# Appendix — Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1987
- **Citation:** 481 U.S. 1016

## Text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,
PETITIONERS,
V.

THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

J. Gusty Yearout*

Attorney for Petitioners
YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.
2700 SouthTrust Tower
Birmingham, AL 35203

(205) 326-6111

*Counsel of Record

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al,
PETITIONERS,
Ve
THE AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

J. Gusty Yearout*

Attorney for Petitioners
YEAROUT, MYERS & TRAYLOR, P.C.
2700 SouthTrust Tower
Birmingham, AL 35203

.205) 326-6111

*Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Comany,
793 F.2G 1464 (ilth Cir. 1986) ... 175
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Company,
6i9, F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Alia. 1985) . 1
BP Wemece § 2060 4-6 es oe « st ee 8 280
a eS ee Se ee ee ee ae a ee ee yy
nae, Goce § 692-3 (1978S) «es « «© «231
Ram. Coage § G-2-39 (1975). . « « « «#31

Denial on

Petition for Rehearing . .173

619 F. Supp. 694

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

VS.
AMOCO OIL COMPANY, a
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV80-L-1416-S
United States District Court For The
Northern District of Alabama,
Southern Division
June 18, 1985
This is an action seeking the
recovery of specified employee benefits,
together with compensatory and punitive
damages. It stems from the sale of a
liquid propane gas operation py defendant
Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco") to defendant

Northern Propane Gas Company ("Norgas").

The plaintiffs have cast their net wide,

BEBERERBRERBEUULEESE

alleging that the sale violated no less

than eight sections of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.

Moreover, in apparent recognition of the
fact that such a wide net is bound to
develop a few holes, the plaintiffs have
tacked on certain state law claims as
well. The jurisdiction of the Court is
invoked under 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.+

After numerous pleading amendments
and our ckece of extensive discovery, the
legal sufficiency of these claims may now
be tested. Both Amoco’ and Norgas may
have moved for summary judgment based
upon the pleadings, affidavits,

depositions, stipulations and other

documents now on file.? Upon careful
review of the record as it now stands,
the Court is convinced that all
defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on each and every claim
asserted by the plaintiffs.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed.
In the years before 1979, Amoco operated
a business, in Alabama and elsewhere in
the southeastern United States, which
sold liquid propane gas ("LPG"). Each of
the plaintiffs in this action was an
employee of Amoco working in the LPG
Operation in Alabama. As employees of
Amoco, the plaintiffs were eligible to
participate in the employee Retirement

Plan of Standard Oil Company and

Participating Companies (hereinafter
referred to as “the Standard Plan" or
"the Amoco Plan"). Prior to May, 1979,
Amoco began to seek a purchaser for its
Southeastern LPG operations. On May 4,
1979, defendant Norgas submitted an offer
to purchase Amoco's LPG facilities in the
southeastern United States, contingent
upon approval of the Board of Directors
of its parent company. In that offer,
Norgas specifically noted that retirement
benefits for LPG employees who became
employees of Norgas would be based on
their years of service with Norgas. In
other words, Norgas' initial offer to

purchase the Amoco operation

7)

contemplated that, although years of

service with Amoco would be recognized by

Norgas for certain employee benefit
purposes, those prior years of service
would not be recognized for benefit
accrual purposes under the Nogegas
retirement plan.

By a letter dated May 10, 1979, Amoco
accepted Norgas’ offer. Amoco and Norgas

then exchanged information and negotiated

|r }

the definitive agreement. The parties

signed the final sale contract on July
34, 1979 4 Section 2.5 of the sale

contract provided in part:

Buyer [Norgas] agrees
to offer employment to each
regular full-time employee
of Seller [Amoco] presently
assigned to the business
represented by the various
assets subject to this
Contract, except employees
on long-term and/or
permanent disability...upon

-
~
}

ES ESE SESE SS SBS SBS SF SB SSS SA

the following conditions:
current salary and
appropriate salary
administration plan will be
recognized; ... retirement
benefits under the Buyer's
Retirement Income
Protection Plan will be
based on years with Buyer
except that continuous
years of service with
Seller immediately prior to
the transfer date shall be
credited by Buyer for
vesting purposes....

The saie of Amoco's LPG operations to
Norgas was closed effective 12:01 A.M. on
September 4, 1979. The former Amoco
employees, including p'aintiffs, began
their employment with Norgas on that date.
Immediately after the sale of Amoco's LPG
Operations to Norgas, each plaintiff had
the same job responsibilities and was
compensated at the same rate of pay as he

had enjoyed at Amoco. Exactly one year

later, on September 4, 1980, this action
ensued.

in this action, plaintiffs have spun
a tangled web of arguable related and
intertwined claims, portions of which are
intended to trap Amoco alone, and other
portions of which are intended to ensnare

4 The substance

both Amoco and Norgas.
of these claims ranges from the honestly
debatable to the utterly amorphous. The
plaintiffs' failure to filter out the
latter has rendered this litigation far
more burdensome and unwieldly for the
parties and the Court than it might
otherwise have been.

First, the plaintiffs allege a number

of state law claims. Thus, plaintiffs

claim that at various times Amoco made

misrepresentations regarding plaintiffs'

future job security, the security of
their employee benefits, and the
existence of plans by Amoco to divest
itself of the LPG operation, thereby
inducing plaintiffs to remain “in place"
sO aS to enhance the value of Amoco's LPG
operation as a salable "going concern."
(Pretrial Order at 10-ll). Moreover,
plaintiffs allege that they had contracts
for lifetime employment with Amoco, which
Amoco breached when it sold the going LPG
operation to Norgas and terminated
plaintiffs' association with Amoco.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amoco
and Norgas conspired to misrepresent
certain facts regarding the Amoco-Norgas

sale--specifically, the fact that

plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco
would not ve credited by Norgas for
Purposes of calculating retirement
benefits under the Norgas retirement plan.
(Pretrial Order at 12).

Plaintiffs contend that the terms of
the Amoco-Norgas sale and the manner in
which it was negotiated an effectuated
violated at least eight sections of
ERISA: 29 U.S.C. § 1022, § 1024, § 1056,
§ 1060, § 1104, § 1106, § 1140, and §
1141.

In the face of these allegations, the
defendants contend that based upon an
extensive record developed through four
years of ample discovery, defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with respect to each of the plaintiffs'

claims. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court must agree with the defendants.

DISCUSSION

Ee The State Law Claims

A. Lifetime Employment Contract

The Court will first address the
State law claims, which may be disposed
of without reaching the merits. The
first of these claims concerns an alleged
"lifetime employment contract" between
plaintiffs and Amoco. Amoco has
fervently denied entering into any
lifetime employment contracts with the
plaintiffs. However, assuming for

purposes of this motion that such

contracts existed, it is apparent as a

10

matter of law that they were not breached
on the undisputed facts of this case.
Although lifetime employment
contracts are relatively rare in industry
today, they do exist and they have been
recognized by several states to be valid
and binding. Generally, of course, the
typical employment contracts which
contain no fixed period of employment are
construed as terminable at will by either

party. See Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina

Chepicai €o65; 2241) Ala. 660; 136.431

(1930). Under certain circumstances,
however, employment contracts which
purport to be terminable only at the will
of the employee will be held to create a
valid and binding contract of "permanent"

or "lifetime" employment in favor of the

ll

employee. See Alabama Mills, Inc. v.

Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939).
Nevertheless, Alabama law on this
question follows that of most other
states which recognize lifetime
employment contracts, and holds that
there are certain limitations implied by
law with regard to such contracts.
Specifically, even where a lifetime
employment contract is legally
enforceable, the law implies the
condition that the contract lasts only so
long as the employer remains in the
business for which the employee was hired
and needs the particular services the

employee was hired to perform. Alabama

Wat3e, 266 So. at FOE; FOZ. Accord,

Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418

12

So. 20 903, 906 (Ala. 1982)3 United

Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281

Ala. 264, 201 So. 2d 853, 854-55 (1967);

Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423

So. 2d 896, 898-99 (Ala. App. 1982).

In the present case, it is undisputed
that Amoco se14 i883. EOtest bee
business to Norgas, and abandoned the
retail LPG business in Alabama. Prior to
the sale, the various plaintiffs had held
positions as salesmen, sales office
Supervisors, and sales and service
representatives in various retail sales
branches of Amoco's LPG operations. °
After the sale, it is untontroverted on
the record that Amoco no longer engaged

in the retail sales of liquid propane,

and no longer needed the services the

13

6

plaintiffs had been hired to perform.
This being so, the above-cited
authorities make it clear as a matter of
law that Amoco is entitled to summary
Judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for
breach of lifetime employment contracts.
Even assuming that such contracts were
made, they were not breached, since they
terminated as a matter of law when Amoco
left the retail LPG business in Alabama.

Cf. Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc.,

423 So. 2d at 897-99.

The plaintiffs attempt in vain to
escape the burden of the long line of
precedents mandating this result. First,
the plaintiffs argue that Amoco still
does some business in Alabama, and that

even after leaving the business of retail

14

sales of liquid propane, Amoco was under
a contractual duty to transfer the
plaintiffs to some other type of work in
some other division of Amoco's operations.

Alabama Mills and its progeny are

inapplicable, they argue, because in
those cases the employer no longer had
work of any kind for the terminated
employees to perform.

The plaintiffs labor against the
current. Under Alabama law, a lifetime
employment contract lasts only so long as
the employer remains in the particular
business for which the particular

employee was hired. Thus, in Alabama

Mills, the court stated:

15

A leading case upon
[the] subject [of lifetime
employment contracts] is
Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass.
544, 46 N.E. 117...-It was
said that what they meant
by a permanent employment
was so long as defendant
was engaged in the same

nature of business and

needed the service of such

an employee, and plaintiff

was able and willing to do
it satisfactorily and gave
no cause for his discharge.

If [the employee] has
purchased a contract by
which his employer leaves
the period of duration to
him, it resembles the
purchase of other sorts of
Option rights, subject to
the limitation impiedly
included THAT the employer
shall continue in such

business and need the

things to be done, which

the employee is to do. In
other words, such employee
must have a preference over
others in doing that sort

of work.

Alabama Mills, 186 So. at 701,

(emphasis supplied).

16

702

Thus, in order for the principle of

Alabama Mills to apply, it is not

necessary that the employer go out of
business totally. Rather, it is
sufficient that the employer is no longer
engaged in the business for which the
particular employee is hired, and thus no
longer in need of the particular services
the employee was hired to perform. This
is further confirmed by the decision of

the Alabama Supreme Court in Bates v. Jim

Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903

(1982). There, the plaintiff alleged
that he had entered into a contract of
lifetime employment with the defendant.
In reliance on this alleged contract, the
plaintiff had resigned from another job.

Before she reported for work with the

17

defendant, however, “economic conditions
caused [the defendant] to institute an
austerity program, which included a
hiring freeze." 418 So. 2d at 904.
Pursuant to this program, the plaintiff
was terminated. In the plaintiff's
subsequent suit for breach of a lifetime
employment contract, the Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's grant of
Summary judgment based upon proof that
the employer no longer needed the
services for which the plaintiff had
initially been hired, ” even though the
employer had not gone out of business

altogether. After quoting Alabama Mills,

the Court stated:

18

Thus, according to the
above definition, n
implicit term of the
employment contract wa
that the employee woul
remain employed only if
employer had need f
employee's services. |
trial court correctly f oe
that Bates was terminat:
because [the defendant
not need Bates’ services
the services of other new
employees at that time.

418 So. 2d at 906.

In the instant case, then, it 1s
legally immaterial that Amoco continued
to engage in some types of business in
Alabama following the sale of its LPG
Operations to Norgas. The salient point
is whether Amoco continued to engage in
the business for which the plaintiffs
were hired and continued to need the
services which plaintiffs were hired to

perform. As to that point, there is no

19

dispute of material fact in the record.
Following the Amoco-Norgas transaction,
Amoco was no longer in the retail LPG
business, and no longer needed*’the
plaintiffs' services as LPG retail sales
personnel. 8

Similarly flawed are the plaintiffs'
attempts to sidestep the plain import of

Alabama Mills and its progeny by claiming

that they were never told "that they
would have a job with Amoco [only] until
Amoco decided to sell its facilities."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,
p. 5). Under Alabama law, all lifetime
contracts terminate as a matter of law

when the employer ceases to engage in the

business for which the employee is hired.

There is no requirement that the employee
be notified of this possibility in
advance or that the term be expressed in
the contract itself? --rather, the term

is implied by law into every contract of

lifetime employment governed by Alabama
law.

The plaintiffs have adduced no
evidence tending to establish chat Amoco
continues to engage in the business for
which they were hired, and no evidence
that Amoco continues to need the services
which plaintiffs were hired to perform.
Thus, based on the record before the
Court, it is clear that there exists no
genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the plaintiffs' claims for

breach of lifetime employment contracts.

21

The Court concludes that defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims.

B. The Fraud Claims

The plaintiffs next allege two
discrete claims of fraud--one against
Amoco alone and the other against both
Amoco and Norgas. First, the plaintiffs
allege fraud with respect to their
continued employment by Amoco. In
substance the plaintiffs contend that
Amoco falsely represented that the LPG
Operation would not be sold, that
plaintiffs' jobs and benefits were
secure, and that benefits would only be
lost if plaintiffs voluntarily terminated
their employment with Amoco or if

plaintiffs failed to properly perform

22

their jobs. (Pretrial Order at
10-12), 10 Second, plaintiffs allege
that Amoco and Norgas conspired to
defraud the plaintiffs by misrepresenting
material facts concerning the terms of
the Amoco-Norgas sale (Pretrial Order at
ib ge Specifically, plaintiffs claim that
defendants conspired to misrepresent the
fact that plaintiffs' years of service
with Amoco would not be credited by
Norgas in calculating plaintiffs'
retirement benefits under the Norgas
retirement plan. As will be
demonstrated, both of these fraud claims
are legally deficient.

ls Fraud Concerning Continued

Employment with Amoco.

23

Turning first to the claim of fraud

with respect to plaintiffs' continued
employment with Amoco, it is apparent
from the record that these claims are
barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Fraud actions are governed
by a one-year statute of limitations

under the law of Alabama. Ala. Code

¥

(1975) § 6-2-39. See also Papastefan v.

B & L Construction Co. of Mobile, 385 So.

2d 966 (Ala. 1980). However,

[iJn actions seeking
relief on the ground of
fraud where the statute has
created a bar, the claim
must not be considered as
having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved
Seaentee OF the = Fe:
constituting the fraud,
after which he must have
one year within which to
prosecute his action.

24

Ala. Code (1975) § 6-2-3.
In applying this "savings
statute"

f°} 2s oe eng <
constituting the fraud' is
deemed to have been
discovered when it ought to
have been discovered; that
ig, @€ the: tie: of - the
discovery of facts which
would provoke inquiry by a
person of ordinary prudence
and which, if followed up,
would have led to the
discovery of the fraud.

Moore v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 434

So. 24 751, 7354 (Aiea. - £903} ¢ GNOt ing

Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co.,

inc.,., 3853 S060. 2@ 986 (aAi@. i999).

Accord, Pines v. Warnaco, Inc., 706 F.2d

1173 (llth Cir. 1983); Sexton v. Liberty

National Life Ine. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 21

(Ala. 1981); Seybold v. Magnolia Land

Co., 376 SO. 24@ 1083, 1087 {Bias £3793).

In other words, the statute of

y

Ce one 2 ee o£ fraud and

misrepresentation effectively begins to
run when the plaintiff "has either actual
knowledge of the violation or notice of
facts which, in the exercise of due
diligence, would have led to actual

knowledge thereof." Cf. First Federal

Savings and Loan Ass'n of Miami v.

Mortgage Corp. of the South, 650 F.2d

£376, A378 (A5CR Cit. Unit B i862).

hecoerte, Wittevutt vv. Union O11 Co. of

California, 432 So. 2d 1217 (Ala. 1983);

Moulder v. Chambers, 390 So. 2d 1044 (Ala.

1981); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Griffin,

357 So. 26 sae) 1esa. i973}: Jennson Vv.

Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 389,

281 So. 24 636 (1973): State Security

Life Ine. CO. Ve Benson, 288 Ala. 497;

26

262 So. 264 745 (287235 See also Moss v.

Davitt, 244 Ala. S13; S32 fa. 2a S25
(233 27. More specifically, where (as
here) the alleged misrepresentations
related to future actions or conduct of
the defendant, the Alabama Supreme Court
has neld tnat the limitations period will
be deemed to have commenced at the time
"{wlhen Plaintiff first learned that
Defendant did not intend to perform as

represented." Retail, Wholesale and

Department Store Employees Union, Local

453 v. McGriff, 398 So. 2d 249, 252, (Ala.

1981). Accord, Fuqua v. Barbe, 376 So.

2d 202, 203-04 (Bid. CiVa Bee

cert. denied 376 806. 22 25. (2...

1979),21

27

In the case sub judice, Amoco's

alleged representations that the LPG
operations would not be sold, and that
plaintiffs' jobs and benefits would not
be lost or terminated, were clearly
representations concerning future actions
or conduct of the defendant. Since it is
undisputed that all plaintiffs had actual
knowledge that Amoco did not intend to
perform as represented--no later than
August 21, 1979,!% the statute of
limitations on these claims expired, at
the latest, on August 21, 1980. McGriff,

aoe: S66 24 at 252. Fuqua v. Barbe, 376

So. 2d at 203-04. Since this lawsuit was
not filed until September 4, 1980, these
claims of fraud concerning job and

benefit security with Amoco are clearly

28

time-barred under Ala. Code (1975) §§

6-2-39 and 6-2-3.

Plaintiffs insist, however, that
their causes of action for fraud relating
to their continued employment with Amoco
did not accrue until September 4, 1980,
when the sale was officially closed and
they ceased to be employed by Amoco.
Although the plaintiffs did not allege
that these representations induced them
to accept employment with Amoco in the
first place, they do assert that they
relied on Amoco's representations
concerning their continued employment by
Staying "in place" in their jobs. Even
though they were aware of the
Amoco-Norgas sale by August 21, 1979, the

plaintiffs insist that they suffered no

29

legal injury as a result of their

previous reliance on Amoco's

misrepresentations until they were
actually taken off the Amoco payroll.

It is generally true, as plaintiffs
assert, that damage is an essential
element of a fraud action. "In equity,
as at law, with the exception of special
cases in some jurisdictions, fraud will
not be relieved against unless it is

shown that injury resulted or will result

to the complainants as a consequence of

said fraud." Smith v. Smith, 94 So. 2d

863, 868 (Ala. 1957) (emphasis supplied).
However, as McGriff and Fuqua make clear,
where the fraud alleged involves
representations of intended future action

or conduct by the defendant, the statute

30

of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff first learns that the
defendant does not intend to perform as
represented, regardless of whether the
plaintiff's injury has already resulted
or whether it is only substantially
certain to result at a specified time in

the future. Thus, in McGriff, the

plaintiff claimed that he was told by his
plant manager and his union steward that
he would receive a pension benefit at age
55 if he “stayed on the payroll" for 15
years and joined the union, and that in
1959 in reliance of those
representations, he accepted employment
with the defendant company and joined the
defendant union. In 1970, plaintiff was

injured during the course of his

31

employment. Thereafter, he was paid
workmen's compensation benefits for
approximately six years by his employer's
workmen's compensation carrier, but
remained on the payroll and received one
annual vacation pay check for each of the
years 1971 through 1975. In 1973,
plaintiff learned that the employer had
ceased making payments into the pension
fund on his behalf in 1970. In 1978, the
plaintiff sued the employer and the union
for breach of contract and fraud.
However, despite the obvious fact that
McGriff would not have been eligible to
receive pension benefits until sometime
after 1975, the Supreme Court of Alabama
held unequivocally that his cause of

action for fraud accrued in 1973, when it

32

became clear that he would not be paid a

pension in the future as promised:

When Plaintiff first
learned that Defendant did
not intend to perform as
represented, the statute
began to run. Fugua (sic)
v. Barbe, 376 So 2d 202
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979),
cert. denied 376 So. 2d 205
(Ala. 1979). Consequently.
appellee's cause of actio”
First accrued when he
received the letters above
set forth, representing
Appellant's position
Vis-a-vis Appellee's right
to a pension. From that
Gate, January 24, 1973,
Plaintiff had one year
within which to file his
cause of action bottomed on
allegations of fraud by
a 8 Pp @a 2 @ 42 8 * B
officers....-Plaintiff's
complaint, to which the
fraud claim was added by
amendment was filed in
April 1978, far beyond the
one year after discovery
period allowed by § 6-2-3.

33

McGriff, 398 So. 2d at 252.

The same rule was stated in Fuqua v.

Barbe. There, plaintiff alleged fraud as
to a promise to repair defective
construction. The plaintiff had given no
consideration in exchange for this
promise, and had not altered his position
to his detriment. The court held that
defendant was entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, because
plaintiff's fraud claim was untimely.
The court stated:

The fraud of defendant claimed
by plaintiff is not the extent
of an original defective
performance in construction,
but is the making of a
commitment to repair such
defects which he did not intend
to perform. When plaintiff
first learned that defendant
did not intend to perform as
represented, the statute began
to run.

34

376 So.2d at 203-04 (footnote omitted;
emphasis supplied).
These cases control as to the fraud

allegations relating to continued
employment of the plaintiffs by Amoco and
the receipt of Amoco employee benefits.
the alleged misrepresentations related to
future performance by Amoco. Even if the
representations were made as alleged by
plaintiffs, all of the plaintiffs knew by
August 21, 1979, that Amoco did not
intend to live up to the representations.
They knew then that Amoco had sold the
LPG operation to Norgas, and they knew
that they would be terminated by Amoco.
Therefore, the statute of limitations on
this fraud claim began to run no later
than that date.13 The present lawsuit

was filed on September 4, 1980, and this

35

fraud claim is therefore untimely as a

matter of law.

Even if the date of injury is the
relevant date, however, the plaintiffs'
claims are still barred. It must be
remembered that the claim we are
concerned with here is a fraud claim, not

a breach of contract claim.}4

The damage
which is essential to a fraud action is

damage "proximately resulting from

[plaintiff's] reliance." First Virginia

Bankshares of Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1313

(Sth Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S.

952 (1978)(emphasis supplied); Ellis v.

Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151, 1157-59 (N.D.

Ala. 1976), affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th

Cie. BEtt hs In the case at hand, the

only reliance alleged by plaintiffs is

36

that they remained "in place." (Pretrial
Order at 11-12; Transcript of February
25, 1985 Hearing at 21). However, the
plaintiffs have consistently failed to
identify any damage they might have
suffered which could fairly be said to
have proximately resulted from this “act"
of reliance. Certainly the loss of Amoco
employment and benefits did not result
from their staying "in place." Indeed,
if the plaintiffs had not stayed “in
place," they would still have lost their
Amoco benefits and their status as Amoco
employees. Therefore, even if the
plaintiffs are correct - that even where
the fraud alleged concerns assurances of
Future action by the defendant, the

statute of limitations does not begin to

37

run until the plaintiff suffers damage as

a proximate result of his reliance on the
misrepresentations-their claims are
barred. The loss of their jobs did not
proximately result from plaintiffs'
reliance on the defendant's period. To
the extent that staying "in place" did
constitute damage or result in damage of
some other kind to the plaintiffs-for
instance, the deprivation of an
Opportunity to negotiate the terms of the
Sale or to seek other employment? -
that damage must have occurred prior to
August 21, 1979, when the plaintiffs
learned of the sale. After that time,
the plaintiffs could not have acted or
failed to act in justifiable reliance

upon any representations by Amoco

38

concerning the security of their jobs and
benefits or the existence of plans to
sell the LPG operation. It seems, then,
that the plaintiffs are posed a conundrum
of sorts. Either the fraud allegedly
perpetrated upon them did not proximately
result in damage to them at all, in which
case their claims fail for lack of an
essential element, or the plaintiffs
suffered damage prior to August 21, 1979,
and their claims are time-barred.!®

Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs
suffered some damage as a proximate
result of their reliance upon the alleged
misrepresentations concerning future
employment with Amoco, the Court

concludes that Amoco is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law with respect

39

to this fraud claim based upon the

Statute of limitations.
2. Fraud Concerning the Terms
of the Amoco-Norgas Sale.

With regard to the common law claims
for fraud and conspiracy to defraud made
against both Amoco and Norgas, the
plaintiffs allege that Amoco "did
fraudulently misrepresent ... that years
of service would be accumulated toward
retirement, [and] that retirement
benefits and the right to early
retirement would be protected."
(Pretrial Order at 10). Plaintiffs also
allege that Amoco and Norgas conspired to
misrepresent material facts about the
terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale in order

to “deceive the employees about the fact

40

that years of service for retirement and
pension purposes would not transfer to
Norgas." (Amended Complaint of June 25,

1982, at par. 6; see also Pretrial Order

ae 227. In other words, the thrust of
these claims is that Amoco and Norgas
misrepresented of failed to disclosel/
the true terms of the Norgas benefit plan
and the plaintiffs' rights under that
plan.

Viewed in this light, it becomes
plain that no recovery may be had upon
these state law fraud claims unless the
right to such recovery arises under ERISA.
Section 514 o£ S82isSs. 2.22
1144(a), preempts all state laws that

"relate to" any employee benefit plan:

41

Bzcept as provided in
subsection (b) of this section,
the“ erevisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar

as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit
plan described in § 1003(a) of
this title and not exempt under
§ 1003(b) of this title.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis supplied).

The only state laws expressly exempted
from ERISA's broad preemptive sweep are
those laws regulating insurance, banking
and securities, and criminal laws of
general application. 239 @.9.Cs. §
1144(b).

_—_ een: Of €£his. e2zpftess
Congressional declaration of preemptive
intent, the Court need not determine
whether and to what extent state law
fraud and misrepresentation principles

might conflict with or alter the

42

requirements of ERISA. See Brown v.

Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders

International Union Local 54, U.S. ;

82 L.Ed.2d 373, 382-83 (1984); Fidelity

Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. De La

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). The
import of the statutory language cannot
be mistaken. As the Supreme Court

Stated in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,

Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981), ERISA was
"Meant to establish pension plan
administration as exclusively a federal
concern."

Recently, in Shaw v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 463 0.8. 83, (i983), the

Supreme Court confirmed ERISA's broad
preemptive sweep and further confirmed

that the term "relate to" as used in the

43

Act was to be given a liberal and broad

interpretation. As noted by the Court,
it was the intent of Congress to
eliminate all possibility of conflict
with state law principles and to make the
field of employee benefit plans
exclusively federal in nature. 463 U.S.
at 99-100, 105. Indeed, Congress
considered and rejected a proposal to
limit the preemptive scope of the statue
to the specific areas and issues
concerning employee benefit plans
directly regulated by ERISA's express
provisions, reasoning that "[s]Juch a
formulation raised the possibility of
endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on the

federal regulatory scheme." Shaw v.

44

Delita Air Lines, Ine., 463 U.S. at

99-100, n.20 (9183), quoting 120 Cong.

Rec. 29942. See also Hewlett-Packard Co.

v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-1300

(N.D. Cal. 1977), affirmed 571 F.2d 502

(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.

831 (1978); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust

Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1130-31, n.4

(E.D. Pa. 1977), affirmed 582 F.2d 1273

raee CiGs 2278) ¢ thus, the settled
construction of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) is
that it preempts not only state laws
dealing with subject matters directly
covered be ERISA, but also any state laws
which “relate” either directly or
indirectly to an employee benefit plan.

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. at

98-100; Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten,

45

Inc., 451 U.S. at 525. Accord, Wadsworth

v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1977),

cert. denied 435 U.S. 980 (1978)3

District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row

Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.

N.Y. 1983). See generally American

Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. of

New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784 (2d

Cir. 1983); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept. of

Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 599

F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied

444 U.S. 1031 (1980).

In the instant case, it is clear
that the state law claims of fraud and
conspiracy to defraud relating to the
terms of the Amoco-Norgas sale are
preempted. As noted above, the trust of

these claims is the failure to accurately

46

report or disclose the terms of the
Norgas benefit plan and the plaintiffs’
benefit rights following the sale. Thus,
it can hardly be disputed that, insofar
as state law fraud principles are
relevant here, they relate to the
administration of an employee benefit
plan governed by ERISA and are thus

preempted./® See Justice v. Bankers

8Q@itai FP. Supp.

(CV-83-L-5188-NE)(N.D. Ala. April 19,
1985)(state law claims of fraud based
upon suppression of material facts
relating to employee benefit plan

preempted by ERISA); District 65, UAW v.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 576 F.

Supp. at 1487 (state common law claims of

fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and

47

tortuous interference with contact

preempted by ERISA); Ogden v. Michigan

Bell Telephone Co., 571 S. Supp. 520,

(E.D. Mich. 1983) (state common law fraud
claim dismissed as preempted by ERISA);

Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp.

745 (N.D. Ga. 1983)(state law
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary

duty claims preempted by ERISA); Ziskind

v. Retail Clerks International

Association, 3 E.B.C. 1012, 1014-1015

(E.D. Cal. 1982)(state cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation preempted

by ERISA). f. Russell v. Massachusetts

Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.

1983), cert. granted U.S. oe}

L.Ed.2d 29 (October 2, 1984) 1? (state

law tort claims for negligent and

48

intentional infliction of emotional

distress preempted by ERISA); Dependahl

v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208

(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S.

968 (1981)(state common law tortuous
interference with contract claim

preempted by ERISA); Kelly v. IBM, 573 F.

Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affirmed 746

F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1984)(state law
wrongful discharge claim preempted by

ERISA); UAW v. Dyneer Corp., 4 E.B.C.

1486, 1488 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affirmed 747

F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1984)(various state
law claims, including tort claim for

conversion, preempted by ERISA); Shaw v.

Association of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653

(C.D. Cal. 1983)(state common law breach

49

of contract claim preempted by ERISA).
Indeed, in the present case, it is
important to note that the plaintiffs’
claims of misrepresentation and
conspiracy to misrepresent deal with an
area already specifically regulated by
ERISA-namely, reporting and disclosure of
plan terms, provision of information to
participants, the content of plan

descriptions, and so on. See e.g., 29

U.S.C. §§ 1021 through 1030. To allow
plaintiffs to pursue the present common
law claims of misrepresentation would
bring to pass the very result which
Congress intended to prohibit - the
possibility of inconsistent state law
regulation of matters relating to the

administration of employee benefit plans.

50

For these reasons, the Court finds
that plaintiffs' state law claims of
fraud and conspiracy to defraud relating
to misrepresentation or nondisclosure of
material facts about the crediting of
Amoco service under Norgas ERISA plans
are indeed preempted. Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims.29

= or née 223732. © ieee

Having thus disposed of the
plaintiffs state law claims, we now come
to the core of this lawsuit. Although
the sale of Amoco's LPG facilities had
all the earmarks of a routine business
transaction, plaintiffs insist that
insofar as their employee benefits were

concerned, the terms of the sale and the

51

manner in which it was accomplished

violated several provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq. The primary theme of these ERISA
claims is that Amoco and Norgas violated
a supposed duty under ieRISA to effect the
LPG sale on terms that would ensure that
years of service with Amoco would be
credited in calculating benefits under
Norgas benefit plans.

ERISA is a comprehensive and
reticulated statute designed to prescribe
minimum vesting and accrual standards for
Gualifying employee retirement benefit
plans; to establish minimum rules for

employee participation and plan funding;

to delineate fiduciary standards for pla"

52

managers; and to otherwise ensure that
legitimate +=mployee pension expectations

are not @a@aeteeted. As ¢ oes Vy

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,

S11 (1981). For purposes of the issues
presented here, the pertinent portion of
ERISA is Subchapter I of the Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144.

ERISA divides employee benefits
covered by the Act into two categories:
(1) pension benefits (referred to herein
as "retirement" benefits); and (2) all
other benefits (including, for example,
medical and disability). 23 UGC. §
1002(1)-(2). The Act terms the second
category "welfare" benefits. For both
categories of benefits, retirement and

welfare, ERISA imposes certain

53

disclosure and reporting requirements

(Subchapter I, Part 4, set forth at 29
0.8.¢C. $§ 2101-1114). Sethete most
importantly, ERISA requires that employer
plans providing both categories of
benefits be established and maintained in
writing, 29 0.8.C. § 1102(a), and that
the rights conferred by the terms of such
written plans are enforceable by the
participants as a matter of federal law.
29 U.S.C. § 1132.

In addition, for certain but not all
retirement benefits, ERISA imposes
minimum requirements for the
participation in and the vesting of
benefits under retirement plans
(Subchapter I, Part 2, set forth at 29

U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061) and for the funding

54

of plans to ensure that assets are
available to pay the retirement benefits
when the time comes (Subchapter I, Part
3, set forth at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086).
These participation, vesting, and funding
requirements are not applicable to
welfare benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§
10S i, ASS ct eats The vesting
requirements for retirement benefits
apply to what the particular plan
establishes as the "normal retirement
benefit" that will be paid at the "normal
retirement age". 29 UsS.C."§ 105344}.
With whatever "normal retirement benefit"
the particular plan establishes as the
reference, ERISA sets minimum benefit be
attributed to the employee as a function

of his years of participation in the plan

55

(which, for present purposes, may be

considered to be his years of service
with the employer). 29 U.S.C. § 1054.
ERISA's minimum vesting standards require
that after a number of years of service,
an employee's "right" to whatever accrued

benefit he has earned to that time cannot

be forfeited even though his service with
the employer terminates before he reaches
what the particular plan defines as the
"normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C. §
1053.

A retirement benefit that is vested
may still be “contingent" in several
important respects. 29 U.S.C §
1053(a)(3)(A)-(D). In particular, a plan
may permissibly provide that vested

benefits are not payable until normal

56

retirement age and, if the employee dies
before that time, his benefit, while
vested, generally need not be paid. See,

e.g., Hernandez v. Southern Nevada

Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust,

662 F.2d 617, 619-620 (9th Cir. 1981).
On the other hand, welfare benefits and
the so-called “ancillary"™ retirement
benefits, including early retirement
benefits such as plaintiffs complain of
in this case, may be "contingent" in a
much more persuasive sense -- ERISA
does not require that such benefits be

vested and nonforfeitable. Sutton v.

Weirton Steel Division of National Steel

Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, > - » £4 2.GEs

2387 (1984); Petrella v. NL Industries,

57

Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1364-1366 (D.

N.J. 1982). Accordingly, an employee's
"rights" to such benefits may be
forfeited entirely if his service with
the employer is terminated before he
becomes eligible under the plan's terms

for payment of such benefits. Petrella

v. NL Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. at

1364-65.

It is equally important to note that
ERISA does not require that employers
provide employee benefits at all; does
not confer a general right to continued
employment in order to earn vested
retirement benefits or to become eligible
for other benefits; and does not mandate

the level or amount of such benefits.

58

([A]n employer has no
affirmative duty to provide
employees with a pension plan.
H.Rep. No. 93-807, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News,
4670, 4677. In enacting
ERISA, Congress continued its
reliance on voluntary action
by employers by granting
substantial tax advantages for
the creation of qualified
retirement programs. Id.
Neither Congress nor the
courts are involved in either
the decision to establish a
plan or in the decision
concerning which benefits a
plan should provide. In
particular, courts have no
authority to decide which
benefits employers must confer
upon their employees; these
are decisions which are more
appropriately influenced by
forces in the marketplace and,
when appropriate, by federal
legislation.

Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement

Program, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir.

1984

S.Ct.

), cert. denied U.S

’

105

786 (1985)(emphasis in original).

59

Accord Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahnattan,

Inc., 451 U.S. at S511, 512-14.

A claim of wrongful denial or
deprivation of employee benefits under
ERISA involved a two-pronged inquiry:
(1) is the action or conduct complained
of contrary to the terms of the plan
itself? (2) are the terms of the plan or
the conduct complained of independently
violative of ERISA's substantive
requirements?

In this case, the answer to the
first question is undisputed. The
Standard Plan itself did not confer upon
plaintiffs a right to guaranteed or
continued employment with Amoco in order
to earn retirement benefits. Rather, the

Plan expressly provided that:

Nothing contained in this
Plan shall be construed as a
contract of employment between
an employer and any employee,
Or as a right of any employee
to be continued in the
employment of an employer.
(Webb Affidavit, Ex. A at § 14.07,
Appendix in Support of Amoco's Motion for
Summary Judgment at A354). Nor did the
terms of that plan require that Amoco
arrange for plaintiffs' years of service
with Amoco to be credited for all
purposes under the retirement plan cf any
future purchaser of the LPG operation.
Nor do plaintiffs contend that there was
a forfeiture of any vested retirement
benefit to which they were entitled under
the Standard Plan. Rather, those
plaintiffs who were vested under the

Standard Plan at the time of the sale of

the LPG operation to Norgas are

61

receiving, at their option under that
plan, an annuity based upon their length
of service with Amoco. (Pretrial Order
at 9). 21 Finally, plaintiffs have never
even alleged that the terms of any other
benefit plan available to employees of
Amoco were violated by the Amoco-Norgas
sale.

Accordingly, despite plaintiffs'
generic allegations that the Amoco-Norgas
transaction deprived them of “benefit
rights," their claim that the
Amoco-Norgas agreement could have been
more generous in its benefit provisions,
standing alone, has no force in law.
Because nothing in the plans available to
Amoco employees required otherwise,

plaintiffs' complaints that their years

62

of service with Amoco are not credited

for all purposes under Norgas' retirement
plan and their related complaints about
the effect of the sale on their pension
rights are legally immaterial unless
ERISA forbids the arrangement agreed upon
by Amoco and Norgas. Apart from the
specific restrictions set forth in the
Statute, "ERISA permits the total benefit
levels and formulas for determining their
accrual before completion of 15 years of
service to vary from plan to plan."
Alessi, 451 U.S at 513-14. Thus, because
there is no allegation of breach of the
terms of any plan available to them as
Amoco employees (or for that matter, any
Norgas plans), plaintiffs' claims fail as

a matter of law unless the Amoco-Norgas

63

ae ee & &
7
> =

sale violated one or more of ERISA's
specific restrictions.

The plaintiffs claim that several
ERISA's specific substantive provisions
have in fact been violated on the facts
of this case:

(2?) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. § 1060(b)(2) by failing
to credit plaintiffs' prior years of
service with Amoco for purposes of
benefit accrual under the Norgas
retirement plan.

(2) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. § 1056 by interfering

with plaintiffs' possible future

64

attainment of early retirement benefits
under the Amoco plan.

(3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(acting in concert with Norgas) violated
a fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104
to act solely on behalf of the plan
participants in negotiating the terms of
the sale insofar s those terms affected
the plaintiffs' benefits under the Amoco
plan.

(4) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(acting in concert with Norgas) violated
29 U.S.C. § 1106 by engaging in a
transaction involving the plan on behalf
of parties whose interests were adverse
to the interests of plan participants,
and by dealing with the assets of the

plan in their own interests.

65

3) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco

and Norgas violated or conspired to
violate 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140 and 1141 by
interfering with rights or the attainment
of rights to which plaintiffs might have
become entitled under the Amoco plan.

(6) Plaintiffs allege that Amoco
(but not Norgas) violated the reporting
and disclosure requirements of 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1022 and 1024 by failing to disclose
the circumstances and modifications which
might result in disqualification,
ineligibility, denial or loss of benefit
under the Amoco plan.

In short, the plaintiffs have
invoked every section of ERISA which is
even colorably applicable to the facts of

this case. As will be seen, however

66

these ERISA violations are more easily
pleaded than proved. Although ERISA's
substantive provisions have been
systematically invoked and clothed in
verbiage and allegations which carefully
track the tent of the Act, in each
instance the plaintiffs proceed from
faulty premises and inadequate
foundations of fact. Consequently, each
of their claims under ERISA fails as a
matter of law. 22 We will proceed to
address each claim separately.

A. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1060

The plaintiffs insist that by
failing to credit their prior years of
service with Amoco in calculating the
accrual of benefits under the Norgas

plan, Amoco and Norgas violated 29 U.S.C.

67

§ 1060. That section provides in
pertinent part:
(bo) For purposes of this part
and part 3 -~
e2 in any case in which
the employer maintains a plan
of a predecessor employer,
service for such predecessor
shall be treated as service
for the employee, and
(2) in any case in which
the employer maintains a plan
which is not the plan
maintained by a predecessor
employer, service for such
predecessor shall, to the
extent provided in regulations

prescribed by the Secretary of

68

the Treasury, be treated as

service for the employer.

29 U.S.C. § 1060{b).

This provision forms a crux of this
entire controversy, for the heart of the
plaintiffs' case is and always has been
their claim that they should receive
Credit for their years of service with
Amoco for purposes of computing benefits
under the Norgas retirement plan.?23
Plaintiffs allege that defendants
Violated this provision of ERISA by

failfing] to maintain the

predecessor plan so that

years of service would be

treated as years with

Nersg9eeés o£ ion the

alternative to maintain a

Separate plan from the

predecessor plan but to
have years of service in

69

ye

the predecessor corporation

(Amoco) treated as years of

service for the employer

(Norgas) ({29 U.S.C. §]

1060).

(Pretrial Order at 14).

The allegaticn "in the alternative"
notwithstanding, subsection (b)(1) is
irrelevant to this case. i ae
undisputed that Norgas and its employees
were part of a pre-existing plan. Apart
from the fact that about 400 people (out
of a total of approximately 56,000) left
the Standard Plan due to the Norgas sale,
the sale had no effect on the Standard
Plan. Nothing in the words of §

1060(b)(1) requires that the plan of a

predecessor employer actually be

maintained by a successor employer,

either "in the alternative" to the

70

requirements of subsection (b)(2) or
otherwise. Rather, the plain words of
Subsection (b)(1) provide only that
Service with a predecessor employer
"Shall be treated as service" with a
Successor employer if the successor
elects to maintain the plan of the
predecessor. Moreover, that plain
meaning is confirmed by the legislative
history. See House Conference Rep. No.

93-1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code

Cong.& Ad.News 5038, 5047 ("[sJlervice

with a predecessor employer must be
counted for purposes of the plan if the
Successor employer continues to maintain
the plan of the predecessor employer...")
(emphasis supplied). Where, as here, a

predecessor plan is not maintained by a

71

successor employer, § 1060(b)(1) is

4

simply inapplicable. -

Nor is Section 1060(b)(2) the oasis
that plaintiffs would like it to be. The
language of subsection (b)(2) requires a
successor employer to credit an
employee's years of service with a
predecessor employer for purposes of
determining that employer's retirement
benefits only if and to the extent the
Secretary of Treasury issues regulations
requiring such service to be credited.
Since the Secretary of Treasury has never
required, by regulation or otherwise,
that such service be credited, it is
clear from the statutory language that,
for now at least, such service need not

be credited by a successor employer.

72

Whether the failure to promulgate
regulations requiring successor employers
to credit service with a predecessor
employer has been a conscious policy
decision in the part of the Secretary or
not, the plain import of § 1060(b)(2) is
that Congress chose to vest the Secretary
with the discretionary authority to
decide if and to what extent such service
should be credited. Unless and until the
Secretary requires otherwise, Congress
obviously chose as a matter of policy not
to require prior service with a
predecessor employer to be taken into
account in calculati:.g benefits under the
Successor employer's separate retirement

plan.

73

Plaintiffs' claim under § 1060(b)(2)
in essence asks this Court to construe §
1060(b)(2) as if it read: “service for
such predecessor shall be treated as

service for the employer except as

regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Treasury otherwise allow." While
Congress could easily have drafted the
subsection that way, it chose not to do
so. Rather, it provided that service
with a predecessor shall be treated as
service with a successor only "to the
extent provided" by any affirmative
regulations the Secretary of Treasury
might choose to promulgate. This Court
is bound by the Congressional directive
embodied in the clear language of the

statute, absent a clearly expressed

74

legislative intention to the contrary.

See Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,

Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); American

Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463

U.S. 855, 77 L.Ed.2d 1072, 1078 (1983);

North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S.

300, 312 (1983); Consumer Product Safety

Commission v. GET Sylvania, Inc., 44/7

U.S. 102, 108 (1980); United States v.

640.00 Acres of Land in Dade County,

Florida, — F.2d (No. 82-5510)

(llth Cir. April 3, 1985); Scarborough v.-
OPM, 723 F.2d 801, 812 (llth Cir. 1984).
There is nothing in ERISA" sS
legislative history to cast doubt upon
the plain meaning of the statute, much

less anything amounting to “a clearly

expressed legislative intention to the

75

contrary." American Bank & Trust Co. Vv.

Dallas County, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1078. The

House Conference Report declares quite
simply that except where the successor
employer maintains the plan of a
predecessor employer, the question of
whether service with the predecessor is
to be credited is left entirely to the
determination of the Secretary of

Treasury:

Service with a predecessor
must be counted for
purposes of the plan if the
successor employer
continues to maintain the
plan of the predecessor
employer.... The question
of the extent to which such
service must be counted in
other circumstances is to
be determined under
regulations.

House Conference Report No. 93-1280,

76

reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News at 5038, 5047, 5052. Other portions
of the legislative history make it even
clearer that § 1060(b), standing alone,
does not require the crediting of prior

service with a predecessor employer:

[W]here the employee moves
from one employer to
another the ancillary
benefits (which are
usually on a contingency
basis) would often be
provided by the new
employer, whereas the new
employer would not provide
pension benefits based on
years with the old
employer.

House Report No. 93-807, reprinted in

1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4670,

4726.

Apparently, only one court has

addressed the issue of a successor

employer's obligation to credit prior
years of service with a predecessor
employer for retirement benefit purposes.

In Vorpahl v. Union Oil Co. Retirement

Plan, 4 E.B.C. 2565 (D. Minn. 1983),

affirmed F.2d (No. 83 2528 (8th

Cir. December 14, 1984), the court
analyzed the issue and concluded that a
successor employer is not required to
credit an employee's years of service
with a predecessor employer for purposes
of determining that employer's benefits
under the successor employer's pension
plan. However, rather than focusing its
inquiry on Section 1060(b)(2), the

Vorpahl court looked to Department of

Labor regulations defining "year of

78

service." This regulation states in
pertinent part:
§ 2530.204-l. Year of

Participation for Benefit
Accrual

kkk

(6b) Service Which May be
Disregarded for Purposes
Of Benefit Accrual. (1)
In calculating an
employee's period of
service for purposes of
benefit accrual under a
defined benefit pension
Plan, § 204(b)(3) [29
U.S.C. § 1054(b)(3)] of
the Act and § 411(b)(3)
of the [Internal Revenue]
Code permit the following
S09 5 6.6 ts be
disregarded: service
before an employee first
becomes a participant in
the plan;

29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1(b) (1976). Thus,
not only has the Secretary of Treasury

chosen not to issue regulations requiring

79

an employee's service with a predecessor
employer to be credited in calculating
retirement benefits under the successor's
own plan, but the Department of Labor
regulation defining "year of service"
expressly permits an employer to
disregard an employee's service before he
becomes a participant in its pension plan.

See Vorpahl, 4 EBC at 2575. Therefore,

since plaintiffs were not participants in
the Norgas retirement plan during their
prior years with Amoco, Norgas is under
no statutory obligation to credit their
years of service with Amoco for purposes
of calculating their Norgas retirement
benefits.

Finally, in response to plaintiffs'

apparent argument that this Court should

80

fashion such a requirement, it is
important to note the very real dangers
involved in such an endeavor. In the
first place, judicial exercise of the
authority delegated to the Secretary of
Treasury would contravene the language of
the statute and the principles of
Statutory construction discussed above,
as well as the clearly expressed
legislative intent of Congress that the
"question of the extent to which such
service must be counted. ..is to be
determined under regulations." House
Conference Report No. 93-1280, 1974 U.S.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 5038, 5047, 5052.

Furthermore, settled legal principles
dictate that courts may not exercise the

authority to promulgate legislative rules

81

that a statute delegates to an
administrative agency or other rulemaking

body. See, @.0@., Sierra Club v.

Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d

1165, Tis CTtn Cif. 2993). See also

Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of

Engineers, U.S. Army, 356 F. Supp. 14, 18

(S.D. N.Y. 1973) (“where Congressional
action has provided an administrative
process for the resolution of particular
subjects, great respect must be paid to
the presumptive exclusivity of that
process").

From a more practical viewpoint, the
creation of crediting requirements by a
court under § 1060(b)(2) would involve
numerous questions of policy, the

resolution of which would have

82

consequences far beyond the case at hand.
Requiring a successor employer to credit
an employee's years of service with a
predecessor employer could frustrate the
very purpose of ERISA. In large part,
ERISA was enacted to protect and secure
the viability and desirability of
employer-established retirement programs
for employees. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 4639; S. Rep. No.

383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974

U-~S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4890.

However, requiring a successor employer
to credit an employee's years of service
with a predecessor employer for
retirement purposes would dramatically

increase an employer's cost of operating

83

a retirement benefit plan for its

employees, since the successor would be
required to immediately fund a retirement
plan much more heavily whenever it adds
employees previously covered umder a
predecessor employer's plan. Faced with
this dilemma, many employers might choose
not to establish or continue a retirement
plan rather than incur the significant
cost of funding an employee's years of
service with a predecessor employer.
Alternatively, the employer may simply
choose not to hire the employees of the
predecessor .29 In either event, the
employees in question would be adversely
affected--i.e., they would either lose
their retirement plan or lose their jobs.

Surely Congress could not have intended

such a severe result. Thus, it may not
be altogether surprising that the
Secretary of Treasury has chosen not to
issue regulations imposing such a credit
requirement. © This Court is hardly
competent to second-guess such decisions
of Congress and its delegates on
difficult questions of legislative policy.
The function of this Court is to apply
the statutes, not to rewrite them.

In short, unless and until the
Secretary of Treasury prescribed
Otherwise, Section 1060(b)(2) does not
require a successor employer to credit an
employee's service with a predecessor

employer?/

in calculating the employee's
retirement benefits under the successor's

separate retirement plan. Accordingly,

85

the defendants are entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law with respect to the
Section 1060(b) claims.2®

B. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1056

Plaintiffs next contend that by
entering into the Amoco-Norgas sale
defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1056,
inasmuch as they interfered "with the
rights of the plaintiffs in the
attainment of service requirements
necessary to obtain early retirement
peietiees* (Plainti€tis* Brief in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 37). This claim is
specious. This section of ERISA is quite
limited in scope and effect. It provides

in pertinent part:

86

a Each pension
plan shall provide that
unless the participant
Otherwise elects, the
payment of benefits under
the plan to the participant
Shall begin not later than
the 60th day after the
latest of the close of the
plan year in which--

(1) the date on which
the participant
attains the earlier of
age 65 or the normal
retirement age
specified under the
plan,

(2) occurs on the 10th
anniversary of the
year in which the
participant commenced
participation in the
plan, or

(3)the participant
terminates his service
with the employer.

In the case of a plan
which provides for the
payment of an early
retirement benefit,
Such plan shall
provide Saat a

87

participant who
: satisfied the service
requirements for such
early retirement
1 benefit, but separated
from the service (with
any nonforfeitable
4 right to an accrued
benefit) before
satisfying the age
requirement for such
‘ early retirement
benefit, is entitled
upon satisfaction of
: such age requirement
to receive a benefit
not less than the
| benefit to which he
would be entitled at
the normal retirement
age, actuarially
q reduced under
regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of
7 the Treasury.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(a). In short, § 1056
7 merely requires that if a plan provides
; early retirement benefits, an employee
who has satisfied plan requirements as

to years of service shall be entitled to

88

receive an actuarially reduced benefit
upon reaching the early retirement age
specified in the plan, even if that
employee leaves the employer's service
prior to attaining early retirement age.
It is important to recognize that
neither ERISA in general nor § 1056 in
particular require a plan to provide
early retirement benefits at all.
Moreover, even if an employer does
provide early retirement benefits, §
1056 itself does not confer upon plan
participants any substantive right to
continued employment in order to meet
service requirements and qualify for
early retirement benefits under the

terms of the particular plan.

89

In the present case, it is undisputed
that the terms of the Amoco plan go well
beyond the minimum requirements of §
1056 by giving terminated employees the
option to receive actuarially reduced

benefits immediately upon their

termination rather than requiring that
the terminated employees attain the
early retirement age specified in the
plan before receiving vested early
retirement benefits. It is also
undisputed that all plaintiffs who were
vested under the Amoco plan elected that
option and are currently receiving such
payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).
With this in mind, it is piain that the
claim of a violation of § 1056 has no

Support whatsoever on this record. The

90

plaintiffs are apparently laboring under
the misapprehension that ERISA in
general and § 1056 in particular provide
comprehensive protection of the inchoate
interests of employees in such unfunded,
contingent benefits. Such is not the

case. Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 724

F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied

U.S. » 104 S.Ct. 2387

(1984).

Because Section 1056 confers no
substantive right to continued
employment in order to earn vested
rights to early retirement benefits, the
defendants are entitled to judgment on
the Section 1056 claims as a matter of

law.2?

91

C. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C.§ 1104

Plaintiffs next contend that Amoco
and Norgas violated their fiduciary
duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104. That
provision of ERISA provides in pertinent

part:

Subject to sections
1103(c) and (d), 1342, and
42344 .@£ <6 £44304 «a
fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the
interest of tre
pat &i@ 4-364 te and
beneficiaries and... for
the exclusive purpose of:

(i) providing benefits
to participants and
their beneficiaries;
and

( 2,43 defraying
reasonable expenses of
administering the plan

92

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). PlaintiffS base
their claims of a violation of this

section upon the following allegations:

Amoco dealt with the
plan and the assets of the
plan in its own interests
and not in the interests of
the plan participants in
that it received more money
for the facilities by not
transferring years of
service and/or the
accumulated benefits of the
participants in the plan to
Norgas and further were
allowed to keep and
maintain the additional
Sums of money in the plan
for the use of other
participants, including
itself, to the damage of
plaintiffs.

(Pretrial Order at 16). In other words,
plaintiffs' theory with respect to their
§ 1104 claims is quite similar to the
Substance of their § 1060 claims: they

claim that in negotiating the terms of

93

the sale of its LPG operation, Amoco was
under a fiduciary duty to ensure that
plaintiffs' years of service with Amoco
would be credited for all purposes undec
the Norgas retirement plan, and that
Amoco's failure to arrange a sale
transaction meeting these standards
violates the statute. Furthermore,
although plaintiffs admit that Norgas was
not a fiduciary with respect to the Amoco
plan and hence owed no direct fiduciary
duties to olaintiffs as beneficiaries of
that plan, 29.5 they contend that Norgas
is liable for assisting Amoco in the
commission of a breach of Amoco's

fiduciary duties. Cf. Donovan v.

Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 411 (S.D.

Ala. 1982) (holding that nonfiduciaries

94

may be accountable under ERISA for
breaches of fiduciary duty which they
help promote). 30

Plaintiffs' claim under § 1104 is

without merit. The fiduciary duty

provisions of ERISA are not implicated
in the sale of a business or a portion of
a business merely because the terms of
the sale will affect the terms and
conditions of contingent future
retirement benefits.

This is lucidly illustrated by the

related cases of Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 567 F.

Supp. 1184 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), and Dhayer

. Weirton Steel Division of National

Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. W.Va.

1983), both of which were affirmed in

Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied i P

104 6.Ctsc 2387 (1984). In Sutton and
Dhayer, plaintiffs included both union
and non-union employees of National
Steel's Weirton Steel Division. There,
as here, the plaintiffs challenged the
sale of a division of their employer's
business and the terms of the underlying
transaction on the grounds that, as a
result of ‘the sale, their non-vested
retirement and early retirement benefits
and other contingent benefits would be
adversely affected. Specifically, the
terms of the sale provided that the
seller's existing benefit plan would be

amendec so that the sale itself would not

96

trigger entitlements to different types
of early retirement and severance pay

benefits. See Sutton, 724 F.2d at 409.

As in the present case, the plaintiffs
were to become employees of the successor
employer, and their eligibility for early
retirement benefits was to be more
limited than under the predecessor
employer's plan. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at

1190; Dhayer, S71 fF. Gene. St 32.

There, as here, the employees alleged
that avoidance of pension and welfare
benefit obligations was the employer's
motive in agreeing to the sale and its
terms. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1198;
Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.

Because the cases were being decided

On summary judgment, the district court

specifically assumed as true "that
avoiding future pension obligations was
the sole motivation of [the
employer-seller]." Sutton, 567 F. Supp.
at 1198; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 326.
Nevertheless, the court squarely rejected
the plaintiffs' claim that, under § 1104,
National Steel h§8d a fiduciary obligation
to act solely in the interest of
beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of
the sale. In so holding, the court noted
that ERISA simply does not prohibit a
company from eliminating previously
offered benefits which are neither vested
nor accrued. Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at
1196, 1200; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 324,

328-29. Accord Petrella v. Nels

Industries, 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1365-66

98

iD. BiJa 1382) « Likewise, the court
held, there is no requirement that
day-to-day corporate business
transactions, which may have a collateral
effect on prospective, contingent
employee benefits, be performed solely in

the interest of plan participants:

When acting on behalf of
the pension fund, there is
no doubt that [an employer
who is also a fiduciary
with respect to a plan]
must act solely to benefit
part ieipaents2 aad
beneficiaries. However, it
is the Court's opinion here
that when a corporate
employer negotiates the
terms of the sale of a
division, whose employees
are participants in a
pension plan, the
negotiations that affect
the terms and conditions of
future benefits (at least
EROS (FRA are, aot
protected by ERISA'sS
ie oer Sat ole tee ee and

99

neon Cette Caset ait
provisions), do not
implicate fiduciary duties
as to the pension fund.
Such negotiations are
distinct from actually
administering a plan and
conducting transactions
affecting the monies and
property of the plan's fund.
In other words, the mere
fact that a company has
named itself as pension
plan administrator or
trustee does not restrict
it from pursuing reasonable
business behavior in
negotiations concerning
pension benefits not
otherwise affected by the
requirements of ERISA. See
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
Ges SOLs S22 Bede wee
(1981).

Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer,

571 F. Supp. at 328-29. Accordingly, the
district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer-seller.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit

affirmed. After noting the district

100

court's assumption that National Steel's
sole motivation for the sale was avoiding
future pension obligations, the appellate
court held first that ERISA does not
require the vesting and nonforfeitability
of early retirement and other ancillary
benefits. The court further held that
ERISA does not impose any fiduciary
obligations on an employer to maintain
and protect future contingent benefit
rights in negotiating the sale of a
division:
Congress ... has not
prohibited an employer who
is also a fiduciary from
exercising the right
accorded other employers to
renegotiate or amend, as
the case may be, unfunded
contingent benefits payable
before the normal

retirement age. The
changes, accomplished in

101

this matter, are not to be
reviewed by fiduciary
standards.

724 F.2d at 410-411.

Considering the Weirton Steel

decisions in the context of the present
case, it is clear that plaintiffs' claims
under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 are without merit.
As noted in the previous discussion of 29
U.S.C. § 1060, infra, ERISA presently
imposes no requirement that service with
a predecessor employer be credited in
calculating benefits under the
successor-employer's plan. Thus, neither
Norgas nor Amoco violated ERISA in their
capacity as employers by failing to
include such a provision in the sale
agreement. Moreover, despite the fact

that the sale obviously had certain

102

effects upon plaintiffs' benefits under
the Amoco plan, clearly neither Amoco nor
Norgas had any fiduciary duty under ERISA
to act solely in the plaintiffs'
interests in negotiating the terms upon
which the LPG operations were to be sold.
A contrary holding would mean that every
corporate business decision which had any
possible collateral effect on pension
benefits would have to be made "solely in
the interests of pension plan
beneficiaries and participants." Cf.
Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1200; Dhayer, 571
F. Supp. at 328. At least insofar as
contingent future benefit rights are

concerned, Congress clearly could not

have intended such a pernicious result.

103

The Court finds the Weirton Steel

cases persuasive and controlling, and
agrees that "when a corporate employer
negotiates the sale of a division, whose
employees are participants in a pension
plan, the negotiations that affect the
terms and conditions of [non-vestecd
future pension benefits ... do n

implicate fiduciary duties as to tne
pension fund." Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at

1201; Dhayer, 571 F. Supp. at 328.

Plaintiffs have cited no contrary
authority even arguably on point.

If Congress explicitly considered
the question of whether successor
employers must credit service with a
predecessor employer, and left the

question to be determined under Treasury

Regulations, it would seem clear that
Congress could not have intended § 1104
to implicitly require such crediting in
any event. The plaintiffs' theory under
§ 1104 would seem to render § 1060(b)
essentially redundant, even under their
Own reading of the latter provision.
Based upon the foregoing discussion,
then, the Cou es Finds that

defendants?!

are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law with respect to the
Claims made under 29 U.S.C. § 1104.

D. THE CLAIMS UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1106

Plaintiffs next allege that Amoco and
Norgas violated 29 U.S.C. § 1106, which

provides, inter alia:

(a) ss

105

(i) A fiduciary with
respect to a plan shall not
cause the plan to engage in
a transaction, if he knows
or should know that such a
transaction constitutes a
direct or indirect --

(A) sale or exchange, or
leasing, of any property
between the plan and a
party in interest;

(D) transfer to, or use by
or for the benefit of, a
party in interest, of any
assets of the plan;

(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan
shall not --

(1) deal with the assets of
the plan in his own
interest or for his own
account,

(2) in his individual or in
any other capacity act in
any transaction involving
the plan on behalf of a
party (or represent a
party) whose interests are
adverse to the interests of
the plan or the interests

106

of its participants or
beneficiaries, or receive
any consideration for his
Own personal account from
any party dealing with such
plan in connection with a
transaction involving the
assets cf the plan.

29 U.S.C. § i106.

Plaintiffs contend that Amoco was a
fiduciary with respect to the Amoco Plan
and that by selling the LPG operations
without ensuring that service with Amoco
would be credited for all purposes under
the Norgas retirement plans, Amoco acted
in a "transaction involving the plan" on
behalf of parties whose interests were
adverse to the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries; dealt
with the assets of the plan in its own

interests; and caused the plan to emerge

107

in a transaction which indirectly
aan nee 8 penefkit"™ to a
party-in-interest -- namely Amoco. This,
say the plaintiffs, constitutes a
prohibited transaction under §1106.22
Although the plaintiffs have
attempted to couch their allegations in
the language of the statute itself, it is
DBliain that § 1106 applies only to
transactions to which the plan itself is
a party or in which the monies, property
or fiscal assets of the plan are

involved, and it has been construed

accordingly. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division of National Steel Corp., 567

F.Supp. 1184, 1199 (N.D. W.Va. 1983);

Dhayer v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316,

108

327 (N.D. W.Va., 1983) [both affirmed in

Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of

National Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied 0.8, >

L046 8. Ct. 2387 (1984)i. Accord, Donovan

v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).

Congress did not intend an expansive

interpretation of Section 1106. Evans v.

Bexley, 750 F.2d 1498, 1500 n.3 (llth
Cit. 1963).

In the present case, the
evidence stands uncontroverted that the
Standard Plan was not a party to the
Amoco-Norgas transaction (See Affidavit
of William C. Jackson). Nor did the LPG

facilities involve any transfer of the

109

funds or assets held by the Standard Plan.

(Id).

Plaintiffs' only effort to
establish evidentiary support for the §
1106 claim is their contention that
"Amoco did receive more money for the
[LPG] participants in the plan to Norgas."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

at 41; see also Pretrial Order at 15-16).

However, the evidence is undisputed that
no funds or property held by the plan
were transferred, and plaintiffs were not
deprived of any benefit required to be
vested and nonforfeitable by ERISA.
Indeed, plaintiffs admittedly received
all benefits to which they had already

become entitled under the terms of the

110

Standard Plan by the time of the sale and
their consequent termination of
employment with Amoco. As a matter of
law, Amoco's contingent future liability
for non-vested benefits -- i.e.,
plaintiffs' inchoate interest in their
"years of service" with Amoco for
purposes of the putative benefits to
which they might have become entitled had
they continued to work for Amoco -- did
not itself constitute an "asset" of the
plan for purposes of § 1106, so as to
prohibit Amoco from dealing with those
contingent liabilities in its own
interest or in ways adverse to the
interests of plan participants and

beneficiaries. See Sutton v. Weirton

Steel Division of National Steel Corp.,

111

724 F.2d at 411-412. As noted above, the

mere fact that an employer also acts as a
plan fiduciary does not restrict it from
pursuing reasonable business behavior in
negotiating the sale of a division, even
though the terms ultimately agreed upon
modify or eliminate the contingent rights
of transferred employees to benefits
under the seller's ERISA plan which are
neither vested nor accrued. Sutton, 567
F. Supp. at 1200-01; Dhayer 571 F. Supp.

at 328-29. See also Sutton, 724 F.2d at

41l.

Because there is no evidence
that the Standard Plan was a party to the
Amoco-Norgas sale or that fiscal assets
of the Standard Plan were involved in the

transaction, there exists no genuine

112

issue of material fact as to plaintiff fs'
Claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
Therefore, as to these matters,
defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter ot law.

E. The Claim Under 29 U.S.C. § 1140

The next arrow in the plaintiffs'
crowded quiver is 29 U.S.C. § 1140:
It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, Suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of
an employee benefit plan [or] this
titie. . . or for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of

any right to which such participant

may become entitled under the plan
[or this title]...
The plaintiffs contend that by agreeing
to the sale of the LPG operation on terms
that did not assure the crediting of
service with Amoco for all purposes under
the Norgas retirement plan, Amoco and
Norgas unlawfully “discriminated against
the plaintiffs for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of the
rights to which the plaintiffs might
[have] become entitled under the [Amoco]
Plan." (Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition
to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment at 25-26).
The plaintiffs misapprehend the
purpose of Section 1140. That provision

is not intended to prohibit the sale of

114

going businesses or to require a
Successor employer to credit service with
a predecessor employer -- indeed, any
such construction would render 29 U.S.C.
§ 1060 rather meaningless. Nor is
Section 1140 intended to impose a
fiduciary duty on employers to act solely
in the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries in negotiating the terms of
sale of a business or division. Such
matters are the province of Sections 1104
and 1106, which as discussed above, do

not impose such a duty. See Sutton v.

Weirton Steel Division, 724 F.2d 406, 410

(4th Cir. 1983) cert. denied i ’

104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984). Rather, Section
1140 is intended simply to prohibit

discriminatory harassment or adverse

115

treatment of a particular employee which
amounts to or threatens “constructive
discharge," and which is carried out for
the purpose cf interfering with the
employee's attainment of future benefits
or punishing the employee for the

exercise of protected rights. West v.

Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
This meaning is confirmed by the
legislative history of the provision:
Most collective bargaining
agreements protect employees against
discharge without good cause and
provide effective enforcement
machinery in arbitration proceedings
whose results are enforceable under
section 301 of the Labor-Management

Relations Act. But roughly half of

116

all pension participants ere not
unionized and so they lack
protection. Especially vulnerable
are managers and executives whose
Substantial pension potentialities
provide an incentive to their
discharge before vesting. The
managers of the bill ought to think

twice too. Discipline and

discrimination can be so unpleasant

as to amount to constructive

discharge, a term used by the

National Labor Relations Board.

That can be the type of harassment

which does not say that one is

fired, but makes living such a hell

that a person wishes he did not have

to hang on and endure.

117

In recognition of the problem,

section 610 of S.4 as originally

reported -- made it illegal to

"discharge, fine, suspend, expell

[sic], discipline or discriminate"

against plan participants to defeat

rights under the act or a plan. The

language parallels section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act
and should do the trick -- but only
if an adequate enforcement machinery
exists.
119 Cong. Rec. 30374 (views of Senator
Hartke, speaking on behalf of his
proposal that the Secretary of Labor be
direct to establish administrative
procedures for enforcing the provision

that became 1140)(emphasis supplied).

118

See also West v. Butler, 621 F.2d at 245;

Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons,

anc., 680 F.2d 911, $16-)9 cae .Cie.

1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1039 (1982)

("this section is designed to prevent
unscrupulous employers from discharging
Or harassing plan participants in order
to keep them from realizing their vested
pension rights").

The undisputed facts of this case
establish that there was no harassment or
discriminatory treatment of the
plaintiffs amounting to the kind of
"constructive di schartrge* or
"discrimination" prohibited oy 22. Bi hC.
§ 1140. Indeed, the only evidence of

"discrimination" relied upon by the

plaintiff in this connection is the mere

119

:

4
|
;
;

fact that as a consequence of the sale,
they were "prevented from attaining [the
benefit] rights toward which they had
been working as employees of Amoco."
(Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
at. 283-0 However, that consequence is
part of nearly every sale or termination
of a going business or division. ERISA
simply does not require that every
purchaser of a going concern credit
service with a predecessor employer for
purposes of the successor's separate
plan, nor does it require that a
successor's plan be identical in every
respect to the predecessor's. Certainly
Section 1140 contains no such

requirement, express Or implied. Here,

120

as in Aronson v. Servus Rubber Division

of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12 (lst Cir.

1984), cert. denied, U.S. , -e2

S. Ct. 431 (1984), the plaintiffs' claim

is grounded upon
a misreading of a section which
relates to discriminatory conduct
directed against individuals, not to
actions involving the plan in
general. The problem is with the
word "discriminate." An overly
literal interpretation of this
section would make illegal any
partial termination, since such
terminations obviously interfere
with the attainment of benefits by
the terminated group, and, indeed,

are expressly intended so to

121

interfere. Such cannot be the
intent of the section, where the
Statute expressly recognizes partial

terminations. ag

1343(b)(4)( incorporating Tax Code
Geeemaceome, 26 UsS.C. § 411(d)(3)).
This is not to say that a plan could
not be discriminatorily modified,
intentionally benefiting, or
injuring, certain identified
employees or a certain group of
employees, but a partial termination
cannot constitute discrimination per
se. A termination that cuts along
independently established lines --
here separate divisions -- and that
has a readily apparent business

justification, demonstrates no

122

invidious intent. . . Nor can
Plaintiffs claia they were
discriminated against with respect
to participants in defendants'
[other] operations that [were] not
being [sold]. . . We cannot regard
it as discriminatory for defendant
to make voluntary contributions to
continuing employees to maintain
their morale, but not to make such
to departing employees of the
admittedly profitless, wound-up
branch of its business.
Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.
In the present case, the
uncontroverted evidence adduced by the

defendants establishes that the sale was

motivated by legitimate business concerns.

The evidence on this point reveals that,
prior to the sale, Amoco conducted
profitability studies of the LPG
operation. This study revealed that the
LPG operation was not sufficiently
profitable, and would be even less
profitable in the future. This was
primarily because, as a major refiner,
Amoco was subject to Department of Energy
regulations that limited the price it
could charge for liquid propane.
(Exhibits 265-289, Appendix in Support of
Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at
Al169-A183). The price limitations did
not apply to non-refiners, and for that
reason, the LPG operation would be more
valuable and profitable if owned by a

non-refiner. (Exhibit 834, Appendix in

124

Support of Amoco's Motion for Summary
Judgment at A198). The approval of sale
by Amoco's parent, Standard Oil Company
(Indiana), was based upon these facts.
(Exhibit 265, Appendix at A169; Exhibit
267, Appendix at Al7l).

The plaintiffs do not attempt
to controvert these facts. Indeed, the
plaintiffs have stipulated that Amoco
sought to sell the LPG operation for
business reasons. (Pretrial Order at 5).
However, the plaintiffs contend that
because Amoco received offers from other
prospective purchasers which were lower

than the Norgas offer but included an

offer to credit years of service with
Amoco for all purposes under the buyers'

retirement plans, Amoco must have

125

accepted the Norgas offer "for the
purpose of interfering" with the
plaintiffs' attainment of future benefit
rights in violation of Section 1149.
Moreover, say the plaintiffs, since
Berges was a@ patty to & his
"discrimination," Norgas is also liable.
The plaintiffs' theory distorts
the plain meaning of Section 1140.
Indeed, if the plaintiffs' theory were
accepted, Section 1060(b) would be little
more than a redundant appendage in the
text of ERISA, since Section 1140 would
generally have the effect of requiring
employers to sell their businesses on
terms that protect employees' inchoate
interests in non-vested benefits under

the seller's plan. Neither the express

26

language of Section 1140 nor its
legislative history reveals any such
Congressional intent.34 The plain fact is
that neither ERISA in general nor Section
1140 in particular was intended to outlaw
the termination of contingent future
liabilities such as those involved here
pursuant to the sale of the entire
division or operation of the employer's

business. see Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16.

Cf. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division, 567

FP. Supp. 1134, 1198 (N.D. W.Va. 1983)
(even assuming that avoiding future
pension obligations was the employer's
sole motivation for selling a division of
its operations in a manner which
adversely affected contingent employee

benefits, the sale did not violate

ERISA); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division,

724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied U.S. » 2064 S.Ct. 2287

(1984) (making same assumption in
affirming summary judgment). Moreover,
the fact that the LPG employees were
terminated when the LPG operation was
sold, whereas employees in other Amoco
divisions or operations which were not
sold were retained and continued as
participants in the Amoco plan, simply
does not establish the kind of
discrimination prohibited by Section 1140.
Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16. The termination
of plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was
merely an incidental result of an

entirely legitimate business transaction

128

which ERISA was not designed to regulate
Or prohibit.

Because there is no evidence on
the record of any discrimination or
adverse treatment within the prohibitions
of Section 1140, the defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
with respect to these claims?>

F. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. § 1141

Proceeding directly in the face
of all existing precedent as well as the
plain language of the statute itself,
plaintiffs next claim a right to recover
under 29 U.S.C. § 1141, which provides,

inter alia:

ft shall be unlawful for any person

through the use of fraud, force,

violence, or threat of the use of

Id.

force or violence, to restrain,
coerce, intimidate or attempt to
restrain, coerce or intimiaate any
participant or beneficiary for the
purpose of interfering with or
preventing the exercise of any right
to which he is or may become
entitled under the plan [or] this
title. . . Any person who willfully
violates this section shall be fined
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.

This section of ERISA is clearly a

criminal statute designed to supplement

1140 by giving law enforcement officials

the right to prosecute individuals who

fraudulently or coercively interfere with

an employee's rights under a pension plan.

As every court which has addressed the
question has concluded, Section 1141
provides no private right of action
whatsoever, but simply allows for
Criminal prosecution of certain egregious
forms of conduct already prohibited by

Section 1140. See, e.g., West v. Butler,

621 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980);

Maxfield v. Central States, Southeast and

Southwest Areas Health, Welfare and

Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D.

Tll. 1982). Thus, plaintiffs' Section
1141 claim is devoid of legal merit and
is due to be dismissed. Enforcement of
Section 1141 is the exclusive prerogative

of the Attorney General. See, West v.

Butler, 621 F.2d at 244.

G. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1022

131

Section 1022 of ERISA requires that
a “summary plan description" be filed
with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C.
1022(a). The plan description and
summary plan description are required to
contain, among other things,
The name and type of administration
of the plan;. . . the plan's
requirements respecting eligibility
for participation and benefits; a
description of the provisions
providing for nonforfeitable pension
benefits; [and] the circumstances
which may result ion
disqualification, ineligibility or
denial or loss of benefits.
29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Plaintiffs contend

that by failing to disclose in the plan

132

the description the circumstances which
might result in their loss of employment
of the possibility that the LPG Operation
might be sold, Amoco violated the duty
imposed by Section 1022 to disclose "the
circumstances which may result in
disqualification, ineligibility, or
denial or loss of benefits."

The plaintiffs have no viable
Claim under Section 1022. That section
requires only a description of the plan
itself, a..d what general circumstances
would cause a loss of eligibility for
benefits under the terms of the plan.

see generally 29 <2 6% §

2530.102-3(4)-(1) (Department of Labor
regulations implementing § 1022). The

Summary plan description provided by

133

Amoco more than adequately satisfied

those requirements. It repeatedly refers
to the fact that eligibility for benefits
will be lost if employment is terminated,
and describes the various rights the
employee will have under the different
benefit plans if that occurs. Thus, the
description of the "Retirement Plan"
States that “all regular, full-time
employees of the company are covered."
(Exhibit 1 at 30, Appendix in Support of
Amoco's Motion for Summary Judgment at
Al62). If further states that
In order to enjoy the full benefits
of this plan, you must "retire" from
the company. You are retired or not
retired depending on your status

when you leave the company. You are

134

"retired" if you leave the company
-- at age 65; or
~~ at any time beginning at age 55;
when your age plus years of service
add up to 75; or
-- at any time for approved
disability or with company consent
Py geeeting certain, Se
requirements.
(Id). Immediately following the
foregoing, it states in bold-face type
that:

If you have not satisfied any one of

these requirements when you leave

the company, you will be a

"terminated employee" and not

135

BHEREeHEHhhe es &
EU iT le Ee a

entitled tc full benefits of the

plan.

(Id). The description goes on to state
that "[i]f you leave the company before
you have satisfied the requirements for
retirement, you will be entitled only to
the benefits of a terminated employee --
with these benefits based on your years
of company service." (Exhibit 1 at 33,
Appendix at Al63). It then describes in
detail the retirement benefits to which a
terminated employee is entitled.
(Exhibit 1 at 33-34, Appendix at
Al63-Al164).

In view of the foregoing, there
clearly was no breach by Amoco of its
duty under § 1022 to describe

"circumstances which may result in

136

disqualification, ineligibility, or
denial or loss of benefits." The summary
plan description clearly indicates the
possibility that employment could be
terminated, and that termination prior to
the satisfaction of specific requirements
would result in the loss of eligibility
or denial of benefits in specific
respects. Section 1022 imposes no duty
for a summary plan description -- which,

again, is designed to summarize the terms

of the plan -- to go further anc

enumerate all imaginable future external
events which could cause the termination
of employment, be it the employee's poor

job performance of insubordination, the

company's poor economic condition caused

by increased competition or a declining

demand for the company's product, a
decision to abolish a particular job, or,
as here, a decision to sell the business
to another company.

There being no genuine dispute
of material fact as to the 1022 claims,
the Court concludes that defendants Amoco
and Bearden are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.36

H. The Claims Under 29 U.S.C. 1024

Finally, the plaintiffs claim
that Amoco's decision to sell the LPG
facilities was a plan "modification or
change which Amoco should have reported
to the Secretary under the requirements
ot. .029. Uchetuch) 6 t084-" (Plaintiffs'
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment at 36). Again, this

138

claim is utterly specious. The
undisputed evidence establishes that LPG
Sale did not involve any change,
amendment or modification of the terms of
any of Amoco's benefit plans. Rather,
plaintiffs' employment with Amoco was
Simply terminated at the time of the sale.
Plaintiffs received all benefits to which
they were entitled at the time under the

terms of the existing plan, and

non-terminated employees had the same
rights under the plan as before the sale.
In short, the sale effected no
modification in the terms of the Amoco
plan or the conditions for eligibility
under the plan; it simply effected a

termination of the employment of the

plaintiffs and other LPG employees, 37

139

Consequently, Amoco was not obligated to
report the sale as a modification in the
terms of the plan under Section 1024.°8

For these reasons, defendant Amoco
is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law with respect to the claims made under

29 U.S.C. § 1024.39

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing
analysis, the Court concludes that as to
each and every one of the plaintiffs’
claims, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact, and that defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiffs' attempts to convert a
routine business transaction into a
series of state and federal wrongs are

based upon severely strained

140

interpretations of law to which this

Court cannot accede. An appropriate

order will be entered.

DONE this 18th day of June,
1985.

14]

FOOTNOTES

1. The defendants have also
asserted diversity jurisdiction under 28
0.82C« 8 1332, 2d the sdeetrive of
fraudulent joinder jurisdiction.

2. Joe D. Bearden, a resident of
Alabama and a former employee of Amoco,
is also named as a defendant in this
action. Bearden has joined in Amoco's
motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs have not attempted to
distinguish between Amoco and Bearden for
purposes of this motion, nor will the

Court do so.

1 42

3 This action was Oriyinally
brought by the named plaintiffs as a
Class action. However, to date, no class
has been certified. At the request of
counsel, and with their mutual assent,
the Court has proceeded to address the
Summary judgment motions at this time.

4. None of plaintiffs' claims are
made against Norgas alone.

- - See Pretrial Order at 6,8.

6. See Affidavit of Larry J. Boyd.

7. This was one of two alternative
bases for the Supreme Court's affirmance,
the other being that no lifetime contract

existed in any event. See Bates, 418 So.

2d at 906.

8. Plaintiffs have alleged that

Amoco did in fact transfer some

managerial employees formerly employed in
the LPG operation to other Amoco
divisions and operations in Alabama.
This is of little relevance to the legal
issue at hand. For our purposes, Amoco
was under no contractual duty to transfer
particular employees to new positions
unrelated to the work for which they were

initially hired. See Alabama Mills;

Bates. However, nothing in Alabama Mills

or its progeny prohibits an employer from
voluntarily transferring and retaining
employees where it is feasible to do so.

9. The rule of Alabama Mills should

not be confused with the defense of
“impossibility of performance." As noted

in City of Albertville v. United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F.2d 594

144

(Sth Cir. 1959), Alabama law has
traditionally refused to recognize the
"impossibility of performance" as a
defense to a contract action, subject to

certain limited exceptions. See also

Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620 (Ala.

1979); Capital Fertilizer Co. v.

Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co., 202 Ala. 92, 79

So. 464, 487 (1918). In the case at
hana, however, Amoco does not rely on an
"impossidility of performance" defense.
Rather, Amoco relies on the fact that the
contracts, if they exist at all,
terminated by virtue of their own terms
(albeit terms implied by law) when the
LPG operation was sold.

10. In addition to this claim for

fraud against Amoco as an entity,

plaintiffs have also claimed that "[t]he
defendant Amoco Oil Company by and
through its agents, servants, and
employees and executives conspired to
defraud the plaintiffs" with respect to
the security of their jobs and benefits.
(Pretrial Order at 12). This allegation
fails as a matter of law. Under the law
of conspiracy in general, the law of
Alabama in particular, a civil conspiracy
to commit a tort requires a combination
of two or more persons and cannot exist
between a corporation and its agents or
employees, since the acts of agents and
employees acting within the line and
scope of their employment are considered
the acts of the corporation itself. See

Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,

1 46

Inc., 200 F.2d 91l, 914 (5th Cir. 1952),

cert. denied 345 U.S. 925 (1952) ;

Tuskegee Institute vy. May Refrigeration

COo., Inc., 57 Ala. App. 344, 328 So. 24

598 (1976), affirmed in part, reversed in

part on other grounds 344 So. 2d 156 (Ala.

1977). Accord, Girard vy. 94th St. &

Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2¢@ Cit.

1976), cert. denied 425 U.S. 974 (1976);

Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,

332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.

denied 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Zelmger vy.

Uvalde Rock Asphalt COe, 316 F424 47

(lOth Cir. 1963); Jewel Foliage Co. v.

Univlora Overseas Florida, iIne., 497. .P.

Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980). This is only
logical, since a corporation is a

fictional entity and Capable of acting

1 47

only th ough its agents and employees.
Thus; insofar as the plaintiffs seek
recovery for a conspiracy between Amoco
and its agents and employees, the claim
is legally precluded, and Amoco is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
ll. Misrepresentations as to future
acts and events are actionable under
Alabama law in certain circumstances.

See Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510, 262

So. 20d 756 (1972); Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F.

Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 1976),

affirmed 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).

Ze On August 2l, 1979, Amoco and
Norgas held a meeting with Amoco LPG
employees in BoaZ, Alabama, to discuss
the terms of the Amoco~-Norgas sale

contract and its effect on their jobs and

148

benefics. It is entirely undisputed that

no later than August 21, 1979, every
plaintiff had actual as well as
constructive knowledge of the fact that
Amoco's LPG operations were being sold,
that plaintiffs were being terminated by
Amoco, and that each of the plaintiffs
would nasal an employee of Norgas and be
covered by Norgas benefit plans when the
‘sale was completed. (See Deposition of
Davis at 31-33; Deposition of Fennell at
15, 35, 37-38, 43; Deposition of Gardner
at 22-23; Deposition of Gurley at 26,
29-30; Deposition of Jones at 37-39;
Deposition of Lovell at 35-38; Deposition
of McClendon at 38-40, 51; Deposition of
Moore at 34, 38-39; Deposition of

Murphree at 35-36; Deposition of Owens at

149

39-40; Deposition of Phillips at 69-70,

73-74, 77-78; Deposition of Pinyan at
51-54; Deposition of Shaneyfelt at 24-46;
Deposition of Shrader at 42-43, 48;
Deposition of Sims at 27-28; Deposition
of Weaver at 30-33.

R32 Plaintiffs' knowledge of the
sale by August 21, 1979, not only
constituted actual knowledge of the fact
that Amoco did not then intend to perform
Seoeemnresented, but it also put
plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the
possibility that Amoco's representations
concerning the plaintiffs' job security
were made with a contemporaneous
intention to deceive and not to perform

as promised. See Moore v. Merchants &

Planters Bank, 434 So. 2d at 754 (fact

150

constituting the fraud deemed discovered

at the time of discovery of facts which
would provoke inquiry by a person of
Ordinary prudence and which, if followed
up, would have led to the discovery of

fraud). Ci, MeGei tt, 2398 86. 24-252

(fraud with respect to future acts or
events deemed discovered when plaintiff
first learns that defendant does not
intend to perform as represented).

Compare Walter v. Woodall, 288 Ala. 510,

262 So. 2d 756 (1972) (fraud with respect
to future actions or events requires
contemporaneous intent to deceive or not
to perform as promised).

B4, The piaintiftts’ breach of
contract claims are separate and distinct

and have been dealt with Supra.

151

iS. At oral argument on these
motions, counsel for plaintiffs argued
that the deprivation of an opportunity to
take concerted job action or participate
in negotiations concerning the terms of
the sale constituted damage suffered by
the plaintiffs in reliance on Amoco's
misrepresentations. (Tranecriot at
February 25, 1985 Hearing at 22-23).

16. Even where the date of injury
is relevant, it is well-established that
a cause of action in tort accrues (and
the limitations period begins to run) as
soon as the plaintiff suffers any damage
as a result of fraud, regardless of
whether additional damages are incurred
later which were not apparent at or fixed

at the time of first legal injury. See,

152

e.-g-, Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle,

inc., 291 Ala. 601, 285 So. 2d 468, 473
(1973). Since the plaintiffs have argued
that the damage they suffered included
the deprivation of an opportunity to take
concerted job action, seek iother

employment, or participate in the

negotiations concerning the sale, see n.

eo Supra, and since that damage

necessarily occurred prior to August 21,

1979, when plaintiffs learned of the
Amoco-Norgas sale, it is plain that the
Statute of limitations precludes the
fraud claims at issue here.

17. It appears that the plaintiffs'
claims of fraud with respect to the
crediting of service are actually based

upon nondisclosure of information rather

Roa

than affirmative misrepresentation. (See
Amended Complaint of June 25, 1982, at
pgh. 56). Thus, several plaintiffs
repeatedly testified that they were never
told that Amoco service would be credited
under the Norgas retirement plan. (Davis
Deposition at 41; Fennell Deposition at
58-59; Gurley Deposition at 39-40; Jones
Deposition at 65; McClendon Deposition at
§i-53). Of course, four of the
plaintiffs admitted that they were
told the truth concerning credit for
Amoco service under the Norgas plan --
i.e., that such service would not be
credited. (Gardner Deposition at 22;
Lovell Deposition at 37-38; Shaneyfelt
Deposition at 26; Weaver Deposition at

35).

154

18. Indeed, the plaintiffs
themselves implicitly recognize that
these fraud claims "relate to" an
employee benefit plan, since the only
compensatory damages specifically sought
by the plaintiffs for these fraud claims
are “compensatory damages in the form of
loss of employee benefits, including but
not limited to, the value of the
following benefits: early retirement,
retirement, life and health insurance,
vacation, and savings plan benefits...."
(Pretrial Order at 17).

19. The grant of certiorari in

Russell is apparently limited to whether

a fiduciary may be liable for "punitive

damages or extracontractual compensatory

155

damages" under ERISA. 52 U.S.L.W. 3203
(October 2, 1984).

20. Defendants also contend that
these claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and that plaintiffs suffered
no damage as a proximate result of their
reliance on any misrepresentations
concerning the terms of the sale. These
contentions have substantial support in
the record. However, because the Court
finds these fraud claims preempted, there
is no need to reach these other
contentions made by the defendants. The
Court does note, however, that the record
is entirely devoid of any evidence of any
agreement or conspiracy between Amoco and
Norgas to commit a civil wrong. In the

absence of such evidence, the conspiracy

156

to defraud claim fails as a matter of law.

See Purcell Co., Inc. y. Spriggs

Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515 (Ala.

1983) (negotiation of business sale alone
is insufficient to establish that parties
agreed or conspired to perpetrate a tort).
The Court specifically notes this as an
alternative basis for the dismissal of
the fraud claims predicated upon
conspiracy.

21. As noted above, ERISA does not
require a retirement plan to provide for
such immediate payments of vested

benefits. See, @.g., Hernandez vy.

Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders

Pension Trust, 662 F.2d 617, 619-20 (9th

Bons) £982 3.2 Under the terms of the

Standard Plan, however, a vested

Sa @&eeeeg@eeegQeeeéegerEent = =

participant whose employment terminates
before he is eligible for retirement may
elect to receive at that time an annuity
equivalent to the present actuarial value
of the vested benefits. (See Webb
Affidavit, Ex. A. at 9.05(c)). In
this case, each of the vested plaintiff.
elected to receive an annuity immediately
under this provision of the Standard
Plan, and is currently receiving those
payments. (See Pretrial Order at 9).

22. In addition to the substantive
ERISA violations enumerated above,
plaintiffs have alleged a separate claim
for a general conspiracy to violate ERISA.
(Pretrial Order at 13). It would appear
that this general "conspiracy to violate

ERISA" claim fails to state a claim under

158

ERISA, the provisions of which focus on
the underlying wrong rather than any
conspiracy to commit the wrong. In any
event, considering all evidence and
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,
the Court finds no evidence in this
record tending to establish that Amoco
and Norgas agreed to violate ERISA. See

and compare note 19, Supra. Moreover,

Since the Court finds no substancive
violations of ERISA on the facts of this
case, the general “conspiracy to violate
ERISA“ claim must likewise fail.

23. As set forth in the
Amoco-Norgas sale agreement, service with

Amoco is credited for purposes of vesting

under the Norgas retirement plan.

(Pretrial Order at 7). Amoco service is

159

s

credited under the other Norgas plans, as
well. (Bx. A to Aff. of John Churchhill).
Although their damage allegations are
somewhat ambiguous on this point
(Pretrial Order at 17-18), plaintiffs
have not adduced evidence of any loss
caused by the alleged ERISA violations
apart from the failure to credit Amoco
service in calculating Norgas retirement
benefits.

24. A contrary construction would
not only flout 1060(b) (l1)'s express
language and the legislative history, but
would also contravene the rule that,
under ERISA, “[nleither Congress nor the
Courts are involved in either the
decision to establish a plan or in the

decision concerning which benefits a plan

160

should provide." Moore v. Reynolds

Metals Co. Retirement Program, 740 F.2d

454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied

U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 786 (1985).

25. Plaintiffs do not (and cannot)
contend that the termination of all
employees of a particular business or
division in connection with the sale of
that operation would constitute a per se

violation of any provision of ERISA. Cf.

Sutton v. Weirton Steel, 567 F. Supp.

1164 (N.D. W.Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d

406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S.

, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).

26. If and when the Secretary of
Treasury does promulgate regulations
imposing a crediting requirement, the

validity of those regulations will of

16]

course be determined under settled
principles of administrative law. oh

Rowan Companies Inc. v. United States,

452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (court's inquiry
generally limited to whether the
regulation is within the delegation of
authority).

27. For present purposes, the Court
has assumed without deciding that this is
the type of “predecessor employer"
situation that would fall within the
ambit of § 1060(b).

28. In analagous situations where a
federal statute delegates authority to
promulgate regulations to an
administrative agency and does no more
than adopt these regulations by advance

reference, the federal courts have

162

consistently held that where the
administrative agency fails or chooses
not to promulgate the described
regulations, there is no substantive law
for the court to apply and the court
therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain
a claim alleging a violation of the Act.

See, e.g. Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita

Associates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.

, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1034 (1974);

Wuillamy v. Werblin, 364 F. Supp. 237,

240 n.2 (D. N.J. 1973). Cf. Sierra Club

v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716

F.2d at 1154; Citizens for Clean Air,

Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army,

356 F. Supp. at 18.
29. In any event, the plaintiffs

have not stated a proper claim against

163

Norgas under § 1056. Norgas clearly was
not the employer, administrator or
fiduciary responsible for complying with
the requirements of § 1056 vis-a-vis the
Amoco plan, and no evidence has been
adduced to demonstrate that Norgas
promoted or participated in any such
violation by Amoco within the meaning of

Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390,

411 (S.D. Ala. 1982).

29.5 See Plaintiffs' Brief in

Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 41.

30. For present purposes, it is not
necessary for this Court to adopt the

theory of Donovan nor express a view as

to its scope or validity.

164

31. Clearly, if Amoco breached no
fiduciary duties in negotiating the sale
of the LPG facilities, then Norgas, which
was not a fiduciary with respect to the
Amoco plan, cannot be held liable for
promoting or participating in any such

breach, Compare Donovan vy. Daugherty,

350 F. Supp 390, 411 (S.D. Ala. S962).
In any event, the Court is of the Opinion
that the mere purchase of a going
business from a fiduciary, without more,
would not render a nonfiduciary liable
under § 1104 for the seller's breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with the
Sale, at least where no transfer of plan
assets is involved.

aes Plaintiffs admit that Norgas

was not a fiduciary with respect to the

Amoco plan and that § 1106 is by its

literal terms technically inapplicable to
Norgas. See Brief of Plaintiffs in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 4l. However,
plaintiffs contend that Norgas is liable
for Amoco's violation of § 1106 because
Norgas "participated" in the violation by

Amoco. Cf. Donovan v. Daugherty, 550

F.Supp. 390 (S.D. Ala. 1982)(third party
who assists fiduciary in the breach of a
fiduciary duty is liable for losses
sustained by beneficiaries due to the
breach). As to this contention, see notes
30 and 3l, supra.

33. Amoco's parent, Standard Oil
Company, is the administrator and named

fiduciary of the "Amoco" plan. (See

166

Pretrial Order at 9, pgh. 21). However,
at least for purposes of the present
motion, Amoco has not denied that it is a
fiduciary with respect to the plan. See

generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).

34. As far as Norgas is concerned,
the failure to credit prior years of
service with Amoco in calculating accrued
benefits under the Norgas plan certainly
cannot be considered discriminatory,
particularly since neither ERISA nor the
Norgas retirement plan requires such
treatment. In fact, the granting of such
credit would arguably constitute
favorable discrimination with regard to
plaintiffs and a breach of fiduciary duty

as to the Norgas plan and its incumbent

participants. Cf. Winpinsinger v. Aurora

Corp. of Illinois, Precision Castings

Division, 456 F.Supp. 559, 566, 569 (N.D.

Ohio 1978)(requirement that fiduciary
discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries prohibits
fiduciary from granting preference as
between plan's participants or as between
plan's beneficiaries).

35. Plaintiffs argue that questions
of intent or motive are rarely

appropriate for summary judgment, citing

Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National

Bank and Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th

Cir. 1983). While this proposition is
not without support, it has little
application where, as here, the

underlying facts are not disputed and the

168

central question to be determined is
whether, as a matter of Liaw, the
discrimination alleged is the kind of
"discrimination" that falls within the
Proscription of a statute narrowly
tailored to serve specific purposes. In
any event, to the extent that the court
must draw inferences from the undisputed
evidentiary facts to determine whether
there has been prohibited discrimination,
the court in a nonjury case is entitled
to draw such inferences and conclusions
on motion for summary judgment if a bench
trial would not enhance its ability to
draw those inferences and conclusions.

See Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d

1506, 1509-10 (llth Cir. 1985); Nunez v.

Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24

169

(Sth Cir. 1978). The ERISA claims made
by the plaintiffs in this case are not

triable to a jury, see Calamia v. Spivey,

632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), and it
does not appear that any further
probative evidence on point would likely
be presented at trial. Based on all of
the evidence before the Court at this
time, then, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs have not suffered
discrimination or other adverse treatment
within the prohibitions of Section 1140.
36. No claim has been made under
Section 1022 against Norgas, which
obviously had no duty of reporting or
disclosure with respect to the Amoco

plan.

170

CP Even where the terms of a
proposed sale of a business do involve
amendments of existing plans, neither
Section 1022 nor Section 1024 requires an
employer to supply information regarding
amendments before the amendments are

effected. Sutton v. Weirton Steel

Division, 567 F.Supp. 1184, 1196 (N.D. wW.

Va. 1983), affirmed 724 F.2d 406 (4th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S. ;

104 S.Ct. 2387 (1984).
38. In any event, the Court is of
the opinion that Section 1024 provides no

Private cause of ac’ ‘on for failure to

report modifications to the Secretary (as

Opposed to the failure to comply with the
duties of reporting and disclosure owed

to participants and beneficiaries).

Etim

Therefore, even assuming that the sale
did constitute a "modification" of the
plan within the meaning of Section 1024,
the plaintiffs would have no right to
recover the damages they seek based upon
Amoco's failure to properly report the
modification to the Secretary.

39. Plaintiffs have made no claim

against Norgas under Section 1024.

172

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-7623

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et al.,

Plaintiffs-
Appellants,

versus

— an ar ry atu = a» %
AMOCO OIL COMI ANY, etce, et Giles

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Jlorthern District of Alabama

IN PETITIONS(S) FOR REHEARING
(October 28, 1986)

BEFORE: RONEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges,
and DOYLE*, Senior District
Judge.

PER CURIAM:
The petition(s) for rehearing filed
by appellants is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/‘s/ THOMAS A. CLARK
United States Circuit Judge

* Honorable James E. Doyle, Senior U.S.
District Judge for the Western District
of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

174

799 F.2d 1464

WILLIE D. PHILLIPS, et ai.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv

AMOCO OIL COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85-7623
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit

September 22, 1986

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, CLARK,
Circuit Judge, and DOYLE, Senior District
Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Former employees of Amoco Oil

Company's Alabama retail liquid propane

175

gas ("LPG") business appeal from the
district court's decision to grant
Summary judgment in favor of Amoco Oil
Company ("Amoco"), Joe D. Bearden, and
Norgas Propane Gas Company ("Norgas") on
claims of breach of contract, state
common-law fraud and Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") violations
arising in the context of the sale of
Amoco's Alabama LPG operations to Norgas.

We affirm.

I. FACTS

Appellants (the "employees") were
formerly employed by Amoco in its LPG

operations in Alabama. All participated

in the Employee Retirement Plan of

Standard Oil Company and Participating
Companies (the "Standard Plan").

In May of 1979, Amoco agreed to sell
its LPG operations in the southeastern
United States to Norgas. The sales
contract was signed on July 31, 1979 and
the sale closed on September 4, 1979.
Upon seiling its Alabama LPG operations,
haeco completely left the retail LPG
business in Alabama and therefore had no
work in that area for any of the
employees.

The sales contract provided that
Norgas would offer employment to each
regular full-time employee at his or her
Current salary. It further provided that
retirement benefits under Norgas'

retirement plan would be based on years

177

of service with Norgas, except that
continuous years of service with Amoco
would be credited by Norgas for vesting
purposes. Thus years of service with
Amoco would not be credited for the
purpose of calculating benefits or
determining eligibility for early
retirement. Each of the employees with
vested benefits under the Standard Plan,
including those who have not yet reached
the age of sixty-five, opted to receive
and is currently receiving an annuity
from the Standard Plan.

A meeting for the Amoco employees
was held on August 21, 1979 at Boaz,
Alabama to explain the various Norgas
benefits that would be available to the

employees after the sale (the "Boaz

178

meeting"). At the meet

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1892%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
