# Opposition Brief — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 486 U.S. 1014

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

APR 24 987

No. 86-1548
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

>LERK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the GAnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT AIR LINE
PILOTS ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION

EUGENE B. GRANOF*

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

“Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

First Officer Larry W. Morrison was discharged by
Northwest Airlines for serving as co-pilot on a pas-
senger jet while under the influence of alcohol. A
System Board established pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act mitigated the penalty to a suspension, with
reinstatement explicitly made dependent upon Mr.
Morrison’s unconditional requalification to return to
duty by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
Board expressly based its award on the totality of
facts and circumstances, including findings that Mr.
Morrison’s misconduct was caused by alcoholism for
which he was subsequently treated and that he has
been successfully rehabilitated as evidenced by a con-
sistent pattern of recovery over an extended period
of time.

1. Whether the Federal Aviation Act deprived the
System Board of jurisdiction to overturn the carrier’s
determination that Mr. Morrison must be discharged?

2. Whether in any event the System Board’s award
is contrary to public policy and, therefore, judicially
unenforceable?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................sseecverecrseosers
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........cscescseseesesesseeees

ET winds atinxanasdancisasscssssanieciaiienniemonaae
1. BiowreEmen's DRGCIID cciscsscnncnssrcossnsinsssocesersnce
2. The System Board Award ........:ccccccccsesesseeeees
8. The District Court’s Decision ..............cccccccs0
4. The Decision of the Court of Appeals ..........

ARUIGUMEINT vcscccssssescsssnndaninccedssiciccasstanssanesnnbnunnnios

I.

Il.

III.

THE SYSTEM BOARD HAD JURISDIC-
TION TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THERE WAS JUST CAUSE FOR MOR-
RISON’S DISCHARGE AND, IF NOT,
WHAT SHOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE
PENALTY cscncssncsissssxsnassantacanensnintnasemahecasaces

THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS TO FIND A PUBLIC POLICY.

EXCEPTION TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE
BOARD’S AWARD IS WELL GROUNDED
IN THIS COURT’S DECISION IN W. R.
FRRAGID « scsntscesenexsrseacenersanemashimassconntaainiasiins

THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN MISCO
IS NOT ADEQUATE REASON TO GRANT
CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE ...................

OCB ooascsicssesescssacesssstcanaaensnnsnsareeen

19
21

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

ALPA v. Capitol Airways, 88 LRRM 2169 (S.D.NY
I Ai ai aieinduadenabuundanibecsisrsadderssersesvscesns

ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 632 F.2d 1321 (5th
Te ais cas csi naseniadeeranadeneasens

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food
o, tan fame tae (6th Cir. 1968) ..................

American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

Association of Professional Flight Attendants v.
American Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 1331 (9th
SY ddvtacnateneies ainsi heddsaaledsvactindenstshcecsees

AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Work-
ore, _... U.5. —.,...., 106 §.Ct. 1415
ae ic sdikdncinsbasiausonntbnanbinsosocesses

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963) ..........

Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks,
BEd Fee Bee COE Cir. 19TO) — .nccccccccccccscceseess

Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway,
MII II - sicvsnsasenocccsnessosesssenasconcesse

Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local 1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 416 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1969) _........

Hart v. Overseas WY {onal Airways, 94 LRRM 3133
I aida diaasanenedinsenabenestsseiornerves

Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 768
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S.
essa dancensnstebananedbesecacssacdacee

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 373 F.2d 136
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827
es cas esnobasnnacunadee

Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89
EEE SENG SS TER ROC OD ODE TOD

United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Se Ms PE EDOUD cccesccccccssesercssesseccnens

7,10,11

aaa

iv

Table of Authorities Continued

Page
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)... 10,20
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) _ ............ 9,20
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union,
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) — ........cccccsseeseees 8,15
Western Air Lines, v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
ERUPT . ascinssesnstcssaiehihassanaatbakesinaamlanedeasnesnes 13
World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978) . 14
STATUTES:
Federal Aviation Act
Re ee Te EE bvkasinasuntiascinansnaxscaccees 11
49 U.S.C. § 1371(kX3) .................. susinihenimansiaks 12
BD Bes Ae ED, © esdcsaktasschenncesenrensntinnces 11
ee ID. chickecinsonbaccenndeinnnesanninnaie = ae
Railway Labor Act
is te 2) ee sii ahiaiadaniacanennnenisien 3
Ge TEs. BR Pe COD. wrncnctecscennnncsnsccacsnce 7
eis oe | ee ea 11
The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act
of 1970 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-1.(b\1) _............... 18
REGULATIONS:
14 C.F.R. § 67.13(dX1)iXc) (1986)... ee eee e eee 4
BA Gr ais BT Asernedobcanncnicnndsnnsinstcrinsvscssann =
MISCELLANEOUS:
FAA Notice of Nov. 10, 1976 Alcoholism And Air-
line Flight Crewmembers ....ccccccccssseeeeseeeeeeeees 17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1548

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.

AIR LINE PILoTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
Respondent.

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT
1. Morrison’s Discharge

On August 6, 1982, First Officer Larry W. Mor-
rison was discharged by Northwest Airlines, Inc.
(““Northwest”’) for violating the Company’s rules pro-
hibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages within
24 hours of flight duty and for being under the in-
fluence of alcohol during a flight on which he served
as a crew member. (Pet. App. 3a-4a, 53a-54a) Until
then, Mr. Morrison had been a pilot with Northwest

for sixteen years with an unblemished disciplinary re-
cord. (Pet. App. 3a, 50a)

The circumstances that resulted in Mr. Morrison’s
dismissal were that he had been drinking during a
thirty-hour stopover in Las Vegas and became ill sev-
eral hours before his next scheduled flight. (Pet. App.
3a, 50a-51a) Although he asked to be replaced on the
flight, no replacement was available, and he was told
that the flight would have to be cancelled if he could
not fly. Hence, he agreed to perform his duties as
co-pilot for the first two legs of the flight, with the
understanding that a substitute would be found for
the final leg. (Pet. App. 3a, 51a) The flight proceeded
to its first stop at San Francisco without incident.
To the Captain (pilot-in-command), Mr. Morrison’s ap-
pearance was “perfectly normal’’ and he did ‘‘an ex-
cellent job.” (Pet. App. 51a) Nevertheless, alerted by
a station agent in Las Vegas whose suspicions were
triggered because Morrison was late for crew pick-
up, did not “look very well,’’ and was chewing tobacco
early in the morning,’ Northwest officials in San
Francisco ordered Morrison to submit to a blood test.
The test showed Morrison to have a blood alcohol
level of .13%.?

At a subsequent investigation conducted by North-
west, Mr. Morrison described a history of “drinking

‘In fact, Morrison, who had a farming and ranching back-
ground, ‘‘chewed tobacco almost constantly.”” (Pet. App. 52a,
n.2)

2 FAA regulations prohibit any person from serving as a crew
member with a blood alcohol level of .04% or more. 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.11(aX4) (1986). State law in California establishes a pre-
sumption of intoxication with respect to a person with a blood
alcohol content of .10% or more. (Pet. App. 3a-4a, 54a).

3

straight from the bottle for some 10 years,” to the
point where his tolerance for alcohol had become so
great “‘that if he had drunk a pint an hour before
the meeting, no one would have been able to detect
from his behavior that he had been drinking.’’ Al-
though it occurred to him that he might be an al-
coholic, he feared he would be fired by Northwest if
he sought treatment for his drinking problem. (Pet.
App. 4a, 52a-53a) During the course of Northwest’s
investigation, a representative of the Air Line Pilots
Association (““ALPA”’), the collective bargaining agent
for the Northwest pilots, suggested that the investi-
gation be extended to determine if Morrison was an
alcoholic because “‘[i]Jt would be a serious mistake. . .
to treat it as a straight misconduct case without in-
vestigating whether or not there is an underlying
medical problem.”’ (Pet. App. 53a) However, the Com-
pany declined and instead terminated Morrison.

2. The System Board Award

As required by § 204 of the Railway Labor Act
(““RLA’’), 45 U.S.C. § 184, the applicable collective
bargaining agreement between ALPA and Northwest
established a System Board of Adjustment to resolve
“disputes between any employee covered by the Pil-
ots’ Agreement and the Company growing out of
grievances or out of interpretation or application of
any of the terms of the Pilots’ Agreement.”’ (Pet.
App. 9a) ALPA grieved Mr. Morrison’s discharge, and
in due course the grievance was submitted to the
Board, with the issue being whether the discharge
was for good cause, and, if not, what the appropriate
remedy should be. (Pet. App. 4a, 49a)

The Board, comprised of one member each ap-
pointed by ALPA and Northwest and a neutral Chair-

man, heard extensive and unrefuted evidence
concerning Mr. Morrison’s alcoholism and the pros-
pects for his rehabilitation. With the Northwest mem-
ber dissenting, the Board found that Morrison was
‘“‘an untreated alcoholic’’ when he flew as co-pilot on
August 1, 1982, and that his “uncontrolled drinking
and subsequent flying under the presumptive influ-
ence were medically related to and the result of his
affliction.”” (Pet. App. 66a) The Board further found
that Morrison had completed a comprehensive alcohol
treatment program, had remained abstinent since, and
had been successfully rehabilitated as evidenced by a
“consistent pattern of recovery over an extended pe-
riod of time.”’ (Pet. App. 4a, 56a, 72a) Additionally,
the Board determined that on January 10, 1984 the
FAA had declared Morrison eligible for ‘“‘a special
issuance” first-class medical certificate which would
permit him to pilot commercial aircraft again if ALPA
and Northwest would monitor and periodically report
on his continued abstinence. (Pet. App. 5a, 56a) The
Board further determined that Morrison would be el-
igible under FAA regulations* for unconditional first-
class medical certification—that is, without the mon-
itoring and reporting requirements—if and when the
clinical evidence, including not less than two years of
sustained total abstinence, satisfied the Federal Air
Surgeon as to his recovery.‘

Based ‘‘on all the facts and circumstances”’ before
it, the Board concluded that Morrison’s discharge was

°14 C.F.R. § 67.13(d\1\iXc) (1986).

* Subsequent to the F ard’s award, and after more than three
years of abstinence, Morrison did receive his unconditional first-
class medical certification from the Federal Air Surgeon. (Pet.
App. 5a)

————

without just cause, and that he should be offered
reinstatement, without back pay or benefits, if and
when the FAA issued him an unrestricted first-class
medical certificate. (Pet. App. 4a-5a, 7la-75a) The
Board acknowledged that Morrison’s misconduct was
“serious” and ‘“‘must weigh heavily against him”’ (Pet.
App. 72a), but that his alcoholism, rehabilitation, and
lengthy service were significant countervailing fac-
tors. (Pet. App. 66a, 72a-73a) The Board was careful
to state that it was not promulgating any general
rule “‘that the Company cannot, under its present
policy, terminate rule violators who are found to be
alcoholics;”’ rather, ‘‘[t]hose alcoholics who do not
come forward before breaking the rules are still sub-
ject, upon a full review of the facts and their medical
condition, to the severest of consequences, including
termination.”’” As the Board emphasized, “‘[a]ll that is
being said here is that on the facts as presented,
Morrison’s reinstatement, subject to unconditional
qualification by the Federal Air Surgeon, is justified,’’
and that ‘“‘[ojther facts may dictate other results.”’
(Pet. App. 6a, 74a-75a). As a final point, the Board
stated that ‘‘[iJnasmuch as the Federal Air Surgeon
has the statutory authority to make [medical fitness]
determinations and must do so with the highest re-
gard for air safety, ... the award hevein is consistent
with public policy and within the Board’s authority
to make.”’ (Pet. App. 6a, 75a)

3. The District Court’s Decision

As the District Court saw the issue before it, there
were two strong federal policies involved here: the
federal policy of furthering safe air travel and the
federal policy of resolving labor differences through
arbitration; hence, “the central question ... is

whether the balance between the two federal policies
lies sufficiently in favor of air safety to rule that the
arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction or ‘acted con-
trary to public policy’ in ordering Morrison’s rein-
statement.”’ (Pet. App. 37a) In the District Court’s
view, because application of the Company’s 24-hour
rule to Morrison’s situation is “‘a matter about which
the collective bargaining agreement is silent’’—that
is, it involves only a grievance rather than interpre-
tation of specific contract language—then, ‘‘[a]t best,
the subject matter of the dispute sits only on the
outer perimeter of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.’’ (Pet.
App. 38a, 45a) The District Court faulted the Board
for denying Northwest the ‘‘right”’ to enforce its own
safety rules, even though Northwest’s rules on alcohol
were not incorporated in the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pet. App. 38a-39a) As the Court put it,
““filf safety rules are listed as a legitimate subject for
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement,
or if the rules are clear [sic, ‘“‘unclear’’?], judicial re-
view might well not be permissible.’’ (Pet. App. 42a)
However, in this case ‘‘no specific agreement was
reached to submit safety matters to arbitration,”’ and,
therefore, ‘‘the arbitration Board has exceeded its ju-
risdiction not because the Company retains exclusive
jurisdiction over safety matters under the FAA, but
because the Board’s decision substantially interferes
with air safety responsibilities entrusted to Northwest
without encroaching unduly on concerns underlying
federal arbitration policy.”’ (Pet. App. 39a, 42a-43a)

The District Court also concluded that “the Board’s
interference with Northwest’s enforcement of its 24-
hour rule was [not] entirely consistent with public
policy.”” (Pet. App. 44a) The Court reasoned that

“(t]he public policy against the use of alcohol and
flying is ‘well-defined and dominant,’ ”’ and “that na-
tional policy ... incorporates both the concept of de-
terrence (through rehabilitation and reinstatement),
and that of incapacitation (dismissal for violation of
a 24- or 8-hour rule).”’ (Pet. App. 48a, 44a)

4. The Derision of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed. Citing the RLA
provision which makes system board awards ‘“‘final
and binding’ (RLA § 3, First (m), 45 U.S.C. § 153,
First (m) (1982)) and the emphatic comment in Union
Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93 (1978) that
“this statutory language means just what it says,”
the Court addressed the issue of “‘whether the Board’s
decision falls within the scope of its jurisdiction.”’ (Pet.
App. 8a) The Court found it “‘absolutely clear’ from
the ‘“‘explicit terms’ of the ALPA/Northwest collec--
tive bargaining agreement ‘‘that an unresolved griev-
ance claiming the absence of ‘just cause’ with respect
to a disciplinary action taken against a pilot is a ‘dis-
pute’ within the jurisdiction of the Board.”’ (Pet. App.
9a) Indeed, ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the parties’ agree-
ment that even suggests that a disciplinary action
related to an alleged breach of a safety rule is ex-
cluded from arbitral review,’”’ nor is there any “‘con-
ceivable way to construe the parties’ agreement as
removing from the Board’s jurisdiction disciplinary
actions related to alleged breaches of the twenty-four
hour rule.” (Pet. App. 10a) Moreover, “‘in reviewing
the grievance, it is equally plain that the Board was
authorized to judge the legitimacy of the disciplinary
penalty imposed in the light of mitigating circum-
stances ... because ‘(a)rbitral determination ... of
the fitness of the punishment is routinely grist for

the arbitral mill,’ ”’ citing Gulf States Tel. Co. v. Local
1692, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 202
n. 10 (5th Cir. 1969). (Pet. App. 9a)

The appellate court rejected as totally unsupported
“the District Court’s. imposition of a presumption
against arbitration of safety issues.’’ (Pet. App. 10a)
It held instead that the ‘fact that the arbitration
touches on issues related to airline safety is irrele-
vant.” In short, the Court said, ‘“‘{iJn all critical re-
spects, ... this case involves a_ straightforward
application of well-established law concerning the lim-
ited role of the courts in reviewing labor arbitration
awards ...’”’ (Pet. App. 9a, 11a)

The Court of Appeals likewise characterized as
‘“‘meritless’’ Northwest’s contention ‘‘that the Board’s
decision is somehow contrary to public policy.”’ (Pet.
App. 12a). Drawing the controlling principles from
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union,
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) and its own recent decision
in American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986)—72.e.,
that the public policy exception to enforcement of
arbitration awards “‘applies only when the public pol-
icy emanates from clear statutory or case law, ‘not
from general considerations of supposed public inter-
ests’’’—the Court saw nothing “unlawful’’ either in
the Board’s ‘‘determination that Morrison’s alcoholism
was an illness that could not support a finding of
‘just cause’ for dismissal in this case’’ or in the “‘pol-
icy of allowing reformed alcoholics to fly as pilots
...” (Pet. App. 12a-13a) Especially significant in the
Court’s view is that the ‘‘Board’s decision merely re-
quired Northwest to reinstate Morrison if and when

he was recertified by the FAA as fully fit and licensed
to fly.”” (Pet. App. 13a) For, as the Court put it, ‘‘[t]o
suggest that the Board’s award violates public policy
is to contend that the FAA was derelict in its re-
sponsibilities in considering Morrison for recertifi-
cation. .. .It would be the height of judicial chutzpah
for us to second-guess the present judgment of the
FAA recertifying Morrison for flight duty.’’ (Pet. App.
13a) In any event, the Court noted, ‘“‘this is not a
situation in which the Board has permitted a drunkard
to pilot an aircraft, nor did it treat lightly the fact
that Morrison had flown an aircraft while under the
influence of alcohol.” Instead, the ‘Board carefully
considered all safety issues and applied stringent pre-
requisites to allowing Morrison to fly again. (Pet. App.
14a, n. 33)

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals correctly evaluated this case
as one which involves nothing more than ‘a straight-
forward application of well established law’’ to judicial
review of Railway Labor Act system board awards.
The appellate court was equally correct in its appli-
cation of those principles to the particular facts and
circumstances of the case. Hence, the decision does
not warrant any further review by this Court.

I. THE SYSTEM BOARD HAD JURISDICTION TO DE-
TERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS JUST CAUSE
FOR MORRISON’S DISCHARGE AND, IF NOT, WHAT
SHOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY

It is well settled that a labor arbitration award
which “draws its essence from the collective bar-

gaining agreement’’ must be enforced. Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597

ia aaa

10

(1960). The judicial role “‘is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract,”’
and ‘(t]he courts, therefore, have no business weigh-
ing the merits of the grievance, considering whether
there is equity in a particular claim, or determining
whether there is particular language in the written
instrument which will support the claim.” Steelwork-
ers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
Moreover, “‘[i]n the absence of any express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, .
only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to ex-
clude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’”’ AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, U.S.
,__, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1419 (1986); Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
838, 584-85 (1960).

The RLA establishes a “‘mandatory, exclusive and
comprehensive” scheme of grievance arbitration in the
airline industry by requiring that ‘“‘disputes between
an employee... and a carrier. . . growing out of griev-
ances...’ be submitted to System Boards of Adjust-
ment for ‘‘final and binding’’ resolution. 45 U.S.C. §§
153 First (m), 184; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 373 U.S. 33, 38
(1963): accord, Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439
U.S. 89 (1978). The range of judicial review of System
Board awards is ‘‘amongst the narrowest known to
law” (Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks,
421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970)), for the RLA ex-
plicitly limits such judicial review ‘‘to three specific
grounds: (1) failure of the... Board to comply with
the requirements of the... Act; (2) failure of the...
Board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within

———

11

the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corrup-
tion. 45 U.S.C. 153 First (q).” Sheehan, supra, 439
U.S. at 93.

Northwest argues that ‘‘this case presents the im-
portant, unresolved and recurring question of the in-
terplay between an air carrier’s safety obligations
under the Federal Aviation Act and the mandatory
arbitration of grievances under the Railway Labor
Act.” (Pet. 19) Contrary to Northwest, if there are
any legitimate questions concerning the interplay be-
tween the two Acts, none are presented by this case.
If anything, the case offers a textbook example of
intelligent accommodation: the System Board set aside
Morrison’s discharge and awarded him reinstatement
(without any back pay), but only if and when the
FAA, which has a statutory duty to “assure safety
in air commerce’”’ (49 U.S.C. § 1422(b1)), issues him
an unrestricted medical certification.

Northwest suggests that system Board jurisdiction
in this case is undercut by 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b), which
provides that “‘[i]n prescribing standards, rules, and
regulations, and in issuing certificates..., the Sec-
retary of Transportation shall give full consideration
to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their
services with the highest possible degree of safety in
the public interest. . .’’ This provision recognizes that
there is an implicit duty on air carriers—as, indeed,
there is on all other enterprises—to conduct their
business in a manner commensurate with the safety
risks involved. It is precisely because safety is such
a major concern in air travel that the Federal Avia-
tion Act mandates close government oversight, di-
rects the Secretary in 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) to ensure
that carriers comply with their safety responsibilities,

12

and gives him broad authority (49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-
1441) to see that they do so. The implication is not,
as Northwest would have it, that the Federal Aviation
Act creates a safety related exception to the normal
jurisdiction of RLA System Boards; it is rather that
safety is too important a matter to be entrusted to
the airlines alone. Moreover, the Federal Aviation Act
elsewhere makes clear that its provisions are not in-
tended to undermine the RLA’s statutory procedures:
49 U.S.C. § 1371(kX8) expressly states that ‘“‘[nJothing
herein contained shall be construed as restricting the
right of any. . . pilots or co-pilots, or other employees,
of any. . . air carrier to obtain by collective bargaining
higher rates of compensation or more favorable work-
ing conditions.” It is not consistent with § 1371(k\3)
to rely on the Federal Aviation Act to deprive a pilot
discharged for a safety violation—even a serious one—
of his right under a collective bargaining agreement
and the RLA to have a System Board determine
whether there is “just cause’’ for his discharge. If
the law were otherwise—that is, if carriers had dis-
cretion unfettered by System Board review to mete
out discipline for alleged or actual safety infractions—
then in an industry like air transportation, and par-
ticularly for pilots, a key aspect of the Railway Labor
Act would largely be nullified.

In view of the foregoing, it is scarcely surprising
that a number of court decisions have upheld System
Board awards which conflicted with carriers’ safety
determinations. E.g, Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona
Eastern Railway, 382 U.S. 257, 262-264 (1965) (train
engineer’s health and physical ability to operate an
engine); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 632 F.2d 1321
(5th Cir. 1980) (Board overturned discharge of pilot

13

who had failed to satisfy proficiency requirements);
Hart v. Overseas National Airways, 94 LRRM 3133
(E.D. PA, No. 73-2448, Feb. 17, 1977) (Board rejected
carrier’s determination on critical safety matter);
ALPA v. Capitol Airways, 83 LRRM 2169 (S.D. N.Y.,
No. 72 Civ. 3015, Apr. 2, 1973) (Board overruled
carrier’s determination regarding upgrade to Cap-
tain). Indeed, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA,
373 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
827 (1967)—a case which also involved the discharge
of pilots for violating Northwest’s rules governing the
use of alcoholic beverages—the Eighth Circuit explic-
itly sustained the trial court’s determination that a
System Board’s award of*reinstatement must be ac-
corded finality.

Moreover, this Court’s decision in Western Air
Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) further refutes
the novel contention that a System Board lacks ju-
risdiction to overrule an airline’s decision on employee
discipline where safety is implicated. Criswell fully
recognized and specifically took note of the public
interest in safety and the special need ‘“‘to err on the
side of caution’ in air transportation. 472 U.S. at
419-420. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that a jury
of lay persons could appropriately evaluate a carrier’s
contention that implementation of a particular safety
policy—in that case, a rule requiring flight engineers
to retire at age 60—is “‘reasonably necessary’’ to the
safe operation of its business. It would be incongruous
to permit a jury to make that evaluation, and yet to
hold that a System Board lacks jurisdiction under the
RLA to evaluate a carrier’s contention that nothing
less than the discharge of a pilot will suffice to satisfy
legitimate air safety concerns.

aaa ei ia aii

14

Northwest argues that the holding here conflicts
with that of the Ninth Circuit in World Airways, Inc.
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F.2d
800 (9th Cir. 1978). (Pet. 20-21) In World, an arbi-
trator directed that a pilot who had been demoted
for undisputed ‘‘judgmental deficiencies’ be offered
retraining and an opportunity to requalify as Pilot-
in-Command. The district court, however, specifically
found that these ‘‘judgmental deficiencies’’ rendered
the pilot unfit to serve as Pilot-in-Command, and could
not be cured through retraining. The appellate court
determined that the lower court’s findings were fully
warranted by the record (578 F.2d at 802). World
Airways will not support the expansive reading
Northwest seeks to give it in order to demonstrate
a conflict. In Association of Professional Flight At-
tendants v. American Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 1331
(9th Cir. 1985), the carrier, relying on World Air-
ways, asserted “that because beards raise safety con-
cerns, the issue of whether flight attendants should
be allowed to wear beards is not subject to arbitra-
tion.” 767 F.2d at 1334. Not only did the Ninth Cir-
cuit reject that contention, it also made clear that a
“less intrusive remedy”’ than complete reinstatement
to Pilot-in-Command ‘‘might well have fared differ-
ently” in World Airways. Ibid. In other words, it was
not that the arbitrator generally lacked jurisdiction
over the carrier’s determination in World Airways,
but rather that he lacked jurisdiction to order a rem-
edy which, so far as appears, did not involve the FAA
and which the court specifically found endangered
public safety because of the pilot’s unremediable de-
ficiencies. World Airways is thus factually distinguish-
able from this case in which the System Board

)
3
3
$

SET

15

awarded Morrison reinstatement only if and when the
FAA deems him fully safe to return to flight duty.

Il. THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
FIND A PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE BOARD’S AWARD IS WELL
GROUNDED IN THIS COURT’S DECISION IN W.R.
GRACE

As this Court plainly stated in W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983), an arbitration award may not be set aside
based on “general considerations of supposed public
interest.”” To be deemed judicially unenforceable, the
award must be violative of “‘some explicit public pol-
icy” which “must be well defined and dominant, and
is to be ascertained by ‘reference to the laws and
legal precedents...’ ”’ .

Obviously, there is a ‘“‘well defined and dominant”
public policy based on safety considerations that pilots
should not fly when intoxicated. But neither the policy
itself nor its effective administration precludes from
reinstatement a pilot who, although he flew while
“under the influence,” was suffering from alcoholism,
a medically recognized condition characterized by
compulsive out-of-control drinking; who, according to
the uncontroverted evidence, subsequently has been
successfully treated for alcoholism and rehabilitated;
and who is now entitled to reinstatement only because
the appropriate federal officials—7.e, those charged by
law with issuing airman certificates in a manner “‘nec-
essary to assure safety in air commerce’ (49 U.S.C.
§ 1421(b))—unconditionally recertified him based on
satisfactory evidence that he had been abstinent for
more than three years.

cca

16

Northwest asserts that ‘‘those involved in public
transportation who drink and jeopardize safety are
unworthy of the public trust.” (Pet. 12-13) A gen-
eralization of this nature, however, simply does not
translate into a concrete public policy that such in-
dividuals may never be reinstated to their former po-
sitions and presumably must forever be barred from
obtaining any similar positions with other carriers. To
be sure, common sense dictates that they not be per-
mitted to return to duty without due regard for
safety. And the cases cited by Northwest (Pet. 14
n.5) stand for just that limited proposition. For in-
stance, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great West-
ern Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983), an
appellate court refused to enforce an arbitration
award reinstating a truck driver who admitted to
drinking shortly before he overturned his eighteen
wheel rig on the highway. In that case, though, the
court was confronted with an arbitration decision
which returned the driver to his prior duties without
any meaningful rationale for doing so and especially
without much assurance he would not drink and drive
again (712 F.2d at 124). But that is a far cry from
this case, in which the safety conc* ns have been
fairly addressed by both the System Board and the
Court of Appeals (supra, pp. 5, 8-9). Once those con-
cerns have been satisfied, as they have here, there
is little logic to insisting that public policy demands
continued denial of the opportunity to fly again.
Northwest cites no precedent, nor have we discovered
any, for invoking the public policy exception in a sit- |
uation even remotely comparable to that of Mr. Mor- |
rison—that is, in which the award ordering
reinstatement recognized the serious nature of the
misconduct, but also took into account subsequent re-

-

17

habilitation, continued abstinence over an extended
period, and unconditional recertification by the FAA.

Northwest complains that the award treats volun-
tary intoxication as a defense to wrongful conduct,
and is thus at odds with civil and criminal law. (Pet.
14) The complaint is without substance. As shown
supra, p. 5, the Board went out of its way to make
clear that it did not consider alcoholism a defense and
that its decision should not be taken to mean that
Northwest could not “terminate rule violators who
are found to be alcoholics.’”’ What it said, instead, is
that “alcoholism is an illness and that, as another
Board said in... [a prior case involving ALPA and
Northwest], ‘the possibility of recovery from an illness
is an element which should be considered in deter-
mining the appropriate remedy.’ ’’ (Pet. App. 55a, 69a)
Northwest offers no persuasive showing that the lat-
ter position is in any way inconsistent with estab-
lished public policy within the meaning of W.R. Grace.
On the contrary, as the Board itself observed, “‘if the
public policy of a regulatory agency be the guide, the
FAA’s public policy is to recognize alcoholism as a
treatable disease and to encourage treatment and an
early return to productive employment.” (Pet. App.
68a)

5 Expert medical witnesses testifying before the Board ac-
cepted as valid the FAA’s definition of alcoholism, as contained
in an FAA notice dated November 10, 1976, titled Alcoholism
And Airline Flight Crewmembers, which was introduced as an
exhibit at the hearing. That definition reads: “Alcoholism. . . is
a diagrosable disease in those whose alcohol intake is great
enough to damage physical health, or personal or social func-
tioning (which includes occupational functioning,), or when it has
become a prerequisite to normal functioning.” (Pet. App. 56a-

18

Finally, Northwest contends that public policy em-
bodied in the Federal Aviation Act gives it inde-
pendent authority “‘to assure air safety by employing
only pilots that Northwest believes have the character
and judgment necessary to protect the safety of its
passengers.” (Pet. 17) Undoubtedly Northwest does
have a responsibility to employ competent pilots. But,
as shown supra, pp. 11-13, that does not mean it is
the sole judge of pilot qualifications and can terminate
employees at will without regard to the grievance/
arbitration provisions of the RLA. If Northwest could
discharge pilots for lack of proper character or judg-
ment without having to objectively justify its assess-
ment before a System Board, then RLA and
contractual protections would, indeed, be illusory.

We submit the public policy issue raised by North-
west can best be placed in perspective in light of the
question asked by Judge Edwards during oral argu-
ment at the appellate level: could Northwest and
ALPA have entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which provided that a pilot who was guilty
of job-related misconduct attributable to alcoholism
would be reinstated after completion of a high quality
treatment program, recovery as indicated by at least
two years of continuous abstinence, and unconditional
recertification by the FAA? If the answer is “‘yes’’,
as it clearly should be, then it cannot be against public
policy for a System Board to make that determination

57a). See also, The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 290dd-1.(bX1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o
person may be denied or deprived of Federal civilian employment
or a Federal professional or other license or right solely on the
grounds of prior alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism.”’

19

when the contract itself is silent on the “‘just cause”
issue. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, if North-
west is uncomfortable with that result, it ‘‘is free to
negotiate with ALPA to remove the application of
safety rules from the jurisdiction of the Board or to
reduce the amount of discretion given to the Board
on such matters.’’ (Pet. App. 14a)

Ill. THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN MISCO IS NOT
ADEQUATE REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN
THIS CASE

Northwest urges that this case be heard in tandem
with Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union,
768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, __ U.S.
—__., 107 S. Ct. 871 (Jan. 12, 1987, No. 86-651). (Pet.
8-10) In Misco, the employer discharged an employee
for violating a company rule against possession of
marijuana on company property. An arbitrator rein-
stated the employee with full back pay and seniority
because he found the evidence did not establish the
employee had violated the rule. The Fifth Circuit,
affirming a district court’s refusal to enforce the
award, evaluated the evidence itself and concluded
that the employee was, indeed, a rule-violator and
that his dismissal was therefore justified on public
policy grounds. There are three reasons why this case
is different from Misco, and, accordingly why the
grant of certiorari in Misco does not warrant granting
certiorari in this case or holding it in abeyance pend-
ing a decision in Misco.

First, for the reasons set forth by Judge Tate in
his dissent (768 F.2d at 743-746), the decision in Misco
violates “‘settled principles by which judicial review
of arbitration awards is ‘sharply circumscribed.’ ”’
Specifically, Judge Tate found inconsistent with the

20

Steelworkers’ Trilogy® the majority’s reevaluation of
‘‘(a) the arbitrator’s factual evaluation of the evidence
as not proving that Cooper possessed or used mari-
juana on the plant premises, (b) the arbitrator’s inter-
pretation of the contractual provision as not providing
grounds for discharge if Cooper was in a vehicle
where someone else was smoking marijuana, or (c)
the arbitrator’s procedural ruling that evidence un-
known to the employer at the time of his discharge. . .
was not probative of the issue before the arbitra-
“tor...” (768 F.2d at 744). By contrast, the Court of
Appeals in the instant case followed the principles
laid down in the Trilogy cases, and enforced the Sys-
tem Board award; hence, there is no reason for this
Court to review the decision here.

Second, in Misco, having made its own finding that
the employee had brought marijuana on to the em-
ployer’s premises, the Court had no assurances that
he would not do so again if he were reinstated. As
the majority thus saw the issue, the employer could
not adequately protect the safety of the workplace
and of other employees if a confirmed drug user were
permitted to return to his job, which involved oper-
ating dangerous machinery (768 F.2d 742-743). In the
Court’s view, public policy precluded such a result.
But the majority opinion provides scant basis for be-
lieving that the outcome would have been the same
in the totally different context of the case at bar: 1.e,
a detailed and well reasoned System Board opinion
in which the Board did not minimize the seriousness

®* United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

t

21

of the misconduct and “‘carefully considered all safety
issues and applied stringent prerequisites to allowing
Morrison to fly again.” (Pet. App. 14a n.33) In short,
the public policy considerations which led the Fifth
Circuit to intervene in Misco are simply not present
here.

Third, in Misco there was no governmental agency
assigned to determine whether the employee’s rein-
statement was consistent with the public interest.
Here, of course, Morrison’s reinstatement was ex-
plicitly made contingent on his unconditional recer-
tification by the FAA. Unlike Misco, in which a far
broader public policy issue is present, this case pre-
sents only the narrow issue of whether a court is
compelled ‘‘under the guise of ‘public policy,’ to re-
verse an arbitration award that is expressly limited
by deference to the ultimate judgment of the agency
that is charged with the enforcement of the public
policy here at issue.”’ (Pet. App. 13a)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Air Line Pilots
Association requests that the petition for certiorari
be denied.

April 24, 1987

22

Respectfully Submitted,

EUGENE B. GRANOF*

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INT’L.
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-4119

Counsel for Air Line Pilots Association

*Counsel of Record

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_2016%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
