# Opposition Brief — Punton v. City of Seattle

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 481 U.S. 1029

## Text

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A

NO. 86-1446

IN THE SUPREME COURT||
of the
UNITED STATES

Octobe: Term, 1986

DELMUS PUNTON,
Petitioner,
vs.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DOUGLAS N. JEWETT
City Attorney
GORDON F. CRANDALL*
Senior Assistant
GORDON B. DAVIDSON
Assistant

Seattle Law Department
10th Fl.-Municipal Bldg.
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 625-2402

* Counsel of Record

April 8, 1987

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The petition for a writ of certiorari
filed by petitioner herein is in response
to a ruling by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the
petitioner could not assert claims for
damages and attorney's fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court because
he had split his single cause of action
and had previously secured a judgment on
that cause of action in state court.

The questions raised by this petition
are the following:

hie Should this Court grant certi-
Orari where the facts of this case are
unlikely to recur and where ne ‘subetantial
federal question is presented?

2. Should this Court grant certiorari

to review petitioner's claim when the

atte

Ninth Circuit applied principles of res
judicata approved by this Court to reject
petitioner's claim, and where there are
no conflicts among the circuits or novel
questions of law?

3. Should this Court grant certiorari
where the Ninth Circuit properly found
that petitioner's claim was barred by

Washington law?

-iii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented . ...«. + 6 © « « i

ere or COME « «0 «© # 6 & te te ce eo) CUR

rr rr raheem . «*’s «6 «© «© «© 8 AF

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee oe 1

Counterstatement of the Case .... .- 2
A. Administrative Proceedings ... 2
B. State Court Proceedings -

"Punton ;” e . o * * * o . * e 2 4

Federal Court Proceedings
"Punton | - . * 2 * * a a es e a 6

Reasons for Denying Certiorari .... 10

l.

Supreme Court Review Is Not
Appropriate For This Case Because

It Is Factually Unlikely to Recur

and No Substantial Federal Question
Is Presented ...« « « «© «© «© « « 12

The Ninth Circuit Applied the
Standard Adopted By This Court

for Determining Whether the

Judgment In Punton I Had a Claim
Precluding Effect On Punton's

Federal Court Action ....e«.. 16

Punton's Federal Court Claim Is

Not Allowable Under Washington

Law Because It Represents Part

of a Split Cause of Action and Was
Merged Into Punton's State Court
| a a a a ae a oe ee ee ee |

rs

Comelmeion « «© 6 & 2s oe Sa ee oe «688
Reeeebign 86 4s ek 8 6 6 ee ee se + HI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Table of Cases
Clark v. Yosemite Community College

District, 785 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1986) - 2 — = os e om * oF J «a + * . iv 18

Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 84 L.Ed.
2qd 494, 105 S.Ct. 1487
¢) |) re a ae ae ae ee ee Coe oe ee

Danielson v. Seattle, 45 Wn. App. 235,
724 P.2d 1115 (Div. I, 1986) .. 15, 16

Dept. of Labor & Industries v. City of
Kennewick, 31 Wn. App. 777, 644 P.2d
1196 (Div. III, 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 Wn.2d 225, 661 P.2d 133
23 <>) Pee eee ee ee ee ee” ee er |

Hansen v. Seattle, 45 Wn. App. 214,
724 P.2d 371 (Div. I, 1986) . ... 14-15

In re Bouchat, 1l Wn. App. 369, 522
P.20d 1168 (Div. I, 1974) . « « « « e 21

McConnell v. Seattle, 44 Wn. App. 316,
722 P.2d 121 (Div. I, 1986) . 14, 15, 16

Memphis Community School District v.
Stachura, __ U.S. , 91 L.Ed.2d
249, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (1986) ..-«-.-- 20

Migra v. Warren City School District
Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 104
S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56
(1984) . « « « « « 9, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24

-V=

Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County,
801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986) .. 17,

Punton v. Seattle Public Safety Com'n.,
32 Wn. App. 959, 650 P.2d 1138 (Div.
I, 1982), review denied, 98 Wn.2d
1014 (1983) * + 2 7 ® * e * * 12, 1S,

Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 674 P.2d
165 (1983) * 2 e * ~ 2 ° = a * a ° *

Sanwick v. Puget Sound Title Ins. Co.,
70 Wn.2d 438, 423 P.2d 624
(1967) * * e a e 2 *- o ye e * * * 21,

Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066, 46 L.Ed.2d 657, 96 S.Ct. 807
[lvees -s 64 ee 8 ae 2 ee ee Se

Seattle-First National Bank v. Kawachi,
91 Wn.2d 223, 588 P.2d 725 (1978) . .

Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247
Pac. 960 (1926) . . « « « « « «© © 20,

Williams v. Seattle, 607 F. Supp. 714
(W.D. Wash. 1985) e © e e ee @ e@ 12-13,

Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 39833 <« @ «8 be De She 268

42 US Co § 1988 - * es * e € * - e . qe

22

43

22

22
8

-V i-

Other Authority

2 Orland, Washington Practice, § 361
(1972) . - . ” . _ © . . . . ” * . . 20

1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
§§ 24, 25 (1982) ~ . . . + . . a 21-22

Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion
in Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805
(1985) * = * — — . +. . . * . . . . _ 19

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

DELMUS PUNTON,
Petitioner,
vs.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

This brief is submitted by respondent
The City of Seattle in opposition to the
petition of Delmus Punton for a writ of

certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Administrative Proceedings:

The petitioner, Delmus Punton, is an
officer in the Seattle, Washington Police
Department. He was subjected to progres-
sive discipline for a variety of conduct
infractions culminating in a five-day
suspension for using information obtained
under police authority for personal
purposes. (Petition for Certiorari
Appendix G-4.)

Thereafter Punton was found to have
committed four more offenses:

(1) Allowing unauthorized civilians
to ride in his patrol car;

(2) Disobeying a supervisor's direct
order;

(3) Broadcasting a tape of drunken
Japanese conversation and hysterical
laughter over his patrol car public
address system while his car was parked

on the sidewalk outside a liquor store

2

in an area with a predominantly Asian
population; and

(4) Using unnecessary and unreason-
able force in removing Phillip Williams
from inside a hospital, where Williams
had sought treatment for a possible
heart attack. Williams, a passenger in
a car that had been observed committing
traffic infractions, was followed by
Punton into the hospital and ordered to
return to the car. When Williams
protested, saying he was having a heart
attack, Punton gripped him in a hammerlock,
threatened to break his arm if he did not
comply, and forced him outside to discuss
the infractions.

Through an internal police department
investigation, Punton was given notice and
the details of these four allegations as

well as an opportunity to explain his con-

duct. He also received a full evidentiary

hearing by a police discipline panel after
his employment was terminated.

Punton appealed his discharge to the
Seattle Public Safety Civil Service
Commission, arguing that the Seattle

Police Department's Manual of Rules and

Procedures guaranteed him a full eviden-

tiary hearing before he could be fired
and that its omission violated his due
process rights. The Commission upheld
Punton's discharge, finding all of the
accusations supported by substantial
evidence, and concluding that the
"discharge of Delmus Punton from the
Seattle Police Department was done in
good faith, and for cause." (Petition
for Certiorari Appendix G-5.)
B. State Court Proceedings - "Punton I":
The administrative decision was
reviewed by the King County Superior
Court. In that proceeding Punton again

argued that his discharge from employment

prior to a full evidentiary hearing was a
deprivation of due process under the
United States Constitution. The state
trial court judge found that each of the
grounds on which the Police Chief based
his decision to discharge Punton was
supported by substantial evidence.
(Petition for Certiorari Appendix H-6.)
The trial court held, however, that the
City's failure to accord Punton a full
evidentiary hearing as provided by the
Seattle Police Department's Manual and
the applicable collective bargaining
agreement, before subjecting Punton to
discipline, violated his constitutional
rights to due process of law. (Petition
for Certiorari Appendix H-9 through -1ll.)
The trial court reinstated Punton to the
Seattle Police Department effective
September 22, 1980; awarded him back pay
from September 22, 1980, through the

date of the trial court's order plus

prejudgment interest at 8 percent;
ordered that the City's personnel
records be corrected to reflect the
court's decision; and awarded Punton
attorney's fees of $15,000. (Petition
for Certiorari Appendix I.)

The Washington State Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision
regarding Punton's constitutional rights.
It held that Punton's discharge prior to
a full evidentiary hearing pursuant to
the provisions of the Police Department's
Manual constituted an infringement of a
substantive "property" interest and a
prima facie deprivation of due process.

Review was denied by the Washington
State Supreme Court. (Petition for
Certiorari Appendix K.)

C. Federal court proceedings - "Punton II":

Between the dates that the King County
Superior Court and the Washington State

Court of Appeals respectively ruled on

Punton's due process claim, the petitioner
started the separate proceedings below.
His complaint in federal district court
alleged that, because he was

"terminated without prior notice

or hearing, his property interests

were denied without due process

having been afforded as required

by the United States Constitution

and 43 U.S.C. § 1983."

(Appendix A, infra.) Punton's complaint
requested, as relief, reinstatement
effective September 22, 1980; damages;
costs, disbursements and attorney's fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and such
other relief as the court considered
appropriate.

After the Washington State Supreme
Court denied both the City's petition for
review of the State Court of Appeals
decision on the due process issue and
Punton's petition on the denial of attor-

ney's fees, Punton moved for summary

judgment in the federal court action.

The City responded with a motion requesting

dismissal on res judicata grounds. The
district court ruled in Punton's favor
and against the City, holding that res
judicata principles did not bar Punton's
second action but, rather, established
the City's liability for damages. A
judgment was entered awarding Punton
$150,000 after a jury returned a verdict
in that amount. Punton then petitioned
the court for $509,993.25 in attorney's
fees, based on claimed fees of $78,460.50
times a requested multiplier of 6.50.
The district court awarded him only
$15,000.

The City appealed the district court's
judgment, assigning error to the denial
of its motion for dismissal on res judicata
grounds. Punton cross-appealed the
district court's refusal to award the
full amount of attorney's fees requested

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court. (Petition
for Certiorari Appendix B.) The majority
acknowledged that, in cases arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,

"a prior state court judgment has

the same preclusive effect that

the judgment would have in the

courts of the state in which it

was rendered..."

citing Migra v. Warren City School

District Board of Education, 465 U.S.

75, 83, 104 S.Ct. 892, 897, 79 L.Ed.2d
56 (1984). (Petition for Certiorari
Appendix B-7.) The Ninth Circuit then
determined that Washington law bars a
second litigation of a claim that has
been actually litigated in an earlier
proceeding. (Petition for Certiorari
Appendix B-8.) It found Punton had a
single claim or cause of action for a
deprivation of due process.

After noting that Punton received

through state court proceedings everything

he lost, the Ninth Circuit concluded

that Punton's decision to litigate his
claim first through state proceedings

and then in federal court constituted an
impermissible splitting of his cause of
action under Washington law. (Petition
for Certiorari Appendix B-15.) The

Ninth Circuit reversed the district

court and dismissed Punton's cross-appeal
as moot. Punton then filed his petition

for certiorari with this Court.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

Were the petitioner's due process
claim heard initially, today, he would
receive no relief whatsoever. This

Court's decision in Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

84 L.Ed.2d 494, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985),
settled that substantive property rights
cannot be defined by the procedures pro-

vided for their deprivation. Loudermill

afj-

emasculated the Washington state deci-
sion giving him relief. In considering
the federal claim, the Ninth Circuit
followed this Court's instructions to
apply Washington law to determine the
claim preclusive effect of the petitioner's
state court judgment on his federal
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By

Suing the respondent in both state and
federal courts for the same violation

of due process, the petitioner attempted
to split a single cause of action.
Alternatively, when he secured relief
through the state court, the petitioner's
federal claim became merged with the
state court judgment. By reversing the
federal district court, the Ninth Circuit
produced the right result. Accordingly,

Punton's petition should be denied.

1. Supreme Court review is not appropriate

for this case because it is factually

unlikely to recur and no substantial federal

guestion is presented.

In Punton v. Seattle Public Safety

Com'n., 32 Wn. App. 959, 964-65, 650 P.2d
1138 (Div. I, 1982), review denied, 98
Wn.2d 1014 (1983), “Punton I", the
Washington State Court of Appeals
concluded that the Seattle Police
Department's Manual granted Punton a
substantive right to a full evidentiary
hearing regarding potential discipline
against him. It reasoned that because
the Manual established "elements of a
substantive 'property' interest...", a
failure to follow the Manual's procedures
gave rise to a prima facie deprivation of
due process. (Petition for Certiorari
Appendix J-20 & -21.)

The district court in Williams v.

Seattle, 607 F.Supp. 714 (W.D. Wash.

1985), characterized that analysis as

"misguided", citing the distinction
between substance and procedure in the
context of Due Process Clause guarantees

that this Court emphasized in Cleveland

Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503, 105 S.Ct.
1487, 1493 (1985). It held that Williams,
another Seattle police officer subjected
to discipline in a manner inconsistent
with the Manual's requirements,

"was constitutionally entitled

only to notice of the charge,

an explanation of the evidence

against him, and an opportunity

to respond prior to the Chief's
disciplinary decision."

Williams, 607 F.Supp. at 721. (Emphasis

added.) Ina flat rejection of Punton I,

Williams concluded that the City's failure

to follow the identical Manual and collec-
tive bargaining agreement provisions did
not constitute a prima facie deprivation

of due process.

-14- |

Since Williams and this Court's

determination in Loudermill, there has

been a rapid retrogression from the

reasoning of Punton I and a consistent

effort by various panels of the State
Court of Appeals to distinguish it away.

In McConnell v. Seattle, 44 Wn. App.

316, 325, 722 P.2d 121 (Div. I, 1986),
review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1007 (1986),

the Washington State Court of Appeals
concluded that neither the Manual nor the
collective bargaining agreement provides
a right to a full evidentiary hearing to
a police officer charged or likely to be

charged with a felony. McConnell held

that a Seattle po’‘ce officer's consti-
tutional rights do not include a full

evidentiary hearing as provided by the
Manual but only the minimal due process

described in Loudermill, supra.

In Hansen v. Seattle, 45 Wn. App.

214, 221-22, 724 P.2d 371 (Div. I,

eB

_—~—

1986), the same court concluded that

Punton I did not address police officer's

rights under the collective bargaining
agreement. It held that, because no

full evidentiary hearing is guaranteed

by that agreement to officers subject to
discipline, the failure of a terminated
officer to resort to contractual remedies
or to seek administrative relief precluded
judicial review of his termination.

In Danielson v. Seattle, 45 Wn. App.

235, 242-44, 724 P.2d 1115 (Div. I, 1986),
certiorari granted, 107 Wn.2d 1013 (1986),
the Court of Appeals reached the same

conclusion as the McConnell court.

Finding support in the Williams criticism

and other federal decisions, the court

in Danielson flatly declared that the

City's failure to comply with the Manual's
procedures was neither a violation of
constitutional standards nor an error of

constitutional magnitude.

enemie

Were the facts in Punton to be
repeated, today, no due process depriva-

tion would be found. lLoudermill,

Williams, and Danielson have provided

clear directions regarding pertinent
substantive and procedural requirements.
No substantial federal question remains
for determination by this Court.

2. The Ninth Circuit applied the standard

adopted by this Court for determining

whether the judgment in Punton I had a

claim precluding effect on Punton's

federal court action.

In Migra v. Warren City School District

Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 104

S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), this
Court held that a federal district court
hearing an action arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 should apply the law of the forum
state when deciding matters of claim
preclusion. This was precisely what the

Ninth Circuit did when it ruled that

ee

petitioner's federal lawsuit was barred.
(Petition for Certiorari Appendix B-7
& -22.)

Contrary to petitioner's assertions,
this holding does not constitute a
departure from the decisions of this
Court, nor does the holding conflict
with any rule adopted in other circuits.
The Ninth Circuit was guided, in part,
by its earlier holding in Clark v.

Yosemite Community College District, 785

F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1986). Punton's
petition admits that the holding in Migra
is the basis for the Ninth Circuit's

decisions in Clark and Norco Construction,

Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1146

(9th Cir. 1986). (Petition for Certiorari
10.) The Ninth Circuit's reference to

Seattle-First National Bank v. Kawachi,

91 Wn.2d 223, 588 P.2d 725 (1978), and
its characterization of Punton's litiga-

tion strategy as an impermissible

il

splitting of a single cause of action

demonstrate that it focused on Washington
law in applying Migra.

Certiorari is not warranted in light
of the fact that the Ninth Circuit applied
Migra in the instant case, just as it

did in Clark and in Norco, supra. This

case does not demonstrate disregard for
Migra or a conflict between circuit
courts of appeal.

3. Punton's federal court claim is not

allowable under Washington law because

it represents part of a split cause of

action and was merged into Punton's

state court judgment.

"Claim preclusion, more tradi-
tionally called res judicata, is
a doctrine designed to curtail
the relitigation of a claim or
cause of action. For the doc-
trine to apply, there must be
substantial identity in the
successive proceedings. More =
particularly, the Washington
Supreme Court has stated for
almost seven decades that a
judgment has claim preclusive
effect only if the successive

caiencemnr emeaeainieten eee

proceedings are identical in
four respects: (1) subject
matter; (2) cause of action;
(3) persons and parties; and
(4) the quality of the persons
for or against whom the claim
is made."

Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in

Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805, 812

(1985). (Footnote omitted.)

The petitioner's motion for summary
judgment before the federal district
court admitted that his state court and
federal court proceedings were identical
in each of these respects. On page 4 of
his motion, Punton confessed that

"the subject matter in both

the state and federal cases
involves the same facts, the
same persons, the same arguments,
the same case law, the same
constitutional amendments, the
same everything. Even the
counsel are the same. The only
difference is that plaintiff
sought reinstatement in the
state court, but seeks damages
in the federal court."

(Clerk's Paper 25 submitted to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals.) That

=30-

"difference" was not a sufficient basis
for allowing Punton's federal lawsuit to
proceed to judgment.

The petitioner had only a single
claim or cause of action for a depriva-
tion of due process, "a species of tort

liability. . . ." Memphis Community

School District v. Stachura, U.S.

, 91 L.Ed.2d 249, 258, 106 S.Ct.

2537 (1986). Under Washington law, a
single tort can be the subject of only

one lawsuit. 2 Orland, Washington

Practice, § 361 p. 402 (1972), citing

Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247

Pac. 960 (1926). Under Sprague, prop-

erty damages and damages for personal
injuries arising from a single tort
cannot be made the subjects of separate
lawsuits against the same defendant.

Punton was not precluded from seeking,
in a single lawsuit, relief for all of

the damages resulting from his termination.

a,

It is state policy that all litigation
between the same parties, arising out of
the same transaction, be determined in
one action to avoid a multiplicity of

lawsuits. In Re Bouchat, 1l Wn. App.

369, 522 P.2d 1168 (Div. I, 1974); Dept.

of Labor & Industries v. City of Kennewick,

31 Wn. App. 777, 644 P.2d 1196 (Div. III,
1982) rev'd on other grounds, 99 Wn.2d
225, 661 P.2d 133 (1983).

Washington courts are required to
dismiss subsequent actions where relief

could and should have been sought ina

prior action. Sanwick v. Puget Sound

Title Ins. Co., 70 Wn.2d 438, 423 P.2d

624 (1967). The Restatement (Second) of

Judgments, §§ 24 and 25 succinctly state

the rule applied:

"§ 24 Dimensions of "Claim"
for Purpose of Merger or Bar
-- General Rule Concerning
"Splitting"

(1) When a valid and final
judgment rendered in an action
extinguishes the plaintiff's

essai saasiasisiiisaiiiiaiiaimaiiiiaiaiiaal

Pay ie

claim pursuant to the rules of

merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19),

the claim extinguished includes
all rights of the plaintiff to |
remedies ajyainst the defendant |
with respect to all or any part

of the transaction, or series

of connected transactions, out

of which the action arose.

"§ 25 Exemplifications of
General Rule -Concerning
Splitting

The rule of § 24 applies to
extinguish a claim by the
plaintiff against the defendant
even though the plaintiff is
prepared in the second action:
(1) To present evidence or
grounds or theories of the case
not presented in the first
action, or

(2) To seek remedies or forms
of relief not demanded in the
first action."

Section 1983 actions can be barred
by res judicata principles. Rains v.
State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 674 P.2d 165

(1983); Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d

436, 437 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 1066, 46 L.Ed.2d 657, 96 S.Ct.
807 (1976).
By attempting to secure reinstatement,

monetary damages and attorney's fees

through federal proceedings at the same

time he was engaged in state proceedings
to regain his job and obtain back wages
and attorney's fees, Punton split his
Single cause of action. The judgment
entered by the state court should have
had a preclusive effect on his federal
court claims, consistent with established

Washington law. Sanwick and Sprague,

both supra. The Ninth Circuit applied
Migra as it should have, correctly
interpreting Washington claim preclusion
law as a prohibition against Punton's

federal lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

The district court should have denied
the petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and granted the City's motion
to dismiss on res judicata grounds simply
on the basis of the admissions in Punton's

motion and the principle under Washington

ee ee

seriall

=$é@u

law that remedies available for a single
claim or cause of action cannot be

sought in separate lawsuits. The City
has been required to reinstate an officer
with back pay in spite of having estab-
lished solid grounds for his termination.
Monetary damages and attorney's fees are

not appropriate in this case. The Ninth

Circuit's decision corrected the district
court's error in this case and is the
right result, and a fair result. It
follows this Court's instructions in
Migra, demonstrates no conflict with
another circuit, and presents no substan-
tial federal question. For these reasons,
respondent The City of Seattle respect-
fully requests this Court to deny Punton's

petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day

of April, 1987.

DOUGLAS N. JEWETT
City Attorney

Ye vem 7. Cnet £?

-

GORDON F. CRANDALL*

GORDON B. DAVIDSON
sistant

* Counsel of Record

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

DELMUS PUNTON,
Plaintiff, NO. C82-397

COMPLAINT AND JURY
DEMAND

VSe
CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendant.

ee ee eee eee eee ee”

I. PARTIES

1.1 Delmus Punton is a citizen
. residing in the Western District of
Washington.

1.2 The City of Seattle is a
municipal corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Washington and
located within the Western District of

Washington.

II. JURISDICTION

2.1 The court has jurisdiction over
the parties pursuant to 28 USC §1331l
because this case arises under the
United States Constitution and the laws
of the United States; viz., 42 USC §1983
and 42 USC §1988.

III. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

3.1 On September 22, 1980, the City
of Seattle summarily terminated the
employment of plaintiff, a permanent
employee with eleven years of service as
a Seattle police officer.

3.2 Delmus Punton was given no
prior notice of discharge nor was he
given an opportunity to be heard prior

co termination.

3-3 Pursuant to the applicable
civil service rules, Delmus Punton has a
legitimate expectation of continued
employment with the City of Seattle
because his employment could only be
terminated for cause. The City of
Seattle concedes that Delmus Punton
possessed a property interest in his
continued employment with the City of
Seattle.

IV. CLAIMS PRESENTED

4.1 Because Delmus Punton was
terminated without prior notice or
hearing, his property interests were
denied without due process having been

afforded as required by the United

States Constitution and 43 USC §1983.

4.2 Delmus Punton has suffered
hardship, both mental and physical, as a —
result of his wrongful discharge.

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff requests the court to
_ grant the following relief:

5.1 Reinstatement, effective
September 22, 1980.

5.2 Damages in an amount to be
determined at the time of trial.

5.3 Cost, disbursements and
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USC
§1988.

5.4 Such other and further relief

as the court may consider appropriate

following a full trial.
|

VI. JURY DEMAND

6.1 Pursuant to FRCP 38 and Local
Rules, W.D. Wash. 38(b), plaintiff
demands a jury on the issue of damages
as identified in paragraph 4.2 above.

DATED this 8th day of April, 1982.

CLINTON, FLECK, GLEIN & LINVILLE

By:_/s/

Lawrence B. Linville
Attorneys for plaintiff

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1934%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.