# Opposition Brief — Doe v. Webster

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1930%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1988
- **Citation:** 487 U.S. 1223

## Text

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Saye ON CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE at
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT oe

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT aM
IN OPPOSITION hin a

CHARLES FRIED a8 Hi
Solicitor General et, TN
Department of Justice yin
: Washington, D.C. 20530 Cae
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DAvip P. DOHERTY
General Counsel
‘Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Bishop Vv. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) -..................... 3-4
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ...... 2

Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948

6: Re eg ens 2 A ON eS Oe 7,8
CIA ¥. Sima, 471 U.S. 168 (1966) ............................. 6
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470

| RESETS 2,3
Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977)................-.--...... 3, 4
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).......................... 6
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) ............ 8,9

Egan v. Department of the Navy, 802 F.2d 1563

(Fed. Cir. 1986), petition for cert. pending, No.

ee nadinpiawimsnentnec~ 11
Gonzalez v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955)...... 9
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .....: Ee 6
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) .................... 5
Hoska v. Department of the Army, 694 F.2d 270

GY. Bip ROR ee 8
King v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.), aff’g

827 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Mo. 1971) ....................... 8
Normile v. McFague, 685 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1982)... 8
Olsen v. Department of Commerce, 735 F.2d 558

BR REESE a SE ea Ee 8
Simmons Vv. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955).... 9
Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,

ee 6
Zeisel v. Pierce, 784 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1986)...... 8

Constitution, statutes, and regulation:

U.S. Const. Amend. V (Due Process Clause) ........ 2,6
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp.
IIT) 551:

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SE I TR 6, 7, 8,
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5 U.S.C. 701 (a) (2)....

“IF © 0 00 WOW

II

Constitution, statutes, and regulation—Continued: Page

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 7501.... 3
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 504, 100 Stat. 3198... 11
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 481:

I oc ccctinisenesisncesaisaconeticcaaseuiaes 9

Be II inciteccccsenccndivicncinniiannticacncmab eee. a 9
National Security Act of 1947, § 102(c), 50 U.S.C.

| ESOS IS pee ea OE DON 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Universal Military Training and Service Act
§ 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. II 1948) 456(j).. 9

MR I Shia hs ccknce thn eatin sas od a 11, la-2a
10 UU. (eee Til) 1604(e) (1) 10
Se I chs iniicaspssiceninspicinncnaei eke ee 10
CIA Headquarters Reg. 20-27 (Mar. 17, 1977):
| a eC men aon eee WS Pree 3,9
| EERE REO PME reas eh, ee SY 3,9
1 F 5| RE CLOSE Sr et wee 3,9
Miscellaneous:

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Administrative
Procedure Act: Legislative History, S. Doc. 248,
voun tee, BE Get, COO 5c 8

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 86-1442
JOHN DOE, CROSS-PETITIONER
Vv.

ROBERT M. GATES,
ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ON CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

In No. 86-1294, we filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari presenting the question whether the decision
of the Director of Central Intelligence to discharge
an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency (here, John Doe) pursuant to the Director’s
authority under Section 102(c) of the National Secu-
rity -Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 403(c), is judicially re-
viewable under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 701-706. Respondent John
Doe has now filed a cross-petition, claiming that the
review afforded him by the court of appeals does not
go far enough, because he is entitled to a fuller ex-
planation of the reasons for his dismissal (Cross-
Pet. 2). Because the cross-petition neither raises a

(1)

2

significant question of federal law nor demonstrates
a conflict with the decisions of this Court or among
the circuits, review by this Court is not warranted.

1. Doe maintains that he is entitled under the
Due Process Clause, the APA, and the CIA’s regula-
tions to a statement of the reasons for his dismissal
from the CIA. That claim does not warrant review
even if the government’s petition is granted. The
court of appeals remanded this case to the district
court precisely because the record did not reveal the
Director’s reason(s) for dismissing Doe (Pet. App.
25a, 32a). In these circumstances, it is difficult to
see how the relief Doe has sought in his cross-petition
differs from the relief he has already been awarded
under the judgment below. In any event, he is not
entitled to further information concerning the rea-
sons for his dismissal.

a. Relying on Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 582 (1985), Doe argues (Cross-
Pet. 8) that he was entitled to a statement of the
reasons for his discharge from the CIA, since it may
affect his liberty interest in obtaining future em-
ployment. Loudermill ruled that a “tenured public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of
the story” before he may be discharged (470 U.S. at
546). Doe was not a “tenured” CIA employee, how-
ever,, as the court of appeals correctly deter-

*Tenure rights are created by “existing rules or under-
standings” that stem from a source independent from the
Due Process Clause, such as a statute, regulation, or contract
(Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ). Nosuch authority gave Doe a property
right in continued employment with the CIA. The text of

3

mined,? and Doe does not argue to the contrary. Ac-
cordingly, Doe’s reliance on Loudermill is misplaced.

Doe argues that the hearing procedures necessary
before a tenured public employee may be discharged
also apply when an employee is entitled only to a
“name-clearing hearing’ (Pet. App. 31a). It is
doubtful that Doe has stated a claim that the govern-
ment has deprived him of a liberty interest by pre-
venting him from obtaining future employment, be-
cause his complaint did not allege that the CIA has
published any false or defamatory statements in con-
nection with his dismissal, and the failure to do so
ordinarily “dooms” a claim like Doe’s (Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 547 n.13; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,

Section 102(c) denies CIA personnel the qualified tenure
rights held by other civil service employees under the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act (now the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
5 U.S.C. 7501) ; the Agency’s regulations reiterate the terms
of the statute (CIA Headquarters Reg. §§ 20-27.j, 20-27.m,
20-27.m(8)(c) (Mar. 17, 1977); and Doe has alleged no
other source of a property right. Accordingly, s.ace Doe was
not deprived of a property right by his discharge, he had no
due process right to examine the Office of Security report or to
receive a statement of reasons for his dismissal. Codd Vv.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (when a public employee
has no property interest in continued employment, “the ade-
quacy or even the existence of reasons for failing to rehire
him presents no federal constitutional question”).

2 Doe erroneously asserts (Cross-Pet. 6) that the court of
appeals never addressed his claim that he had a property
interest in continued employment with the CIA. The court
ruled that Doe would have no constitutional claim unless the
Director dismissed him because of a CIA policy barring the
employment of all homosexuals. Pet. App. 23a-28a (discussed
at 86-1294 Pet. 7-8). In so ruling, it necessarily rejected
Doe’s claim that his discharge unlawfully deprived him of a
property interest in continued employment with the CIA.

4

348 (1976)).° In any event, “the hearing required
where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized
in the course of a decision to terminate his employ-
ment is solely ‘to provide [him] an opportunity to
clear his name,’” not to convince his employer that
he should be reinstated (Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S.
624, 627 (1977)). As the court of appeals found
(Pet. App. 3la-32a), the procedures afforded Doe
gave him “an opportunity to refute the charges and
‘clear his name.’ ” Doe admitted that he was a homo-
sexual; he was given notice that the CIA was con-
cerned that the circumstances of his homosexuality
created a security risk;* he was given a chance to

8 Doe’s complaint alleged that the CIA will give him a posi-
tive recommendation to any future employer, but that he was
told by a CIA security officer and an assistant general counsel
that, if he applies for a job requiring a security clearance, the
CIA will inform the prospective employer that the CIA deter-
mined that Doe is a security risk because of his homosexuality.
Amended Complaint paras. 37-38 (C.A. App. 49-50) ; see also
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts As To Which There
Is No Genuine Dispute paras. 53-54 (C.A. App. 16-17). The
court of appeals predicted that, “[a]s a practical matter,
Doe will be unable to obtain employment whenever a security
clearance is required,” because “we find it inconceivable that
other agencies [and private employers] would second-guess
such a determination by the CIA” (Pet. App. 30a & n.67).
But Section 102(c) in terms provides that dismissal does not
by itself bar a former CIA employee from obtaining other
employment by the federal government (86-1294 Pet. 24).
Given the sensitive nature of the CIA’s work, there is also no
reason to assume, as the court of appeals did, that private
employers will automatically follow the CIA’s determination.
There is no need to resolve these issues in this case, however,
since the court of appeals correctly held that the procedures
afforded Doe by the CIA were sufficient.

* The letter that Doe’s counsel submitted to the Director
stated that a CIA security officer had told Doe that the CIA

ace iacacaaemmmmmias

5

review and to respond to a factual report summariz-
ing his interviews and his polygraph results; and
he took advantage of the opportunity to dispel the
CIA’s concern that he was a security risk in a letter
from his counsel to the Director (id. at 4a; C.A.
App. 26-30). Doe has cited no decision suggesting
that a “name-clearing hearing” requires more.

Doe complains (Cross-Pet. 7) that he deserved a
fuller explanation of the facts to learn whether the
Director’s decision “was based on some misunder-
standing of the facts of his case or on an irrational
bias toward homosexuals.” But Doe was aware of
the nature of the Office of Security’s general con-
cerns, including “his unwillingness to identify his
homosexual partners” (C.A. App. 27). Moreover, in
an extensive letter to the Director, Doe’s counsel ad-
dressed his concerns that the Director might mis-
understand the facts of his case or harbor an irra-
tional bias towards homosexuals (id. at 26-30). Ac-
cordingly, Doe had a meaningful opportunity to clear
his name, even though the proceedings were informal.
Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472-474 (1983)
(prison officials need only conduct “an informal, non-
adversary review” of the information supporting
administrative confinement).

Doe concedes (Cross-Pet. 10-11) that there are cir-
cumstances where the CIA may properly withhold the
reasons for dismissing an employee because of na-
tional security concerns, but he maintains that the
Director should be required to justify such with-
holding on a case-by-case basis. The court of appeals

was concerned about “the duration and frequency of Mr.
Doe’s sexual activity, his failure to reveal his homosexuality
to the Agency for six years, and his unwillingness to identify
his homosexual partners.” C.A. App. 27.

_——

6

correctly noted (Pet. App. 23a-24a), however, that
Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947,
50 U.S.C. 403(c), reflects Congress’s judgment that
the Director must have broad power to remove em-
ployees for the slightest security risk, and that even
his judgments about whether to withhold information
or explain the reasons why he is doing so are en-
titied to great deference. This judgment by Congress
is entitled to deference even on the question whether
due process requires disclosure (see Walters v. Na-
tional Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
319-320 (1985)). Congress’s judgment is also emi-
nently reasonable. As this Court has recognized,
“Tijt is conceivable that the mere explanation of
why information must be withheld can convey valu-
able information to a foreign intelligence agency,”
which has “both the capacity to gather and analyze
any information that is in the public domain and
the substantial expertise in deducing the identi-
ties of intelligence sources from seemingly unimpor-
tant details.” CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178-179
(1985). These considerations are relevant in deter-
mining the process that is due under the Fifth
Amendment. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309
(1981); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546-547
(1956). It was thus hardly unreasonable for the
court of appeals to limit the disclosures necessary
for a proceeding whose sole purpose is to allow an
employee to clear his name.

b. Doe also contends (Cross-Pet. 8-9) that he has
a right under 5 U.S.C. 555(e) to a statement of the
reasons for his dismissal. More specifically, he

5 Section 555(e) of Title 5 provides:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or
in part of a written application, petition, or other re-

7

claims a right under Section 555(e) to a copy of the
CIA Office of Security report to the Director, but
having made no such claim in the lower courts he
may not do so now. In any event, Doe’s argument
under Section 555(e) is insubstantial.°

quest of an interested person made in connection with
any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior de-
nial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice
shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds
for denial.

* As we have explained in the petition (86-1294 Pet. 12-22),
the Director’s decision to dismiss a CIA employee under
Section 102(c) is not subject to review under the APA. Doe
therefore is not entitled under 5 U.S.C. 555(e) to a statement
of the reasons why he was discharged. Bollow vy. Federal
Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 10938, 1101-1102 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982) (the government is not required
by 5 U.S.C. 555(e) to provide a statement of reasons for an
employee’s dismissal when the decision to discharge him is
“committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C.
701 (a) (2)).

But Section 102(c) shows that Doe’s claim lacks merit
even if the Director’s decision to dismiss him may be re
viewed under the APA. As we explained in the petition (at
14-15), Section 102(c), which was adopted the year after the
enactment of the APA, denies CIA personnel the rights that
Doe seeks, because it provides that the Director’s authority
to remove a CIA employee is exempt from the civil service
laws, which would otherwise have guaranteed Doe notice of
any charges and a statement of reasons for his removal. It
would be anomalous to find that 5 U.S.C. 555(e) guarantees
CIA personnel the same rights explicitly withheld from them
under a statute that is specifically addressed to the rights of
Agency employees, Section 102(c). Accordingly, 5 U.S.C.
555(e) cannot be read to require the Director to provide a
statement of reasons why he invoked his authority under
Section 102(c) to remove a CIA employee, even if the merits

8

Section 555(e) applies only to an “agency proceed-
ing,’ and an “agency proceeding” includes only
“rule-making,” “adjudication,” or “licensing” proce-
dures (5 U.S.C. 551(5), (7), (9), and (12)). While
the termination of an employee might conceivably be
argued to involve an adjudication, it is clear from
the statute that the APA hearing procedures do not
apply to disputes regarding the “selection or tenure
of an employee.” 5 U.S.C. 554(a) (2) ; Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act: Leg-
islative History, S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
202, 260-261 (1946) ; Normile v. McFague, 685 F.2d
9, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) (5 U.S.C. 555(e) is in-
applicable to the dismissal of a federal employee) ;
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1098,
1101-1102 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
948 (1982) (5 U.S.C. 555(e) does not entitle a
federal employee to a statement of the reasons for
his removal) ; King v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 247, 249
(8th Cir.), aff’'g 327 F. Supp. 714, 716 (E.D. Mo.
1971); see Zeisel v. Pierce, 784 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (dismissal of an employee is a matter
involving “tenure” under 5 U.S.C. 554(a)(2));
Olsen v. Department of Commerce, 7385 F.2d 558,
562 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[t]he discharge of an
employee involves his ‘tenure’” under 5 U.S.C. 554
(a)(2)); Hoska v. Department of the Army, 694
I'.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1982).’ Accordingly, Doe

of the Director’s decision can itself be reviewed under the
APA.

For the reasons given in the text, however, Doe’s claim
lacks merit even if our construction of Section 102(c) is
erroneous.

7 None of the cases cited by Doe is to the contrary. Dunlop
v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), on which Doe relies

9

had no right under 5 U.S.C. 555(e) to a statement
of reasons from the Director explaining his actions.

ce. Finally, Doe argues (Cross-Pet. 10) that the
CIA’s regulations entitle him to know why he was
dismissed and to examine the Office of Security re-
port, but that claim is frivolous. The pertinent regu-
lation expressly preserves the Director’s discretion
under Section 102(c) to remove an employee summar-
ily without issuing a statement of reasons. CIA Head-
quarters Reg. §§ 20-27.j, 20-27.m, 20-27.m(8) (c)
(Mar. 17, 1977) (reprinted in relevant part at Pet.
App. 19a-20a).® As the court of appeals succinctly

(Cross-Pet. 8), does not support his claim. Dunlop found
insufficient the Secretary of Labor’s statement of reasons for
refusing to file an action to set aside a labor union election,
on the ground that the statement did not satisfy the require-
ments of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 482(a) and (b) (421 U.S. at 573-
574). That statute is not at issue in this case, and, in con-
trast to it, the relevant statute, Section 102(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 403(c), certainly does not
expressly or impliedly require a statement of reasons for an
employee’s removal.

Doe’s reliance (Cross-Pet. 9) on Simmons vy. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955), and Gonzalez v. United States, 348 U.S.
407 (1955), is also misplaced. Neither case involved 5 U.S.C.
555(e). Instead, those cases dealt with the requirements of
an entirely different statute, Section 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp.
II 1948) 456(j), which required a hearing on “ ‘the charac-
ter and good faith’” of a claim of conscientious objector
status (Simmons, 348 U.S. at 403 (quoting statute) ). In this
case, the relevant statute, Section-102(c), does not require
the Director to find any facts or to conduct a hearing before
an employee may be removed.

8 Doe argues (Cross-Pet. 10) that the Director’s authority
is limited by the Agency’s regulations to those circumstances

10

put it (Pet. App. 20a), “[w]Je cannot imagine how
the CIA could have more plainly expressed its intent
to protect the discretion granted it by section 102
( c) ”

2. Doe asserts (Cross-Pet. 7) that the court of
appeals’ decision threatens “thousands of federal em-
ployees,” who, he contends, may be summarily re-
moved under that decision by “the mere invocation
of the phrase ‘national security.’” Doe has clearly
exaggerated the effect of the court of appeals’ deci-
sion on federal employees.

The court of appeals emphasized that judicial re-
view is limited because of the broad discretion vested
in the Director to remove CIA personnel under Sec-
tion 102(c) and because the sensitive nature of the
CIA’s functions and the national security interests
at stake dictate that judicial oversight of the Direc-
tor’s removal decisions be particularly circumscribed
(Pet. App. 23a-24a). Neither consideration is pres-
ent for civil service personnel not employed within
the intelligence community.® In fact, a different stat-

where urgency is required. As the court of appeals explained
(Pet. App. 20a-21a), however, the CIA’s regulations impose
no such requirement. In any event, the Director’s affidavit
indicates that he did “exercis[e] my discretion under the
authority granted by section 102(c) * * * and pursuant to
HR 20-27m” to discharge an employee “immediately” when
the “circumstances of a case * * * make the[] [normal sepa-
ration] procedures impractical or undesirahle”’ (C.A. App.
45 (quoting regulation) ). Doe is incorrect in asserting that
the Director did not.

___® There are other statutes similar to Section 102(c), but
they are also limited to employees of other intelligence
agencies. 50 U.S.C. 833(a) (National Security Agency) ;
10 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 1604(e)(1) (Defense Intelligence

11

ute, 5 U.S.C. 7532, defines the procedures for the
separation on national security grounds of such civil
service employees, and it provides them with the very
procedures that petitioner deems necessary (App.,
infra, 1a-2a).” Accordingly, although we believe that
the court of appeals’ decision will have a serious and
damaging effect on the intelligence community, there
is no substance to Doe’s fear that its ruling will be
applied beyond those confines.

Agency); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, §504, 100 Stat. 3198 (civilian
intelligence employees or officers of a military department) ;
see 86-1294 Pet. 18-19 & nn.16-17 (reprinting statutes).
Moreover, under these statutes the Secretary of Defense may
summarily discharge an employee only when the Secretary
finds that other procedures cannot be followed consistent
with the national security.

1°In Department of the Navy v. Egan, petition for cert.
pending, No. 86-1552, we have sought review of a decision of-
the Federal Circuit holding that the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board may, in the course of reviewing the removal of an
employee for failing to maintain a required security clear-
ance, review the merits of the agency’s underlying decision
to revoke a security clearance. (We have provided Doe’s
counsel with a copy of our petition in Egan.) The questions
in Egan and in this case are quite distinct. In Egan, we
agree that Egan’s removal was subject to review to determine,
inter alia, whether he received procedural due process; we
contest only the MSPB’s right to second guess the clearance
determination on the merits. 86-1552 Pet. 19-20. Here, our
contention is that another statute specifically bars review of
either the merits or the procedures leading to removal. The
Federal Circuit in Egan specifically recognized that the intel-
ligence agencies, such as the CIA, are governed by their own
statutes, which exempt them from the procedural rights
applicable to civil service employees generally. Egan v. De-
partment of the Navy, 802 F.2d 1563, 1567 n.2 (1986).

12

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
DAVID P. DOHERTY
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

APRIL 1987

APPENDIX >
5 U.S.C. 7532 provides as follows:

(a) Notwithstanding other statutes, the head
of an agency may suspend without pay an
employee of his agency when he considers that
action necessary in the interests of national se-
curity. To the extent that the head of the agency
determines that the interests of national security
permit, the suspended employee shall be notified
of the reasons for the suspension. Within 30
days after the notification, the suspended em-
ployee is entitled to submit to the official desig-
nated by the head of the agency statements or
affidavits to show why he should be restored to
duty.

(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section,
the head of an agency may remove an employee
suspended under subsection (a) of this section
when, after such investigation and review as he
considers necessary, he determines that removal
is necessary or advisable in the interests of na-
tional security. The determination of the head
of the agency is final.

(c) An employee suspended under subsection
(a) of this section who—

(1) has a permanent or indefinite appoint-
ment;

'(2) has completed his probationary or trial
period; and

(3) is a citizen of the United States;

is entitled, after suspension and before removal,
to—

(1a)

2a

(A) a written statement of the charges
against him within 30 days after suspen-
sion, which may be amended within 30 days
thereafter and which shall be stated as spe-
cifically as security considerations permit;

(B) an opportunity within 30 days there-
after, plus an additional 30 days if the
charges are amended, to answer the charges
and submit affidavits;

(C) a hearing, at the request of the em-
ployee, by an agency authority duly consti-
tuted for this purpose;

(D) a review of his case by the head of the
agency or his designee, before a decision ad-
verse to the employee is made final; and

(E) a written statement of the decision of
the head of the agency.

W U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1987 181483 40306

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1930%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.