant authorized the police to
search the entire home for narcotics and
paraphernalia. Rather, it is the "search"
of the gun and the television which the
defendant claims was unlawful on the first
visit.

7a

unlawful because the warrant under which
the police entered her home authorized
them to search only for drugs and drug
paraphernalia, an undertaking which one of
the police officers who conducted the
search conceded would not be aided by
looking for the serial numbers.

To challenge the legality of a search,
a defendant must first show that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area searched. State v. Daay, 5 Conn.
App. 496, 498, 500 A.2d 248 (1985). The
defendant here made no such showing as to
the gun or the television set. She did
not claim at the suppression hearing’

either that she owned or that she pos-

A

“While there was no testimony at the
suppression hearing concerning the
defendant's interest in the television, at
trial the defendant claimed to own the
television set. We note that even had the

8a

sessed the television set and the gun
"although [s]he could have doe so without

running the risk of having that testimony

defendant made the requisite showing that
she had an expectation of privacy in the
television set and the gun, she would not
have prevailed. The basis of the
defendant's claim as to the gun is that
the police moved the television set from
the wall to record its serial number and
by so doing searched it. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that
"when a police officer comes upon evidence
in open view, that discovery is not a
search at all." (Footnote »mitted.) State
v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 56, 425 A.2d
916 (1979). Here, the police officers saw
the television set in open view in the
defendant's bedroom while they were
executing a valid search warrant.
Accordingly, their discovery of the
television did not constitute a search.
Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the
officer did not conduct a search of the
television merely by moving it away from
the wall. The defendant's claim as to the
gun is similar: that the police searched
the gun by looking for its serial number.
There was, however, no testimony at the
suppression hearing as to where the serial
number on the gun was located.
Accordingly, there was no basis for the
trial court to determine whether or not
the items had been searched by the police.

9a

used to prove [her] guilt of the [larceny]
charge. Simmons v. United States, 390
0.8.. 377,. 394, @8 8.Ct. 967, 19 b. Ba. 26
1247 (1968)."> State v. Haynes, 7 Conn.
App. 550, 553, A.2d (1968).
Accordingly, she has not shown that she is
entitled to challenge any "search" of the
television set or of the gun, and we,
therefore, reject her claim that the trial
court erred in refusing to suppress the

gun and the television.°

i~<4

“The trial court did not base its
ruling on the defendant's motion to
suppress on a finding that the defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the gun and the television. We
are free, however, to sustain the trial
court's decision on grounds different from
those it adopted. Johnny Cake, Inc. v.
Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296,
301,,429 A.2d 883 (1980).
The defendant also claims that the
police "searched" other items by looking
for their serial numbers, and thereby
unlawfully exceeded the scope of the
warrant. She has not, however, provided

10a
The defendant next claims that by

seizing 148 items in addition to the two
authorized by the warrant, the police,
during their second search of her home,
conducted a general search in violation of
the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution and article 1, §7 of the
Connecticut constitution. The state con-
tends that the seizure of these items was
lawful under the plain view doctrine.

"""(W)here a police officer has a
warrant to search a given area for

specified objects, and in the course of

an adequate record for the court to
determine the merits of this claim. While
there was testimony at the suppression
hearing that the police copied down serial
numbers from many items, there was no
testimony as to where the serial numbers
were located. Accordingly, we cannot
determine whether any search of those
items occurred, and cannot, therefore,
determine the merits of the defendant's
claim.

lla
the search comes across some other article
of incriminating character, the property
is seizable under the plain view
doctrine." United States v. Pacelli, 470
Pian 67, 70 {2G Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
Spe wees ees, 9S S.Ct. 1501, 36 L. Ed. 2d
178 (1973), citing Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. e643, 465, 514-16, 91
ee Meee. «ae te, EG. 24564 (1971).'
United States v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269,
274 (2d Cir. 1975).”" State v. Pepe, 176
Comms 7a, *9, £05 A.20 51 (1978). The
plain view doctrine may be invoked to
validate the seizure of contraband or
stolen goods not mentioned in a warrant

7 ee
where two requirements are satisfied:

=

‘There has been extensive dispute in
the United States Supreme Court; see Texas
w= meee Gee Us. 730, 103 &.Ct. 1535, 75
L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29

l2a
(1) the initial intrusion which enabled
the police to view the items was lawful;
and (2) the police had probable cause to
believe that the times were contraband or
stolen goods.® Ga, #3

Here, the first precondition for

application of the plain view doctrine was

fulfilled. The police had a legitimate

prior justification for being in a posi-

L. Ed. 2g 564 (1971); over whether a third
reguirement, that the police discover the
items inadvertently, snould be applied.
While this area has not been definitively
resolved, it is clear that in Connecticut
"inadvertence is not required if the items
seized fall under the category of
contraband, stolen property or objects
dangerous in themselves." State v.
Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 547, 482 A.2d 300,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. » i035 S.Ct.
967, .83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1984).

Where the seized object is evidence,
as opposed to contraband, the police must
have probable cause to believe that it was
"reasonably related, in an evidentiary
sense, to the commission of the crime."
State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 41, 425
A.2d 560 (1979).

l3a
tion to view the merchandise: they were
executing a valid warrant to search for
and seize the television set and the gun.
Whether or not the requirements for
applying the doctrine were met, therefore,
turns on whether there was probable cause
to believe that the seized items were
stolen. Probable cause to believe that
goods are stolen exists when there is
enough trustworthy information supporting
that proposition that a person of
reasonable caution would be justified in
believing it. See State v. Asherman, 193
Gonn. 695, 705, 478 A.2d 227, cert.
denied, 0.8. , 103 S. Ct. 1749, 84
L. Ed. 2d 814 (1984). "The quantum of
evidence necessary to establish probable
cause exceeds mere suspicion, but is

substantially less than that required for

l4a
conviction." State v. Acquin, 187 Conn.
647, 657, 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 &.Ct. 3570, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1411 (1983).

In addition to the television set and
the gun, the state introduced into
evidence several other items which were
seized during the second search of the
defendant's home: a pocket watch, a cameo
pin, a bracelet, an earring, some coins, a
creamer, a sugar bowl, a gravy ladle and
accompanying tray, and a ring. When the
police seized these items, they had
extensive information to support their
hypothesis that they were stolen. Before
the police went into the defendant's home
to execute the first warrant, they had
probable cause to believe that narcotics

were being sold from the home, and in fact

15a
when they entered the home on that
occasion, they found narcotics ad
narcotics paraphernalia. They knew, on
the basis of their training and
experience, that stolen clothing and
consumer goods are often accepted in lieu
of cash as payment for drugs, and they saw
large quantities of such items in the
defendant's home: stacks of designer jeans
in different sizes, a rack containing
articles of clothing that still had store
tags attached to them, stereos, cameras,
television sets and several pieces of
jewelry. When the police entered the home
to execute the second warrant, having the
information gained from the first search
in mind, they again found similar objects
present. They also discovered a couple of

trash bags full of silverware and similar

l6a
objects, some with initials or inscrip-
tions which did not refer to the defendant
or her sons. Also present was a case of
exerciser equipment, and a fur ccat with
initials that did not match those of any
of the occupants of th2 house.

"Our cases have made clear that
'{t]here is often a fine line between mere
suspicion and probable cause, and "[t]hat
line necessarily must be drawn by an act
of judgment formed in light of the
particular situation and with account

taken of all the circumstances." Brinegar
v. United States, [338 J.S. 160, 176, 69
S§.Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)].° State
v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 155-56, 384
A.2d 356, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98
$.Ct. 2237, S36 Lb. 8. 24 64604 (1976) .*

State v. Acquin, supra, 657. Here, the

17a
evidence available was sufficient to cross
this line and provide the police with
probable cause to believe that the
articles were stolen.

In light of these factors, we accept
the state's contention that the technical
requirements for invocation of the plain
view doctrine were satisfied. There is,
however, an additional limitation to
application of the doctrine: it may not be
used to permit a general or exploratory
search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.8. 443, 466, 91 &.Ct. 2022, 29 &. Ba. 26
564 (1971); State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn.
23, 40, 425 A.2d 560 (1979). The
application of the doctrine to validate
the seizure of some of the articles found
in the defendant's home would have such an

effect. Here, the second warrant was

18a
extremely precise, authorizing the seizure
of only two specified articles: the gun
and the television. In spite of this, and
even though they found the television and
the gun in the defendant's bedroom where
they knew the articles had previously been
located, the police searched several other
rooms of the house, including the attic.
As a result of the search of the attic,
the police discovered and seized the
creamer, sugar bowl, and the gravy ladle
and its tray. In searching for and
seizing these items, the police ignored
the limits of the warrant and thereby
conducted a general or exploratory search
in violation of the prohibition on
unreasonab searches and seizures in both
our state and federal constitutions.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in

19a
refusing to suppress these items.

The trial court correctly determined
that the items seized from the defendant's
bedroom should not be suppressed. The
police had a warrant authorizing them to
seize the television and the gun, and they
knew that the gun and television were
previously located in the defendant's
bedroom. The police, therefore, had
authority to enter the defendant's bedroom
and search that room to the extent
necessary to fina the gun and the
television. While lawfully present in the
defendant's room the police saw, in open
view on or around the defendant's dresser,
the pocket watch, pin, bracelet, earring,
coins and ring. They had, as discussed
above, probable cause to believe that

those items were stolen. Accordingly,

20a
under the plain view doctrine, the police
were entitled to seize those items. State
v. Pepe, supra, 79.

Having determined that the trial court
should have suppressed the gravy ladle,
tray, sugar bowl and creamer, we must
decide what remedy should be awarded to
the defendant. To prove the defendant
committed larceny in the third degree, the
state was required to show that he value
of the stolen items she received or
retained exceeded $1000. General Statutes
§53a-124. To establish the value of the
stolen items, the state elicited testimony
from Joseph Pari, an auctioneer and
appraiser. Pari testified that the market
value of the television set when stolen
was approximately $400. He estimated that

the combined value of the other items

2la
taken from the defendant's bedroom,
exclusive of the television and the gun,
was approximately $542.65. He testified
that the combined value of the four items
taken from the attic was approximately
$80. Stephen Prindle, the owner of a gun
store, testified that the market value of
the gun on October 7, 1982, was
approximately $100. Given this evidence,
the jury could reasonably have concluded
that the combined fair market value of the
items legally seized was over $1000 a
required to sustain a conviction under
General Statutes §53a-124. Had the court
properly suppressed the bowl, creamer,
ladle and tray, the jury would have been
allowed to consider the value of only the
television, gun, watch, pin, bracelet,

earring, coins and ring which the state's

22a

experts testified was approximately
$1042.65.” Accordingly, even had the
trial court properly suppressed the items
found in the attic, there would still have
been sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have found that the defendant
committed larceny in the third degree. we
conclude, therefore, that the trial
court's error-was harmless.

The defendant next claims that the
trial court erred in denying her motion

for mistrial based on alleged juror

misconduct. Before the close of evidence,

——While the defendant asserted that the
television and the gun_ should be
suppressed as the fruits of the unlawful
first search, she did not claim, nor could
she claim given the warrant, that the
seizure of the television and the gun was
unlawful independent of the first search.
Since we have rejected the defendant's
argument as to the first "search," we find
no basis for suppressing the television
and the gun now.

23a

while an argument was being made with the
jury absent, defense counsel claimed to
have heard someone in the adjoining jury
deliberation room shout that "It's a one
of a kind earring. She remembers what it
was, "19 After the incident occurred,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial, and
the court denied the motion and noted the
defendant's exception. The defendant now
claims that any premature juror
deliberation requires reversal if the
jurors did more than merely refresh their
memory of the evidence. We reject the

defendant's argument.

In State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419,

14

~ The comment apparently referred to
the testimony of one of the state's
witnesses in which she related that her
home had been burglarized and also
described some of the articles, including
an earring, which had been taken.

24a
429, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980), our Supreme
Court held that “it is error of
constitutional magnitude for the trial
judge expressly to instruct the jurors
that they may discuss the case among
themselves prior to its submission to them
- »« « « Accord State v. Castonguay, 194
Conn. 416, 434, 481 A.2d 56 (1984). In
this case, however, the trial court did
not expressly allow the jurors to
deliberate prematurely. In fact, it
affirmatively told them not to. Where a
trial court does not authorize the jury to
deliberate prematurely, a finding of error
is not automatic. In such circumstances,
"(t]he test is ‘whether or not the
misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to
the extent that he has not received a fair

trial.' United States v. Klee, [494 F.2d

2sa

Seecosee -ceun Car. 1974)].° State v.
McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 77, 444 A.2d 896
(1982). Here, there is no indication that
the fairness of the defendant's trial was
in any way affected by any premature
deliberation. "A trial court has a large
measure of discretion in dealing with a
motion for a mistrial; State v. Martinex,
7s comm. 342, 544, 378 A.2d 517 (1977);
and its decision as to the fairness of the
trial must be afforded great weight."
State v. McCall, supra, 77. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant's motion for
mistrial.

The defendant claims that the state
failed to prove two of the elements of the

crime of larceny beyond a reasonable

doubt: that the defendant possessed the

26a

stolen items, and that she possessed them
knowing that they were probably stolen.
"Appellate review of such a claim requires
us to undertake a two step analysis. 'We
first review the evidence presented at the
trial, construing it in the light most
favorable to sustaining the jury's
verdict. We then determine whether, upon
the facts thus established and the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the
jury could reasonably have concluded that
the cumulative effect of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.' State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574,
$76, 500 a.2d $39 (1985)." State v.
Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 352, 503 A.2d 566
(1986). Applying this standard, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to support the jury's verdict.

27a

The defendant first challenges the
sufficiency of the state's proof that she
possessed the stolen items. "In criminal
law, the word ‘'possession' generally
denotes ‘'"an intentional control of a
designated thing accompanied by knowledge
of its character." [Citation omitted.]'
State v. Harris, i159 Conn. $21, $31, 271
A.2d 74 (1970), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S.
1015, 91 8.Ct. $78, 27 tsa BA. 26 630
[1971]; see Webster, Third New
International Dictionary." State v. Kas,
171 Conn. 127, 130, 368 A.2d 196 (1976).
The evidence presented at trial, construed
in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict, showed that the defendant
owned and lived in the house from which

the items were seized. She admitted to

possessing, in fact she claimed to own,

28a
the television’ which was found in her
bedroom. As discussed above, the pocket
watch, pin, bracelet, earring, coins and
ring were also fund in the defendant's
bedroom, as was the gun. The objects were
on top of her dresser or in the dresser
area. The jury can hardly be deemed to
have engaged in speculation by concluding
that the defendant possessed items that
were found out in the open in her own
bedroom. +} The defendant was not merely

present in the home when the objects were

found; see id.; she owned the home and she

+ Be |

~~Generally, when faced with a claim
of insufficient evidence, we review the
evidence as presented at trial since if
the evidence as presented were
insufficient to support a guilty verdict,
then "the state would be barred by double
jeopardy principles from retrying the
defendant, and [she] would be entitled to
a judgment of acquittal rather than a new
trial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 98 §.Ct. 2141, 37 te wee ee eee”

29a
lived there. See State v. Chisolm, 165
Coon, @23, 84, 328 A.2€ 677 (1973)
(evidence that defendant possessed
narcotics found in locked bin in basement
insufficient where defendant did not live
on premises and where state did not show
that tenants of premises did not have
access to the bin).

The defendant's final claim is that
the state did not produce sufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she possessed the items knowing

they were probably stolen. We disagree.

State v. Grant, 6 Conn. App. 24, 32, 502
A.2d 945 (1986). Here, however, we do not
need to review the sufficiency of the
evidence as to the defendant's possession
of the items seized from the attic since
we have already determined that they
should have been suppressed and even
without those items there was sufficient
evidence that the value of the property
exceeded $1000.

30a
"To convict a defendant of the crime of
receiving stolen goods, it is necessary
for the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had actual knowledge that
the goods were stolen when he received
them. State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543,
546, 95 A.2d 695 [1953]; State v. Newman,
127 Conn. 398, 400, 17 A.2d 774 [1940].
Ordinarily, guilty knowledge can be
established only through an inference from
other proved facts and circumstances. The
inference may be drawn if the
circumstances are such that a reasonable
man of honest intentions, in the situation
of the defendant, would have concluded
that the property was stolen." State v.
Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d
581 (1961). Given the quantity,

diversity, and condition of the consumer

3la
goods, jewelry and clothing present in the
home, a reasonable man of honest
intentions would have concluded that the
items were stolen. The jury, therefore,
could infer that the defendant had the
requisite actual knowledge that the goods
were probably stolen. Additionally, we
note that possession of recently stolen
property "raises a permissible inference
of criminal connection with the property,
and if no explanation is forthcoming, the
inference of criminal connection may be as
a principal in the theft, or as a receiver
under the receiving statute, depending
upon the other facts and circumstances
which may be proven." State v. Palkimas,
153 Conn. $55, 559, 229 A.2@ 220 (1966).

The trial court did not err in denying the

32a
defendant's motion for judgment of aquit-

tal.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges

concurred.

lb
APPENDIX B
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
NO. CR6-211459 SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
Vs. NEW HAVEN
GLADYS HOBSON DECEMBER 2, 1983
Present, Hon. Francis R. Quinn, Judge.
JUDGMENT.

The information of an Assistant
State's Attorney, within and for the
Judicial District of New Haven, charging
Gladys Hobson with the crimes of Larceny,
2nd Degree by possession and Larceny, 3rd
Degree by possession, and Theft of a
firearm, and a substituted information
charging said Gladys Hobson with the
crimes of Larceny, lst Degree, by
possession and Theft of firearm, as by

informations on file will appear, were

2b
filed in the Superior Court, Geographical
Area 6 in the September, 1982 criminal
term of said Court, and thence to October
15, 1982 when said action was transferred
to this Court, and thence to November 2,
1982 when the defendant filed a Motion for
appointment of Special Public Defender,
which the Court (Fishman, J.) on said date
granted and appointed Francis D'Urso
Special Public Defender, and when the
defendant appeared before this Court and
for pleas said Not Guilty to both counts
of said substituted information and
elected to be tried by a jury of 6, thence
to October 18, 1983 when the State
Attorney, with permission of the Court
filed a second substituted information
charging Larceny, 3rd Degree, and thence

to October 18, 1983 when the State

3b

Attorney, with permission of the Court
filed a second substituted information
charging Larceny, 3rd Degree, and thence
to October 20, 1983 when the Court (Quinn,
J.) granted in part and denied in part the
Motion of the defendant filed October 19,
1983 for discovery and inspection, and
thence to October 24, 1983 when the Court
(Quinn, J.) granted the Motion of the
defendant filed October 19, 1983 to
require notice of uncharged misconduct
evidence and granted the Motion of the
defendant filed October 19, 1983 in limine
to establish fair procedures for the
examination of witnesses and statements,
and on said October 24, 1983 the Court
(Quinn, J.) granted the Motion of the

defendant filed October 19, 1983 for

production at trial, and on said date the

4b
Court (Quinn, J.) denied the Motions of
the defendant filed October 19, 1983 to
dismiss and to suppress physical evidence,
and when the defendant filed a Motion in
limine- re: testimony concerning
narcotics, which the Court on said date
(Quinn, J.) granted, and thence to October
26, 1983 when the State filed a list of
stolen items to be offered at trial, and
thence to October 28, 1983 when the
defendant filed a Motion for judgment of
acquittal, and when all the evidence
having been submitted, said action was
committed to the jury who returned a
verdict of Guilty as charged to count one
of said second substituted information,
which verdict was accepted and ordered
recorded by the Court, and when the

defendant filed a Motion for new trial,

5b
and thence to the present time when the
parties appeared and were heard by the
Court on said Motions for acquittal and
for new trial, and when the Court denied
said Motions, and the defendant appeared
for sentence.

Whereupon it is adjudged that the
defendant be committed to the Commissioner
of Correction for a term of three years,
suspended after service of one year, and
placed on probation for three years.

By the Court

Chief Clerk.

le
APPENDIX C
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
NO. PSC-86-1020
State of Connecticut
Vv.

Gladys Hobson

ORDER OF PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION TO APPEAL

On consideration of the petition by
the defendant for certification to appeal
from the Appellate Court (8 Conn. App. 13)
it is hereby ordered that said petition

be, and the same hereby is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Assistant Clerk-Appellate

zc

Dated: September 24, 1986
9-24-86
Notice to:
Clerk, Superior Court, New Haven,
CR6-121459
Clerk, Appellate Court

Arnold Markle, S.A.

Robert Devlin, A.S.A.

Julia DiCocco Dewey, A.S.A.
Paul M. Scimonelli, S.D.A.S.A.
Williams & Wise

John R. Williams in support of petition.

mlv

ld
APPENDIX D
NO. CR6-211459
STATE OF CONNECTICUT : SUPERIOR COURT
VS. : J. D. OF NEW HAVEN
GLADYS HOBSON : OCTOBER 24, 1983

MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States
Constitution, the defendant moves that:

1. The Sony television set and Colt
handgun seized from her house on October
7, 1982, be suppressed on the ground that
the warrant authorizing the seizure of
these items was the fruit of an illegal
search and seizure conducted on the
premises on September 24, 1982.

2. All items not listed in the search
warrant dated October 6, 1982, and seized

on October 7, 1982, be suppressed on the

following grounds:

a. The seizure of these items was not
authorized under a search warrant;

b. The seizure of these items fell
within no exception to the warrant
requirement.

3. All testimony pertaining to these

items be suppressed.

THE DEFENDANT

BY
JOSEPH G. BRUCKMAN
Her Attorney

3d
ORDER
The foregoing motion having been
considered this 24th day of October, 1983,
it is hereby DENIED

ORDERED:

Service certified per Practice Book

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2425%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.