# Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Hall v. Taylor

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 967

## Text

[
1} INDEX
8 ’
3 OPINIONS Pe rr ee re ee ee ee 2
QUNSUNNG COUN x... «65 cds a teat 2
5 IID ao. nic vnncegesiishs as suenueeecs eee 2
Ge Gs as ceo ccnbenscnevedeeccenbacunseeeetee 3
GREENE Solsctccocdsceceshondesceseseoaeeede ee ise 7?
a Opinion of California Supreme Court is
in Accord with Constitutional Requirements
3 of Vlandis vs. Kline
10 (1) Must the Pres tion Necessarily or
Universally Be True In Fact? ............... 7
11
(a) Irrelevance of "Biological
12) PU ob ons nks dn wate aaeee eee 8
13 (2) Does the State Have Reasonable Alter-
native Means of Making the Crucial
14) DOCOUMERERAGRS | oc cks cnwincsbenseaedanscheeen 9
15 (3) Is a State Interest or Public
Policy Served or Supported by the
16 Application of the Presumption Against
Appeliane im Gbe TORRE eas cccacsuusaseaee 10
17 |
Constitutionally Protected Paternal Rights
18
- (1) Lack of Essential Parental Rights...... ll
(2) Additional Presumption of
20 Parent-Child Relationship Between
21 | Appellant and David Fuller ............ 12
Appellant's Claim of Constitutionally Protected
22 Right of Inheritance.
23) (1) State Law Determinative as to Rights
os OE TERING bacisccncccncvseseeeeue 12
a oes avecceshgisseevhaesk hike Wass 5 466 haan 13
APPENDICES
26 :
Appellant's Response to Supreme Court
27 Letter
28
29
30
31
332
i

BESRERTRESERBS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

In Re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 636,
S37 Pd 123

‘

uisor vs. Silver (1960) 54 C2d 603,

lli vs. Lalli 7279 439 U.S. 269,

ort oeoweeawn ir

10People vs. Thompson (1979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 193

14)Stanleyv vs. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645,

Trimble vs. Gordon (1977) 430 U.S. 762,
16 O7 S. tt. 1459

17 Wlandis vs. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441,
i 93 S. Ct. 2230

TATUTES
alifornia Evidence Code §621l (a) Z

alifornia Probate Code §422

alifornia Probate Code §423
lifornia Civil Code §7004(a)(1)
aliforntd Civil Code §7004(a) (4)
Iiforfia’Civil Code §7004(b)

ection 1 of Fourteenth Amendment, ©
U.S. Constitution

ii

Page
ll,
ll
re
a
Be Os
a F

1 NO. 83-6147

2

5 }

4

5 In The

6 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
|

8) October Term 1983

oi

10.

LLIESTATE OF

12)WILLIS CORNELIOU

13 Deceased.

$s
>,

TRUDY ANN HALL,

|

Vv.

HETTIE TAYLOR,

|
Appeliiant,

Tw Iw 1 a a a a ee a a O_O

19

20

21) ON APPEAL FROM

22 | THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

23)

- MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

25 HETTIE TAYLOR, the Appellee, moves the Court to dismiss the

27

26 appeal herein, or in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of the
—— Court of the State of California, on the grounds that the

28 federal questions presented are so insubstantial as not to require

29 ifurther argument, and on the additional grounds that the prior

30 Judgment rests on an adequate nonfederal basis.

OPINIONS BELOW

|

The opinion of the California Supreme Court is officially

ireported at 35 Cal 3d 461; the opinion the California Court of

lcourt decision is not officially reported.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1
2
3
*
§||Appeal is officially reported at 133 Cal. App. 3d 684; the trial
6
7
8
9

10 The constitutional question posed by Appellant on appeal is

ll|best stated as follows:

12 | Did the application of the conclusive presumption set forth in
is California Evidence Code §62l(a) to deny Appellant priority to
14) letters of administration pursuant to California Probate Code
15) §§422 and 423 constitute a denial of due process as applied
a against the Appellant in the trial court?
17|
18. STATUTES INVOLVED
19)
20 | California Evidence Code §62l(a) provides:
21 | “Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife
22) cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
23) conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."
24 |
25 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, United States
sal onstitution, provides:
27
28 | "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
29 subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Unite
30 States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
31 make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
32 immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

2

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

|
;

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

|
|
;

STATEMENT OF CASE

1
2
3
+
°|
6)
7 This action arises out of a probate proceeding involving the

8 priority of opposing parties to administer the estate of a decedent
9 Ieurotant to California Probate Code §§422 and 423.

10

11 The decedent, WILLIS CORNELIOUS, died on Julv 24, 1980, a
12\resident of Imperial County, California. (CT 42:16-17) On October
13/}29, 1980, HETTIE TAYLOR, the Appellee herein and the nominee of the
14 |decedent's two sisters (who resided in the State of Arkansas) filed
15 ja petition in the Superior Court to be appointed administratrix of
16|the decedent's estate. (CT 42:21-26) On November 6, 1980, the

17 Appellant, TRUDY ANN HALL, daughter of ARZINA FULLER, filed a

18 petition in the same Superior Court, seeking to be appointed

19 Indministratrix of the decedent's estate. (CT 42:28; 43:1-3; 44:4-6)
20 In her petition, the Appellant, TRUDY ANN HALL, alleged that she was

2l\the daughter of the decedent, WILLIS CORNELIOUS. (CT 43:1-3)

23) The hearing on the petition of MS. HALL and MS. TAYLOR was held
24 on December 19, 1980, and at said hearing the following facts were

25 established through the testimony of ARZINA FULLER. (CT 43:16-18):
26

27) (a) ARZINA FULLER is the mother of the Appellant. (CT 44:4-6)
|

28

29 (b) ARZINA FULLER was married to DAVID FULLER in 1933, and

oS

50} said marriage was in existence as a continuing relation-
31) ship from that date through the time of trial. (CT
se! 43:20-22, 44:4-6)

i | (c) At the time the Appellant was conceived, her mother,
. ARZINA FULLER, and DAVID FULLER, were cohabiting as
3 husband and wife. (CT 44:1-6; RT 4:23-26, 5:17-26, 6:1-4)
‘|
5 (d) The original certificate of live birth for the Appellant,
6) TRUDY ANN HALL (FULLER) dated March 16, 1953, and signed
7| by the Appellant's mother, ARZINA FULLER, names DAVID
7] FULLER as the Appellant's father. (CT 44:8-11; RT $:3-23)
9|
|
10 In addition, pursuant to an offer of proof bw Appellant's

lljcounsel, the additional facts referenced in Appellant's "Jurisdic-

}
12 \tional Statement" were accepted as proven bv the trial cou

13 \for the limited purpose of ruling on the Appellant's Motion for

14|Judgment based on California Evidence Code §621(a).

15 |

16 | Pursuant to the conclusive presumption of paternity set forth
17 lin California Evidence Code §621l(a), the trial court concluded that
ae was the child of ARZINA FULLER and DAVID FULLER, and

19 laccordingly held that:

20)
21 (a) The petitioner, TRUDY ANN HALL, was not the daughter of
22 the decedent ;
23
24) (b) The “parent and child relationship" as required for
25 | Appellant's priority of right to Letters of Administration
26| pursuant to the California probate Code §§422 and 423 did
27 not exist; and
28 | .
29 | (c) The petitioner, HETTIE TAYLOR, was entitled to Letters of
30) Administration in the Estate of WILLIS CORNELIOUS, as the
31) nominee of the decedent's sisters. (CT 46:20-23).
32

| 4

|

|

|

1 The Court further ruled that the presumption of legitimacy as
gleet forth in California Evidence Code §62l(a) did not violate
$ |constitutional guarantees of due process in that the State of

4|California has a strong social interest in the application of the

5 conclusive presumption of paternity set forth in California Evidence

6\Code §621(a) in order to promote:

7

8 | (a) Marriage and not impugn the family unit, and

9 }

10 (b) The speed and efficiency of judicial inquiries in these

11 circumstances, and

12

13 (c) The stability of titles to property and rights of inherit-
14 ance.

15

16 The trial court further determined that the application of the

17 conclusive presumption was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-

18 cious, and there was a rational connection between the ultimate fact
19 presumed and the facts actually proved. (CT 46:6-11, 11-14)

20

21. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision
bf the trial court, with Justice Work dissenting. The majority
bpinion written by Justice Cazarez, and concurred in by acting
residing Justice Stansforth, set forth in detail the state

mterests which supported the application of the presumption,

ncluding (a) the stability of titles to property and rights of

inheritance, (b) the speed and efficiency of judicial inquiry, and

ppeals opinion (see Appendix B, p. 9 of Appellant's Jurisdictional

tatement):

: the sanctity of the family. As was stated in the Court of
|
i
|

1 "The facts here show the familial relationship HALL had with

2 DAVID FULLER was much more palpable than the biological rela-

3 tionship she had with CORNELIOUS. HALL was raised and supported
4 by DAVID. Her birth certificate names DAVID as her father.

5 DAVID and ARZINA FULLER were married over 48 years without

6) separation. DAVID was never told he was not HALL'S father, nor
7 was he told of this proceeding for fear of ruining the mar-

ry riage. HALL was aware of CORNELIOUS' status for 12 years (9

9 years during which she was of majority). Now, after 27 years as
10) the daughter of DAVID FULLER, HALL claims the paternity of

il another man.”

12

13 Appellant petitioned for a hearing before the California

14$8upreme Court, and a hearing was granted. In her petition, and in
15 oral argument before the court, Appellant reiterated the argument
16 Bhe raised in each of the lower courts. After oral argument and

17 prior to deciding the case, the court requested counsel to respond
18 to additional issues under California probate statutes by letter
19brief. Appellant's response is appended to the Appellant's "Juris-
20 dictional Statement"’ as Appendix E. Appellee's response to the
21 California Supreme Court is appended hereto as Appendix A.

22
|

23 In its opinion, the California Supreme Court addressed the
24 fonstitutional questions, and with the Chief Justice dissenting,

25 gecided against Appellant and affirmed the trial court. In that
26 Mecision, the California Supreme Court went into great detail in
27 reviewing the reasoning and rationale of its decision, and in

28 piscussing the relevant state interests.

{
|
|

ARGUMENT

(Constitutional Requirements of Vlandis vs, Kline.

1
2
3) A. Opinion of California Supreme Court is in Accord with the
3
5

The Case of Vlandis vs. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 935 S. Ct.

‘ae is cited by the Appellant for the proposition that the Due
"Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

8 Ironstitution is violated when a conclusive (irrebuttable) presump-

9 tion:
10 |
11 (a) Is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and
12
13 (b) When the state has reasonable alternative means of making
14) the crucial determination.
15 |

16 To that limited extent, the Appellant's statement of the Viandis

case is correct. However, Appellant's arguments and analysis are

18 |sncorrect as related to the case at hand.
19°
20

(1) Must the Presumption Necessarily or Universally be True in
21 Fact?
” The realization that establishment of certain preliminary facts
23 |

y give xsise to a "presumption" of additional facts should put us

a4

m notice that a "presumption", because of its very nature, will

a5 ever be universally true in fact. Further, the determination that

presumed fact is not correct does not in itself make the applica-

i ion of that "presumption" a violation of "due process". The fact
” hat a "generally valid rule" or "presumption" may have some rough
29

dges does not make its application unconstitutional under the

ourteenth Amendment. (Vlandis vs. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 465,

= i Dissenting Opinion.)
!

1 Given a certain relationship between husband and wife, the

2State of California may impose the "legal consequences” of father-
3 hood on a husband even though he is not the "biological" father of
4 the child. In certain situations, overriding social policies

S mandate that the “biological” impossibility of fatherhood be dis-

6iregarded. The father and child relationship is a “legal relation-
7 ship" incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privi-
8S leges, duties, and obligations, including certain rights of
9 inheritance. California Evidence Code §621(a) provides that given a
10 certain factual situation (preliminary fact situation), the State of
11 California shall impose the “legal consequences" of paternity on a
12 married man. This “legal relationship" is imposed to further certain

13 legitimate and substantial state interests.

14
15 (a) Irrelevance of "Biological Paternity”
16 Appellant argues that the application of the conclusive pre-

17 sumption against the Appellant in this case is a denial of "due
18 process" because she, if given the opportunity, can prove that DAVID
19 FULLER is not her biological father. But "biological paternity" has

20 mever been required under the California statute. The holding of a

21 long line of California cases is best summarized by the headnotes in

|
|

22 People vs. Thompson (1979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, in which the

23 conclusive presumption of Evidence Code §621(a) was used to prove |
24 paternity in prosecuting a defendant for willful failure to support

25 his son under the California Penal Code.

26 |

27 "While paternity is an essential element of the crime, and

28 | proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a criminal
29 | charge is constitutionally required, proof of biologic parent-
30 | hood is not an essential element of proof of guilt under Penal
31 Code §270, as the determinant factor is whether the legal

|
'
32 | relationship of father and child exists."

|

* The application of the conclusive presumption of paternity

2 herein is not unconstitutional just because ‘‘non-paternity"™ may be

5 | proved. |
7 |
a (2) Does the State Have Reasonable Alternative Means of Making
| che Crucial Determination? |
7] In Vlandis vs. Kline the court reviewed the reasonable alterna-
8 '

|tive methods available to the state to make the "crucial determina-_
|

® | tton" of residency. In the case at hand, the "crucial

10 | determination" is whether there are alternative means to establish

11 paternity, mot (as Appellant has misstated) whether there are

12 alternative means to establish non-paternity.
13
aa The same erroneous argument by Appellant was previously
15 rejected by the California Court of Appeals in this matter:
16)
17 | "The ‘crucial question’ according to Brown, supra (80 Cal. App
16 3d 297) is not whether there are alternative means to win
| the presumed father's non-paternity, but whether there are |
aad reasonable means to establish the alleged biological father's
se paternity (id. at p. 306). Brown thus reaffirms Kusior vs. |
aad, Silver 54 C2d 603, holding blood test evidence cannot be used
- to controvert a conclusive presumption of paternity. The
ae reasoning is simple: Although in some cases blood factors may
as operate to eliminate a certain man as the father, they do not
a6 designate a specific individual as the biological father. The
a7 | purpose underlying the statutory presumption of conclusiveness
26 | does not imply a legislative doubt as to the scientific relia-
"= bility of blood tests, but rather the purpose is to determine
50 the legal father and to achieve certain social policies uphold}
= ing the integrity of the family (Kusior vs. Silver, supra, 54
$2// ss c2d 603, 619).
9
i

:

In correctly applying the second portion of the analysis in

2 Viandis vs. Kline to this case, we would inquire as follows: Does
3

the State have a reasonable alternative method of ‘etermining

“paternity for children conceived during the marital cohabitation?
S ithe answer to this auestion is clearly "no".

6)
7 Therefore, like other types of blood tests, the sickle cell
® | anemia test proposed by the Appellant should not be admissible to
9 | refute 7 conclusive presumption of paternity.

10.

il (3) Is a State Interest or Public Policy Served or Supported
12 by the Application of the Presumption Against Appellant in this

1S |Matter?

14,

16 | Appellant, contrary to the evidence and the facts in this case,
6 |

argues that no state interest or public policy is served or
leupported by the application of the §621(a) presumption against the
*8 appellant. Each court in these proceedings has reviewed in detail
| che applicable state interests or public policies which are
50 | curthered by the application of the presumption. Appellant's
denials of any state interest are in direct conflict with the facts
as established by Appellant's own witness. ARZINA FULLER clearly
testified to the familial relationships in a long term marriage of
over 48 years. Appellant argues that ubsequent death of the
Appellant's presumed father paler ance somehow retroactively
terminates the family relationship in existence at the time of
trial. The California courts reviewed in detail the state interestq
which supported the application of the presumption, which included
protecting (a) the sanctity of the family, (b) the speed and we
efficiency of judicial inquiry, and (c) the stability of titles of
property and rights of inheritance. These important state aasneet

have long been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as permissible

10

a ee ~~ ~ 2 ~ er
o27 anne | WY KF O

19

0 ort ones ef Ww

state interests. (Lalli vs. Lalli (1978) 439 U.S. 259, 99 S Ct.
1518, Trimble vs. Gordon (1977) 430 U.S. 762, 97 S Ct. 1459).

The opinion of the California Supreme Court stands in full

accord with the precepts of the Vlandis vs. Kline opinion. The
application of the presumption under California Evidence Code

§$621(a) clearly withstands constitutional scrutiny in the case now

before the court.

|

| B. Constitutionally Protected Parental Rights

(1) Lack of "Essential" Parental Rights

i Appellant cites Stantosky vs. Kramer (1982) __ U.S. ___, 102
|s. Ct. 1388, Quillon vs. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549,
Stanley vs. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, and In Re

‘Lisa R. (1975) 12 Cal. 3d 636, as cases involving similar issues as

ithe case at bar. Said cases are in no way similar or binding in
this matter. Stantosky involved parental rights termination pro-
ceedings between parent and child. Quillon involved the petition by
the step-father of an illegitimate child for adoption over the
objections of the natural father. Stanley involved the rights of an
unwed father to custody of his children on the natural mother's

death. In Re Lisa R. involved attempts by an individual father to

prove paternity of an orphaned child. These cases all involved
attempts by the state to deny the parent or parents the opportunity
to establish or re-establish a family relationship or "essential"

parental rights. As was stated in Stanley vs. Illinois (1972) 405

U.S. 645, 651, these cases involved "rights far more precious ...
than property rights"’. Appellant's attempts to bring herself within
the purview of these cases is lacking. There are no "essential"
parental rights being asserted for the protection of a "viable"

family relationship.

11

1 (2) Additional Presumption of Parent-Child Relationship
@ Between Appellant and DAVID FULLER.

3|

ry Appellant further claims the existence of a rebuttable presump-

5 tion of MR. CORNELIOUS' paternity of the Appellant under California
6 Civil Code §7004(a)(4). (This section relates to acknowledgement of
7 a child). As pointed out in the Appellee's letter brief of June 30,
8/1984 to the California Supreme Court (a copy of which is appended

9 hereto as Appendix A), there is, no such surviving presumption

10 because of the conflict with another rebuttable presumption of DAVID
1l |FULLFR's paternity of Appellant under California Civil Code
12 |§74004(a)(1). Any conflicts in the presumptions arising under

13 §7004(a) are resolved by the application of §7004(b) which provides

14 in part:

15

16. "(b) .... If two or more presumptions arise under this section
17 which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the
18 facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and
19 logic controls

20 |

21 Clearly, the presumption of Appellant's paternity by DAVID

22 | FULLER based on his marriage to ARZINA FULLER, the Appellant's
23 mother, and the birth of the Appellant during said marriage (Civil
24 |i\Code §7004(a)(1)) is founded on the weigrtier considerations of

25 ipolicy and logic, and would therefore control.

27 | C. Appellant's Claim of a Constitutionally Protected Right of
28 | Inheritance.
29 |

;
‘
'
;
|
|
|
|

Appellant claims that she has a constitutionally protected
property right involving the right to “inherit” from MR. CORNELIOUS ‘
3l jestate. The Calif: nia statutes involved the rights of the parties
32 jas set forth in the California Probate Code, and the application of

12

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S$ £28 8 S.8 & TP RRBRBE SF OW rADWTaAe HAD eH O

those sections is traditionally a state as opposed to federal right.
It is a well recognized rule that the orderly disposition at death
(probate procedures) is a matter particularly within the competence

of individual states, and as such, the federal courts should give

ubstantial deference to the state's statutory scheme of inherit-

lLabine vs. Vincent (1971) 401 U.S. 532, 91 S$ Ct. 1017). The fact

oe (Trimble vs. Gordon (1977) 430 U.S. 762, 97 S Ct. 1459,

oor oat 8 WD HF
me

hat the logical interpretation of those state statutes does not
nclude the Appellant within the statutory scheme, is not a viola-
ion of her rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
onstitution. As such, there are adequate non-federal grounds on

which to support this decision.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we respectfully submit that this

prpeal should be either dismissed or affirmed.
|

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Appellee

13

o ont aa rf awn fF

~
Oo]

Rime

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
COUNTY OF IMPERIAL ‘os

I am a resident of, and employed in, the aforesaid County. I
am over the age of eighteen (18) years, not a party to that certain
legal action No. 83-6147 entitled Estate of WILLIS CORNELIOUS,

deceased, TRUDY ANN HALL vs. HETTIE TAYLOR ("action"), and my

business address is 444 South Eighth Street, El Centro, California

On April 12, 1984, I served the following dcecuments in the

action on the counsel of record for Appellant, Trudy Ann Hall:
' (1) MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM, with APPENDICES, said service
having been made by placing true and correct copies of said

documents, and each of them, enclosed in a sealed envelope with

postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at El
Centro, California, addressed as follows:

LLOYD EDWARD TOOKS

2414 Kathleen Place

San Diego, California 92105

I certify and declare under penalty of perjury that the fore-

going is true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

Executed on April 12, 1984, at El Centro, California.

YY ee PY
ona no &

19|

& b&b er 5S ow om a oa ae aD Pe

RECEIVED

NO. 83-6147 APR 13 884
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1983
ESTATE OF
WILLIS CORNELIOUS, )
)
| Deceased. )
|
TRUDY ANN HALL, ;
| Appellant,
v. )
)
HETTIE TAYLOR,
: Respondent.
APPENDICES

CLIFFORD C. CALDWELL
PINNEY & CALDWELL, APC

444 South Eighth Street

P. 0. Box 71

El Centro, California 92244
Telephone: (619) 352-7800

Attorneys for Appellee

Law OFFICES

PINNEY 8 CALDWELL

& PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
a ' ”
CHARLES A. OimmEY. oF SOuTH CIGHTs STREET

CurrrOoRo CC. CAL OWEN ?. © BOK 710
MICHAEL A. RALSTON EL CENTRO. CALIFORNIA 92244 poe Cane

(6:9) 382-7800

June 30, 1983

SUPREME COuRT
FILED
Clerk of the Supreme Court
State of California JUL 1 - 1983
3580 Wilshire Blvd., Room 213 LAURENCE P. Gi
Los Angeles, CA 90010 Om
Re: L.A. 31631 - Estate of Cornelious Demet

To the Honorable Rose E. Bird, Chief Justice,
and to the Honorable Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the State of California:

The court has requested counsel to address the follow-
ing issues in this case while assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Section 621 of the Evidence Code violates due
process:

Issues

1. Is the Appellant nevertheless barred from qualify-
ing for letters of administration because of the provisions
of subdivisions (a) and (d) of Section 255 and subdivision
(b) (1) of Section 422 of the Probate Code?

ae Is the Appellant nevertheless barred from qualify-
ing for letters of administration because she did not file
an action “within a reasonable time after obtaining know-
ledge of relevant facts", as required by subdivision (a) (2)
of Section 7006 of the Civil Code?

he Appellant's Failure to Quality For Letters Pur-
suant to Probate C $§ a), an

In order to gualify for priority of right to
letters, the Appellant must be entitled to succeed to all or
part of the Estate of Willis Cornelious pursuant to sub-

APPENDIX ‘A’
A-\

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Two.

division (b)(1) of Section 422 of the Probate Code (see
Exhibit “A" attached). In order to succeed to the Estate of
Willis Cornelious, the Appellant must in turn establish her
rights of succession pursuant to Probate Code Section 255,
which defines the necessary “parent-child” relationship that
is required for purposes of succession.

1. Section 255 yeas tee that for Purposes of Succes-
sion a Parent an tionship which is not presumed
must be established prior to the death of the Secelent.
Kppeliant, Trudy Ann Hall, is barred from inheriting in
Willis Cornelious's estate by Probate Code, Section 255
which provides in pertinent part:

"(a) The rights of succession by a child, as set
forth in this division, are dependent upon the
existence, prior to the death of the decedent, of
@ parent call child relationship between such child
and the decedent.”

*"(d) For purposes of this division, a parent and
child relationship exists where such relationship
is (1) presumed and not rebutted, pursuant to, or
(2) established pursuant to, Part (commencing
with Section 7000) 6f Division 4 of the Civil
Code." (emphasis added)

In order to understand Probate Code Section 255,
it is necessary to read said provision in conjunction with
Civil Code Section 7004 (see Exhibit "B" and °C* attached).
Read together, these provisions define when the “parent and
child" relationship exists.

A-%@

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Three. gi

The “parent-child” relationship exists where such
relationship is presumed and not rebutted or where such
relationship is established pursuant to Civil Code Section
7004. The Appellant must prove either the presumption of a
"parent-child" relationship prior to the death of the dece-
dent (not our case) or establish the “parent-child” rela-
tionship in a court proceeding prior to the death of the
decedent (not our case).

Presumption of Parent-Child Relationship

Under the provisions of Section 7004, David Fuller (not
the decedent) is Trudy Ann Hall's presumed father, because
*he and the child's natural mother are ...... married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage..."
Civil Code Section 7004(a) (1).

Conflicting Presumptions Under Section 7004

The best Appellant could hope to argue is that somehow
the decedent “received the Appellant into his home and
openly held out the Appellant as his natural child". Civil
Code Section 7004(a) (4). This would create a conflict in
the presumptions of Section 7004(a)(1) and 7004(a) (4).
However this is of no help to the Appellant, since Section
7004(b) provides in part:

"(b) .... If two or more presumptions arise under
this section which conflict with each other, the
presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic
controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court
decree establishing paternity of the child by
another man."

Clearly the presumption of paternity based on marriage

of the parties and the birth during said marriage (Civil
Code §7004(a) (1) is founded on the weightier considerations

A -3

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Four.

of policy and logic and would therefore control. This is
even more obvious given the weight previously attributed to
Evidence Code §621 which section requires underlying facts
of a similar nature.

Necessity of Court Action Prior to Death

In addition, Civil Code Section 7006(a)(2) provides the
method in which one can determine the non-existence of the
father and children relationship presumed under Civil Code
$7004(a)(1). It is accomplished only by bringing a action
to rebut the presumption. Appellant has not done this.
Section 7006(a)(2) states in pertinent part:

"After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity
of the child by another man may be determined in
the same action, if he has been made a party."

It is clear that David Fuller is the Appellant's pre-
sumed father as established by Civil Code §7004(a) (1), and
the only way the parent-child relationship between Appellant
and the decedent, Willis Cornelious, could come into exist-
ence would be through its establishment in a court action
pursuant to Civil Code §7006(a)(2) (see Exhibit "D" attached).

Since no court action was brought to establish non-
paternity or paternity prior to the death of Willis Cornelious,
the Appellant, Trudy Ann Hall, is barred by Probate Code
Section 255 from relying on a court declaration of paternity
after Willis Cornelious's death to make any claim as his
heir.

Probate Code Section 255 clearly provides that a

child's right to inherit from a parent depends on the exis-
tence of the parent-child relationship prior to the death of

n=

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Five.

the decedent, and that such a relationship "exists" where
such relationship is presumed (not the case here) or is
established in a court proceeding under the Uniform Parent-
age Act (Civil Code §7000 et seg.).

In other words, since paternity was not established by
@ court action prior to the death of Willis Cornelious, a
parent-child relationship (as defined in PC §255) did not
exist prior to his death, and the Appellant has no right of
succession as the purported child of the decedent. This
view is supported in 7 Pacific L. J. 416, Selected 1975
California Legislation, which states:

"For purposes of succession under this Section
($255), the existence of a parent and child rela-
tionship must have been established prior to the
death of the decedent....*

Legislative History of Probate Code Section 255

The meaning of Section 255 and its qualifying language
that the parent-child relationship must exist "prior to the
Geath of the decedent" is clear on the face of the statute.

The phrase “prior to the death of the decedent” was not
simply an oversight. The original law as it was proposed
did not require the establishment of the parent-child rela-
tionship prior to the decedent's death. (See &.B. 347, as
introduced February 4, 1975, which is attached hereto in
pertinent part as Exhibit "E"). The bill was subsequently
amended in conference on September 12, 1975, to add the
phrase “prior to the death of the decedent". (See &.B. 347,
as amended on September 12, 1975, which is attached hereto
in pertinent part as Exhibit "F").

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Six.

The Enrolled Bill Memorandum explaining the effect of
&.B. 347 and subsequently sent to the governor further
confirms that Section 255 was designed to bar heirship
claims where the parent-child relationship was not estab-
lished prior to death. The memorandum, dated October 1,
1975, and attached hereto as Exhibit "G", states as follows:

"The bill would grant fathers and children who have
an established parent and child relationship
(prior to death) full reciprocal inheritance
rights without regard to marital status of the
father and mother."

It is obvious that the language “prior to the death of
the decedent" was added for the specific purpose of prevent-
ing heirship claims such as is raised in this case. There-
fore, pursuant to Probate Code Section 255(d), a parent-
child relationship "exists" only when it is presumed or
established by court action “prior to the death of the
decedent” as provided in the Uniform Parentage Act (Civil
Code Sections 7000, et seq.). Since there are no cases on
point interpreting Pr e Code Section 255, we must look to
the clear language of the statute and the clear legislative
intent behind its enactment as has been previously discussed.

B. llant's Failure to lify for Letters Pur-
suant to Civ ection E

Appellant is further barred by Civil Code Section
7006(a) (2) from attempting to establish her heirship in
order to qualify for letters in this case.

As previously mentioned, David Puller is the legally
presumed father of Appellant, Trudy Ann Hall, under Civil
Code Section 7004(a) (1), because at the time of Appellant's
birth, he was married to Arzina Fuller, Appellant's mother.

fi -&

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Seven.

In order to have Willis Cornelious adjudicated her
father for purposes of inheritance pursuant to Probate Code
§255, Trudy Ann Hall would have to comply with Civil Code
Section 7006(a) (2), which provides that a child or the
child's natural mother may bring an action:

"(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence
of the father and child relationship presumed
under paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subdivision (a)
of Section 7004 onl pi the action is broaget
within a reason e time after obtainin owled
of relevant facts. After the presumption has i=
rebutted, peternity of the child by another man

may be determined in the same action, if he has
been made a party. (emphasis added).

llant’s Failure to Bring an Action Within a Reasonable
ares

Before Appellant could have the decedent, Willis
Cornelious, declared to be her father for purposes of
Probate Code Section 255, or for any other purpose, she must
first bring an action to declare that no father-child rela-
tionship exists between herself and David Fuller, her pre-
sumed father. A petition for letters of administration in
the Estate of Willis Corneliaus does not constitute such an
action. However, even if it were such an action, it would
be barred in this case because it was not “brought within a
reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant
facts". Civil Code Section 7006(a) (2).

Arzina Puller, Appellant's mother, testified at trial
that she told Trudy Ann Hall when she was fifteen (15) years
old that Willis Cornelious was her father, and that Trudy
Ann Hall's relationship and association with the decedent,
Willis Cornelious, allegedly began at approximately the same

A-7

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Eight.

time. (Testimony of Arzina Fuller at page 4, lines 3-10, of
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, and the trial Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law on page 45 of the
Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, lines 1-4).

At the time Trudy Ann Hall filed for letters of admin-
istration in this matter, she was twenty-seven (27) years
old. (Reporter's Transcript 56) Her mother, Arzina Fuller,
could have brought an action twenty-seven (27) years prior
to that to declare the non-existence of a father-child
relationship between Trudy Ann Hall and Navid Puller and to
establish such a relationship between Trudy Ann Hall and the
decedent, Willis Cornelious. Trudy Ann Hall could have
brought such an action at any time after she reached age
eighteen (18), which event occurred more than nine and one-
half (9 1/2) years prior to the filing of her petition for
letters in this case.

Instead, Arzina Puller and Trudy Ann Hall waited until
after the death of Willis Cornelious to bring this action,
when the decedent would be unavailable to admit or deny
paternity. David Fuller, the presumed father, has died and
is also unavailable to co or deny paternity. When the
parties have knowledge of the relevant facts, as in this
case, it is certainly unreasonable to allow them to wait
twenty-seven (27) years, or even nine (9) years, to bring
such an action.

The delay in this situation cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be called reasonable. To allow an action to
declare the non-existence of a parent-child relationship in
order to establish the existence of another such relation-
ship at this late date, when the alleged relevant facts have
been known all along, and after all other relevant witnesses
have died, would only present enormous problems of proof
that could easily have been avoided by a more timely action.
There are no extraordinary circumstances which would justify

the long delay involved in this case.

A-F

Clerk of the Supreme Court
June 30, 1983
Page Nine.

Legislative Intent >)

An idea as to what the legislature considers a "reason-
able time" to bring an action pursuant to Civil Code Section
7006(a)(2), is provided by a Digest of the Senate Committee
On Judiciary on SB 347. The bill originally set forth a
five (5) year statute of limitations for such actions. (See
Exhibit "H" attached) While the legislature chose not to
enact a hard and fast time period, this certainly indicates
time period they originally had in mind. There are no
extraordinary circumstances in this case which would justify
the delays involved.

Conclusion

Probate Code Section 255 bars Appellant, Trudy Ann
Hall from establishing her right to letters of administra-
tion herein, in that she is unable to establish the neces-
sary existence of a parent-child relationship between her
and the decedent prior to the death of the decedent.

Further, Civil Code Section 7006(a)(2) constitutes a
second bar to Appellant's action herein. Appellant did
not bring an action to declare the non-existence of a father-
child relationship between herself and David Puller, her
presumed father, within a reasonable time after obtaining
knowledge of relevant facts. It would be unreasonable to
allow the Appellant to bring such an action at this late
date.

Thus, Appellant is precluded from establishing her
right to letters of administration by hoth Probate Code
Section 255 and Civil Code Section 7006(a)(2), and the
decision of the lower courts in favor of the respondent,
Hettie Taylor, should be affirmed.

Dated: June 30, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,

PINNEY & CALDWELL
A Professional Corporation

By: C ed CALDWELL

“CLIFFORD C. CALDWELL
Attorneys for Respondent

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
C.C Pe a an .

I, the undersigned, say: I am over the age of 18
years, and I am employed in the County of Imperial, Cali-
fornia, in which county the withinmentioned mailing occur-
red. I am not a party to the subject action. My business
is 444 South Eighth Street, El Ce:.ro, California 92243. I
served the Letter Brief, of which a true and correct copy of
the document filed in the action is affixed, by placing a
copy thereof in a separate envelope for each addressee named

hereafter, addressed to each such addressee respectively as

follows:
Lloyd Tooks Court of Appeal
2414 Kathleen Place Fourth Appellate District
San Diego, CA 92105 6010 State Building
1350 Front Street
Clerk of Superior Court San Diego, CA 92101

Imperial County

939 Main Street

El Centro, CA 92243

Each envelope was then serled with the postage thereon
fully prepaid, and deposited in the United States mail by me
at San Diego, California, on June 30, 1983.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.

Executed this 30th day of June, 1983, at El Centro,
California.

C. C. CALDWELL

right te letters: Steeding of relatives os

.
(a) Administration of the estate of a pervon dymg imtesistc most be granted
to one or more of the following perscas, who are entitled to letters im the

@) The relative is a parent,
Gecadent and either takes under of, or is entitled to succeed to all or

Cal Der 36 Decetenes’ Eocnees $9 79, 158, 198, TT FG TS FMR BR OSL, BR, OT, RR, PR De Be,
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1782%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.