# Opposition Brief — Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 484 U.S. 975

## Text

- Supreme Court, U.S.
"ELLED

APR ZO {S87

No. 86-1562 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
GLEbS

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

PAWTUXET COVE MARINA, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs

CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit

RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

DOUGLAS E. KLIEVER
| KATHERINE L. RHYNE
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN M. BREDEHOFT
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN
& HAMILTON
1752 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 728-2700
Counsel for Respondent

CIBA-GEIGY Corporation
April 20, 1987

WILSON - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED *

1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to relitigate in this
Court their view of the factual circumstances of their
purported tort claims and federal claim, where that
view was repeatedly rejected by the courts below as
wholly unsupported.

2. Whether a citizen suit under Section 505 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, will lie against a
former industrial discharger where the former discharger
is not and cannot be alleged to be “in violation” of an
effluent standard or limitation contained in a permit that
is “in effect” under the Clean Water Act.

* These questions have been restated from those set out in the
Petition.

(i)

ii
PARTIES BELOW

Petitioners, who were plaintiffs in the District Court
and appellants in the Court of Appeals, are Russell Hunt,
Beverley Hunt, and Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Incorpo-
rated. Respondent, who was defendant in the District
Court and appellee in the Court of Appeals, is CIBA-
GEIGY Corporation.*

* The following information is provided for purposes of Rule 28.1.
The parent company of CIBA-GEIGY Corporation is CIBA-GEIGY
International, Limited. CIBA-GEIGY Corporatien’s only subsidi-
ary or affiliate (other than wholly-owned subsidiaries) is CIBA-
Corning Diagnostics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........000000000000000- 2020...

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .............
A. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Entitled to Relitigate

B.

in This Court Their View of The Factual Cir-
cumstances of The Case, Where That View Was
Repeatedly Rejected by the Courts Below as
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Be EE a
2. The State Common Law Claims .....................

Citizen-plaintiffs May Not Maintain an Action
Under Section 505 of the Clean Water Act
Where, As Here, the Former Discharger Is Not
and Cannot Be Alleged To Be “in violation” of
an Effluent Standard or Limitation Contained in
a Permit That Is “in effect’? Under the Clean
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(iii)

Page

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) ..................... 9
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, —— U.S. ——, 106 S. Ct.

TRIE SEED ick ik ss saicncecovigseeshednnsiainaaasanioemmnpenentces 8
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. American Re-
covery Co., 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985) ............ 19

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986),

cert. granted, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 872

§.- 2 SRRER ORRIN « 202 ELD Cmne eID BODEN pln ara 10-11
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air

Products Co., 386 U.S. 271 (1949) ..................-.--- 9
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756

fp ¢ 8 Be Sy — ; peeReheee cee eee 10

National Labor Relations Board v. Hendricks
County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454
ee SIE sia cac dictates mentacoachoonsccsaunsteeieaes 9
Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA- GEIGY

Corp., No. 85-1940 (1st Cir. 1985) ....................... 3
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) ..................... 9
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) ............ 9
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ...... 6

Statutes and Rules:
Clean Water Act, Section 311, 33 U.S.C. $ 1321...... 7
Clean Water Act, Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365......passim
I I er eats tak 7

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‘

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986
No. 86-1562

PAWTUXET COVE MARINA, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit

RESPONDENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

Respondent CIBA-GEIGY Corporation (“CIBA-
GEIGY”) opposes the Petition for a Writ of Certioran
to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc., a defunct
Rhode Island corporation, and Beverley and Russell Hunt,
two of its former shareholders (“plaintiffs”), were the
owners and operators of commercial marina properties
on Pawtuxet Cove in Cranston, Rhode Island. For ap-
proximately three decades prior to the commencement of

2

this action, respondent CIBA-GEIGY, a New York cor-
poration, operated a specialty chemical manufacturing
facility in Cranston, Rhode Island. The plant discharged
treated process wastewater into the Pawtuxet River pur-
suant to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (“NPDES”) permit No. RI-0001171.

CIBA-GEIGY’s permit expired by its own terms in
July of 1983, and by August 1, 1983, CIBA-GEIGY had
“tied in” its pretreated wastewater discharges to the
Cranston municipal wastewater treatment plant and com-
pletely ceased direct process wastewater discharges from
the Cranston plant.! During the pendency of this litiga-
tion, manufacturing operations at the Cranston plant
were discontinued.

Notwithstanding the cessation of process wastewater
discharges several months earlier, plaintiffs brought this
action in November 1983 in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island. Plaintiffs alleged
that certain past discharges from CIBA-GEIGY’s Cran-
ston manufacturing facility upstream had affected Paw-
tuxet Cove, damaging plaintiffs’ marina business and
rendering CIBA-GEIGY liable to them pursuant to fed-
eral and Rhode Island common law under a variety of
theories including trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict
liability, and “res ipsa loquitor.” Plaintiffs also alleged
that past discharges had violated CIBA-GEIGYs NPDES
ermit, and sought the imposition of civil penalties under
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act (which penalties

plaintiffs erroneously contended would be payable to
themselves).

Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint was dismissed by the Dis-
trict Court, District Judge (now Circuit Judge) Bruce

1The Cranston plant continued to discharge relatively small
amounts of cooling water (tap water which did not come into con-
tact with any process materials), which is not at issue in this
action.

3

M. Selya presiding, on May 17, 1984, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave was
given to file an amended complaint for “enforcement of
ongoing effluent standard violations (and civil penalties
ancillary thereto, payable to the United States)” and
for properly-pleaded state common law claims.’ Plain-
tiffs filed an Amended Complaint in June 1984 but, be-
cause CIBA-GEIGY did not discharge process waste-
water pursuant to an NPDES permit, plaintiffs remained
unable to allege ongoing violations. On September 10,
1984, the District Court again dismissed the citizen suit
count for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, but approved the finding of a magistrate
that the “bare essentials’ of state common law ciaims
had been alleged and permitted the action to go forward
based on the diverse citizenship of the parties.’

Following extensive discovery, CIBA-GEIGY filed a
motion for summary judgment as to the state common
law claims, based on the absence of any issue of material

2 May 17, 1984 Memorandum and Order of the District Court,
App. at 17. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under
federal common law, a determination which the plaintiffs have not
challenged.

3 Plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration of the two dismissals
of the citizen suit counts on January 24, 1985; the District Court
denied that motion on June 7, 1985. App. at 18-21. Yet another
motion to amend, this time with a complaint alleging unspecified
ongoing violations based on two spill incidents, was filed in August
of 1985. The District Court denied the motion to amend, on a
variety of grounds. App. at 31. See infra at 7. Plaintiffs filed
an objection to the ruling, which the District Court treated as
another request for reconsideration of the citizen suit claim and
denied on October 30, 1985. Plaintiffs then filed a premature
appeal on the citizen suit issue to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA-
GEIGY Corp., No. 85-1940 (1st Cir. 1985), which was summarily
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction on
December 10, 1985, approximately two months before trial of the
diversity claims commenced in the District Court.

4

fact respecting the role of CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges in
causing plaintiffs’ injuries. As the District Court char-
acterized it, the “gravamen of the plaintiffs’ main claim”
was that CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges entered Pawtuxet
Cove, thus adversely affecting public opinion regarding
the disposal of dredging spoil from the Cove and thereby
preventing dredging of the Cove.* The lack of dredging
was asserted to have injured financially the plaintiffs’
marina business, with attendant stress from the financial
harm allegedly causing various physical ailments of the
individual plaintiffs.

Judge Selya granted CIBA-GEIGY’s motion in part,
holding that “[{t]he voluminous record in this case is
entirely barren of any evidence (or even the hint of any
evidence) from which a rational factfinder could deduce
that pollution emanating from [CIBA-GEIGY’s] factory
proximately caused Pawtuxet Cove to remain un-
dredged.” * However, based on plaintiffs’ assurances
that the state common law claims had bases independent
of the lack of dredging of the Cove, Judge Selya per-
mitted plaintiffs to go to trial on the state law claims.

Trial began on February 3, 1986. After empanelment
of a jury, a viewing of the marina and the CIBA-GEIGY
plant site, and one and one-half days of testimony,
plaintiffs admitted that all of the state common law
claims were predicated on the failure to dredge Paw-
tuxet Cove, the issue which had been resolved in CIBA-
GEIGY’s favor on summary judgment. Plaintiffs sub-
mitted a Second Amended Complaint, specifying that all

4September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District
Court, App. at 25. The plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint,
which delimits the common law issues, alleged that the “lack of
dredging . . . was the sole, direct and proximate cause of each
and all of the losses, damages, injuries, and harm of which the
plaintiffs complain in this action.” App. at 35.

5September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District
Court, App. at 26.

5

of the common law claims were based entirely on the
dredging theory.* Judge Selya discharged the jury and
entered complete summary judgment in favor of CIBA-
GEIGY on the common law claims.

Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit, contesting both the entry of
summary judgment on the common law claims and the
repeated dismissals of the citizen suit. The Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion delivered by Senior Circuit Judge
Aldrich, agreed with the District Court that: (i) “as a
matter of law on the overall record” CIBA-GEIGY’s dis-
charge “was an insignificant, and in no sense a ‘but for’
factor” in the failure to dredge Pawtuxet Cove, plain-
tiffs being left with “nothing but hope [which] was
clearly insufficient to make out a case against defend-
ant;’’* and (ii) a citizen suit under Section 505 “may
go forward if the citizen-plaintiff fairly alleges a con-
tinuing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined,
will again proceed to violate the Act.” Because “[u]t
the time plaintiffs brought suit ... the defendant had
ceased operating under [its] permit ... [and] there
was no reasonable likelihood that defendant’s alleged
infractions would continue,” the Court ef Appeals af-
firmed the District Court’s dismissal of the action.®
Plaintiffs subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ
of certiorari.

6 See App. at 35. The sole exception was plaintiffs’ trespass
claim, which on plaintiifs’ motion was dismissed with prejudice
after plaintiffs admitted they could not prove any trespass.

7 December 18, 1986 Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Pawtuzet
Cove Marina, Inc. v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1091
(1st Cir. 1986) ; App. at 3.

8 December 18, 1986 Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 807 F.2d
at 1094; App. at 9-10. The Court of Appeals also held that there
was no abuse of discretion by the District Court when it denied
plaintiffs’ August 1985 motion to amend based on the spill inci-
dents. 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

A. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Entitled to Relitigate in This
Court Their View of the Factual Circumstances of The
Case, Where That View Was Repeatedly Rejected by
the Courts Below as Wholly Unsupported.

Plaintiffs base their Petition for Certiorari entirely on
supposed errors of fact made by the courts below, as to
both the citizen suit issue and the common law claims.
These assertions, even if colorable (and they are not),
do not suffice to support a Petition for Certiorari.

1. The Citizen Suit Claim.

The body of plaintiffs’ Petition does not appear to
challenge the legal conclusion of the courts below that
no aciion will lie under Section 505 unless it is one to
abate ongoing violations. As plaintiffs frame the citizen-
suit issue in their Petition for Certiorari, the “circuit
court ignored the fact there were ongoing violations” of
CIBA-GEIGY’s NPDES permit.*

It is settled practice that this Court does “not grant a
[writ of] certiorari to review evidence and discuss spe-
cific facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,
227 (1925).

Moreover, it is clear that the courts below correctly
found that plaintiffs did not—and could not—allege an
ongoing violation of CIBA-GEIGY’s NPDES permit at
the time the action was commenced (or thereafter).
The plaintiffs’ Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Sec-
ond Amended Complaint each failed to allege that CIBA-
GEIGY was “in violation” of an effluent standard or
limitation in a permit “‘in effect.”

Plaintiffs’ Petition for Certiorari, however, cites the
existence of violations “after the petitioners had filed
the requisite statutory notice,’ though not as of the time

® Petition for Certiorari at 7.

7

the action was commenced.’ This argument tracks
plaintiffs’ August 1985 motion to amend based on pur-
ported “ongoing violations,” which was rejected by the
District Court. The District Court held that “the fourth
attempt by the plaintiffs to inject the (phantom) on-
going violation issue into the case . . . comes too late
and clearly bears the hallmark of yet another exercise
in abject futility.” App. at 31. The Court of Appeals
agreed. 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

The plaintiffs now attempt to argue that the courts
below should have presumed that violations of CIBA-
GEIGY’s NPDES permit were ongoing and that plain-
tiffs would be able to prove a likelihood of continued vio-
lations." This position has no support in law, and is con-
trary to the facts as found by the courts below.

10The purported “violation” referred to in the Petition for
Certiorari, at 4, was a minor “spill” of pretreated wastewater
being transported between the CIBA-GEIGY plant and the Cran-
ston municipal wastewater works. The spill did not contain any
reportable quantity of any substance; was not a violation of any
NPDES permit which was in effect; and is separately regulated un-
der Section 311 of the Clean Water Act governing spills (and there-
fore not properly the subject of a citizen suit under Section 505).
In any event, it occured prior to the commencement of this
action with no likelihood of recurrence. See December 18, 1986
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 807 F.2d at 1094; App. at 10-11.

11 Plaintiffs also state, somewhat plaintively, that “[n]Jot doing
so, both courts should have allowed petitioners leave to amend
the complaint so as to allow them to conform to the court’s new
interpretations of the statute.” Petition for Certiorari at 8.
Though the court’s interpretation merely tracked the plain lan-
guage of the statute, the District Court did allow plaintiffs leave
to amend following its May 17, 1984 ruling. App. at 17. Plaintiffs
were unable, consistent with the District Court’s instruction that
any amendment “comply fully with the mandate of Fed. R. Civ. P.
11,” Jd., to amend the Complaint to allege ongoing violations. The
District Court again dismissed the Clean Water Act count on
September 10, 1984, and denied a motion for reconsideration on
June 7, 1985. As the Court of Appeals found, there was no abuse

8

2. i The State Common Law Claims.

As regards the granting of summary judgment on the
state common law issues, plaintiffs base the entirety of
their argument in this Court on an alleged misreading
of the evidence by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. As the District Court noted, on motion for
summary judgment, CIBA-GEIGY presented “a pot-
pourri of materials” from the “voluminous record” in
the case negativing plaintiffs’ contentions of proximate
and actual causation; in response, plaintiffs “offered
nothing but the merest of vellieties: they eschew any
present tender of proof, but mouth empty assurances
that they will (somehow) prove the ‘but for’ connection
at a trial. Such generalized assurances are manifestly
insufficient to blunt the blade of a properly-honed Rule
56 axe.” Plaintiffs simply did not come forward with
any showing sufficient to resist CIBA-GEIGY’s properly-
supported motion for summary judgment."* The District
Court clearly evaluated plaintiffs’ claims in an appro-
priate light." So did the Court of Appeals.

of discretion when the District Court rejected yet another attempt
to introduce the issue in August of 1985. 807 F.2d at 1094; App.
at 11.

12 September 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District
Court, App. at 26. At trial, plaintiffs admitted that they were un-
able to offer any additional evidence, beyond their assertions in
opposition to summary judgment, bearing on the causal connec-
tion between CIBA-GEIGY’s discharges and the lack of dredging
of Pawtuxet Cove. See the District Court’s order, App. 35.

13 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, —— U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2548
(1986). CIBA-GEIGY submitted with its motion a statement of
facts drawn from plaintiffs’ own allegations in their various plead-
ings, plaintiffs’ sworn deposition testimony, plaintiffs’ sworn an-
swers to interrogatories, plaintiffs’ documents provided in dis-
covery, and certified copies of official records of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (the agency in charge of dredging
projects).

14“(T he plaintiffs have failed to offer a fact-based predicate,
sufficient, even when examined in the light most favorable to the

9

Plaintiffs’ Petition for Certiorari—as to both the citi-
zen suit claim and the state common law issues—pre-
sents primarily ‘a question of fact, which does not merit
Court review.” National Labor Relations Board v. Hen-
dricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454
U.S. 170, 176 n.8 (1981) (dismissing writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted). This Court consistently has
been unwilling to disturb such lower court determina-
tions, particularly where, as here, the District Court
and the Court of Appeals reach identical conclusions.”

B. Citizen-plaintiffs May Not Maintain an Action Under
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act Against a Former
Industrial Discharger Where, As Here, the Former
Discharger Is Not and Cannot Be Alleged To Be “in
violation” of an Effiuent Standard or Limitation Con-
tained in a Permit That Is “in effect” Under the Clean
Water Act.

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,
permits an action against any person “who is alleged to
be in violation of” an effluent standard or limitation,
which is defined to include a permit “which is in effect”
under the Act. Section 505(a)(1), (f) (6) (emphasis
added). Jurisdiction is conferred on the district courts
to enforce the effluent limitations in the permit and as
ancillary relief to apply “appropriate” civil penalties.
Section 505(a).

No allegation of continuing or recurring violations was
or could be made in this case; no permit for the discharge

plaintiffs, to support the conclusion that the Cove would have been
dredged but for [CIBA-GEIGY’s] shortcomings. In the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact on the issue, the defendant
is plainly entitled to brevis disposition as a matter of law.” Sep-
tember 19, 1985 Memorandum Decision of the District Court, App.
at 26 (emphasis supplied).

1S See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) ;
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980); Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949).

10

of process wastewater was in effect, and no possibility of
continuing or indeed any future violation existed. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit undertook an ex-
tensive examination of the language, history, and pur-
pose of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act, and correctly concluded that it did not reach the
conduct of CIBA-GEIGY in the case at hand.

Plaintiffs urge that certiorari should be granted in this
case because the decision below of the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit conflicts with the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, U.S.
, 107, S.Ct. 872 (1987), pending before this Court
as No. 86-473.1° This Court is already addressing the
issue of statutory construction presented here in the
Gwaltney case, and need not review this case to resolve
the purely legal question.

Moreover, the defendant in Gwaltney and CIBA-
GEIGY in this case are in fundamentally different fac-
tual circumstances.'7 In Gwaltney, though the alleged
violations had ceased at the time the action was com-
menced, the defendant continued to discharge process
wastewater pursuant to an NPDES permit which was in
effect. In contrast, in this case: (i) no permit was “in
effect” at time of suit; (ii) no future violations of a

16 The decision below in this case is consistent with Hamker v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
In Hamker, no NPDES permit ever existed and the alleged “viola-
tion” was a one-time incident. In Pawtuxet Cove, all process waste-
water discharges pursuant to the NPDES permit had ceased prior
to suit, and there was no ongoing pollution to be abated.

17TIn a case more closely analogous to the present one, i.e., where
the discharger “has ceased or will shortly cease the operations at
issue here and will abandon its relevant discharge permits,” the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal of
a citizen suit under Section 505 as moot. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209 (4th Cir. 1985).

11

permit were possible because process wastewater dis-
charges had ceased, and (iii) plaintiffs did not—and re-
peatedly remained unable to—allege any continuing vio-
lation.

The Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney did not have occasion
to examine the combined effect of Section 505(a) (1) and
Section 505(f) (6), since Gwaltney’s permit was still “in
effect” although not being violated at the time suit was
commenced. This Court’s decision in Gwaltney will neces-
sarily be limited to construction of the statutory term
“in violation” in Section 505(a)(1) and will not alter
the decision in this case where no permit is “in effect”
within the meaning of Section 505(f) (6). Thus, even
if this Court should decide in Gwaltney that civil penal-
ties are available under Section 505 for purely past vio-
lations by a discharger who continues to operate under
an NPDES permit, that decision would not necessarily
alter the outcome of this case against a former dis-
charger. Regardless of the outcome in Gwaltney, there
is no need for the Court to review the decision in this
case.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS E. KLIEVER
KATHERINE L. RHYNE
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN M. BREDEHOFT
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN
& HAMILTON
1752 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 728-2700

Counsel for Respondent

CIBA-GEIGY Corporation
April 20, 1987

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2028%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
