# Opposition Brief — City of Angoon v. Hodel

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 870

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S, .
= : FILED
No. 86-1627

JUN 19 1987

In the Supreme Court of the

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

City OF ANGOON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
VY.

DONALD HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor. Generai
F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
DAVID C. SHILTON
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Corps of Engineers’ grant of a permit
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
1344) for the construction of a breakwater in navigable
waters is a disposition of a property interest of the United
States that requires the preparation of a subsistence
evaluation under Section 810 of the Alaska National In-
terest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA), Pub.
L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2427.

2. Whether Section 503(d) of ANILCA (94 Stat.
2400), which prohibits the sale or harvesting of timber
within the Admiralty Island National Monument in
Alaska, applies to the privately owned land of respondent
Shee Atika, an Alaska Native Corporation.

3. Whether the court of appeals erred in directing the
entry of summary judgment for respondents on peti-
tioners’ claim under the National Environmental Policy
Act, based on a determination that there were no remain-
ing issues of material fact.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

’ Page
EE ES ee ee ee ee |
ee Sar gid Wee b wcevavechdesses |
ee are EL Ta ha Sos shes b Gases escesesss 2
i a Seah sh skeen os ke kes evegebeesececs 7
ek senor geese ceennrens 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIiES
Cases:
Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, No. 85-1239 (Mar.
ere 8, 9, 10, 12-13
Bettin v. Nelson, 744 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1984) ........... 16
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. _USPS, 648 F.2d 97 (2d

EOS Oe 16-17
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ..... 16
First Nat’l Bank vy. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253

ee ee SUL eS ca bk bees ses cccrecces 16
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949) ................ 17
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) ...... 8
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S.

ee eee beer hb xs ch cs esnsesves 17
Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d

772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984) . 16
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.

Es Tr 13
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593

ee 5 usc chek be wadavenees 17
National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 496 F.

Supp. 716 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.

Ne eg bie bo eb sic necvees 14
SEC v. Spence & Green, 612 F.2d 896 (Sth Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981) .................. 16
Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) .......... 17
Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134 (ist Cir. 1984) ........ 16
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978) ......... 9
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53

OU A &

IV

Cases — Continued: Page
United States v. Cherokee Nation, No. 85-1940 (Mar. 31,

Ne FS Uis oak ake aera uae ee een 11
United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945) .. 8
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222

SES neue athe sae Sad eee ee ek Lek ee kk eae ed 8
United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.

SS xa WeLcckecdled st wadesl ee aun Se mTt & 8
Upper Westfork River Watershed Ass’n v. Corps of Engi-

neers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. W.Va. 1976), aff'd, 556

F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010

Cs op bac s sh suis bo eee see eee ees. 14
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

RT Re ee rery ei Pun a 16
Viger v. Commercial Insurance Co., 707 F.2d 769 (3d

a ks ube ic ba Fick hic SEAS oR a ees 17
VISA Int'l Service v. Bankcard Holders, 784 F.2d 1472

Sg aw uk a eh ea Kee Rh ccae rea ek weae 16

Constitution, statutes and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) .........4.... 11
Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2(Property Clause) .............. 1]
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 16 U.S.C. 3101 ef
$eq.:
© 602, SO Bit. 2575 COG US. PAGE) . oe vee ees 8
§ 102(1), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(1)) ......... 8
§ 102(2), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(2)) ......... 8
§ 102(3), 94 Stat. 2375 (16 U.S.C. 3102(3)) ......... 10, 12
§ 103(c), 94 Stat. 2377 (16 U.S.C. 3103(c)) ......... 1]
Se ssp a's we Sew cee da Re aoe 13
Se ee ss ys va vs beans wee alew oS 2.4,
© Se es Us oie cv aliceevai ees 4, 6, 11, 12, 13
Se I os ki ba eke ena cad eeee eae’ pe
& $10, 96 iat. 2427 (16 U.S.C. 312)... wc, Vs

9, 10, 11, 12, 13

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601
gE TET TC Oe Ne PEE TP OTe Peer eT Sere
Po ea RS ome |,
re a, Os gio os ook ba ns eee a eee seas
ee ORE BE gl) re ee

V

Constitution, statutes and rules — Continued: Page
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m),
ck As the Court noted in Gambell, slip op. 14, the Submerged Lands
Act applies to Alaska by virtue of Section 6(m) of the Alaska
Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 343.

10

The decision in Gambell also supports this conclusion.
The Court there held that the grant of oil and gas leases on
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is not subject to Sec-
tion 810 of ANILCA because the OCS is not “in Alaska,”
as required by Section 102(3), 94 Stat. 2375, 16 U.S.C.
3102(3). Significantly, however, the Court also explained
that Congress could not have intended Section 810 to ap-
ply to the OCS for an additional reason (slip op. 19):

Section 810 places the duty to perform a subsistence
evaluation on “the head of the Federal agency having
primary jurisdiction over such lands.” Unlike onshore
lands, no federal agency has “primary jurisdiction”
over the OCS; agency jurisdiction turns on the par-
ticular activity at issue. See G. Coggins & C. Wilkin-
son, Federal Public Land and Resources Law 434
(1981).

As with the OCS, federal responsibility over waters in the
three-mile coastal zone is divided among various agencies:
navigation in coastal waters is subject to Coast Guard
regulation; fishery resources are regulated by the National
Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of Commerce
(and in some instances by the Fish and Wildlife Service of
the Department of the Interior); discharges of pollutants
are regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency;
and obstructions to navigable capacity must be approved
by the Corps of Engineers. None of these agencies has
“primary jurisdiction” over the coastal waters of Alaska.

Petitioners rely (Pet. 12) on the statement in Gambell
that “[t]he United States may not hold ‘title’ to the
submerged lands of the OCS, but we hesitate to conclude
that the United States does not have ‘title’ to any ‘interests
therein’ ” (slip op. 16 n.15). That passage, however, re-
ferred not to the navigational servitude, but to mineral in-
terests leased by the Untied States. The United States does
not have any mineral interests in the three-mile coastal
zone granted to the State by the Submerged Lands Act,

11
and no such interests would be implicated in any event by
the construction of the log-transfer facility for which Shee
Atika sought a permit under Section 404.

Nor does United States v. Cherokee Nation, No.
85-1940 (Mar. 31, 1987), suggest that the navigational ser-
vitude is a property interest for purposes of Section 810 of
ANILCA. As petitioners concede (Pet. 15), the Court in
Cherokee Nation found the source of the navigational ser-
vitude to be the Commerce Clause (see slip op. 4), not the
Property Clause. Petitioners therefore err in reading (Pet.
17) Cherokee Nation to hold that the navigational ser-
vitude is a property interest that could be conveyed to a
private party. Instead, the Court simply suggested that the
Cherokee Nation could have been (but was not) granted
“an exemption from the servitude,” through a “waiver of
sovereign authority” (slip op. 7). This language is fully
consistent with the character of the navigational servitude
as a regulatory power. ¥

2. The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners’
contention (Pet. 17-19) that Shee Atika’s private land on
Admiralty Island is governed by Section 503(d) of
ANILCA, which provides that “[w]ithin the Monuments,
the Secretary [of Agriculture] shall not permit the sale o[r]
harvesting of timber” (94 Stat. 2400). As the court of ap-
peals observed in Angoon I (749 F.2d at 1416), Section
503(b) defines the Admiralty Island National Monument
as consisting of “approximately 921,000 acres of public
lands” (emphasis added). Shee Atika’s lands are private,
not public, arid they therefore are not part of the National
Monument and are not subject to the prohibition against
timber harvesting “within the Monument{].” This inter-
pretation is supported by Section 103(c) of ANILCA, 94
Stat. 2377, 16 U.S.C. 3103(c), which states that “[o]nly
those lands within the boundaries of any conservation
system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined
in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of

12

such unit.” Furthermore, the legislative history makes
clear that “inclusion of these Native lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units is not intended to
* * * restrict use of such lands by the owning Corpora-
tions nor to subject the Native lands to regulations ap-
plicable to the public lands within the specific conserva-
tion system unit” (125 Cong. Rec. 9905 (1979) (remarks of
Rep. Udall) (quoted in Angoon I, 749 F.2d at 1417)). In-
deed, as the court of appeals observed (Pet. App.
A15-A16; Angoon I, 749 F.2d at 1418), application of the
timber-harvesting prohibition to Shee Atika’s land would
deprive that land of its only real economic use, and would
thereby frustrate Congress’s purpose of promoting
“economic growth” when it provided for and then ratified
the exchange of Shee Atika’s original ANSCA selection
for the tract at issue here. See page 3, supra.

Gambell does not support petitioners’ contention that
both public and private lands are subject to the timber-
harvesting prohibition in Section 503(d). In Gambell, the
Court concluded that the term “in Alaska,” as used in Sec-
tion 102(3) of ANILCA, does not include the OCS, which
by definition is outside Alaska. Slip op. 14. But the Court
did not suggest that Congress’s use of the phrase “in
Alaska” was intended to subject a// lands within the boun-
daries of the State, private as well as public, to the
subsistence-evaluation provisions of Section 810 of
ANILCA. To the contrary, the Court recognized (slip op.

+ Section 503(d) states that “the Secretary shall not permit” the sale
or harvesting of timber. This language does not impose a prohibition
directly on private parties with respect to their private affairs, but
rather imposes a duty on the Secretary with respect to matters under
his jurisdiction. As the court below recognized in Angoon I (749 F.2d
at 1416), the Secretary of Agriculture does not have jurisdiction to
manage private lands in general (see 16 U.S.C. 1609(a)) or the private
lands conveyed to a Native Corporation ir particular (see 43 U.S.C.
1621(i)).

13

13-14) that Section 810 applies only to “public lands” (94
Stat. 2399). Simiiarly, Section 503(a) of ANILCA defines
the Admiralty Island National Monument as consisting
only of “public lands.” The parallel reach of Section 810,
as construed in Gambell, therefore supports, rather than
undermines, the court of appeals’ interpretation of Section
503(d).5

3. Petitioners’ remaining contention (Pet. 19-25)—
that the court of appeals erred in directing entry of sum-
mary judgment for the respondents on the issue of the ade-
quacy of the EIS (Pet. App. A3)—likewise does not war-
rant review. Although the district court found the EIS
inadequate (and granted summary judgment for peti-
tioners) on the ground that the Corps had failed to con-
sider the alternative of exchanging Shee Atika’s current
holding for other land, the court of appeals reversed and
held that the Corps was not required to consider that alter-
native further. Petitioners expressly do not seek review on
that issue. See Pet. 7 n.4. Instead, petitioners object to the
court of appeals’ ruling insofar as it disposes of other
possible objections they might have had to the EIS. That
ruling, however, was entirely appropriate.

5 The decision below also does not conflict with Minnesota v.
Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1248 n.15 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982), cited by petitioners (Pet. 18-19). That case construed Sec-
tion 4 of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1650, which prohibits motorboats “within the
wilderness” created by the Act. The Eighth Circuit observed that this
prohibition must apply to waters under state jurisdiction in order for
the prohibition to have any meaning, “[iJnasmuch as all navigable
waters within the area fall under state jurisdiction.” 660 F.2d at 1248
n.15. The court also found that certain exemptions contained in Sec-
tion 4 of the Boundary Waters Act would make no sense unless all
waters within the area were covered by the prohibition (ibid.). These
considerations are not presented by Section 503(d) of ANILCA. To
the contrary, as noted above (see pages 11-12, supra), the language
and legislative history of ANILCA affirmatively demonstrate that
Shee Atika’s private holding was not intended to be subject to restric-
tions applicable to the Admiralty Island National Monument.

14

a. The court of appeals was presented with a con-
troversy that had been the subject of litigation for 12
years. That litigation had deprived Shee Atika of the com-
pensation Congress afforded it under ANSCA for the ex-
tinguishment of its aboriginal claims (Pet. App. A4),
despite Congress’s actions in 1980 and 1983 to ensure that
Shee Atika would realize the economic benefits of the very
tract at issue in this case. The court of appeals had
authority under 28 U.S.C: 2106 to direct the entry of a
judgment “as may be just under the circumstances.” In the
circumstances of this case, it clearly was “just” to resolve
the EIS adequacy issue in its entirety, rather than to re-
mand to the district court based on speculation that peti-
tioners might come up with new theories to attack the EIS,
and thereby further frustrate Shee Atika’s ability to make
economic use of its lands.

The 120-page EIS and all relevant parts of the ad-
ministrative record were before the court of appeals,
which reviewed the EIS and found it “technically
sophisticated and analytically rigorous” (Pet. App.
A8-A9).° Furthermore, petitioners had ample opportunity
to develop other challenges to the EIS, yet failed to do so.
A draft EIS concerning the log-transfer facility had been
distributed for public comment in March 1984, and after
public hearings, the final EIS was issued in October 1984
(E.R. 139, 293). Comments on the final EIS were accepted
until December 17, 1984 (E.R. 139). Petitioners filed their
consolidated complaint on April 29, 1985, more than four
months later (Pet. App. A6). That complaint alleged that

a EN AT mee tems ae

6 Jt has long been accepted practice to resolve EIS inadequacy
claims on summary judgment motions that attach the administrative
record. See, e.g., National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu,
496 F. Supp. 716, 737-738 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.
1980); Upper Westfork River Watershed Ass'n v. Corps of Engineers,
414 F. Supp. 908, 922 (N.D. W.Va. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 576 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).

SE, |

15

the Corps of Engineers issued an EIS on the log-transfer
facility “without studying the reasonable alternative of an
exchange of the Cube Cove lands for other timber lands
located off of Admiralty Island, and otherwise without
complying to the fullest extent possible with NEPA” (E.R.
14). But petitioners never specified in what respects the
EIS was “otherwise” defective under NEPA.

Both the federal defendants and Shee Atika moved for
summary judgment on petitioners’ entire NEPA claim. See
page 5, supra. Petitioners filed a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment on the NEPA claim insofar as it was based
on the exchange alternative, and they opposed respond-
ents’ motion for summary judgment on other aspects of
the NEPA claim. But in so doing, petitioners did not file
affidavits pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding
other possible defects in the EIS. The court of appeals
therefore did not have before it a record that either iden-
tified other specific defects in the EIS or demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact pertaining to
any such defect.

Counsel did file an affidavit in district court, pursuant
to Rule 56(f), stating that petitioners could not at that time
present facts essential to justify their opposition to peti-
tioner’s motion. Affidavit of Lewis F. Gordon, dated
6/18/85. Even then, however, counsel did not identify any
specific ground (other than the alleged failure to consider
the exchange alternative) on which their opposition to the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment might be
based. Counsel merely suggested in general terms that
there were disputed facts concerning the “environmental
and subsistence effect of the project” (id. at 3) and in-
dicated that petitioners would seek discovery of such facts.
Petitioners’ submission under Rule 56(f) was addressed to
the discretion of the court. See 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.24, at 56-1424 to 56-1425,

16

56-1437 to 56-1438 (2d ed. 1987); VISA Int’l Service v.
Bankcard Holders, 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986);
SEC v. Spence & Green, 612 F.2d 896, 901 (Sth Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981). For at least three
reasons, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion
by declining to accept counsel’s affidavit under Rule 56(f)
as a basis for still further proceedings and attendant delay.
First, when counsel executed the affidavit on June 18,
1985, petitioners already had had at least seven months
since the filing of the final EIS (and 14 months since the -
filing of the draft EIS) during which they could have
developed facts concerning other possible defects in the
EIS, through discovery or otherwise. Indeed, if petitioners
disagreed with the “methodology and data” in the EIS, as
they now vaguely claim (Pet. 21 n.20), they should have
raised that issue with the Corps of Engineers during the
comment period on the draft EIS. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-554
(1978). Second, petitioners have not initiated discovery
with respect to any other objections to the EIS since June
1985. Third, petitioners have not in any event identified a
specific legal question regarding the adequacy of the EIS
to which any facts that might be developed through
discovery would be material.

Against this background, it appears that the discovery
petitioners contemplate would be nothing more than a
fishing expedition, based on speculation that a basis for
some other objection to the EIS (and to the defendants’
motions for summary judgment) might surface. See First
Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 (1968);
Bettin v. Nelson, 744 F.2d 53, 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Taylor v.
Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (Ist Cir. 1984); Mid-South
Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 779-781
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120, 127-128 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. USPS, 648 F.2d 97,

17

106-107 (2d Cir. 1981). Petitioners might have preferred to
hold in reserve the possibility of mounting a different at-
tack on the EIS should their argument concerning the ex-
change alternative fail, so that they might further delay the
resolution of this case and the economic development of
Shee Atika’s land. But the court of appeals surely was not
required to countenance such a piecemeal attack on the
EIS.

b. Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 23-24),
this case is readily distinguishable from Fountain v.
Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949). There, the court of appeals
directed the entry of summary judgment “on a new issue as
to which the opposite party had no opportunity to present
a defense before the trial court” (id. at 683). Here, by con-
trast, the adequacy of the EIS as a whole was put in issue
by the respondents’ motions for summary judgment. Peti-
tioners could have defended against those motions by
developing their unspecified NEPA claims.

The decision below also is consistent with other cases in
which courts of appeals have found it appropriate to direct
the entry of summary judgment where the record disclosed
no genuine issue of material fact. See Viger v. Commercial
Insurance Co., 707 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir. 1983); Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593, 599-600 (7th
Cir. 1972); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.
1965); see also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra,
§ 56.27[1], at 56-1560; 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2716, at
660-662 (2d ed. 1983). Indeed, in Kern County Land Co.
v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 590-591 (1973), this
Court sanctioned the court of appeals’ direction of sum-
mary judgment for the appellant, despite the appellant’s
failure even to move for summary judgment in the district
court. 411 U.S. at 604 n.31; id. at 614 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). Petitioners conceded below that a court of appeals

18

has the power under 28 U.S.C. 2106 to direct the entry of
summary judgment in appropriate circumstances. See
Reh’g Pet. 6. They therefore merely argue that the court of
appeals should not have done so in the particular cir-
cumstances of this case. Moreover, as petitioners concede
(Pet. 22 n.21), the paragraph in the court of appeals’
opinion directing that summary judgment be entered for
respondents on the NEPA claim is not accompanied by
any discussion of the varrous issues petitioners discuss,
and it therefore is of little or no precedential value with
respect to them. Review by this Court therefore is par-
ticularly unwarranted.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT II
Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
DAVID C. SHILTON
Attorneys

JUNE 1987

S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986— 181-483/40394

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2089%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
