# Appendix — McCarthy v. Toussaint (Nos. 86-1587, 86-1588)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987

## Text

ig
Vr

Supreme Court, U.S.

2G ] ad 88 ea B&D

MAR 30 1987

EPH F. SPAWIOL, JR.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNE TED S BAERS

October Term, 1986

DANIEL J. McCARTHY, DANIEL VASQUEZ
and ROBERT BORG, Petitioners,

Ve

JOSEPH TOUSSAINT, et al., Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
Attorney General of the
State of California

STEVE WHITE
Chief Assistant
Attorney General

KENNETH C. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General

PAUL D. GIFFORD
Deputy Attorney General

6000 State Building

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 557-3299

Attocneys for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ninth Circuit Opinion filed
September 30, 1986

United States District Court
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed
October 18, 1984

Order of Reference filed
October 18, 1984

Judgment of Permanent Injunction
filed October 18, 1984

Ninth Circuit Order
Denying Rehearing
filed December 31, 1986
Statutes
ae U.8.C. § 2263
28 U.S.C. § 2254

42 U.S.C. § 1983

PAGE

267

277

300

301

303
309

FOR PUBLICATION

Filed
9-30-86

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH TOUSSAINT,

C.A. Nos. 84-2833

et al., 85-1507
85-1878
Plaintiffs/ 85-2526
Appellees/
Cross- D.C. No.
Appellants, CV 73-1422 SAW
vs. OPINION

DANIEL MCCARTHY,
et al.,

Defendants/
Appellants/
Cross-
Appellees.

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On Appeal From the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of California
Stanley A. Weigel
Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 13, 1985
San Francisco, California
Before: WRIGHT, KENNEDY and BEEZER,
Circuit Judges

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:

Both parties appeal from the district

court's order granting permanent injunctive

relief against California prison officials.

Although this appeal presents a variety of

Ka

discrete issues, the case presents this
general issue: Does the protection
afforded by the United States Constitution
require that San Quentin and Folsom prison
officials remain subject to controls
imposed by the district court or should
prison control be returned to California
prison officials? We conclude that, in
general, the district court assumed too
much control over the day to day affairs of
the prisons. Therefore, constitutional
restraints require modification of the
district court's decree.
I
BACKGROUND

This class action was commenced on
behalf of prisoners committed to
administrative segregation in four
California prisons: San Quentin, Folsom,
Devel Vocational Institute at Tracy, and
the Correctional Training Facility at
Soledad. The defendants are the Director
of the California Department of Corrections

Ze

and the wardens of the prisons involved.

We address orders pertaining to San Quentin
and Folsom.

The complaint was filed in 1973. In
the first phase of the proceedings, a
three-judge district court held that the
state's practice of removing prisoners from
the general population and placing them in
maximum security segregation units violated
the prisoners' fourteenth amendment right

to due process of law. See Wright v,

Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397 (N.D. Cal. 1976)

(hereinafter referred to as "Wright I").
In Wright I, the defendants were ordered to
employ a variety of procedures before
segregating prisoners for administrative
reasons. See id. at 404-05. The Supreme

Court summarily affirmed the district

court. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052

(1978).
In the next phase of the litigation,
the district court issued an unpublished

comprehensive preliminary injunction

Be

—iiieccne perce: |

governing the conditions of confinement in
the segregation units of the four prisons.
We reversed the district court and vacated
the injunction on the grounds that the
district court applied the incorrect legal
standard in assessing the plaintiffs'
eighth amendment claims. See Wright v.
Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981).

On remand, the district reevaluated
the conditions of confinement under the
standard prescribed by Wright v. Rushen and
issued “a detailed preliminary injunction
governing conditions of confinement and
procedures for placement and retention in
administrative segregation. See

Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F.Supp. 1365 (N.D.

Cal. 1983). Although we affirmed the
district court for the most part, we
vacated a portion of the order which was
not supported by the record. Toussaint v.
Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1984). We
also directed the district court to
reconsider its conclusions regarding the

4.

aan

continuing propriety of procedural

requirements in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hew v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460 (1983). See Toussaint v. Yockey,

722 F.2d at 1494 n.6.
In the present phase of this case, the
district court entered an injunction, which

we refer to as the Permanent Injunction,

governing conditions of confinement and
segregation procedures at San Quentin and

Folsom. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp.

1388 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The court appointed
a special master, known as the Monitor, to
assist in the implementation of the
Permanent Injunction and to advise the
court regarding the need for further
modifications of the Injunction. Id. at
1420-22. Pursuant to the order of
reference, the Monitor ordered the release
of a number of prisoners from
administrative segregation.

Defendants now challenge various

aspects of the Permanent Injunction and the

5.

aera ties

district court's affirmance of the
Monitor's order to release a number of
prisoners from administrative segregation.
Defendants urge us to vacate parts III,
IV(B), (C), and (D), and to modify Parts
II(6), (10), and (15) of the Permanent
Injunction. Defendants also complain about
the district court's affirmance of the
Monitor's decision to release prisoners
Altamirano, Mendoza, Ramos, Castro,
Gallegos, Hayes, Ferrel, Shryock, Pina,
Elmore and Barela.

Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district
court's refusal to extend the sweep of the
injunction to cover additional prison
conditions. Plaintiffs urge us to hold
that enforced idleness in administrative
segregation constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, that inmates legitimately
barred from the prison law library be
previded with adequate legal assistance,
that health care services provided at
Folsom do not meet minimum constitutional

6.

standards, and that denial of contact

visitation constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.

The opinions cited above offer
additional discussion of the facts. We
will discuss specific facts and arguments
in turn.

II
SCOPE OF FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th

Cir. 1982), amended, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983),

the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district
court's order of injunctive relief against
state prison officials. The Fifth Circuit
described the role of the federal courts as
follows:

There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country. When
the remedial powers of a federal
court are invoked to protect the
constitutional rights of inmates,
the court may not take a hands-
off approach.

The duty to protect inmates'
constitutional rights, however,

7.

does not confer the power to
manage prisons, for which courts
are ill-equipped, or the capacity
to second-guess prison
administrators. Federal courts
should not, in-the name of the
Constitution, become enmeshed in
the minutiae of prison
operations. Our task is limited
to enforcing constitutional
standards and does not embrace
Superintending prison
administration.

679 F.2d at 1126 (notes and quotations
omitted). The court also stated that

As a matter of respect for the
state's role and for the
allocation of functions in our
federal system, as well as comity
toward the state, the relief
ordered by federal courts must be
consistent with the policy of
minimum intrusion into the
affairs of state prison
administration that the Supreme
Court has articulated for the
federal courts. "[T)he
principles of federalism which
play such an important part in
governing the relationship
between federal courts and state
governments" are applicable
"where injunctive relief is
sought . . . against those in
charge of an executive branch of
an agency of state" government.
[Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 361],
380 (1976).] We should,
therefore, fashion the least
intrusive remedy that will still
be effective. In shaping that
remedy, we must also, as a matter
of judicial administration,

regard the essential nature of
federal courts in an adversary

system. Our remedial powers are

inherently judicial, not
administrative.

679 F.2d at 1145 (notes and quotations
omitted).

We agree with the Fifth Circuit's
description of the role of the federal
courts. Injunctive relief against a state
agency or official must be no broader than
necessary to remedy the constitutional

violation. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433

U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (remedy must be
related to condition alleged to offend the

constitution); Swann v. Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. l,

16 (1971) (task is to correct, by a
balancing of the interests, the condition
that offends the constitution; judicial
powers may be exercised only on the basis

of a constitutional violation); Hoptowit v.

Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 785 (9th Cir. 1985)
(judge must order correction of specific

violations and may require only that these

9.

corrections bring the conditions above

constitutional minima); Newman v. Alabama,

683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (5th Cir. 1982) (relief
must be no broader than necessary to remedy
the constitutional violation), cert.

denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)
(function of court is limited to
determining whether a constitutional
Violation has occurred and to fashioning a
remedy that does no more and no less than
correct that particular constitutional

violation); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d at

1144-46 (court must fashion the least
intrusive remedy that will still be
effective). A federal court may not enjoin
a state official to follow state law.

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-121 (1984).
"The federal courts do not sit to supervise
state prisons, the administration of which
is of acute interest to the States."

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976).

10.

In fashioning a remedy for

constitutional violations, a federal court
must order effective relief. Smith v.

Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir.

1980). Therefore, a federal court may
order relief that the Constitution would
not of its own force initially require if
such relief is necessary to remedy a
constitutional violation. See Worth

Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann,

402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte

Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. at

15-16. A defendant's history of
noncompliance with prior court orders is a
relevant factor in determining the
necessary scope of an effective remedy.

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978);

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1247; Ruiz v.

Estelle, 679 F.2d at 1155-56.
However, our goal is to cure only

constitutional violations. Swann v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

402 U.S. at 16; Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d
ll.

AL2Z9, 2133-34 (9ER Cis. L988). The

commission of a federal judge is not a
"general assignment to go about doing

good." Jett v. Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842,

845 (Sth Cir. 1978). Accordingly,
injunctive restraints that exceed
constitutional minima must be narrowly
tailored to prevent repetition of proved
constitutional violations, and must not
intrude unnecessarily on state functions.

Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d at 1156. See

generally Mishkin, Federal Courts at State

Reformers, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949

(1978).
III
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
We are guided by three standards of
review. We defer to the district court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer,

105 S.Ct. 1504, 1510-11 (1985); Fed. R.
Civi #0 6S. We review the district

court's legal conclusions de novo. In_ re

+ #

———

McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1984)

(en banc); United States v. McConney, 728

F.2d 1195, 120I (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 101 (1984). We review
the scope of injunctive relief for an abuse
of discretion. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.

at 687-88; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Board of Education, 402 U.S. at 15;

Hoptowi* v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1245-46.

The term, “abuse of discretion," is
often misunderstood and, perhaps, is an
unfortunate label. See Pearson v,
Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 n.6 (9th Cir.

1965); R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process

759 (1976). Yet, the legacy of hundreds of
cases renders "abuse of discretion" a term

of art. See Friendly, Indiscretion About

Discretion, 31 Emory L. J. 747, 762-63

(1982). We must recognize, however, that

the term is a "verbal coat of many colors."

Id. at 763 (quoting United States v. L. A.

Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952)

13.

*

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Judge
Friendly notes that

[tJ]here are half a dozen
different definitions of "abuse
of discretion," ranging from ones
that would require the appellate
court to come close to finding
that the trial court had taken
leave of its senses to others
which differ from the definition
of error by only the slightest
nuance, with numerous variations
between the extremes.

Friendly, supra, at 763.1/ MThe Third
Circuit has reasoned that

[iJn our judicial system, a wide
variety of decisions covering a
broad range of subject matters,
both procedural and substantive,
is left to the discretion of the
trial court. The justification
for committing decisions to the
discretion of the court are not

1. We have recognized implicitly that
the abuse of discretion standard varies
with the decision being reviewed. See,
e.qg., C-Y Development Co. v. City of
Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir.
1983); see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1985)
(the term, “abuse of discretion," is
capable of widely varying interpretations) ;
Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries,
749 F.2d 380, 390 (7th Cir. 1984) ("abuse
of discretion" describes a range of
standards); Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d
1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1984) ("abuse of
discretion" is variable standard).

14.

uniform, and may vary with the
specific type of decisions.
Although the standard of review
in such instances is generally
framed as "abuse of discretion,"
in fact the scope of review will
be directly related to the reason
why that category or type of
decision is committed to the
trial court's discretion in the
first instance.

United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817

(3d Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). We
agree with Criden. The extent of our
deference to the district court is
determined by several competing factors.
The remedy prescribed by the district
court is something more than a mere

permanent injunction2/ in which a United

2. The term, “structural injunction,"
refers to the course of litigation and the
series of orders that seek to "effectuate
the reorganization of an ongoing social
institution." QO. Fiss, The Civil Rights
Injunction 7 (1978). This form of
injunctive relief is also known as an
"institutional decree," an “administrative
injunction," see Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale
L. J. 635, 635 and n.l (1982), a “public
law remedy," see Hinkle, Appellate
Supervision of Remedies _ in Public Law
Adjudication, 4 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 411,

411-13 (1976); Chayes, The Role of the
iS.

States district court has enjoined state
administrative officials in order to force
a state agency to comply with
constitutional standards. Such an
injunction presents several relevant
considerations, some of which militate
towards great deference, and others which
demand close and exacting scrutiny.

In protracted, complex litigation, the
district court will acquire a close
familiarity with the facts, parties, and
nuances of the case, especially, as is the
Situation here, when the same judge has
presided throughout. See Hinkle, Appellate

Supervision of Remedies in Public Law

Adjudication, 4 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 411,

440 (1976).3/ The ability to hear

Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281, 1313 (1976), and as “complex
enforcement," see Note, Complex
Enforcement; Unconstitutional Prison
Conditions, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 626 n.l
(1981).

‘3. For instance, in the Arkansas
prison litigation, Chief Judge Henley of
the -Eastern District of Arkansas continued

16.

witnesses and directly view prison
conditions places the district court judge
in a superior position to consider
alternative forms of relief. A district
court's ability to fashion the most
effective remedy may be hampered by
unnecessary appellate interference.
However, the choice of remedy in
structural litigation also involves several
factors weighing in favor of close
appellate review. First, the very
familiarity that allows a district court to
design an effective remedy may lead to
excessive involvement and a breakdown of
institutional perspective. See Fiss, The

Social and Political Foundations of

Adjudication, 6 Law & Human Behav. 121, 126

to sit as a district judge by designation
even after his appointment to the Eighth
Circuit. See Finney v. Hutto, 410 F.Supp.
251 (B.D. ‘Agck. £376)3 Gs Figs. & ©.
Rendleman, Injunctions 528-752 (2d ed.
1984) (case study of Arkansas prison

litigation). See generally M. Harris & K.
Spiller, After Decision: Implementation of

Judicial Decrees inCorrectional Settings (1977).
or

(1982). The court of appeals, which enjoys

greater distance from the daily affairs of
the litigation, is in a better position to
assure detached neutrality. See Hinkle,
Supra, at 441.

Second, structural litigation
frequently involves a close association of
rights and remedies. See Note, Complex
Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison
Conditions, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 637-40
(1981). As we have noted above, the scope
of federal injunctive relief against an
agency of state government must be narrowly
tailored to enforce constitutional
requirements only. The adoption of a
remedy in a particular case tends to
establish the norm that defines the future

standard of conduct.4/ The precedential

4. We do not mean to imply that the
adoption of a particular remedy in a given
case requires the use of that remedy in
another case. Indeed, we share Judge
Sneed's view that courts should hesitate
before "constitutionalizing”" a remedy. See
Grummett_v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 496-97
(9th Cir. 1985) (Sneed, J., concurring).

18.

value of the adoption of a particular

remedy raises questions of consistency and
authoritativeness that can be resolved
similarly to resolution of legal questions.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, a
federal district court's exercise of
discretion to enjoin state political bodies
raises serious questions regarding the
legitimacy of its authority. See Fletcher,

The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial

Legitimacy, 91 Yale L. J. 635,- 642-44
(1982). Other that appellate review, few
effective external controls check the
district court's power.

Our weighing of the above factors
leads us to the following standard of
review. We will scrutinize the injunction
closely to make sure that the remedy

protects the plaintiffs‘ constitutional

Nevertheless, we recognize the tendency to
adopt remedies that have survived appellate
review.

19.

a

rights and does not require more of state
officials than is necessary to assure their
compliance with the constitution. Within
these parameters, we will defer to the
district court.
IV

THE EXISTENCE OF A LIBERTY INTEREST

The fourteenth amendment provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law..." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 466. Our

threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether
plaintiffs have a liberty interest in
remaining in the general population. If
plaintiffs do not possess a liberty
interest, the constitution does not require
prison officials to accord plaintiffs any
procedural protections when deciding to
segregate plaintiffs for administrative

reasons. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215

(1976).

20.

| minnie

A liberty interest may arise from
either of two sources: the due process

clause itself or state law. Hewitt, 459

U.S. at 466. In Wright I, the district
court held that California prisoners
possessed liberty interests on both
grounds. First, the court held that the
due process clause itself prohibits
arbitrary placement of prisoners in
administrative segregation. The court
reasoned that:
When a prisoner is transferred
from the general prison
population to the grossly more
onerous conditions of maximum
security, be it for disciplinary
or for administrative reasons,
there is a severe impairment of
the residuum of liberty which he
retains as a prisoner--an
impairment which triggers the
requirement for due process
safeguards.
462 F.Supp. at 402. Second, the court held
that section 3330 of Chapter 4, Article 6
of the Rules and Regulations of the

Director of Corrections constituted a

21.

state-created liberty interest.5/ The

district court assumed that the Wright I

decision was law of the case in these
proceedings. 597 F.Supp. at 1416.
Plaintiffs, similarly, contend that we are

bound by Wright I, especially in light of

the Supreme Court's summary affirmance.
A. Law of the Case

The doctrine of law of the case was
"crafted with the course of ordinary

litigation in mind. Such litigation

5. At the time of the district
court's decision in Wright I, 15 Cal.
Admin. Code § 3330 provided:

§ 3330. General Policy. (a)
Inmates must be segregated from
others when it is reasonably
believed that they are a menace
to themselves and others or a
threat to the security of the
institution. Inmates may be
segregated for medical,
psychiatric, disciplinary, or
administrative reasons. The
reason for ordering segregated
housing must be clearly
documented by the official
ordering the action at the time
the action is taken.

462 F. Supp. at 403.
pe RB

proceeds through preliminary stages,
generally matures at trial, and produces a
judgment, to which after appeal, the
binding finality of res judicata and
° collateral estoppel will attach." Arizona

v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618-19 (1983).

Here, however, we review a structural
injunction, which involves the ongoing
application of changing law to changing
circumstances.

Because permanent injunction relief
controls future conduct, we are sensitive
to the need for modification when
circumstances change.

A continuing decree of injunction

directed to events to come is

- subject always to adaptation as
events may shape the need. The
distinction is between restraints

that give protection to rights

fully accrued upon facts so

nearly permanent as to be
substantially impervious to

. change, and those that involve
the supervision of changing

conduct or conditions and are

thus provisional and

. ' tentative... =. [A] court does
not abdicate its power to revoke

or modify its mandate if

satisfied that what it has been

rae

doing has been turned through
changing circumstances into an

instrument of wrong.

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 105,

114-15 (1932) (citations omitted). A
change in the law may constitute a changing
circumstance requiring the modification of

an injunction. System Federation No. 91 v.

Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961). An
intervening judicial opinion may require
modification of an injunction. See

Pasadena City Board of Education v,

Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976) (when
intervening clarification of constitutional
law reduced obligations of state officials,
district court abused its discretion by
refusing to modify injunction accordingly).
"When a change in the law authorizes what
had previously been forbidden, it is an
abuse of dis retion for a court to refuse
to modify an injunction founded on

superseded law." American Horse Protection

24.

ye ®

eed

iia ata dee aS bia

Association yv. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1316

(D.C. Cir. 1982) .6/
The Fourth Circuit's decision in

Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.

1981), is closely analogous to the instant
case. In Nelson, the district court found
"double celling" of inmates to be erue2 and
unusual punishment and ordered the prison
administration to cease double celling.
Id. at 421. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's legal conclusions but
remanded with instructions to fashion a
decree that incorporated defendants'
timetable for elimination of overcrowding.

Id.; see Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378

(4th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The district
court modified its decree accordingly. See

659 F.2d at 421 (procedural background of

6. See also Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure, § 2961, pp. 604-605
(1973) ("The three traditional reasons for
ordering the modification or vacation of an
injunction are (1) changes in operative
facts, (2) changes in the relevant
decisional law, and (3) changes in any
applicable statutory law").

25.

case). When defendants realized that they

could not comply with prescribed
timetables, they moved to modify the
injunction. See id. at 423. In April of

1981, the district court denied the motion,

found defendants in civil contempt, and

imposed sanctions. See id. Defendants

appealed. Id. On June 15, 1981, the

Supreme Court decided Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337 (1981), which held, in short,
that double celling does not violate the
eighth amendment. The Fourth Circuit
vacated the district court's order
disapproving double celling. See 659 F.2d
at 429. The Fourth Circuit also vacated
the civil contempt citation and imposition
of sanctions. Id. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that "[t]Jhe question for purposes
of decision here becomes, therefore,
whether there have been, since the entry of
the original Decree in these cases, changes
in either operative facts or laws which

cast a new light upon the facts or law as

26.

vr

STEEN MAINE TH GE eR

originally ruled on in these cases." d.

at 424. The Nelson court found that Rhodes

v. Chapman, and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520 (1979), mandated a different result
from that reached by the court sitting en

banc. 659 F.2d at 424-29.7/

7. The standards for modification of
an injunction should apply with equal, if
not greater vigor, to direct appeals of an
order of permanent injunctive relief. A
modification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (5)
implicates the judicial ideals of repose
and finality; a settled decision may be
overturned. A direct appeal of an order of
a permanent injunction, however, does not
implicate repose or finality. Therefore,
the procedural distinctions between a
motion to modify an injunction and a direct
appeal do not justify a more deferential
approach in the case of direct appeals.

The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505
F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), supports this
conclusion. In Finney, the district court
granted injunctive relief regarding
disciplinary procedures employed in the
Arkansas prison system. Id. at 208. After
the district court ordered relief, the
Supreme Court decided Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Eighth Circuit
found that Wolff required a greater measure
of relief and ordered the district court to
modify its decree accordingly. 505 F.2d at
208. In Finney, the court of appeals
applied intervening law in a direct appeal
of a district court's order of injunctive
relief. We find ourselves in a similar
procedural position.

27.

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in

Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th

Cir. 1984), similarly demonstrates that
structural injunctive relief (aust follow
the changing contours of constitutional
law. In Newman, the district court ordered
prison administrators to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt for
violating prior orders of the court
concerning the Alabama state prison system.
Id. at 1519. The district court gies
Ordered that prisoners be released from
confinement to relieve overcrowding. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the order.
Id. at 1522. The court held that "total
compliance with a prior judgment or consent
decree is not required before a court can
entertain a request for modification." Id,
at 1519-20. The Eleventh Circuit further
held that the Supreme Court's intervening

decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, along with

Changed factual circumstances, required

28.

SRE AINE es A EE NI AR sy ~

ype.

Pa NET

SSS RE EE eg ons

reconsideration of the propriety of
injunctive relief. Id. at 1521.8/
Similarly, we cannot rely on Wright I.
Neither premise upon which the Wright I
court relied in finding a liberty interest

still exists.

In Hewitt v. Helms, the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause does not
of its own force create a liberty interest

in freedom from administrative segregation.

8. In Graddick, the Eleventh Circuit
considered the prospect that a motion to
modify an injunction would be used as a
dilatory tactic. The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that:

The contention could be made
that this decision would simply
mean that the defendants could
continually delay enforcement of
a remedy for unconstitutionality
by seeking modification every
time enforcement is sought. This
should not be a necessary result.
The good faith of the defendants
and the substantiality of the
alleged improvements would always
be a consideration before a
hearing on modification would be
required.

740 F.2d at 1521. We agree.
29.

—7_™-SF

It is plain that the
transfer of an inmate to less
amenable and more restrictive
quarters for nonpunitive reasons ‘
is well within the terms of
confinement.... Accordingly,
administrative segregation is the
sort of confinement that inmates
should reasonably anticipate
receiving at some point in their
incarceration.

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. A liberty

interest does not arise even wnen
administrative segregation imposes "severe
hardships,” such as "denial of access to
vocational, educational, recreational, and
rehabilitative programs, restrictions on
exercise, and confinement to [one's] cell
for lengthy periods of time." See id. at

467 n.4; Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226,

228-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (due process clause
itself does not create liberty interest
notwithstanding the fact that conditions in
"close management" are significantly more
harsh than conditions in general

population); see also McFarland v. Cassady,

779 F.2d 1426, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Supreme Court in Hewitt held that due
30.

process clause does not give inmate liberty
interest in remaining in general
population). Therefore, the Wright I
court's holding that the due process clause
Creates a liberty interest in remaining in
the general population is no longer
correct.

The Wright I court's reliance on

section 3330 is entitled to no deference.
The version of section 3330 upon which the

Wright I court relied has been repealed.

See 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 3330 (former
section 3330 was repealed on April 18,
1980).9/ A state-created liberty interest
exists only as long as the statute or
regulation creating it remains effective.
If the state repeals the statute or
eliminates the regulation, the liberty

interest ceases to exist. Clark v. Brewer,

476 P.2G at 232. The Wright I liberty

9. Because section 3330 has been
repealed, we need not consider whether the
language of that section would create a
liberty interest under current standards.

31.

interest determinations, therefore, neither

guide nor control our cdénsideration

today.10/ | .
Therefore, the doctrine of law of the

case does not preclude review of the

10. The plaintiffs argue that the
Supreme Court in Hewitt reaffirmed its
summary affirmance of Wright I. We
disagree. In Hewitt, the Court merely
noted that its summary affirmance of Wright
I was the only case in which the Court had
found that state statutes or regulations
created a liberty interest in freedom from
segregated housing within a prison. 459
U.S. at 469. The Court neither reaffirmed
nor rejected its holding in Wright I; the
reference to Wright I was entirely neutral.

Plaintiffs point out that the
Court in Hewitt had the opportunity to
reject its earlier affirmance of Wright I
yet "ailed to do so. Plaintiffs argue that
the Court's silence indicates approval of
Wright I. This argument seriously
misapprehends the nature of judicial ‘
opinions. It is a well recognized maxim
that a court ought to avoid unnecessary
decisions. Such dec’sions are dicta. The
Court in Hewitt hed no need to revisit
Wright I. We refure to attribute a hidden ‘

meaning to the Cou.t's failure to engage in

BEST AVI

obiter dictum.

32.

continuiaAg -ropriety of permanent

injunctive -cclief.1l/ The relevant

ll. Even if the doctrine of law of
the case applied in its usual manner, its
strictures would not require blind

, obeisance to outdated legal principles. As
the Supreme Court noted in Arizona v.
California, supra:

Unlike the more precise
requirements of res judicata, law
of the case is an amorphous
concept. As most commonly
defined, the doctrine posits that
when a court decides upon a rule
of law, that decision should =
continue to govern the same
issues in subsequent stages in
the same case. Law of the case
directs a court's discretion, it
does not limit the tribunal's
power.

460 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted). We
have recognized that the doctrine is not to
be applied woodenly. Russell v.
Commissioner, 678 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir.
1982), and that we will reconsider issues
that have previously been decided "if such
a course is warranted by ‘considerations of
substantial justice.'" United States v
Imperial Irrigation District, 559 F.2d 509,
520 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Lehrman v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 662-63 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975)). We have also recognized that a
prior decision should not be followed if
"controlling authority has since made a
contrary decision of the law applicable to
° such issues." Kimball v. Callahan, 590

F.2d 768, 771-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 826 (1979); see Handi Investment

ILABLE COPY

33.

question becomes whether intervening
changes in law-or fact require different
results.
B. Eighth Amendment Liberty Interest
Plaintiffs argue that the existence of :
eighth amendment violations in the
administrative segregation units raises a
due process liberty interest. We disagree.
Plaintiffs" sole authority for this

Proposition is a footnote from Justice

Co. v. Mobil, Oil Corp., 663 F.2d 391, 392-
93 (9th Cir. 1981) (examining intervening
case law to determine whether contrary
result was proper); see also Amen v. City
of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794 (6th Cir.
1983) (doctrine of law of the case "must
yield to an intervening change of
controlling law between the date of the
first ruling and the retrial"); In re
Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability
Litigation, 653 F.2d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (decision may be reexamined in light
of changes in governing law); EEOC v.
International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 623
F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cig. 1980) (law of the
case does not apply when controlling
authority has since made a contrary
decision of law inapplicable), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 917 (1981); White v.
Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.
1967) (intervening controlling decision -
constitutes exception to doctrine of the

law of the case), cited with approval in

Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8.

34.

PO ica S88 i i MS lia

Stevens' dissenting opinion in Hewitt v.

Helm. We find this a curious use of
authority. Not only is the sole authority
a footnote from a dissenting opinion, but
the footnote does not support plaintiffs'
position. Justice Stevens indicated that
if such eighth amendment violations
existed, "the Constitution would impose

substantive, rather than procedural limits

on transfers into segregated status." 459
U.S. at 481 n.4 (emphasis added).

Some fundamental considerations
Support Justice Stevens' conclusion. The
state has no right to subject a prisoner to
cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth
amendment is not a "maybe" or a "sometimes"
proposition. If conditions violate the
eighth amendment, all prisoners have the
right to be free of such conditions. The
right does not vary depending on the threat
that the individual prisoner presents to

institutional security. No amount of

356

Process can justify subjecting a prisoner
to cruel and unusual punishment.
Moreover, acceptance of such an
argument would create an unworkable
standard. The assumption implicit in
plaintiffs' argument is that eighth
amendment violations exist in the
segregation unit but do not exist in the
general population. If both locations were
infected with eighth amendment violations,
process would be a meaningless gesture; it
would make no sense to interpose a
constitutional impediment to transfer from
One place to another when the conditions in
both locations are constitutionally

impermissible.12/

12. The conditions at San Quentin
perfectly illustrate the infirmities of
plaintiffs' argument. While we focus on
the conditions in administrative
segregation, state-court litigation is
currently addressing the problems in San
Quentin's general population. See Wilson
v. Deukmejian, No. 103454 (Sup. Ct. Marin
County, August 5, 1983) (Tentative Decision
and Proposed Statement of Decision, Savitt,
J.). Although we hesitate to venture into
areas beyond the scope of this case, we

36.

Assuming arguendo that the conditions
in the general population lacked
significant eighth amendment violations, we
would have to determine what quantum of
violation in administrative segregation
would be sufficient to create an eighth
amendment liberty interest. Wright v.
Rushen, 642 F.2d at 1133-35, counsels that
we consider separately each condition that
allegedly contributes to the violation of
plaintiffs' eighth amendment rights; a
variety of discrete conditions exist in the
segregation units. If we were to find that
the defendants cured one of the conditions,
would the eighth amendment liberty interest
evaporate? Or if we were to find that a
particular condition in the general
population violated the eighth amendment,

would the liberty interest vanish? Or

cannot ignore reality. Judge Savitt's
proposed decision paints as bleak a picture
of the conditions in San Quentin's general
population as does Judge Weigel's
description of the segregation units.

37.

perhaps plaintiffs would have us hold that

a prisoner has an interest in remaining
with his own eighth amendment violation and
not being subjected to another in its
place. Plaintiffs' approach would require
a comprehensive determination regarding the
conditions throughout the prison, if not
the entire state prison system, to
determine whether the eighth amendment
created a due process liberty interest. We
decline to require such an ambitious task
in the name of such a dubious proposition.
The presence of eighth amendment
violations in the segregation units,
therefore, does not create a liberty
interest. We will not parlay one
constitutional right into another.
C. State-Created Liberty Interest
Several cases decided after the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's

decision in Wright I illuminate our

perspective on state-created liberty
interests. Before we will recognize a

38.

constitutionally protected liberty

interest, state law must direct that a
given action will be taken or avoided only
on the existence or nonexistence of

specified substantive predicates. See Olim

v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983);

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72

(1983); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979): Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 226-27 (1976); Allen v. Board

of Pardons, 792 F.2d 1404 (1986); Roberts
v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir.
1986); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426,

1428 (9th Cir. 1986); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778

F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985): Baumann v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 754 F.2d

841, 844 (9th Cir. 1985).

The adoption of guidelines to
structure the exercise of discretion does
not necessarily create a liberty interest.

Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d at 870;

Baumann v. Arizona Department of

39.

Corrections, 754 F.2d at 844. As the

Supreme Court has stated,

The creation of procedural .
guidelines to channel the
decision-making of prison
officials is, in the view of many
experts in the field, a salutory ,
development. It would be ironic
to hoid that when a state embarks
on such desirable experimentation
it thereby opens the door to
scrutiny by the federal court,
while states that choose not to
adopt such procedural provisions
entirely avoid the strictures of
the Due Process Clause. The
adoption of such procedural
guidelines, without more,
Suggests that it is these
restrictions alone, and not those
federal courts might also impose
under the Fourteenth Amendment,
that the state chose to require.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 471.

1) The California Statutory Sentence
Credit Scheme

The district court held that
California Penal Code sections 2931 through
293313/ create a liberty interest in
sentence reducing credits. 597 F.Supp. at 4

1416-17.

13. See Appendix.

40. ,
| PEST
7

Tr a nutshell, sections 2931 and 2933
create 1 two-tiered scheme:

Penal Code section 2933 provides
that a state prison inmate may
receive six months of worktime
credit for every six months of
, full-time performance in a credit
qualifying work, training or
education program established by
the Director of Corrections.
Prisoners willing to participate
in a full-time credit qualifying
assignment, but who either are
not assigned to such a program,
Or are assigned for less than
full time, are to earn credits
under the formula provided for by
Penal Code section 2931, which is
a four-month combined work and
good behavior credit for each
eight months served.

People v. Vallardes, 162 Cal.App.3d 312,

320, 208 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (1984).
Examination of section 2933 leads to
the conclusion that prisoners have no right
to earn the one-for-one worktime credits
provided by that section. Section 2933
provides that "[w]lorktime credit is a
privilege, not a right." Cal. Penal Code §
2933 ¢b). Section 2933 expressly
contemplates that not all prisoners will be
assigned to a credit qualifying program.

4l.

See Cal. Penal Code § 2933(a) (". . . every
prisoner willing to participate in a full-
time credit qualifying assignment but who
is either not assigned to full-time
assignment or is assigned to a program for
less than full time, shall receive no less
credit than is provided under section
(2 Fo Soe Although the California
legislature intended the worktime sentence

reducing scheme to instill a work ethic,

see People v. Vallardes, 162 Cal.App.3d at
321, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 609, it did not
create an absolute right to participate in
work programs; the legislature created only
a "reasonable opportunity." See Cal. Penal
Code § 2933(b).

Moreover, a prisoner's "reasonable
opportunity to participate" must be
"consistent with institutional security and
available resources." See Cal. Penal Code
§ 2933(b). Section 2933 delegates broad
authority to the Director of Corrections to
allocate worktime resources between various

42.

; - - - F -

categories of prisoners. See, e.g., In re
Barnes, 176 Cal.App.3d 235, 221 Cal. Rptr.
415, 416-17 (1985) (Department of
Corrections has established priority list;
segregation unit prisoners are at bottom of
List). Prisoners are not entitled
automatically to participate in worktime

credit programs. People v. Rosaia, 157

Cal.App.3d 832, 848, 203 Cal. Rptr. 856,
867 (1984). There is no guarantee that

work programs will be available. People v.

Caruso, 161 Cal.App.3d 13, 16 n.5, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 221, 224 n.5 (1984). In sum, section
2933 merely creates a possibility of early
’ release; it does not create a
constitutionally protected liberty

interest. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1979). Therefore, we
conclude that section 2933 does not create
a liberty interest in one-for-one worktime

credits.

43.

This conclusion, however, does not

address the question of whether section
2933 creates a liberty interest in the one-
for-two goodtime credits provided by
section 2931. Section 2931 applies by its
own terms to prisoners who are incarcerated
for crimes committed prior to January l,
1983 and who have not waived the right to
receive credits under section 2931. Cal.

Penal Code §§ 2931(d), 2934; see In re

Ramirez, 39 Cal.3d 931, 933, 705 P.2d 897,
899, 218 Cal. °Rptr. 324, 325-26 (1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2266 (1986). More

importantly for our purposes, section 2933
establishes that prisoners who are willing
to participate in the worktime credit
scheme but who are denied the opportunity
to do so through no fault of their own
"shall receive no less credit than is
provided under Section 2931." Cal. Penal
Code § 2933(a).

» Section 2931 provides that a
prisoner's sentence may be reduced by four

44.

months for every eight months that the

prisoner serves. Three of the four months
accrue automatically if the prisoner
commits no illegal acts or serious
disciplinary infractions. Cal. Penal Code
§ 2931(b). One of the four months is based
solely on participation in "work,
educational, vocational, therapeutic or
other prison activities." Cal. Penal Code
S$ 2393i(¢). In practice, this one month
credit is granted unless a prisoner refuses
to accept work when offered. People v.
Austin, 30 Cal.3d 155, 161-62, 636 P.2d l,
5, 178 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 (1981); 15 Cal.
Admin. Code § 3043; Cal. Penal Code §§

2931(c), 2932(b); see also People v. Sage,

26 Cal.3d 498, 510 n.l, 611 P.2d 874, 880-
81 n.1, 165 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 n.1 (1980)
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
While section 2931 differs somewhat
from the Nebraska statute at issue in

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal

and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1l

45.

—————

(1979), in all material respects it is’
identical. Section 2931 contains the
"shall/unless" formula that we find

dispositive. See Baumann v. Arizona

Department of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, :

844 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, we
conclude that section 2931 creates a
constitutionally protected liberty
interest.

The conclusion that section 2931
Creates a liberty interest, however, does

not assist plaintiffs in this case. Since

the defendants generally grant the credit
to segregated prisoners, administrative
segregation does not implicate the liberty
interest arising from sections 2931 and
2933. The existence of a liberty interest,
therefore, is irrelevant and cannot support

the district court's holdings.14/

14. The district court found that
credits due under sections 2931 and 2933
are not invariably afforded. To the extent
that the defendants may from time to time
deny the credits due under sections 2931
and 2933, without affording a prisoner due

46.

2) California Decisional Law
The plaintiffs argue that "by virtue

of its appellate court decisions applying
its constitution, California has created a
"substantial liberty interest in not being
placed in lockup by arbitrary procedures."
Plaintiffs primarily rely on Conti v. D ’
593 F.Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

In Conti, the district court held that
California state-court decisions created a
liberty interest cognizable under the
fede: .1 Constitution. Id. at 700-02. The
Conti court found that California
decisional law created a federal liberty
interest notwithstanding the fact that the
California courts expressly reject federal
due process analysis and recognize 4
liberty interest in freedom from all
arbitrary state action. Id. at 701; see
People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal.3d 260, 268, 599

rocess of law, that prisoner may obtain
abeas corpus relief. See Preiser v,.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

47,

P.2d 622, 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320
(1979) ("when an individual is subjected to
the deprivatory governmental action he
always has a due process liberty interest
both in fair and unprejudiced decision
making and in being treated with respect

and dignity."); see also Inmates of Sybil

Brand Institute for Women v. County of Los

Angeles, 130 Cal.App.3d 89, 108, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 599, 609 (1982).

The district court's decision in Conti
is not persuasive for several reasons.
First, the court failed to acknowledge that
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the due process clause of the
California constitution seek to protect
qualitatively different interests. Under
the fourteenth amendment, when the state
deprives a person of liberty, it must
provide that person with procedural

protection. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319,.335 (1976). Unless a liberty interest

is implicated, arbitrary state action does

48.

not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-69. The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment
focuses in relevant part on protecting
liberty. The due process clause of the
California constitution also seeks to
protect liberty. But in addition, the due

process clause of the California

constitution seeks to promote accuracy and
reasonable predictability in all government
decision making when individuals are
subject to any deprivatory action. People

v. Ramirez, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The

California constitution does not impose the
threshold requirement that a liberty
interest exist. Id.

Even though the distinction between
the two approaches will be academic in some
instances, the distinction is critical in
prisoners' rights cases. Under federal due
process analysis, a legally incarcerated
prisoner is stripped of all but the most
incremental interest in liberty. Hewitt,

49.

459 U.S. at 467; Greenholtz v. Inmates of

the Nebraska Penal and Correctional

Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). The federal
perspective instructs that arbitrary
decision making cannot deprive a person of
that which has already been taken.

Greenholtz, 442 U.§. at- 8-11. The

threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether
the state has given back to the prisoner
some liberty interest that previously the
state had taken away. Stated
alternatively, we must determine to what
extent the state has deprived a criminal
defendant of liberty in the first place.
For federal purposes, the extent and
nature of the prisoner's remaining or re-
created liberty is determined by looking

for the substantive conditions or

predicates that must exist before the state
can again take the liberty away. Baumann

v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 754

50.

F.2d 841, 843-45 (9th Cir. 1985).15/ The
quantity of procedural protections that a
state may offer prisoners is not
dispositive in determining the existence of

a federal liberty interest. Greenholtz,

442 GiB. at 7. As the Court in Olim v.

Wakinekona stated,

"[a] liberty interest is of
course a substantive interest of
an individual; it cannot be the
right to demand needless
formality." [Shango v. Jurich,
681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir.
1981).] Process is not an end in
itself. Its constitutional
purpose is to protect a
substantive interest to which the
individual has a legitimate claim
of entitlement.

461 U.S. at 250 (footnote omitted).

15. The difference between
substantive and procedural predicates to
denial of liberty can be illustrated as
follows. A person cannot be imprisoned
unless he is tried. The trial is the
procedural predicate to imprisonment. But
merely affording a person a trial does not
entitle the state to imprison a person; the
state must prove the person's guilt. Guilt
is the substantive predicate to
imprisonment. The procedural predicate
merely assists in determining the existence
of the substantive predicate.

5l.

In contrast, the California due
process clause requires process
notwithstanding the absence of substantive
predicates or conditions. People v.

Ramirez, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The

state's provision of additional protection
is entirely permissible. But the fact that
the state courts call this additional
protection a liberty interest does not make
it so for the purposes of the federal
constitution. Although a state court's
determination of state law binds the
federal courts, interpretation of the
federal constitution cannot be
circumscribed by state definitions. The
California cases requiring heightened
procedural protection, therefore, do not
create a federally evqni sabia liberty

interest.

3) California Prison Regulations

The plaintiffs argue that sections
3335 and 3336 of Title 15 of the California
Administrative Code create a liberty

$2.

Cee Atl et ST tt AB HR na i a sth Ne as sara 0 ahaa tanese Le.

interest. These sections govern the
placement and retention of prisoners in
administrative segregation.

Our hesitance to construe a statute or
regulation as creating a liberty interest
is especially great when the statute or
regulation governs the day-to-day
administration of a prison. Again, Hewitt
instructs that

The deprivations imposed in the

rE course %f daily operations of an
institution are likely to be
minor when compared to the
release from custody at issue in
parole decisions and good-time
credits. Moreover, the safe and
efficient operation of a prison
On a day-to-day basis has
traditionally been entrusted to
the expertise of prison officials
- « e « These facts suggest that
regulations structuring the
SaQteewesaeey OF prison
administrators may warrant
treatment, for purposes of
creation of entitlements to
"liberty," different from
Statutes and regulations in other
areas.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 470 (citations

omitted). Accordingly, we have noted in

the context of inter-institutional

53.

transfers that "[u]Jnless there is some

Guarantee that transfer will not be

effected except for misbehavior or some
other specified reason, due process
protections cannot apply." Rizzo v.
Dawson, 778 F.2d at 530 (emphasis added).
We are convinced that sections 3335
and 3336, standing alone, do not create a
liberty interest. However, when read in
conjunction with section 3339 of the
California Administrative Code, sections
3335 and 3336 withstand our exacting
scrutiny; they create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. -
Section 333516/ specifies those
circumstances requiring the immediate
removal of an inmate from the general
population. Nothing in section 3335
purports to limit the Department of
Correction's authority to segregate inmates

to the circumstances enumerated in that

16. See Appendix.
54.

section. The only mandatory language in
section 3335 runs to the benefit of
prisoners in the general population; they
have some expectation that their dangerous
neighbors will be removed to administrative
segregation. Nothing in section 3335
suggests that a-prisoner shall be allowed

to remain in the general population absent

the specified circumstances.

Section 333617/ contains mandatory
language running to the benefit of the
segregated prisoner. Specifically, section
3336 requires that a sufficiently senior
officer make the segregation decision, that
the decision be documented, that the
‘prisoner receive assistance, if needed, in
presenting his case, and that the prisoner
be informed of the reason for his
segregation. Sections 3335 and 3336
standing alone, therefore, constitute a

procedural guideline that "channel[s] the

17. See Appendix.
55.

decision-making of prison officials." See
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471. Such procedural
requirements, even if mandatory, do not
raise a constitutionally cognizable liberty

interest. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at

250.

However, section 3339(a) provides that
"[rJelease from segregation status shall
occur at the earliest possible time in
keeping with the circumstances and reasons
for the inmate's initial placement in
administrative segregation." 45 Cai.
Admin. Code § 3339(a) (emphasis added).
Section 3339(a) indicates that absent
justification, a prisoner may not be
retained in administrative segregation.
The use of the word, shall, constitutes the
mandatory language needed to create a

liberty interest. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at

471-72.
As the Supreme Court reasoned in
Hewitt, the word "shall" alone is not

sufficient. Rather, the liberty interest

56.

is created when the word "shall" is used to

mandate certain procedures "in connection

with requiring specific substantive

oredicates for action." 459 U.S. at 472

(emphasis added). Those substantive
predicates are contained in section 3335,
and include standards fer removal from the
general inmate population where there is an
immediate threat to the inmate's own safety
Or the safety of others, or when
institutional security is endangered or the
integrity of an investigation put in
jeopardy. These standards are incorporated
into section 3339 by that section's
reference to "the circumstances and reasons
for the inmate's initial placement in
administrative segregation." We think,
therefore, that the word "shall," read in
conjunction with these specific substantive
predicates, does create a liberty interest
in the present case. We note, moreover,
that the word "shall" is not used simply to

mandate an investigation but to mandate

57.

nk ee ae ee hm OO ae ow

immediate release, absent procedures that
determine that the substantive predicates
for retaining the inmate in restrictive
custody are demonstrated.

Vv

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING
PLACEMENT AND RETENTION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION

A. PLACEMENT

Our conclusion that the state has

created a liberty interest in freedom from
administrative segregation requires us to
determine the quantum of process required
by the fourteenth amendment. The
determination of what process is due

generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's
interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute
procedural requirement would
entail.

58.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976). "It is axiomatic that due process
‘is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation

demands.'" Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (quoting Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

The district court incorporated the
procedural requirements mandated by the
three-judge court in Wright I. See 597
F.Supp. at 1424. The Wright I order
followed the procedures required for
disciplinary confinement and denial of good
time credits established in Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See Wright

I, 462 F.Supp. at 403-05.18/ The district

18. The Wolff procedures apply when a
state, for disciplinary reasons, seeks to
withdraw sentence credits that a prisoner
already has acquired. See Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 555-58. In Wolff, the Supreme Court
held that a prisoner facing misconduct
charges be accorded 24 hours' advance
written notice of the charges against him;
the right to call witnesses and present

59.

a» liane Dasha Re Sem me

court also established additional
procedural requirements. The court ordered

the defendants to release a prisoner no .
later than twelve months after placement in
administrative segregation unless that -
prisoner is afforded all the hearing rights

that attend the initial segregation

decision. 597 F.Supp. at 1424. The court

also required disclosure of the identity of

any person providing information to prison
authorities unless disclosure would

endanger the safety of the source. Id. at

1424-25. Finally, the court prohibited
segregation on the basis of undisclosed

information. Id. at 1425.

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983), the Supreme Court held that a

lesser quantum of process is due when a

documentary evidence in a manner consistent
with institutional security; if illiterate,
staff assistance in preparing a defense; an
impartial tribunal; and a written statement
explaining the basis of the tribunal's
decision. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
at 563-72.

60.

prisoner is placed in administrative

segregation than is required by Wolff. The
Court stated:

We think an informal,
nonadversary evidentiary review
is sufficient both for the
decision that an inmate
represents a security threat and
the decision to confine an inmate
to administrative segregation
pending completion of an
investigation into misconduct
charges against him. An inmate
must merely receive some notice
of the charges against him and an
Opportunity to present his views
to the prison official charged
with deciding whether to transfer
him to administrative
segregation. Ordinarily, a
written statement by the inmate
will accomplish this purpose,
although prison administrators
may find it more useful to permit
Oral presentations in cases where
they believe a written statement
would be ineffective. So long as
this occurs, and the
decisionmaker reviews the charges
and then-available evidence
against the prisoner, the Due
Process Clause is satisfied.

459 U.S. at 476. The process mandated for
administrative segregation under Hewitt,
therefore, is substantially less than that
required by Part III of the Permanent

Injunction.

61.

Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that
Hewitt is distinguishable and a higher
guantum of process is due in the instant
case. Plaintiffs argue that they have a
greater private interest than did the ~ ‘
prisoners in Hewitt, that the presence of
eighth amendment violations requires
heightened process, and that the
defendants’ noncompliance with prior court
orders requires a highly structured
administrative proceeding.

We disagree. We recognize that the
segregation units at issue in Hewitt were
modern facilities and that the segregation
units at San Quentin and Folsom, in
contrast, are riddled with conditions that
violate the plaintiffs’ eighth amendment
rights. Nevertheless, the Court in Hewitt
proceeded on the premise that placement in
administrative segregation would result in
"severe hardships.” 459 U.S. at 467 n.4.
The hardships that a segregated prisoner in
Hewitt would face included “denial of

62.

access to vocational, educational,
recreational, and rehabilitative programs,
restrictions on exercise, and confinement
to [one's] cell for lengthy periods of

time." Id.; see id. at 479-80 n.]

(Stevens, J., dissenting). The distinction
between the private interest at issue in
Hewitt and that at issue here is not as
extreme as the plaintiffs assert.

In addition, the state's interest in
maintaining security in San Quentin and
Folsom is at least as great, if not
greater, than the state's interest shown in
Hewitt. The inmate population at San

Quentin and Folsom is composed of the most

violent and anti-social offenders in the
California prison system. See 597 F.Supp.
at 1394, 1404-05. Given the disruptive
propensities of the inmate population, we
are especialiy sensitive to the Supreme
Court's admonition that "“"[t]Jhe safety of
the institution's guards and inmates is

perhaps the most fundamental responsibility
63.

of the prison administration." Hewitt, 459
U.S. at 473.19/ The state's interest in
maintaining safety and security weighs
heavily in favor of avoiding prolonged and
cumbersome administrative proceedings.
Finally, the value of Wolff-type
procedures was minimal in the context of
the decision to segregate a prisoner for
administrative reasons. When determining
whether the prisoner was guilty of
misconduct, as was the case in Wolff, the
inquiry is essentially factual. The prison
administrator seeks to determine whether
the prisoner committed the alleged offense.
When deciding whether administrative

segregation is needed, however, the

19. Once again, we note that failure
to remove dangerous prisoners from the
general population may amount to a breach
of the state's constitutional duties. See
Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at 1134 n.3
(citing Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206,
1211 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Thomas v.
Booker, 784 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975 (1986).

64.

administrator relies largely on subjective
factors:

In assessing the seriousness of a
threat to institutional security,
prison administrators necessarily
draw on more than specific facts
surrounding a particular
incident; instead, they must
consider the character of the
inmates confined in the
institution, recent and
longstanding relations between
prisoners and guards, prisoners
inter se, and the like. In the
volatile atmosphere of a prison,
an inmate easily may constitute
an unacceptable threat to the
safety of other prisoners and
guards even if he himself has
committed no misconduct; rumor,
reputation, and even more
imponderable factors may suffice
to spark potentially disastrous
incidents. The judgment of
prison officials in this context,
like that of those making parole
decisions, turns largely on
purely subjective evaluations and
on predictions of future
behavior; indeed, the
administrators must predict not
just one inmate's future actions,
as in parole, but those of an
entire institution.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 474 (citations

omitted); see also Jones v. North Carolina

Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,

132-33 (1977); 15 Cal. Admin. Code §

65.

3338(d), (e). A trial-like proceeding is
unlikely to inform a prison administrator
regarding such subjective considerations. é

See Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d at 235.

We conclude that when prison officials
initially determine whether a prisoner is
to be segregated for administrative reasons
due process only requires the following
procedures: Prison officials must hold an
informal nénudeareacy beaetee within a
reasonable time after the prisoner is
segregated.20/ The prison officials must
inform the prisoner of the charges against
the prisoner or their reasons for
considering segregation. Prison officials

must allow the prisoner to present his

views.

20. The district court's requirement
that a hearing be held within 72 hours of
segregation constitutes a "reasonable
time." See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at
476-78 nn. 8 & 9. We intimate no view as .
to whether due process would tolerate a
more lengthy delay.

66.

We specifically find that the due
process clatse does not require detailed
written notice of charges, representation
by counsel or counsel-substitute, an
Opportunity to present witnesses, or a
written decision describing the reasons for
placing the prisoner in administrative

segregation. Cf. Wright I, 462 F.Supp. at

404-05; Toussaint III, 597 F.Supp. at 1424.

We also find that due process does not
require disclosure of the identity of any
person providing information leading to the
placement of a prisoner in administrative

segregation. Cf. Toussaint III, 597

F.Supp. at 1424-25.
B. RETENTION

In Part III(B)(1) of the Permanent
Injunction, the district court ordered
defendants to release prisoners from
administrative segregation on the
prisoner's Minimum Eligible Release Date or
at the expiration of twelve months of
consecutive confinement, whichever is

67.

—————————————— ~~ ~&~&=«~«©=~7;}.

shorter, unless the defendants afford the
prisoner all the hearing rights that attend™
initial placement in segregation.

In Hewitt, the Supreme Court

instructed that administrative segregation "

may not be used as a pretext for
indefinite commitment of an
inmate. Prison officials must
engage in some sort of periodic
review of the confinement of such
inmates. This review will not
necessarily require that prison
officials permit the submission
of any additional evidence or
Statements. The decision whether
a prisoner remains a security
risk will be based on facts
relating to a particular prisoner
-- which will have been
ascertained when determining to
confine the inmate to
administrative segregation -- and
on the official's general
knowledge of prison conditions
and tensions, which are
Singularly unsuited for "proof"
in any highly structured manner.
Likewise, the decision to
continue confinement of an inmate
pending investigation of
misconduct charges depends upon :
circumstances that prison
officials will be aware of--
most typically, the progress of
the investigation. .

Hewitt, 459 J.S. at 477 n. 9. The third
circuit, similarly, has stated "the
governmental interest involved in a good
faith decision to subject a ce saeuinx to
administrative segregation may fluctuate
with the passage of time and change of

circumstances." Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d

946, 953 (3d Cir. 1984).

In Mims v. Shapp, the Third Circuit

found that monthly review of a prisoner's
status satisfied due process concerns. 744

F.2d at 952. Similarly, in Clark v.

Brewer, the Eighth Circuit held that review
every seven days for the first two months
of segregation followed by regular review
hearings every thirty days thereafter
satisfied due process requirements. 776
F.2d at 234. Here, however, segregation
nay continue withou- review for as long as
twelve months. We do not believe that
annual review sufficiently protects
plaintiffs' liberty interest. However, we

intimate no view as to the frequency of

69.

————————————— OO ii“. ..

periodic review required. That is for the
parties to recommend and the district court
to decide in the first instance. .
VI
SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA GOVERNING
PLACEMENT AND RETENTION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
In Parts III(B) and IV(B) of the
Permanent Injunction, the district court
imposed criteria governing placement and
retention of prisoners in administrative
segregation. See 597 F.Supp. at 1424,
1426. The district court required that a
prisoner not be placed or retained in
segregation unless allowing the prisoner to
remain in the general population would
severely endanger the lives of prisoners,
the security of the institution, or the
integrity of an investigation into
suspected criminal activity or serious
misconduct. Defendants argue that these

criteria impose unwarranted limitations on

prison management. 4

70.

On their face, the substantive
requirements merely restate the reasons
justifying administrative segregation. See
15 Cal. Admin. Code § 3335(a). In Hewitt,
the Supreme Court recognized that "(t]he
safety of the institution's guards and
inmates is perhaps the most fundamental
responsibility of the prison
administration." 459 U.S. at 473. The
substantive requirements accommodate this
concern. The Court in Hewitt also stated
that administrative segregation of a
prisoner "pending investigation of charges
against him serves important institutional
interests relating to the insulating of
possible witnesses from coercion or harm."
Id. The substantive criteria accommodate
the prison administration's interests in
this regard as well. Moreover, the
substantive criteria apply only to
placement or retention in administrative
segregation. The criteria do not impinge

on defendants' ability to hold disciplinary

yp

hearings and to punish prisoners for
misconduct. Since administrative
segregation must not be a pretext for
punitive isolation, Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477
n.9, the substantive criteria assure that
plaintiffs' due_process rights are not
meaningless gestures. The district court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion in
fashioning these substantive criteria.
VII
THE INTERIM PERIOD REMEDIES

In Part IV of the Permanent
Injunction, the district court established
an additional layer of relief to apply
during the “interim period." The court
defined the interim period as that time
between the date on which the Permanent
Injunction issued and the date on which the
Monitor2l1/ certifies that defendants are

"in full compliance with the Permanent

21. The Monitor is a special master,
appointed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
See 597 F. Supp. at 1425.

72.

Injunction and that conditions of
confinement in segregation units at San
Quentin and Folsom do not violate the
Constitution." 597 F. Supp. at 1425.22/
The court ordered that any prisoner
assigned to segregation could request
release and, if the defendants denied the
request, the prisoner could obtain review
by the Monitor. The court empowered the
Monitor to order the release of individual
prisoners from administrative segregation.
Id. at 1426. ,
A. Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction

The defendants argue that the district
court lacks jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 to order prisoners released from

22. Although Part IV of the Permanent
Injunction speaks of "interim" relief, we
question whether the district court can
retain jurisdiction once the defendants
meet the conditions specified in Part IV.
See generally Riddick v. School-Board of
the City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.
1986). Of course, this litigation has not
reached a point demanding resolution of
this question.

73.

administrative segregation-23/ Defendants

contend that under Preiser v. Rodriquez,

411 U.S. 475 (1973), the writ of habeas
corpus is the exclusive federal remedy
available to a prisoner who seeks to e
challenge the fact of conf inenent, and that
the district court's order evades the

requirement that the prisoner exhaust state

23. We note sua sponte that the
district court's delegation to the Monitor
of the power to order release raises
serious constitutional questions. See,
-€.g., Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980); Fiss, The Social and Political

Foundations of Adjudication, 6 Law & Human

Behav. 121 (1982); Note, Article III
Constraints and the Expanding Civi
Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A
Dissenting View, 88 Yale L. J. 1023 (1979).

We have found no case in which such a broad
delegation of power to a special master has
withstood review. Nevertheless, the
defendants do not object to the delegation

of power to the Monitor; defendants contest °
the authority of the court itself to order
the release of prisoners from
administrative segregation. Therefore, we
refrain from deciding the question.
However, we do not wish our silence to be
taken as a ratification of the district
court's order.

74.

remedies. Preiser does not support
defendants’ contentions.

In Preiser, state prisoners sued in

federal district court under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that they were deprived of
good-time credits improperly. 411 U.S. at
476. The prisoners sought injunctive
relief to compel restoration of the
credits. Id. The Supreme Court held that
“when a state prisoner is challenging the
very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release
from the imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at

500.24/

24. The Court also stated in dictum
that "when a prisoner is put under
additional and unconstitutional restraints
during his lawful custody, it is arguable
that habeas corpus will lie to remove the
restraints making the custody illegal.”
Id. at 499. One court has followed this
reasoning and held that habeas corpus
provided the exclusive remedy for obtaining
an order compelling release from

75.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
554-55 (1974), however, the Supreme Court

held that Preiser only precludes
restoration of credits under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The Court stated "that it was proper .
for the Court of Appeals and the District
Court to determine the validity of the
procedures for revoking good-time credits
and to fashion appropriate remedies for any

constitutional violations ascertained,

short of ordering the actual restoration of
good time already cancelled.” Id. at 555

(footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Here, the district court did not
restore credits nor release any prisoner
from prison. The court, in essence,
authorized the Monitor to move individual
Prisoners from one location to another
within the prison. We do not believe that

such relief falls within the traditional

administrative detention. Boudin v.
Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1111-12 (2d Cir.
1984).

76.

core ..f habeas corpus. Consequently, the
plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies
before seeking relief in federal court.
The district court did not exceed its
jurisdiction by authorizing the release of
prisoners from administrative segregation.
B. Standard of Review Employed by the

Monitor

Part IV(D) of the Permanent Injunction
authorizes the Monitor to review records of
defendants' placement and retention
decisions, to accept additional evidence,
and to order a prisoner's release "[iJf the
Monitor concludes on the basis of all
evidence submitted, that the prisoner was
placed or retained in segregation in
violation of any provision of [the]
Permanent Injunction . . .." 597 F. Supp.
at 1416. Defendants argue that the
district court abused its discretion by
authorizing the Monitor to review
defendants' placement and retention

decisions de novo.

77.

We have already determined that the

district court properly imposed substantive

standards to be used in deciding whether to
segregate a prisoner or retain a prisoner
in segregation. The question here is who
should apply those standards and how much
evidence is required in support of a
segregation or retention decision.

Prison administrators, not courts,
must run prisons:

[A] prison's internal security is
peculiarly a matter normally left
to the discretion of prison
administrators. In assessing the
seriousness of a threat to
institutional security, prison
administrators necessarily draw
on more than specific facts
surrounding a particular
incident; instead, they must
consider the character of the
inmates confined in the
institution, recent and
longstanding relations between
prisoners and guards, prisoners
inter se, and the like. In the
volatile atmosphere of a prison,
an inmate easily may constitute
an unacceptable threat to the
safety of other prisoners and
guards even if ge himself has
committed no misconduct; rumor,
reputation, and even more
imponderable factors may suffice
to spark potentially disastrous

78.

incidents. The judgment of
prison officials in this context,
like that of those making parole
decisions, turns largely on
purely subjective evaluations and
On predictions of future
behavior; indeed, the
administrators must predict not
just one inmate's future actions,
as in parole, but those of an
entire institution.

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474 (citations

omitted); see also Jones v. North Carolina

Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,

132-33 (1977).

Courts must accord wide-ranging
deference to prison administrators "in the
adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security."

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).

"{[W]here state penal institutions are
involved, federal courts have a further
reason for deference to the appropriate

prison authorities." Procunier v.

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). We

recognize, moreover, "that ‘the

79.

relationship of state prisoners and the
state officers who supervise their
confinement is far more intimate than that
of a state and a private citizen,' and that
the ‘internal problems of state prisons °
involve issues . . . peculiarly within

state authority and expertise.'" Pell v,

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1974)

(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 492 (1973)). The need to restrict
injunctive relief to enforcement of minimum
constitutional rights is especially great
when federal judicial relief threatens to
uSurp such highly discretionary state
functions.

The Supreme Court's decision in

Superintendent v. Hill, 105 S. Ct. 2768

(1985), indicates that the due process
clause requires only the existence of "some
evidence" in support of a prison

administrator's segregation decision. Id.

at 2770.

80.

In Hill, the plaintiff, a prisoner,

was charged with misconduct for assaulting
another inmate. Id. At the disciplinary
hearing, a prison guard testified that he
heard a scuffle, found the victim bleeding
from the mouth, and observed the plaintiff
and two other inmates jogging away down an
enclosed corridor. Id. No evidence was
adduced concerning which of the three
retreating inmates caused the victim's
injuries. Id. The prison disciplinary
board withdrew 100 days of plaintiff's good
time credit and ordered that plaintiff be
confined in isolation for 15 days. Id.
The plaintiff challenged the prison
administration's decision in state court,
which granted summary judgment in
plaintiff's favor. Id. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that
the record failed to reflect any evidence
that would support the disciplinary board's
findings. Id. at 2771. The United States
Supreme Court reversed. Id.

81.

The Court held that "revocation of

good time does not comport with minimum
requirements of procedural due process
unless the findings of the prison
disciplinary board are supported by some
evidence in the record." Id. at 2773
(citation omitted). The Court held that
the evidence recited above was sufficient.
Id. at 2775. The Court's reasoning merits
recitation at length:

Where a prisoner has a liberty
interest in good time credits,
the loss of such credits
threatens his prospective freedom
from confinement by extending the
length of imprisonment. Thus the
inmate has a strong interest in
assuring that the loss of good
time credits is not imposed
arbitrarily. This interest,
however, must be accommodated in
the distinctive setting of a
prison, where disciplinary
proceedings "take place in a
closed, tightly controlled
environment peopled by those who
have chosen to violate the
Criminal law and who have been
lawfully incarcerated for doing
£64" Consequently, in
identifying the safeguards
required by due process, the
Court has recognized the
legitimate institutional needs of
assuring the safety of inmates

82.

and prisoners, avoiding
burdensome administrative
requirements that might be
susceptible to manipulation, and
preserving the disciplinary
Process aS a means oOf
rehabilitation.

° Requiring a modicum of
evidence to support a decision to
revoke good time credits will
help to prevent arbitrary
deprivations without threatening
institutional interests imposing
undue administrative burdens.

Because the written
statement mandated by Wolff
requires a disciplinary board to
explain the evidence relied upon,
recognizing that due process
requires some evidentiary basis
for a decision to revoke good
time credits will not impose
significant new burdens on
proceedings within the prison.
Nor does it imply that a
disciplinary board's factual
findings or decisions with
respect to appropriate punishment
are subject to second-gquessing
upon review.

We hold that the

requirements of due process are

- satisfied if some evidence
supports the decision by the

prison disciplinary board to

revoke good time credits. This

standard is met if "there was

some evidence from which the

conclusion of the administrative

tribunal could be deduced ...."

83.

Ascertaining whether this
standard is satisfied does not
reaquire examination of the entire
record, independent assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence.
Instead, the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the
Gisciplinary board. We decline
to adopt a more stringent
evidentiary standard as a
constitutional requirement.
Prison disciplinary proceedings
take place in a highly charged
atmosphere, and prison
administrators must often act
swiftly on the basis of evidence
that might be insufficient in
less exigent circumstances. The
fundamental fairness quaranteed
by the Due Process Clause does
not require courts to set aside
Geeisi ons o f prison
administrators that have some
basis in fact.

Id. at 2774 (quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis added).

The Court's decisions in Hewitt and
Hill lead to two conclusions: First, the
exigencies of prison administration allow
prison administrators to make segregation
decisions on the basis of "some evidence,”

including the administrator's experience

and awareness of general prison conditions;

84.

second, a reviewing court may not reverse
the administration's decision if "some
evidence” supports the administration's
decision.

Plaintiffs seek to distinguish Hill on
the basis that "the issue before this Court
is not what due process requires, but
rather, whether the district court abused
its discretion in formulating a remedy for
proven violations of the Constitution
(including Eighth Amendment Rights)." We
reject this argument for reasons similar to
those we gave in holding that eighth
amendment violations do not create a
liberty interest. See supra pages 20-22.
A prisoner who presents a clear security
risk enjoys exactly the same eighth
amendment protection as does the most
placid prisoner. The fact that
justification exists for segregating a
particular prisoner will not assuage his
sufferings. Therefore, close scrutiny of

prison officials" segregation decisions

85.

will do little to protect plaintiffs'
eighth amendment rights.25/

We also do not consider the
defendants' history of noncompliance with
prior orders to constitute a valid reason
for this court to arrogate to itself the
discretion imposed on the defendants. The
earlier orders demanded much more of the
defendants than the law now requires. Our
purpose is not to punish defendants for
their past failures, but to enforce
compliance with current constitutional
standards. We perceive no reason why the
defendants would be unwilling to comply
with the requirements we have established.
But even if the defendants failed to
comply, de novo review by the court or the
Monitor would be unwarranted. The district

court could assure itself that the

25. Moreover, if Judge Savitt's
cenclusions regarding the conditions in the
general population are correct, see supra
note 12, interfering in segregation
decisions, would be futile, at least as far
as the San Quentin plaintiffs are concerned.

86.

defendants were complying with the
constitution simply by examining the record
for "some evidence" in support of each
challenged segregation decision. The
Gistrict court abused its discretion by
allowing the Monitor to substitute his
discretion for that of the defendants.26/
VIII
THE WORK REQUIREMENT

In Part III(C) of the Permanent -
Injunction, the district court ordered that
no prisoner assigned to administrative
segregation be denied the opportunity to
participate in work, education, or
vocational training programs. 597 F. Supp.

at 1425.

26. We note that Part IV(D) of the
Permanent Injunction appears to allow a
segregated prisoner to obtain repeated
review of his status. As we have discussed
above, due process requires only reasonable
periodic review. See Clark v. Brewer, 776
F.2d at 234. On remand, if the district
court decides that review by the court or
the Monitor is required, the court shall
not require more frequent review than is
necessary to protect plaintiffs' due
process rights.

87.

A. Due Process

Plaintiffs contend that P: rt III(C) is
necessary to the enforcement of plaintiffs‘
due process rights. This is not true.
Requiring prison officials to provide work
programs is an inappropriate remedy. The
due process clause seeks to prevent denial
of life, liberty or property by arbitrary
decision. Hewitt, 457 U.S. at 476;

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. The due process

Clause requires procedure. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. The district

court's order, however, does not relate to
enforcement of procedural protections. The
work requirement relates only to the
conditions of confinement. To the extent
Part III(C) merely constitutes an
enforcement of state law, it violates the

eleventh amendment. Pennhurst State School

and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-

121 (1984).

88.

B. Eighth Amendment

In Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 7.2d at 1254-

. 55, 1258, we held that “[iJdleness and the
lack of programs are not eighth amendment
. violations. The lack of these programs
Simply does not amount to the infliction of
pain." The district court recognized this
language as controlling. 597 F. Supp. at

1414. Plaintiffs,27/ nonetheless, urge us

27. Plaintiffs failed to brief this
issue in their opposition brief and opening
brief on cross-appeal, but instead refer us
to the briefs filed by amici, the Bar
Association of San Francisco, the San
Francisco Lawyers Committee on Urban
Affairs, and the California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice. Defendants object to
consideration of this issue on the basis
that an argument made on appeal by amici,
but not by the parties, is not properly
before the reviewing court. In each of the
cases cited by defendants, the courts
refused to consider issues not raised by
the paries. See United Parcel Servi
Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.
(1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531
n.13 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364

‘ U.S. 361, 370 (1970); Wiggins Bros., Inc.
v. Department of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 83
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 905 (1982); National Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d
: 157, 160, n.3 (7th Cir. A977), Certs
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). In the
instant case, however, plaintiffs raised

89.

to reverse the district court's decision
that enforced idleness is not a violation
of the eighth amendment. Plaintiffs

implicitly urge us to overrule Hoptowit v.

Ray.

To arrive at the desired result,
plaintiffs believe that two logical steps
must be taken. First, plaintiffs urge us

to clarify the language in our prior

the issue but failed to brief it.
Moreover, plaintiffs argue this issue in
their reply brief on cross-appeal. The
piaintiffs obtained leave of court to file
their 75 page brief. The amici briefs add
39 pages of argument in support of
plaintiffs' request on this issue. By
incorporating amicis' arguments by
reference, plaintiffs have circumvented the
page limits set by the court.

Although we do not condone such
practices generally, we recognize that this
case presents a number of weighty
constitutional issues. The defendants have
had every opportunity to respond to the
arguments of plaintiffs ard amici and, in
fact, have briefed this issue. Justice
would not be served by ignoring the amicis'
arguments. Therefore, we exercise our
discretion to consider this issue.

To avoid confusion, henceforth we will
refer to plaintiffs and amici solely as
plaintiffs.

90.

opinions regarding the proper framework for
analyzing an alleged eighth amendment
violation. Second, plaintiffs urge us to
reject or limit our holding in Hoptowit v.
Ray regarding idleness.

In Hoptowit v. Ray, we considered the

eighth amendment analytical framework at
length. See 682 F.2d at 1246-47. Our
discussion leads to the undeniable
conclusion that we follow the "related
conditions" approach urged by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs object, however, to one

statement in Hoptowit. In Hoptowit we

stated, inter alia, that "[a] number of
conditions, each of which satisfy Eighth
Amendment requirements, cannot in
combination amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation." 682 F.2d at 1247. To the
extent that this sentence creates
uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the
analytical framework employed in this
circuit, such uncertainty or ambiguity may

be rectified easily. We meant that a

91.

number of unrelated conditions, each of

which satisfy eighth amendment
requirements, cannot in combination amount
to an eighth amendment violation. See

Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at 1133.

Plaintiffs contend that Hoptowit v.

Ray ignores related conditions by creating
a per se rule that enforced idleness does
not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Plaintiffs argue that by

applying Hoptowit's per se rule, the

district court failed to consider related
conditions that, when combined with
enforced idleness, would create a cruel and
inhuman situation.

Plaintiffs' arguments are unpersuasive
for several reasons. First, related
conditions are those conditions that
combine to deprive a prisoner of a discrete

basic human need. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682

F.2d at 1246. The discrete basic human
needs that prison officials must satisfy

include food, clothing, shelter,

92s

sanitation, medical care, and personal

safety. Id.; Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at

1132-3). Enforced idleness, taken alone,
Simply does not deprive a prisoner of any
of these basic needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray,
682 F.2d at 1254-55.28/

Second, plaintiffs do not identify any
related conditions that would support a

finding that enforced idleness created an

28. Although methods of analysis
differ, each circuit that has considered
the issue has held that enforced idleness
does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. See Jackson v. Meachum, 699
P.28@ S76, S8i-83 (286. Cis. £29833
(cataloging decisions of other circuits);
see also Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868,
874 (7th Cir. 1981); Ramos _v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Bono v. Saxbe,
620 F.2d 609, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1980);
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
num. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978);
Sweet _v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir.
1975); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
192-93 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972). The expert opinions
cited by plaintiffs are entitled to little
weight in determining whether a particular
condition constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Rhodes _v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 348 n.13 (1981). We adhere to our
holding in Hoptowit v. Ray.

93.

eighth amendment violation in this case.
Plaintiffs point to the vViatenes and
psychological pain that enforced idleness
engenders. Related conditions, however,
are not those that result from another .
condition, but those that in combination
create a cruel and unusual punishment.

See, e.g., Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at

1134; Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199

(Sth Cir. i979)» In reality, plaintiffs
urge us to hold as a matter of law that
"lengthy enforced idleness does not comport
with contemporary standards of decency, and
that work, educational, and vocational
programs are constitutionally mandated."
Plaintiffs, therefore, implicitly ask us to

overrule Hoptowit v. Ray and create a per

se rule to the contrary.

Third, even if we held that enforced
idleness in administrative segregation
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
it does not follow that mandating work

programs is the appropriate remedy. An

94.

injunction must be narrowly tailored to
cure the constitutional violation and must
not intrude on the functions of state
officials unnecessarily. We would violate.
. this principle by holding as a matter of

law that provision of work programs is the

necessary remedy for enforced idleness.

See supra note 4; Grummett v. Rushen, 779

F.2d at 496-97 (Sneed, J., concurring).

Fourth, whether or not Hoptowit states

a per se rule, the district court did not
apply it as such. Plaintiffs distort the
district court's factual findings and legal
reasoning to create the impression that the
district court failed to consider the
effect of enforced idleness on the
plaintiffs. The district court, however,
considered several factors in concluding
that idleness did not rise to an eighth
amendment violation. The court stated
that--

the denial of programs to

plaintiffs is not ‘totally

without penological

95.

————— LOO = =EAhni TS

justification.' At least in

theory, each plaintiff has been

selected for segregation on the

basis of criteria indicating that

he is in some way unfit or .
unsuited for intermingling with
other inmates, whether because he
has misbehaved, because he
presents a threat to the safety
of other inmates, or because he
has requested isolation from
other inmates for his own
protection.

597 F. Supp. at 1414. The district court,
therefore, did not blindly follow a per se
approach.29/

The plaintiffs' argument largely
depends on the assertion that enforced

idleness engenders a high degree of

violence. Plaintiffs attempt to draw a

29. Regardless of the ambiguity in
this circuit's description of the eighth
amendment analytical framework, it is
abundantly clear that the district court
adopted and applied the related conditions
approach throughout its opinion. See,
e.g., 597 F. Supp. at 1408 (if all other
conditions are satisfactory, segregating
inmates in small cells is not eighth
amendment violation); id. at 1409 (under
prevailing conditions, double celling is
cruel and inhuman); id., at 1411
(conditions of filth require that inmates <
be provided with hot running water or
periodic showers).

96.

close connection between enforced idleness
and violence in the instant case by stating

that "The District Court specifically found
that ‘'[lJockup units at San Quentin and

Folsom are counted among the most violence-
racked correctional facilities in the
United States .... In part, it may be due
to the fact that lockup units have no
programs.'" The district court's findings
indicate that the connection between
violence and enforced idleness in
administrative segregation is substantially
more attenuated than plaintiffs would have
us believe. The district court stated in
full:

Lockup units at San Quentin and
Folsom are counted among the most
violence-racked correctional
facilities in the United States.
In part, this is due to the
California Department of
Corrections policy of
concentrating the most violence-
prone offenders in these two
institutions. _In part, it is
caused by the horrendous physical
conditions, including double-
celling. In part, it is due to
the crowding of both facilities
beyond design capacity. In part,

97.

it may be due to the fact that
lockup units have no programs.
But in large measure, it
Originates in the violent
propensities of segregated
inmates themselves.

597 F. Supp. at 1404-05.

The plaintiffs' argument also depends
on the assertion that enforced idleness
inflicts psychological pain without
penological justification. Again,
plaintiffs ignore the actual findings and
reasoning of the district court. The
district court expressly found that "denial
of programs is not totally without
penological justification." 597 F. Supp.
at 1414. Plaintiffs' argument that the
district court failed to consider related
conditions, therefore, is incorrect.

We vacate Part III(C) of the Permanent
Injunction. The administration of state-
created work programs is the province of
prison officials, not of the district

court.

98.

Ix

ACCESS TO THE PRISON LAW LIBRARY

In Part I1I(15) of the Permanent
Injunction, the district court ordered
defendants to allow segregated prisoners
access to the prison law library as
reasonably necessary, absent documented
security reasons. 597 F. Supp. at 1424.
The court found that the "paging system"30/
in use at San Quentin and Folsom rendered
effective legal research virtually
impossible. Id. at 1403. However, the
district court allowed the defendants to
deny physical access to the libraries to
those plaintiffs who are documented
security risks. Id. at 1424. The court
specified that any prisoner denied access

tc {le libraries be permitted to order five

30. A paging system allows a prisoner
to request specific volumes. The
significant features of such a system are
that the prisoner must know in advance
which volumes he will need to review and
that the process of ordering and returning
books drastically prolongs legal research.

99.

books per week, which would be delivered to

the prisoner's cell. Id.

In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817

(1977), the Supreme Court held that
prisoners have a constitutional right of
access to the courts which in turn requires
prison authorities to provide prisoners
with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law.

Id. at 828; see Lindguist v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 85l, 855

(Stan. €ixc.. 2963} @ In Lindquist, we

recognized that

The existence of an adequate law
library does not provide for
meaningful access to the courts
if the inmates are not allowed a
reasonable amount of time to use
the library. However, the
Constitution does not guarantee a
prisoner unlimited access to a
law library. Prison officials of
necessity must regulate the time,
“Manner, and place in which
library facilities are used. The
fact that an inmate must wait for
a turn to use the library does
not necessarily mean that he has
been denied meaningful access to
the court.

Id. at 858 (citations omitted).

100.

Defendants do not challenge the
validity of the district court's factual
findings. Defendants argue that the
district court should have limited
injunctive relief to remedying the
deficiencies in the paging system.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering
physical access absent compelling security
needs. Plaintiffs also argue, however,
that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to require defendants
to provide legal cssistance to inmates
barred from physical access.

The district court's order
accommodates defendants' interests by
allowing them to limit physical access to
the law library. They need only permit
reasonably necessary use. Moreover, even
if a segregated inmate needs to use the law
library, defendants may preclude physical
access if such access would interfere with
institutional security.

101.

The defendants interpret the portion
of the court's order allowing limited use
of the paging system as an acknowledgement
of the efficacy of the system. This
interpretation is incorrect. The district °
court expressly found that the paging
system significantly impairs effective
legal research. 597 F. Supp. at 1403,

1413. Allowing a limited use of the paging
System merely recognizes defendants'
interest in institutional security.

Plaintiffs contend that even as
"improved" by the district court, the
paging system is constitutionally
deficient. This argument has merit. In

William v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979),

the Fourth Circuit held that allowing é@
prisoner physical access to a law library
for 45 minutes a day, three days a week did
not constitute a meaningful opportunity to
conduct legal research. Id. at 1340.
Presumably, a prisoner could examine more

102.

than five books in that amount of time.
The Williams court noted that

° Ordinarily, a prisoner should
have direct access to a law
library if the state chooses to
provide a prison law library as

‘ its way of satisfying the mandate
of Bounds. Simply providing a
prisoner with books in his cell,
if he requests them, gives the
prisoner no meaningful chance to
explore the legal remedies that
he might have. Legal research
often requires browsing through
various materials in search of
inspiration; tentative theories
may have to be abandoned in the
course of research in the face of
unfamiliar adverse precedent.
New theories may occur as a
result of a chance discovery of
an obscure or forgotten case.
Certainly a prisoner, unversed in
the law and the methods of legal
research, will need more time or
more assistance than the trained
lawyer exploring his case. It is
unr6alistic to expect a prisoner
to know in advance exactly what
materials he needs to consult.

Id. at 1339.

The Williams court permitted the state

to use a paging system when the state did
not rely solely on access to a law library
to satisfy Bounds. In Williams, Virginia

and South Carolina provided state-funded

103.

legal counsel or trained legal assistants
to prisoners contesting the legality or
conditions of confinement. Id.

Plaintiffs in the instant case request
research assistance for all prisoners
denied physical access to the law
libraries. The great weight of authority
in the courts of appeals Supports
plaintiffs' request. See Nordgren v,
Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853-55 (10th Cir.

1985) (state provided access to courts by
providing legal assistance in drafting
pleadings), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 593

(1986); Williams v. Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231,

1232 (8th Cir. 1984) (state satisfied
Bounds by providing two inmate paralegals
and one runner to procure law books, copy
materials and research legal questions for
23 death-row inmates; Corgain v. Miller,
708 F.2d 1241, 1247-50 (7th Cir. 1983)
(where state actually provided legal
assistance, access to legal materials could

be restricted); Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d
104.

639, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1983) (state may deny
physical access to law library to ensure

security when prisoner has access to person

trained in law); Rich v. Zitnay, 644 F.2d

41, 43 (lst Cir. 1981) (state must show
that alternatives to access to prison

library satisfy Bounds); Williams v. Leeke,
584 F.2d at 1339. Cf. Arsberry v. Sielaff,

586 F.2d 37, 44 (7th Cir. 1978) ("as long
as adequate alternatives are available in
light of legitimate penological objectives,
a limitation on a prisoner's constitutional
rights will not be deemed impermissible").
Moreover, plaintiffs' suggested remedy
would not be overly intrusive. The
defendants would only be required to
provide legal assistance to those prisoners
that defendants deem to be a security risk.

Therefore, we conclude that all
prisoners are entitled to meaningful access
to the courts. If the state denies a
prisoner reasonable access to a law
library, the state must provide that

105.

prisoner legal assistance. If the parties
fail to agree on a plan that provides
meaningful access to the courts, the
district court shall fashion one that
comports with the requirements established
in this opinion.
X
ACOUSTICAL WALL COVERINGS

In Part I1(6) of the Permanent
Injunction, the district court ordered
defendants to install, inter alia, sound-
absorbing wall-coverings in the five-tier
units. 597 F. Supp. at 1423. Defendants
do not object to the district court's
conclusion that the level of noise in the
five tier units inflicts pain without
penological justification. They contest
the court's remedy. They argue that wall
coverings would not reduce the noise
perceptibly and would be costly.

The fact that a remedy is costly does
not preclude a district court from ordering

the remedy. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1247.

106.

The testimony of defendants' expert witness

Supports the conclusion that the remedy
ordered by the court would reduce the noise
levels perceptibly. The district court's
choice of remedy was a proper exercise of
discretion.
XI
ADJUSTABLE HOT AND COLD WATER CONTROLS

In Part I1(10) of the Permanent
Injunction, the district court ordered that
tne shower facilities used by inmates in
segregation be equipped with adjustable
valves for hot and cold water. 597 F.Supp.
at 1423. The court found showers necessary
to protect the plaintiffs' interest in
proper shelter, sanitation, and medical
care. Id. at 1399-1400, 1411. )

The defendants contend that the remedy
was too intrusive. Defendants claim that
the district court could have required
defendants to provide warm water, rather

than hot and cold water.

107.

The court's order is not overly
intrusive. The requirement that defendants
install hot and cold water controls will
necessitate the expenditure of public
funds. Defendants, however, do not
complain that the cost would be
prohibitive. Nor do defendants complain
that adjustable controls will interfere
with prison security or other legitimate
penological concerns. Most importantly,
requiring defendants to install adjustable
controls will not affect the daily
Operation of the prison. The adjustable
controls will encourage showering and help
reduce the adverse effects of confinement
in a filthy environment.

We uphold Part II(10) of the Permanent
Injunction.

XII
HEALTH CARE AT FOLSOM

The district court determined that the

system of health care at Folsom does not

manifest deliberate indifference to the

108.

serious medical needs of the prisoners.
See 597 F. Supp. at 1414. Plaintiffs
appeal this conclusion in respect to
several aspects of Folsom's health care
system. We will discuss each separately.
A. Access to Medical and Psychiatric Care
The district court found that Folsom
employs five physicians, two psychiatrists,
and a psychologist to care for 3,500
prisoners. 597 F. Supp. at 1403-04.
Medical technical assistants (MTAs) screen
inmate complaints. Id. at 1404. MTAS
conduct sick call in the lockup units on a
daily basis. Id. A physician passes by
the cells once a week. Id. MTAs generally
determine which inmates will be sent to the
infirmary for medical treatment. Id.
However, inmates will be allowed to consult
a physician if they insist. Id. The court
found “that while there may be isolated
exceptions, Folsom provides most strictly
‘necessary’ treatment on a timely,

medically sound basis." Id.

109.

Denial of medical attention to

prisoners constitutes an eighth amendment
violation if the denial amounts to
deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of the prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). "Prison officials
Show deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs if prisoners are unable to
make their medical problems known to

medical staff." Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

at 1253. The district court found that
segregated inmates could be examined or
treated by a doctor during the weekly visit
Or insist on an earlier appointment.
Folsom, therefore, does not deliberately
deny or delay a prisoner's access to

medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. at 104-05. Plaintiffs' citations to
isolated occurrences of neglect do not
amount to a constitutional violation. "In
order to state a cognizable claim, a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

110.

indifference to serious medical needs.”
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added).
B. Use of Unqualified Medical Personnel
Plaintiffs argue that defendants place
an unconstitutional degree of reliance on
MTAs, registered nurses (RNs), and inmate
workers. The district court found that the
MTAS screen inmates and administer
noiprescription drugs. 597 F. Supp. at
1404. Plaintiffs cite testimony indicating
that MTAs, RNs, and inmates provide a
number of services which they are not
qualified to perform. Defendants respond
that MTAs, RNs and inmates are qualified to
perform a number of services. $
plaintiffs correctly contend that
unqualified personnel regularly engage in
medical practice, precedent indicates that
the prison health care delivery system may
reflect deliberate indifference to

plaintiffs' medical needs. See Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682: F.2d at 1252 (district court

correctly found eighth amendment violation

lll.

where, inter alia, medication was prepared

and dispensed by unqualified personnel).
Therefore, we must remand for entry of
explicit factual findings regarding the
nature of services performed by MTAs, RNs,
and inmates, their level of medical
qualification, and the level of
qualification required to adequately render
the services that they perform.
es Confidentiality of Records

Plaintiffs argue that constitutionally
adequate medical care cannot be provided
without complete medical records, and that
medical records are inadequate if they lack

confidentiality. Plaintiffs cite Williams

v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1216 (5th Cir.

1977), for the proposition that medical
records are inadequate if they lack

confidentiality. In Williams v. Edwards,

inmate medical assistants failed to keep
any medical records of certain procedures.

Id. Nothing in Williams v. Edwards

indicates a causal connection between lack

112.

of confidentiality and inadequacy of

records. We reject plaintiffs' argument.
D. Lack of Special Medical Diets

The district court found that the only
special diet available at Folsom is one
designed for treating ulcers. 597 F. Supp.
at 1404. Prisoners needing other special
diets must await transfer to another
institution. Id. Plaintiffs argue that so
long as prompt transfers are unavailable,
failure to provide special diets is
unconstitutional. We disagree. A fair
reading of the district court's findings of
fact indicates that if a prisoner needs a
special diet, eventually he will be
transferred to an institution that is
equipped to provide it. Neither precedent
nor common sense suggests that delay in
providing a special diet arises to the
level of deliberate indifference. The
district court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to order defendants to provide
special diets.

113.

E. Medical Facilities

The district court found that in
comparison with other parts of the prison,
the Folsom infirmary is relatively clean,
but that sanitation failed to meet medical
Standards. 597 F. Supp. at 1404.
Plaintiffs argue that inadequate and
unsanitary health care facilities violate
the eighth amendment.

Plaintiffs' authorities do not Support

such a broad proposition. In Williams v,

Edwards, 547 F.2d at 1217, a "filthy"

emergency room was but one factor in
determining the existence of deliberate
indifference. The filth included the
storage of live fish in a whirlpool bath.

Id. In Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320,

1323 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421

U.S. 948 (1975), the lack of sanitation

included the cleaning of linens from

patients with hepatitis and tuberculosis

along with the linens of other infirmary

inmates.31/ In Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F.

31. The lack of health care in the
Alabama prisons, which were the subject of
Newman v. Alabama, provides a stark
contrast with the level of health care at
Folsom:

Immediately before [court]
intervention, medical services
for Alabama's almost 4,000
prisoners were provided largely
at a state medical and diagnostic
center. The center maintained no
full-time physician; instead,
care was provided by three
private doctors working part-time
at the center, three registered
nurses, eight unlicensed former
military medics, and a part-time
dentist. Facilities at
individual prisons were even
worse. One unit housing 850
inmates, for example, had no
full-time physician and a dentist
available only one-half day of
each week. Because of
understaffing, unsupervised and
untrained inmates regularly
provided medical services,
including minor surgery. The
horror stories coming out of such
a setting were numerous.
Bedsores of a quadraplegic who
spent many months at the medical
and diagnostic center, for
example, became infested with
maggots. In the month before his
. death, he was bathed, and his
bandages changed only once.

Yarbrough, The Alabama Prison Litigation, 9

115.

Supp. at 512, surgical instruments were not
sterilized, the surgical suite was not
Cleaned routinely, and clean and soiled
linens were stored together.

Unlike Lightfoot and Williams, surgery
is not performed at the Folsom infirmary.
597 F. Supp. at 1404. Unlike Williams, the
Folsom infirmary is not subject to vermin
infestation. Id. Unlike Newman, there is
no indication in this case that infirmary
officials were so callous to the health
needs of the inmates as to mix the laundry
of patients with highly communicable
infectious diseases with that of the
general infirmary inmates. Id.

F. Conclusions Regardi»;, Health Care at

Folsom

In sum, Folsom's health care
conditions fall below medical standards.
The fact that a given condition might

constitute medical malpractice, however,

Just. Sys. J. 276, 277 (1984) (citations
omitted).

116.

does not necessarily mean that the
condition constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at

106. It is only deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs that can offend
"evolving standards of decency" in
violation of the eighth amendment. § Id.
However, the district court's failure to
render specific factual findings regarding
the level of reliance on unqualified
personnel requires a remand for entry of
such findings.
XIII
CONTACT VISITATION

The district court held that denial of
contact visits to inmates in administrative
segregation does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 597 F. Supp. at 1413.

Plaintiffs assert that the district
court improperly applied a per _se rule.
They urge us to remand the case to the
district court with instructions to
reconsider whether all prisoners in

117.

administrative segregation in San Quentin
and Folsom are entitled to individualized
determinations on their suitability for
contact visits.

Plaintiffs cite no authority for the
proposition that denial of contact visits
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Instead, they argue that the evidence
adduced at trial demonstrates that contact
visitation would have beneficial
rehabilitative effects. They contend that
"there was unanimity of evidence that
contact visits thus are vital to inmate
health, as the deprivation of human contact
involves extreme suffering and affects both
physical and mental health.”

Judicial authority uniformly
contradicts plaintiffs' assertions. See

Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 580 n.26 (10th

Cir. 1980) ("weight of present authority
clearly establishes that there is no
constitutional right to contact visitation

- + « We agree with this view."), cert.

118.

denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Lynott v,
Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.

1980) ("convicted prisoners have no
absolute constitutional right to

visitation"); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d

364, 372-73 (lst Cir. 1978) ("we can
discover no constitutional guarantee that
[contact visits] may take place.");

Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407

(4th Cir. 1975) ("[prisoner] has no
constitutional right to physical contact
with his family."); see also Smith v.
Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1984)

(contact visits with persons other than
priest, lawyer, and doctor could disrupt
prison administration, create security
risks, and allow smuggling of contraband;
denial of contact visits did not violate
prisoners' first amendment rights); O'Bryan
v. County of Saginan, 741 F.2d 283, 284-85

(6th Cir. 1984) (denial of constitution);

Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce,

612 F.2d 754, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1979) (ban on
119.

contact visits does not violate due process
rights of prisoners). Expert opinion is
entitled to little weight in determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.

See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 348

n.i3. Plaintiffs' argument, therefore,
lacks support. Denial of contact
visitation simply does not amount to the

infliction of pain. Cf. Hoptowit v. Ray,

682 F.2d at 1254-55.

Even if denial of contact visitation
amounted to an infliction of pain, the
eighth amendment would not prohibit the
denial unless the pain were inflicted
wantonly and without penological

justification. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

at 346. The district court found that no
segregated inmate was deprived of all
visits and most were allowed contact ’
visits. 597 F. Supp. at 1413. The court
found that despite thorough searches,
contact visits result in the smuggling of
contraband, particularly drugs. Id. at

120.

1403. The court commended defendants for
their efforts to improve visiting
facilities at Folsom. Id. at 1413 n.44.
The court noted that San Quentin was one of
the very few maximum security prisons in
the nation to allow conjugal visitation for
any of its inmates. Id. at 1402 n.25. The
court's findings hardly indicate that
defendants wantonly inflict pain on the
plaintiffs. To the contrary, the district
court's findings indicate that denial of
contact visitation is based on sound

penological justifications.32/

32. Plain

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2053%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
